DOI
10.1007/s10790-020-09735-4
Abstract
Peter Singer famously argues that speciesism, like racism and sexism, is based on a prejudice. As Singer argues, since we reject racism and sexism, we must also reject speciesism. Since Singer articulated this line of reasoning, it has become a wide- spread argument against speciesism. Shelly Kagan has recently critiqued this argument, claiming that one can endorse speciesism without doing so on the basis of a prejudice. In this paper, I defend Kagan’s conclusion (that one can endorse speciesism without being prejudiced). However, many philosophers have found Kagan’s argument deeply unsatisfactory; so, I advance an alternative argument, different from Kagan’s, in support of his conclusion. My argument runs as follows: I argue that, if there is epistemic peer disagreement about a view, then the parties to this disagreement cannot reasonably label each other as prejudiced in their beliefs about this view. Then, I argue that there is epistemic peer disagreement about the truth of speciesism, from which it follows that the parties to this disagreement cannot reasonably label each other as prejudiced. Thus, one can affirm speciesism without being prejudiced. If I am correct that one can affirm speciesism without being prejudiced, then Singer’s argument (that if one rejects racism, one must reject speciesism) is unsound.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
3-2021
Publisher Statement
© Springer Nature B.V.
The Journal of Value Inquiry is an international, peer-reviewed, philosophical quarterly devoted to the stimulation and communication of research in value studies. The journal explores the nature, origin, experiences and scope of value, as well as problems of value in such fields as culture, aesthetics, religion, social and legal theory or practice, ethics, education, and methodology, technology and the sciences. F
Recommended Citation
Samuel, Director. 2021. "Speciesism, Prejudice, and Epistemic Peer Disagreement." Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (1) (03): 1-20. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-020-09735-4.
