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LOYALISTS AND REBELS:
THE ELECTION OF 1928 IN VIRGINIA

by Susan Parker

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Mr. Jordan
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The election of 1928 was a unique event in the political history of Virginia. For the first time since Reconstruction the state went Republican in a national election, Herbert Hoover getting 53.9% of the total vote. This was not the beginning of a definite trend because the state did not go Republican in a presidential election again until 1952. The hold of the Democratic Party over the people appeared as strong as ever on both the local and national levels after this bolt.

Since the Civil War the Republican Party in the South had been identified with Reconstruction, emancipation, and civil rights for Negroes. It usually had little support. In Virginia this tendency to a one-party system was accentuated by the lack of several strong factions within the Democratic Party, as was usual in most of the rest of the South. One Democratic faction had the loyalty of most of the voters. The "machine" or "organization" had been under the direction of Senator Claude Swanson and Thomas Martin, but control was passing to Governor Harry F. Byrd in the late 1920's. State leaders had a high degree of control over local leaders, and the organization was generally well co-ordinated over the entire state. The Virginia Democratic leaders, Senators Claude A. Swanson and Carter Glass, and Governor Byrd, remained loyal in 1928. Glass helped write the Democratic platform in the party's Houston convention, and after the convention all three visited the nominee, New York Governor Alfred E. Smith, in Albany to advise him on the campaign.

In spite of tradition and this support at the top, Smith only carried the counties of Southside Virginia and those immediate to Washington, D. C. The principle cause for this poor showing was less a matter of national issues than of personal questions about the Democratic candidate. The issues of the campaign were prosperity, fraud and graft, control of water power,
relief of agriculture, governmental economy and reorganization, foreign policy, and prohibition. On all but the latter the stand taken by the Democratic Party and Smith was acceptable to Virginia and the rest of the South.

Governor Smith criticized the Republicans for claiming to be solely responsible for the prosperity of the nation. He attacked the governmental corruption which had been discovered as high up as the Cabinet. He emphasized the needs of the parts of the population, such as the farmers, who were left out of the general prosperity, and he promised relief through several programs. Conservation and continued government ownership and control of water power resources were part of the platform. Smith pledged reorganization and consolidation of governmental activities, and a reduction in taxes, if possible. In foreign affairs he promised to keep the public informed and to carry out certain programs such as the restoration of friendly relations with Latin America, renewal and extension of arbitration treaties, and continuation of efforts to make the outlawry of war effective. He agreed to the limitation of immigration but wanted reforms within the existing restrictions. On the whole Alfred Smith expressed a belief in constructive, progressive government existing for the benefit of all Americans. He said he would "strive to make the nation's policy the true reflection of the nation's ideals."

The prohibition plank was a compromise; it condemned the Republican administration for failing to enforce the law and promised that the Democrats would enforce it and all other laws. Smith accepted this without hesitation, but recommended changes within the existing statutes. The stand on prohibition, however, was not the only factor that led to the defeat of Governor Smith in predominantly dry Virginia. The voting of 1928 was not so much pro-Hoover as it was anti-Smith. Smith was defeated for reasons that no platform could touch -- his Roman Catholicism and immigrant, urban background.
Al Smith's personal convictions on these controversial topics were well known even before the campaign of 1928. He was open and honest about his views and insisted on being accepted as he was. He made no pretense about his urban origins, his Catholic faith, or anti-prohibition sentiments. His record as a member of the New York state legislature and as governor of that state made his prohibition position clear. He had supported a bill to allow the manufacture and sale of light wines and beer with an alcohol content up to 2.75%; he signed the bill that repealed the Mullan-Gage Act, the New York law for enforcing prohibition, in spite of great pressure to refuse for the sake of his political future. He sponsored a referendum in New York on prohibition, in which the people of the state voted for modification of the existing law.

In 1928 Smith did not favor complete repeal of prohibition but alteration of the statutes to provide for limited availability of alcoholic beverages; he advocated temperance, not prohibition. Al Smith understood that much of the furor over the issue was really directed against people like himself of immigrant, urban, and Catholic background. The saloon or bar was considered evil not just because it dispensed liquor, but because it was located in the city and patronized by recent immigrants. In his autobiography he wrote, "the whole liquor question during all these years was an issue between city and country."

Until the late 1920's Alfred Smith's faith was of a very un-introspective nature. He was not concerned with theology; his religion was a natural, accepted part of his life, and he saw it as essentially love, justice, and kindness. He did not believe that there was need to defend the patriotism of Roman Catholics. A man's creed was irrelevant to his qualifications for public life; what mattered was the individual, his conscience, and his record. Smith's faith first became a major issue at the Democratic Convention of 1924.
The issue weighed heavily in people’s minds, and the trend of thought was definitely expressed in March 1977 when the Atlantic Monthly published an open letter from Charles C. Marshall, a lawyer whose avocation was studying canon law, questioning the ability of a devout Catholic to be loyal to the United States and its Constitution. Smith received a copy of the letter before the magazine went to press and decided to write a reply, which was published in the next issue of the Monthly. Marshall’s letter was not a scurrilous attack. It was written on a high, unemotional plane and based on a knowledge of theology and canon law. In writing his reply, Al Smith was assisted by Father Francis J. Duffy and Father Francis Spellman and Justice Joseph M. Proskauer, all of whom were personal friends. In the sections on the church-state relationship, he relied on his own experiences and knowledge.

In the reply Al Smith disclaimed that there was any conflict between loyalty to his church and loyalty to the United States. He refuted Marshall on practical grounds through citing his own life and career: "everything that has actually happened to me during my long public career leads me to know that no such thing as that is true."

Alfred Smith then refuted the arguments of the letter on theological grounds. Reviewing the various encyclicals and statements cited in Mr. Marshall’s letter, he showed how they were used out of context or misinterpreted. Most of them were of such little importance that Smith had never heard of them. Smith also asserted that no Roman Catholic "cleric or lay, has ever directly or indirectly attempted to exercise Church influence on my administration of any office I have held, nor asked me to show special favor to Catholics or exercise discrimination against non-Catholics."

In conclusion Smith summarized his beliefs as an American Catholic. He believed in the worship of God according to the faith and practice of the
Roman Catholic Church, but he recognized "no power in the institutions of my Church to interfere with the operation of the Constitution of the United States or the enforcement of the law of the land." He believed in the complete separation of church and state and upheld strict enforcement of the Constitutional provisions forbidding the establishment of any church or the prohibiting of the exercise of any religion. He believed in freedom of conscience for all people. The spirit of Smith's faith was expressed in his closing sentence, "I believe in the common brotherhood of man under the common fatherhood of God."

