Colonial Lessons: Africans' Education in Southern Rhodesia, 1918-1940

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COLONIAL LESSONS

AFRICANS' EDUCATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1918–1940

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INTRODUCTION

Early in twentieth-century Southern Rhodesia, a diviner’s son called Jonasi gave up herding his father’s goats and went to school. Instead of apprenticing to learn his father’s skills and insights, he “wanted to learn so that he would know [how to] . . . read invoices and papers.” Knowing how to read and to understand the new colonized world—a sort of divining his father had never mastered—had become critical to Jonasi’s ability to survive, help his father, protect his family, and prosper.

In the early twentieth century, Africans’ definitions of useful knowledge and schooling changed. The men who moved quickly and effectively to learn English, acquire literacy, and adopt European-sponsored skills and sometimes values, were not necessarily turning their backs on their fathers. Nor were they strategically acquiring skills with which to oppose the colonial onslaught. Instead, especially during the years of experimentation and crisis between the First and Second World Wars, they sought new ways to meet old needs, and innovations that would allow them to build meaningful communities despite pressure from an increasingly segregationist state. They also pursued individual opportunities and new roles, rejecting the segregationist logic in which all Africans were equal, and inferior to all whites. For these men, interwar Southern Rhodesia was not simply a stark black and white world of deepening segregation, but a place where ideas, values, roles, identities, and material culture were negotiable within uncertain boundaries.

Jonasi, and the many others that attended mission schools or sent their children to school, made new possibilities for Africans in South-
ern Rhodesia. In going to school or supporting schooling, they created the institutions and identities that made and reinforced an African elite of middlemen who, both as individuals and as members of groups such as school associations and teachers’ unions, understood colonial institutions as well as African ones. In making new selves and possibilities, these men defined a new social, cultural, and political middle ground within an increasingly segregated Southern Rhodesia, a new class of people who simultaneously administered segregation and challenged its sharply delineated categories of black and white.

Munyikwi Samson Chibvongodze, who attended mission schools before training and working for the government as an agricultural demonstrator, exemplified this contradictory experience of invention and
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constraint. Chibvongodze recalled a life in which he had made things fit—mission training, government schooling and employment, a complex relationship with a segregation-stressed rural community, and his initiative in acquiring a freehold farm and founding a model farmers’ association. These initiatives were possible because despite a proliferation of rules, bureaucracies, and restrictions, Chibvongodze met challenges with inquiry and flexibility. “I do not throw away the ideas that I was given because acquired knowledge is inherent to me. This is the full lesson I was taught and I have kept it,” he asserted.

This is a book about men such as Jonasi, Chibvongodze, and many others who responded to the challenges of life in Southern Rhodesia not through a simple pattern of resistance or acquiescence, but through maneuver and contestation. While these individuals were fully aware of state, settler, and mission power, and often resentful of abuses, they portrayed themselves and acted neither as victims nor as rebels. Instead—within the schools, churches, and development programs that expanded dramatically during this period—they learned new things, experimented with new affiliations and organizations, and built themselves lives to be proud of. Obliquely, they reshaped European power, making it their own. The influence, power, or authority these men had was rooted in the very segregationist institutions that limited their horizons.

Educated African men were not simply agents of the colonial government or, conversely, of the common people. They acted as individuals, and as members of a new, emerging category of elite Africans. Sorting out what these individuals were, and what they did, from the general administrative histories of Southern Rhodesia, or heroic depictions of the struggle for independence, is a complex task, especially when their successes rested on their ability to conflate the interests of notably different groups, blurring boundaries and making cooperation or at least acquiescence under unlikely circumstances.

To understand the possibilities and limits of the middle that these men created, this book uses archival sources to reconstruct, contextualize, and explicate very local conflicts. Specific chapters discuss school stay-aways and student strikes, disputes over school sponsorship and control, negotiations over the professional status of teachers and demonstrators, and some of the ways elite Africans constructed respectable, safe power over church money and through companionate marriage. Africans’ initiatives did not reshape the general outlines of segregation in Southern Rhodesia. Nor were they responsible for ideological shifts in administrative policy. When we look very
Photo I.1  Chikore Agricultural School (undated). ABCFM Rhodesia Picture Collection, Chikore 20:14.
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specifically and precisely at the local level, though, we can see how Africans acted, asserting African agency in a context where a segregationist state blocked Africans' authority. Local Africans could provoke crises. They could manipulate responses. They could cripple, or aid, government or mission initiatives. They could play one patron off against another. They could, in other words, shape the colonial agenda, and block or force revisions on specific colonial initiatives.

Local written sources that reflect specific struggles allow this book to go beyond a simple assertion that of course Africans struggled, resisted, or negotiated in Southern Rhodesia. These documents' existence and obsessions emerge directly from the concerns of those living and debating in the interwar period, rather than reflecting problems and concerns of today or expressing nostalgic ideals. I have used three different sorts of documents. First, I have pursued controversies, looking at correspondence, memos, affidavits, and investigations produced at points of conflict, such as strikes. Second, I have contextualized these sources within the reams of routine bureaucratic housekeeping materials generated by government offices, missions, and routine inspections and reporting. Both crisis and routine documents emerged from specific times and places. They illuminate events, perceptions, and knowledge both by what they say, and by what they exclude. Finally, I have deepened my analysis through the careful use of more reflective documents, such as life histories and local nonfiction and fictional depictions of how things were, and what changed. Together, these arguments, routine documents, and reflections allowed me to assemble and explicate specific stories and exemplary lives. The microhistories that emerge from these documents allow me to explore how Africans acted and what individuals were able to accomplish. In Southern Rhodesia in the 1920s and 1930s, Africans' agency emerged locally, in small ways, in contexts where officials, missionaries, and sometimes settlers needed support and help from specific Africans. I therefore explore Africans' ability to act by looking at very particular conflicts, including clashes over appropriate food in a mission school, what a teacher's job entailed, and when a church could defy its mission sponsor to hold overnight concerts on Saturday nights.

The structure of this book departs markedly from conventional chronological narratives of the development of educational and social policy in Southern Rhodesia. Instead, it follows the crises and constraints that shaped Africans' education in Southern Rhodesia and explores the categories and ideas Africans built on this foundation of experiences. In doing so, I acknowledge the coercive power of state
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and mission educational initiatives, but choose to emphasize not government and mission norms, but local adaptations, accommodations, and negotiated practices. Here, while I draw on the regional studies that have recently enriched our understanding of Southern Rhodesia’s history, I choose to follow educational controversies around the country, acknowledging and exploring the larger, colony-wide identities of educated African men rather than emphasizing a specific regional context and following a small, geographically based community through time. Here, I use parochial sources, concerned with a category of people (not a specific place) during a relatively short period of time, and I explore not the ideals and structures of education and mission programs in Southern Rhodesia but, very precisely, how people got around them.

In understanding Africans’ agency in Southern Rhodesia through the close readings of specific conflicts, rather than assuming African resistance and defining all struggles as examples of a general ideal category, I draw on two literatures that have challenged older ways of understanding colonialism, and fundamentally reshaped both where historians look for agency and significance, and how we discuss what we find: histories of women and gender in Zimbabwe, and new explorations of the cultures of colonialism in Africa.

In seeing elite Africans’ ability to provoke a crisis and shape the results, or to construct new social models of respectability, as a form of agency, I draw on works by Elizabeth Schmidt, Diana Jacter, and Teresa Barnes that have explored ways in which women and ideas of gender, though technically marginal to colonial concerns, were in reality central to colonial debates and initiatives. The sorts of agency I describe here—provoking crises, shaping responses, and contributing, generally nonverbally, to debates over what was possible, or necessary—parallel Schmidt’s and Jacter’s explorations of how girls and women made change despite being formally powerless. Girls and women who ran away from family-negotiated marriages, experimented with a new economics of sex, and explored new models of mission-influenced Christianity and domesticity thereby challenged African patriarchs’ authority, created nuisances for white officials, and made new demands on junior African men. Barnes’ discussion of how these women built “righteous” lives for themselves, and in the process remade their relationships with men in colonial Harare, takes this specific, gendered discussion of the agency of formally marginal women even further.

Elsewhere, I have connected the literature on women and gender in Southern Rhodesia to an exploration of education and development
policy by looking at the ways men saw girls’ and women’s education as a potential solution for social problems, and by exploring how at first white girls’ education, and then black boys’ and men’s education, became models for the training and education of backward white boys. In this book, however, I focus on the African boys and men who went to school, sponsored schools, taught, became professionals, and did the cultural work of constructing not the ideal of “righteousness” that Barnes explores, but a male-centered respectability. The strength of the literature on Zimbabwe’s women has made the lack of an equally nuanced discussion of Zimbabwe’s men particularly glaring. Here, drawing on ideas of agency that have enriched our understandings of Zimbabwean women’s struggles and creativity, I explore how boys and men built new individual and professional identities, and communities. Instead of simply viewing these individuals as workers or peasants, I have explored how elite men distinguished themselves, taking on status, respectability, and power.

In the case studies I explore here, I am reexamining the colonial interface between Africans and white colonizers in Southern Rhodesia. I do so, though, from the perspective of colonialism as locally understood and practiced by African brokers. Educated African men were central to the shape and sustainability of colonialism throughout Africa, and in Southern Rhodesia. Lord Lugard saw them as threatening to indirect rule, even as he acknowledged that development would not be possible without them. In Southern Rhodesia, educated African middlemen, viewed as simultaneously dangerous and essential by nervous colonizers, were not simply transparent filters of demands and initiatives from below and above. Instead, their existence shaped the possibilities and limits of colonial change and to some extent colonial protest. And the institutions they worked to build—schools, churches, parents’ associations, concert clubs, and companionate marriages—made new identities possible. These men and their families were challenges to new, segregationist logics, even as they policed and administered racial boundaries. And in their actions, as they built alliances with missions, new chiefs, teachers’ unions, and specific government programs, they became participants in colonialist debates.

In my case studies, I explicitly avoid portraying even Southern Rhodesia as a Manichean world of struggle between two fundamental opposites. Instead, I reconstruct the terrain of possibilities that gave teachers, students, parents, and others real options, however limited. In emphasizing local possibilities and peculiarities, and the work of social construction on the colonial interface, I draw on a growing literature that explores how our understandings of colonialism change
when we view colonial ideals and practices from the perspective of the colonial interface and negotiation, rather than beginning with an administrative policy ideal, or a historian’s hypothesis of resistance. Timothy Burke’s discussion of soap and the making of new sorts of cleanliness and bodily maintenance has emphasized the intimacy of colonial interventions and African interpretations.\textsuperscript{11} Nancy Hunt’s study of midwifery in the Belgian Congo has explored the ways missionaries, Africans, and officials built categories to think with, deducing personality and suitability for medical training from dexterity with imported cutlery.\textsuperscript{12} And Luise White has encouraged us to think about how colonized Africans transmitted knowledge—and wild surmise—through rumors of Europeans’ vampiric activities.\textsuperscript{13}

These literatures—on women and gender, and on contingency and social construction in a colonial world—both draw upon and challenge an older literature that has emphasized Africans’ struggles as workers and peasants, and has created a narrative of ongoing struggle toward nationhood and independence. Key studies of workers’ struggles or interesting cross-class solidarities underwrite historians’ efforts to rethink Africans’ abilities to act under colonialism.\textsuperscript{14} These works challenged narratives in colonial documents that had once dominated discussions of colonialism and characterized Africans as a rough agglomerate, sometimes unruly, available for colonial molding. But newer histories of women, gender, and colonial culture go further to discuss colonialism not simply as a monolith that Africans sought to undermine, but as a space of cultural and social identities and institutions that at least some Africans learned to live within, use, and value. Colonial lessons provided ways for some Africans to become new sorts of people, with all the gains and losses that such remaking of identities implies.

In focusing on local colonial contestation and creativity, I have chosen to emphasize individuals, their class positions and connections, and the structural tensions they encountered. There are, however, important aspects of identity that I have not been able to address, especially Zionism and ethnicity. Colonial officials were obsessed with both. Their discussions, though, were less about the sorts of new selves and communities that educated individuals were able to build than about colonial methods and fears. Zionism, the idea of a church administered by Africans, adapted to local circumstances and accommodating indigenous practices and beliefs, was a highly political label in Southern Rhodesia, functioning in white discourse as “communist” would in later years. Zionist activists existed in the region, as M.L. Daneel and others have discussed at length.\textsuperscript{15} But politics within the mission
churches and schools of Southern Rhodesia were not conflicts between the obedient members of mission churches and the Zionist dissidents; they were complex negotiations over who had the power to determine and enforce rules, monitor the behavior of others, and guide believers’ relationships with God through prayer, ceremony, gifts, teaching, and healing. However frequently Native Commissioners invoked Zionism, or men expelled by the mission founded or joined Zionist movements, Zionism in interwar Southern Rhodesia was more important in the stories here as an idea than as a social movement. To label an individual a Zionist, in the context of missionary and official discussion and negotiation, was to blacklist him, and cast him out of mission station, church, and community. Zionism was less a part of a conversation than the end of a debate.

Ethnicity, likewise, was a real aspect of identity in early twentieth-century Southern Rhodesia, documented by Terence Ranger and others in examinations of Ndebele, Manyika, and other specific affinities.16 What has proven more remarkable than ethnicity’s existence, though, has been its flexibility and adaptability. Ethnicity was an important part of how white officials attempted to administer the region, and some activists used it in shaping their protests or struggles. But among the educated African elite, ethnicity was clearly malleable. At times, students, teachers, and others might build it up. At other times, it provided a subtext during a controversy over which part of a local population controlled a specific rural school. The ethnic map of Southern Rhodesia can be drawn in a variety of ways. The region had a Shona majority, a Ndebele minority, and a variety of other minor groups and subgroups. For administrative purposes, a more significant difference was between the Shona and Ndebele with long-term roots in the region, and individuals labeled “alien natives” by colonial officials—Zulu and Mfengu migrants from South Africa, “Zambesi” migrants from Northern Rhodesia and Katanga, and Nyasalanders and Mozambiquans who came to Southern Rhodesia in large numbers as both temporary and permanent migrants. Ethnicity, though, did not make the struggles I discuss here. Distinctions between long-term residents and newcomers, between schooled and unschooled, between Methodist and Catholic, were at least as significant.

Jonasi, Chibvongodze, and other middlemen of interwar Southern Rhodesia constructed identities and remade colonial policies in a region with a challenging history. By 1897, when the British South Africa Company finished decisively and emphatically defeating Africans’ military efforts to oppose its rule, it was obvious that armed opposition to Company rule was not working. Shortly after the war, the Na-
tive Department, sometimes called the Native Affairs Department, took on the structure and duties it was to hold to for the next 40 years. The Chief Native Commissioner (CNC), answerable to the country’s administrator until 1923 and premier afterwards, headed a department of officials who considered themselves experts in managing the African population. Native Commissioners (NCs), each responsible for a specific district, wielded remarkable powers with little oversight. Their most basic responsibilities were to prevent another uprising, and to collect taxes. To do so, they ran increasingly complex systems of recognized chiefship and headmanship, deployed messengers throughout their territories, and sat in courts and offices that administered laws, passes, and property rights. Individual NCs, assisted by the occasional assistant NC, regularly functioned as sole administrative authorities within a specific territory. Groups of NCs were technically under an intermediate official, a Superintendent of Natives (SoN), stationed in a regional center, such as Bulawayo (Matabeleland) or Fort Victoria (Midlands), who was responsible for coordinating their actions under the general policy guidelines set by the Chief Native Commissioner.

The school that Jonasi began to attend was part of this new order. By 1908, the administration slowly began to go beyond a simple concern with peace and taxes, and accepted responsibility for some basic forms of social policy. Social policy, however rudimentary, required Africans with at least some basic training and education. Initially, the administration contracted schooling out to the Christian missions that had flocked to the region in return for promises of land and possible converts. Between 1908 and 1920, missions, competing among themselves, provided all formal, administration-recognized schooling in Southern Rhodesia. During those years, the number of schools expanded from the four schools for Africans that had ever received funding prior to 1907, to hundreds, scattered across the country in elaborate webs.

The most important parts of this mission system of church schools were village third-class schools, called “outschools,” under African Christian teachers, and the all-important central boarding schools on mission stations, called first-class schools, at which missionaries expected to train a corps of African leaders and provide a model of what an African Christian community could become. Outschools tended to be rudimentary, but provided the basic literacy necessary for baptism and provided a recruiting pool for more substantive schools. Generally run by one or two teachers, they could be attended by as many as 200 students, though the ideal teacher:student ratio was set by officials at
one teacher for every 50 students. Outschools rarely provided training beyond Standard I (U.S. 3d grade). Often, they were entirely vernacular schools, without practice in English. First-class schools, on the other hand, often used English as a medium, and trained teachers, preachers, and sometimes wives through curricula that emphasized literacy, but included crafts, agriculture, and construction work. Technically these schools merely provided primary education until St. Augustine's Penhalonga opened a secondary school in 1939. In practice, however, men and women educated past Standard IV in mission schools or one of the government training programs at Domboshawa or Tjolotjo, along with individuals who had attended missionary secondary schools in South Africa, constituted Southern Rhodesia's African educated elite.

In the 1920s, Southern Rhodesia's social landscape changed as African teachers trained in the central first-class schools established and improved village outschools, drawing new areas into networks of outstations and central stations, and African parents and students negotiated the content of schooling in mission outschools and central institutions and in government programs.

This transformation was possible because of linked political, bureaucratic, and economic changes in the region in the aftermath of the First World War. In the 1920s, the British South Africa Company, white settlers, and the imperial government negotiated a transition from Company administration to "Responsible Government." "Responsible Government," instituted in 1923, transferred political authority in the colony from the Company—which had run the region as a chartered company under oversight from the British Crown—to the Southern Rhodesian electorate, which, while technically color-blind until the 1930s, was dominated by white settlers. These settlers endeavored to protect their own interests—which they believed were threatened by skilled, educated, prosperous, and ambitious Africans—through increasingly aggressive, explicitly segregationist, legislation. New measures included the Native Affairs Act of 1927, which increased the powers of Native Commissioners; the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which aggressively restricted Africans' access to land; and the Maize Control legislation of 1931 and 1934, which locked Africans' access to markets. Ironically, though, in the 1920s, settlers found it necessary to legitimate these measures by arguing that they were parts of a broader program of Native Development. Thus, a government elected by settlers supported both the capitation grants to mission schools that encouraged school expansion, and two new government-
sponsored institutions, Domboshawa and Tjolotjo, that became impor-
tant centers training African clerks, builders, policemen, and others.
Segregation and Native Development, if not to become prohibitively
expensive, had to employ Africans to guide the training, development,
and administration of other Africans. Segregationists thus needed pre-
cisely the men they most feared, the skilled, educated, prosperous, and
ambitious Africans who could act as inexpensive, reasonably efficient
agents for state and private initiatives to reshape Africans’ society and
economy.

The 1920s and early 1930s were thus marked by an expansion of
Native Development controls, and new, important niches for educated,
skilled Africans. H.S. Keigwin, a maverick Native Commissioner and
strong supporter of government-sponsored education for Africans, was
promoted to a new post, Director of Native Development, after the
First World War. He immediately began surveying—and critiquing—
mission schools, and opened the first government-run school in the
region at Domboshawa, soon followed by a second institution at
Tjolotjo. Keigwin’s principal initiative was the “Keigwin scheme,” an
effort to suppress excessively academic and religious education in fa-
vor of controlled, community-based appropriate education similar to
that advocated for African Americans by Booker T. Washington and
his supporters and popularized in Africa by the Phelps-Stokes Com-
mission. In practice, however, Keigwin and the department he headed
initiated efforts to improve the quality of teaching in third-class
schools, and the appropriateness of industrial work in central institu-
tions. Forced out amid allegations of financial improprieties, Keigwin
was succeeded in 1927 by the younger and even more energetic Harold
Jowitt, who rewrote the government’s Native Development legislation
and policy, transformed a Native Education Department into a Native
Development Department, and actively fought with the Native Affairs
Department to implement policies aimed at inducing change rather than
promoting stability and control.

Jowitt’s department accelerated existing trends toward more and
better schools staffed by more and better-trained teachers. By the end
of the 1920s, instead of being grateful to hire a Christian, literate
teacher, missions—pressed by Jowitt’s department—worked to staff
basic outschools with teachers educated at least to Standard IV (ap-
proximately U.S. 6th grade), and ideally with certificated teachers
emerging from new teacher training programs that provided normal
training along with Standards VI and VII. These teachers remained
poorly paid and subject to tight mission rules. Teaching was not a par-
ticularly attractive choice for a young man who wanted to get ahead in
the world. High levels of turnover meant that many youth taught for a few years, on the way to other roles, whether within missions or outside in more secular activities. Yet the proliferation of schools and a high turnover among teachers created an increasingly large group of men, and a few women, with education, a background as students and teachers, and a basic understanding of how the education and development system worked.

