DOI
10.1080/13698230.2012.740178
Abstract
According to the freedom argument for open borders, immigration restrictions are generally unjust because these restrictions infringe on important freedoms, such as freedom of association and the economic liberties. Some authors have objected to the freedom argument by claiming that potential immigrants only have rights to sufficient options to live decent or autonomous lives and, consequently, states can permissibly prevent people from immigrating when potential immigrants have adequate options. This paper shows that this objection to the freedom argument for open borders is unsound and that restrictions on international freedom of movement can be morally impermissible even when potential immigrants have adequate options.
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-8-2012
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2012, Taylor & Francis.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2012.740178
The definitive version is available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698230.2012.740178
Recommended Citation
Hidalgo, J. S. (2012). Freedom, immigration, and adequate options. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 17(2), 212–234. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2012.740178
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