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# Leadership model for Fire Battalion Chief in the 21st century

Douglas Alan Jessup

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# Leadership Model for Fire Battalion Chief in the 21st Century

By

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Master's in Human Resource Management

University of Richmond

May, 2007


Dr. Robert S. Kelley, Ph. D.

## Abstract

This research investigation seeks to identify a leadership model for Fire Battalion Chief comprised of a set of theoretical dimensions of leadership that are required of a Fire Department Battalion Chief to successfully lead their personnel over then next 10 years. This paper also examines the roots of corporatism at national and local levels and demonstrates how the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) had significant levels of influence on policy making in the United States of America. However, at a local level longstanding corporatist partnerships between unions such as FMU and local associations like CACFOA began to break down as a financial crisis arose and management took a more proactive approach. Corporatist structures at a national level, though, remained and it was not until the Labor government's second term of office that these national structures were overhauled following a White Paper and legislation. (Christiansson, 1992)

Signature Page

I certify that I have read this thesis and find that, in scope and quality, it satisfies the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts/ Master of Science.




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Leadership Model for Fire Battalion Chief in the 21st Century

By

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B.S., Bluefield College, 2001

A Thesis

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty

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In

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## Chapter 1

### Introduction

The need for professional development, especially for fire service officers, is not a new issue. At least as early as 1966, this issue drew international attention as a key component of the report from the first Wingspread Conference- Statements of National Significance to the Fire Problem in the United States. This conference convened top fire service leaders on four occasions at 10- year intervals. Each conference continued to emphasize the need for the development of effective leadership.

In the foreword to the initial report, the committee notes that all too often, “success is largely dependent upon the caliber of leadership of the individual fire chiefs, and there is no assurance that this progress will continue... when there is a change of leadership...”

Further, Statement # 9 of the report reads, “The career of the fire executive must be systematic and deliberate.” This statement goes on to point out the ineffective fire service practice of promoting personnel into higher ranks and then attempting to train or educate them. This practice of on-the-job training, rather than systematic skills building and preparation, is in direct contrast to the methodologies employed by virtually any other profession.

And what has happened in the interim?



Wingspread II – 1976; Statement 6

“A means of deliberate and systematic development of all fire service personnel through the executive level is still needed. There is an educational void near the top.”

Wingspread III – 1986; Statement 3

“Professional development in the fire service has made significant strides; but improvement is still needed.”

Wingspread IV – 1996; Statements 7 and 9

“Leadership: To move successfully into the future, the fire service needs leaders capable of developing and managing their organizations in dramatically changed environments.”

“Training and Education: Fire service managers must increase their professional standing in order to remain credible to community policy makers and the public. This professionalism should be grounded firmly in an integrated system of nationally recognized and/or certified education and training.”

Have we made progress? We certainly have. However, much remains to be accomplished. The challenge before us asks, what will be written about this issue as the result of Wingspread? The need is certain and your involvement and action is imperative. With a thoughtful professional development plan and your commitment, we can make a difference now and for the future. The first step in this process is to determine what dimensions are related to being an effective leader and what will cause your direct reports to follow you as well as to be inspired to develop themselves.

## Purpose of Study

This research investigation seeks to identify a leadership model for Fire Battalion Chief comprised of a set of theoretical dimensions of leadership that are required of a Fire Department Battalion Chief to successfully lead their personnel over the next 10 years. This leadership model for Fire Battalion Chief will help develop future Officer Development programs as well as identify needed changes in curricula offered by higher education.

## Operational Definitions

**Battalion Chief:** A middle management position responsible for the operations of a fire district. This district consists of six to seven fire stations and a complement of fifty firefighters on average. The Fire Battalion Chief responds to routine emergency calls in their districts as well as being responsible for the career development for all Fire Lieutenants and Fire Captains to report directly to them.

**Chain of Command:** The line of authority and responsibility along which orders are passed. The line of command will generally go from a higher-ranked Firefighter who gives the order, i.e. an officer, down to a lower-ranked Firefighter who is ordered to perform.

**Corporatism:** A system that embraces the idea that legislators are primarily elected to represent their interests, resulting in intensifying political market research and instant polling, along with enormous growth in the lobbying industry. Corporatism

permits only two goals: growth and profit. All other ethics and notions are subordinate, sometimes even considered malfeasance.

**Fire Brigades Union:** A British labor union formed for the improvement of management and operations in the fire service.

**Fire District:** A geographical separation of the fire service area as well as county fire stations.

**Fire Station:** Buildings where assorted fire apparatus is located and where Firefighters are assigned to work.

**Fire Captain:** A middle management position below a Battalion Chief in the Chain of Command. A Fire Captain is responsible for a fire station and the personnel assigned to this location.

**Grey Book:** A set of policies and operating guidelines used to maintain standardization in the fire service.

**Leadership Model for Fire Battalion Chief:** Theoretical dimensions needed for outstanding job performance within the framework of an individual's job.

### Leadership Essentials

**Lead by example.** A leader is "the first ship in a line." He does what he says, says what he does, acting in a way that his crew respects. He does the right thing.

Subordinates want to conform to his rules, and he provides a consistent positive example and maintains his integrity to get his people to follow a correct, ethical, and moral example. He is responsible, is accountable, takes initiative, and is understanding. The

ideal leader keeps expectations in the open and clearly defined so that goals are understood. He inspires subordinates to accomplish goals and work objectives by example with minimal verbal direction. He displays honest concern for his crew and knows a firefighter's name at his memorial service.

**Motivate others.** A leader motivates his people to want to follow him. He can get firefighters to buy into the ideas and ideals he practices through his commitment to the team and being the best he can be. A leader can rally the troops to the fire department's cause and get individuals to work together to accomplish a common task. His troops know he is there for them and with them. He inspires pride, camaraderie, and teamwork in his crews and uses these traits to be effective and efficient in his responsibilities.

**Demonstrate competence.** A leader is competent, knowledgeable, well-versed, and experienced in the areas he expects his workers to perform and thus inspires their confidence in him. He makes the best decision based on information and not on what is popular. He thinks with his brain, not his mouth. He cares about his people and brings out and develops his crew's strengths and identifies its weaknesses. He's a reliable person firefighters can count on and be proud to follow. He leads people, makes decisions, provides an example for his crew of what he wants done or expects to be done, directs and educates coworkers, and is a reliable role model for Fire Battalion Chief. (Glaser, 1967)

**Create trust.** A leader creates an atmosphere that encourages trust. He can get his people to take action and to trust and follow direction by building respect, confidence,

and competence. He shows trust in his subordinates. He can rally people behind his cause or ideal and take that trust and use it to accomplish goals and ideas.

These are the core values of leadership gathered from a random group of firefighters. Among the expected leadership qualities often repeated from firefighter to firefighter is trust, respect, knowledgeable, competence, and leading by example. As a leader, you must be consistent and have integrity in these areas if you want to be a leader firefighters will follow.

### Building Leadership

As individuals, resource managers, and members of groups who are trying to work together better, to understand the need for building fire management leadership. So do the people who work on the fire line and who depend upon leadership decisions and support. Good leadership is also vital to the many millions of taxpayers, water users, wild land-urban interface residents, and visitors to the forests, refuges, parks, and other public wild lands across the Nation. Indeed, never before has wild land fire management been so important in the national scheme. Never before have so many been aware of, or affected by, resource management decisions. Hardly a day goes by without a media report on the issues that are faced in wild land fire management.

Perhaps never before has it been seen so much interest in what is happening on public lands. In recent years, the focus on forest health, on financial and budgetary issues, and on a host of associated legislative and political concerns has drawn unprecedented congressional attention and involvement by the administration. The public is voicing their concerns at the local, regional, and national level far more effectively than ever before.

The scientific and professional journals are full of discussions about the dilemmas that are face today in wild land fire management.

More than ever, it can be seen how wild land fire management connects the various disciplines and program areas. Fire is no longer just a functional piece of what firefighters do—a backcountry concern far removed from anyone who really cares, or perhaps a summer affair for fire departments to deal with. Today, in one way or another, fire figures into everything land management agencies do. No longer can it be afforded for our fire programs, budgets, and organizations to be entities unto themselves. Fire has become the essence of much of our existence as land management agencies.

Over the past decade, the public has begun to see the consequences of failing to work with fire as an important management tool. Most of the professionals in wild land resource management believe that there's a major turning point, although it remains to be seen whether it will be permitted—or even able—to fully turn in the needed direction. Hopeful signs include a growing national emphasis on budgetary concerns and on finding ways to protect “acres at risk.” Fortunately, the principle of managing fire for resource benefits now seems to be understood and to some extent supported. Implications include closely linking fire management plans with land use plans, wilderness plans, recreation plans, watershed plans, forest health plans, and other resource management plans.

The past decade has also show limitations and vulnerability in dealing with wild land fire, a lesson that must never be forgotten. Safety must be the highest priority and a primary obligation as leaders in wild land fire management. In view of recent efforts to

reform policy, training, and oversight, and hopefully move toward a new awareness of the importance of fire safety. (Johansson, 2001)

Our desire for a science-based resource management also tests leadership. A glance at history can help understand what has and hasn't changed. To illustrate, Please refer to Gifford Pinchot, the first Chief of the USDA Forest Service, who published an article in *National Geographic* more than 100 years ago under the title “The Relation of Forests and Forest Fires” (Pinchot 1899). In his article, Pinchot regrets the “meager” contemporary understanding of “what might be called the creative action of forest fires” in establishing and maintaining wild land ecosystems. “For only through knowledge of this relation and through the insight which such knowledge brings,” he observed, “can there be gained a clear and full conception of how and why fires do harm and how best they may be prevented or extinguished.”

Pinchot's insight reflects something we are only now relearning—the need to base a sound wild land fire management policy on a thorough understanding of fire's ecological role. In his article, Pinchot provided a number of examples documented with photos from the Black Hills in South Dakota, the Priest River in Idaho, and the Olympic Peninsula in western Washington. He addressed many of the same issues the fire service still face. Despite vast advances in information and science over the past 100 years, there seem to be more questions than ever. Today, the problem is often not the science, but rather the policies, the politics, and—yes—the leadership. Albert Einstein once said, “Perfection of means and confusion of goals seems, in my opinion, to characterize our

age.” We have lots of science and the capability to do almost anything, but we are impeded by a confusion of goals.

