DOI
10.1080/21550085.2023.2282915
Abstract
I contend that to be politically feasible a global climate treaty must satisfy the International Paretian principle (IP). I begin by defending IP as a principle of instrumental rationality that reflects the fact of extremely limited altruism vis-à-vis foreigners. I then address two objections to my thesis. One holds that an IP treaty is either economically infeasible or, contrary to its proponents’ claim, does not require side payments from poor states to rich ones. The other holds poor states will reject any climate treaty that requires such side payments because it ignores or exacerbates their unjust treatment by rich states.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-15-2023
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2024 Informa UK Limited
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Recommended Citation
Lefkowitz, D. ‘Political Feasibility and a Global Climate Treaty,” Ethics, Policy, and Environment (2023): https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2023.2282915.