Alfred Emanuel Smith had first come before the eyes of the nation as a whole at the Democratic Convention of 1920 in San Francisco, where he received an ovation and a few token votes. In 1924 he made a serious try for the nomination. The religious question came up in the form of a proposed condemnation of the Ku Klux Klan, which was narrowly rejected. This was evidence that Smith did not have much chance of being nominated, but he stayed in the race to defeat William G. McAdoo. Intra-party struggles tore the convention apart, and over one hundred ballots were taken before John W. Davis was nominated. Davis lost the election by a large margin, but from the fiasco of the convention and the election, Alfred Smith emerged better than anyone else. As governor of New York, the state with the most important single bloc of votes in a Democratic convention, he was automatically a prospective candidate. During the four years from 1924 to 1928 his position improved; he increased his list of achievements as governor, and he became better known. The forces of the Klan were disgraced by scandals that resulted in the imprisonment of some of its leaders, and most of the rifts in the Democratic party were healed. As the Marshall letter shows, his nomination was already a definite possibility by 1927, and the public was aware of this.

During the spring of 1928 it became obvious that Smith would be the
Democratic contender for the presidency. There was opposition to his nomination, but there was no other leading Democrat about whom the opposition forces could concentrate their strength. Most of the party leaders in Virginia were neither rejecting or accepting Smith in public during the spring and early summer of 1928. The people, however, were aroused and openly taking sides for or against him on the basis of the same issues that were important after the Democratic Convention. He was denounced because of his connection with Tammany Hall; "it cannot be denied that he is and always has been, steeped in corruption." His position on prohibition and his religion were also already under attack. Those people who opposed prohibition favored Smith: "I am not a Catholic, nor a wet... but I am sure so called prohibition is the biggest piece of hypocrisy that has ever come before this nation... If Smith is nominated I will vote for him." There was denunciation of religious prejudice:

My judgment is that the greatest enemies of American institutions today are not the products of the parochial schools...but the bigots and slanderers, falsefiers and agitators who are trying to stir up religious prejudice throughout this great nation... Only a few people saw beyond these issues in evaluating the man. One of them criticized the South for not supporting "a man of the moral courage, the governmental genius, the superb administrative ability, and blamelessness of character as Alfred E. Smith."

The question of Virginia's choice for Democratic presidential nominee was complicated by Governor Byrd's proposed amendments to the state constitution. Harry Byrd wanted to reorganize the state government and introduce certain reforms such as the short ballot. A June constitutional referendum would determine the question. Byrd was working strenuously to have his amendments passed; the reputation and future of his career and organization depended upon the program. Among the individuals and groups...
opposing the amendments was the Virginia Ku Klux Klan. Part of its attack on Byrd and his program suggested that the amendments were the result of joint work by Byrd and Governor Smith of New York. An editorial in the Richmond News Leader defended Byrd, saying,

The Ku Klux Klan, without a scintilla of evidence to support it, has made the charge that the amendments are being foisted on the people of Virginia by some sort of collusion between Governor Byrd, of Virginia; Governor Smith, of New York; the pope and Thomas Fortune Ryan."

The basis for the Klan's charge was that the New York Bureau of Municipal Research had been paid $5,000 from state funds. This was true, but the payment had not been for work on the proposed constitutional amendments.

The most dramatic incident of the conflict came on June 8, when Governor Byrd received a letter signed "K K K." He was cursed and threatened with flogging and warned that when the Klan got hold of him he would no longer place Catholics in high positions but K K K members. The local Klan office denied knowing anything about the letter, but as the News Leader pointed out, the policy of that organization encouraged attacks of this nature. The opposition of the Ku Klux Klan was to little avail, however; later in the month the amendments were overwhelmingly ratified in the referendum. That Alfred Smith's name was used to discredit a local official is indicative of the strong sentiments about him in Virginia.

By June 21, when the state Democratic party convention opened in Roanoke there was already much organized anti-Smith activity; the Anti-Saloon League and many Protestant church societies were campaigning against any wet candidate. The party leaders remained uncommitted on both the prohibition issue and the man Smith. Sentiment seemed to favor an uninstructed delegation to Houston, but the most enthusiastic drys opposed this. The Reverend David Hepburn, an official of the Anti-Saloon League in Virginia, attended the convention to represent its interests. The state convention, obviously
engineered by the party organization, lasted only five hours, and the prohibition issue was never argued on the floor. Forty-eight uninstructed delegates were chosen to go to the Democratic National Convention in Houston and cast the state's twenty-four votes. Among the leaders of the delegation were Governor Byrd, the Commonwealth's National Committeeman; Mrs. Robert C. Watts of Lynchburg, National Committeewoman; Senators Swanson and Glass, and J. Murray Hooker, the state Democratic Chairman. The delegation was to determine itself whether to vote as a unit.

The platform adopted by the state convention declared graft and corruption in government to be the principal issue of the campaign. It expressed satisfaction with the fiscal policies of the last Democratic administration and called for lower taxes, the establishment of a sinking fund, a lower tariff, and agricultural relief. The plank on prohibition was dry; it endorsed the Eighteenth Amendment and all federal and state enforcement acts:

prohibition ... is a constitutional and statutory policy of the United States and of the state of Virginia; and obedience to the laws in respect thereto is distinctly an obligation of good citizenship and an imperative duty of public officials.42

The Republican party was denounced for failing to enforce the law and thereby discrediting prohibition. Corruption in the prohibition bureau was also attacked. The plank urged that these declarations be included in the Democratic national platform at Houston and that a candidate be nominated who would enforce them.

The National Democratic Convention opened in Houston, Texas on June 26. At its caucus the Virginia delegation decided to cast eighteen votes for Cordell Hull and six for Alfred E. Smith on the first ballot. Harry Byrd and Carter Glass agreed that the party's platform should have a law enforcement plank specifically naming the Eighteenth Amendment. Glass was considered
to be one of the "ultra-drays" at the convention. Bishop James Cannon, Jr. of the Methodist Church attended the convention as he had the Republican one in his role as chairman of the National Legislative Committee of the Anti-Saloon League and as chairman of the Social Service Committee of the Methodist Church, South. He and Bishop Dubose of Tennessee presented a prohibition petition with 300,000 signatures, 20,000 of which were from Virginia, to the Convention.

The Resolutions Committee met to draft the party's platform. As Virginia's representative on it, Senator Glass was expected to propose the Virginia platform's prohibition plank. According to Bishop Cannon, "For the first time in the history of the Democratic party its national convention was absolutely dominated by Tammany and its allied forces and the other wet Northern cities." He said that these people selected the members of the committee except for the southern delegates and that the committee was predominantly wet. Cannon addressed the committee and proposed that the committee adopt a prohibition plank stating,

that the Democratic party will stand positively, unreservedly for the maintenance of the Constitution and ... Specifically for the maintenance of the Eighteenth Amendment. That it pledges the nominee of the party to a program of vigorous, efficient enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment ..."

