DOI
10.1016/j.jebo.2010.02.018
Abstract
Previous research offers compelling evidence that leaders suffice to effect efficiency enhancements on cooperation, yet the source of this effect remains unclear. To investigate whether leadership effects can be attributed exclusively to the common information that leaders provide to a group, irrespective of the source of that information, we design a public goods game in which non-binding contribution suggestions originate with either a human or computer leader. We find that group members’ decisions are significantly influenced by human leaders’ non-binding contribution suggestions, both when the leader is elected as well as when the leader is randomly chosen. A leader’s suggestion becomes an upper bound for group member’s contributions. Identical suggestions do not impact the group members’ decisions when they originate with a computer, thus supporting to the view that information provided by human leaders is uniquely able to establish welfare-enhancing norms.
Document Type
Restricted Article: Campus only access
Publication Date
1-2011
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2010, Elsevier.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.02.018
The definitive version is available at:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268110001769
Recommended Citation
David M. Levy, Kail Padgitt, Sandra J. Peart, Daniel Houser, Erte Xiao, Leadership, cheap talk and really cheap talk, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 77, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 40-52, ISSN 0167-2681, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2010.02.018
