JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT: HOW DAUBERT INFRINGES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A CIVIL JURY TRIAL

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I. INTRODUCTION

The complexity of modern day civil litigation has created unique pressures on the American legal system. Many cases now entail multiple parties, dozens of witnesses, and unprecedented amounts of discovery. Disputes involving securities regulation, civil rights, and mass torts have tested the limits of court administration and case management. And somewhere within this evolving legal terrain stands the civil jury: laypersons who must weigh increasingly complex evidence and determine fault, liability, and causation.

As courts struggle to develop new procedures to manage their expanding civil dockets, the jury trial often becomes a focus of attention. Although the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in most federal civil suits, some scholars and judges have questioned whether modern day cases are too complex for jurors to decide properly. A tension has developed between the right to a jury trial and effective judicial management of complex litigation.
The Supreme Court’s decision in *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*\(^1\) aimed to relieve some of this tension by giving federal judges gatekeeping power over what expert evidence reaches the jury.\(^2\) The Court reasoned that, if juries never saw confusing, unreliable, or inaccurate evidence, then their decisions would more likely be based on an appropriate understanding of the facts instead of other superficial considerations.\(^3\) Despite these good intentions, *Daubert’s* practical effect within the legal system has been the erosion of the right to a civil jury trial because judges often use their gatekeeping power to block cases from ever reaching the jury. In short, courts are using *Daubert* in a way that circumvents the Seventh Amendment.

This Article begins by reviewing the history, purpose, and function of the Seventh Amendment within the American constitutional system. It then discusses the Supreme Court’s analytical framework for preserving the fundamental features of the right to a civil jury trial while simultaneously permitting rational legal development of the jury system. Next, the Article provides a brief overview of the Court’s *Daubert* jurisprudence, and argues that the creation of judicial gatekeeping has caused an institutional shift of adjudicatory authority away from juries and into the hands of judges in violation of the Seventh Amendment. The Article concludes by suggesting three legal reforms that would achieve many of the same goals of *Daubert* without infringing on the jury’s constitutionally protected fact-finding power.

**II. HISTORY OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT**

The Founding Fathers cherished the right to trial by jury.\(^4\) Indeed, “its deprivation at the hands of the English was one of the important grievances” leading to the American Revolution.\(^5\) The Declaration of Independence even cites the lack of jury trials as one of the gravest injuries against free people, “having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over [the] States.”\(^6\) Records from early American history are filled with references to juries serving as “anchors” in society that prevent the State from straying too far from principles of republican governance.\(^7\)

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2. *Id.* at 597.
3. *See id.* at 592.
5. *Id.*
6. *The Declaration of Independence* para. 2 (U.S. 1776); *see id.* para. 20 (“For depriving us in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.”).
7. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 15 *The Papers of Thomas
Although the Founders often spoke of the importance of criminal juries, they viewed civil juries with similar reverence. Patrick Henry even described the right to trial by jury in civil suits as “one of the greatest securities to the rights of the people, [which] ought to remain sacred and inviolable.”

To be sure, the Framers were most concerned about protecting personal liberties from an oppressive executive, but they were equally weary of an oppressive judiciary. Many of the debates at the 1787 Continental Congress involved creating government structures that minimized the potential for judicial oppression. From these debates, the civil jury emerged “as [a] necessary... counterbalance [to] an invigorated judiciary.”

After Hugh Williamson suggested the “necessity” of a provision to secure the right to jury trials in civil cases, Elbridge Gerry concurred by stating that civil juries were indispensable safeguards against “corrupt Judges.” Agreement about the importance of this judicial counterbalance was so widespread that it was even suggested that Article III, Section 2 be amended to include language preserving the “usual” right to civil jury trials. For many at the Convention, “the jury represented the most effective means available to secure the independence and integrity of the judicial branch of the colonial government.” In short, the Founders viewed the jury as an important bulwark against all forms of government oppression, including judicially created injustices.


11. Id. at 580–81.

12. Id. at 581.


14. Id.

15. Id. at 628.

16. Landsman, supra note 10, at 596.

17. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing jury trials as an “important bulwark against tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the judiciary”).

18. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power—to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the . . . overconditioned or biased response of a judge.”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
Based on the Framers’ strong support of civil juries, it may seem counterintuitive that the Constitution emerged from the Continental Congress without a reference to jury trials. But in all likelihood, this omission was not due to anti-jury sentiment; instead, it resulted because the Framers viewed the right to trial by jury as so inextricably linked to the new constitutional system that including language specifically preserving it was unnecessarily repetitive. Moreover, “[t]he right to trial by jury was probably the only one universally secured by the first American state constitutions.” And because the states had sufficiently protected the right to a civil jury trial, the new Constitution did not need to do the same.

Regardless of the reason why the new Constitution did not mention the civil jury, its omission “triggered a firestorm of protest.” The Anti-federalists led the attack. One of their most prevalent and persuasive criticisms of the new Constitution was its lack of any provision securing the right to civil jury trials. “The Anti-Federalists insisted that the Constitution should explicitly recognize the traditional procedural rights.... The most important of these was the trial by jury.” Patrick Henry, Samuel Adams, and George Mason rallied opposition to the Constitution “by asserting that [it] would abolish civil juries altogether,” thereby giving judges nearly unencumbered power to constrain personal liberties. Jury trials were thus necessary to restrict judicial discretion and further the interests of democracy.

145, 156 (1968) (“Providing an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard ... against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”).
19. Notably, Mr. Gerry voted against ratification, in part, because Article I seemingly gave Congress the power “to establish a tribunal without juries.” FARRAND, supra note 13, at 632–33.
20. See Wolfram, supra note 8, at 656.
21. Id. at 655 (quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1960)).
22. See id.
23. Landsman, supra note 10, at 598.
24. Id. at 599.
25. See Henderson, supra note 9, at 295 (“The almost complete lack of any bill of rights was a principal part of the Anti-Federalist argument; the lack of provision for civil juries was a prominent part of this argument ... ”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 289 (Alexander Hamilton) (David Wooton ed., 2003) (“The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this state, and perhaps in several of the other states, is that relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury in civil cases.”) (emphasis omitted); HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 64 (1981) (“[O]ne of the most widely uttered objections against the Constitution was that it did not provide for (and thus effectively abolished) trial by jury in civil cases.”). See generally Wolfram, supra note 8, at 669–73 (reviewing the Anti-federalist attacks on the new Constitution).
26. STORING, supra note 25, at 64.
The Federalists responded to these criticisms by arguing that the absence of a specified right in the proposed Constitution did not mean that the right was abolished. Alexander Hamilton, for example, agreed that the civil jury system was a “valuable check upon corruption,” and he eventually wrote Federalist Paper 83 to respond to the Anti-federalists’ charge that the new Constitution would destroy the right to a civil jury trial. In it, Hamilton confirmed that the right’s omission from the Constitution was due to disagreements about whether such a provision was necessary, not whether the right was important:

The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.