In the past 5 years, a series of reviews and reports have pinpointed weaknesses in the organizational environment for wild land fire management, including shrinking workforces, fewer skills, and experience concentrated in fewer people. As experienced people leave, the fire-related experience and interest among the remaining employees from all agencies continues to decline. With fewer red-carded employees, agencies are having growing difficulty finding overhead and even firefighters in July or August. The line officers have less experience and interest in fire. They lack a commitment to fire and are not comfortable with, or experienced in, safety leadership. Other priorities drive a lot of their work. Moreover, they are unprepared or inadequately trained to provide effective direction that reflects the long-term integrated-stewardship view of where we are headed. Unit managers emphasize other functional programs ahead of fire. Line officers who do poorly face few adverse consequences, and those who do well enjoy few rewards. In a nutshell, leadership is not providing strong enough direction or commitment to encourage the general workforce to become trained, qualified, and available to support fire management.

Areas of weakness indicate where there should be concentrated leadership energy. In brief:

- Adequate support for fire activities
- Careful attention to safety



- A workforce that understands the connections among fire, fire-related jobs, good science, and ecosystem stewardship
- Line officers who understand their role and responsibilities, with regard to both safety and cost-effective fire programs
- Top management that holds line officers accountable
- Managers with the skills, experience, and qualifications necessary to get the job done
- Better recognition of good leaders and help for those who need it

The one consistent recommendation made in recent reviews is that the fire service should strengthen the abilities and skills of our line officers and leaders through formal training, experience, and—where necessary—direct oversight. (Klein, 1993)

## Chapter 2

### Review of Literature

Corporatism was a long-standing feature of public sector and local government industrial relations and for many industrial relations commentators the central role of trade unions in these relationships marks its presence. Corporatism is defined in terms of both structure and process. The structures reflect an industrial relations model for Fire Battalion Chief rooted in joint bodies and recognition of the role of trade unions. Process is based on agreed procedures (for example, the fire service Grey Book) and a notion of consensus rooted in a long-term joint interest. Of central importance to corporatism is the role of the state and describes how corporatists relationships are power-dependent, arguing that all parties “enjoy some measure of autonomy, although within a set of constraints”. For this develops when state intervention is constrained because of either, a lack of state power or knowledge. Both the structure and process of corporatism are clearly evident in any analysis of the employment relationship in the fire service.

In a service context the importance of structures such as Central Fire Brigades Advisory Committee (CFBAC) and Her Majesty's Fire Service Inspectorate (HMFSI) is that they were populated by what the Fire Brigades Union (FBU), senior management (interviews) and government would term “insiders” and have provided almost the sole outlets for ministerial advice on service matters. These have been bodies of compromise rather than change, offering advice in the context of the “well being of the Service” rather than model for Fire Battalion Chiefs for the radical overhaul of structures and service

provision. This was coupled with the presence of a National Joint Council (NJC) for negotiation without the disruptive annual wage round, an employer's body (Local Government Association, LGA) and a senior management body (Chief and Assistant Chief Fire Officers Association, CACFOA) who both consistently argued for increased funding rather than undertake radical service overhaul. Given these relationships it is not surprising that the report, even though it praised the overall management and quality of the service, noted that "at a wider level there is cause for concern". They proposed a statutory responsibility for fire prevention, a modification of fire cover and a review of conditions of service. It took eight years and the emergency planning impetus of 11th September to bring forth a White Paper and ensuing legislation endorsing this.

(Danielsson, 1997)

While with the election of a Conservative government corporatist relations in the public sector at the macro level quickly died. They have been identified at a meso-sectorial level built on professional alliances. However, as has argued:

Effective meso ... corporatist arrangements can be found in countries which have no corporatist arrangements at the macro level, but this does not mean that there is no relationship between the arrangements at the different levels. If structures below the macro level are to be stable and permanent, they must to some extent rely on support from the macro level.

This argument is significant here and holds the key to understanding why relations broke down in the fire service and were finally laid to rest following the second national strike of 2002-2003. To use the Grant argument, even though service meso-level

corporatism was not overtly challenged by Conservative and early Labor government policy it was not directly supported either. Its permanence hinged not only on professional and technical expertise, which government began to increasingly ignore, but also on diminishing levels of funding. As a Labor Fire Authority member stated “it's not that easy to come to agreement when its cuts what you're talking about”. The breakdown of meso-corporatist relationships was driven by the financial crisis at a local level. Although national structures and procedures of engagement remained, the attitudes and actions of participants changed as the organized interests reacted to crisis, unable to resolve conflict through the prevailing channels of compromise and consensus.

Entering the Labor period of office, meso-corporatist relations were in crisis and the FBU were only effectively involved in service strategy via resilient national corporatist structures. At a local level the union, although proactive in their campaigning, had a dwindling influence. For example, in Met Brigade the two-tier system and tripartite meetings were no longer in operation. Instead “the CFO and Fire Authority sort out Brigade strategy with one of the principle officers informing us what is going to be done and inviting discussion”. The FBU has become increasingly isolated from its former partners with the current brigade secretary highly critical of the current Labor party, particularly since the strike. “I feel let down by the response of the Labor leadership, not so much the grass roots but the leadership. I mean we're having a big debate over disaffiliation with the Labor party”. He went on to note he was a member of the Labor party and on his local executive party and general committees “but only because I have to get across the FBU position, which I had to do during the strike”. Any resemblance to

meso-corporatism viewed from the local level is gone and given this it is perhaps not surprising that national structures followed.

However, the government was not initially focused on the type of radical structural change introduced through the White Paper and later legislation. Instead the earlier O'Brien draft White Paper proposed a slower pace of change in the key area of fire cover, so why the change in strategy? Even though corporatism was effectively dead pressure still remained on government to increase financial support and although not central to the previous argument a strong early case can be made that the events of 11th September and subsequent "war on terror" brought sharply into focus the need for a well-resourced fire service. Labor was not prepared to fund a service with a strong trade union controlling interest. Instead responsibility is now being effectively moved to the regional level, where greater economies of scale are available. The implementation of local IRMPs move responsibility for co-operation and co-ordination firmly to senior brigade management and fire authorities who are now co-operating at a regional management board level, with government keeping a watchful eye on events.

Both Bain and the White Paper identified the FBU as a major obstacle to change and an efficient service, which the later acts of parliament ratified. However, if a cursory glance is taken of the evidence the conclusion is that this is not the case. The service has continually met its government targets and furthermore, death from fire, which the government has identified as a major target in the new national framework, was of considerable importance to the union with community fire safety (CFS) seen as the key. Brigades were implementing CFS, with FBU assistance, before Labor's 1997 election. A

lack of finance in this area slowed change and expectations were high that a newly elected Labor government would inject money into this area allowing brigades to begin to refocus their management of fire; the overall reality proved very different. (Lazarus, 1991)

While management has consolidated their position under Labor, the administration has proved a disaster for the FBU. At a national level meaningful input into policy has effectively ended and negotiations over terms and conditions will now not only have to be shared with other much smaller service unions but are also under the watchful eye of government. Locally the implementation of IRMPs could mean a major dismantling of the watch system of work organization, with the introduction of multi-level entry. These changes will undermine the near closed shop that the FBU have in many brigades, proving a significant challenge to their current high levels of membership. A potential outcome of this is increased local industrial unrest as watches are broken up and new arrangements introduced. The success of the new project will rely on the now strained traditional service ethos that greatly contributed to corporatist arrangements, priding itself on saving lives and caring for the community at large. It is to be seen whether these vital firefighting instincts can be instilled into new entrants or whether in fact they are needed in a new service based on prevention. A Labor government has finally dismantled the structure and process of corporatism in the fire service.

While the period of Conservative government did not fully undermine service meso-corporatism, the introduction of NPM put structures under considerable pressure

and significantly began to challenge the process of corporatism through its influence on attitudes. Driven by the politics of the new right and based on the efficiency drives of the private sector, NPM was dominated by austere financial arrangements accompanied by a business-led managerialism. Although growing pressure was brought to bear, the national corporatist framework – based on the newly formulated pay formula – proved resilient. Throughout the Conservative period this formula was defended by employers, management and the FBU as successive governments made half-hearted attempts to change or remove it. As a senior officer at Met Brigade stated: “the pay formula has taken away a lot of the need for confrontation. You don’t have that annual argument about money, with work to rules and stoppages”.

At a local level going into the 1990s while relations in local government deteriorated and other emergency services such as the ambulance service began radical restructuring facilitated by exponents of the new managerialism for example, Laurie Caple at North Umbria Ambulance – the fire service retained its structures, bargaining arrangements and corporatist attitudes. At Met Brigade meso-corporatism operated locally through a two-tier system supported by “tripartite meetings between FBU, management and the Fire Authority finance committee. Here the union had their say on brigade strategy, including budgetary matters submitting papers for discussion” (Fire Authority Labor Party member). The two-tier system operated initially at brigade level where the FBU came to an agreement with the Chief Fire Officer (CFO) over brigade strategy for the coming year, he then took these proposals to the Fire Authority “for rubber-stamping”. If agreement was not reached at brigade level “the FBU always had a

feeling that if the worst came to the worst they could appeal above the head of Brigade management to the politicians and in the past they've used that card many times". The Labor group on the Fire Authority resolved any issues at a pre-meeting "an hour before the full Fire Authority committee meeting. Discussion of the finer points of policy and disputes were undertaken here with Brigade management" (interview Fire Authority Labor Party member). (Mårtenson, 2005)

More austere financial arrangements, though, had begun to be implemented through the Audit Commission and, in a change of emphasis, HMFSI. These organizations reported on the "value for money" and cost-effectiveness of brigades with benchmarking through the output measures and performance indicators scheme, prevalent in other areas of the public sector. For the first time a growing number of brigade outputs were compared, hastening an emphasis on the devolvement of budgets within brigades. At a local level throughout the 1980s and early 1990s any funding shortfalls were ameliorated through either transferring funding from other services (in the case of shire brigades) or by "dipping" into brigade reserves (metropolitan brigades).

As the funding deficit grew, efficiency savings at a local brigade level became the attention and in common with other local authority services "cutback management and creative accounting became the order of the day"). Met Brigade downsized and decentralized in 1993 with tight control of finance at the centre. Downsizing meant the loss of 33 management posts and even though these were all FBU members the union acquiesced as local meso-corporatism was still in place. A similar picture was evident in other brigades as establishments and strengths were consistently reduced. Significantly,



attempts to streamline through the type of quality and HRM techniques identified elsewhere in the public sector were limited due to the prevailing labor process, traditionally built on FBU controlled teamwork with a multitude of semi-Taylorist procedures contained within the watch culture. Pressure, therefore, was directly applied to levels of fire cover and in turn quality of service, as around 80 per cent of central funding was dependent on prescriptive national fire cover criteria. These criteria decided the number of fire stations, appliances and ultimately the uniform establishment of brigades. They had identified that the service as a whole met fire criteria around 15 per cent more than national minimum requirements. Consecutive governments strongly argued that brigades should conform to national minimum targets in order to be cost effective for example, the Home Secretary quoted in. However, pressure was to a large extent resisted, with management and the FBU showing a strong commitment to quality of service. For example, CFO in his CACFOA presidential speech attacked measured quality stating that "minimum standards of fire cover are quickly becoming the maximum. This nonsense is fast becoming a reality with people trying to measure quality", instead ongoing efforts were made to increase funding. Delegations of employers, management and union made repeated funding requests to government but were met with a simple "no", "when we've made representations to the DOE about our funding settlement we generally meet Sir Paul Beresford and a lot of bloody good that does us" (Chair of the Fire Authority).

