Separation of powers doctrine will have implications for any budget regime which contemplates explicit power sharing. This Article examines the possible separation of power pitfalls which threaten to undermine the emergence of a relatively healthy new budget regime and the creative mechanisms necessary to make that regime work. The Constitution does not provide many explicit instructions regarding the federal budgeting process. Thus, whether a particular budget arrangement is a good one requires a largely political analysis. Whether a particular budget arrangement is constitutional must be answered by the Supreme Court. On what basis the Court should make such a decision, the likelihood that the decision will have an impact on future budget arrangements, and whether the Court's vision of the Constitution will unduly influence budget reform manifested as power sharing are the key concerns of this short Article.
Henry L. Chambers Jr. & Dennis E. Logue, Jr., Separation of Powers and the 1995-1996 Budget Impasse, 16 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 51 (1996).