Abstract
I begin the Essay with a bit of comparative history. In Part I, I describe the death and burial of the Sixth Amendment no-contact rule espoused by Jimmy Hoffa. In Part II, I contrast the birth and expansion of an extra-constitutional no-contact rule under Model Rule 4.2 and the McDade Amendment. I begin with these contrasting histories because I believe they illustrate two critical points about the no-contact rule in criminal investigations. First, despite its place in codes of ethics, the no-contact rule in criminal investigations has little to do with ethics. Instead, today's debate over Rule 4.2 is simply the latest chapter in a debate over what is, and what is not, a fair tactic of criminal investigation - a debate that began even before Hoffa's case. Second, this comparative history illustrates that, when it comes to shielding suspects from direct contacts with investigators, we treat whitecollar suspects much more favorably than others, and we treat corporations more favorably than anyone. And that comparison leads to the central questions of Part III: Why should we treat white-collar suspects so differently? And, when we apply a broad no-contact rule to corporations, whose interests are we really protecting?
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2002
Recommended Citation
John G. Douglass, Jimmy Hoffa's Revenge: White-Collar Rights Under the McDade Amendment, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 123 (2002).