If the party failed to do this "millions" of Democratic men and women would be alienated, and "disaster" would inevitably befall the party.

The Resolutions Committee rejected a wet plank and accepted one authored by Carter Glass. The platform was adopted by the convention without a fight on June 28. Byrd, Swanson, and Hooker endorsed it. On prohibition it stated, "this convention pledges the party and its nominees to an honest effort to enforce the eighteenth amendment and all other provisions of the federal constitution and all laws enacted pursuant thereto."

This declaration satisfied Cannon, but he was sure that it had been insincere-
ly accepted, because the Tammany forces, which controlled the convention, had no principles. Platforms were consequently meaningless to them. They had only one purpose, to get Alfred Smith nominated.

From the opening of the convention the nomination of Al Smith appeared a certainty. He was chosen to be the Democratic standard bearer on the first ballot, capturing 849 votes to a combined total of 152 for the three other major candidates. Only six of Virginia's votes had gone to Smith, but on June 29, the day after the nomination, the entire Virginia delegation was unified in his praise. Demonstrations of harmony and unity followed his nomination. Senator Joseph Robinson of Arkansas was chosen as the vice presidential candidate to give a southern and western balance to the ticket. Following this, Governor Smith sent an acceptance telegram from New York, in which he agreed to the prohibition platform but again stated his belief that the Volstead Act should be modified to give more power to the states. In the spirit of unity demonstrated at the convention, the Richmond press largely ignored the telegram. In an editorial praising and defending Al Smith, the News Leader declared that the question of prohibition was behind the party now. It had an issue, "honesty in office," and the man to expound that issue sincerely.

The nomination of Smith and the subsequent telegram precipitated Bishop Cannon into action; with the cooperation of the Baptist minister Dr. Arthur J. Barton, he issued a call for a conference of anti-Smith Democrats. This action came as no surprise, for Cannon had been expressing his hostility to Al Smith for a long time. In February 1928 at a Law Enforcement Conference held in Richmond under the auspices of the Anti-Saloon League and the W.C.T.U., Cannon declared that the nomination of a wet by the Democrats would mean the arising of new southern political leaders. At this time he became convinced that the Democratic leaders would "surrender" to Smith and that an all out
effort had to be made to prevent Smith's election. At a banquet of the same two organizations during the same month, he suggested a bolt from the Democratic party in a statement that the "moral forces" of the country must refuse to give up their convictions for the sake of a partisan victory. In May his address before the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church openly attacked Governor Smith and the Roman Catholic Church, whose hierarchy had supposedly advocated an end to prohibition in the United States.

After the Republican convention, which adopted a prohibition plank that the Bishop fully approved of and nominated a dry candidate, Cannon wrote to some southern Democratic leaders pointing out the seriousness of the situation. On June 16, he wrote Senator Claude A. Swanson of Virginia and declared that if Governor Smith were nominated, "I greatly fear the disruption of the Democratic party in the South so far as the Presidential vote is concerned." Cannon was not without support in his threats; on June 8 the annual Richmond district conference of the Methodist Church, South unanimously endorsed resolutions stating that it would break with party loyalty if necessary for the sake of "great moral issues." Dry candidate resolutions had also been passed by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, the Southern Baptist Convention, and the Disciples of Christ. The Reverend David Hepburn, superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League of Virginia, pointed out that while these groups of religious leaders did not pretend to speak for all their communicants, "it must be remembered that these leaders have tremendous influence with the rank and file of the members of their respective denominations."

In a letter to the editor of the News Leader on June 13, Bishop Cannon explained his objections to Governor Smith. The Democrats wanted to make "privilege and corruption" the issue of the campaign, but the nomination of Smith would automatically label the party as wet and make prohibition the
outstanding question. The nomination of the New York governor would amount to calling on dry Democrats "to sell their very souls, and to assist actively to put in the White House the most dangerous opponent of prohibition in public life today." It would be absurd to declare "privilege and corruption" the major issue and then nominate a man who was "Tammany bred, Tammany-trained, Tammany-branded." If such a thing were to happen, many life-long Democrats would decide that the "ideals of Southern Democracy" would be better served by the defeat of Smith than by his election.

The invitations for the conference of dry Democrats were mailed on July 9, and the meeting was held in Asheville, North Carolina, July 18-19. Sixteen Virginians were among the 267 people in attendance. The participants adopted a document called the "Declaration of Principles and Purposes of the Conference of Anti-Smith Democrats." They pledged their loyalty to "Southern Democracy" and asserted the necessity of maintaining the strength of the Democratic party in all the southern states. They would work to elect dry, Democratic local and state officials and senators and congressmen, but they would do everything necessary to defeat Alfred E. Smith. Four reasons lay behind this decision: Smith's "repudiation" of the Democratic platform on prohibition, as indicated in his telegram, his wet record, his choice of a "wet Republican" as chairman of the Democratic National Committee; and his connection with Tammany Hall.

The telegram to the convention was a deliberate "action of brazen, political effrontery" planned to secure the wet Republican vote. It insulted the dry Democrats of the South by assuming that they would surrender their moral convictions to secure a partisan victory. Governor Smith was personally responsible for the ineffective prohibition enforcement in New York and for "the horrible vice-conditions ... reported to be worse in New York City than they have been for the past twenty years." As governor he had sworn
to maintain the American Constitution, yet in practice he had done everything possible to nullify the Eighteenth Amendment. Smith's insulting attitude to dry Democrats was emphasized by his selection of John Jacob Raskob as Democratic National Committee Chairman. Mr. Raskob was an ex-Republican who openly declared that he accepted the position in order to work for the repeal of prohibition. These men were symbolic of the corrupt, unprincipled Tammany Hall element of the Democratic Party, which had nothing in common with Southern Democracy. On behalf of the "highest moral interests of the Democratic party," the people of the conference rejected these men and what they stood for and advocated the support of Herbert Hoover as the best way to insure their defeat.

