This article develops a dilemma for Buddhist Reductionism that centers on the nature of normative reasons. This dilemma suggests that Buddhist Reductionism lacks the resources to make sense of normative reasons and, furthermore, that this failure may cast doubt on the plausibility of Buddhist Reductionism as a whole...Can Buddhist philosophy make sense of reasons? In this article, I have examined whether one important Buddhist view—Buddhist Reductionism— has the resources to justify the existence of reasons. My diagnosis is pessimistic. I have argued that Buddhist Reductionism lacks the resources to make sense of reasons and, furthermore, that this failure casts doubt on the plausibility of Buddhist Reductionism as a whole. If my argument here is correct, then Buddhist Reductionists face a stark choice. They must either endorse skepticism about normative reasons or reject key Buddhist commit- ments. Neither option is appealing. If nothing else, this conclusion suggests that Buddhist philosophers have more work to do in clarifying how reasons fit into their ontologies.
Copyright © 2020, Philosophy East and West
Hidalgo, Javier. "A Dilemma for Buddhist Reductionism." Philosophy East and West, vol. 70 no. 4, 2020, p. 977-998. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/pew.2020.0072.