Abstract
CT. This paper examines the transition from cardinal to ordinal utility. We begin with the egalitarian utilitarianism of J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer, in which everyone was supposed to count as one. That is their phrase to explain how the happiness of existing people was to be maximized. We compare Spencer's goal with Darwin's goal of the "general good," in which the number of perfect people was to be maximized. Spencer's goal was egalitarian, while Darwin's entailed biological perfection or hierarchy. We consider Edgeworth's hedonic calculus, in which the notion of hierarchy enters economics. For Edgeworth, agents have differential capacities for happiness. Throughout, we consider normative aspects of Darwin's work, in particular Darwin's challenge to the early utilitarianism of Mill and Spencer. We suggest that the Paretian principle returns utilitarianism to its egalitarian roots.
Document Type
Restricted Article: Campus only access
Publication Date
7-2005
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2005, Wiley.
The definitive version is available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3488162
Recommended Citation
Peart, Sandra J., and David M. Levy. “From Cardinal to Ordinal Utility Theory: Darwin and Differential Capacity for Happiness.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 64, no. 3, 2005, pp. 851–79. JSTOR, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3488162