In sum, records surrounding the Constitution’s ratification reveal a broad consensus that civil jury rights were an important element of free society. “The only disagreement seems to be over whether civil jury rights were the most important of all individual rights, or simply one of the most important rights.” For that reason, amending the Constitution to memorialize the right to a civil jury trial was relatively uncontroversial. After a brief debate, the First Congress passed the Seventh Amendment on September 25, 1789, which became effective on December 15, 1791. The amendment provides:

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

The anti-federalists were not arguing for the institution of civil jury trial in the belief that jury trials were short, inexpensive, decorous and productive of the same decisions that judges sitting without juries would produce. The inconveniences of jury trial were accepted precisely because in important instances the jury would reach a result that the judge either could not or would not reach. Those who favored the civil jury avowed that important areas of protection for litigants in general, and for debtors in particular, would be placed in grave danger unless it were required that juries sit in civil cases.

Id.

29. See The Federalist No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 25, at 290.
30. Id. at 291.
32. The Federalist No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 25, at 292.
33. Klein, supra note 27, at 1010.
34. Wolfram, supra note 8, at 725–26.
35. U.S. Const. amend. VII.
By preserving the right to civil jury trials, the Seventh Amendment diffused adjudicatory power among “neighbors and equals,” thereby reducing the risk of judicial oppression. 36  

This Article proceeds by placing the Seventh Amendment’s history at the forefront of its analysis. Our Founders considered the right to a civil jury trial to be a vital check on judicial power. 37  Thus, any institutional shift of adjudicatory authority away from the jury and into the hands of a state actor—judges—must be viewed skeptically.

III. HOW HAVE COURTS INTERPRETED THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT?

A. The Jury as an Independent Constitutional Actor

Historically, the federal courts have been uneasy with judicial intrusions into the province of the jury. Consider, for example, United States v. Wonson, 38 in which then-Judge Story authored the first judicial opinion interpreting the Seventh Amendment. 39  In Wonson, the government challenged the accuracy of a jury verdict, and asked the appellate court to reverse the verdict or resubmit the case to a new jury. 40  Judge Story began his analysis by noting that, “when then constitution [sic] was submitted to the people for adoption, one of the most powerful objections urged against it was, that in civil causes it did not secure the trial of facts by a jury.” 41  He reasoned that the Framers passed the Seventh Amendment “to remove the weight of this objection” and prevent judges from intruding—either directly or indirectly—into the province of the jury. 42  Thus, because he was

38. 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16750).
39. See id.; see also James L. “Larry” Wright & M. Matthew Williams, Remember the Alamo: The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Doctrine of Incorporation, and State Caps on Jury Awards, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 449, 467 (2004) (“The most influential case in the initial development of the Seventh Amendment’s historical test came from a Massachusetts federal circuit court [in Wonson].”).
40. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 745.
41. Id. at 750.
42. Id. Judge Story’s analysis on this point parallels Anti-federalist criticisms of the proposed Constitution. The Anti-federalists alleged that, without a constitutional guarantee to the right to a civil jury trial, appellate courts could essentially “gut the authority of . . . juries by redetermining ‘law and fact.’” Krauss, supra note 31, at 412.
constitutionally prohibited from reexamining the jury’s factual determinations, Judge Story denied the government’s request for relief.  

The Wonson decision embraced an extremely limited role for judges in civil jury trials. The Seventh Amendment carved out an adjudicatory function that federal judges simply cannot perform: finding facts. Judge Story’s analysis treated the civil jury as an independent constitutional actor, not unlike a fourth branch of government. As such, the jury has a constitutionally protected sphere of fact-finding power with which the other branches of government—specifically the judiciary—are prohibited from interfering.

B. The Supreme Court’s “Historical Test”

Until recently, the Supreme Court has followed Judge Story’s analysis and used the history of the Seventh Amendment as a jurisprudential tool to maintain the exclusive fact-finding authority of civil juries. The Court’s method of analyzing Seventh Amendment questions—sometimes called the “historical test”—hinges upon the Amendment’s reference to “preserving” the right to a civil jury trial. The scope of the right thus depends on when the amendment became effective. As the Court has stated, “[b]ecause the Seventh Amendment demands preservation of the jury trial right, our cases have uniformly held that the content of the right must be judged by historical standards.”

For that reason, the Court has consistently referred to English trial practice circa 1791 when determining the appropriate scope of the right to a trial by jury in civil cases. More than any other constitutional provision, a proper analysis of the Seventh Amendment depends on the historical setting
in which the amendment was adopted. This referential interpretive framework means that English common law defines the scope of the American right to a civil jury trial. The Court’s interpretation of the Seventh Amendment, therefore, has remained largely stagnant for the past two centuries.

C. Modernizing the Right to a Civil Jury Trial

The demands of modern day trial practice have forced the Court to abandon a strict legal orthodoxy of per se compliance with the antiquated features of the English jury. Quite simply, modern civil disputes do not resemble those from 1791, and the American legal system needs to adapt. Blind adherence to English common law would “place modern judicial administration in an historical straight jacket, controlled by the policies of a society 200 years ago.”

Recognizing that such historical dependency could threaten rational legal development, the Court has permitted some modern deviation from English common law. Its new jurisprudential course preserves the substance of common law civil jury trials—in particular the jury’s power to find facts—while simultaneously allowing procedural modifications in the interest of efficiency. Put another way, the Seventh Amendment “preserve[s] the basic institution of the jury trial... not the great mass of procedural forms and details.” The constitutionality of a legal reform that alters any feature of the common law jury thus “resolves itself into a question of what

52. Wolfram, supra note 8, at 641; see also United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16750) (“Beyond all question, the common law [referred to in the Seventh Amendment] is not the common law of any individual state... but it is the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.”). For a critique of the Court’s historical mode of analysis and an explanation for how it can be traced to Judge Story’s opinion in Wonson, see generally Klein, supra note 27, at 1020–30, and Krauss, supra note 31, at 460–78.
53. Wolfram, supra note 8, at 649.
54. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 161 (1973) (discussing why the Seventh Amendment did not “saddle archaic and presently unworkable common-law procedures upon the federal courts” or “nullify innovative changes” to modern day trials). But cf. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963) (“The federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength.”).
55. Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 487 (1975); see also id. at 530 (“[N]o constitutional provision can be interpreted in a social vacuum.”).
56. Henderson, supra note 9, at 336; cf. Meyer, supra note 37, at 346 (“[C]ourts have... held that the purpose of the Seventh Amendment was to preserve the substance of the jury trial right rather than the exact details of the procedure as it existed in 1791.”).
requirements are *fundamental* and what are *unessential*.