These men—like Chibvongodze—went on to explore further niches of the new Native Development programs. In 1927, 11 agricultural demonstrators began work intended to provide a model for an African agricultural revolution. These demonstrators, and the colleagues who quickly joined them, were African technical professionals, trained to be agricultural experts, and assigned to specific regions to work with African farmers, called “cooperators,” to show them improved farming techniques. And under Jowitt’s guidance, the Native Development Department trained even more classes of demonstrators. Jeanes teachers—community demonstrators—trained in a program modeled on an American program that promoted demonstration teachers as a means of turning local African American schools into centers for community development, constituted an additional new African elite in Southern Rhodesian communities. Men trained at Domboshawa, and women in a government-sponsored program at Hope Fountain, a London Missionary Society girls’ school. These men and women entered the training programs as schooled teachers, sponsored by their home mission societies. Upon graduation, they went back to their sponsoring missions for community development assignments. Male Jeanes teachers supervised outschools and worked with teachers to improve both pedagogical skills and integration of school and community with the environment. They encouraged the construction of gardens, buildings, roads, and latrines; planted trees; and taught handicrafts. They worked to increase support for these activities through meetings with teachers, students, and parents. Female Jeanes teachers taught domesticity by inviting students and others into their immaculately kept homes and used their homes as bases for community development work such as first aid and nursing services, midwifery, and handicraft training.

At the end of the 1920s and into the 1930s, segregationist programs and Native Development initiatives created opportunities for educated African men. Teachers, demonstrators, clerks, shopkeepers, builders, furniture makers, and others used the knowledge they had gained in mission schools and government training programs to become a new class of people.

As the Great Depression hit Southern Rhodesia, though, these men built their new identities in an atmosphere of crisis and mission and
administrative retrenchment, amid intensifying government efforts toward segregationist restrictions on Africans’ participation in the urban and industrial economy. In the early 1930s, mission societies faced financial problems as donations dropped and needs expanded worldwide. Within Southern Rhodesia, the administration cut school-support and capitation grants to missions by 25 percent. Low commodity prices and restrictions on Africans’ marketing of maize and cattle further depressed the amount of money African communities could give to schools. In the early 1930s, therefore, a number of schools stopped growing, and began to shrink.

The 1930s were critical years of crisis. School strikes, fights over control of existing schools, teacher activism, unrest within government programs, played out in a background of insufficient resources and a settler-elected government increasingly blunt about making the economy, administration, and society serve white people’s interests first. By 1934, Harold Jowitt, the activist Director of Native Development, gave up on his development agenda and moved to Uganda. Without his leadership, his department’s profile diminished, and, as World War II began, education and development programs suffered a temporary eclipse.

This book explores interwar stalemates and contestations in education against that larger historical background. In the first section of this book, I focus on case studies of fights over schools. Looking at the possibilities and costs of education from the perspective of communities, the section introduces some of the tactics Africans used as they experimented with what education, and the specific institutions of schools, could and could not do in the context of an increasingly restrictive economy and polity. In the first chapter, I discuss stay-aways and strikes from the perspective of students and teachers in three very different sorts of institutions: third-class mission schools in Gutu and Mondoro; a London Missionary Society central school at Inyati; and the two government central institutions at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo. The second chapter of this first section is an extended analysis of a complicated failure of both a chief in his effort to sponsor a school, and a community in their effort to demand the sort of schooling it needed. In the process, this chapter, a case study of Umchingwe school, ties together both the hopes for schools as centers of political, economic, generational, and social reconciliation, and an investigation into why those demands were ultimately not met.

The second section of the book turns from communities to professionals. First, I examine teachers’ visions of their own roles, both as individuals, and as protesters forming a union. Then I explore how the Jeanes
teachers' program moved from an effort to rebuild communities and support self-help with professional expertise, to a controversy over who had authority to give orders. In the process, this section discusses how Africans claimed new sorts of expertise and authority.

The third section of the book discusses two of many ways in which educated individuals in Southern Rhodesia worked to remake community. Schools alone, or claims for professional status, were not particularly effective. Instead, new individuals and groups worked out new identities in more subtle, multifaceted ways. I look at two of these: developing new symbols and institutions of solidarity through the exchange and celebration of money in the mission churches; and the establishment and honoring of monogamous families under new, mission-affiliated Christian couples.

Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss how detailed stories of education and schooling in interwar Southern Rhodesia challenge simpler narratives, failing to fit a story of progress and enlightenment, suppression and control, or hegemony and resistance.

The people I discuss in this book were not ordinary Zimbabweans. They were exemplars. And they stood as exemplars for a range of meanings and audiences. To ordinary farmers and struggling workers, men like Jonasi and Chibvongodze were examples of what was possible—schooling and mission or government patronage leading to positions of importance, respect, and leadership. Teachers, even young ones, generally stood out dramatically in communities where their literacy, familiarity with a broader world, and connections with white patrons set them apart. More conservative individuals sometimes resented the successes and power of such young men. But for many, teachers, schooling, and the world they represented, was something to aspire to. Missions and government officials were fully aware of this status, and indeed, sought to use it. In attempting to remake farming with agricultural demonstrators, and teach new patterns of family life through teachers' and ministers' domestic arrangements, they employed men they saw as good models and expected them to lead by example.

Educated middlemen, though, lived in a real world of limited resources, bureaucratic squabbles, and power struggles. And in the 1920s and 1930s, they proved to be not simply exemplars of progress, success, and orderly development, but also experimenters who developed and modeled new sorts of alliances and types of struggle. Whether they went on to become full-scale nationalists or not, their local experimental struggles created a vocabulary for colonial struggle in the region.

When a Jeanes teacher gave orders, or an African minister used the new tools of money and domesticity to shape a church congregation into
a community, these men drew on Europeans' authority, values, and ideals. And what they made was new. The people discussed in this book made hard decisions, accepting losses and making choices that could be painful, to become fundamentally different sorts of people from those conquered in the nineteenth century. In a colony with a less aggressive administration, or a serious commitment to indirect rule, they might have managed their negotiations with fewer sacrifices and more victories. But despite the circumscribed, limited nature of these colonial conversations between Africans who had learned the lessons of the possible and improbable, and settlers and administrators with their own agendas, the conversations—and struggles—were important. The middle-people whose struggles and lives are explored here shaped the colonial realities. They were not refugees from a white-run segregationist government and society, but exemplars and social engineers, working as new chiefs, parents, teachers, ministers, and development workers to put together possibilities for the future.

NOTES

1. Jonasi—as remembered by Isaac Chiremba, born 1921, oral history interview by Dawson Munjeri, 29-10-81, National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ) AOH 72.
2. Munyikwi Samson Chibvongodze, born 1903, oral history interview by Dawson Munjeri, 14-7-78, NAZ AOH.
3. I have drawn on oral histories translated and transcribed by other historians, especially Dawson Munjeri, and filed in the National Archives of Zimbabwe, and have benefited from insights put forward by historians drawing on oral sources. I have not, however, done formal oral histories of my own.
5. Recently, several excellent regional studies have enhanced understanding of specific areas that were on the borderlands of colonial policy. David Maxwell, Christians and Chiefs in Zimbabwe: A Social History of the Hwesa People (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999) and Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor, and Terence Ranger, Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the Dark Forests of Matabeleland (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2000) and, for a more central region, Terence Ranger, Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999). These studies draw—brilliantly—on oral histories that permit exploration not merely of the lives of the educated, but of how the educated fit into a larger, more diverse local community. My research,
conversely, emphasizes the imagined cohesion arising among the educated, and those interested in education, throughout Southern Rhodesia.


10. See, for example, Lord Lugard, *The Dual Mandate* (New York: Archon Books, 1922, 1965), 80–90, though Lugard does also (458) acknowledge the colonies’ need for educated Africans to facilitate economic development.


17. H. Jowitt to Oldham, 20 April 1934, SOAS IMC/CBMS, Africa, Box 1221.
African students, parents, and teachers had a variety of ideas about education and social change in the communities of interwar Southern Rhodesia, but they had limited resources. After a brief economic boom early in the twentieth century, Africans watched the economy falter. White resentment of African workers grew. In the agricultural sector, with the falling commodity prices of the late 1920s and the Land Apportionment regulations of 1930, farming grew problematic for many ambitious African men.

Young men, and often their parents and patrons, tried to adapt to this changing landscape of restricted opportunity. They identified possibilities for success through literacy and teaching skills; knowledge of the English language, culture, and ideas; and specific training in building and carpentry. Senior men and parents sought to negotiate schools that could provide the preparation and training these young men needed for the changing world.

These African efforts to shape the next generation for survival, however, had only limited success. Alliance with mission and government development initiatives was the logical strategy for ambitious Africans. But while Africans managed to demonstrate their interest in schools, curricula, and useful knowledge, and block efforts to simply exploit them, they could not push hard enough to escape a reality of limited opportunities. Instead, by rejecting mission and government school initiatives that fostered subordination and failed to meet Africans’ demands, youth, parents, and patrons principally achieved a frustrating stalemate. Schools, at all levels from the local village school to the government industrial institution, were seen by both European elites and Africans as providing ways to structure the region’s changes. The two groups’ fundamentally different interests and politics, though, kept the schools from resolving conflicts. Missions and government officials saw schools and education as an opportunity for peaceful social engineering that might circumvent challenges to white dominance. But Africans pursued schools precisely be-
cause education might provide access to “civilized” society and social and political opportunities.

In Southern Rhodesia during the interwar years, though, stalemates were not stagnant, but dynamic. In fighting their way to a stalemate, missionaries, government officials, African teachers, parents, and students learned more than the lessons officially on the school curriculum. They studied struggle, learning skills and developing identities and solidarities. They built new institutions in schools, churches, and community organizations. They constructed the economic, social, and cultural terrain of struggle and contestation where the people of Southern Rhodesia worked out what possibilities would exist in an increasingly segregated society. The lessons of struggles over schools remained, even as children and youth returned to Dutch Reformed schools, chiefs’ efforts to sponsor mission schools ended in loss of control, Inyati Institute students discovered the fragility of mission patronage, government students at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo won only basic recognition, and innovative efforts at community development, such as Umchingwe, failed.
Social observers in Southern Rhodesia, whether settlers, government officials, missionaries, senior African men, or educated youth, considered education a problem during the first part of the twentieth century. They debated its existence, content, and consequences as part of a much larger debate over what the region's future might be, and the places for Africans in that future. But during the interwar years, from 1920 to the mid-1930s, the debates intensified, and education, whether defined as schooling, socialization, or acculturation, became a crisis rather than a chronic problem that could be left for the future.

Schools for Africans were chronically underfunded, crowded, and staffed by poorly trained teachers operating in shoddy buildings with few books or materials. Despite these paltry human and material resources, however, both Africans and Europeans had high hopes for education's power to transform and improve individuals, communities, and the region as a whole. During the first two decades of the century, schools experienced problems when droughts or epidemics hit the region, when a specific teacher got a reputation for molesting female students, or when another teacher hit or worked students beyond what observers considered reasonable.

By the 1920s, however, Africans had specific educational expectations and wants. They evaluated mission and government schools according to the curriculum and conditions offered by each school. When
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students considered a school inadequate, they complained, left, or even held school strikes, explicitly labeled as such. Even as the settler population of the 1920s and 1930s sought to use education to shape a specific and subordinate role for Africans, Africans voiced concerns, demands, and agendas in ways that proved more effective in education than in any other sector of the region’s economy or society. Stay-aways, strikes, protests over curricula, and attempts to acquire European allies outside the school were all strategies employed by Africans seeking changes in education. But while the history of African education in Zimbabwe is a history of struggle, it is also a history that shows distinct limits on the achievements of even the most effective forms of African activism, limits that protests could push, but not overturn. Strikes and conflict over the founding and control of schools were chronic features of mission and government schools in Southern Rhodesia. In conflicts at all levels of the educational system, from the rural third-class mission schools to the elite mission central schools and the relatively well-funded government industrial institutions, students and African school sponsors learned the dynamics of Southern Rhodesian colonialism, and how schools created a space for conflict, instead of a simple gateway to opportunities and patrons.

Working up the region’s educational hierarchy, this chapter will first explore tensions over third-class, local village schools. In Gutu, these tensions emerged as students, parents, and government officials critiqued the Dutch Reformed Church’s monopoly on schooling in the region. On the Devuli Ranch, conflicts emerged as missions and government first embraced and then critiqued an activist new chief who sought to sponsor American Board schools, and exclude Dutch Reformed initiatives. At Malusi Muketsi’s school, conflict broke open within a community as a chief called for a Catholic school after Methodists closed the local school for lack of funding. In all these cases, ranging from stay-aways to kidnapping and riots, senior men and local communities found that local schools did not work as simple tools for social solidarity. They could equally well crack a community apart, and challenge senior men’s power and authority.

Building on this discussion of rural third-class schools and their communities, the chapter will go on to explore more elite schools, both those sponsored by missions and by the government. The London Missionary Society’s Inyati Institute, a boys’ and men’s central school outside Bulawayo in Matabeleland, experienced a series of strikes that highlighted tensions between mission autocracy, and youths’ visions of themselves as respectable individuals, who should
be consulted on the running of their institution. Government institutions at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo, likewise, suffered from tensions between autocracy and students with aspirations to learn skilled work. The strikes, protests, and accommodations in these institutions provide glimpses of African youths’ ability to manipulate mission and government programs, and place limits on attempts to engineer education for simple subjection.

CRISES

Gutu

When H.C. Finkle was interviewed about his years as an inspector in the Native Development Department, he looked back on most of his somewhat accidental career with pleasure, remarking only, “fortunately I didn’t have Gutu.”1 Gutu District was crisis-prone during the 1920s and 1930s. In earlier years, Native Commissioners had expressed disapproval of the way the region was developing. In 1906, the Native Commissioner (NC) complained of tax resisters, and Gutu acquired a reputation for harboring workers who had fled mines and farms in other districts of Southern Rhodesia.2 Africans in Gutu, as in some other regions, consistently pursued work according to their own schedules, not those of would-be employers, as they plowed and harvested their fields at home in Gutu before going out to seek wage work to pay taxes. When offered only low, dry season wages, they felt themselves cheated, and rejected further exploits in the wage labor market.3 This strategy did not impoverish Gutu inhabitants. Instead, during the early years of the century, observers from the Native Department labeled the population of Gutu as “some of the wealthiest natives in Rhodesia.”4

By 1920, when labor emigration from other regions of the country was increasing, the Native Department still saw Gutu as a region doing little to supply the European economy with workers. The NC had tried to push men from the region to go out to work, violating the spirit if not the letter of rules against officials’ involvement in recruiting, and incurring voluble protests from Chief Gutu and others.5 Nevertheless, the NC argued that labor emigration from Gutu had actually decreased with the introduction of the plow, as farmers could now make money by plowing for others and by producing maize for the market. Higher wages, he asserted, were not the answer, as white farmers considered it impractical to pay workers as much as African men could earn if working for themselves.6
The attempts of Gutu’s NC to force local notables to recognize his authority did not produce a prosperous and orderly district. He clashed repeatedly with the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) missionaries in his region, especially H.H. Orlandini, whom he viewed as attempting to usurp power that rightfully belonged to the Native Commissioner. Orlandini, at various times, attempted to enforce compulsory school attendance policies, got involved in the settlement of local cattle ownership disputes, and fined mission inhabitants for moral trespasses. Nor did the Gutu NC have a smooth relationship with local European farmers, whose protests in 1920 regarding one long-serving NC, Kenney, led to his transfer.

The DRC, the only government-recognized mission in the area, was aggressively expansionist. Its missionaries opened schools in as many places as possible. Other missions were concerned that the DRC was spreading too fast for effective supervision and staffing; government officials were appalled by the mission’s metastatic spread, and urged restrictions. But DRC missionaries protested the government’s decision that no missionary supervisor should get grants for more than 30 schools. “Thirty is only enough for breakfast,” George Murray, the head of Gutu Mission, reportedly remarked. S. Lenfestey, an inspector in the Department of Education, characterized the DRC’s rapid expansion in Gutu and Melsetter as pathetic. He noted cases in DRC schools where a school with an enrollment of 97 and attendance of 53 had only six slates, where 48 children had spent three months reciting the first syllable chart—now memorized—for lack of other materials or further training in literacy, and where a school with 66 pupils had been open for a full year without a schoolroom. Keigwin, his frequent rival, agreed with this assessment, noting that students learned with painful slowness, memorizing charts rather than learning to read, and sitting through a two-hour school day mostly taken up by “reading and marking registers, prayers, catechism and other religious teaching. . . . The deadening monotony of much of this early learning results in parrot-like repetition. Interest is largely lacking, and progress is painfully slow.” DRC schools were notorious for failing to satisfy Africans who came to school wanting to learn English and acquire an education that would lead to a better job. And, unlike the networks of schools run by other mission societies, those run by the DRC in Gutu were not improving. Hannis Mungazi, a Jeanes teacher, was shocked in 1933 by how bad the schools were. DRC schools, he suggested, lacked the basic resources and discipline necessary to offer youth educated respectability. He reported a variety of problems to the Department of Native Development: a schoolchild killed during a
quarrel; the absence of basic school equipment such as chalk, slates, ink, books, or even school buildings; and teachers who were so lazy or incompetent that they did not keep their registers accurately, never prepared lessons or timetables in advance, preached rather than taught scripture, and forced students to work for them, both in gardens and at road work. Furthermore, some teachers were short tempered and violent, making the children afraid of them.¹³

The DRC schools also gained an unsavory moral reputation among the Africans of the region and their Native Department allies. That senior Africans and Native Department officials accused the DRC stations of sheltering and encouraging runaway girls and wives was not surprising. Nearly every mission in Southern Rhodesia faced such charges at some time, along with occasional cases of female pupils who became pregnant by teachers or fellow students.¹⁴ Nevertheless, observers considered the DRC an especially good example of the moral dangers of a mission education. Missionaries such as Orlandini were not accused of actively promoting illicit sex, but they were accused of profiting from it, since they levied fines in money or cattle on each pupil or mission adherent caught at illicit sex, or with responsibility for an out-of-wedlock pregnancy.¹⁵ While nearly all missions were seen as providing increased opportunities for illicit sex, DRC critics could point not merely to activities in schools or on the paths between school and home, but to various mission-sponsored overnight events of dubious content.¹⁶ The DRC mission sponsored kwayira dances. These dances had a superficial similarity to the beer parties that senior African men had customarily used to mobilize labor for large jobs such as land clearing, harvest, or planting.¹⁷ Unlike the beer parties, though, these dances were events for adolescents, organized by schools, under the administration of teachers who might themselves be young. After investigating the movement in response to numerous protests from parents, the Native Commissioner of Gutu (NC Gutu) described the dances as follows:

Teachers of one or more kraal school write to one another and arrange a joint dance of their school pupils. Alternatively, the people at whose kraals they dance give a goat or something similar—alternatively it is arranged that the combined schools should go to cultivate for some individual (black or white) a price is arranged by the teacher—one or more beasts usually—the teacher supervises his pupils at work—on completion of the (dance or) work the animals are taken by the party to a place in the veld and killed—the party then carries on dancing and feasting—beer of varying strengths has
been prepared beforehand, food taken out from the home also, etc.—dance and feast may go on for 2 days and nights or last for as long as two weeks. The pupils and teachers even go outside the district into adjoining districts.  

Girls, parents complained, returned home from these dances pregnant. Boys came back tired, but addicted to the excitement of the events and unwilling to go out and do wage work to earn their tax money. The missionaries who supervised the schools that engaged in kwayirra dances, Native Department officials alleged, “tolerated if not tacitly encouraged” dances because “despite the immorality, the evil effects on discipline, the inevitable absences from school . . . they make the schools popular . . . [and] numbers are the Mission desideratum.” Numbers meant money for the mission, the NC pointed out, both in capitation grants from the government, and in the variety of contributions from mission adherents. Furthermore, teachers held the dances themselves as moneymaking ventures, sometimes selling the labor of their pupils for a fee, and pocketing the proceeds.

The mission, its teachers, and its network of schools taught a form of respectability rooted in the idea of the individual, and his or her relationship with God, built up through that individual’s behavior as a student, worker, spouse, and parent. Kwayirra dances, in providing an opportunity for youth to serve the mission’s and teachers’ economic needs, potentially court a possible Christian spouse, and have fun, made sense, even if they might, occasionally, get a bit out of hand. Fathers and senior men, though, were worried about having daughters “spoiled” for bridewealth marriages, about pregnancies with children of unclear lineage, and about sons who sought to arrange their sexual, reproductive, and work lives for themselves, rather than working through the relationships of the father and lineage. Teachers and youth pursued a domestic respectability that differed radically, particularly in its economic and social obligations, from more customary practices. Hostility by fathers and elders to DRC schools was firmly rooted in a basic clash of values. DRC mission schools cost fathers control over their children for work, bridewealth, marriage arrangements, labor exchanges, and discipline.

