Date of Award
12-2025
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Arts
First Advisor
Dr. Nancy Schauber
Abstract
The unwilling addict agent archetype–who wholeheartedly resolves to abstain from taking a drug but takes it regardless–is important to moral responsibility theorists for many reasons, but two in particular stand head-and-shoulders above the rest. The first is the frequency with which the archetype must be reckoned with through our everyday practices of moral assessment. It is not an idle thought experiment, pushing nothing but the theoretical limits of a particular theory. It is a near-ubiquitous presence in real, practical moral assessment. The second reason is a consequence of the first. Because we deal with the archetype frequently, we morally assess agents that fit the archetype frequently: And, in our everyday practice, we succeed in doing so. Our frequent moral assessments are largely made with no great difficulty. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that our assessments of unwilling addicts don’t involve much critical thought at all.
The most common characterization is something like the following:
- There is an agent, call him A.
- A has a powerful first-order desire to take a drug.
- A also has a higher-order evaluative standpoint that says, “I have decisive reasons not to take the drug. I don’t want my desire to take the drug to be effective in moving me to action. I judge it best that I abstain from taking the drug.”
- Despite this standpoint, A repeatedly takes the drug when the desire arises.
Theorists have argued what our moral reaction to the UA ought to be, but there is a general consensus that our reaction to the UA should be different and less harsh than our reaction to the willing addict. Whether or not the UA is fully, partially, or not at all responsible for his action, our moral appraisal is that he deserves less blame – he is ‘less bad’ – than the wholehearted, willing addict. This is, I take it, the intuition that makes responsibility theories that ground moral responsibility in an agent’s evaluative activity appealing.
Recommended Citation
Kissam, Henry, "Losing Control: Evaluative Access and the Limits of Attributability In Angela Smith’s Theory of Moral Responsibility" (2025). Honors Theses. 1877.
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses/1877