However, as the 1990s moved on the scope for financial tinkering, or more importantly jointly agreed financial tinkering, diminished and nationally a growing

number of local disputes occurred. Fire authorities and management began to ameliorate funding crisis through protracted negotiations over enhanced local service conditions or a lessening of service quality. By the mid-1990s the annual challenge of the growing financial deficit had replaced the challenge of the pay round. The question for meso-corporatism was how the key service interests would deal with this growing crisis. A clue comes in the following quote, "a tripartite arrangement can work perfectly well up until a certain point but if you're talking about saving money and making cuts, sides Part Company." (Creveld, 1977)

### Case Study

Project leadership is widely considered to be an important aspect of project control. While the theory of managerial control in projects is well developed, there remains the need to further develop understanding of the leadership style that complements the sophistication of contemporary control techniques and methods (Barber, 2004). Regardless of the availability of software tools, project control remains dependent on a leadership style that is outcome focused and not problem focused. Although problems will always arise and deviations from plan will occur, the need for control requires a shift away from reactive behaviors, the firefighter style, where the focus is on tackling immediate problems. A focus on outcomes depends on a proactive leader, a firelighter, who is able to explain the big picture, anticipate events and even prevent problems. The paper provides an analysis of relevant leadership literature to identify a set of leadership behaviors that can be used to develop a more proactive leadership style, the

firefighter style. A leadership model is presented that encompasses both the reactive and proactive leadership style.

### Control over chaos

An underlying belief about any project is that human Endeavour can achieve planned outcomes (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Gaddis, 1997). The Battalion Chief embarks on a project in the expectation that using a combination of resources, skilled people and appropriate methods, planned results can be achieved. Nevertheless, many projects run overtime, over-budget, or fail to achieve the expected outcomes. Unexpected events disrupt schedules and trigger consequential effects that intrude on the manager's capacity to keep the project to plan. All too likely the manager will respond to these unfolding events as they occur but this style of leadership behavior is unlikely to be successful as one crisis leads to another. The Battalion Chief becomes consumed by fighting fires. Hindsight may show that these actions were reactive and achieved only short-term fixes.

The complexity of many projects and the interconnectedness of many resource decisions as well as unforeseen events that could occur that have not been covered by even the most astute planner. Also even the best attempts at control in planning may be subject to oversights that result in crises. Diagnostic systems with their tools and software are aimed at tracking project progress and deviations as they begin to arise. A reactive leader will depend overly on these tools to focus on specific problems in an unconnected manner and will look for quick solutions. In a complex system, this leadership behavior

will trigger other unintended effects and the project leader will become preoccupied with fire fighting.

Project management has continued to benefit from innovative methods, improved skills of project members, higher quality resources, and better control over resources through technological advances. The search for such improvement is an attempt to control potentially chaotic events. In addition there is not only a need for enhancement of the technical and managerial skills of the project leader, but also for ongoing leadership development. When Battalion Chiefs become frustrated with firefighting, it indicates a leadership style that is reactive rather than proactive. Corresponding to the future oriented directions of management is a body of leadership theory that does identify alternatives for the Battalion Chief. Future oriented leadership theorists (Bass et al., 2003) indicate that proactive leadership entails an emotional as well as cognitive commitment from followers. The leader must evoke passion as well as reason. To continue the metaphor of a reactive leader being a “firefighter”, the proactive leader is a “firelighter”. The firelighter energizes as well as makes visible an altered but achievable future. (Sjöberg, 2005)

The aim of this paper is to establish a theoretical basis for distinguishing reactive from proactive leadership in project management and for identifying the skill sets required for the Battalion Chief to make the shift in leadership style.

Achieving a broader range of desirable outcomes requires the leader to interact with various stakeholder groups and to be able to see and communicate the “big picture”. The project leader needs to derive a vision that identifies a means to a common pathway

and shared goals (Atkinson, 1999). In the firefighter role the leader illuminates the value of the project outcomes and the means to achieving them by communicating the bigger picture and its consequences. Doing so requires a leadership style with the capacity to connect daily problem solving with planned strategies that may circumvent foreseeable problems and align the project's progress with the important outcomes.

### The firefighter-firefighter leadership model

Although a range of leadership theories and models have been developed they can be categorized under some broad groupings (Northouse, 1997). Promising for explaining firefighter leadership are some of the transformational and charismatic theories that collectively have been called the new leadership theories (Marta et al., 2005; Zaccaro and Horn, 2003; Hunt, 1999). These theories were developed in response to the apparent limitations of earlier theories (Yukl, 2001) in explaining how leaders can change the status quo and can lead those whom they may not directly supervise.

Transformational leadership is about lighting the fires of people's motivation and imagination. If leaders are to engage in purposive action they need to exhibit transformational leadership behaviors that direct people towards constructive effort and that provide others with a more integrated understanding of what is to be achieved. In contrast to the transformational style is transactional leadership that describes the reactive styles of leadership, otherwise known colloquially as putting out fires. At best, transactional leadership realizes performance levels that meet status quo expectations. The transformational leadership model of Bass and Avolio (1990) recognizes that there

are times when leaders may need to apply a more reactive transactional style and be firefighters, but the main outcomes for success depend on the leader's capacity for being a firefighter.

There is substantial empirical evidence to support the claims that leaders can exhibit a full range of transactional and transformational behaviors (Bass, 1999). This model is particularly relevant for providing a theoretical framework to underpin the firefighter-firelighter distinction in project leadership. The transformational/transactional leadership model (Bass and Avolio, 1990; Bass et al., 2003) forms the foundation of our firefighter-firelighter model (see Figure 1). However, our model differs from the transformational/transactional split because it separates the transactional segment into avoidant, reactive and maintenance behaviors. Our model emphasizes the range of maintenance behaviors available to project leaders by specifically referring to the behavioral styles of initiating structure, emotional consideration and contingent rewards to highlight the particular combination leadership styles underpinning the firelighter leadership style. (Barber, 2004)

The firefighter-firelighter model presents a range of leadership styles. Beginning with avoidant, also called *laissez-faire* by Bass (1999), which occurs whenever firefighters become overextended and as problems escalate they resort to avoidant behaviors where they ignore problems and avoid decision-making. The firefighter style is comprised of the reactive leadership behaviors of management by exception. Some firefighter leaders only take action when problems become chronic (management by exception – passive) whereas others actively track deviations from expected standards

and react to deviations or mistakes (management by exception – active). The firefighter either actively addresses problems as diagnostic tools identify them, or waits for problems to become so obvious that they cannot be ignored. Either approach remains reactive.

In contrast the firefighter leader will use a combination of maintenance and transformational leadership behaviors in a project setting to proactively lead the progress of the project. The firefighter must be able to lead people in the daily maintenance of the project (especially to keep control of time, cost, and quality). Contingent reward reflects a combination of task oriented and people supportive behaviors. Contingent reward, as defined by Bass et al. (2003) is the capacity to set basic expectations and goals and to reward project members accordingly. The maintenance behaviors clarify the tasks, delegate responsibilities, identify rewards for effort and attend to the personal needs of the team members. These maintenance behaviors form a bridge to the transformational styles of leadership behaviors because they establish the foundation of credibility in the leader's competence and trust that enables the more demanding expectations of transformational leadership to be accepted among the team members.

Active transactional leadership involves developing social exchanges between the leader and followers that contribute to the maintenance of the task and the group. Research (Yukl, 2001) has identified two skill sets, initiating structure and emotional consideration, as important. In the initiation role the leader will engage in providing specific directions, organizing people to tasks, and explaining contingent rewards flowing from achieving tasks. The leader will provide structure for the team to engage in problem

solving and to carry out tasks successfully. Outcomes linked to this leadership role are maintaining the task orientation of the project team, particularly keeping it on time, and on budget. The other role of consideration is enacted when the leader supports team members, assists in fulfilling their personal needs and ambitions, and generally does team building. Consideration is also expressed as the leader defuses conflict between team members and builds emotional attachment for the team and creates an appropriate social climate to support the task. Snow et al. (1996) noted that in addition to defining the team's mission to key stakeholders, the leadership role is crucial for directing the project and for encouraging team members. Team members are unlikely to believe in the vision if the project leader is unable to organize daily project tasks and support people through the setbacks of the day. In a recent meta-analysis of original data, Judge et al. (2004) concluded that both dimensions are significantly related to a number of leadership criteria. (Bennis, 1985)

Although initiation and consideration are important, success as a proactive firelighter requires a continued focus on the elements of transformational leadership – the ability to express vision and promote inspirational motivation to support the project when transactional rewards may not be available. This may be the case at the beginning of the project when benefits are anticipated rather than realized. Other aspects of transformational leadership are required when problems occur and the established routines need to be revised or more drastically when a major crisis occurs and radical change is needed. The effective leader is able to handle change and deal with uncertainty by engaging followers in creative problem solving (Bennis and Nanus, 1985).



Transformational leaders “stimulate their followers' effort to be innovative and creative by questioning assumptions, reframing problems, and approaching old situations in new ways” (Bass et al., 2003, p. 208).

Bass et al. (2003) define four components of transformational leadership which are aligned with the firelighter style:

Idealized influence represents role-modeling behavior where the leader instills pride, faith, and respect, and has a gift for seeing what is really important, and transmits a sense of mission.

Inspirational motivation represents the use of images and symbols that enable the leader to raise the expectations and beliefs of their follower concerning the mission and vision.

Individualized consideration represents providing experiential learning and occurs when the leader delegates a project, provides coaching and teaching, and treats each follower as an individual. (Gaddis, 1997)

Intellectual stimulation arises when the leader arouses followers to think in new ways in order to tackle problems, and the use of reasoning and planning before taking action. Effectively used, it can assist in the cognitive development of the follower and leader.