English common law, for example, guaranteed civil plaintiffs the right to a twelve-person jury, and for many years, the Court maintained that a guarantee to a “trial by jury” meant “a trial by a jury of twelve.” But in 1970, the Court permitted federal judges to empanel civil juries of six, reasoning that the historical requirement of twelve jurors was incidental to the common law right to a jury trial. Federal courts were thus free to modify the composition of civil juries, but, importantly, not free to alter the jury’s essential fact-finding function. The former legal reform is sufficiently peripheral to the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee; the latter strikes at its core. Put another way, the qualities of juries may change, but the right to jury trial may not.

This distinction between the fundamental and unessential qualities of civil juries is important. Modern legal developments—such as the increasing complexity and size of civil suits—have pressured our justice system to resolve disputes more efficiently. The system has responded to this pressure by reducing jury sizes, promulgating new rules of evidence,

60. *Id.; see also Maxwell v. Dow*, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900).  
61. *Colgrove v. Battin*, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973) (“A jury of six satisfies the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury in civil cases.”); *see also Williams v. Florida*, 399 U.S. 78, 102 (1970) (describing the twelve person jury as an “historical accident”); *Jeffrey Abramson*, *We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy* 180 (1994) (“[T]he Court reasoned that the number twelve was a fluke of history unrelated to the core functions of the jury.”).  
62. *Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Ref Co.*, 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931); *see also Dimick v. Schiedt*, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (“Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.”).  
63. *See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore*, 439 U.S. 322, 345 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“If a jury would have been impaneled in a particular kind of case in 1791, then the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial today, if either party so desires.”); *Curtis v. Loether*, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (“[T]he thrust of the [Seventh] Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791.”); *Beacon Theatres v. Westover*, 359 U.S. 500, 510 n.18 (1959) (“This Court has long emphasized the importance of the jury trial.”); *Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman*, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (“The aim of the Amendment, as this Court has held, is to preserve the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury, as distinguished from mere matters of form or procedure.”); *Scott v. Neely*, 140 U.S. 106, 109–10 (1891) (“In the Federal courts this [jury] right cannot be dispensed with, except by the assent of the parties entitled to it.”).  
64. *See infra* Part III.D.  
65. *See John W. Wesley*, *Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial Capacity*, 25 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 675, 686 (1984) (“The increased use of scientific evidence, the trend toward a more relaxed standard of admissibility, and the increasing number of suits involving science and technology will compound the problem of delay. Thus, scientific evidence often creates additional burdens of manageability and poses serious problems of judicial administration.”).
and updating antiquated rules of procedure— all of which have changed the institutional framework within which litigants assert their Seventh Amendment rights. Many of these institutional modifications are constitutionally permissible. Legal developments that merely change the form of civil jury trials remain sufficiently detached from the core right preserved in the Seventh Amendment. Yet other changes in the law can go—and have gone—too far. One of the key challenges for our legal system, therefore, is modernizing judicial administration without circumventing the constitutional right to civil jury trials. Federal courts are not bound to follow England’s rules of evidence from 1791, but they are bound to respect civil litigants’ right to a trial by jury. As then-Justice Rehnquist stated in *Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore*,

To say that the Seventh Amendment does not tie federal courts to the exact procedure of the common law in 1791 does not imply, however, that any nominally “procedural” change can be implemented, regardless of its impact on the functions of the jury. For to sanction creation of procedural devices which limit the province of the jury to a greater degree than permitted at common law in 1791 is in direct contravention of the Seventh Amendment.

In other words, any legal reform that erodes the jury’s historical fact-finding function is unconstitutional.

### D. The Challenges of Complex Evidence

Striking the constitutional balance between improving judicial administration and preserving the jury’s fact-finding primacy is not easy, and the increased complexity of modern day civil litigation has made achieving this balance even more challenging. In recent years, for example, the number of science-based grievances reaching the courtroom has increased substantially. “Few dispute that litigation today deals with more
complex scientific issues than it did in the past." Many civil trials now take months to complete, entail multiple parties, and involve vast quantities of evidence. "This combination of factors results in cases so complicated that they are difficult for both attorneys and courts to manage and for any of the trial participants, including juries, to understand." Such complex cases raise serious questions regarding whether the scientifically unsophisticated fact-finder is, or should be, able to decide between the two competing versions of "truth" presented in the courtroom.

In the latter part of the twentieth century, many scholars and judges questioned whether jurors could even comprehend the evidence of complex civil litigation. According to one commentator: "It is difficult to believe that lay jurors can be thrust into a complicated antitrust or shareholder derivative action and, on the basis of conflicting expert testimony, determine whether a challenged business practice is improper." Chief Justice Warren Burger further attacked the fact-finding abilities of modern juries by "suggest[ing] that jurors lack the abilities required to deal with the complex issues often presented in federal civil trials."

To be sure, not all courts and commentators demeaned juror intelligence at the end of the twentieth century. But a broad consensus did exist that the increasingly complex scientific evidence of civil litigation raised serious questions about the propriety and viability of the jury's historical fact-finding primacy. The layperson jury simply seemed incapable of properly understanding and weighing this new evidence. For that reason, there was

(compiling cases).

