Intuitions, Biases, and Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium
DOI
10.1111/meta.12454
Abstract
It seems that intuitions are indispensable in philosophical theorizing. Yet, there is evidence that our intuitions are heavily influenced by biases. This generates a puzzle: we must use our intuitions, but we seemingly cannot fully trust those very intuitions. This paper develops a methodology for philosophical theorizing that attempts to avoid this puzzle. Specifically, it develops and defends a methodology it calls Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium. It argues that this method allows us to use intuitions, while also providing a mechanism to check the influence of bias on our intuitions. In section 1, it defends the claim that intuitions are indispensable in philosophical theorizing. In section 2, it outlines recent arguments against the reliability of intuitions. In section 3, it explains and defends its account of Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
9-29-2020
Publisher Statement
© 2020 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Recommended Citation
Director, S. (2020), Intuitions, Biases, and Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium. Metaphilosophy, 51: 674-684. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12454
