Abstract

In the last decade, just as Title VII jury trials have become common, the Supreme Court has given judges more latitude to dispose of both weak and fairly strong disparate treatment cases through summary adjudication, even when Title VII liability is plausible pursuant to the McDonnell Douglas test. 11 This article explains how the Court's disparate treatment jurisprudence results in the abandonment of the summary adjudication principle that weak but winnable cases should be tried before a jury and suggests that the Court correct its mistake. Part I of this article discusses the Supreme Court's summary adjudication doctrine. Part II discusses the Court's Title VII disparate treatment jurisprudence. Part III reviews how summary adjudication principles should be applied in disparate treatment cases. Part IV suggests how the Court should redefine its disparate treatment jurisprudence to make it consistent with summary adjudication principles.

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2005

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