The DRC’s problems, educational or moral, were not limited to its village schools. Its central schools, designed to train teachers, were hopelessly inadequate even by the admittedly low standards of the Southern Rhodesian administration. The Department of Education, usually slack about adherence to industrial education requirements, tried to crack down on the DRC when inspectors found that at the central
training institutions students were merely engaging in manual labor rather than receiving instruction in such staples as building and carpentry.\textsuperscript{21} The department repeatedly attempted to shut down the central training school at Gutu, complaining that the mission’s four Standard I pupils, the most advanced in the school during 1927, lacked the background to be trained as teachers and that even the European staff was only marginally qualified.\textsuperscript{22} Despite inspectors’ disapproval, Gutu continued to function with a staff composed, according to the inspector, of one “exceedingly poor teacher” and another who was mediocre at best.\textsuperscript{23} Government inspectors even considered the DRC’s flagship school at Morgenster, in Melsetter, to be inferior to the mission school standards upheld by stronger schools such as Nengubo (Waddilove), or Mount Silinda, as they repeatedly debated whether it should qualify for its grant. “Morgenster has hypnotised itself into thinking that it is doing excellent work,” they noted, but it exploited its students economically and disappointed them academically, producing a school in which “students [were] apparently existing for the mission rather than the mission for the students.”\textsuperscript{24} Despite these chronic and widely known problems, however, the DRC mission during the late 1920s received more money from the government for its schools than nearly any other mission society, and reached large numbers of pupils.\textsuperscript{25}

DRC missionaries were emphatic that in opening schools of whatever quality they were doing a favor to the Africans of a region. When the Native Commissioner of Gutu (NC Gutu) had stalled one application for a school after vocal objections from Chingombe, Chibasa, and Nyamandi, the relevant African leaders, DRC missionary Orlandini protested, writing

I really wonder why missionaries, alone in Rhodesia, should for the sake of education, still occupy such a humbling position as to go to native chiefs with hat in the hand and implore of them permission to educate the children . . . the time has come that we should disregard the objections unwilling chiefs make as to opening of schools . . . and simply do what we know is right.\textsuperscript{26}

Furthermore, once some form of consent had been acquired from the relevant chief or headman and a school opened, Orlandini argued that

both the missionary and the natives have entered into a mutual agreement which I consider binding on both, the missionary to run the school and give the necessary instruction, the fathers to send their children to
school. Where this agreement is being kept by both parties there is no trouble, there everything runs smoothly, there is discipline and progress, but where one of the parties, in this case the parents, deliberately keep their children out of school there I consider it my duty as teacher and missionary, in virtue of the agreement and for the sake of discipline and education, to look up the children and bring them to school and if needs be to compel them.27

This contractual agreement, Orlandini argued, made by the headman of a village, obligated all the people of the village to obey, and justified the use of whatever force was necessary to get children into schools.28

Orlandini may have believed he was in a contractual agreement with the local population, but African attitudes were far more ambivalent toward the schools that sprouted not merely on mission-owned land, but also on the native reserve land. A few pupils were enthusiastic attenders, sometimes to the disgust and disapproval of their parents. Some of these were girls who left home and went to Orlandini’s central mission station at Alheit without parental approval. Some evidently came to the mission station following the men they hoped would become their husbands, frequently former teachers at the local village school returning to the central station for more training.29 Others, the Native Commissioner complained, were breaking loose from parental control by living on the mission permanently.30

Not all Africans, however, were enthusiastic, or even willing, supporters of the mission schools and the establishment of mission authority in Gutu District. In 1921, Orlandini reported, not for the last time, that mission schools were empty of students in the aftermath of a visit by the Native Commissioner’s messenger, who had informed people “they need not send their children to school if they do not want.”31 Such stay-aways from the schools did not occur as a result of apathy. They were clear signs of rejection of mission authority, and those who stayed away or abetted their children in staying away knowingly faced the possibility of mission “chastisement” from Orlandini, other European DRC missionaries, or African mission helpers. In some cases, “chastisement” included floggings. In many more cases it included fines and forced labor for the mission.32

Whatever dissatisfaction stay-aways expressed, students did tend eventually to return to both DRC village and central schools. The students came back because they wanted to learn, and in the Gutu District, the DRC held a monopoly on government-recognized schooling. All sections of the population, however, from the chiefs on down, aggressively pursued any possibility of an alternative to the DRC.
During the 1920s, the situation in Gutu became volatile. While the Native Department lacked sympathy with students’ ambitions and teachers’ ideals, the new Native Development Department in 1929 considered Gutu one of the most volatile areas of the country, noting dissatisfaction with DRC schools “significant of growing unrest, growing dissatisfaction, a desire for fuller independence and also the acceptance of higher standards even if these be linked with personal ambitions.” This assessment implied that senior men had become frustrated enough to prefer higher standard teachers, who would make more serious inroads on their authority and resources, over the men who ran local schools under mission auspices. Senior men who had been conservative in their suspicion of third-class mission schools, were becoming radical enough to ask for better schools, though those would mean an abandonment of ideals of mass education in favor of expensive training for a smaller elite of ambitious individuals.

During the early 1930s, the educational situation in Gutu District deteriorated further. With good jobs becoming more difficult to find and producer prices for maize falling, parents in the district wanted education for their children, but actively sought alternatives to the DRC. During 1929, they repeatedly petitioned the Department of Native Development for a government school, modeled on Domboshawa and Tjolotjo, to be established in the Victoria circle. Explaining why they wanted it, they asserted that DRC schools were staffed by unqualified, inefficient teachers who were incapable of teaching English, or indeed anything else useful for the young man entering the job market. This demand paralleled the call for a government school at Umchingwe, discussed in the next chapter. In Gutu, given financial austerity and the dubious status of Tjolotjo, the administration rejected the petitions.

But the parents and students of the region kept trying. Attendance at DRC schools remained highly erratic as pupils and parents balanced the costs and benefits of going to school, under pressure from the mission’s truancy officers, the government, the job market, and their own doubts. Africans reportedly viewed the DRC as “not quite fair” as it was “making money out of the Native and giving little in the way of education in return.” While Orlandini may have seen schools as contractual charities offered by the mission, African parents and students were more critical, seeing them as moneymaking enterprises, exploiting students and community for the profit of white DRC missionaries. After a meeting in Gutu, the Superintendent of Natives (SoN) of Victoria reported that “The unpopularity of the DRC in Gutu is extraordinary. . . . Were any other missionary body to open schools
in that district, the Dutch Reformed Church could close its doors."\textsuperscript{36}
Yet, remarked the critical NC Gutu, the DRC remained active because "to a Native seeking to attend school in this district, there is no alternative to the DRC schools."\textsuperscript{37}

The parents and students of Gutu were strikingly sophisticated consumers of education. They assessed the inadequacy of the DRC system. They knew to ask the government for better schools. When their petition to the government to break the DRC monopoly through the establishment of a government school failed, and as most alternative missions were retrenching rather than expanding as the Depression took hold, the Africans of Gutu increasingly tried to establish their own independent schools under "Zionist" preachers unsupervised by white missionaries. The Native Development Department inspector responsible for the region began reporting unauthorized schools in 1930.\textsuperscript{38} Mukiyo Esthinus, one of Orlandini’s teachers, explained that when he resumed school in February 1931, after the long holidays, only a few of the girls from the school showed up for classes. All the boys and some of the girls stayed away. When he visited their homes to inquire why, they “informed me that they did not wish to attend my school as they were now attending the school of Zion.” He tried to persuade them to go back to school, unsuccessfully. And in July, when Orlandini inspected the school, looked at the register, and noted the absences, he was told the same thing. Orlandini’s reply was blunt, and typical of the DRC response to challenges: he demonstrated no willingness to negotiate, compromise, or respect his critics. Instead, he whipped a girl, and ordered students to come to school. The students did attend that day. But four days later, the teacher of the “Zion” church “came to me and asked why Orlandini was interfering with the children. Pilato [the Zionist teacher] threatened to assault me if I interfered with the children again.”\textsuperscript{39}

By the middle of 1932 the movement had grown as more “unauthorized Native Preachers” entered Gutu, telling the local people that they need not pay taxes since the Europeans’ rule was about to end, and establishing open-air schools. Within a few months, DRC outschools were empty as the majority of pupils had moved to the independent schools.\textsuperscript{40} Independent schools attracted a wide spectrum of students, including some middle-aged men and some women with babies on their backs, but the vast majority of students were men between the ages of 18 and 30. These schools were attended by ex-DRC students who wanted to learn more, and they were supported by some conservative headmen who had previously been skeptical regarding the value of education. They thus brought together two groups that had very
different reasons for opposing the DRC schools. By the time the Superintendent of Natives of Victoria (SoN Victoria) was concerned enough to intervene, in August of 1932, he was able to hold a meeting on the problem that involved more than a thousand concerned chiefs, DRC teachers, pupils, and 25 preachers from the African Methodist Episcopal church.41

The SoN Victoria intervened vigorously against this movement for independent schools by revoking preaching licenses and beginning prosecutions for tax default and pass violations against the AME preachers, and by prosecuting a headman for failing to report strangers. Nevertheless, "some hundred" men came up to him after the meeting, requesting that they be allowed to establish their own church rather than go back to the DRC.42 The SoN informed them bluntly that they could not have a church unless it was headed and supervised by a European. He did, however, back off his order that all should return to DRC schools. Under pressure, he agreed that only the children needed to go back: adults, or anyone above the age of puberty (the majority of students) could stay away.43

Though the SoN Victoria had clearly intended his mass meeting to end independent agitation in the region, local dissatisfaction with the DRC remained high, and local Africans continued to explore alternatives to the mission schools. Despite the SoN's order to return to school, attendance in DRC schools in the region remained low.44 Concerned that educational and religious dissatisfaction had political overtones, Native Department officials wrote chiding letters to each of the three DRC missionaries they had heard complaints of, and brought a special British South Africa Police investigator into the region to inquire into possible misconduct by the DRC. By November of 1933, the Native Department ordered Orlandini to leave the region.45 Murray and Badenhorst, however, remained, since investigators did not produce enough concrete evidence to allow expulsion. The concerted movement toward the Zionist church that had emptied the DRC schools in 1932 was over, but chronic dissatisfaction remained. Itinerant preachers attracted interested audiences.46 Male students and missionaries at the central stations of Alheit and Gutu bickered over attendance, fees, and the price of books, leading to intervention by the Native Commissioner, and female boarders at Gutu went on strike in June.47

DRC schools did gradually improve thereafter. They did not, however, improve in any direct response to the demonstrated discontent of the Gutu community. The African community had found that merely staying away from the DRC schools, or refusing consent for their establishment, had led to physical assaults on children and adults by
missionaries and their helpers, as well as mission attempts to insult or slander African headmen to the Native Department, which paid the headmen’s subsidies. Attempts to gain allies within the Native Department had been marginally more successful, but there were sharp limits on how far Native Commissioners or other government officials were willing to go to intervene. Despite a conviction on assault charges in 1927 for beating and blinding a parent who tried to keep his child out of school, Orlandini had remained in the district for six more years, until his illegal cattle dealing provided a pretext for expulsion. The government, short of funds, turned a deaf ear to repeated petitions that it should establish schools capable of providing an alternative to the hated DRC institutions, except for a brief suggestion that Morgenster, another DRC central school, should become the government school for the Victoria circle. When young men and elders united in opposition to the DRC and built Zionist schools and churches, seeking Zionist organizations as a protection from a predatory and disruptive DRC, the government’s reaction was to suppress the Zionists and the self-help movement, and re-ally itself with the DRC mission, forcing children back into DRC mission schools to eliminate what it viewed as a source of dangerous Zionist propaganda.

African activism, particularly the combined activism of young men and headmen or elders, did push the DRC toward less violent recruitment practices and more successful teaching of English. But it was incapable of pushing the DRC to do more than meet the minimal standards set by institutions in other regions of the country. When DRC schools improved, they did so because of Department of Native Development regulations that undermined the profitability of massively enrolled, underattended, poorly taught village schools. Central schools improved because young men from the region knew about better schools and were increasingly willing to leave the territory to go to them, returning, if at all, as Jeanes teachers, agricultural demonstrators, or teachers. African activism in Gutu, then, did not succeed in developing new standards to which the DRC would be held. It did, however, force the DRC to try to meet standards set and kept by others outside of the region.

**New Chiefs: Chief Ziki’s Schools**

The student stay-aways and strikes at Gutu schools introduce us to some of the controversies over schooling, its costs for communities and students, and what Africans in Southern Rhodesia hoped to gain from demanding institutions that promised to transform youth from
children into progressive Christian adults. But students’ activism of the kind emphasized in the Gutu crisis was only a part of the picture of schools, and their people, in interwar Southern Rhodesia. By the 1920s and into the 1930s, schools were the center of not only individuals’ initiatives as students and teachers, but communities’ efforts to stake claims to state, mission, and other resources. Communities’ initiatives involved not merely youth, but older men as well. Key to these initiatives were new, educated, experienced chiefs, who were appointed by the administration and honored by their people not merely for their lineage or their seniority, but for their professional skills and their knowledge of a world increasingly constrained by segregation, state initiatives, and settlers.

These new chiefs were not the old men who might once have led. They were familiar with Native Department administrative offices, where some had previously been employed. Their chiefly positions were ratified not by their followers, but by Native Commissioners. Some of these men bought support from missions by embracing ideas of progressive development. They pursued popularity among the people they headed by providing access to schools, development initiatives, and knowledge of the new economy of land, state power, and segregationist limitations. As agricultural and intercultural expertise, and notoriously fickle mission patronage, became sources of power, communities in the 1930s faced a social landscape where individuals and factions created legitimacy and association on the basis of expertise and patronage rather than genealogy or seniority. In this new context, if a new chief failed to deliver, his followers could push for another chief. In uneasy circumstances, such as those experienced at the Devuli Ranch, or Umchingwe, where a community’s land rights were not secure, people could even abandon a chief and aggregate around voluntary associations, whether church and school, or political initiatives such as the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU).

This volatile social landscape brought struggles over education to a new prominence, as fights over schooling involved not merely students, teachers, and their official or mission patrons, but parents, elders, and a wide range of ambitious individuals within communities across Southern Rhodesia. New chiefs’ most ambitious initiatives—both Ziki’s schools, discussed in this chapter, and Mdala’s Umchingwe initiative, discussed in the next chapter—were not particularly successful in reconciling local needs with aggressive state policies. But in examining chiefs’ initiatives, and internal divisions as communities
responded to these new possibilities and pressures, it is possible to glimpse some of the ways specific Africans in Southern Rhodesia sought to use new rhetorics of progress and development to reconstruct alliances between senior and junior African men based not on traditionalism or conservatism, but on an active embrace of all the social changes a good school could bring.

Schools stirred up youth and daughters. They introduced uncontrollable teachers into local power politics. And they advanced a new type of authority, based on educational qualifications and knowledge, distinct from the authority of age and experience that had once allowed patriarchs to control their communities. But though some senior men fought against schools and education in their territories up through at least the 1930s, others fought only specific types of education while cultivating other schools that they saw as potentially controllable, helpful, and necessary. During the late 1920s and into the 1930s, as the administration began to implement new segregationist legislation, such as land apportionment and job reservation, and as producer prices for cattle and crops (the basis of chiefs' wealth) eroded, some chiefs saw education—even restricted, segregated education—as an innovation allowing themselves and their communities to survive and prosper.48

Some of the men who began to emerge as community leaders in the late 1920s and early 1930s were “new chiefs,” a phrase that describes both their identities and their affiliations.49 These men, such as Willie Samuriwo, Gonzao Patrick Guzha (Chief Zwimba), Chief Mangwende, and Chief Ziki of the Devuli Ranch, had qualifications beyond age and inheritance. They had experienced various aspects of the new colonial society. Samuriwo reported that, despite being of a secondary house and living as a commoner, working for his father and preparing to make his own farm, he was chosen as chief “mostly because I was clever and I had taught the people many progressive things and agriculture.”50 Guzha began paid work in Salisbury at age 10, attending night school whenever possible between 1900 and 1905 until he entered Waddilove School in 1906. From 1911 through 1918, he worked as a teacher, resigning to accept work in the Native Department for a year, before going back to work for a series of employers: Falcon Mine (as clerk), the British South Africa Police (as native constable), and the Native Department (as an interpreter and messenger at the Selukwe office).51 Chief Ziki acquired his position after working his way up in the office of the Native Commissioner, and serving a term as the Head Messenger, a position that placed him as the most powerful African in the district office.52
These men, and others like them, understood how the administration, settlers, and missions were constricting and changing their lives. They had lived through government changes and through travel, a variety of employers, and both formal and informal schooling. Some critics of these chiefs and others like them have viewed them as dupes co-opted by the segregationist administration. But in a context of limited options, the new chiefs, from the late 1920s onward, were more than just dupes. Instead, they experimented with tactics and alliances that facilitated their personal and corporate survival and prosperity. One of the most important of these initiatives was the effort to develop local systems of education that were under their own control, rather than that of an obnoxious mission (such as the Dutch Reformed Mission or in some contexts the Anglicans) or an unsympathetic government official. Senior men considered schools both entertaining and important. As Isaac Chirembe remembered:

The elders spent most of their time . . . enjoying their children’s activities. . . . They were fascinated by the marching. The children were also taught to sing. Church songs were sung softly. . . . They were now able to write a, b, c, d, e, f. . . . There was something divine about this. . . . They wrote on the ground with their fingers. There were school slates . . . and the pencils. . . . They now knew how to write meaningful things. They also wrote the numerals.

But schools were more than entertainment: they provided essential job skills and patronage connections that shaped future possibilities. Chief Ziki, a new chief on the Devuli Ranch, understood this when he sought to block DRC expansion into his region and recruit American Board evangelists and teachers to found schools for him. The Devuli Ranch, on the west side of the Sabi River, was distinctly beyond the region the American Board had marked out for evangelization. But Ziki offered to pay for the American Board’s expansion, and he began construction of schools immediately, announcing that he himself expected to attend his school, leading his people to new levels of education. Missionaries patronized Ziki, asking “What can one do with a chief like that?” and comparing Chief Ziki’s activism to the “enthusias[m] . . . of . . . a boy . . . about a new pair of skates.” But Chief Ziki, and others like him, were strong and dynamic leaders, and in their investments of resources and willingness to order their people to attend schools, they sought to shape their region’s changes. Chief Ziki traveled around his region, announcing “that all the children in his kingdom must go to school so that the nation will progress. In one school he asked each child how many children there
were at home who were big enough to come to school, and then told
them they must come."\textsuperscript{57}

By the interwar period, a school had become an important status
symbol for each headman or chief who sought to maintain his influ-
ence. These schools were often named after their local patron. Gov-
ernment regulations required that missions get the permission of the
local headman or chief before opening each school. And since schools
were more common than government-recognized and salaried chiefly
positions, struggles over school sponsorship were a way for ambitious
"kraal heads" and headmen to pursue elevation into official status and
recognition.\textsuperscript{58} Schools were expensive and dangerous: teachers regu-
larly required donations in money and in kind, and called for unpaid
work in gardens, construction, and roads by both students and par-
ents, and schools offered opportunities for students to escape disci-
pline, potentially promoting opposition to senior men within African
communities.\textsuperscript{59} Alliance with a helpful mission, though, could provide
threatened communities with a source of patronage and emergency
resources.