Transformational leadership involves raising the consciousness of followers by appealing to higher ideals and values, and moving the focus of followers away from their self-interests as encouraged by transactional leadership (Bass et al., 2003). In other words, leaders encourage their followers to consider their actions beyond simply “what is

in it for them”. Transformational leadership is required to promote understanding of the wider benefits of the project among the stakeholders.

Battalion Chiefs readily identify with the description of being a firefighter as they see themselves being called on to continually solve problems and put out fires. Less well understood is how broader strategic outcomes can be achieved. The contribution of our firefighter-firelighter model is to expand understanding of the importance of the firelighter role.

#### Applying the firefighter-firelighter model

“A Battalion Chief is a businessman, a psychologist, an accountant, a technician, part designer, part nuts-and-bolts: a truly rare combination of skills” (Birnberg, 1998). A Battalion Chief wears many hats in orchestrating the project's progress and the firm/client partnership. The Project Management Institute (PMI, 2004) has developed taxonomy, the project management body of knowledge (PMBOK) which identifies eight primary management competencies, which require the management of scope, time, cost, risk, quality, contract, communication and human resource. Battalion Chiefs need to be highly effective people – people who possess knowledge of the technical details of their jobs as well as the capacity to get things done by leading the project team effectively.

The above description of the role of Battalion Chief underscores the need to develop leadership competence. The firelighter component of our model combines the day-to-day maintenance behaviors as well as the transformational behaviors. Having a vision is important for creating understanding of purpose but by itself it is insufficient for

harnessing the energy of the group to solve problems as they occur. The Battalion Chief needs to be skilled in task and people behaviors to meet practical demands of the job. The project manager will, almost on a daily basis, need to adapt project members task perceptions to changing contingencies (e.g. late deliveries) and resolve the interpersonal and emotional issues arising from the grind of schedules and work pressures.

The well-defined set of project management skills contained in the PMBOK model (PMI, 2004) with their associated clear training pathways and tangible tools may result in an undue emphasis on monitoring. The prevalence of software tools in project management with their emphasis on monitoring past data reinforce a project leadership style that is reactive. The output from the software application encourages fire fighting. The monitoring software prominently displays deviations from goals and engenders a situation where the project leader should be seen to take control by implementing immediate corrective action. Reliance on monitoring software tools shapes the behavior of the project leader in a reactive firefighter manner through the project life cycle.

An elusive ability that is crucial for good leadership in project management, but is often neglected, is the perception and control of forthcoming problems. To avoid reactive behavior, project leaders need to perceive the forthcoming problems and be proactive in preventing the problems from occurring. In these instances, Battalion Chiefs become firefighters with the ability to motivate their teams to change and to implement different work practices that prevent the problems from occurring. Firefighters ignite their team's creativity and motivate the team to adopt the requisite behaviors to deal with the problem.

Firefighter leaders will exhibit a mix of transactional and transformational behaviors. However they will rely more on the transformational and active transactional behaviors rather than the more reactive behaviors of management by exception. The active transactional behaviors also provide the bridge to a firefighter style of leadership for Battalion Chiefs who are caught in the confusion of reactive fire fighting. Particularly for a Battalion Chief, who has to perform within short time frames to produce specific outcomes, the shift to transformational behaviors is likely to hinge on being successful at the level of active transactional behaviors.

The firefighter-firefighter model with its linkage to leadership theory enables different leadership skills to be formally identified and addressed in the selection and training of Battalion Chiefs. The model shows a full range of leadership styles but weights the importance of the firefighter behaviors. The firefighter leader will have experience in initiating structure, providing emotional consideration and demonstrated competency in transformational behaviors, whereas the firefighter will focus on tackling problems as they arise. (Birnberg, 1998)

The project leader needs to be a firefighter who maintains commitment to shared outcomes, encourages reflection before action and coaches others to achieve demanding objectives. The leader of the project team interacts with a number of networks. In this sphere the Battalion Chief has to be an ambassador and represent the team to others while at the same time protect the team from interference, explain the way ahead and motivate these external stakeholders to pursue objectives cooperatively with the project team.

## Leadership Expectations

What is expected of you today as a leader in wild land fire management?

Obtaining a certificate from a leadership training course at NARTC is only a start. It's up to you and other leaders across the country—whether as agency administrators, local unit managers, staff leaders, or line officers—to lead our agencies and our departments in the years ahead.

Integrity involves the three R's: Respect for self; Respect for others; and Responsibility for all your actions.

There is a common theme among experts who have studied or written about modern leadership. That all leaders must act with integrity at all times. The first reason for acting with integrity is that subordinates are constantly observing the lead figure.

A leader is the role model for Fire Battalion Chief by which the group that they command is most influenced. Eventually this will lead to a molding or model for Fire Battalion Chiefing of the group's behavior. This is why a leader (fire officer), must have and maintain the highest standard of character and integrity whether on or off duty. Integrity of one's character will consist of honor, virtue, allegiance, and subordination. Without integrity the fire officer can never garner the respect and confidence of junior and senior members within the department.

Individual integrity is never easy, and is never suppose to be. At most it may be the most difficult of all personal qualities to hold intact because of its complicated nature and the multiplicity of it dimensions.

One part of integrity is virtue, this can be considered the courage that a fire officer must possess as part of their integrity. This represents one's "bravery" and the endurance required to stand up against something that is deemed to be wrong, unjust, corrupt, or dangerous. The rank of a fire officer means little because there will always be pressures placed upon the fire officer to yield to influences from someone else's will as long as they are part of the line staff of the department. This pressure may come from chief officers, company officers, civilians, Governmental agencies(s), political figures or social/community groups.

Succumbing to these types of pressures will eventually lead the fire officer to take shortcuts in order to accomplish a goal. Loyalty and trust by superiors and subordinates must be the ultimate goal for the fire officer rather than shortcuts or "favors" that one might receive, including possible promotional opportunities.

A fire officer must be a "straight shooter," if caught lying to a senior officer(s) then it is an inevitability that the people under his command will eventually lie to the fire officer. Lying only infects the honor system that exists in the fire service. This also breeds deceit, dishonesty, and insincerity among the company and its members. If allowed to manifest this will cause the firehouse to swarm like the hive full of agitated bees. Sometimes fire officers have or will be pushed into a corner by the troops. If pressured the fire officer may lie in order to get out of a jam, but the ramifications of this will not only be deep, but also far reaching. Misleading the subordinates to protect your own skin will eventually return to you ten fold. Lack of trust, lack of respect, and lack of confidence will eventually lead the fire officer down the road to self-destruction.

If the officer attempts to “pull the wool” over a senior’s eye’s or if the fire officer works a shady deal in order to get something accomplished, then those under their command will assume that this is business as usual. If the organization is based upon absolute integrity of its officers, then the organization will operate as a fully functional unit. If the fire officer commits an act that is not necessarily criminal in nature, or an act that could possibly result in demotion or expulsion from the department, they must still be reprimanded or punished in accordance with the departments prescribed procedures. If no gauge for reprimand has ever been used, then the punishing officials can refer to the “Douglas Factors” as guidance for the initiation of punishment.

Other individuals who become aware of the incident will be adversely affected if no action is taken, thus the moral fabric of the department will be damaged. At some point everyone will break a rule or regulation, as this is only human by nature. The failure must be evaluated on whether it was intentional or unintentional and the punishment should be dealt out accordingly. But, if the fire officer fails as a person or as a representative of the department and then fails to admit mistakes or guilt, then they must be removed from their position. This is a distinction that must be maintained in all disciplinary actions within the department.

And what about time spent away from the fire station. The question is “am I, as a fire officer, required to abide to the same rules that govern me at work? In some departments even off duty you are a representative of the department and in reality we all are. But there are cases when someone steps beyond the norm or moral code of the department when off duty and they believe that this will not affect their employment

status. Many in the fire service are unable to keep their home life together, does this reflect upon their integrity? In some cases, yes it will affect the way senior department members and subordinates judge the fire officer concerning the way they are viewed. Basically if the fire officer cannot get a grip on the conditions, which they live, how can they handle the conditions, which they must perform and work in.

How does someone develop integrity as part of his or her character? Where does integrity come from? The quality of integrity is not a trait that we are born with, rather it is "learned" as we go through life. Not all (great) leaders come from backgrounds that would indicate their level of integrity either, instead, during the process of learning, integrity of the individual is developed. As with fingerprints, no two people have the exact value system that we live by. Within the fire service as in the law enforcement community or the military, we find others with whom we have similar values. But, no two people have the same level of integrity even though we share common ideologies. So how does someone live by a code of conduct and standards? How does a sense of obligation develop towards others, the community, community groups, the fire service, and our country develop?

This process of integrity begins when we are very young, usually taught by our parents, grandparents, neighbors, teachers, and other children whom we may have contact with. This process can also be taught by reading or by the watching of certain television programming. The process by which we develop integrity is also dependent upon our reception senses as well. How many times have we heard of families who were the cornerstone of integrity and wholesome living in the community, only to have a child



who turned out to be the complete opposite, otherwise known as “the demon seed?” In defense of that example the reverse can be true as well, there have been some who come from families that have lacked integrity only to have a child who possesses a high level of integrity. While this does not happen often, it does happen.

Development of integrity depends solely upon the moral fabric of the individual.

There are four ingredients that make up the foundation for someone’s integrity.

Without these factors joining combining together either the individuals’ foundation will be weak, or it will eventually crumble and disintegrate. These ingredients include:

1. Receptive Ability: Can the fire officer listen to other’s ideas or directions?

Failure as an officer occurs when one acts as an authoritarian leader. This person dominates and to a certain extent possesses a certain degree of arrogance that is above the norm.

2. Flexibility: Are you, the fire officer a risk taker? Can you think outside the box? Do you have an active imagination that allows for alternative ways or ideas to be used in accomplishing the departments’ mission or goals? Fire officers fail when they become rigid or unbending in their way of operating or their beliefs? These are the type of officers who carry the old timers’ attitude or simply state, “We can’t do that because we have always done it this way?”

3. Humility: Can the officer put the organizations concerns ahead of your personnel interest? Or does the officer put a premium on their personnel image (glitter & gold syndrome), and do they remember where they come from? If title, image, and being

the center of attention appeal more to you, than humility is one quality they do not possess.

4. Compassion: Can the officer bring himself or herself to reconcile a difference with a member of the company or department? Can they be nice to fellow firefighters and express compassion and mercy to the people to whom we provide service?

But what does integrity really mean? Integrity is:

Self-respect: The fire officer must first start by liking him or herself. If they are unhappy with whom they are, they will be unable to show someone under their command compassion or understanding. Having self-respect for yourself will be noticed by those around you and will be appreciated. The perception of you (as a fire officer) can always be enhanced, updated and improved. It will all depend upon factors such as willingness, motivation, and career goals that you wish to accomplish.

