DOI
10.1007/s11406-023-00667-4
Abstract
Each person has a special relation to his or her own well-being. This rough thought, which can be sharpened in different ways, is supposed to substantially count against objectivist theories on which one can intrinsically benefit from, or be harmed by, factors that are independent of one’s desires, beliefs, and other attitudes. It is often claimed, contra objectivism, that one cannot be _alienated_ from one’s own interests, or that improvements in a person’s well-being must _resonate_ with that person. However, I argue that every theory of well-being must allow that we can be alienated from our own well-being, and that sophisticated objectivists can accept and make use of a resonance constraint against their opponents.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
8-4-2023
Publisher Statement
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Recommended Citation
Alwood, A. (2023). Alienation, resonance, and experience in theories of well-being. Philosophia, 51(4). 10.1007/s11406-023-00667-4