Chief Ziki had reason to be concerned by DRC expansionism and
forced removals, and pursued schools and American Board missionary
patronage aggressively, becoming featured in a variety of government and
mission sources as an exemplary chief and leader of development. Dur-
ing 1929, Chief Ziki recruited the American Board and sought out ap-
propriate teachers to run his schools. He contacted the American Board
evangelist Columbus Nyamunda when he passed through the region. Ziki
reportedly "begged him [Nyamunda] to stay and start a school."\textsuperscript{60} Ziki
sent a man along with Nyamunda to bring back word as soon as possible
of the central mission's decision regarding a school. He also called up
labor immediately to cut poles to construct the school building, and be-
gan lobbying an anti-education Native Commissioner to permit an Ameri-
can Board school.\textsuperscript{61} Chief Ziki offered the American Board money,
proposing to pay the mission for all school expenses above those covered
by the notoriously inadequate government grants.\textsuperscript{62} He further showed
his enthusiasm by providing additional help: he purchased slates for pu-
pils who could not afford them, and pushed regular attendance. Within
months of the school's opening, it had four teachers and 250 pupils at-
tending.\textsuperscript{63} Given mission estimates that Ziki's territory held a total of
about 4,000 people, many of whom would have been far from the central
school, or too young or too old, such high levels of attendance were
remarkable.\textsuperscript{64}

During the school's first year, Ziki not only offered money; he deliv-
ered, despite worsening regional economic conditions.\textsuperscript{65} Enthusiastic
American Board missionaries considered Ziki’s school a tremendously successful case of African-sponsored, self-funded educational development. As such, it provided a progressive model for the country at a time when the mission and government had few resources available for Africans’ education. The mission even proposed to expand its influence further by stationing one of its first female Jeanes teachers (home demonstrators) at Ziki’s.\(^6\) Ziki’s school was featured in the annual report of the Director of Native Development.\(^6\) In 1930, the mission expanded further in Ziki’s region, opening up two more schools while Ziki’s principal school, despite the regular departure of young men for work, had 266 pupils on the rolls.\(^6\)

Soon, however, Ziki’s schools were in trouble. Missionaries reported famine conditions by the end of 1931.\(^6\) Even more significantly, foot-and-mouth disease among his cattle decreased Ziki’s access to money. Hard pressed, Ziki could not pay for his schools. At the end of 1931, they closed.\(^7\) Unable to acquire sufficient local or mission funding to run schools in the territory, the Board missionaries turned again to the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), asking them to take over the schools’ funding and supervision while retaining the American Board teachers with their superior qualifications.\(^7\) Both Ziki and the government officials in charge, however, rejected this solution, pointing to the DRC’s dismal scholastic record. Despite the region’s economic difficulties, Ziki offered £5/10s/6d and 20 head of cattle to clear up his indebtedness and restart his schools under the American Board. The mission, however, considered this insufficient. The schools stayed closed through 1932.\(^7\)

When the famine ended, the American Board did not reopen Ziki’s schools. Instead, the American Board recruited the DRC to take over the schools, foiling Chief Ziki’s original efforts to block DRC expansion, and ignoring his ongoing protests. In 1934, Ziki complained about the progress of students at his schools under the DRC as opposed to that which students had made under the American Board.\(^7\) Enrollment in his principal school fell from approximately 250 to only 103, and only two teachers remained. Columbus Nyamunda and his wife and sister-in-law, who had been key in opening the school as a family operation in response to Ziki’s request, were gone. The school was no longer a shining beacon of African initiative: the government inspector graded it only fair, remarking of first-year students’ recitations that classes were characterized by “parrot-like repetition . . . without a meaning.”\(^\)\(^7\) As a final indignity, one of Ziki’s daughters either ran away or was kidnapped by DRC teachers, and sent to the DRC boarding school at Pamushana over his protests. While the facts
Photo 1.2  Interior of Mutema (third-class) school, 1926, photo by A.J. Orner. ABCFM Rhodesia Picture Collection, Mount Silinda 20:17.
of the daughter’s case were unclear, the result was not: the local school inspector who had once praised Ziki’s schools reversed himself, condemning Ziki and implying that Chief Ziki, as an old man excessively fond of beer, and married to 18 wives, was a parent unfit for custody over his own daughter.

Ziki’s schools had been founded on the basis of his own initiative and “cooperation” between him, teachers, missions, and officials.75 As communities in Gutu had done, Ziki had tried to recruit allies, and construct institutions in an African community that would permit his people’s continued survival, and block the Dutch Reformed Mission’s intervention. Chief Ziki’s failure, as officials labeled him a drunken polygynist unworthy to hold custody of his own daughter, highlighted the difficulties of combining the roles of school sponsor and traditional leader. Government officials, in the aftermath of Ziki’s efforts, combined a new scorn for “traditional” leadership with a distrust of African initiative and a growing sense that the administration should be the source and controller of educational and social programs in the territory. The Native Department continued to back the elderly traditional leadership against Native Development Department and mission power, but they did not defend traditional leaders’ ability to make change.76

Malusi Muketsi’s School

Chiefs were not alone as actors in the political and geographical maneuverings of African education. The new Christian communities that were centered around schools also cared enough about education and its possibilities to experience schooling as a flash point between rival factions in local communities. Fights over schools, therefore, were not always just fights by unified African communities against DRC initiatives and exactions, or efforts by a progressive chief to sponsor a development initiative by enlisting mission and government sponsors. The demands that schools and churches made on the people who lived near them meant that even within a community, individuals or cliques frequently fought over school control, or used their patronage of one mission’s school as opposed to another mission’s institution as a way of expressing local solidarities and claims.

Missions competed fiercely with each other for territory, and, even when they lacked the sort of monopoly control the DRC had achieved in Gutu, monopolies and mandatory school were often their ideals. Regardless of a family’s belief, if they lived on, or sometimes near, a
mission station, their children could be compelled to attend school. Mona Hlatywayo, born in a non-Christian household, recalled that “When he was old enough to go to school he did not like it and his parents did not want him to go to school either. They did many deceitful things, whenever Mr. Njapa (the school policeman) went around for children who were old enough to go to school. One day Mr. Njapa came to Mona’s home.” Mission attendance officers like Mr. Njapa could take children from their parents and the work their parents expected them to do. Schoolchildren could also be subject to stern treatment than their parents imposed. Even the American Board mission—one of the most enlightened, liberal missions in the country—imposed a discipline harsh enough that word spread and potential students feared to attend. Knight Sitole remembered that when a friend urged him to go to school, “I told him that I heard that people are beaten at school, and why do you want us to be beaten too.” The presence of compulsory schooling and the fact that missions sometimes removed children from parents against the parents’ will explain why senior members of a community could see a mission school as something external, pulling the youth and young women away from home. Thus, while missions may have viewed compulsory education policies as ways of ensuring uniformity of training and adherence to missions, these policies could divide local communities into those who accepted mission demands, and those who complied only under duress, or actively resisted.

Missions not only demanded children; they also required money and resources, including land. By the 1930s, the American Board, among others, collected school taxes from parents, whether or not the parents had money or wanted their children schooled. Parents who could not or would not pay school fees, rent, and government taxes could be driven off the mission station and forced to try to find land elsewhere. Off the land formally owned by the mission, the Board provided schools only when communities, or at least their headmen, offered to pay. Chief Ziki, for example, paid well for his school, collecting funds and cattle from his clients to meet his payments. But in the context of the Depression, costs were high and unequally distributed. Mission demands for local funding, therefore, were not met simply by joyful giving by solid communities. Instead, like demands for children’s time and work, chiefs and headmen who demanded money to meet their obligations to the missions could foment unrest, or efforts to find alternatives, that pitted chiefs and headmen against factions of their own people. Schools’ demands for land allocations
sufficient to supply school gardens and private fields for teachers and their families, could also prove polarizing. The chosen school would shape the future of the community’s children. The headman whose name was attached to a school would gain prestige. Schools were worth fighting over.

Like the African communities they worked with, mission communities were far from homogeneous. White missionaries participated in the interdenominational Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference (SRMC), but individual missionary societies were highly competitive and hostile to other missions’ expansion onto what they viewed as their territory. Catholics viewed Protestants as “sectarians” and mourned Protestant expansion as the loss of souls. American Board missionaries were appalled by Dutch Reformed missionaries. Salvation Army and Seventh-Day Adventist missions disconcerted more staid denominations. And both missions and government officials expressed concern about how the varieties of the mission experience could lead to confusion or comparison shopping. They worried with reason: by the 1930s, chiefs recruited or blocked mission initiatives based on a mission’s reputation, teachers moved from one mission to another in search of higher paying work, and Africans increasingly noted not theological distinctions, but the opportunities each mission society offered. In this context of multiparty competition, framed and regulated by the government’s rule that all schools be at least three miles from the next nearest school, local Africans fought for control of schools not just by maneuvering against other Africans, but by engaging mission sponsors.

One of the more notable examples of this conflict was the 1935 fight over schools near Malusi Muketsi’s home in Hartley District, near the Mondoro Reserve, that culminated in a “religious riot” and a government judgment dividing the community into Catholics and Methodists. Mission affiliation suddenly defined who belonged, and who stood outside. Difficulties began to emerge by 1932, as the Wesleyan Methodists experienced the Depression and all the shortages of cash associated with it. To cope, the mission closed schools where parents failed to pay school fees or work for the mission. Malusi Muketsi’s school closed. Muketsi was a government-recognized headman, possibly with additional connections with some of the more progressive, education-oriented factions within the country. Ethnically, he was Mfengu. Mfengu, descendants of South Africans who immigrated to Southern Rhodesia during the 1890s, were a community strikingly willing to pay for quality education. Why the Methodists closed this particular school is not entirely clear, but the Methodists expected community contributions to help fund schools. If those were
absent, they closed schools and reassigned teachers. Malusi Muketsi’s school ceased to function in July 1932, and the government declared it officially closed effective August 1934.\textsuperscript{85}

By 1935, as the Methodist mission still failed to supply the local community with a teacher and a new school, Malusi Muketsi took the matter into his own hands and went to the Catholics. Father Daignault reported that “Muketsi came to request me for a teacher, stating that for reasons of money their Wesleyan superintendents had denied them a teacher for the last three years. Later, they stated that they had seen you [the Native Commissioner] and told you that they wanted a Catholic teacher.” Muketsi did not choose the Catholic mission at random: of the available local alternatives, the Catholics were among the least likely to respect any Protestant’s claim to turf. Furthermore, the local Native Commissioner was Catholic, and presumably more sympathetic to a Catholic request to supersede Muketsi’s Methodist history than a request to open any other form of school.\textsuperscript{86} Administrative approval for the new, Catholic, school came through by March 1935.\textsuperscript{87} Methodists later charged that the Native Commissioner approved the new Catholic school before consulting local parents.\textsuperscript{88} The commissioner, however, claimed that he had acted when “Malusi [Muketsi], a Fingo [Mfengu], the Head of the Kraal has appeared here with 8 sub-heads of kraals and they all ask for a Roman Catholic school . . . [providing] evidence as to the wishes of the people which had to be respected.”\textsuperscript{89}

What makes this story more than just another description of a headman in pursuit of a functioning school, though, is what happened next: learning of the new school, members of Muketsi’s community who remained Methodist petitioned the Methodists to reopen their school.\textsuperscript{90} Attempting to retain control over territory, the Wesleyan Reverend Stewart actually sent a teacher down to the former school site, and applied to reopen the old Methodist school within three miles of the new Catholic school. At this point, however, “unseemly disturbances” broke out between the supporters of the two factions.\textsuperscript{91} The police reported rather incredulously that the May 22, 1935, disturbances at Muketsi’s were about religion.\textsuperscript{92} According to Father Daignault the problem was that a Methodist teacher was trying to reopen a school. This teacher was “told by Malusi Mukelets to go away. He did so but came back again. He was shown the Government Authorization of our school but he refused to go. I gather that he has no authorization from Mr. Stewart to re-open that school.”\textsuperscript{93} According to Stewart, however, his teacher, Mudikayi, had been acting in accordance with Department of Native Education rules on reopening closed schools, and should be
allowed to begin work. The disturbances, according to Stewart, were the "outcome of Father Daignault's effort to force his views on our people." By June, Muketsi's community was thoroughly split and the Native Commissioner was embroiled in the controversy. He reported to Stewart that the Methodists lacked authority to reopen their school, and he called parents into his office in an effort to negotiate a settlement. The 20 who attended included 12 of the 29 people who signed the Methodist petition for reopening the school. Of these 20 people, the 12 Methodists had 25 children (10 girls, 15 boys). The 8 Catholics had 26 children (14 girls and 12 boys). The Native Commissioner declared the community evenly split. He ordered the Methodist teacher, Mudikayi, to stop teaching at Muketsi's for fear of increasing friction between the "adherents of the two sects." And he supported the Methodists' departure from Malusi Muketsi's village and the establishment of their own school center more than three miles away from the "now definitely Roman Catholic" Malusi's.

Far from being a simple story of a headman pursuing education for his community, Muketsi's conflict proved an example of the ways in which the new religious and educational affinities provided alternative social networks, with connections that could conflict with or supersede "traditional" allegiances to headmen and patriarchs. The 29 Wesleyans who signed the Methodist petition enclosed in their petition a letter from the pastor of their church, asking for the education that they, as parents, could approve of, rather than the education that their headman saw fit to provide. The NC's decision to hand the region over to the Catholics was based on his assessment that those who mattered, the headman and eight sub-heads, had chosen the Catholic school. The petitioners who tried to keep a Methodist affiliation were not the powerful, significant members of the community. Instead, they organized through their new institution, the church, even when it was seemingly abandoned by white missionaries slow to provide a teacher. Complicating the matter even further, some of the new Methodists may have been individuals whose very access to land depended on their finding someone outside the local power structure to allocate it: the Native Commissioner complained at one point that Zambesi immigrants, organized by a man named Mbaibai, had entered the controversy. These men may have been married to local women, but their wives could not, without help, provide the land necessary to support new families.

In 1936, the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, to whom the Methodists had complained about Muketsi's situation, rejected their appeal,
affirming the NC’s decision. He supported the traditional leadership at the expense of the majority of the population, and rejected any “sort of ballot at the kraals” over which denomination should build a school and church.98

The controversy over Malusi Muketsi’s school, though, demonstrated the centrality of the local school to village identity and power structures. Factions organized by denomination used church and school structures to gain outside support and resources. They used church and school arguments to back, or oppose, local authorities. And they felt strongly enough about these institutions to riot over them. Muketsi’s conflict generated paperwork when it escalated and involved the police, the various missions, and government departments. The real action, however, was local politics, politics of which the written record provides only hints, politics in which community definitions of “self” and “outsider” were worked out through fights over school control.

The Native Commissioner’s compromise solution, declaring Malusi Muketsi’s school proper to be Catholic, but allowing the Methodists to build again if they stayed beyond three miles, demonstrated how religion in this context did not provide unity. Instead, it hammered a wedge between various factions of a community under stress from depression, land apportionment, and immigration.

Often, colonial officials in Southern Rhodesia and elsewhere emphasized the opposition that could exist between institutions modeled on the past—such as chiefship and headmen’s authority—and new patterns of status and identity propounded by educated youth and mission churches.99 In Southern Rhodesia, however, neither communities nor chiefship were static categories. Challenged by youth, endeavoring to maintain status and constituencies, chiefs tried to use schools, just as they used other resources, to pull communities together under their own influence. As ambitious communities pushed for chiefs such as Samuriwo and Guzha with experience and education as well as descent, schools and education became one of the resources a successful chiefly patron tried to provide for his people. And chiefs with experience of government and mission patrons, such as Ziki, worked hard to try to provide education that served specific needs. These African patrons of education acknowledged the differences among missions, and worked to bring schooling into their communities under their control, with schools as demonstrations of their effective alliances with government and missions.

Yet unlike cattle or land, schools and education proved difficult resources for chiefly distributors. Schools brought teachers and students
with ties to additional external patrons, and relationships between teachers, students, and mission sponsors that chiefs could not necessarily control. And students, teachers, or parents could seize initiative away from a headman or chief, and use a school as the basis for a new community, rather than as a building block of the existing headman’s or chief’s status and connections with his people. Chief Ziki was both one of the most successful new chiefs in sponsoring an American Board school, and one of the most serious losers, as he watched both his school and his daughter be given to the Dutch Reformed Mission over his protests. And the “riot” at Malusi Muketsi’s demonstrated the dark side of new religious affinities: they did not simply make new nurturing communities for people stressed by removals, segregation, and land apportionment; they could provide the tools to rip older connections apart, without offering any new unity in Christianity. Ultimately, chiefs’ initiatives for schools worked best as they competed with other chiefs and headmen for the resources of prestige and followers within the limits of Southern Rhodesia’s allocation of power and resources. Initiatives such as Ziki’s or Malusi’s allowed some negotiation with the state and its mission allies. But buying into an ideal of an educated people, centered on a specific church, did not provide enough new resources to allow new African communities to change their status.

Iyati

In Gutu, at Ziki’s schools, and through the fight over Malusi Muketsi’s schools, schools clearly brought senior African men into conversations with mission and government sponsors over control, respectability, and the future possibilities that youth should be trained for. Such third-class schools constituted the bulk of schools in Southern Rhodesia. Teachers for those schools, though, were trained in central schools, called first-class schools. First-class schools—not Ziki’s efforts at local mass education—were the essential link to the future for missions, which hoped to train the leadership of the next generation, and for the administration, which needed educated Africans to staff its initiatives. Since first-class schools explicitly trained leaders, specific individuals who could aspire to important roles, they were centers in which African youth and men worked through the possibilities of respect and prestige in a segregated world.

Training ambitious young men for sharply limited roles had obvious dangers. Tensions between mission and administration needs for
educated men, and the desire to control them and keep them humble, emerged when students struck in 1931 and 1932 at the London Missionary Society's Inyati Institute. Inyati, a central mission station of the London Missionary Society (LMS), was one of the oldest missions in the country, sitting in Matabeleland on a land grant made by Lobengula himself. From the beginning of the century, the LMS, like every other mission society, experienced problems in acquiring enough trained teachers to staff its expanding webs of outschools. "In the absence of trained teachers we must do the best we can with the material we have in hand. . . . The teaching is not so important in our sight as a strong Christian character," argued Bowen Rees, the head of Inyati in 1900 as he admitted that one of his teachers was a child and others were marginally literate. These early schools were strictly evangelical, with few pretensions to practical or literary training. At the central station, though, the mission did have an industrial missionary who trained apprentices in building and other such work, despite opposition from skilled and semiskilled European workers in Bulawayo. While mission objectives might be limited, however, Africans trying to cope with the changing administration and economy of the region were anxious for relevant education. When one missionary barely able to speak Sindebele offered an English reading class to students willing to buy their own books, 18 pupils showed up the next day with book in hand. Missionaries realized that if they wanted to keep students enthusiastic, they had to provide teachers who knew something worth learning. By 1903, the crisis had become so severe that some of the missionaries began campaigning for a European schoolmaster and a solid teacher training program. "The schools," Cullen Reed pointed out,

have nearly reached the climax of their possible results under the present circumstances. That is the present teachers cannot carry them further unless some plan is formed for raising their own education . . . it is vitally necessary to our mission that a higher school should at once be established.

Despite this recognition of need, and a very real African demand for quality education, LMS plans to provide a central training institute got off to a rocky start. The first missionary assigned to run it left the region after a short visit, and the next, R.C. Williams, failed—despite enthusiasm and ambition—in the face of serious budgetary problems and personality conflicts with senior members of the mis-
Even the increased attention to education represented by the training institute at Hope Fountain did not necessarily translate into a strong educational program elsewhere. In 1908, Williams reported that Inyati central school was a one-teacher school, poorly organized and cacophonous, with an average attendance of only 35 of the 72 students on the roll. The school opened at 9:30 A.M., closed at 1:00 P.M., and taught little. Only 6 of the students present could read the vernacular Testament, only 13 could write at all, however badly, and all but 4 of the students he examined failed in arithmetic.

Inyati remained in the shadow of Hope Fountain, which gradually became a quite successful girls' school. But in the 1920s, with the teacher crisis and the mission's need for male evangelists, the mission once again attempted to improve Inyati, and transform it into a central school capable of teaching the African men it needed to lead a mission community. In 1921, facing competition from the new government schools, Inyati opened as a boys' boarding school with a teacher who had passed Standard IV in South Africa at Tiger Kloof, and 18 boarders. Though there were two male European missionaries on Inyati station, neither of them taught in the school, concentrating instead on evangelical work at the mission and in the surrounding area. The school had difficulty recruiting industrial teachers with qualifications that the mission or government would consider adequate. But one of the men assigned to the station, W.G. Brown, had qualifications that made the government take notice. Though he was an ordained minister, he had received his education late in life. At age 14, he had left school to work as a bricklayer's assistant, gradually working his way up as a builder for the London County Council, taking courses in night school, and eventually establishing a contracting firm. For four years, he was part owner of a firm that bought land, drew up plans, and built houses on speculation, employing as many as 60 men at a time, and then he spent three more years doing contract construction work. Brown's practical experience at all levels of the building and contracting trade fit well with the government's emphasis on practical training.

By 1923, with the forced resignation of the first principal of Tjolotjo, the government industrial school in Matabeleland, Keigwin and others within the native development field considered Brown a nearly ideal candidate to head an industrial school. So they negotiated with the LMS to transfer him to the government as principal of Tjolotjo, or to take over Inyati as a government school. While both Brown and the parent committee back in London were willing, the
local missionary committee was not. They did not want to be associated with Tjolotjo, which they considered a wastefully expensive disaster, and they viewed the government as a potential competitor, not as an ally. The local executive committee of the LMS blocked that appointment. But they blocked it at a price. In the face of Brown’s newly stated interest in industrial education, they found themselves committed to investing resources in Inyati to transform it from a rudimentary central school that had only qualified for a government grant as a third-class school, into a first-class boys’ industrial institution capable of training not just male teachers and evangelists, but builders and carpenters. By August of 1924, Brown became principal of an Inyati that had 40 boarders and a new ranking as a first-class school.

