DOI
10.4337/lath.2014.02.03
Abstract
This article defends the claim that followers are justified in using what would be considered private behavior to assess a leader's fitness. In defense of this claim, I make a liberal, autonomy-based argument. The argument is liberal in that it does not appeal to the intrinsic wrongness of the behavior in question. Rather, it appeals to the fact that leaders have voluntarily taken on special obligations to followers to behave in ways that promote, rather than detract from, the causes to which they are collectively committed. To make this argument, I consider whether Mill's analysis in On Liberty could be applied in leadership contexts to derive some special privacy protection for leaders, and I conclude that such an application ultimately fails. I conclude that judging the private behavior of our leaders does not inappropriately threaten the value of autonomy when their behavior would interfere with discharging these obligations. The special obligations of leaders extend, then, even into their private lives.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
9-2014
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2014, ElgarOnline.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.4337/lath.2014.02.03
The definitive version is available at: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/journals/lath/2-2/lath.2014.02.03.xml
Recommended Citation
Price, T. L. (2014). Judgmental privacy and the special obligations of leadership. Leadership and the Humanities, 2(2), 120-129. Retrieved Jan 18, 2025, from https://doi.org/10.4337/lath.2014.02.03