73. Meyer, supra note 37, at 337–38.
74. Id. at 338.
76. Redish, supra note 55, at 505.
78. See, e.g., In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 429–30 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The opponents of the use of juries in complex civil cases generally assume that jurors are incapable of understanding complicated matters. This argument unnecessarily and improperly demeans the intelligence of the citizens of this Nation. We do not accept such an assertion."); Jones v. Orienstein, 73 F.R.D. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying a motion to quash a jury demand because, although the case was a complex derivative class action, it was not beyond the practical abilities of a jury); Radial Lip Mach., Inc. v. Int'l Carbide Corp., 76 F.R.D. 224, 229 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (rejecting plaintiff’s request for a bench trial because the jury was able to understand the complex trademark infringement issues involved in the case); see also infra Part V.C.
79. For a review of the legal climate surrounding the admissibility of expert evidence in the 1980s and early 1990s, see Amy T. Schultz, The New Gatekeepers: Judging Scientific Evidence in a Post-Frye
a clear trend in the 1980s “to diminish the role of the jury in civil actions.”  
And in 1993, the Supreme Court continued this trend when it issued *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*

IV. THE *DAUBERT* TRILOGY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

A. *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*

In *Daubert*, the Court responded to the increased complexity of modern day litigation by outlining a gatekeeping function for judges when parties seek to introduce expert testimony at trial. According to the Court, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ("Rule 702") obligates trial judges to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” As a threshold matter, trial judges should exclude expert testimony if they determine that such evidence will not reliably assist the jury in ascertaining disputed facts. The *Daubert* opinion thus "deputizes federal judges as amateur scientist gatekeepers." If the proposed scientific evidence is reliable, the judge may permit its presentation to the jury; if it is unreliable, the judge will keep the evidence from the jury.

To help judges perform this new gatekeeping duty, the *Daubert* opinion outlined general components of “good science,” such as whether an expert’s proposed theory or technique has been tested, subjected to peer review and published, or sufficiently investigated to establish margins of error. These factors are only guidelines. *Daubert* did not “hand judges a step-by-step

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82. Id. at 585.
83. Id. at 589.
87. *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 593–94. Before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, many federal courts followed the dictates of *Frye v. United States*, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and determined the admissibility of scientific evidence by looking exclusively at its “general acceptance” in the scientific community. *Frye*, 293 F. at 1014. *Daubert*, however, relegated this once-controlling inquiry into just one of several factors that determine admissibility. See *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 589 (“*Frye* made ‘general acceptance’ the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.”).
guide to applying scientific principles.” Trial court judges—who often lack scientific sophistication—thus maintain considerable discretion over what expert evidence, if any, ultimately reaches the jury.

B. General Electric Co. v. Joiner

The Court further defined the role of the Daubert gatekeeper in General Electric Co. v. Joiner. There, the Court held that appellate courts should use the highly deferential “abuse of discretion” standard when reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert. Joiner is also notable because it advised federal judges to conduct an inquiry into the basis of proposed expert testimony. This inquiry helps to ensure that opinion evidence is connected to reliable science by more than simply “ipse dixit of the expert.” Put another way, trial judges should focus on the science underlying an expert’s opinion, not merely the witness’s conclusions derived therefrom. If expert testimony strays too far from reliable science, the trial court must exclude the testimony.

In short, Joiner substantially broadened and deepened the judicial gatekeeping responsibilities outlined in Daubert. Federal judges must now scrutinize the factual predicates of expert opinions to determine whether they comport with principles of reliable science.

C. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael

The third and final case of the Daubert trilogy is Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. In Kumho, the Supreme Court clarified that Daubert’s gatekeeping requirement applies to all expert testimony, regardless of

89. See infra Part V.C.
91. Id. at 138–39.
92. Cf. id. at 147 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The Court’s opinion, which I join, emphasizes Daubert’s statement that a trial judge, acting as a ‘gatekeeper’, must ‘ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.’” (citation omitted)).
93. Id. at 146 (majority opinion); see also Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony: The Supreme Court’s Rules, Issues Sci. & Tech., 57, 61 (2000) (“[S]terling credentials are not enough. . . . [A]n expert’s outstanding qualifications will not make the expert’s opinion admissible unless the expert has a valid basis for how and why a conclusion was reached.”).
95. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146–47.
whether it is based on professional studies or personal experience. Rule 702 “makes no relevant distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge.” Accordingly, Kunho held that trial judges have gatekeeping power to exclude all proposed expert testimony from trial proceedings. District judges now have incredible “discretionary authority”—reversible only on grounds of abuse—over what, if any, expert evidence ultimately reaches the jury.

V. JUDICIAL GATEKEEPING’S THREAT TO THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT

A. Not Just Another Rule of Evidence

The questions presented in the Daubert line of cases primarily involved the appropriate scope of Rule 702. Daubert may thus be viewed as just another evidentiary constraint limiting the jury’s access to prejudicial or irrelevant evidence, much in the same way that the Federal Rules of Evidence generally prohibit hearsay or speculation. This perspective, however, fails to appreciate the way that Daubert functions in modern day practice. The Supreme Court may have intended Daubert to give federal judges gatekeeping power over evidence, but in practice, Daubert gives federal judges gatekeeping power over the right to a civil jury trial.

Consider, for example, toxic tort cases, where “plaintiffs cannot prove that the defendants’ pharmaceuticals or chemicals caused their damaged health without expert testimony on causation, the crucial issue in these cases.” In many toxic tort disputes, judges use pre-trial “Daubert hearings” to “exclude so much of the evidence upon which plaintiffs intend to rely that a given case cannot proceed.” Put another way, a trial judge’s

97. Id. at 152.
98. Id. at 147.
99. Id. at 158.
decision to exclude proposed expert testimony is outcome determinative: the evidentiary ruling leads directly to a summary judgment dismissal, thereby blocking the case from ever reaching a jury. Other Federal Rules of Evidence may prevent litigants from introducing certain evidence at trial, but rarely do they prevent entire cases from reaching a jury altogether.

Indeed, modern day “[f]ederal jurisprudence is largely the product of summary judgment.” Since Daubert, the frequency of motions for summary judgment in civil litigation has increased significantly, as has the frequency with which judges grant such motions. Daubert has thus transferred substantial case disposition power away from juries and into the hands of judges. Chief Justice Feldman of the Arizona Supreme Court found this shift particularly troubling:

In my mind, Daubert gives trial judges far more authority over civil cases than they ought to have.... What I feared would happen eventually, and what has happened, is that instead of having jury trials we now have Daubert hearings before the judge. The judge, in effect, then determines the outcome of the case by granting summary judgment. To my mind, this far exceeds any power that the Constitution gave judges over jury trials.

Judicial gatekeeping is also troubling because federal judges have lengthy dockets, and consequently “have an incentive to dispose of cases quickly.” In turn, judges may use their gatekeeping discretion to exclude evidence and grant summary judgment in a greater percentage of cases than defense attorneys, by and large, filed the majority of motions to challenge expert testimony. The differential impact of these motions was realized by civil plaintiffs, due to the potential dispositive nature of the motion against a lone expert.

