DOI
10.1017/S0266267104000239
Abstract
David Hume's sympathetic principle applies to physical equals. In his account, we sympathize with those like us. By contrast, Adam Smith's sympathetic principle induces equality. We consider Hume's “other rational species” problem to see whether Smith's wider sympathetic principle would alter Hume's conclusion that “superior” beings will enslave “inferior” beings. We show that Smith introduces the notion of “generosity,” which functions as if it were Hume's justice even when there is no possibility of contract.
Document Type
Restricted Article: Campus only access
Publication Date
11-16-2004
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2005, Cambridge University Press.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267104000239
The definitive version is available at:
Recommended Citation
LEVY, D. M., & PEART, S. J. (2004). SYMPATHY AND APPROBATION IN HUME AND SMITH: A SOLUTION TO THE OTHER RATIONAL SPECIES PROBLEM. Economics and Philosophy, 20(2), 331–349. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267104000239