After the Asheville conference adjourned, Bishop Cannon returned to Richmond and established a headquarters for the new organization in Murphy's Hotel. There was a Committee for the South with Cannon as chairman and the Reverend J. Sidney Peters as secretary and a Virginia State Committee with Cannon as chairman and treasurer and Peters as secretary. The Bishop ordered many copies of the "Declaration" printed and wrote appeals and letters, all of which he mailed or distributed. Subscription cards were mailed with the propaganda, and many contributions were received as a result. Cannon emphasized holding meetings in public halls or outdoors rather than in churches; the first meeting took place in Richmond and Cannon spoke. State committees were organized in Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Alabama before Bishop Cannon sailed on August 24 to the International Congress against Alcoholism in Antwerp. Just before leaving, in order to avoid duplication of effort or expenditure, Cannon conferred with C. Bascom Slemp, the chairman of the Republican State Committee of Virginia. In this conference, "The scope of the work of the Virginia Committee of the Anti-Smith Democrats and of the Virginia Republican State Committee was clearly
Bishop Cannon also explained to Slemp that although the Anti-Smith Democrats expected no financial assistance from the Republican National Committee, they would be happy to accept contributions from any individuals who were moved by their cause.

The Methodist and Baptist denominations played the central role in the Anti-Smith movement. They supported it through their leaders, convocations, agencies, press, and the rank and file clergy. Other denominations were active participants too. Clergymen were the leaders, and 1928 probably saw the height of clerical involvement in political affairs. The year marked the climax of James Cannon's political activity; he dominated the entire movement.

Bishop Cannon's thoughts reflected the motives of most of the adherents of the Anti-Smith movement. On the surface prohibition was their greatest concern:

a critical time has been reached in the conflict of the forces of sobriety, temperance, righteousness, and humane betterment with the organized, world wide, debasing, soul destroying liquor traffic... He repeated many times that 1928 was a period of crisis for the prohibition movement and that the future of the Eighteenth Amendment depended on the results of the election. Certain that inefficient enforcement was the cause of all the failings of prohibition by law, he became convinced that unless this was corrected soon the Eighteenth Amendment would be repealed.

With these ideas he combined a personal vindictiveness toward Alfred Smith, the Roman Catholic Church, and Tammany Hall. Cannon made reference in his addresses many times to the "indulgence" of Governor Smith in alcoholic beverages; he spoke of the possibility of bootleggers becoming frequent visitors at the White House. He suggested that the reason for Smith's desiring the repeal of the New York enforcement law was the money that would accrue to Tammany through the liquor traffic.
Bishop Cannon frequently denied having any religious prejudice, but his statements suggest another attitude. He accused Pope Pius XI of having brought the issue of bigotry and intolerance before the world, when he issued an encyclical saying that true religious unity was to be found only in a return of all people to the Church. Cannon felt that, "Nothing could be more intolerant or bigoted, deprecatory, even contemptuous, of Protestants and their beliefs..." than this papal encyclical. He warned that Smith, Raskob, and their supporters would deliberately inject the religious issue into the campaign so that they could accuse their opposition of bigotry. Cannon was convinced that the Catholic hierarchy opposed prohibition and that their views would certainly influence Catholics in government. He accused Governor Smith of demonstrating a belief in the subordination of the state to the "Romish" Church, because he had knelt and kissed the rings of several visiting cardinals on one occasion. He referred to Smith as a Catholic "of the intolerant, bigoted type, characteristic of the Irish Roman Catholic hierarchy of New York City."

Bishop Cannon attacked Alfred Smith's prohibition attitude and Catholicism with the greatest zeal and energy. The Anti-Smith movement of 1928 was a modern crusade. Convinced of their righteousness and justification, Cannon and his followers were certain that they were "trying to bring in the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ."

On August 22 Governor Smith gave his acceptance speech in Albany, New York. He declared that the president had two constitutional duties with regard to prohibition. In the oath of office the president promised to "preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution, and Smith pledged himself to live up to this oath. He said, "The President does not make the laws. He does his best to execute them whether he likes them or not." The president's other duty was to "recommend to the Congress such measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient," and Smith believed that there should be change in the prohibition laws. He recommended an amendment to the Volstead Act giving a better definition of what constituted an intoxicating beverage. Within the limits of this standard set by Congress, each state could fix by law its own level of permissible alcohol content. He further proposed that the question of modification of the Eighteenth Amendment be submitted to the people and declared that he personally favored an alteration of it,

which would give to each individual state ... only after approval by a referendum popular vote of its people the right wholly within its borders to import, manufacture or cause to be manufactured and sell alcoholic beverages, the sale to be made only by the state itself and not for consumption in any public place.\(^{87}\)

The next day the Richmond and Virginia Democratic leaders expressed great satisfaction with the speech. Byrd praised it as did Murray Hooker, the state Democratic chairman, and Mayor Fulmer Bright, the Richmond party leader. Both Bright and Hooker, however, withheld approval of the suggestions for modification of the prohibition laws. Several prominent Richmond businessmen interviewed by the newspaper endorsed Governor Smith's speech, but the three ministers consulted refused to comment. An editorial in the *News Leader* praised Smith and his ideas but tried to reassure the drys by stating that even Smith recognized that his recommendations on prohibition had no chance of being carried out.

The Reverend David Hepburn, speaking for the Anti-Saloon League declared that the prohibition proposals would prevent any dry Democrats in Virginia from supporting the party's candidate. Bishop Cannon, although still in Europe, wrote a reply to Governor Smith's speech for the *New York Times*. He considered Smith's promise to uphold the Constitution as hollow in view of his actions as governor of New York, where he was personally responsible for the prevalent lawlessness. The changes in the prohibition laws suggested by Smith were an affront to the Democratic party, particularly in the South and
an open attempt to win Republican votes. The plan for state control had already been tried and failed; Smith's proposal necessitated unanimous efforts by the prohibition supporters of the nation to defeat "the wet-nullification of Tammany candidate from the sidewalks of New York."

Alfred Smith's acceptance speech was the signal for the beginning of the Democratic campaign in earnest. Governor Byrd went to Albany for the address and then returned to Richmond and opened the state drive. On August 24 Byrd and Senator Glass released public statements. The governor, Harry Byrd, had already announced his support for Smith, but he elaborated on it at this time. He sharply criticized the Old Dominion's citizens who were attacking Smith, and then declared that some Virginia Democrats were refusing to back Smith because he was wet, a Roman Catholic, and had been a part of Tammany.

Byrd defended the Democratic candidate on each of these charges. Of Governor Smith's prohibition program he said,

Without discussing the merits of this suggestion, the answer is that there is not the least chance of either repeal or modification of the Eighteenth Amendment in the probable life of Governor Smith. Byrd affirmed his own dryness and pointed out that he was still supporting Smith; he declared that there was no valid reason for any Democrat to desert the party on this issue. In denouncing the religious attacks on Smith, the Governor emphasized Virginia's traditional ties to religious freedom, dating from the time of Jefferson. He declared that this question threatened the most fundamental principles of the nation.