103. Weinstein, supra note 101, at 21–22; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 327 n.8 (2007) (“In numerous contexts, gatekeeping judicial determinations prevent submission of claims to a jury’s judgment . . . .”); WATERS & HODGE, supra note 102, at 1 (arguing that “[c]laiming an expert witness may dispose a case”); id. at 15 (“The impact of the bench rulings on admissibility of experts influences the disposition. For instance, if a plaintiff’s lone expert is excluded, typically the case is resolved by either a summary judgment or a directed verdict.”); TELLUS INST., supra note 102, at 3 (“Polluters and manufacturers of dangerous products are successfully using Daubert to keep juries from hearing scientific or any other evidence against them.”).


106. TELLUS INST., supra note 102, at 13 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

may be justified. Put another way, “Daubert gives a powerful tool to judges with incentives to dismiss.” Such potential for judicial oppression is precisely what the Founders intended to prevent with the Seventh Amendment.

Daubert thus provides judges with the awesome—and unique—power to stop a case from proceeding to a jury based solely on an evidentiary ruling. “[T]he judge[,] acting as a gatekeeper at a Daubert hearing[,]... is essentially blocking a litigant’s right to a jury trial.” Federal trial judges are acting as jury gatekeepers; to access the jury, a litigant must first go through the judge. This judicial control over the right to civil jury trials undermines the fundamental guarantee of the Seventh Amendment. As one scholar described:

Daubert affects pretrial practices like discovery and summary judgment far more than trial, the supposed domain of rules of evidence. In the name of Daubert and Evidence, judges who so choose have a powerful tool with which to manipulate the American system of adjudication and bypass the Seventh Amendment.

Not only are gatekeeping judges resolving factual disputes among opposing witnesses, but they are also resolving such disputes in a way that “poses a threat to the continued viability of the Seventh Amendment jury trial.”

The threat that Daubert gatekeeping poses to jury trials becomes particularly clear with an appreciation of the extensive use of expert testimony in civil litigation. One pre-Daubert study of jury verdicts in California reported that experts testified in eighty-six percent of civil jury trials. In most of these cases, both parties called expert witnesses, and

108. Id.
109. Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 298. “If a court is unwilling or unable to try cases, Daubert certainly can be abused. The opportunity to dismiss a case which should be heard by a jury is within every judge’s grasp.” Id.
110. See supra notes 4–18 and accompanying text; see also Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 307 (arguing that Daubert gives the opportunity to inject their personal preferences into the American judicial system).
111. Cf. Tellus Inst., supra note 102, at 16 (noting that the Daubert line of cases “hand[s] judges extensive powers for deciding not only whether complex evidence should be allowed into the courtroom, but whether the case should move forward at all when there are differences of opinion among experts”).
112. Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 292.
113. Cf. supra Part II.
114. Weinstein, supra note 101, at 22 (emphasis added); see also id. at 105 (noting how Daubert has highlighted the “reluctance” of courts “to allow juries to decide cases”).
115. Id. at 112.
117. Id. at 1120.
an average of 3.8 experts testified per trial. This widespread use of expert testimony in civil litigation, which is expected to increase in the future, highlights the extraordinary opportunity for judges to prevent cases from proceeding to a jury, especially because defendants are increasingly using Daubert hearings as a litigation strategy. One study of state civil cases reported that defendants challenged plaintiffs’ expert witness proffers eighty-two percent of the time. Almost half of these challenges were successful.

B. Gatekeeping in Practice

1. Judicial Fact-Finding

The nature of Daubert evidentiary decision-making further highlights the distinction between it and other rules of evidence. For instance, when ruling on a liability insurance objection, the judge simply determines whether a party is offering evidence of insurance to prove negligence. The judicial inquiry is similarly straightforward with criminal history, character, and hearsay evidence, for which the Federal Rules of Evidence are fairly easy to apply; judges frequently rule on such objections at trial with little or no argument from counsel.

But ruling on a Daubert objection is entirely different. “In their role as amateur scientists, [gatekeeper] judges examine a theory, gather opposing facts about it, and then attempt to make a ‘reasoned judgment’ about which set of facts are [sic] correct.” Sorting out conflicting facts and determining the appropriate credence to give competing expert witnesses, however, is the constitutionally safeguarded purpose of the jury. Daubert thus robs the jury of its role as arbiter of the weight and credibility of

118. Id. at 1119.
119. Edward J. lmwinkelried, Trial Judges—Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury’s Province to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 6 (2000).
121. Id. at 111.
122. FED. R. EVID. 411.
124. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 902 (1983); see also United States v. Cisneros, 203 F.3d 333, 343 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Credibility determinations are the exclusive province of the jury . . . .” (citation omitted)); Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 292.
In *Wonson*, Judge Story outlined a bright line rule that the Seventh Amendment prevents judges from interfering with the civil jury’s fact-finding domain. *Daubert* violates that rule.

2. Increased Costs, Decreased Jury Trials

Before the Court issued *Daubert*, litigants challenged the admissibility of expert testimony during trial. After *Daubert*, however, litigants raise the majority of such challenges in motions *in limine*. These motions usually lead to *Daubert* hearings, which resemble full trials: the judge presides, the expert is cross examined, and a stenographer creates a transcript. *Daubert* hearings are essentially “dry runs” of jury trials, and can be one of the most expensive, adversarial, and time-consuming phases of litigation.

The additional cost of *Daubert* hearings can itself be a barrier to jury trials. Large law firms, for example, may request a *Daubert* hearing to drive up litigation costs and disadvantage smaller, opposing firms. Litigants seeking to utilize expert testimony must now pay for and conduct two trials: one before the gatekeeping judge and one (potentially) before the jury. These costs can be prohibitive to litigants—usually plaintiffs—seeking access to jury trials. Defending a *Daubert* motion “can cost

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126. DAVID M. FLORES ET AL., EFFECTS OF DAUBERT ON EXPERT EVIDENCE PRACTICES IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH CAROLINA 30 (2008),
127. Id. at 19.
129. Id. at 151.
130. Kanner & Casey, supra note 86, at 324.
131. Gutheil & Bursztajn, supra note 128, at 152.
132. According to one scholar:
Separate *Daubert* hearings can be quite expensive, consuming many hours of attorney and expert witness time. The prospect of shepherdung expert witnesses through depositions and *Daubert* hearings in which opposing attorneys launch intensive attacks on the corpuscles of the relevant scientific studies, as well as on the expert witnesses’ own conclusions, may be enough to discourage even the most aggressive trial attorney from taking even the most meritorious cases in which causation in fact is a seriously contested issue.
plaintiffs hundreds and thousands of dollars."

