Raising the price of talk: An experimental analysis of transparent leadership
DOI
10.1016/j.jebo.2014.05.003
Abstract
Does transparent leadership promote cooperative groups? We address this issue using a public goods experiment with exogenously selected leaders who are able to send non-binding contribution suggestions to the group. To investigate the effect of transparency in this setting we vary the ease with which a leader's actions are known by the group. We find leaders’ suggestions encourage cooperation in all treatments, but that both leaders and their group members are more likely to follow leaders’ recommendations when institutions are transparent so that non-leaders can easily see what the leader does. Consequently, transparency leads to significantly more cooperation, higher group earnings and reduced variation in contributions among group members.
Document Type
Restricted Article: Campus only access
Publication Date
9-2014
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2014, Elsevier B.V.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.05.003
The definitive version is available at: https://www-sciencedirect-com.newman.richmond.edu/science/article/pii/S0167268114001449
Recommended Citation
Daniel Houser, David M. Levy, Kail Padgitt, Sandra J. Peart, Erte Xiao, "Raising the price of talk: An experimental analysis of transparent leadership", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 105, 2014, Pages 208-218. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.05.003
