This article argues that those unjustly displaced from a particular territory T cannot involuntarily lose their rights to reside there, or, as a consequence, their rights of return to it, even if they develop territorially grounded conceptions of the good where they now reside. The contrary position fails to accord the unjustly displaced the respect due to them in virtue of their personal autonomy. Facts commonly alleged to justify the supersession of rights of return to T only provide evidence that the unjustly displaced have abandoned their rights to reside there, or would do so if given a just opportunity to return. The rights of those now residing in T, which author argues may include those responsible for the unjust displacement, may limit the right of return but are unlikely to preclude it altogether.

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Copyright © 2015 Taylor & Francis. Article first published online: 6 June 2014.

DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2014.927117

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Lefkowitz, David. “Autonomy, Residence, and Return.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18, no. 5 (September 3, 2015): 529–546. DOI: 10.1080/13698230.2014.927117