This substantial expense may help to explain why the number of toxic tort jury trials has steadily decreased in the years following Daubert. Defendants began using Daubert motions to drive up plaintiffs’ costs and erect “smoke screens” that attack well-regarded experts simply to prevent cases from proceeding to trial. In one study of Daubert’s impact within the Delaware Superior Court, plaintiffs’ attorneys expressed concern about “the additional costs and fees that arise out of the discovery process and depositions of experts in response to a Daubert challenge.” These extra costs likely contributed to Delaware’s “clear trend” away from jury trials in post-Daubert case dispositions. Similar trends exist in the federal courts: despite an increase in litigation over the past few decades, the number of federal civil trials between 1992 and 2002 decreased by twenty-eight percent.

C. Are Judges Better Equipped Than Juries To Decide the Reliability of Expert Evidence?

One theme present throughout the Daubert trilogy is the underlying fear that unsophisticated jurors will “fall prey to cunning expert witnesses” and return verdicts inconsistent with reliable science. “[T]he Supreme Court’s overriding concern... was with the problem of jury exposure to confusing and unreliable expert testimony.” In other words, the Court

133. TELLUS INST., supra note 102, at 12.
134. Id.
136. In 1999, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Daubert trilogy as binding precedent within the state court system. See M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. 1999).
137. WATERS & HODGE, supra note 102, at 18.
138. Id.
140. See generally Paula Hannaford-Agor, Robert C. LaFountain & Shauna Strickland, Trial Trends and Implications for the Civil Justice System, 11 CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS 3 (2005), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/csp/highlights/highlights main page.html (follow “Trial Trends and Implications for the Civil Justice System” hyperlink under “Title” to download “PDF”) (discussing the causes and implications of the “vanishing” civil jury trial).
was worried that, in the presence of conflicting testimony about complex evidence, jurors would decide cases based not upon an appropriate comprehension of the evidence, but upon some other superficial factor. *Daubert* further assumes that judges will not suffer from these shortcomings because they are better equipped than jurors—through education, experience, or sophistication—to determine the validity and reliability of expert evidence.  

This reasoning is questionable at best. Legal expertise does not equate to scientific expertise. Most judges lack formal scientific training, and when it comes to understanding and assessing expert testimony, they are laypeople—just like most jurors—who struggle to comprehend complex evidence. *Daubert* thus transferred authority to determine the credibility and reliability of expert testimony from non-expert juries to non-expert judges.

One survey of state trial court judges found that only six percent of them properly understood the scientific meaning of falsifiability, a key principle used to assess the merits of scientific evidence. The authors of that study questioned whether judges could properly administer the *Daubert* criteria given their “lack of sophistication” regarding important principles of scientific validity. In other words, judicial gatekeeping “is likely to

142. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1678 (1998) (noting that *Daubert* assumes that judges are “in a significantly better epistemic position to decide whether proffered scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admissible in a trial before a nonexpert jury”); Damiani, supra note 140, at 545–46 (“Concerns over expert testimony lie at the heart of the real and proposed authority shift to judges; *Daubert*, *Joiner*, and *Kumho* operate on the theory that the evidence rules give experts excessive authority and make jurors excessively vulnerable.” (quotation omitted)).

143. See Brief for Neil Vidmar et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709), 1998 WL 734434, at *14 [hereinafter Brief for Vidmar] (“None of the studies [on jurors’ ability to comprehend complex evidence] produced any evidence that in the face of complicated testimony jurors simply deferred to the experts and suspended their responsibility to make the best judgment that they could.”).

144. Wesley, supra note 65, at 685. Indeed, empirical evidence reveals substantial similarities between how judges and juries scrutinize and weigh evidence. See Brief for Vidmar, supra note 143, at **7–10 (reviewing studies showing trial judges’ and experts’ agreement with jury verdicts).

145. Brewer, supra note 142, at 1678; cf. Neil Vidmar & Valerie P. Hans, American Juries 188 (2007) (“The difficulties that both judges and juries face in evaluating expert evidence challenge the easy assumption that, because of education or experience, a trial judge deciding alone will more often than not do better than the jury in judging scientific expert testimony.”).


147. Id. at 453.
produce inconsistent, arbitrary, and unpredictable results"—the very sort of judge-made injustices that our Founding Fathers sought to eliminate when they passed the Seventh Amendment.

Furthermore, empirical investigations of jury decision-making tend to disprove criticisms of the jury’s ability to understand complex cases. In a 1991 study, a group of legal scholars identified a “sharp contrast” between the research and popular legal opinion regarding jury competence. According to the study, the weight of available research showed that jurors were “remarkably adept” fact-finders whose capabilities even “extend[ed] to cases of the greatest complexity.” Although jurors may struggle to comprehend complex litigation, “there is no firm evidence that their judgments have therefore been wrong.”

In sum, Daubert assumes that judges are better able than jurors to understand and scrutinize expert testimony. This assumption is wrong; it rests on anecdotes, not data. Available jury research shows that jurors can—and do—comprehend expert testimony at least as well as judges. That is not to say that jurors do not struggle with complex evidence. The point is simply that, in cases where jurors may have been confused, “judges would have been equally confused.” Both are likely to struggle and make mistakes. But, as Thomas Jefferson once stated, the risk of an incorrect

148. Vickers, supra note 107, at 120.
149. Notably, because these non-expert judges may possess an incorrect understanding on scientific reliability, they may prevent experts from testifying for erroneous reasons. See CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 16 (2006). Poor implementation of the Daubert criteria can thus create improperly high barriers for plaintiffs seeking access to trials, thereby depriving litigants of their Seventh Amendment rights. See id. at 17.
150. See generally Cecil, Hans & Wiggins, supra note 77, at 744–75.
151. Id. at 744.
152. Id. at 745.
154. Indeed, jurors may be better at scrutinizing expert evidence than judges because they share ideas and knowledge with one another. This collaboration may lead to a collective wisdom superior to the individual wisdom of a trial court judge. As the Ninth Circuit explained:

While we express great confidence in the abilities of judges, no one has yet demonstrated how one judge can be a superior fact-finder to the knowledge and experience that citizen-jurors bring to bear on a case. We do not accept the underlying premise of appellees’ argument, “that a single judge is brighter than the jurors collectively functioning together.”