Governor Byrd next reviewed the dangers inherent in a Republican victory in Virginia. Republican leaders advocated removing the restrictions on the franchise in the South, a plan which would return Virginia to the days of Reconstruction. The Republican party disregarded the true interests of the state. If southern Democrats broke with those of the east and west, Republican power would be unchecked throughout the nation. Byrd concluded his statement
by declaring that Virginia owed white supremacy and honest and efficient govern-ernment to the Democratic party; a vote against the party's nominee was not simply a vote against Al Smith, but a vote against the party itself. He was confident that if Virginians would listen to the facts and vote their consciences, a Democratic victory in November was assured.

Carter Glass's statement developed the same ideas. He praised Smith's proposals, criticized the Republicans, and warned Virginians not to desert the party that "helped to preserve Anglo-Saxon civilization in Virginia ..."

The Democratic campaign in Virginia had a slow start, but after the acceptance speech the forces began to fall in line. Many local party organizations took a long time to join the drive. There was such strong feeling over the campaign, however, that voluntary Smith supporters organized and started to work. In some areas of the Old Dominion, Smith-Robinson clubs assumed the duties of the Democratic party committee. Smith was running stronger in the Valley and the southwest, areas which usually defected from the Democrats; the rest of the state was torn by party disloyalty. The old line leaders and the top levels of the party hierarchy remained intensely loyal, but the clergy and much of the rank and file rejected Smith. There were some attempts to weed out the disloyal party officials; many were asked to resign and cooperated with this request. In Prince William County Judge Howard Smith unseated "Hoover Democrat" judges and clerks of election by mandamus writ. To make up for their losses, the Democrats were hoping to bring to the polls many of the people who usually did not bother vote, because they were confident that the state was safely Democratic.

The Democrats had certain advantages over the bolters and the Republicans. Virginia tradition stood squarely behind them. They were better organized and had the support of most of the press. The Richmond News Leader was ardently Democratic in its editorial policy. It had nothing but praise for
Al Smith, his record, and his programs. It neither condemned or endorsed his plan for modification of the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act, but it assured the drays that there was no chance for passage and commended the candidate for having the courage to suggest the plan in defiance of the Anti-Saloon League and like groups. It assailed those who made the vicious public attacks on the New York governor as well as the "whisper campaign."

The editor went after the Anti-Saloon League with such vigor that Reverend David Hepburn, in writing a defense of the League, compared the News Leader editor to the Old Testament prophet Balaam "You attempt to preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ, while like Balaam, you are giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the home, the church and civilization." Herbert Hoover and the Republican party were also objects of the paper's scorn. At one time it ran a series on the history of Virginia's experiences with the Republican party; the author of course emphasized the evils the Old Dominion had suffered at Republican hands. Above all else it praised and defended the Democratic party, the party of equal opportunity, states' rights, and honesty in office.

Typical of the News Leader's attitude was the issue on the day of Al Smith's campaign visit to Virginia. The headline story was entitled "Al Smith is Given Thundrous Welcome Here" and proclaimed him "the most popular presidential candidate Richmond has entertained in years." Governor Smith stopped in Richmond on the morning of October 11 during his southern tour. At Broad Street Station he was greeted by a band, a gun salute from the Howitzers, and a large crowd. He participated in a parade down Broad Street and then appeared at the state capitol where Governor Byrd introduced him to an enthusiastic crowd of fifteen thousand people. Smith's short speech thanked the crowd for such a warm greeting. Senator Glass had joined Smith's party on the train in Washington; Governor Byrd, state Democratic Chairman Hooker, and other party functionaries boarded the train in Fredericksburg. Party
conferences were one of the major purposes of the trip. Smith left before noon from Main Street Station, having "easily captured Richmond" according to the News Leader.

An editorial that day expressed the same idea. The writer declared that Al Smith was magnetic before a crowd or in a private conference, but the real essence of the man appeared when he wrote or spoke advocating a principle. Quotations from Governor Smith on international peace, welfare legislation, and the obligations of liberty were used as examples. Although he had been maligned and lied about, he was in truth "a practical idealist, unspoiled, unshaken, undeterred from the hard way of honest public service."

The loyal Democrats mustered all their forces in the fight for Smith's election. They relied upon public speakers primarily. Democratic notables such as Glass, Swanson, E. Lee Trinkle, John Garland Pollard, George C. Peery, James H. Price, J. Vaughan Gary, and William Tuck all hit the lecture circuit in Smith's behalf. They were joined by distinguished Virginians like historian-editor Dr. Douglas Southall Freeman and Edwin A. Alderman, President of the University of Virginia. Even two men who customarily opposed the Byrd "machine," Andrew Jackson Montague and Westmoreland Davis, participated in the speaking campaign. As election day approached the pace became faster; on October 23 Glass spoke in Richmond, while Trinkle, Montague, Pollard, Gary, Tuck, and eleven others were speaking in various areas of the state. Governor Byrd began a seventeen talk drive throughout the state on October 15.

In their speeches they rarely endorsed Smith's views on prohibition, but they praised his qualifications and condemned efforts to awaken religious prejudice against him. There was great use of the appeal equating disloyalty to the Democratic party with disloyalty to the South and white supremacy.

Governor Byrd made a radio address on October 2 that was typical of the
Democratic speeches. He emphasized the dangers to Virginia, the South, and the Democratic party if the Republicans won the presidential election and attacked Cannon, Hepburn, and Peters for destroying the party while pretending to be loyal to it. He pointed out that the Commonwealth's drys should know that Smith was not a threat to prohibition if sincere prohibitionists like Glass, Swanson, Pollard, and Trinkle were supporting him. Byrd lauded Smith and his achievements as a legislator and governor and concluded the speech with an expression of confidence in a Democratic victory.

Carter Glass's speeches used the same topics but were written in a fiery style that made him a very popular orator. He campaigned throughout the South, and his address in Richmond on October 24 was broadcast over nationwide radio. He assailed the Republicans and Hoover from all possible angles. He asserted that prohibition was being used as a screen for religious bigotry and attacked the dry leaders with vigor,

I want to warn the people of Virginia against the Methodist popes (Cannon, Hepburn, and Peters), ... who are trying to transform my church, the Methodist Episcopal church, South into the Methodist Republican church, South. 106

The Democratic party was backed by a variety of organizations ranging from the Richmond Bar Association to the Virginia Seafood Association and Oysterman's Protective Association. The lawyers of the Bar Association adopted a committee to direct their efforts on Smith's behalf and to raise funds to carry on campaign work. In October a Woman's Democratic Loyalty Club was formed in Richmond to bring out the feminine vote for Al Smith. It held public meetings at which speakers as noteworthy as Governor Byrd delivered addresses.