Inyati’s transformation was not unproblematic. In 1925, Neville Jones, the head of the LMS in the region, wrote to the parent committee that while Brown’s results were excellent and the students appeared to be learning, the school was filled with controversies. Brown was a strict disciplinarian. And he was determined to be in sole control, a determination that brought him into direct conflict with the other missionaries at the station. By the local standards, Inyati was a success by 1925. By 1926, it was, according to informal accounts, actually making a profit, receiving £312 in government grants alone, and earning revenue from sales of woodwork products, books, livestock and farm produce, rents, and fees. By 1928, it had a quite well qualified African staff, though Brown remained the only European missionary. In 1928, Brown again campaigned for a government takeover, complaining that he was overworked, and that the institute needed more resources than the mission could provide. Again, the mission’s local executive committee turned down the government’s proposal. Students continued to come to the mission, though, as, by the late 1920s, it probably offered the best education available to African men in Matabeleland. By 1929, Brown was turning away would-be students, and by 1930, with 145 boarders, he was pleading for more staff.

The institution did not, however, remain at this peak of popularity and success for long. With the beginning of the Depression, LMS funds dried up. The mission opened no new stations during 1929, and plans for expansion of Inyati, to include blacksmithing and other skilled work, were put on hold. Then the 1930 harvest proved catastrophic: the 150 acres cultivated by the mission’s students reaped only 250 bags of corn instead of the 600 to 700 Brown had expected, and the greens, grown in market gardens for sale in Bulawayo as an im-
portant source of school revenue, failed entirely.\textsuperscript{116} Worse yet, the government began to implement austerity policies with the beginning of the Depression, cutting into the funding available for maintaining or expanding schools. At the same time, as a missionary pointed out, Africans perceived the mission society as rich. “The LMS Institutions are always fully equipped with missionaries and our European staff and money is freely spent on buildings and equipment.”\textsuperscript{117}

In this context, African students’ expectations that Inyati was a rich institution that would provide the training and patronage they needed for respectable elite status, and the mission’s sense of itself as impoverished, clashed. In the midst of this conflict of resources and expectations, Inyati had its first serious student strike in February of 1931. According to Inyati’s headmaster W.N.G. Davies, the head student, Thomas (Nqabe) Tjuma, informed Brown in the morning that if there was not more mealie meal per person by midday, there would be trouble. Brown rejected the warning and reportedly told students

that he was principal, and that it was not their place to tell him what he had to do. He added that he did not wish to see any remnants about in the pot or on the plates, and that he did not intend to fatten them up like pigs.\textsuperscript{118}

Brown’s bluntly contemptuous response to Inyati’s head student did far more than simply reject a student request. Brown attacked students’ vision of themselves as organized, disciplined, sensible participants in an educational process. His vision of his role as principal, and their role as students, coupled with the implication that they were wasteful children aspiring to eat like hogs, struck hard at an ideal of elite mission education as being a form of partnership between students and their patrons.

Unsurprisingly, poor rations and Brown’s clear contempt for student demands provoked trouble. At noon, students delegated to do the serving refused. They were willing to tolerate weevils, though they asserted that weevils were never present in meal ground in African homes, but they needed more food. A mug full of mealies alone was not enough for a meal, particularly when the students had been working hard on mission fields and in mission workshops for much of the day. Emphasizing their status as hard workers whose labor supported the mission, as opposed to children or hogs receiving mission charity, these students tried to defend their status, aspirations, and ability to participate in mission decisions regarding how to allocate resources. Brown, though, did not react sympathetically, and did not even at-
attempt to explain the mission’s financial crisis. Instead, he called the police, who arrived armed and ordered students down to school. Possibly intimidated in response to such blunt willingness to use force, the students backed down, returning to school and work.

Local missionaries labeled this unrest a food strike, prayed that it was an isolated incident, and hushed it up, refraining from reporting it to the London parent committee or the administration, in the hope that student discontent might just go away. This was not an uncommon reaction. Strikes were routine parts of life in central mission schools in Rhodesia and throughout Southern Africa. Mission sponsors in England, however, worried about them as failures of discipline and indications that the children to whom they donated money were insufficiently grateful. Whenever possible, therefore, missions declared common interest with African students, and attempted to downplay the real tensions that strikes could express.

In response to a 1933 strike at the Wesleyan Methodist Tegwani Institute, for example, during which students armed with sticks confronted the school’s administration and the Assistant NC, the Director of Native Development (DND) counseled calm. Though the Assistant NC was prepared and anxious to intervene, and was backed in his activism by a Chief Native Commissioner who believed the strike indicated a situation gone dangerously out of control, the principal of the school succeeded in calming the students and getting the schedule back on course through a negotiation session in which he made compromises. The DND supported him by placing a priority on negotiation with students as participants in schooling rather than as wayward children, and by maintaining appearances and school solidarity. He argued that publicity or punishment would be a mistake:

I regard this strike as identical in its main feature with periodic disturbances which have occurred at most Native Institutions in South Africa and elsewhere. . . . Periodically at all such centres there is some disturbance related to irregularities in the food supply and fomented by one or two ringleaders. The trouble is faced, action is taken, and then possibly for the next 10 years there is no recurrence. . . . Since the pupils are fee paying pupils, they cannot be treated in exactly the same manner as could a group of disaffected Natives who were not paying fees. . . . I do not think that at Domboshawa or at any Mission school the pupils are ever convinced that the fees they pay do not more than cover the full cost of running the institution. On the contrary, they feel that probably they are contributing large sums to revenue. . . . settlement of disturbances of this nature is almost invariably a matter which
can be satisfactorily disposed of without introducing the suggestion of criminal offence . . . [as] the prestige of the school suffers if outside authority [the police] be introduced to endorse a situation which, by its very constitution, must be on a voluntary basis.\textsuperscript{120}

The principal of Tegwani, however, had made more compromises and achieved a more lasting peace than Brown was able to manage. Faced with sticks, Tegwani’s principal had nevertheless talked with students, offering them respect as fee-paying participants in the educational process, rather than beating them, arresting people, or labeling them as animals.

As the economic crisis at Inyati worsened, tensions did not go away. Missionaries worried about money, fearing that if the government’s financial crisis persisted, half the educational work in the country would be shut down, and they would lose their source of influence and respect.\textsuperscript{121} Brown was proud of the economic success of Inyati, seeing it as a center for agricultural production, as well as education. In a good year, he noted, it sold 1,000 bags of maize and the surplus from £600 worth of livestock in addition to garden produce, for a net profit of at least £150 per year. Under budgetary pressure, Brown tried to maintain sales and revenue, and cut expenses.\textsuperscript{122} Among the cuts he made in trying to keep the mission solvent were cuts that affected what students ate.

In 1932 the second student strike in as many years broke out. On Tuesday, March 29, the school’s two prefects went to see Brown before dinner to explain what the students wanted. The food, they explained, was of such poor quality as to be indigestible, and there was not enough of it.\textsuperscript{123} “I had to hesitate,” Brown reported later, “and consider whether it could be afforded.”\textsuperscript{124} When it became clear that Brown would not meet their demands, the students struck. They refused to go to prayers, attend school, or perform industrial work. Brown responded like a foreman whose authority had been challenged, rather than as a patron, whose clients petitioned for necessities, or a proponent of mutually beneficial development. According to Davies, Brown kicked a couple of students when they refused to go to church. And Davies himself, as his students marched out of the classroom, “immediately seized a sjambok [whip] and, telling them that when they were in school they must obey my rules, ordered them back into the classroom.”\textsuperscript{125} On Saturday and Sunday, Brown alleged, the students raided the school and damaged the fields.\textsuperscript{126} On Monday, 90 out of approximately 150 students refused to go to work. Instead, they sat in
a group across the road from the church, and demanded that their requests be fully met. Brown talked with them, and managed to get all but 30 to go to work. Then he ordered the 30 remaining strikers to leave the mission, and called a meeting of the European staff members. After that, the situation deteriorated rapidly.

As tension continued to grow, Brown called in the NC, Mr. Green. Green arrived with three sjambok-armed messengers, talked with the strikers for an hour and a half, attempted unsuccessfully to force students back to the schedule, and then, swayed by Brown’s increasingly worried wife, told Brown to call in the police. When the police arrived—two European policemen on motorbikes and several African constables—a scuffle broke out. The policemen pulled out their guns. Students threw stones. Several students were hurt “falling” in ways probably assisted by the native constables. A stone-throwing student who had hurt a constable was handcuffed and the rest of the strikers fled.

Inyati did not settle back down smoothly. Students continued, throughout April, to skip lessons, pretend sicknesses, run away from work, or hold meetings, and all but one of the students from Hope Fountain left the Inyati in the middle of the night in mid-May. The administration and the mission held divisive investigations. Both Lanning, the Bulawayo Superintendent of Natives, and the local NC were present for the investigations, along with the LMS executive committee’s delegation. The LMS delegation included Neville Jones, the head of Hope Fountain, who had had frequent conflicts with Brown and whose clients, men from Hope Fountain Mission, Brown had labeled as the strike’s ringleaders. Two other missionaries, Jennings and Haile, came from South Africa to represent the LMS of the entire region, and Mtompe Khumalo, an ordained Ndebele minister, also participated. The delegation was clearly composed of men committed to the idea of cultivating Africans’ leadership and participation in mission activities as more than simple mission servants.

The investigative committee looked first at the specific trigger of the strike—food. Brown asserted that the diet at Inyati was the standard, time-tested, maize-based diet used for years at Inyati, Hope Fountain, and other missions. But he also admitted to punishing students who had supplemented their maize rations with greens from the garden, diverting most of the milk supply as a free bonus for European missionary families, eliminating supplemental foods such as coffee with milk and sugar, and providing only boiled mealies—rather than the more digestible ground mealies—for supper. “No other sta-
tion,” he argued, “has been cut so fiercely for Grants as Inyati.” In cutting food, however, Brown had gone too far. The students, Daniel Dube reported, all had stomachaches in the evening because the mission was too cheap to get the maize ground finely enough to make proper porridge. “It is quite right to strike for food,” another student wrote, as “no one should starve in a school.” The Superintendent of Natives who came to investigate admitted that though the students did not appear to be physically suffering from malnutrition, it was difficult not to sympathize with them regarding the food, as the diet was monotonous, consisting of little beyond various types of mealies and small quantities of milk or stew. To “remove the unpleasant flavour of this affair from the mouths of the boys,” one of the first acts of the mission investigative team was to kill an ox and offer the students a solid meal that included meat.

The strike was about food, but food in the mission school was a symbol for bigger concerns about the mission’s vision of Africans’ status as opposed to Europeans’ priorities, and about students’ ideas of how communication and benevolent patronage should occur. Asked to explain what happened, Nqabe Tjuma, whom Brown accused of being a “ringleader,” asserted

I did not think—none of us thought—that by asking Mr. Brown about our food that we would get into trouble and the Native Commissioner and the Police be sent for. We thought Mr. Brown would speak to us.

The fragmentary comments by students point to their understanding of themselves as individuals entitled to demand acceptable food, and to protest when their demands were unmet. These students framed their demand as a desire for food that would be digestible, at least as good as that in rural African homes, and sufficient for them to avoid hunger. Brown undermined his own credibility as a patron by cutting students’ rations. When Brown offered them lower-quality, insufficient food, he attacked their status as African leaders, especially when they could see his priorities enacted in his decision to give the milk from their cattle to white missionaries’ families, and offer for sale the greens they had cultivated. Refusing to compromise, or even discuss his priorities, Brown attacked any hopes students might have for not merely economic status, but also social status—and for respect within the world of the mission that he ruled.

The investigators, though, concluded that the strike had occurred because communication between students and teachers had been sacri-
ficed to Brown’s overrigorous sense of discipline. Ultimately, they argued, the food that had been so extensively discussed by students, teachers, and investigators, had little to do with the real issue. The real issue, they argued, was “treatment . . . the deep-rooted dissatisfaction generally felt by staff, pupils and parents with the unsympathetic and overbearing attitude of Mr. Brown . . . [a] resentment, almost amounting to hatred” felt by pupils toward Brown.\textsuperscript{136} Lanning, agreeing with the missionaries, referred to Brown as a “drill sergeant” and observed that “discipline, discipline and still discipline” appeared to have become an obsession with Brown, at the expense of communications or accessibility.\textsuperscript{137}

Neville Jones blamed the entire strike on Brown, making a clear critique of Brown’s ideas, methods, and style. He asserted that when Brown went on leave in 1930 and Inyati was under his own control, it had done as well as Hope Fountain. Brown simply did not know how to run a school. He did not place enough emphasis on religion, and “he does not seem to have the facility to handle natives which comes naturally to some people. I mean, of course, the handling of natives as the missionary ought to handle them”—with paternalistic guidance, rather than abusive force.\textsuperscript{138}

Brown, on the other hand, indirectly blamed Jones not merely for the strike, which he asserted had been led by Jones’ Hope Fountain protégés, but for the investigation and reorganization, which produced a demoralized, disintegrating mission station.\textsuperscript{139} Furthermore, he restated his philosophy that

\begin{quote}

at present and for some years to come the most useful means of winning the Mandebele tribe for the Kingdom of God is, and will be, through vocational training . . . doctrinal training without practical training . . . has left the African very little better in living than in his pagan days.\textsuperscript{140}
\end{quote}

Unlike Jones, Brown did not believe benevolent paternalism was enough to lead students to Christianity, and to enable them to be active participants and leaders in a progressive African Christianity. Africans, he argued, must become disciplined producers before the mission engaged in conversations about how all could work together. As Jones and Brown bickered over Africans’ participation in mission discussions and priority setting, F.D. Harker, who succeeded Davies as headmaster at Inyati, assessed the mission’s situation bluntly, noting that after Inyati’s strike, and Jones’ investigation, both Jones’ concept of religious consensus and Brown’s disciplinary standards broke down, and the mission was torn by
the very real "deep down antagonism that exists between the two races, an antagonism that leads to the destruction of each other's intentions, even on a mission station." \[141\]

Despite reorganization under a new management committee, a new headmaster, and, early in 1933, Brown's resignation, Inyati did not make any quick recovery. Enrollment plummeted and severe staffing problems made the LMS consider closing it in 1936. The mission was once again forced to recognize what it had first learned decades earlier when it had first struggled to train, recruit, and retain qualified teachers: "The boys are here for what they can get, not for what they can give." \[142\] The students of even a strong mission school like Inyati, which had trappings of an English public school, such as prefects, and sought to build a sense of school spirit, learned that the mission did not belong to them. They flocked to the mission when it could provide training capable of yielding significant economic and social returns in the changing economy of Southern Rhodesia. But when Brown defended his management style he fundamentally misunderstood Africans' aspirations. Brown asked "If I am such a tyrant, how is it that the teachers have been here for years, some with me ever since I took over the school? How is it that the school numbers have continually increased...? And how is it that the workmen remain on for years and even when they leave come back again?" \[143\] Brown implied that teacher, student and worker persistence implied approval of his tactics. The reality was probably more complex. During the 1920s, Brown's enthusiasm, qualifications, and connections had made it possible for students, teachers, and mission workers to move into the African elite. The LMS had produced Mtompe Khumalo and Shisho Moyo, salaried, suit-wearing members of the mission, as well as the many mission-trained builders, who earned much more money than untrained labor and married or aspired to marry educated women from Hope Fountain. Yet with the economic crunch of the 1930s, Brown's economy measures and the deteriorating prospects for graduates made it clear that the future might not hold as many rewards. And the school experience provided a context for prefects and leading student teachers such as Nqabe Tshuma to hone skills of organization and protest, rather than passive acceptance and discipline. \[144\]

Brown restricted food to levels that would be considered marginal even on the mines, refused to discuss concerns with students, sold garden and dairy products that could have provided a more varied diet, broke negotiated agreements about improving the quality of the food, and resorted to both personal violence (kicking students) and state-
sponsored violence (police with guns). Students reacted to the loss of both economic resources and less tangible things like respect, dignity, and recognition as a prestigious class of educated Africans. Inyati’s strike was one of a would-be African elite brought face to face with economic limits and social distances in the contracting environment of Southern Rhodesia during the Depression. But the strike crippled the school and threatened the mission program because the mission needed educated Africans even more than the educated Africans needed it. Initially, the Director of Native Development accused the mission of setting entirely the wrong atmosphere when it “rewarded” strikers with an ox feast that would “fix for ever in their minds, the two-fold conviction that their case was considered thoroughly sound, and their procedure thoroughly commendable.”

The gift of an ox, however, restated quite clearly the mission’s relationship with the students. It precisely paralleled the administration’s pattern of giving an ox for a feast whenever it called chiefs or headmen together for a show of solidarity. The mission needed teachers and evangelists to mind its flocks just as the government needed chiefs and headmen. And, after hearing what the students had to say, the mission needed to appear as a rich, powerful, and generous patron, reasserting its identity as provider just as the governor or administrator did by feeding the chiefs after it had encouraged them to voice their discontents or concerns.

At Inyati, the alliance between students and mission broke down when the mission became unable to function as a prosperous provider of the education, jobs, and contacts capable of lifting its graduates into the elite. When it began feeding its pupils as workers, and training them for disciplined subordination, they struck. The strike destroyed the school because the mission could not effectively pursue any of the tactics available to the employers of the region without fundamentally undermining its ideological and religious commitments and alliances. It did not need interchangeable unskilled workers supervised by Europeans. It needed elite Africans—men like Nqabe Tshuma—working for the mission as they would for themselves.

Government Schools

Tensions and struggles over schools in Southern Rhodesia were closely tied to missionization because missions provided most of the country’s schools. Chiefs, communities, members of different denominations, students, all struggled over limited resources and mission patronage in both third-class schools and central schools. Hoping for a
less divisive form of education, some dissidents, both Christians and those rejecting the missions, hoped that government resources could offer more for African communities than missions could afford. But the first government school initiatives brought their own problems. Instead of offering a new form of education that would transcend the bickering that characterized local mission schools and central schools, they instead offered a new scene for struggle. Students and African teachers within these schools, though, were able to push for changes and opportunities, gaining access to resources and salaries substantially higher than those available to mission teachers. Using what the government schools provided, and blocking their more coercive policies, educated Africans were able to turn government schools into centers for a new class of Africans.

Before the First World War, some members of the Native Department began to advocate government schools for Africans. Keigwin, ultimately the most influential of these, argued in a 1914 memorandum that mission schools, which were the government’s strategy for education on the cheap, would not work:

A comprehensive system of state education is what is required. Such a system must necessarily be an expensive one but compared with the great benefit which the white population as well as the black is going to derive from it, the question of expense may be dismissed. . . . The benefit which the Country would derive as a result of the thorough education of the native would be enormous, for are not all our industries capable of expansion provided a regular and intelligent supply of labour is assured? As the natives advance on the road of intelligence and industry, portions of the Reserves could be cut up into small holdings and given to them conditionally on good behavior and progressive methods of agriculture . . . we could look forward to a contented and prosperous native population. 147

Keigwin believed, and in the enthusiasm of the post-War period convinced others within the administration, the settler community, and (temporarily at least) the mission community, that education in government schools could save the country from the racial conflict that was otherwise likely to destroy any hope of national consensus and economic development. Furthermore, many within the European administration believed it was necessary to acquire African allies to keep the peace. Government schools should provide these allies. They could offer schools for chiefs, focus on manual training and discipline rather than the more clerkly and potentially politicizing education of the
missions, or emphasize the reserves as the sites of African schooling, development, and prosperity.