In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
jury verdict “is less dangerous to the [S]tate, and less afflicting to the loser,” than leaving such power over the rights of litigants to the potentially oppressive decision of an unelected governmental actor.\footnote{Thomson Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 214–15 (1787); see also id. at 215 (“In truth, it is better to toss up cross and pile in a cause, than to refer it to a judge whose mind is warped by any motive whatever, in that particular case.”).}

VI. ADAPTING THE JURY SYSTEM WITHOUT CIRCUMVENTING THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT: CHANGING THE UNESSSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE RIGHT TO A CIVIL JURY TRIAL

*Daubert* was the Supreme Court’s response to the increasingly complex fact-finding demands of modern litigation. The Court’s response, however, was flawed. Instead of helping jurors respond to the challenges of complex evidence, *Daubert* removed a portion of the jury’s fact-finding authority and gave it to judges. The Court decreased the jury’s power to resolve civil disputes and increased the judge’s power to control litigants’ access to civil juries. This major shift of adjudicatory authority is a fundamental change to the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. And such fundamental changes are constitutionally impermissible.\footnote{See Hyongsoon Kim, Adversarialism Defended: Daubert and the Judge’s Role in Evaluating Expert Evidence, 34 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 223, 226 (2001) (quotation omitted).}

This section briefly outlines three ways that the legal system can adapt to the challenges of modern day civil litigation without infringing on the essential functions of the American jury. The goal here is not to provide a full defense of these proposals; instead, the objective is to demonstrate ways that the legal system can address the underlying concerns of *Daubert* without violating the Seventh Amendment. These three proposals thus focus on enhancing—rather than circumventing—the fact-finding abilities of jurors. Each proposal alters some unessential feature of the right to a jury trial, leaving the fundamental qualities of that right undisturbed.

A. Increase the Use of Court-Appointed Experts

Because litigants present their cases within an adversarial system, their expert witnesses are likely to present one-sided, distorted perspectives on the evidence.\footnote{Molly Treadway Johnson, Carol Krafs & Joe S. Cecil, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials: A Preliminary Analysis 5 (2000), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/exptesti.pdf/$file/exptesti.pdf.} These experts may become “advocates for the side that hired them” and thus abandon objectivity in pursuit of victory at trial.\footnote{See supra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.}
a result, fact-finders—whether judge or jury—can be misled, confused, and frustrated.\textsuperscript{160} Daubert’s solution to these problems was to eliminate a significant portion of the jury’s fact-finding power. A better, constitutional solution is to help jurors sort through the biased rhetoric and conflicting expert testimony by providing them with an objective framework within which to scrutinize such evidence.

To provide this framework, judges should more frequently use their power under Federal Rule of Evidence 706 (“Rule 706”), which authorizes them to appoint neutral experts to testify at trial alongside partisan experts called by litigants.\textsuperscript{161} These neutral experts will enhance each juror’s ability to understand, assess, and evaluate the testimony of the litigants’ experts.\textsuperscript{162} “Appointing an expert enables a court to compensate for omissions and to obtain evidence, opinions, and explanations not presented by the parties. As such, this procedure promotes rational decision making and accurate decisions.”\textsuperscript{163} Put simply, neutral experts will improve jury understanding of complex evidence, thus making it more likely that the ultimate verdict will be based on a proper understanding of the relevant facts.

Admittedly, court-appointed experts are not a perfect solution to the increasingly complex nature of civil litigation.\textsuperscript{164} Because a court-appointed expert may resolve disputes between the litigants’ experts—and therefore be outcome determinative\textsuperscript{165}—judges have understandably been reluctant to exercise their authority under Rule 706.\textsuperscript{166} But limiting the


\textsuperscript{161} FED. R. EVID. 706(a) (“The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.”). Notably, the Daubert opinion encourages judges to “be mindful” of Rule 706 when performing their gatekeeping role. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).


\textsuperscript{164} See Gross, supra note 116, at 1220 (“The essential flaw in the existing schemes for appointment of experts is the absence of incentives to use them. Appointed experts are never required . . . . Judges, even lawyers, may favor the practice in principle, but in the heat of a particular case appointed experts are always dispensable.”). See generally Karen Butler Reisinger, Note, Court-Appointed Expert Panels: A Comparison of Two Models, 32 IOWA L. REV. 225, 235–38 (1998) (reviewing scholarly criticisms of Rule 706).

\textsuperscript{165} See, e.g., Hiern v. Sarpy, 161 F.R.D. 332, 336 (E.D. La. 1995) (“[A] danger exists that the appointed expert would side with either of the other experts, giving one side an inappropriate numerical advantage.”). Deason, supra note 163, at 123 (“In a jury case, the concern is that the temptation for jurors to accept uncritically the views of any expert will be increased only if they perceive that the expert has the blessing of the court.”).

\textsuperscript{166} For example, Joe S. Cecil & Thomas S. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1004 (1994), found
scope of Rule 706 testimony may reduce some of this concern about court-appointed experts acting as potential tiebreakers. Their testimony, for example, could be limited to only background or educational information. The court-appointed expert would thus serve as “a teacher who, unaffected by his having been called as a witness by one side or the other, can explain the technical significance of the evidence presented.”167 The goal of such testimony would be to help the jury find facts, not to resolve the underlying dispute.

In like manner, courts could delegate their expert appointment power to a qualified intermediary. Professor Christopher Robertson has developed a legal reform procedure called “blind expertise,” whereby an intermediary performs a “double-blinding function” by soliciting expert opinions on behalf of the litigants.168 The expert would hence “be unaware of whether the plaintiff or defendant was requesting the opinion.”169 After receiving the expert’s case assessment, the litigant could either (1) call the expert as a witness and disclose her identity to the opposition, or (2) treat the expert as a consultant, thereby shielding her opinion from discovery within the protective umbrella of the work product doctrine.170 Because blind experts shrouded in a “veil of ignorance”171 are more likely to render objective opinions, this procedure would enhance the overall accuracy of expert testimony presented to juries. In turn, verdicts would more likely be based on reliable science and thus more likely be seen as legitimate, final, and factually correct.172 Although this blinding process cannot guarantee the truth of expert testimony—or the jury verdicts derived therefrom—it would “eliminate the litigant-induced selection, compensation, and affiliation biases that degrade the accuracy of litigation witnesses under the status quo.”173 And it accomplishes all of this without eroding the jury’s fact-finding power.

that only twenty percent of federal judges had appointed an independent expert.
169. Id. at 208.
170. See id. at 209–10.
173. Robertson, supra note 168, at 179.
B. Improve Expert Witness Accountability

Another way to help juries assess the complex evidence of modern civil litigation is by increasing the accountability of experts who testify at trial. The key to this legal reform is the creation of an institutional incentive that discourages experts from testifying as partisan advocates. Currently, scientific peers rarely evaluate their fellow expert’s testimony for accuracy, and so witnesses may feel free to say in court what they would never say to colleagues. As Professor Samuel Gross describes:

One of the limiting features of our present system is its insularity; what an expert says in litigation is almost never exposed to a disinterested audience of the expert’s professional colleagues. As a result, an expert witness is rarely held accountable to those who are best able to evaluate her evidence, and whose opinion may matter most to her career and to her vanity. Breaching this boundary would add a powerful incentive for care and for accuracy.