A conglomerate of several different groups supported the Republican candidate for the presidency, Herbert Hoover. The Virginia Republican party carried on its most active campaign effort in years. For the first time in
half a century it appeared to have a chance of success. The Republican
leaders in the Old Dominion were Colonel Jennings G. Wise, G. Bascom Slemp,
and Colonel Henry W. Anderson. They had the support of the National Re-
publican organization. Hoover never visited Virginia as a candidate, but
other prominent Republicans campaigned for him in the state. The Republican
vice-presidential nominee opened a southern tour with an address in Petersburg;
Charles Evans Hughes gave a last minute speech on November 3. The leading
Republican to speak in Virginia was Senator William E. Borah of Idaho. On
October 15 he addressed an enthusiastic meeting in Richmond attended by more
than five thousand people, whom he greeted as "Democrats and Hooverites." He
defended Herbert Hoover's policies as wartime food administrator and attacked
Smith's stands on prohibition and immigration. Concerning prohibition he
said, "I came not to preach to the righteous but to call sinners to repentance."
There was a deliberate Tammany plot to destroy prohibition. Tammany Hall
had been closely tied to the saloon for years and was continually working to
restore the liquor traffic. The next step in its overall plan was to have a
wet elected president, and Smith was the man.

The Virginia Republicans were not nearly as active as the Democrats, how-
ever. For the most part they chose to stay quietly in the background and let
the various prohibition organizations make all the noise. The two leading ones
were the Anti-Saloon League and the Anti-Smith Democrats, which were closely
tied through an interlocking hierarchy. Hepburn and Peters directed the group's
headquarters and spoke also. They were actively supported by most of the
Protestant clergy of the Old Dominion, and they imported outside help also.
The well known and very popular evangelist, Billy Sunday, spoke in several
cities in Virginia at the end of October. Numerous meetings were held by lay-
men and ministers in their localities. The dry speaking campaign was effective,
but the literature one was even more so. Adequately financed, it printed and
sent out "millions of pages" throughout Virginia and the South. With each pamphlet went a subscription card, and contributions poured in. Subsidies also came from the Republicans. The Anti-Saloon League and the Anti-Smith Democrats expanded their operations and had to move larger quarters. By October 24 the combined paid clerical staffs of the two organizations was double the size of the Democrats'.

The real driving force behind these movements was Bishop James Cannon, Jr. He travelled so fast and had so many speaking engagements that even his own headquarters could not keep up with him. For the seven weeks after September 15, he spoke almost every night, and sometimes he made two or three addresses in a day. He toured the state, but this was not the limit of his activity; he also visited Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Alabama.

On October 30 he gave a speech in Richmond to an audience that nearly filled the city auditorium. He attacked Tammany Hall because it was corrupt and fed on the vices of the nation. Denouncing those who criticized the clergy for taking such an active role in the campaign, he declared that he had not sacrificed his political rights by becoming a Methodist minister. The Bishop stated that prohibition was the only issue of the campaign and bitterly attacked Smith, Raskob, and the Tammany "controlled" Houston convention. He accused Governor Smith of bolting both the immigration and prohibition planks.

Smith favored larger quotas for southern Europe, "Because little Italy is in New York. Northern Europe is not on the sidewalks. They want Southern Europe to come in on the sidewalks so it can control the votes."

Cannon closed by repeating his charge that Smith's supporters were using the bigotry accusations to gain votes.

Herbert Hoover also had support from certain forces that would have horrified him personally. All the prejudices, fears, and hatreds, which normally are latent within an individual, were brought out by the bitterness.
of the campaign. Some of it was displayed through organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan. Both Governor Byrd and Richmond Mayor Fulmer Bright received assassination threats signed "KKK" for their support of Alfred Smith. These sentiments also motivated the vicious "whisper campaign" against Smith. They were most completely manifested, however, at the polls on election day.

Although running scared, the major Democratic officials predicted victory in their campaign addresses. Local leaders were less optimistic. Early in the fall the News Leader's political analyst made a tour of the Commonwealth and found most local Democratic officials putting their area and the state as a whole in the "doubtful" column. By the last week of October the same writer concluded that there had been a shift in sentiment, and a victory for Smith seemed probable in November; even the most cautious political observers were predicting a Democratic majority of fifteen thousand votes. The Third Congressional District, which contained Richmond, was proclaimed to be definitely behind Alfred Smith. The author of the article did concede that it was possible the Virginia Democrats were predicting a win for the party just because it was the usual outcome.

November 6 was election day, and it proved that the optimism of the Democratic leaders had been in reality over-optimism. Herbert Hoover carried the Old Dominion by 24,463 votes; he received 164,609 votes to Governor Smith's 140,146. The percentage figures were: Hoover, 53.91% and Smith, 45.90%. Governor Smith lost Richmond by the smallest margin that had yet been recorded, 554 votes; he received 10,213 votes and Hoover received 10,767. In the congressional elections, there was no major Republican trend although the Republicans gained two of Virginia's seats in the House of Representatives. Senator Swanson was re-elected; there had been no opposing candidate. The News Leader attributed the loss to the slow start of the Democratic campaign effort. From August 22 when the Democrats commenced their campaign, they had
been steadily gaining ground, but there had not been enough time to gain sufficient new votes to compensate for those lost before the Democratic drive began.

The significance and outcome of the Democratic loss in the presidential election were not immediately visible. The News Leader concluded on the day after the election, "The results of this defeat for the Democratic party in Virginia are wholly uncertain." One of the Republican leaders declared that the victory meant the creation of new political alignments in the Commonwealth with a strong opposition party to the state's Democratic organization. Governor Byrd was very cautious; the News Leader said that "he hoped the bitterness of the campaign quickly would disappear and that the united labor of all parties and factions for the good of the state would continue." The Reverend David Hepburn of the Anti-Saloon League was very conciliatory on the day after the election. He declared that his organization considered the election as simply a referendum on the prohibition question and that it bore no grudges against the enemies of the campaign.

Hepburn's desire for an easy reconciliation with Democratic loyalists was not shared by Bishop Cannon. He determined to prolong the existence of the Anti-Smith Democratic organization, supposedly because of the vicious personal attacks on him by Byrd, Glass, and Pollard during the campaign. He wrote in his autobiography,

if Senator Glass, Dr. Pollard, and Governor Byrd had confined themselves to the issues of the campaign, if they had recognized the sincerity of the Anti-Smith Democrats in contending for what they sincerely believed to be a great moral issue, if they had not denounced, and in some instances abused them, there would have been no Anti-Smith Democratic organization continued after 1928.

