DOI
10.1007/s10790-020-09736-3
Abstract
Few philosophers have systematically examined what Buddhist commitments imply for metaethics. In this paper, I explore the status of normative reasons in Buddhist philosophy. I argue that Buddhist commitments entail an error theory about normative reasons. But I also make the case that this is a defensible position. I show that the Buddhist argument for error theory is plausible and that Buddhist error theory can overcome key objections, such as the objections that Buddhist error theory is incoherent, self-defeating, unbelievable, and incompatible with prominent schools of Buddhist philosophy. Furthermore, I argue that Buddhist error theorists can accommodate Buddhist ethical commitments if they adopt fictionalism about normative reasons.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2-3-2020
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2020, Springer Nature.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-020-09736-3
The definitive version is available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-020-09736-3
Recommended Citation
Hidalgo, J. Buddhist Error Theory. J Value Inquiry 55, 21–40 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-020-09736-3
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Buddhist Studies Commons, Ethics in Religion Commons, Leadership Studies Commons, Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons
