There are two parts of our chapter. First, we review Adam Smith's argument that the evolution of monetary institutions is tied up in the problem of detecting deceitful metal offered in exchange. Smith points to no such comparable institution by which deceitful policy advocacy is detected and severely punished.5 Yet his recommendation for caution in the evaluation of policy advocacy points to the caution that routinely prevailed in monetary matters before public safeguards evolved to make the metallic content of the medium of exchange transparent and to preserve its quality. Second, we tum to a different sort of deceit, in the reporting of statistical evidence. We apply Smith's insights regarding counterfeit money to the case of incentives for deceit in reporting statistical results. In the production of "truth", there is no evolved institution that compares to the Mint. We summarize our recent work regarding how another institutioncompeting expert witnesses-might deal with deceitful statistical arguments.
Copyright © 2007 Elsevier Ltd. This chapter first appeared in Game Theory and Linguistic Meaning.
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Peart, Sandra J., and David M. Levy. "Counterfeiting Truth: Statistical Reporting on the Basis of Trust." In Game Theory and Linguistic Meaning, edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, 39-48. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.