The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.008
Abstract
We examine how repeated interaction can facilitate coordinated turn-taking in a two-player infinitely repeated Volunteer's Dilemma. We conjecture that repetition creates an environment for players to coordinate on the Pareto efficient, but asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the stage game by taking turns volunteering. We consider three cost treatments: both players have the same cost; one player has a higher cost and this cost assignment is constant; one player has a higher cost and this cost assignment is random. We find that turn-taking is the dominant play when costs are symmetric. When costs are asymmetric, the low-cost player is more likely to volunteer. However, contrary to predictions, asymmetric randomly allocated costs do not perfectly coordinate turn-taking. When costs are asymmetric and constant over time, behavior is markedly heterogeneous.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-2023
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2024 Elsevier B.V.
Recommended Citation
Kloosterman, A., & Mago, S. D. (2023). The infinitely repeated volunteer’s dilemma: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 142 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.008