Two major vehicles for redressing private racial discrimination are Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In 1968 the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., ruled that section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 18662 applied to private acts of discrimination. The plaintiff in Jones sought relief against a private real estate company under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The Court found that the substance of sections 1981 and 1982 was to be found in its predecessor, section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was intended "to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of the rights enumerated in the statute. . . ." This article will discuss the development of the latter statute and analyze its status in relation to Title VII, focusing on the problems posed by the conceptual and procedural inde- pendence of the two statutes.