Loyalty to the department's vision and mission: As a fire officer you must first realize that without loyalty to the department and its mission your performance cannot make the department fully successful. Great strategy and innovation is not a guarantee for success, the core to success is the employee, and if you are not willing to commit yourself to the department then you are a glitch in the system. The ranks of successful companies are filled with hardworking, dedicated, skilled, honest and faithful employees like you.

Honesty to yourself and others: Officers must always conduct themselves with the utmost of honesty at all times. Firefighters look up to the fire officer as an example of leadership and guidance. One way to ensure that your integrity as a fire officer is intact is to always tell the truth. By telling the truth you will never have to worry about being

caught up in a lie or trying to remember just what you had said. Lying will only lower your self worth in the mind of subordinates, superiors, or worst yet the public. Sometimes telling the truth will not make people happy, or make you the winner of a popularity contest. In some cases you may suffer from “loss of grace” for telling the truth, or for standing up for what is right. But as an adult we find out that this is life, and you can’t please everyone all the time. But being caught in a lie means there will be a much greater need for damage control in the end.

### Avoidance

How many employees in the fire service can state with honesty that they can trust every employee in the department’s officer corps? Within the fire service there are probably more supervisors and managers that a subordinate can place their faith and trust in than in other workforce professions. This can be mainly contributed to the nature of our business, which is to help and serve others, including our own. This type of person eventually becomes a leader with a quality inbred within their skills when they ascend as an officer. But there are some in our profession that you should never turn your back on and this is true in every profession as well.

One way to avoid the integrity pitfall is by retaining the quality that appears to be the most important, trust. Once a subordinate or supervisor loses the ability to put their trust in the fire officer the only effect that can follow is that of an uncontrollable vortex that spirals downward. Lack of trust is listed as the number one problem facing many leaders within the world of corporate or governmental business today, including the fire

service. Take a look at Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Anderson, representatives of the House and Senate, sports athletes, and celebrities. These are only a few examples of leaders who have failed the integrity test. This has been accomplished through lying, deceit, and greed. Is the fire service exempt, no! Just look at the D.C. Fire Departments debacle that is still ongoing with its recently past chief.

Untrustworthy leadership is not a new thing; in fact it has been prevalent since the creation of dawn. But in order to lead an effective and efficient customer service like the fire department we cannot allow ourselves to reward questionable behavior.

#### Corrective measures

a. In order to meet the goals and mission of the department, fire officers should deliver clear and concise messages to the firefighters. Many times verbal or written instructions are received differently and the end result is the placing of blame upon one another as to why the goal or mission was never attained.

b. Fire service managers must be willing to deal with those under their command who act unethically. Failure to do so will result in loss of integrity by the fire officer.

c. Fire officers must be vigilant and remember that there is a constant threat to their integrity. Compromised integrity will only lead to defeat.

d. As a fire officer, never make promises to subordinates or superiors that a task or goal will be accomplished or met if you know it cannot, no matter how minor the assignment is. This can only help to reinforce among the parties involved that trust within the system is either damaged or broken.

Many of today's fire chief's compromise their integrity when they must take on and act out the wishes of city managers or Mayors, even if the chief was a person of the highest moral fabric before assuming the chiefs position.

Accepting the position as fire chief means that you (may) have to hold the corporate line in order to continue your employment status. If the city fathers want to slash the fire department budget, cut staffing, or close stations, as the chief of the department you will be responsible for carrying this directive or manifesto out, no matter how unpopular it may be. By carrying out such wishes means the fire chief now has become the scapegoat or whipping boy for city managers. Accepting these recommendations without any resistance even if you disagree can kill any integrity that you had spent your whole career to build. Going against the city managers wishes may mean loss of your job, or a falling out of favor, or being ostracized by the bureaucrats.

So many fire chiefs have to make many critical choices in today's politically filled arenas. The smart chief will either fight or attempt other ways of convincing the city fathers on the importance of reversing or at least modifying the decision(s) or plan that they want to see implemented. (Marta, 2005)

One way to succeed without seeming to be putting up a fight is by seeking change through accurate and detailed justification, something many fire service leaders either fail or do not know how to do.

Then there is the puppet chief, who will go about granting the city fathers every wish, even though the chief knows that it is not the right thing to do for the department or the community. The puppet chief will also never have anything new to report on even if

the department or service provided by them is not sufficient or may be falling apart. They will always report that the department is doing fine and there are no problems. Is there a simple answer on what to do? No. The fire chief must do what they feel is right. If the chief does not then they can continue to wear the pretty uniform with all its glitter and gold, drive around in their new Crown Victoria and continue to play the part of the pawn. Remember the pawn takes all the heat for the decisions of the city fathers. In the end the only person that will be adversely affected is the fire chief.

Integrity is the most important of all qualities that a fire service leader must possess. To view everyone and the relationships that they have, how they conduct their lives, and see them as not just a number to provide staffing. This will enhance the productivity that all managers hope for. It is easier to keep ones integrity than to recover it. Firefighters and fire chiefs can see a phony, and whether they have respect for others around them.

The fire officer who is fair in all their dealings will garner not only respect but also responsibility. Not being able to rise above prejudices will lead to failure. Being a prisoner to peer pressure, modus operandi, useless traditions or conventional rules will eventually lead to the loss of integrity. To see far beyond ones environment, to use proper ways and means, and to bring a task to a desirable end is the true sign of an effective leader. To discount exterior pressures is what separates leaders from followers.

Bandura (1997, p. 2) has defined perceived self-efficacy as "...beliefs in one's capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required in managing prospective situations. Efficacy beliefs influence how people think, feels, motivate themselves, and

act". Several studies have demonstrated the importance of self-efficacy for improving performance in the organizational context (Gist and Mitchell, 1992). Originally conceived of as a task-specific variable, support has been shown for general self-efficacy which is a disposition predicting individual behavior across situations (Lennings, 1994). Among the determinants of self-efficacy are enactive mastery (personal attainment), vicarious experience (model for Fire Battalion Chiefing), verbal persuasion and physiological arousal; all of which serve to increase self-efficacy perceptions (Gist and Mitchell, 1992).

Schunk (1983) noted that self-efficacy is particularly salient in a crisis situation. The conceptualization of self-efficacy as a stable characteristic that individuals possess describes it as "...one's overall estimate of one's ability to effect requisite performances in achievement situations" (Eden and Zuk, 1995, p. 629). One's past experiences will create a general set of expectancies that get carried over into new situations. In the context of fire-rescue operations the situations faced are often critical and unique in many ways and we expect that these generalized expectancies will "...influence the individual's expectations of mastery in the new situations" (Sherer et al., 1982, p. 664).

House and Shamir (1993) have suggested that the primary motivational mechanism through which transformational and charismatic (or outstanding) leaders influence their followers is by enhancing followers' self-efficacy and self-worth. Transformational leadership behaviors and its effects, especially role model for Fire Battalion Chiefing, verbal persuasion and physiological arousal appear to parallel the determinants of self-efficacy. Podsakoff et al. (1990) suggested that transformational

leaders influence followers by role model for Fire Battalion Chiefing the appropriate behaviors. Followers identify with role model for Fire Battalion Chiefs who are then perceived in a positive light (Bandura, 1986), this serves to empower them to achieve the leader's vision through the development of self-efficacy and self-confidence (Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1996; Yukl, 1998). Eden (1992) argued that leadership was the mechanism through which managers raised performance expectations and enhanced self-efficacy which, in turn, increased performance.

Frost et al. (1983) showed that in both military combat and fire-fighting situations, the leader who set an example by personal risk-taking was judged to be the most effective. Redmond et al. (1993) also showed that leader behavior aimed at increasing follower self-efficacy resulted in higher levels of subordinate creativity in problem-solving situations. It would, therefore, be important for transformational leaders to enhance followers' beliefs, which together they would be able to find a solution for the problem at hand. Once self-efficacy is established, followers will begin to trust the leader which will increase their commitment to the leader and the organization (Yukl, 1998). Thus, we hypothesize that transformational leaders enhance followers' self-efficacy, which in turn, results in higher performance and commitment.

#### Transformational leadership, cohesiveness, performance and commitment

Festinger (1950, p. 274) described group cohesiveness as “the resultant forces which are acting on the members to stay in a group”. This definition has been widely accepted by researchers on group cohesion. Other researchers describe cohesiveness as the degree to which group members are attracted to and motivated to stay with a group



(Zaccaro et al., 1995). Earlier research has shown that leaders who show consideration for their followers cause them to become more attached to the group (Korsgaard et al., 1995). Such leaders may thus draw the group closer together towards the attainment of group goals.

The collectivistic focus of groups led by transformational leaders where there is a consensual sharing of meaning (Bass, 1985) may be a catalyst in eliciting higher levels of commitment and performance especially given the need for fire fighters and other emergency personnel to work in closely coordinated teams in the face of great personal danger. By using the strategies of visioning, setting high performance expectations for the group and participation in group goal setting, transformational leaders may be successful in motivating group members to remain attracted to the group, make personal sacrifices and work towards a common goal. Thus, by internalizing the values of the leader, followers of transformational leaders identify the vision and become committed to collective interests (Yukl, 1998) which can bring about the desired organizational change. It therefore, appears that a transformational leader is capable of facilitating the formation of a cohesive group which performs at higher levels and is committed to the group and the organization. (Marta, 2005)

In this theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief shown in Figure 1 and consistent with the arguments presented above, direct relationships are specified from leadership to self-efficacy, cohesiveness, performance and commitment. In the presence of transformational leadership, cohesive groups with members who have high levels of self-efficacy are motivated in turn, to perform at higher levels and be highly committed to the

organization. It is therefore hypothesize the following. H1.=There will be a positive relationship between transformational leadership and both cohesiveness and self-efficacy. H2.=There will be a positive relationship between both cohesiveness and self-efficacy and the outcome variables of commitment and performance. H3.=There will be a positive relationship between transformational leadership and both commitment and performance. H4.=The relationship between transformational leadership and the outcomes of both commitment and performance will be partially mediated by cohesiveness and self-efficacy. Thus, transformational leadership will have both direct and indirect effects through cohesiveness and self-efficacy in predicting commitment and performance. The following four models are compared for Fire Battalion Chiefs to give a more rigorous test to the hypotheses (Platt, 1964).

