DOI
10.1163/17455243-4681007
Abstract
This paper evaluates an argument for immigration restrictions that appeals to the costs that immigration imposes on the citizens of a recipient state. According to this argument, citizens have associative duties to protect each other’s interests, immigration can damage these interests in certain cases, and the associative duties between compatriots justify immigration restrictions in these cases. Call this: the partiality argument for immigration restrictions. I argue that the partiality argument is unsound. Immigration restrictions violate negative duties to refrain from interfering with people’s liberties and these duties silence compatriots’ associative duties to one another. Furthermore, I argue that compatriots lack associative duties to one another in virtue of the fact that the relationships between compatriots reliably cause injustice to outsiders.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-1-2013
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2013, BRILL.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681007
The definitive version is available at: https://brill.com/view/journals/jmp/10/6/article-p697_1.xml
Recommended Citation
Hidalgo, J. (2013). Associative Duties and Immigration. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 10(6), 697-722. https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681007
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