Domboshawa, the first of the government schools, opened in June 1920 with its first 14 pupils, rising to an enrollment of 40 by November. During these first months, the school had only one teacher, a Shona man trained at St. Augustine, one of the missions Keigwin had condemned when arguing for his alternative educational scheme. The weekday timetable provided for academic subjects of one and a half hours each in a day school and a night school, and seven and a half hours of work, not including time set aside for roll call, drill, and so on. During their working hours, students were trying to construct the school buildings. After six months, Keigwin was able to report that

a good, if small, beginning has been made. Though there is probably no deep consciousness of what it all means, there is I am sure a realisation of better things. There is some conception of the value of time, of the worth of effort, and of the power to do, if only the will is set and the body trained. . . . During the year's course . . . [the student] will have learnt something of cleanliness, orderliness, punctuality, and application. He will have seen that it is possible for him . . . to build a much better house . . . get more out of a smaller piece of land, and . . . to earn a better wage.¹⁴₈

Yet despite Keigwin's determined optimism, not everything proceeded smoothly. Even in the first six months, he had to report "several small food strikes." And, despite his repeated assertions that Domboshawa was different from mission schools because all work was done by students, Keigwin found himself forced to hire various skilled workers for urgent tasks such as thatching.¹⁴⁹ Worse yet, 29 students struck toward the end of 1921 not merely over food, but over the curriculum, marching 19 miles into Salisbury to complain in person at the administration's offices and request that the curriculum be expanded to include reading in English. Keigwin capitulated, settling the strike peacefully. In 1922, half the students walked out again, demanding more time on scholastic work and less for industrial training. Keigwin agreed even more quickly to this demand, producing by the end of 1922 a new timetable marking off four and a half hours a day for nonindustrial schoolwork, a total even higher than that offered by Mount Silinda, which had a reputation as the most academically advanced mission school in the region.¹⁵⁰ And by the end of 1922, the missions had withdrawn their earlier support of the government schools, arguing that they were excessively expensive, duplicated mission curricula, and constituted unfair competition. The money, they ar-
gued, could more economically be spent at existing first-class mission schools.¹⁵¹

Tjolotjo, the second of the government schools to be established, had even more problems. Shortly after it opened in 1922, it was shut down by a strike of students demanding that they be taught how to make buildings with corners, and be trained for skilled or semiskilled construction work. The principal, Alexander, refused, saying he was unwilling to teach them anything that might permit them to compete with European artisans, and ordering them to put in long hours building round huts to provide his home and the station for the Assistant Native Commissioner. Students spread the news of this apparent reversal of policy through the network of Native Department messengers, and to their mission sponsors. By the time Keigwin arrived at the school, the situation was out of control. Alexander, he concluded, had been tactless, dictating policy without consultation, in ways similar to Brown or Orlandini. In doing so, he had nearly wrecked the school.¹⁵²

Alexander resigned in the aftermath of the controversy, but Tjolotjo’s difficulties did not go away. F.R. Mills, who had been hired as a woodwork instructor and whose command of Sindebele was less than fluent, took over from Alexander as acting principal. One of Mills’ principal qualifications for the job was his experience as a regimental sergeant major in the Northern Rhodesia police.¹⁵³ Mills, however, did not get along well with the African teachers, Philemon Butelezi, Philip Moyo, and Ben Sitole, who were all artisans in their own right. Resenting Mills’ assumption of authority, they viewed Keigwin rather than Mills as their supervisor. By October 1923, Mills had reached the end of his tether. Students were plotting and holding debates behind his back. Teachers were not taking their hats off when they talked with him. And both were going off hunting, contrary to regulations. Ben Sitole, a student teacher, was accusing Mills of stealing the fee for repairing a European’s gun. Sitole asked him to write to Keigwin and allow Sitole’s transfer “to a school where I can learn something.” When Sitole handed Mills a ruler and told him to measure for himself if he did not trust Sitole’s skill, Mills hit him.¹⁵⁴ Mills left in disgrace, narrowly avoiding prosecution for assault. Sitole, emerging as a quintessential middleman, went on to a position at Domboshawa where Keigwin argued Sitole’s methods produced more learning than those of Ardern, the European woodwork instructor, and where Sitole lectured, among other things, on measurement, precisely the subject of his dispute with Mills.¹⁵⁵ Sitole’s success in getting rid
of Mills, while maintaining his patron’s valuation of him as a key African leader, was precisely the sort of victory a successful African leader could aspire to, as it reinforced both Sitole’s dignity in a conflict with a petty, insecure European, and his importance and skill, as he went on to a better job after challenging a white authority, rather than being dismissed as dangerous. At Tjolotjo, though, Mills’ departure did not noticeably improve matters. Tjolotjo was relatively isolated from European population centers, and had difficulty attracting and keeping competent European staff members, including principals. In one year, 1927, the school went through three acting principals. But despite its difficulties and an atmosphere described as “a miasma of pessimism”—undisciplined, and characterized by frequent beer drinks in the neighboring villages—Tjolotjo’s enrollment continued to grow.156

When students arrived at the government schools, they arrived seeking opportunities for advancement beyond those available elsewhere. By the mid-1920s, a former student of Domboshawa could expect to earn wages several times those of an average African laborer. Practically none of the students followed the rhetorical advice of the school’s sponsors to take their new skills home to the reserves. Many of the most successful did not even employ their manual skills professionally. Instead, they earned good money for the most important skill taught at Domboshawa—English. In 1924, Broderick, the principal of Domboshawa, reported the locations of 27 former pupils. Three worked as interpreters for various government agencies, and another worked for the post office. Five were employed as, or trying to find jobs as, teachers. Thirteen earned money as builders, thatchers, or carpenters. Two worked as farm supervisors under Europeans, one for a settler, another for St. Augustine’s. Another worked in the stores department at Citrus Estates. Only 2 of these students were at home farming, and one of them was looking for a teaching job.157 The situation had not changed by 1926, when Broderick noted that none of his former pupils were settled on reserves; most worked for the government or Europeans and some worked for missions.158 Chided for neglecting agricultural training, Broderick pointed out to his critics that he could not reasonably push any student into agriculture as “a boy such as this finds difficulty in obtaining employment on a European farm at a wage which will satisfy him when compared with other pupils who have trained as builders, etc.”159 At Tjolotjo, too, students followed programs intended to enable them to earn higher wages. Students were attracted by a particularly good building foreman, Roelke.
And they were uninterested in government attempts to use Tjolotjo school as a center for dissemination of agricultural knowledge to the arid, infertile, Tjolotjo Reserve. The Colonial Secretary was forced to consider it remarkable progress when, under pressure, 9 of the 123 pupils at Tjolotjo were persuaded to major in agriculture rather than building.¹⁶⁰

The relative success of Domboshawa and failure of Tjolotjo grew from a variety of factors, ranging from proximity to areas of European settlement to the degree to which the staff was flexible in response to students' demands. At Domboshawa, the initial rhetoric of the Keigwin scheme vanished quickly and permanently in the face of Africans’ demands for education in English, extra hours on literary education, preparation for wage-earning jobs, and recognition of themselves as an upwardly mobile elite. When, in 1926, the school fired Ardern for defying the principal’s orders to teach planning and design in addition to the manual work of building, Domboshawa—under pressure from students close enough to the central government to make themselves heard—stated clearly that it was not about to be bound by the nervousness of European settlers worried about Africans competing for jobs. At Domboshawa, activist students, supported by teachers who proved to be skilled negotiators, managed to develop not a simple education for subordination and obedience, but an education that taught students how to negotiate with the powerful in a segregated world. Students went on to clerkships, government posts, professional jobs as demonstrators and Jeanes teachers, and independent work as building contractors and craftsmen. Whatever their individual specialties, though, they emerged from Domboshawa as men like Chibvon-godze, able and willing to use whatever knowledge or learning they could find to shape opportunities for themselves in segregated Southern Rhodesia.

**IMPLICATIONS**

In Gutu District and in chiefs’ schools, at Inyati, and at the government schools, students, chiefs, parents, and their allies did not just passively accept education that cost them money; taught them discipline, punctuality, and manual stamina; and prepared them for subordinate and separate roles within Southern Rhodesia’s racially delineated society. Community leaders sought schools, and students chose to learn at these schools, accepting training that was frequently expensive in terms of money, time, and labor. They did so to learn the skills and gain the contacts that would prepare them as individu-
als and communities for living in a segregated world dominated by settlers. Schools varied significantly: learning to read and write, to speak English, or to make bricks, might involve years at a DRC school in Gutu, while central schools like Inyati might move more quickly, offering English language instruction up to Standard VI; government schools claimed superior training in building.

Schools, however, offered more than merely a classroom or workshop. The most important lessons emerged not from the syllable charts of the beginning reader, but from the struggle with the teacher to be allowed access to books; not from the hours spent moving bricks, but from the negotiations to acquire experience in laying them. Schools, planned by European missionaries, administrators, and settlers to minimize interracial conflict and struggle, instead ended up teaching communities and students how to make demands effectively within the European-dominated world. These schools taught important lessons in alliance building, the development of effective rhetoric, and the possibilities and limits of direct action such as stay-aways, calculated gestures of disrespect and disobedience, and strikes.

At all levels of the educational system in Southern Rhodesia during the interwar years, students, teachers, parents, and community leaders built a terrain of struggle, a set of expectations and institutions, that shaped future debates over Africans’ position in an increasingly segregated society. Building schools where Africans and Europeans came into contact, where they worked through alliances based not simply on race, but on ideals and priorities, they learned about the possibilities and difficulties of respect, respectability, and negotiation as resources shrank in the 1930s, and both the government and missions withdrew resources from African communities. The messy realities of multiparty struggles over education in interwar Southern Rhodesia firmly and thoroughly undermined administrative attempts to discipline Africans through education into permanently subordinate positions.

NOTES


3. “Natives will not realize the importance of going out to work when labour is scarce at the mines, but all flock to the mining centres when their crops are in, and consequently are disappointed as all the mines are overstocked with boys. They re-
turn with this story to the NC and seem to imagine that they have done all that is required of them and are justified in remaining at their kraals and making no attempt to renew their search for work.” Annual Report of NC Gutu/Chilimanzi for 1906, NAZ N1/9/1.


5. CNC to Administrator, 28-1-18, NAZ A3/18-27. The CNC was reporting an investigation into Chief Gutu’s allegations that the NC Gutu, Kenney, forced 250 of his subjects to go to work, sending them to local farms and then to the asbestos mines to earn funds to pay taxes, and that he himself was forced to remain in attendance at the NC’s station during the period of tax collection. The CNC decided to dismiss Chief Gutu’s charges, but did note that the NC Gutu “went a little too far.”

6. The NC Gutu alleged that Africans with plows could earn £5 to £6 per month during the plowing season by plowing for neighbors and letting out their plows. Compared with this, the “high” wages of 10 to 30 shillings per month offered by farmers were wholly inadequate. Annual Report of NC Gutu for 1920, NAZ S2076.

7. See the correspondence between H.H. Orlandini and others of the DRC Missions in Gutu and the NC Gutu, from 28-10-12 through 23-5-21, in NAZ NVG 3/2/1.

8. Kenney owned one farm and held another in trust for his children, and his wife owned a farm of her own and had pioneer right to another one. NAZ A3/18-27.


11. Keigwin timed the marking of the government school registers in one school, which qualified the school for capitation grants in aid, at 27 minutes of a two-hour school day. Keigwin to CNC, 27-10-23 (record of tour of African schools, mostly in Victoria region), NAZ S840/1/33.


13. Hannis Mungazi, Jeanes Teacher (trained extension teacher), to DND, 31-3-33, and Jeanes Teacher’s Report, Gutu, 28-2-33, NAZ S1542/M8.

14. These allegations were based on a reality of girls’ and women’s efforts to use missions to remake their lives. See, for a discussion, Elizabeth Schmidt, Peasants, Traders and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870–1939 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1992), 122–54.

15. Orlandini and Murray, indeed, grew rich from such fines, in combination with other forced contributions from the African population, according to the NC Gutu in 1933. He had difficulty proving individual cases, but pointed to the impressive results: Murray, on a wage from his mission of £20 to £25 per year and a mission educational grant of £40 per year for his six children (five of whom received university educations, one of these at Cambridge University), provided for the livelihood of his family and lived with motor cars, a three-month holiday out of the country, certificates and bonds worth hundreds of pounds, cattle stocks so great that a single sale brought in up to £300, property holdings in town as well as in the rural areas, and a side profession as a moneylender with over £1,000 owed him. The NC was less explicit about the signs of Orlandini’s wealth,
but he did note that Orlandini owned multiple houses, including one in South Africa, made loans of more than £1,000, had a car and funds for holidays, and had financed his child’s university education, and he pointed to the fact that cattle buyers liked Orlandini as he tended to sell 200 to 300 head of cattle at a time. For a revealing examination of DRC finances, see NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 28-4-33, NAZ S1542/M8.

16. For examples of the general view of missions as opportunities for fornication, see NAZ S1561/64. The file consists of the Director of Native Development’s protest against the CNC’s 1929 allegation that the missions promote immorality, and the specific responses from NCs detailing cases in Mazoe and Umtali and summarizing the problem. In his summary, F.W. Posselt explained that he was not blaming the missionaries personally, but he went on to describe kraal schools as “in the hands of Native teachers who have usurped the Parental authority and ride the high horse . . . the rendezvous of the young people where most of the evil is hatched.” Girls, in this newly free environment, he argued, tended to forget caution or restraint and “practically throw themselves at the young men.” The teachers, he alleged, tended to take full advantage of this fact, having sex with students and becoming, in the local idiom, “the real bulls of the herd.” Missionaries who defended the schools, he argued, were merely naive, unable to go beyond the bright side of mission activity, whereas he, as a Native Commissioner, saw things from which they would “shrink.” F.W. Posselt to CNC, 5-6-30, NAZ S1561/64. In general, the Native Department was very suspicious of any mission-sponsored event that took place at night. The CNC responded to one report of charismatic meetings near Umtali by asserting “I do not see how or why we should attempt to stop Natives singing and enjoying themselves in their own Reserves. If they cannot do this in the Reserves, where can they do it?” CNC to NC Umtali, 7-3-34. In another case, however, he wrote querulously to the Director of Native Education (DNE) asking him to do something about the proliferating night schools and evangelical meetings of the Salvation Army as parents had complained, “not without reason.” CNC to DND, 20-12-33, NAZ S1542/M8.

17. Davis and Doepcke, “Survival and Accumulation . . .” 82–83; also note a similarity between kwayira dances and the dances of Mwari messengers and Zionist church leaders, particularly in the movement’s earliest years.

18. NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 28-4-33, NAZ S1542/M8.

19. See especially comments by Chanda, Nyamandi, Mahash, and Gutu at the Native Board Meeting at Gutu, 12-4-33, NAZ S1542/M8.

20. NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 28-4-33, S1542/M8.

21. Foggin to Murray, 24-6-22, NAZ S840/1/19.

22. The DRC was not oversupplied with candidate teachers who had passed any standards, let alone anything higher than Standard I. The Catholics had similar problems. But at this time, Standard IV was generally regarded as the entry level for teacher training programs by the educationally stronger missions. Foggin to Rev. Murray, 17-1-27, S840/1/19. For a scathing review of the qualifications of DRC missionaries to run schools, see Inspector, Gwelo, to DND, 27-2-30, NAZ S2307/1/1, where he explained that the mission was seriously understaffed as many missionaries had gone on extended vacations, leaving Gutu station in the hands of de Waal,
who, according to the inspector, “is not capable of conducting and supervising that school,” and Murray’s untrained daughter, whose attempts to help only produced confusion. Furthermore, de Waal and another missionary were responsible for at least 90 outschools, distinctly more than the 30 they were each limited to by government regulations.

23. See the chiding and warning letter written by the DND to Rev. G. Murray, 24-3-32, NAZ S1542/M8.


25. In 1926, for example, only the Catholics received a larger grant from the administration. And the DRC was notable for earning 63 percent of its grant for its activities in third-class schools—a substantially higher ratio than most other societies, who averaged 42 percent. There were probably more students in the schools of the DRC, in Gutu and elsewhere, than in schools operated by any other mission society. “Report of the Director of Education for 1926” (1927), 13-14; 23.

26. Orlandini to NC Gutu (Kenney), 5-5-20, NAZ NVG 3/2/1.


28. Orlandini’s statement of the contractual nature of mission education is the most emphatic I have found, but he was far from alone in believing that under some circumstances, a missionary was justified in requiring pupils to attend school. “After a pupil has voluntarily had his name entered in a Government School Register,” argued the Native Development Department (NDD) Inspector responsible for Gutu, “thereafter he should feel obligated to attend regularly and conform to the rules of the NDD regulating schools” and the government should pressure him as, at present, there was an impression that the government did not care “whether they go to school or not.” Inspector, Gwelo (Mather) to DND, 24-9-29, S2307/1/1. Note, however, that unlike Orlandini, Mather required the pupil’s consent. Some other observers were willing to settle for the parent’s consent to legitimate forcing children to attend school.

29. Note, especially, the case of Aki, niece of headman Chingombe, who followed Rodzani, a native teacher, to the mission in hope of marrying him. She “misled the missionary in charge in that she led him to believe that she had come there as a pupil of the school.” NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 21-10-18, NAZ NVG 3/2/1.

30. NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 21-10-18, NAZ NVG 3/2/1.


32. The meaning of chastisement is most clearly spelled out in the affidavits collected by a British South Africa Police investigator who examined Orlandini’s conduct in 1934. See especially Mazembe’s deposition, 15-9-33 [Mazembe worked for Orlandini as a mission helper], and testimony by Mafuta, 15-7-33; Dune, 13-6-33; and Mukwenya, 19-9-33. All affidavits are from NAZ S1542/M8.

33. DND to CNC, 11-9-29, NAZ S2307/1/2.

34. See, for example, DND to CNC, 23-5-29, NAZ S2307/1/2.


36. SoN Victoria to CNC, 22-8-32, NAZ S1542/M8. This assessment was probably correct. When Roman Catholic schools opened up in the area in 1945, they

37. NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 13-9-32, S1542/M8.

38. Inspector Gwelo to DND (10-5-30?), NAZ S2307/1/1. These schools may have been urban, in the hinterlands of Gwelo, rather than set up specifically in Gutu. Both had been founded by Moses Mfazi, presumably an African Methodist Episcopal evangelist, though he had moved on. Mather found these schools disturbing and did not know what to do about them. Legally, in 1930 the NDD was supposed to be responsible for all African schools in the region. That meant that unauthorized schools were illegal and should be shut down. But the procedure laid down by the DND, who had recommended contacting the missionary superintendent, was to determine whether the school was wholly evangelical or partly scholastic, investigate its quality and status, and give the mission opportunity to regularize the school’s status before threatening closure. This was clearly inadequate. (DND to Inspectors, 23-6-30, NAZ S2307/1/1.) These schools did not have missionary superintendents.


40. This is a somewhat historical overview, CNC to Secretary to Premier, 8-5-33, NAZ S1542/M8.

41. SoN Victoria to CNC, 22-8-32, NAZ S1542/M8.

42. SoN Victoria to CNC, 22-8-32, NAZ S1542/M8.

43. The SoN evidently found nothing heretical in his demand that any church be headed by a European rather than by any local idea of Jesus or God. The Dutch Reformed Mission was upset after the meeting when older pupils remained away and only the children returned to their schools. SoN Victoria to CNC, 22-8-32, and SoN Victoria to CNC, 29-8-32, NAZ S1542/M8.

44. In early 1933, the Jeanes teacher reported attendance of 15 out of 100 at Chatikobo, 24 of 60 at Mutanda, 15 of 60 at Chikombingo, and so on. Furthermore, the inspector found attendance even at the main station at Gutu to be highly unsatisfactory. NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 28-4-33, NAZ S1542/M8. By 1934, the situation had not notably improved: of the 955 students enrolled in schools under the supervision of the Jeanes teacher, the average daily attendance was no more than 336, despite the Jeanes teacher’s work to raise attendance. Annual Report for 1934, NC Gutu, NAZ S1563/1934.

45. Actually, he was not technically expelled primarily for his assaults, or even for his attempts to intervene in the Native Commissioner’s administration of the law. The most specific charges against him had to do with illegal production and marketing of agricultural products, as, in the depression environment, he continued selling hundreds of cattle raised on the reserves, farming reserve land illegally, and even seizing and selling corn from kraal school gardens. NC Gutu to Rev. H.H. Orlandini, 29-11-33, NAZ S1542/M8.

46. For example, Acting NC to Acting SoN Victoria, 12-6-33 [NAZ S1542/N2] reported having to hold a meeting with parents to listen to their complaints regarding DRC teachers’ demands on their children’s labor, and observing how popular Zionist preachers were. These men called themselves Zionists or Bap-
tists, and sometimes held valid preachers' certificates for other districts. Some claimed to be only wandering through, seeking work. Others had established churches or schools.

