In his recent paper, “What a Real Argument is,” Ben Hamby attempts to provide an adequate theoretical account of “real” arguments. In this paper I present and evaluate both Hamby’s motivation for distinguishing “real” from non-“real” arguments and his articulation of the distinction. I argue that neither is adequate to ground a theoretically significant class of “real” arguments, for the articulation fails to pick out a stable proper subclass of all arguments that is simultaneously both theoretically relevant and a proper subclass of all arguments.
Copyright © 2014, Informal Logic. This article first appeared in Informal Logic: 34:1 (2014), 62-76.
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Goddu, G. C. "Why We Still Do Not Know What a “Real” Argument Is." Informal Logic 34, no. 1 (2014): 62-76.