Abstract
Liberalism and multicultural constitutionalism are on a collision course destined to become the next great battlefield in the unfolding odyssey of American constitutional law. The impending battle will define the scope and limits of liberal constitutionalism and its role as the model for democracy around the world. While turbulence between liberalism and multicultural constitutionalism occurs across a panoply of controversies, the eye of the storm focuses on one central question: Can liberalism tolerate non-liberal cultures? This article explores the hypothesis that liberalism's deep structure precludes it from explaining and justifying the toleration of non-liberal cultures. If so, this hypothesis has serious implications concerning the viability of liberal multicultural constitutionalism. Either liberalism must be radically reconceived or abandoned, or we must revise our conviction that multicultural constitutionalism is normatively desirable.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. Lipkin,
Liberalism and the Possibility of Multicultural Constitutionalism: The Distinction Between Deliberative and Dedicated Cultures,
29
U. Rich. L. Rev.
1263
(1995).
Available at:
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss5/2