DOI
10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00310.x
Abstract
Experimental economists frequently invoke Adam Smith's notion of sympathy, and experimental treatments typically examine sympathy in situations where two groups are involved. We explore additional implications of sympathy suggested by the work of later classical economists. We link the notion of sympathy to their majoritarian welfare analysis. Since sympathy provides a source of moral obligation, classical economists held that agents in democratic politics will refrain from unjust acts. We also consider how sympathetic agents may effect reforms that involve more than two parties, in which the benefits from the action accrue to someone who is not part of the 'exchange.'
Document Type
Restricted Article: Campus only access
Publication Date
8-2005
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2005, Wiley.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00310.x
The definitive version is available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00310.x
Recommended Citation
Peart, S.J. and Levy, D.M. (2005), A discipline without sympathy: the happiness of the majority and its demise. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 38: 937-954. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0008-4085.2005.00310.x
