Abstract
In Rhode Island v. Innis, the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the issue of what constitutes interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona. Innis is a significant decision in the criminal procedure area not only because of the workable standard for determining "interrogation" which it sets forth, but also because it signals the Burger Court's decision not to overrule Mirandaor to further disparage its effectiveness. However, Innis by no means represents a return to the Warren Court's solicitous approach to a suspect's Miranda rights. The Burger Court still has not raised Miranda's protections and strictures to the status of constitutionally mandated provisions, nor has it ceased its tacit balancing of the government's interest in using evidence against the competing interests that might be served by exclusion. Arguably, the Court still balances with a presumption in favor of the government.
Recommended Citation
Deborah L. Fletcher,
Rhode Island v. Innis: A Workable Definition of "Interrogation"?,
15
U. Rich. L. Rev.
385
(1981).
Available at:
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss2/7