Parfitian or Buddhist Reductionism? Revisiting a Debate about Personal Identity.
DOI
10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7
Abstract
Derek Parfit influentially defends reductionism about persons, the view that a person’s existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body and the occurrence of a series of physical and mental events. Yet some critics, particularly Mark Johnston, have raised powerful objections to Parfit’s reductionism. In this paper, I defend reductionism against Johnston. In particular, I defend a radical form of reductionism that Buddhist philosophers developed. Buddhist reductionism can justify key features of Parfit’s position, such as the claims that personal identity is not what matters and can also be indeterminate. Furthermore, Buddhist reductionism can avoid Johnston’s objections to Parfit’s reductionism. I conclude that reductionists have good reasons to favor Buddhist reductionism over Parfit’s version.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
5-14-2024
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2024, Springer.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7
The definitive version is available at:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7#Abs1
Recommended Citation
Hidalgo, J. Parfitian or Buddhist reductionism? Revisiting a debate about personal identity. AJPH 3, 33 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00166-7