1. A theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief (Figure 1) in which transformational leadership predicts cohesiveness, self-efficacy, commitment and perceptions of unit performance while cohesiveness and self-efficacy also predict commitment and perceptions of unit performance (this reflects partial mediation since direct and indirect effects of leadership on commitment and perceptions of unit performance are predicted).
2. An unconstrained model for Fire Battalion Chief in which commitment and perceptions of unit performance are correlated, transformational leadership predicts cohesiveness, self-efficacy, commitment and perceptions of unit performance, while cohesiveness and self-efficacy predict commitment and perceptions of unit performance (this is a less restricted model for Fire Battalion

Chief than the theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief since it contains more paths).

3. A direct model for Fire Battalion Chief in which transformational leadership predicts cohesiveness, self-efficacy, commitment and perceptions of unit performance.
4. An indirect model for Fire Battalion Chief in which transformational leadership predicts cohesiveness and self-efficacy and in which cohesiveness and self-efficacy in turn predict commitment and perceptions of unit performance.

#### The research context

I contacted the local fire department and visited several local fire-stations and the fire department headquarters for extensive interviews in order to gain a fuller understanding of the research context. I also obtained permission to ride on the fire-trucks to observe on the first hand, how teams from various fire-stations handled emergencies. The interviews with the fire-fighters, captains, lieutenants, battalion chiefs and also the Fire Chief established the pivotal role played by the unit leader in motivating fire-fighters, setting a heroic personal example and building a close-knit team. In fact, they told me that motivation suffers and stress levels increase if they are not part of a group that functions like a family: when they are on duty, they live together, eat together, interact for long hours within the close confines of the station and have to depend on each other when they are out handling emergency situations. Several of them observed that they were likely to respect and emulate their leaders only if they had proved themselves

in action. I felt that the kinds of situations they faced (e.g. warehouse blazes, aircraft accidents) called for exceptional leadership and teamwork.

## Chapter 3

### Research methodology

#### Research Question

This research investigation seeks to identify a leadership model for Fire Battalion Chief comprised of a set of theoretical dimensions of leadership that are required of a Fire Department Battalion Chief to successfully lead their personnel over then next 10 years. The respondent reports were confidential and respondents were expected to be less biased than if they were being identified. However, any biased reports that are calculated would be a threat to the internal validity of this study. The firefighter-firelighter model with its linkage to leadership theory enables different leadership skills to be formally identified and addressed in the selection and training of Battalion Chiefs. The model shows a full range of leadership styles but weights the importance of the firelighter behaviors. The firelighter will have experience in initiating structure, providing emotional consideration and demonstrated competency in transformational behaviors, whereas the firefighter will focus on tackling problems as they arise. The Battalion Chief needs to be a firelighter who maintains commitment to shared outcomes encourages reflection before action and coaches others to achieve demanding objectives. If these transformational behaviors, structured experience, and encouraged reflection are practiced by Battalion Chiefs. Then this study will maintain external validity through out other applications.

### Hypotheses

1. There will be a positive relationship between transformational leadership and both cohesiveness and self-efficacy.
2. There will be a positive relationship between both cohesiveness and self-efficacy and the outcome variables of commitment and performance.
3. There will be a positive relationship between transformational leadership and both commitment and performance.
4. The relationship between transformational leadership and the outcomes of both commitment and performance will be partially mediated by cohesiveness and self-efficacy.

### Sample and procedure

Three hundred and three fire rescue employees in active service (working in the field) completed a survey questionnaire. Respondents were employed at a fire department in the southeastern United States and completed questionnaires while on duty at their respective fire stations. The Fire Chief sent out memos encouraging employees to participate, but no incentives were offered. The response rate was over 95 percent. The fire stations that participated in the earlier interviews were not included in the study. After accounting for missing data, 271 responses were used for the data analysis.

The sample was 85.5 percent male with an average age of 40.2 years. Fifty-eight percent were white, 13.3 percent were black, and 25.2 percent were Hispanic. Average tenure in the fire service was 13 years and 9.3 years in their current jobs. Each station received approximately 13 emergency calls per day and had an average group size of four

(fire rescue personnel on each shift at each station). Thirty-one percent of respondents had a high school education, 56.7 percent had bachelors' degrees and 4.2 percent had masters' degrees. All fire rescue employees had received professional emergency management training. Over 56 percent of the respondents were firefighters, 8.5 percent were paramedics, 21.5 percent were lieutenants, 11.9 percent were fire captains and 1.5 percent were battalion chiefs. Thus, I was able to tap various levels of leadership. Each respondent indicated who they considered as their immediate supervisor and used this individual as their referent in ratings of transformational leadership: 36.3 percent indicated that they considered their lieutenant to be their supervisor, 29.8 considered the fire captain to be their supervisor and 24.2 percent considered the battalion chief to be their supervisor (9.7 percent indicated "other"). A reason for this is that I surveyed firefighters at different levels in the organization, but I also observed that for some people, the referent was the fire station rather than the immediate group by virtue of the fact that they worked in different shifts and had different leaders on their assignments. Thus, in order to preserve these distinctions and maintain consistency with the conceptualization and earlier research that examines individual perceptions, all variables were measured and analyzed at the individual level.

## Measures

### Transformational leadership

The twenty-three item measure developed by Podsakoff et al. (1990) was employed to measure the transformational leadership. Respondents were asked to describe the behaviors of their supervisors in their current work situation using a seven-

point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The six key leader behaviors identified by Podsakoff et al. (1990) are (examples of behavior in parentheses): identifying and articulating a vision (e.g. “inspires others with his/her plans for the future”), providing an appropriate model for Fire Battalion Chief for employees (e.g. “leads by example”), fostering the acceptance of group goals (e.g. “encourages employees to be team players”), high performance expectations (e.g. “will not settle for second best”), providing individualized support (e.g. “shows respect for my personal feelings”), and intellectual stimulation (e.g. “challenges me to think about old problems in new ways”). The coefficient  $\alpha$  of reliability for these subscales was 0.85, 0.88, 0.93, 0.71, 0.85 and 0.85, respectively. In accordance with the earlier research on this scale, the composite of these scales was created by combining them to obtain a global measure of transformational leadership (Pillai and Williams, 1998) which is used in the analyses. The coefficient  $\alpha$  of reliability for this composite was 0.95.

#### Group cohesiveness

Group cohesiveness was measured as individual perceptions of cohesiveness using the six-item scale presented in the study by Podsakoff et al. (1993) in a manner consistent with the conceptualization and its use in the earlier study. Respondents were asked to use a seven-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” to report on the perceived level of trust and cooperation among group members. (e.g. “the members of my work group know that they can depend on each other”).



### Self-efficacy

General self-efficacy was measured using the seventeen-item scale developed by Sherer et al. (1982). Respondents used a seven-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” to describe how they feel about their ability to achieve their goals (e.g. “if I can't do a job the first time, I keep trying until I can” and “when I make plans I am certain I can make them work”).

### Organizational commitment

Employee commitment refers to the psychological attachment of workers to their workplaces and was measured using the scale developed by O'Reilly and Chatman (1986). Some research has indicated an inability of this measure to separate the two components of identification and internalization (Caldwell et al., 1990). I found that in the sample the correlation between identification and internalization was high ( $r=0.68$ ). However, the results of a confirmatory factor analysis on the measure supported treating them as independent dimensions (the chi-square change between a single-factor and a two-factor model for Fire Battalion Chief was significant at 78.94 for a change in 1 degree of freedom). The two-factor model for Fire Battalion Chief produced a goodness of fit index (GFI) of 0.91 and normed fit index (NFI) of 0.91. I employed the internalization dimension of commitment in this research using the five-items found in O'Reilly and Chatman (1986) since they assert that internalization represents strong attachment, value similarity and extra role behavior. This is consistent with Becker's presentation of internalization: “Internalization occurs when people adopt attitudes and

behaviors because their content is congruent with the individuals' value systems" (Becker, 1992, p. 232). Given that we are interested in the effects of transformational leadership behaviors, internalization appears to provide a stronger reflection of an individual's affiliation with the organization and its leaders (Caldwell et al., 1990). Respondents used a seven-point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" to describe how attached they feel toward the organization (e.g. "what this organization stands for is important to me").

#### Perceptions of unit performance

Respondents rated the performance of their group using the measure developed by Van de Ven and Ferry (1980). It is important to note here that there were no objective measures of performance in existence. Respondents rated their unit over the previous year in relation to other comparable organizational units. Asking respondents to rate unit performance rather than individual performance is less likely to result in socially desirable responses. A five-point scale ranging from "far below average" to "far above average" was utilized (e.g. "efficiency of unit operations").

#### Data analysis

The statistical significance of paths specified in the model for Fire Battalion Chiefs was tested using structural equation model for Fire Battalion Chiefing with the LISREL 8 program. LISREL allows for the testing of the "goodness of fit" of the model for Fire Battalion Chief to the data using indices which are not dependent on sample size (Medsker et al., 1994). A covariance matrix was generated using Prelis through the

LISREL 8 program (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993). The model for Fire Battalion Chief was tested by comparing nested model for Fire Battalion Chiefs: theoretical and alternative model for Fire Battalion Chiefs (Bentler and Bonnett, 1980). The change in chi-square difference is used as an indicator of comparative model for Fire Battalion Chief Fit, a significant chi-square difference suggests that the less restricted model for Fire Battalion Chief (the model for Fire Battalion Chief with more paths specified) is a better fit. The error variance was set equal to the variance of the scale value multiplied by one minus the coefficient  $\alpha$  of reliability (Hayduk, 1987).

## Chapter 4

### Analysis of Findings

This paper is based on an analysis of the service gained over a ten-year period, which has involved over 50 semi-structured interviews, the majority at a brigade level with management at a chief-, deputy chief-, and assistant chief-fire officer level, and senior divisional-, district- and station-officers. Equally important have been interviews with firefighters at a watch level, FBU activists and officials at local, regional and national level and Fire Authority members, mainly at a local level. Interviews at the watch level were supplemented with participant observation. The study began in 1995 at a metropolitan fire brigade and continues to the present. It has also involved an extended visit to the Fire Brigade College, the main outlet for technical and senior management strategy training, informal contact with key local personnel and extensive use of background documents. (pmi.org)

The extensive interview data enables the development of an analysis that draws from a variety of sources to demonstrate how the drivers of NPM strategies were initially challenged by a stubbornly resistant corporatism. This paper will analyze the process of change management through an examination of this corporatist process that typified the fire service employment relationship. It will examine the roots of corporatism at national and local levels and show how the FBU used the framework to establish critical levels of influence on management decision-making. This corporatism was strongly reflected in the key role of the FBU in the industrial relations process in protecting strongly

entrenched working practices. At the heart of this, as argued elsewhere, is the identity of firefighters with their union through the watch system and the consequential mark this leaves on future managers who come through the single-tier entry system. All of this is now challenged through the recent Act of Parliament and the effective demise of pre-existing fire service corporatism.

