DOI
10.2307/136143
Abstract
This paper offers an explanation for why the use of statistical procedures was resisted in economics until late in the nineteenth century. Mill's insistence that the economist, in application, turn attention to 'disturbing causes' and treat each observed outcome as a case study implied that combining observations or using 'wide averages' was inappropriate. By contrast, Jevons argued that the social scientist might reduce causal relationships to the causes of interest and (quantitatively insignificant) 'nokious errors.' His method thus de- emphasized the disturbing causes which were a key to classical methodology; in application as well as in theory Jevons urged the social scientists to abstract from disturbing causes.
Document Type
Restricted Article: Campus only access
Publication Date
11-1995
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 1995, JSTOR.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/136143
The definitive version is available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/136143
Recommended Citation
Peart, Sandra J. “‘Disturbing Causes,’ ‘Noxious Errors,’ and the Theory-Practice Distinction in the Economics of J.S. Mill and W.S. Jevons.” The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue Canadienne d’Economique, vol. 28, no. 4b, 1995, pp. 1194–211. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/136143.