As a result of Cannon's decision the conflicts of 1928 carried over into the gubernatorial election of 1929. In June the Bishop declared that he could support no one who had voted for Al Smith; this eliminated all the people acceptable to the Byrd organization. The Anti-Smith Democrats held a con-
vention which nominated William Mosely Brown for governor. Subsequently
Brown was also nominated by the Republicans.

Governor Byrd did not want any compromise with Cannon and his associates, who he felt had tried to destroy the Democratic party. The other Democratic leaders agreed, especially Swanson and Glass. They were determined not to let Cannon have any voice in the choice of the Democratic candidate for the governorship. They felt the choice of their own man and his victory would completely restore the position of the Democratic party in Virginia. John Garland Pollard, a prominent Baptist and prohibitionist, was their nominee, and he crushed Brown in the election.

Cannon and his allies were vanquished; disapproval of his behavior in this election and the accusation of illegal financial activities made against him in 1929 destroyed his political influence in a few months. The recovery of the Byrd organization meant a final split between the Virginia Democratic party and the prohibition forces in the state. The alliance which Cannon had created and maintained crumbled just as his power did. Byrd and the "organization" no longer owed any political debts to Cannon and the drys. By the end of 1929 Harry Byrd dominated state politics as no one else had ever done before him.

The destruction of Bishop Cannon's political power was just one example of what was happening throughout the South. During the campaign there had been much disapproval of clergymen in active political roles. Local ministers who had participated in the drive against Smith were as subject to this criticism as Cannon. An anti-clerical reaction occurred that was to undercut permanently the political influence of the churches in the South. This reaction disparaged clergymen and the clerical office. There was a general decline in the status of the ministry accompanied by a loss of trust in the spiritual integrity of most Protestant ministers.
As a political community the state of Virginia benefited by the election of 1928. The issues, the candidates, and the vigorous campaigns conducted on both sides combined to create more public interest in an election than was to occur again for many years. This interest was reflected in popular participation in campaign activities, in financial support, and in the turn-out on election day. Whatever the motivation, Virginians were aroused enough to come to the polls and cast their ballots in very large numbers. Al Smith may have lost, but he received more votes than John W. Davis, the state's winning candidate in 1924. The combined total vote for the major candidates in 1928 was more than eighty thousand votes higher than the figure for 1924. Herbert Hoover was the people's choice by action rather than by inaction.

The question of why Al Smith lost the election of 1928 has been of great interest to political analysts and historians. The day after the election in an editorial entitled "The Contest in Retrospect," the News Leader suggested reasons for the loss. The editor wrote,

His record on prohibition alarmed the drys. His loyalty to the Catholic church aroused the suspicions of those who believe that church is out of sympathy with American ideals. His affiliation with Tammany was a constant drag upon him. Not any one of these three could have caused his defeat by itself, but the combination of all of them was too heavy a handicap to be offset by his advantages. The paper's political analyst had earlier declared the religious issue to be the dominant question in the Virginia campaign. An evaluation by William Ogburn and Nell Talbot in the December 1929 issue of Social Forces concluded that prohibition was the most influential issue. In 1931 Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly wrote in their book that religious and social prejudices competed with general economic prosperity in bringing about the Democratic defeat. Both of these analyses dealt with the nation as a whole rather than just with the South.
Later studies of the election have de-emphasized the religious and prohibition questions. It is generally agreed that in terms of the entire nation no Democrat could have beaten the Republican candidate in 1928. Richard Hofstadter wrote an article expounding this view in The Reporter in 1960. Because of the prosperity of the nation, the prestige of Hoover, the condition of the Democratic party when Smith took it over, and the lack of a good issue for the Democrats to make use of, they really had no chance of victory in 1928. This point should not overshadow Al Smith's definite achievements in the election. He received almost six million more votes than either Davis in 1924 or Cox, the Democratic standard-bearer in 1920. In doing this he unified and remodeled his party; he freed it from the agrarian interests of the South and West and drew to it the urban population, particularly ethnic groups. In the South, however, Smith's Roman Catholicism was decisive in causing his loss.

In Southern White Protestantism in the Twentieth Century Kenneth Bailey weighs the religious factor in Smith's defeat in the South very heavily. He described the anti-Catholic campaign as conducted by the "smear groups," the corporate churches, and their spokesmen as very successful in achieving its ends. George Tindall, the author of The Emergence of the New South, attributes Hoover's victory in the South to a combination of factors: the prohibition and religious questions, vague fears of an alien metropolis, and economic changes that created business interests which tended toward Republicanism.

David Burner faced the question in a recent study, The Politics of Provincialism: The Democratic Party in Transition, 1918-1932. He agrees with the trend of thought that no Democrat could have defeated Herbert Hoover in 1928, but he believes that Al Smith could have done much better than he did.
Burner says that an aspirant for the presidency must show that he is widely representative of the nation for which he is a symbol. He must fuse his social, ethnic, or regional identity in with a national identity. Alfred Smith failed to do this; in his own way he was just as provincial as the rural, dry, fundamentalists who despised him. His campaign, which should have been directed at reconciliation with those elements of the population that opposed him, was conducted in a style that further antagonized them.

In the South Burner feels that Catholicism was more important than prohibition in Smith's defeat, but these two issues were combined with several other concerns. There had been a slight Democratic decline for some time; Virginia had had a strong Republican minority for many years. The issues of 1928 built on these foundations. Burner, like Hofstadter, concludes that the fact of Smith's defeat should not overshadow the assets which he gained for the Democratic party outside this in attracting the urban and immigrant voters to it.

After studying the campaign in Virginia 1928, I believe that Alfred Smith's religion, opposition to prohibition, ties with Tammany Hall, and social background were the causes of his defeat in the Old Dominion. These were the issues that captured the public mind and dominated the pages of the News Leader from spring through fall 1928. I would not rank any one as more important than another, because they cannot be separated; they all combined to give a total image of a man that could not be accepted by most Virginians, in spite of their long and dear Democratic tradition.
FOOTNOTES

