Abstract
This Note discusses the interpretation of the opposition clause within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the context of Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee. In general, the opposition clause protects an employee from retaliation by his employer if he opposes his employer's illegal conduct. Part II summarizes the facts and the holding of Crawford. Part III describes Title VII discrimination in general and antiretaliation in particular. Part IV discusses the United States Supreme Court's rationale in Crawford, and Part V questions the interpretation of the opposition clause. Finally, Part VI agrees with the result in Crawford, but disagrees with the extension of the opposition clause.
Recommended Citation
Ryan Nevin,
Title VII Antiretaliation: The United States Supreme Court's Decision in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville &(and) Davidson County, Tennessee on the Scope of the Opposition Clause,
13
Rich. J.L. & Pub. Int.
291
(2010).
Available at:
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolpi/vol13/iss2/5