Professor Gross’s solution to achieving increased accountability is for expert opinions to undergo a peer review process similar to that required for many scientific publications. This review process, however, would be time consuming, expensive, and dependent upon the cooperation of professional associations. In short, it would be impractical.

Nonetheless, Professor Gross’s solution appropriately focuses on increasing the transparency of expert testimony. An alternative proposal is the creation of a statewide or national electronic database to warehouse transcripts of all expert testimony. Interested parties could then review the transcripts for whatever purpose. The goal would be to create a level of transparency that maintains the accountability of expert witnesses—to their peers, future litigants, or the general public—long after they have left the isolated environment of the courtroom. If witnesses know that their words will forever be available to the public at large, then they will, presumably, be more inclined toward cautious, accurate, and vigilant testimony, as opposed to biased testimony that is shaped by the party calling them.

174. Notably, the use of neutral, court-appointed expert witnesses should help to achieve such accountability. If jurors have a basic understanding of the relevant science before partisan experts testify, then those experts would be less inclined to present biased or scientifically incomplete testimony: expert witnesses would presumably be more cautious if they are testifying to an educated jury. Additionally, the mere presence of a scientific colleague (the neutral expert) in the courtroom might also reduce partisan expert “lobbying.”
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1214–15.
178. The transcripts, of course, would be appropriately redacted.
179. Cf. Wrobleski v. de Lara, 727 A.2d 930, 933 (Md. 1999) (discussing concerns surrounding a
C. Let Jurors Ask Written Questions

Perhaps the easiest way to help jurors understand complex evidence is to grant them the ability to submit written questions to expert witnesses.\textsuperscript{180} Other important actors in the legal system already have this power. Before trial, lawyers ask experts questions to better understand the merits of the case and focus court proceedings on the most important issues.\textsuperscript{181} During bench trials, judges also question expert witnesses to aid their own understanding of the facts. But jurors—perhaps the most important decision-makers within the legal system—do not have the same opportunity to ask experts questions.\textsuperscript{182} “It is time to end this nonsensical practice.”\textsuperscript{183} The legal system does not further justice by erecting institutional bars to resolving jury confusion about complex evidence.

One model of this type of legal reform is found in the Arizona state courts, which currently permit jurors to take notes and direct questions to witnesses during trials. One study of this system found that such questioning “promote[d] juror understanding of the facts and issues.”\textsuperscript{184} Moreover, “[b]y empowering jurors with the opportunity to ask questions, they become more attentive, even if they choose not to exercise the questioning option.”\textsuperscript{185} Another study that reviewed jury questioning in New Jersey civil trials reported a widespread consensus among judges and trial attorneys that jurors become more attentive and better understand testimony after being permitted to ask witnesses questions.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{180} Juror questioning of witnesses was common practice in the 1800s, and many Anti-federalists intended that the jury play an active role at trials. See Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 Hofstra L. Rev. 377, 454–55 (1996); see also Jeffrey S. Berkowitz, Note, Breaking the Silence: Should Jurors be Allowed To Question Witnesses During Trial?, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 117, 124 (1991) (explaining that the historical practice of permitting juries to ask questions at trial became disfavored because “[t]he modern Anglo-American judicial system places the primary responsibility for eliciting the facts and issues in a case on the parties presenting the evidence”).


\textsuperscript{183} Meyer, supra note 37, at 365.

In sum, permitting jurors to ask questions engages them in the trial and provides them with an opportunity to resolve any confusion resulting from hearing complex expert testimony. Indeed, when jurors are permitted to submit questions to witnesses, nearly half of the questions are directed to testifying experts. Furthermore, permitting jurors to ask questions “helps the trial to be more than a mere contest of advocacy... [and] helps the trial to maintain a proper focus on the search for truth.” And finding truth is, after all, a primary function of our legal system.

VII. CONCLUSION

*Daubert* encumbers the right to a civil jury trial in at least three ways: (1) by replacing jury fact-finding with judicial fact-finding, (2) by authorizing judges to dismiss cases that do not “survive” *Daubert* hearings, and (3) by permitting litigants “to spend an opponent into [a] disadvantageous settlement or to deter individuals from pursuing their legal rights in the first place.” Within this context, *Daubert* is properly understood as a legal development that alters the fundamental substance of the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial. By giving judges the authority to resolve factual disputes and the corresponding discretion to prevent cases from ever reaching a jury, *Daubert* infringes on the core guarantee of the Seventh Amendment.

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187. Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, *Jurors’ Unanswered Questions*, 41 CT. REV. 20, 22 (2004). One jury, for example, asked a testifying physician, “What is a tear of the meniscus?” *Id.*

188. Eugene A. Lucci, *The Case for Allowing Jurors to Submit Written Questions*, 89 JUDICATURE 16, 19 (2005). “Questioning facilitates juror understanding, attentiveness, and overall satisfaction, improves communications, and corrects erroneous juror beliefs. Some contend it promotes the search for truth and justice.” *Id.*; see also Diamond, Rose & Murphy, *supra* note 187, at 27 (“Jurors not only appreciate the opportunity to submit questions, but also formulate relevant questions to assist them in evaluating evidence.”). But see N. Randy Smith, *Why I Do Not Let Jurors Ask Questions in Trials*, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 553, 561 (2004) (arguing that jurors should not be permitted to ask questions at trial because it may inappropriately alter the plaintiff’s burden of proof and create a biased trier of fact).


190. *Waters & Hodge, supra* note 102, at 18.

191. Brief for Trial Lawyers, *supra* note 125, at *21; see also Gary Wilson, Vincent Moccio & Daniel O. Fallon, *The Future of Products Liability in America*, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 85, 102 (2000) (“Losing a Daubert motion is devastating to the plaintiff’s case, but even when the plaintiff prevails, an additional, and often expensive layer of motion practice, including a very expensive Daubert hearing, is added to the case.”).
Of course, the legal system should adapt to the increasingly complex nature of civil litigation. These adaptations, however, must create an institutional framework that helps juries find facts without intruding upon their constitutionally protected adjudicatory responsibilities. *Daubert* fails to accomplish that objective.