## Results

Means, standard deviations, correlations and reliabilities of the variables in the study are presented in Table I. The zero-order correlations among the key variables were positive and statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ), yet sufficiently low to indicate construct independence.

Scale reliabilities were above the recommended level (Nunally and Bernstein, 1994) at 0.80 or above. Model for Fire Battalion Chief Comparisons and GFIs are presented in Table II. The chi-square, root-mean-square-residual (RMSR), GFI, comparative fit index (CFI) and NFI are reported. The recommended value for a “good fit” is 0.90 while the RMSR should fall below 0.05. The results of the theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief indicate a good fit (RMSR=0.047; GFI=0.98; CFI=0.92; NFI=0.92). The theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief is compared to the alternative model for Fire Battalion Chiefs to ensure that all plausible relationships are examined. (Snow, 1996)

As shown in Table II, the indirect and direct model for Fire Battalion Chiefs provided poorer fits in comparison to the theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief, with

fit indices lower than those for the theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief (Widaman, 1985). The differences in chi-square in comparison to the theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief were also significant. Further evidence in support of the theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief over the alternative model for Fire Battalion Chiefs is provided when compared to the unconstrained model for Fire Battalion Chief. The fit indices were very close; however, there was no significant change in chi-square between the theoretical and unconstrained model for Fire Battalion Chiefs. The additional path over the theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief, which specified the correlation between the perceptions of unit performance and commitment, was not significant. Based on our results, we should not reject the theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief in favor of the model for Fire Battalion Chief which estimates more paths. When the chi-square difference is not significant, including the additional path in the model for Fire Battalion Chief does not significantly add to its explanation of the construct covariance's (Anderson and Gerbing, 1998). Thus, the results reveal strong support for the fit of the theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief to the data.

For the theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief the squared multiple correlations were 0.19 for the prediction of group cohesiveness, 0.03 for self-efficacy, 0.17 for commitment, and 0.34 for perceptions of unit performance. These results indicate that the paths specified explain significant variance for each variable. Figure 2 shows the parameter estimates from a standardized solution. All paths specified in the theoretical model for Fire Battalion Chief were statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ). H1 and H3 are supported with direct effects of transformational leadership on cohesiveness, self

efficacy, commitment and perceptions of unit performance. H2 is supported with direct effects of cohesiveness and self-efficacy on commitment and perceptions of unit performance. H4 is supported with transformational leadership having both direct and indirect effects on commitment and perceptions of unit performance, with cohesiveness and self-efficacy serving as partial mediating variables.

1. The conditions for partial mediation are present based on the following three conditions specified by Baron and Kenny (1986).
2. The independent variables are significantly related to the dependent variables and mediators (H1 and H3).
3. The mediator variables are significantly related to the dependent variables (H2).
4. When the independent variables and the mediators are considered simultaneously, the direct relationship between the independent and dependent variables decreases by a magnitude that is statistically significant ( $p$  of 0.05) (H4).
5. Full mediation requires that in the presence of the mediators the relationship between the independent and dependent variables are no longer significant.

In the direct model for Fire Battalion Chief, the parameter estimates of the paths from transformational leadership to cohesiveness, self-efficacy, commitment and perceptions of unit performance were 0.45 ( $p < 0.001$ ), 0.18 ( $p < 0.01$ ), 0.27 ( $p < 0.001$ ), and 0.41 ( $p < 0.001$ ), respectively. Figure 2 shows that in the presence of the mediators the parameter estimates of the paths from transformational leadership to commitment and perceptions of unit performance were 0.15 ( $p < 0.05$ ) and 0.18 ( $p < 0.05$ ), respectively.

## Discussion

Overall, the results of the study provide support for the model for Fire Battalion Chief I proposed. Transformational leadership was related to perceptions of unit performance and commitment through self-efficacy and cohesiveness. Transformational leadership also influenced commitment and perceptions of unit performance directly, consistent with the earlier research (Bass, 1995; Podsakoff et al., 1996). The importance of self-efficacy and cohesiveness as partial mediating variables was established by the fact that the data did not provide a good fit to the direct model for Fire Battalion Chief in which showed all paths leading directly from transformational leadership to self-efficacy, cohesiveness, commitment and perceptions of unit performance. The current study extends existing knowledge by testing the role of self-efficacy and group cohesiveness in the transformational leadership process. It is believed that this is one of the first such studies carried out in the US. The study also shows that transformational leadership is effective in yet another unique setting, namely, a fire rescue organization, one that faces a constantly changing environment, especially in a post "11 September" world with heightened fears with respect to terrorism and requiring innovative responses, in which there is a great need for outstanding leadership. Emergency situations such as those often faced by military combat units, police patrols, and fire-fighting units may provide a context in which the effectiveness of transformational leadership is influenced by variables such as group cohesiveness and self-efficacy.



Future research must explore the relationship between leadership and cohesive groups over a period of time. Transformational leaders may be able to inspire group members with their vision for the future in the initial stages of group formation, but what if the vision fails? Does the cohesive group lose faith in and turn against the leader? The fact that I used generalized self-efficacy rather than task-specific self-efficacy may have influenced the relationship between self-efficacy and transformational leadership. The correlation was weaker than that between transformational leadership and group cohesion. Future studies should explore the role of task specific self-efficacy in facilitating the impact of transformational leadership on individual and organizational outcomes.

I also tested the possible moderator effect of cohesiveness on the relationship between leadership and perceptions of unit performance and commitment because Podsakoff et al. (1996) have suggested that there might be such an effect although their recent research (Podsakoff and McKenzie, 1997) did not demonstrate it. In the sample, I did not find a significant interaction effect. However, the results of this research supported the importance of the inclusion of variables that potentially complement leadership variables in leadership model for Fire Battalion Chiefs since the finding of partial mediation supports the argument that transformational leadership behaviors influence subordinates both directly and indirectly.

Leaders of fire rescue units could be trained to vary the level of their transformational behaviors depending on the nature of the situation. Routine situations may call for development-oriented transformational leadership behaviors where

subordinates are provided with learning opportunities, whereas emergency situations may call for a display of more heroic leadership behaviors to motivate subordinates to emulate their leaders and perform at higher levels. This could be conducted as part of a leadership intervention designed to bring about positive work outcomes and also to change the culture of emergency service departments. Beaton et al. (2001) designed and implemented just such an intervention in a fire department in Washington State using the Leader-Match model for Fire Battalion Chief. They found positive results on ratings of immediate supervisors' performance and stress-related symptoms 3 months after the intervention.

There are a number of limitations with the current investigation. The first and most important is that the data are cross-sectional and causality cannot be inferred, although this type of data collection is one of the major research methods used in organizational behavior since it is a useful tool in exploratory studies (Spector, 1994). Although I analyzed the data using sophisticated structural equation model for Fire Battalion Chiefing techniques, causal inferences must await a longitudinal or experimental design.

While the findings reveal some interesting potential relationships among our variables of interest, this research is based on self-reports which limit the conclusions that can be drawn due to the potential influence of common method variance in producing inflated correlations. However, the nature of the variables was such that it seemed appropriate to obtain ratings from the same individuals. Perceptions of cohesiveness, self-efficacy, and commitment are unique to the individual who is therefore the best source

for obtaining information on these variables. Regarding the leadership ratings of unit leaders at the fire station, I felt that the individuals who worked with these leaders in the field and were in direct contact with them would be in the best position to assess their leadership ability (Podsakoff et al., 1996). I employed the Harman one-factor test which revealed that there was no single general factor that best represented these data (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). This supports the examination of the study variables as distinct concepts. Future research should focus on multiple data sources to further our understanding of the relationships among the study variables.

In order to further assess the severity of common method variance I also conducted confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on competing model for Fire Battalion Chiefs (containing all the items measuring our five variables of interest) that increase in complexity (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). If a general factor appears to best represent the data, then common method variance poses a problem in the model for Fire Battalion Chief. In order to examine the competing model for Fire Battalion Chiefs, a single factor model for Fire Battalion Chief was compared with more complex model for Fire Battalion Chiefs (increasing the number of factors). Results revealed that the fit of the more complex model for Fire Battalion Chiefs was improved over the simpler model for Fire Battalion Chiefs (fewer factors). For example, the chi-square change between the single factor and the improved five-factor model for Fire Battalion Chief was significant (69.17, with change in degrees of freedom equal to 14) indicating that that method variance is not a significant problem.

Unfortunately, I was unable to collect objective measures of performance. I used a self-report measure of work group performance because the fire rescue organization did not have an objective measure of individual or group performance. I did however, employ an established measure of performance. Since respondent reports were confidential, I expected respondents to be less biased than if they were being identified (reports on the performance variable ranged from 1.71 to 5). The lack of objective performance measures, it appears, is an important concern in the fire service in general as evidenced by the following comment by a 30 year veteran (Crapo, 1998): "When I first began taking fire science courses in the early '70s, I can remember discussing the problems inherent in rating a department's performance in the fire ground. Today, there is still no such performance measure. We simply go to a fire and, regardless of the outcome, pat ourselves on the back for doing a good job". This may change in future studies.

Among the strengths of this study are the fact that we were able to conduct extensive interviews with individuals at all levels within the organization and also that we were given permission to personally administer the questionnaires, ensuring a high rate of response. Furthermore, I conducted this study in a setting in which, to the best of my knowledge, transformational leadership has never been examined. This setting is particularly suited to the emergence of transformational leadership and presents opportunities for responding to dynamic situations: leaders are called upon to role model for Fire Battalion Chief heroic behaviors and build cohesive teams that are capable of responding in real time with innovative solutions to life-threatening situations. (Zaccaro, 2003)

## Chapter 5

### Conclusion

The paper defines two different leadership styles for Battalion Chiefs. It introduces the firefighter-firelighter analogy to explore the distinction between leadership driven by crisis management and reliant on reactive problem solving compared with a leadership style that is proactive and seeks to align wider outcomes.

The paper challenges the belief that project leadership is principally about firefighting. The firelighter style defines a way of overcoming the inertia of reactive leadership. Doing so requires a leadership style that enables the capacity to connect daily problem solving with planned strategies that may circumvent foreseeable problems and align the project's progress with the important outcomes.