48. I've discussed this phenomenon more thoroughly in my study of the Umchingwe school, "Demanding Education . . ." (chapter 2).
49. Leslie Bessant coined this phrase in early comments on my work.
50. Chief Willie Samuriwo, born c. 1896, interviewed by Dawson Munjeri, 10-2-77, NAZ AOH 3.
51. Chief Zwimba, born c. 1889, died 2-6-76, interviewer A.M. Ewing, 8-7-70, NAZ Oral ZW 1.
52. Chief Ziki's personal name was not recorded in the materials I have seen.
53. Even those chiefs without extensive personal experience with education often had trusted relatives who knew more about various missionary societies. And missions cultivated their bridges and connections with chiefs wherever possible. At least part of Hohoza Dube’s advancement within the American Board mission was not merely because of his gifts and application (critical comments were made of both, and Dube eventually left the church) but because he was in line for the chiefship, declined it, and retained excellent relations with the brother who became Chief Mapungwana, who, despite lacking church membership, came to the church to attend Dube’s ordination as one of the first African ordained ministers of the American Board. See Hohoza Dube, in Mabel Larkins Hack to Friends, 8-5-34, ABC 15.6, vol. 4 (item 195?).
54. See, for example, the discussion of the ways agricultural demonstrators and relatives who were often chiefs and headmen, cooperated to prosper through extensive farming at the expense of their less well-connected neighbors, Ian Phimister, An Economic and Social History of Zimbabwe: 1890–1948 (London: Longman, 1988), 140–50. Henry V. Moyana, The Political Economy of Land in Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984), 90–92, 115–18, 155–74, agrees with Phimister’s condemnation of rural differentiation, contrasting those who accepted the programs with his portrayal of heroic resistance by others, especially Chief Tangwenda.
55. Isaac Chiremba (actually referring to an earlier time period), born 1921, died 1983, interviewed by Dawson Munjeri, 29-10-81, NAZ AOH 72.
56. John Marsh to ABC, 2-10-29, ABC 15.4, vol. 37, item 104.
57. He also provided school slates and materials to those who could not afford them and therefore risked being excluded from the school. Mabel Larkins to Board, 6-9-31, ABC 15.6, vol. 3, item 122.
58. See, for example, the cases described by J.W. Posselt (NC Charter) to SoN Salisbury, 26-7-23, NAZ S138/143/1923.
59. See, for examples, the cases of conflict over school siting and permits recorded in NAZ S1542/S2, vols. 1–3.
60. Marsh to ABC, 2-10-29, ABC 15.4, vol. 37, item 104. For a different version of the process, see the Minutes, Annual Meeting of Chiefs, Headmen, etc., Bikita, 27-6-29, NAZ S235/435-437. In this version, representatives of Silinda mission come to him, asking permission to open a school.
61. Marsh to ABC, 2-10-29, ABC 15.4, vol. 37, item 104.

63. Annual Report of the Supervisor of Chikore Station Kraal Schools, June 1929–May 1930, ABC 15.6, vol. 2, item 43; Larkins to Board, 6-9-31, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 122. At least initially, Ziki planned to attend the school himself. It is not clear whether he actually followed through, however. Marsh to ABC, 2-10-20, ABC 15.4, vol. 37, item 104.

64. Ibid. This report quotes the school inspector’s statement that “This is like Paradise in comparison with all other kraal schools in my area.”

65. Ziki even made up the funds that the mission would have been due if austerity measures had not led the administration to make across-the-board grant reductions. Initially, his commitment was so great that he was actually more reliable as a source of funding than the government. Report of Chikore Station, year ended June 1930, ABC 15.6, vol. 2, item 2.

66. Minutes, 10-6-31, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 256.


68. Meacham to Board, 10-9-30, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 22.

69. W.T. Lawrence to Board, 22-10-31, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 133.

70. Ivy Craig to Friends, 3-8-32, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 215.

71. Frederick Dixon to Board, 13-5-32, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 253.

72. Ziki did not expect to pay entirely from his own pockets, but to collect funds from his people. Report of Chikore Kraal Schools, June 1932, ABC 15.6, vol. 2, item 67. Larkins to Board, 28-5-32, ABC 15.6, vol. 1 item 62. Dorothy Mhlanga, the Jeans teacher, was also transferred from Ziki’s to Mapungwana. Minutes, 9-4-32, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 267.

73. NC Bikita to SoN Victoria, 22-5-34, and NC Bikita to SoN Victoria, 25-4-34, NAZ S1542/S4 1933–39.

74. A.R. Mather, Inspector Gwelo, Report on Inspection of Ziki Kraal School, 28-3-34, NAZ S1542/S4 1933–39. By the middle of the year, Ziki’s relationship with the DRC had degenerated as he complained about not just academic standards but about the mission abduction of his daughter, shifting the discussion to a moral and political level. One of Ziki’s daughters, of marriageable age, had attended the local DRC school until 1934, and was sent from the local school to the DRC central school at Pamushana for further industrial and scholastic training. None of the sources are precisely clear on whether this daughter ran away to Pamushana, was sent there by a local teacher at Ziki’s to keep her from an expected polygynous marriage, or was merely selected for further education on the basis of some scholastic success. But regardless of the circumstances, the transfer violated Ziki’s wishes, and he charged the DRC with kidnapping, forcing the local NC to step in to retrieve the girl. The government school inspector, Mather, responded scathingly to Ziki’s critique. He pointed out that Ziki was illiterate and asked how an illiterate could judge school standards. He accused Ziki of being a drunken polygynist who did not even attend the school inspection. And he argued that the students at school were younger than they had been when the school opened. Unlike the 30-year-olds who had once attended, children were unlikely to actually speak to the chief, or to engage in massive indus-
trial projects like construction or pit sawing, leaving the chief as a casual observer with little sense of what was going on. Mather argued that the new school was on "sounder lines" than the old had been. Mather even asserted that Ziki, with his devotion to beer and his keeping of 18 wives, was unfit to raise a daughter. Mather's defense of the DRC constituted a total reversal of patterns of authority and purpose within the school. See Inspector (Mather) to DND, 7-6-34; NC Bikita to SoN Victoria, 22-5-34; and NC Bikita to SoN Victoria, 25-4-34, NAZ S1542/S4 1933–39.

75. NC Bikita to SoN Victoria, 21-6-34, NAZ S1542/S4 1933–39.
76. For examples, see SoN Victoria to CNC 28-6-34, NAZ S1542/S4 1933–34. Ziki's conflict was not unique, merely surprisingly well documented. I have examined other conflicts involving progressive chiefs in chapter 2.

77. In this particular teacher-training graduating class of 1931, Mona Hlatywayo, Musa Mhlanga, and Hargyedzi Dube also reported being forced to attend school, Belle Mhlanga reported trying deliberately to fail so as to be allowed to leave school, Mbabayani Kunhlande reported getting sick to avoid one particularly traumatic year of school, Margaret Hlatywayo reportedly cried through much of her schooling as she did not like to be criticized, Eleanor Nkomo "did not like the school and did not know what she was doing. But she was on [the] mission farm and her parents wanted her to be educated, so she was made to go to school." Mwachikonera Thodhlane resented the way the teaching went, reporting that "They used to beat pupils when they failed to give good answers. . . . Mwachikonera seeing this did not like school but was made to go to school because his parents were on the mission farm." Larkins Hack mentioned 14 students in this graduating class by name. A strikingly high proportion of these extremely successful, elite students seemed highly ambivalent about schooling, at least initially. Mabel Larkins Hack, "Class History," Dec. 1931 (annotated and received March 1933), ABC 15.6, vol. 4, item 55.

78. Mabel Larkins Hack to Friends, 8-5-34, ABC 15.6, vol. 4, item (195?). Sitole said that when he arrived, he found less beating than expected. So he stayed. But his classmates emphasized that even if they were not excessively beaten, schooling was a hard struggle. Ransom Bhila said he was miserable, and stayed only so that his father should not lose his money. Paul Semwayo reported running away because he was hungry. Hohoza Dube reportedly refused to attend school initially, and kept trying to run away.

79. See the case of Chief Ziki's daughter, removed against his will to the DRC Mission at Pamushana. During earlier years, the Catholic missions in particular had a reputation for taking children. Given the ways in which missionized children were encouraged to distance themselves from non-Christian homes, it is perhaps unsurprising that one senior man remarked bitterly to a missionary trying to persuade him to become a Christian, "You have had all my children and you can keep them, but I am not coming." (Headman reported in Etheridge, Mashonaland Quarterly 90 [November 1914]: 8–10).

80. See Ransom Bhila's remarks above.
81. In 1934, as a reform measure, the Director of Native Development sent out a circular announcing that each school could occupy 2 acres if it was doing
agricultural work (as schools were required to do) and an additional 5 acres should be set aside for the teacher’s plot (farmed by his wife and student labor, generally). DND to Missionary Superintendents, circ. 1/34, 15-1-34, NAZ Hist. Mss. MET 3/18/1/1. This ruling upset missionaries, who wanted larger school plots, additional land for evangelists and second teachers, and sometimes additional plots for the teachers’ wives. This caused ongoing problems. See, for example, circ. 2/38, 10-2-38, and C.S. Davies, Dear Teacher, “Teachers’ Lands,” 8-10-38, NAZ Hist. Mss. MET 3/18/1/1. Davies’ letter noted that years after the rules had gone into effect, some teachers were still farming 25 acres. Native Commissioners complained about the amount of land missions were taking for schools, especially in congested areas. The NC Enkeldoorn rejected the idea of providing each teacher with 5 acres, instead recommending that each teacher get one acre, and his wife another, for intensive cultivation (NC Enkeldoorn to CNC, 22-12-33). The NC Marandellas complained that with 17 kraal schools in the congested Shiota Reserve, he was unwilling to accept school allocations of more than about an acre per school (NC Marandellas to CNC, 19-12-33.) The teachers in the Shabani Reserve reportedly all kept stock and made farms on the reserve, without even paying standard rents (Assistant NC Shabani to NC Belingwe, 19-6-34). And the NC Mazoe summed up the situation saying “I feel that on no account should more than 2 acres of ground be allotted to any kraal school particularly in a small and thickly populated reserve such as this whether there be one or more teachers stationed at any particular school. If these schools go on increasing, as they probably will, and more than a very limited area of ground is allotted to each it will mean that the remaining area available for the Natives of the Reserve (already fully occupied) will be totally inadequate.” NC Mazoe to CNC, 22-6-34; all above NC references from NAZ S 1542/S2. These NCs understood mission land demands and teachers’ land use as hostile to the needs of segregation, rather than furthering the system.


83. All government-recognized schools were required to be under mission supervision. For third-class schools, this meant a visit by a specific white missionary four times a year to ensure standards and orthodoxy.

84. The school’s name was variously written as Chirindazi, Curendazi, Sirundazi, and Sirudzai.

85. Acting Secretary for Native Affairs to Frank Noble, 13-2-36, gave a date for the school’s temporary closure, which matched Malusi’s complaint. NC Hartley to Rev. James Stewart, 14-6-35, NAZ S 1542/S2 provided the later date for permanent closure. The discrepancy between the 1932 and 1934 dates may be due to the way in which schools frequently were more or less phased out, and left to die, rather than being closed all at once.

86. See Daignault to NC Hartley, 18-3-35, NAZ S 1542/S2. This was not the first case of a community appealing for a Catholic school after problems with a Methodist preacher or school. Tapera Murombedzi, born in 1912, said that his
father, Dununu Murombedzi, had been sent to Chishawasha in 1912 to invite the Catholics to Zvimba communal lands, because the Methodist Church under Reverend Handa had experienced disputes, and Zvimba's children had been killed. Tapera Murombedzi, Oral history interview by Dawson Munjeri, 13-12-82, NAZ AOH 88.


88. Frank Noble to Acting Secretary for Native Affairs, 28-2-36, NAZ SI542/S2.

89. Director of Native Education to Secretary for Native Affairs, 10-2-36 (quoting a minute from the NC that is not in the file), NAZ SI542/S2.

90. James Stewart to NC Hartley, 1-6-35, NAZ SI542/S2.

91. Acting Secretary for Native Affairs to Frank Noble, 13-2-36, NAZ SI542/S2. Stewart was not a temperate missionary: he was young, brash, and abrasive, and could get on the nerves even of his Methodist colleagues. See, for a candid assessment of the Methodists' staffing problems, Rev. Frank Noble to MMS, 27-11-33, MMS WMMS Box 834: "a great amount of my time is taken up in going to Circuits and trying to extricate these raw lads (Stewart, Evans, and Ockenden) out of financial and administrative tangles from which a little common sense would have saved them." Noble goes on to complain that none of these individuals spoke the vernacular.


94. James Stewart to NC Hartley, 1-6-35, NAZ SI542/S2.

95. NC Hartley to Rev. James Stewart, 14-6-35, and NC Hartley to CNC, 19-6-35, NAZ SI542/S2.

96. NC Hartley to CNC, 19-6-35, NAZ SI542/S2.


98. Acting Secretary for Native Affairs to Frank Noble, 13-2-36, NAZ SI542/S2.

99. For a discussion of this, see Carol Summers, *From Civilization to Segregation*, 74-81, 120-31, 148-49.

100. Rees to LMS, 4-6-00, SOAS CWM 58/2.

101. Wilkerson to LMS, 17-9-01, SOAS CWM 19/3.

102. J. Picton Jones (Inyati), 8-5-02, SOAS CWM 60/2.

103. Cullen Reed to LMS, 18-2-03, SOAS CWM 62/1.

104. Reed to LMS, 1-6-03, SOAS CWM 62/2. The LMS at that point had 23 schools in Matabeleland, with 2,266 pupils on the rolls and average attendance below 50 percent in most locations.

105. Richardson left under a cloud. Williams, after beginning the school at Hope Fountain, went back to England for medical reasons. Later, he tried again, and ran directly into conflict with other missionaries. His school was closed after 1909, and he was transferred to New Guinea.
106. Williams to LMS, 10-3-08, SOAS CWM 71/1.

107. Keigwin informed the mission that it was not making the headway it should, as it did not offer practical training. Furthermore, he said that Africans had informed him they wanted practical education even if that meant they had to leave mission schools for government schools. (Note, though, that Keigwin was, as head of the government schools and instigator of the “Keigwin scheme,” hardly a disinterested reporter.) Keigwin to LMS, 4-3-21; Whiteside to LMS, 28-3-21, SOAS CWM 84/1.

108. “I have tried all in my power to obtain a Building and Carpentry instructor. I have advertised and enquired at the various industrial institutes, but without a single applicant.” Brown to LMS, 15-2-22, SOAS CWM 84/3.


110. Extensive correspondence exists on these negotiations, from Keigwin, the Parent Committee, Brown, and the local missionaries, but the clearest statement of the issues is Neville Jones to LMS, 20-7-23, SOAS CWM 85/3. Brown’s enthusiasm about working for the government appears related to the government salary—at £400 per year plus benefits, it would have been approximately twice what the LMS offered.


112. Jones to LMS, 6-7-25, SOAS CWM 87/3. Brown, furthermore, made sure everyone was aware of his successes, writing home to the parent committee about visits from the governor, the CNC, and H.U. Moffat, then cabinet minister, and the governor’s comment that Inyati “surpassed and outstripped every other Mission in the Colony.” Brown to LMS, 14-12-25, SOAS CWM 87/4.

113. According to a somewhat disorganized summary, Inyati ended 1926 not only with substantial new assets, but with a cash balance of nearly £115. It received a government grant of £312 and donations of £11, and earned money as follows: livestock sales, £35/5s.; farm revenue, £315; fees, £265/10s.; rents, £42/10s.; woodworking sales, £15/17s.; books sold, £6/10s. “Annexure ‘C’” from Director of Native Education to Colonial Secretary, 20-2-28, NAZ S170/1169. As for staff, The DNE inspection, 10-2-28, found Brown, and an African staff as follows: Quinch, headteacher with a Cape teachers 3d class certificate, teaching Standards IV, V, and VI and supervising school; Baart, assistant primary teacher 2d class, assistant in school, teaching subgrades and Standards I to III; Mhlanga, E. Provisional Certificate of Southern Rhodesia, Agriculture diploma of Mount Silinda, teaching 2d class school and assisting in agriculture; and Ncube, with 4 years in carpentry apprenticeship at Tiger Kloof.

114. Further development, he argued, was necessary to meet the needs of the local people. Brown to LMS, 7-3-28; 19-11-28, SOAS CWM 90/ W.G. Brown.


117. Most of the money for all this, Whiteside claimed, came from the government for specific projects and was not under full LMS control. Whiteside, Southern Committee Minutes, 24-11-30, SOAS CWM 5/14.

118. Davies to LMS, 5-4-32, SOAS CWM Box 94/W.N.G. Davies.

119. This is culled from Davies’ retrospective description, as the events were not reported back to London until the strike of the next year had to be explained. Davies to LMS, 5-4-32, SOAS CWM Box 94/W.N.G. Davies.
120. Jowitt to CNC, 14-12-33, NAZ S1542/S2/1.
121. Jones to LMS, 28-12-31; 13-2-32, SOAS CWM 95/Neville Jones.
122. Brown to LMS, 29-4-32, SOAS CWM Box 94/ W.G. Brown. He also became more aggressive about punishing what he viewed as waste or theft, punishing students who ate from the garden produce, “wasted” timber, or “illicitly stole plants.”
123. Davies to LMS, 5-4-32, SOAS CWM 94/W.N.G. Davies. Brown agreed to look into the grinding of the mealie meal, accepting accusations that there was far too much junk, bits of stone, etc., present in it. He was, however, unwilling to promise anything or to negotiate, and would not offer to increase rations.
125. Davies to LMS 5-4-32, CWM 94/W.N.G. Davies.
128. This is drawn from the above sources and, primarily, from the memo from the Executive Council on the Disturbances at Inyati, enclosed in SOAS CWM Box 95/Neville Jones.
133. Lanning, Report of the SoN to the CNC on the Disturbance at Inyati, 7-4-32, in SOAS CWM 95/Neville Jones.
134. Executive Council, on Inyati Strike, SOAS CWM 95/Neville Jones.
135. Statement by “Qabe Tshuma,” Hope Fountain subordinate teacher at Inyati for a refresher course, in SOAS CWM 95/Neville Jones. This was the same person mentioned above in 1931 as Thomas Tjuma. Nqabe Tshuma went on to become the chairman of Sofasonke, an organization that emerged in the 1940s and vigorously resisted government land policy in the Matopos. Terence Ranger, *Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999) 153-61.
136. Executive Council, on Inyati, SOAS CWM 95/Jones.
137. Brown, Lanning asserted, responded to questions about whether he had discussed these issues with students and African staff members by tossing off the comment that “familiarity breeds contempt.” Lanning, Report of the SoN Bulawayo to the CNC on the Disturbance at Inyati, SOAS CWM 95/Neville Jones. Brown had, earlier, blamed some of the unrest on the European headmaster, Davies, ordering him “not to be so free with the boys, and that on no account must boys come to my house.” Davies to LMS, 5-4-32, SOAS CWM 94/ Davies.
138. Jones to LMS, 10-6-32, SOAS CWM 94/Jones.
139. He also referred to the Jones, Haile, and Jennings cabal in charge of the local mission. Brown to LMS, 29-4-32; 15-5-32; and 23-5-32, SOAS CWM 94/ Brown.
141. Harker to LMS, 14-10-32, CWM 95/F.D. Harker.
142. Harker to LMS, 14-10-32, SOAS CWM 95/F.D. Harker.
143. Brown to LMS, 29-4-32, CWM 94/Brown.
144. Terence Ranger, Voices from the Rocks, 147–48 makes it clear that Thomas Tjuma and Nqabe Tshuma (and various intermediate spellings) were the same man—described by Thenjiwe Lesabe, who remembered him from the 1940s, as an elite man from an elite family who gardened industriously without being a materialist focused on his own profit. She went on, though, to note that he was “a very cheeky man.” Reverend Joshua Danisa described him as “very good at raising oppositions . . . not very educated . . . the cause of the trouble at Inyati.” Both Lesabe and Danisa confirmed that Nqabe Tshuma had been involved with politics—specifically the National Congress and the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU)—during his earlier years in Johannesburg, and brought those skills to bear in the Inyati strike, which made him famous, and the Sofasonke organization he worked with later. He also reached out to Masotsha Ndhlouv of the ICU (see the next chapter).
145. Jowitt to LMS, 21-6-32, SOAS CWM 95/Jowitt.
146. See, for examples, the records of meetings held for the visits by the governor or administrator of Southern Rhodesia, PRO DO 63/3 pt.1 and NAZ N9/5/3.
148. Keigwin to CNC, 5-1-21, NAZ S840/1/33.
149. Keigwin to CNC, above.
150. Summers, From Civilization to Segregation, 187.
152. Various letters and reports, NAZ N3/9/1-2.
153. Mills had also been a friend of G. Taylor, Keigwin’s Inspector of Native Development. Keigwin to CNC 19-3-21, NAZ A3/18/30/12.
154. This is taken from Mills’ statement to the assistant Native Commissioner of Tjolotjo, 1-11-23, NAZ S138/69/v2. The student teacher he hit, Ben Sitole, went on to have a prosperous career as a teacher at Domboshawa. Mills’ narration of events tallies respectably well with statements by Sitole, Butelezi, and Moyo, though the three teachers disagree with Mills’ interpretations of events.
155. Domboshawa Principal’s Report for 1924, NAZ S138/69/v.2. Ardern was one of the first European instructors at Domboshawa, arriving by 1920. Ardern himself later had problems. In 1926 the department fired him because he deliberately avoided teaching African pupils to produce skilled work in a self-sufficient fashion. Ardern was on record as believing that Africans should stay in their place—as unskilled helps for European builders, rather than independent contractors. NAZ S138/69.
156. Colonial Secretary to Premier, 10-3-31; and a student letter to the principal of Tiger Kloof, shown to Leggate, Colonial Secretary to Director of Education, 21-10-27, NAZ S170/1182-1183.
157. The only way in which their professions could be seen as meeting the aims of the school is by noting that most of the builders were not working in urban
areas. Whether building for European farmers, missions, or, in one case, Chief Mutambara, they tended to work as independent contractors in rural areas. Domboshawa Principal’s Report for 1924, S138/69, vol. 2. English was particularly useful to a rural builder as it made negotiating contracts with potential employers easier, provided the builder with the ability to insist on written contracts he could read and legally enforce, and offered at least the possibility of writing his own passes.