4. Ibid., p. 18.
5. Ibid., p. 21.
14. Smith, Up to Now, p. 185.
15. Ibid., p. 286.
16. Ibid., p. 185.
17. Ibid., p. 383.
21. Ibid., p. 4.
25. Ibid., p. 727.
26. Ibid., p. 728.
27. Ibid.
30. Ibid., June 7, 1928, p. 8.
32. Ibid., June 6, 1928, p. 8.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., June 8, 1928, p. 1.
37. Ibid., June 9, 1928, p. 8.
38. Kirby, p. 166.
41. Ibid., June 22, 1928, p. 1.
42. Ibid., p. 14.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., June 25, p. 1.
46. Ibid., p. 1.
49. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 418.
52. Ibid., p. 415.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., p. 16.
58. Ibid., p. 8.
62. Ibid., p. 401
63. Ibid., pp. 407-408.
64. Ibid., p. 414.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Cannon, p. 474.
71. Ibid., p. 425.
72. Ibid., p. 426.
73. Ibid., p. 427.
74. Ibid., p. 432.
75. Ibid., pp. 431-432.
77. Cannon, p. xvii.
78. Ibid., p. 399.
79 Ibid., p. 404.
80 Ibid., p. 407.
81 Ibid., p. 416.
82 Ibid., p. 394.
83 Ibid., p. 408.
84 Ibid., p. 399.
85 Ibid.
86 Smith, *Campaign Addresses*, p. 12.
89 Ibid., p. 8.
90 Ibid., p. 1.
92 Ibid.
95 Ibid., October 15, 1928, p. 1.
96 Peel and Donnelly, p. 124.
98 Ibid., October 1, 1928, p. 8.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., p. 8.
102 Ibid., October 23, 1928, p. 1.
103 Ibid., October 15, 1928, p. 1.
104 Bailey, p. 102.
106  Ibid., October 24, 1928, p. 1.
108  Ibid., October 11, 1928, p. 21.
111  Ibid., October 25, 1928, p. 1.
112  Ibid., October 16, 1928, p. 1.
113  Ibid.
114  Ibid., October 30, 1928, p. 2.
115  Cannon, p. 441.
117  Cannon, p. 441.
119  Ibid.
120  Ibid., October 27, 1928, p. 1.
123  Petersen, p. 89.
125  Ibid., p. 8.
126  Ibid.
127  Ibid., p. 1.
128  Ibid.
129  Cannon, p. 446.
130  Ibid., p. xvii.
131  Ibid.
132  Kirby, p. 159.
133 Cannon, p. xvii.
134 Bailey, pp. 107-108.
135 Petersen, pp. 56-89.
139 Peel and Donnelly, p. 106.
141 Bailey, p. 106.
143 Burner, pp. 179-248.
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PRIMARY SOURCES:


Cannon began writing his autobiography in 1934, but did not complete the work before his death in 1944. His son and the editor finished the book. It is a very patchy work, full in some areas but sparse in others. It ends in 1928 before election day. Cannon was interested in vindicating his activities, which were later criticized both in and out of the courts. Mr. Watson accepts the defense that in Cannon's mind his church and episcopal duties remained separate from those associated with moral and social reform.


The letter from Mr. Marshall publically raised the question of whether his Catholicism disqualified Alfred Smith from holding the office of the Presidency. It was atypical of the material on this issue in that it was written on a very intelligent, non-emotional level and based on elements of Catholic thought.

Richmond News Leader, May-November, 1928.

The News Leader is the source that I made the greatest use of. In editorial policy, it remained fervently loyal to the Democratic party and defended Al Smith against all detractors. The "letters to the editor" were a good sampling of public opinion on the controversial issues of 1928.


A collection of twenty-one of Smith's major addresses as a presidential candidate in 1928. It is geographically well balanced, and the stand of Smith and the Democratic party on all the issues of the campaign is covered. Unfortunately, it has no index, which makes finding the information on a specific topic more difficult.


Valuable for Smith's religious beliefs.


Smith's autobiography was written in 1929 after the loss of the 1928 presidential election and is therefore not useful for the later part of his life. It is not a scholarly exposition to Smith's political ideas but an anecdotal account of his life.

SECONDARY SOURCES:


This is a brief social history which emphasizes the qualities that differentiate the South from the rest of the nation. Mr. Bailey believes that the South's uniqueness is best shown in the realm of religion. There is a chapter on the election of 1928, which discusses the
anti-Smith campaign headed by Southern Baptist and Methodist leaders. The prohibition issue was their rallying point, but anti-Catholicism was inherent in their attacks.

This is the period of the transformation of the Democratic party from an institution with a rural outlook and leaders to one that best represented the hopes of urban Americans. Smith's nomination in 1928 demonstrated the power of the city in the Democratic party. His loss was probably unavoidable in the face of the general prosperity of the nation and its ties with Republicanism, but other issues were important factors also. Bigotry and a poorly handled campaign helped cause the defeat. In his urbanism, Smith was just as provincial as the rural forces that opposed him.

In Dabney's biography of Cannon there is only one chapter on the events of 1928. Mr. Dabney is certain that a strong personal prejudice against Roman Catholics was part of the Bishop's motivation for opposing Alfred E. Smith. The Bishop was also aware of the sentiment in others and did not hesitate to make use of it.

Handlin traces the development of Smith's ideas as well as the major events of his life. The author is very sympathetic to his subject; he tends to limit criticism of Smith to the later period of his life. Mr. Handlin's thesis is that the defeat of Smith was the defeat of the "American dream" in a bad episode of our national life. His bibliography was very helpful as a guide for further research.

Mr. Hofstadter has analysed the election of 1928 and concludes that no Democrat could have beaten Herbert Hoover in 1928. He emphasizes that Smith did far better than either of the previous Democratic candidates since Wilson and made an important contribution by attracting urban, immigrant elements of the population to the Democratic party.

Mr. Key's book includes an analysis of politics in each state, but the emphasis is on the characteristics shared by all the southern states. The author's thesis is that southern politics revolve around the question of the Negro and that their character has been determined by the success of "black-belt" whites in imposing their will on the states. He applies this conception to the election of 1928. The book was published in 1950; consequently it is accurate for southern politics up to that time, but the section on Virginia has definitely been out-dated by recent developments.

This book has a good description of the political atmosphere in Virginia leading up to 1938, but it has very little material on the election itself. Evidently Davis did not play an important role in the events of that year.


Of very little use. After 1931 Montague, a Democratic "Independent," no longer had an important role in Virginia or national politics, although he still served in Congress.


Based on studies of Congressional elections from 1916 to 1944, this article expresses the opinion that religion is an important factor in American political life and may be decisive in determining the results of an election. It should not be relied on too heavily because of the limited nature of the research.


Feel and Donnelly, political science professors at New York University, have written an analysis of all elements of the campaign and election of 1938. They use this material to draw some conclusions about the shape of American political life in 1938 and the future. The book has a very full bibliography. It lacks an index which made finding the limited topics I was interested in difficult.


This is a collection of statistics on the presidential elections from 1789 to 1960. The material is presented in three major tables, by election, by states, and by parties. The information is clear and easily understood.


Tindall's book is the tenth volume in the History of the South series. It is a monumental work on political, economic, and social history. The account of the election of 1938 in brief, but Tindall attributes Smith's loss to economic changes in the South which created business interests that gravitated toward Republicanism.