The firelighter leadership style is certainly more complex than that of the firefighter. The model identifies a set of firelighter leadership behaviors that are observable and provides practical implications for selection of a different style of Battalion Chief. It also enables significant changes in the performance evaluation of Battalion Chiefs.

Nevertheless, the research is embryonic on the connection between firefighter and firelighter leadership styles and future research is required on the impact of different firelighter leadership behaviors on the project outcomes. The paper has touched on the need for further research into support tools that will encourage Battalion Chiefs to lead project teams in ways that envision, mitigate and prevent problems. Tools that support

predictive trends in a project's progress will enhance the leadership abilities of Battalion Chiefs who adopt a firefighter leadership style.

### Components of Fire Management Leadership

Leadership is an interesting word. Bennis and Nanus (1997) describe it as the "capacity to translate intention into reality and sustain it." A lot has been written about leadership, although too often we use the word without thinking. Each of us should take a few moments to consider the importance of leadership and what it means to us. We should try to identify our biggest challenges as leaders, acknowledging our strengths and weaknesses.

To lead, you must understand the basics of your program, including the issues and roles that it entails. At NARTC, the leadership course is designed to provide this basic kind of information for the wild land fire program, offering everything a leader needs to know in order to meet basic leadership responsibilities in wild land fire management.

But there's more to leadership than just the basics. As Roy Lessin (1998) writes, "Leadership is not a job title; it is a characteristic of life. We lead by our attitude, by our responses to authority, by the words we speak, and by the example we set. With a vision for the future and a heart for people, leaders can motivate and inspire others to action. A leader is someone who others want to follow; a good leader is someone who is worth following."

In Savvy Saying's (Alstad 1986), there's a quote I like to remember: "If you're out ahead of the herd, it pays to look back occasionally to see if they're still coming." I think

that says a lot about leadership. If you look back and nobody's coming, you're probably not doing the job. Leadership means being out ahead, but it also means that people will follow. Ultimately, that is the real test of a leader—whether or not people will choose to follow.

What are some of the most common characteristics of good leaders? In their highly commendable book *Credibility*, Kouzes and Posner (1993) tell how leaders gain and lose credibility and why people demand it. Leadership, according to Kouzes and Posner, is “not a position, not a skill, but a relationship.” Leaders are admired by others; they are valued, motivated, enthusiastic, challenged, inspired, capable, supported, powerful, respected, and proud. Great leaders put principles ahead of politics, looking out for the interests of others rather than their own self-interest. A crucial point to remember is that leadership takes time. As busy as our everyday work keeps us, it's easy to forget to take the necessary time to lead. In his book *Margin*, Richard Swenson (1992) describes how modern pressures can devour the “margin” we need to build leadership. “If you are homeless, we direct you to a shelter,” writes Swenson. “If you are penniless, we offer you food stamps. If you are breathless, we connect oxygen. But if you are margin less, we give you yet one more thing to do....Margin less is the baby crying and the phone ringing at the same time, and Margin is grandma taking the baby for the afternoon....Margin less is the disease of the 1990's and Margin is the cure.”

Especially in coming years, we will need extra margin in wild land fire management. As leaders, we must make sure that we do not deprive ourselves and others of the margin we need to perform effectively. Unless we find time to devote to leading,

we will be consumed by other things that momentarily seem more important. Leaders in wild land fire management need to be engaged year round; it is not enough just to show up for the prescribed burn or to interface with the type 1 team. Take time all year long to build relationships, to let your people know you care about them and appreciate what they are doing. And don't forget to recognize their achievements. As Tom Peters (1985) puts it, "Celebrate what you want to see more of."

Perhaps the most important leadership principles are the most basic:


- Understand the program
- Know what you believe and stand for
- Carefully reflect on how best to lead
- Take the time to lead
- Believe that you can meet the challenges of leadership.

Today, more than ever, people are expected throughout organizations to meet much of the leadership challenge. That is called "leading from where you are at." Certainly, there is much to be done, especially in today's world, and there is a responsibility for getting it done. But leadership is based on good relationships; if, in our busy workday lives, we forget the importance of building and maintaining relationships, we will fail to make long-term, sustainable achievements. As leaders, we must set the example. Albert Schweitzer once said, "Example is not the main thing in influencing others, it's the only thing."



In summary, results of the current investigation point to the importance of examining the role of mediating variables such as cohesiveness and self-efficacy in the transformational leadership process especially in contexts that call for extraordinary leadership. I hope this research has laid the foundation for a more complete understanding of the transformational leadership process and that it will motivate further research into other contexts that might facilitate or retard such leadership. The results of this investigation also point to the need for developing transformational leadership in fire service departments, possibly through a structured leadership intervention designed to bring about a positive change in employee confidence, attitudes and performance in order to meet one of the critical challenges of the 21st century.

Appendices



Source: LAA (1996, 2.6), LGA (1998) and LGA (2002)

Figure 1





Figure 2



Note: All paths coefficients are statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$

**Table 1**

Variables	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5
<i>N</i> = 271							
Transformational leadership	4.81	1.01	<b>0.95</b>				
Cohesiveness	5.56	1.07	0.42*	<b>0.93</b>			
Self-efficacy	5.66	0.70	0.14*	0.27*	<b>0.83</b>		
Commitment (internalization)	4.58	1.13	0.26*	0.35*	0.33*	<b>0.81</b>	
Perceptions of unit performance	3.78	0.65	0.36*	0.47*	0.28*	0.35*	<b>0.86</b>
Notes: Reliabilities appear in bold along the diagonal; * <i>p</i> < 0.01.							


**Table I.**  
Means, standard  
deviations, and  
intercorrelations

**Table 2**

Model	df	$\chi^2$	$\Delta\chi^2$	RMSR	GFI	CFI	NFI
Theoretical model (partial mediation model)	2	19.01	—	0.047	0.98	0.92	0.92
Unconstrained model	1	15.35	3.66	0.044	0.98	0.94	0.93
Direct model	6	105.69	86.68	0.110	0.86	0.55	0.55
Indirect model (full mediation model)	4	32.57	13.56	0.061	0.96	0.87	0.86
Note: The $\Delta\chi^2$ reported is in relation to the theoretical model.							

**Table II.**  
Results of model  
comparisons

Figure 1



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## Appendix A - 1

**Survey on Core Competencies for Fire Battalion Chief position**

The purpose of the attached survey is to identify a Competency Model comprised of a set of core competencies that are required of a Fire Department Battalion Chief to successfully lead their personnel over the next 10 years. This Competency Model will help to develop future Officer Development programs as well as identify needed changes in curricula offered by higher education. This survey will assist me in gathering information on the topic for my Master's thesis at the University of Richmond. The survey will allow me to collect information from currently active Battalion Chief's nationwide.

If you choose to participate in this study, you should complete the attached survey. The questions will focus on specific job requirements that you will rank in importance of need to do the job of Fire Battalion Chief. The survey should take no more that 20 minutes to complete.

I, Douglas Jessup, am the principal investigator for this project. I may be reached at (804) 501-7231 or via email at [jes04@co.henrico.va.us](mailto:jes04@co.henrico.va.us) . My thesis advisor is Dr. Bob Kelley; he may be reached at (804) 347- 0637 or via email at [bob@pureculture.com](mailto:bob@pureculture.com) if you should have any questions or concerns. If you have any questions concerning your right as a research participant, you may contact the Chair of the University of Richmond's Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Participants at (804) 289- 8417 or [khoke@richmond.edu](mailto:khoke@richmond.edu) for information or assistance.

Your participation in this project is voluntary and you are free to withdraw your consent and discontinue participation at any time without penalty.

The information gathered in this survey will be strictly confidential; therefore, it is important that you do not write your name, location, or make any other marks on the survey that may provide identifying information. The demographic information to be obtained will be age and years of service as a Fire Battalion Chief.

The completion of this survey is voluntary; however, your assistance would be greatly appreciated. If you choose to participate; your candidness and honesty will be essential to collecting accurate data for this study. Once the data from the survey is collected, the results will be made available to the Division of Fire upon completion of the thesis in May 2007.

Enclosed you will find an envelope to return your survey. Please be sure to seal the envelope and return the survey via interdepartmental mail to the Training office no later than **October 6, 2006**.

## Appendix A - 1

For the purposes of anonymity, you will not be asked to sign a consent form. Your completion of this survey shall serve as your consent to participate in this study. Once again, all responses to this survey will be kept confidential. If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me at (804) 501- 7231 or [jes04@co.henrico.va.us](mailto:jes04@co.henrico.va.us), or Dr. Bob Kelley at (804) 347- 0637 or [bob@pureculture.com](mailto:bob@pureculture.com).

Thank you for your assistance with this study.

Douglas Jessup





## Appendix A - 2

## 7. Future Orientation

(5) Always (4) Sometimes (3) Neutral (2) A Few Times (1) Never

[illegible]

### 8. Individual Learning Skills

(5) Always (4) Sometimes (3) Neutral (2) A Few Times (1) Never

[illegible]

## 9. Interpersonal Relations

(5) Always (4) Sometimes (3) Neutral (2) A Few Times (1) Never

[illegible]

## Appendix A - 2

## 10. Negotiates/ Mediates/ Resolves Conflict

(5) Always (4) Sometimes (3) Neutral (2) A Few Times (1) Never

[illegible]

## 11. Organizational Astuteness

(5) Always (4) Sometimes (3) Neutral (2) A Few Times (1) Never

[illegible]

## 12. Performance Management

(5) Always (4) Sometimes (3) Neutral (2) A Few Times (1) Never

[illegible]







## Appendix A - 2

## 19. Technological Literacy

(5) Always (4) Sometimes (3) Neutral (2) A Few Times (1) Never

[illegible]

## 20. Versatility

(5) Always (4) Sometimes (3) Neutral (2) A Few Times (1) Never

[illegible]

## **Curriculum Vitae**

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Chesterfield, Virginia 23832  
(804) 639-7389**

### **Educational Background**

2005 – 2007, University of Richmond, Richmond, Virginia  
Masters of Human Resource Management

2001 – 2002, J. Sargeant Reynolds, Richmond, Virginia  
Associate Degree in Nursing

2000 – 2001, Bluefield College, Bluefield, Virginia  
Bachelor of Science Degree in Organizational Management and Development

1995 – 1998, Tidewater Community College, Virginia Beach, Virginia  
Associate Degree in Emergency Medical Technology

### **Professional Experience**

Henrico Division of Fire, Henrico, Virginia  
2004 – Present, Fire Lieutenant/ Paramedic  
1998 – 2004, Firefighter/ Paramedic

J. Sargeant Reynolds, Richmond, Virginia  
2004 – Present, Adjunct Faculty for Paramedic Program