160. Colonial Secretary to Premier, 10-3-31, NAZ S170/1182-1183.
From at least 1900 on, Africans in Southern Rhodesia, its successor Rhodesia, and today’s Zimbabwe, have demanded schools and education, leaving behind evidence of their demands in a wide variety of sources: mission records, government reports, and the recollections of former students. Even more than demands for land, higher producer prices, or higher wages, demands for education were explicit attempts to negotiate not just economic issues, but also a place within Southern Rhodesia’s increasingly segregated culture and society. But what, exactly, did students, parents, and would-be students want, and were these demands being met? Fathers petitioned for schools for their sons, sons and daughters actively sought or avoided schooling, and missions and the administration offered schools as answers to diverse political, social, and economic difficulties. In Southern Rhodesia in the 1930s, fathers’ and sons’ roles and relationships had changed. Fathers’ ability to act as patrons, rewarding sons’ loyalty and work with bridewealth and land was undermined as depressed commodities markets hindered fathers’ access to cash, government restrictions blocked their ability to provide land or cattle, and sons found paid labor essential to pay taxes for their fathers as well as themselves. This chapter will examine the life of a single ephemeral school at Umchingwe, in the Insiza District, to both explore senior men’s efforts to establish a school that would rebuild their strained ties with young men, and consider why their initiative failed.¹

Much of what we know about the development and expansion of the schooling in Southern Rhodesia has focused less on what that education
Photo 2.1 “Brickmaking at Mount Silinda School,” Frank Njapa (Zulu evangelist) making a kiln, November 1909. ABCFM Rhodesia Picture Collection, Mount Silinda 20:17.
meant to students and their parents than on how the state, the white population, and the Native Administration worked to channel and modify Africans’ educational demands through schools designed to produce useful subjects and workers.²

Yet Africans’ requests for schools proved a strikingly persistent element of local Southern Rhodesian politics, even during the Great Depression, a period of acute economic, fiscal, and educational crisis. Reading the documents about Umchingwe school—its rationale, its problems and its collapse—and placing this case in the larger context of Southern Rhodesia’s school system and society, it is possible to explore what Africans may have meant when they requested education, and how these demands were reconfigured and reinterpreted by European policymakers and administrators.

Reconstructing what African men of the early twentieth century wanted from schools can not be straightforward. A historical analysis of motives is inevitably more uncertain than an analysis of actions. We must extrapolate and, in some cases, guess. But by looking at the documented record of what education became popular, what unpopular and what produced protests, we may be able to gain insight into some of the various agendas different Africans may have had in going to school, sending children to school or petitioning for better schools.

Education is not unproblematic. In and of itself, a certificate or the knowledge of scripture, math, or literacy acquired in school cannot guarantee a job, a wage, or new opportunities. Nevertheless, schools were central to both Europeans’ and Africans’ attempts to shape the future of Southern Rhodesia. Within the context of this restrictive society, African men and women used education to define new roles of respect and justify cultural, economic, and political claims on mission patrons and the white-dominated state. Debates over education in Southern Rhodesia were, ultimately, debates over Africans’ identities and the terms of Africans’ continued existence.

THE UMCHINGWE SCHOOL’S RISE AND FALL

During 1930, as wages dropped, producer prices made peasant production of maize unprofitable, and financially stressed missions began to close schools, the leaders of an African community at Umchingwe formally asked that the government provide the region with a school. This was not just any request. Chief Mdala, leading the group, handed his Native Commissioner a list with the names of 83 men, each of whom was willing to pay 5 shillings per year for local education.³ These men wanted a school that could solve a variety of community
problems. The men’s offer of money, the Chief Native Commissioner contended inaccurately, would easily have met the school’s expenses. Mdala made this offer only five years after declaring to the Land Commission that his people would not be able to buy land even if it were offered, as they lacked money. The offer to pay money for education was therefore a choice of how to allocate scarce funds, rather than an effort to conspicuously display a surplus. The offer of money impressed the CNC because “So far as I know this is the first time that natives have made a definite offer to contribute towards the education of their children.” And the men who requested a school requested a specific type of school: a college (i.e., U.S. secondary school level) that taught English, not religion. A curriculum focusing on English, they hoped, would facilitate higher education. A good school also could, they believed, provide advanced industrial training for the sons who would have to go off to work in the increasingly hostile employment climate of the Depression, and agricultural extension services to the older men who were trying to make their farms pay.

The Native Department and Native Development Department had excellent reasons for supporting Chief Mdala’s request. By 1930, the two departments were in direct conflict over jurisdiction and resources. The Native Department was gratified that the request had come through the proper channels—through the chiefs to the Native Commissioners—rather than being stated as a political demand by young men or advocated by troublesome missionaries or school inspectors. Furthermore, the request indicated a desire for industrial and agricultural education rather than a purely academic school. As the Native Department read the request, it was training, rather than academics, that the local men wanted: the officials went so far as to delete the request for a secondary school that taught English as they passed the Umchingwe file from the Native Department to the Native Development Department. And these officials hoped that this request for industrial training indicated a newly realistic attitude toward appropriate knowledge on the part of the program’s African sponsors.

Finally, the Native Department sought to use the program to buy political peace. A school was not the only request the administration faced from the leaders of Umchingwe. Umchingwe men also wanted good land within Insiza District. They rejected the reserves, Shabani and Sabi, proffered by the Land Apportionment plan, condemning Shabani as unhealthy, sandy, and uninhabitable, and Sabi as too remote. With its inhabitants uneasy and uncertain over the community’s future, Umchingwe block was an area where the ICU (Industrial and
Commercial Workers’ Union), widely perceived by Europeans as a dangerously communist and revolutionary organization, had been active. Governmental responsiveness, a school and the prosperity that they might bring, could divert attention from requests for land, and make the ICU less appealing to local leaders. Despite the Native Department’s long record of ambivalence toward schools and educated Africans, the proposed school, with its focus on industrial education under the guidance of senior men, served the Native Department’s political needs.

The Director of Native Development (DND) was less immediately enthusiastic about the local proposal—possibly because he received it secondhand from a rival department. He also viewed it as somewhat impractical given his department’s resources and budget cuts. But Africans’ willingness to pay was itself a powerful inducement. A successful school might provide a model for community development, and ultimately offer new possibilities for the development that DND Jowitt wrote about so verbosely and passionately. The government’s human resources for the kind of educational outreach the chiefs were requesting were minimal. The DND’s first protest had been that the teaching of English could not expand until more fluent teachers were available, and that their training could not be hurried. And industrially and agriculturally skilled men, trained as teachers and willing to work for teachers’ low wages, were rare.

Economic resources, too, were scarce and becoming scarcer as the Depression became more severe. In 1930, missionaries on the advisory board for native development petitioned the government to “give sympathetic consideration to the difficult financial position of Kraal schools.” By 1931 the decrease in educational funding for Africans under the administration’s economy proposals was at the top of the board’s agenda, and the Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference (SRMC) was recommending drastic action—the complete shutdown of the government’s second industrial school, Tjolotjo—to preserve funds for the more numerous mission educational programs. In 1931, the number of students at Domboshawa, the government’s popular flagship school, briefly dropped because pupils failed to collect enough money for tuition, boarding fees, and taxes, and in outlying areas more schools folded than could be opened. The situation in 1932 was, if anything, even worse as more outschools shut down. “It can no longer be claimed,” the Director of Native Development acknowledged, “that this merely reflects desirable consolidation of effort. It also indicates that in many areas the educational effort of years has been rendered abortive.”
In 1931, in response to local demands and Native Department pressure, the Director of Native Development decided to go ahead with an experimental program at Umchingwe. The Umchingwe school was an attempt to develop an inexpensive, community-based state-sponsored school that substituted African teachers and African sponsors for European teachers and mission and administrative sponsors, without admitting to either economizing or substitutions. The DND selected George Mhlanga, a relatively young man who had attended American Board schools, taught in Dutch Reformed mission schools, and acquired some industrial work experience before his accelerated training at Domboshawa as an agricultural demonstrator. He then sent Mhlanga into what he knew would be a difficult situation, ordering the principal of Domboshawa, where Mhlanga had been trained, to inform him that "this work is unique in Southern Rhodesia and that it has a most important bearing upon community life and community education. . . . If he should succeed in this difficult venture, it may make possible the development of this activity in other suitable areas in the future." In laying out the rules for the Umchingwe project, Jowitt placed a heavy emphasis on Mhlanga's responsibility to "sympathise with the local community" and lead it to believe that the project was "done for them, and was worthwhile." For Jowitt, the Umchingwe project was an opportunity to emphasize community education and needs over individuals' education and ambitions.

The Umchingwe program had problems. The project officially opened in May of 1931 with a meeting between E.D. Alvord, the visiting supervisor of demonstrators, and 250 local men, including those who had initially requested the school. The meeting was not a success. Alvord had to report back that

After we had fully explained our scheme for the establishment of the Industrial Demonstrator and the development of the Community Industrial School, outlining the instruction to be given, we gave them the opportunity to ask questions. . . . No questions were asked but several men spoke. The gist of their remarks was that they wanted a regular school with instruction in literary work, were not keen for the industrial demonstrator alone, and were quite reluctant to accept our proposition as outlined.

Alvord was not sympathetic to this demand for a "regular school with instruction in literary work." He reminded them that the Anglican mission operated an outschool nearby, and explained that the government was not prepared to spend scarce funds to compete with the mission.
When the men went on to complain that it would be impractical for students to go back and forth, attending two schools at the same time, Alvord admitted that the complainants had a problem, but suggested they resolve it by sending the youngest children to the mission and the older boys and men to the demonstrator’s lessons. When this proposal did not receive an enthusiastic welcome, Alvord compromised further, suggesting that the demonstrator might be willing to offer some lessons in English to the older boys and men, teaching them to read and write and using English in the course of industrial instruction. Even after this compromise, however, when the NC asked the 250 men for a show of hands indicating how many wanted the industrial demonstrator, only one, Chief Mdala himself, raised his hand. “[I]n view of the attitude shown by the Natives,” Alvord concluded, “I cannot feel very enthusiastic and in fact am somewhat dubious as to the possible success of the enterprise.”

The NC Insiza, who had been one of the most enthusiastic of the plan’s early sponsors, attempted to reawaken local enthusiasm for the industrial scheme, but found, to his dismay, that what the men really wanted was not the industrial training, but “a teacher who would give them instruction in English and general higher education.” They were willing to accept Alvord’s compromise, a man who would also teach industrial skills, but they were uninterested in the type of self-help plan the government had contemplated, in which they would do most of the work, make monetary contributions, and receive only that education which the community could support and use. Asked to help make bricks and cut grass to thatch a school building, these men talked about hiring someone to do the work with their annual five-shilling contributions. These men had been willing to pay for an academic and industrial school that delivered high-level education. But they were unwilling to work for the simplified money-saving program the government offered, a program that in practice met none of their social and economic goals.

The situation grew increasingly tense through the winter, as Mhlanga sought to finish constructing a house and school before the growing season and the local people remained uninterested in working without pay on a project that had ceased to be what they wanted. Mhlanga asked for help. Chief Mdala, enlisted to prevent the sinking of the whole enterprise, went around from house to house telling people to go to school. He and Mhlanga were invariably told “yes we shall come,” but the workers and students did not arrive. Frustrated, Mhlanga wrote “I do not know what will be done as no one is willing to learn.”
By mid-August, Mhlanga was dubious about the project entrusted to him, finding that even when men did arrive to help with the work, they explained that they were there to work, not learn, and drifted away quickly. Facing the prospect of failure, and determined to find out why a project that had begun with community and official support appeared to be failing so thoroughly, the NC held another meeting. The older married men who attended the meeting all claimed to support the school, but said that “their sons, youths and boys, although exhorted by them to attend school, preferred loafing at the Kraals.” The NC did not accept this excuse, but “advised them to use a firm hand in making their children attend school, as is done by European parents.”

A project that had begun as a community effort to provide older men with the agricultural extension services they wanted, and younger men with a school providing the industrial training and English skills they needed to secure good jobs, had become a divisive issue which had the NC demanding that elders require the younger men and boys to attend school. Fifteen pupils showed up, all between the ages of 13 and 20. The NC ordered them to attend regularly; they said they would, and the school was launched.

Launched, it wobbled. When he visited Umchingwe in September, Alvord found a school that was only marginally alive. People were suspicious of the school’s intentions, attendance was highly irregular, and the school building was far from complete—the roof was not thatched, the walls not bricked up, and the “students” wanted to learn English, not brickmaking, bricklaying, and thatching. Mhlanga was trying in the best traditions of his training: working as an agricultural demonstrator, holding an industrial period of five hours each day, and proposing to tutor in English for 35 to 45 minutes a day. But even the normally optimistic Alvord could merely suggest that the DND suspend judgment a bit longer.

During October, the NC himself held another meeting to attempt to determine what was causing the difficulties. This time, instead of the more than 200 who had attended earlier meetings, or the 80 who had promised money, only 40 to 50 parents of former and present pupils showed up. And even these numbers were an achievement as there were only 10 pupils on the school’s roll, and average attendance was less than 5 pupils per day. The NC reproached these parents, inquiring into their pledges of money, and asking why they did not send their sons. The men at the meeting responded that they wanted the school, they wanted the agricultural demonstration work, and they did try to get their sons to go to school, but the sons were lazy. Nevertheless, they asserted that when the school was built, more students would
come. The NC’s explanation that building the school was, itself, a part of the training, did not impress them, as they explained that walking long distances to work all day without pay was not something their sons would voluntarily do.33

By the end of 1931, Umchingwe school had become a problem for the parents, the teacher, the Native Department, and the Native Development Department, rather than a solution to the difficulties brought on by the Depression. Alvord was the first to publicly conclude that the school should be abandoned. Parents’ lack of enthusiasm and their belief that students must get English training before they studied industrial subjects, rather than as they built, undermined the school’s reason for being, and its strategy for teaching. Furthermore, he argued, Umchingwe block was not terribly suitable for an industrial school, an industrial demonstrator, or even an agricultural demonstrator. The training of the agricultural demonstrators had been paid for through the Native Trust fund. This was justified by the argument that the demonstrators, after training, would do extension work in the “Native Reserves.”34 But under Land Apportionment, Umchingwe was not actually a reserve. It was an area with a population of about 400, in the midst of a large European-designated zone. Instead of working in such an area, Alvord argued, the industrial demonstrator should spend his time working for a larger population on a reserve.35

By 1932, the only problem was how to end the project gracefully. Clear failure alone was not sufficient grounds to call a halt to a program the government had invested in. The NC who had actively promoted the project concluded by March of 1932 that the community’s young men rejected the school. The older men, he argued, were interested, restrained only by the local shortage of cash. The young men, though, he considered fundamentally lazy.36 Mhlanga himself was equally willing to admit that the industrial program had failed. Unlike the NC, however, he complained that even the community’s older men resisted his suggestions:

the people do not give a definite answer they simpl[y] say they want school, but when I asked them why don’t you send your sons to school if you want it they kept quiet. They were 66 on Sunday and today were 63 men. . . . The time wasted showing them better farming they did not believe and I can[not] teach them better farming for they thought [they] know farming better than I do.37

Any successes Mhlanga could report were small: one man, Sibezwile, a former independent preacher,38 came to be a student, but one student was
not enough to finish thatching the school, let alone hold a respectable class. And even when Mhlanga managed to convince the local men "that they do not know better farming at all," and began to receive requests to remain as an agricultural demonstrator, that success did not spread to his industrial work.\textsuperscript{39}

Accepting failure, the Director of Native Development ironically turned to the ICU, which it had sought to thwart, and to the Church of England. Director Jowitt held a meeting with Masoja Ndlovu and other delegates of the ICU, and labeled them unrealistic and irresponsible in their demands. The ICU, he argued,

was largely responsible for the pressure brought to bear upon Government . . . [to establish] an Industrial school at Umchingwe, and . . . subsequently they were largely responsible for advising the Natives that what they required was not an Industrial school but a "college."\textsuperscript{40}

The Umchingwe school, Jowitt implied, was entirely a political rather than a humanitarian or educational project, and it had emerged out of African political pressure rather than the standard rules regarding budgets, fiscal responsibility, and European priorities. But while, within Southern Rhodesia's bureaucratic politics, the ICU was able to push, and to destabilize, it proved unable to sustain a constructive outcome. And the Church of England, in the midst of its own budgetary crisis, was unwilling to take on the responsibility of a failing industrial school. In the end, Jowitt and Alvord removed demonstrator activity from the area and shut the school down, fulfilling none of the original demands of Chief Mdala, his supporters, or the ICU.

The Umchingwe experiment, from beginning to end, was a single project encapsulating the demands, policies, ideologies, and struggles of 10 years of educational policy making. This program—initiated by Africans, reinterpreted by Europeans, boycotted by its original sponsors as alien to their demands, and ended by an administration with words about African laziness—described a common trajectory. And in doing so it undermined the settler population's assertions that segregation and mutually beneficial development programs were possible.

**WHY AFRICANS CALLED FOR SCHOOLS**

The Umchingwe case was a single incident where politically active men clearly sought education for their sons. But in officials' characterization of the school as a response to African requests rather than gov-
ernment or mission pronouncements of what would be good for Africans, the Umchingwe experiment was well within the mainstream of educational expansion in Southern Rhodesia.

By the late 1920s, missions were legally required to have the permission of all relevant government-recognized headmen and the approval of the Native Department and the Native Development Department before they could open new schools on reserves, or on any other land not owned outright by the mission. Thus all schools were, at least in theory, the result of acquiescence, or even of demands by the government-appointed leaders of African communities—not missionary evangelical coercion. And by the late 1920s, few mission societies were in a position to push for additional schools. Instead, they were cutting back, fighting bankruptcy and closing schools as revenues from donations dropped under the economic pressure of the Depression.

The petition that led to the Umchingwe experiment, though, was striking for several reasons. Senior Umchingwe men made specific, politicized demands not merely for a school, but for education with a specific content. Most other early stories of the role played by Africans’ in school establishment tended to follow a narrative line in which the community decided on a school, and petitioned the missionary for a teacher, without specifying anything about what, exactly, was to be taught, or how qualified a teacher they wanted. Reports on these petitions indicate that they may have been made experimentally, after a debate within the local community. Some of these requests were pleas for patronage or protection. The Church of England missionary Christelow, for example, found that Poshayi’s village was “frightfully keen” about a school when people feared that their land would be designated for Europeans and taken away from them. Reasoning that with a school the land would become mission land and the mission would protect them, they built a school and requested a teacher. Once the teacher arrived, though, people felt more secure and were much less interested in attending, or sending children to attend school.

Some requests for new schools, or protests at school closures, may have been attempts to improve a particular chief or headman’s standing in a bid for government recognition and higher salary, or for greater prestige among his peers. A Department of Native Development inspector accused Chief Muroyi of wanting schools to satisfy his concept of what he was due as an important man but refusing to push children to attend and then complaining when they did not learn. Some demands may have been opportunistic attempts by contenders in local power struggles to
develop a new system of community ties. The Native Board in Gutu, for example, was split into hostile camps by a division between those who claimed to represent the people, and those whom others accused of representing the mission.44

But the common feature of this genre of requests, reported primarily in mission literature, is the missionary’s paternalism. The missionary presumably knew what the education would be, and would provide it and the goods that accompanied it, books and materials. African men’s petitions for schools were appeals to the missionary’s beneficence, rather than to a sense of justice, citizenship, or taxpayers’ rights.

For the Church of England, which operated the other school in Umchingwe, this sort of demand had peaked in the early years of the twentieth century, a time when the mission could offer few qualified teachers but was constantly being besieged, sometimes by young men, sometimes by older men, sometimes by workers already at compounds, with demands to open schools. Chief Mawoko asked Etheridge, the missionary in charge at St. Augustine’s, for a school in 1907, “not, indeed, that he had any keen desire for instruction himself, but, being a shrewd old man, he thought it was wise to move with the times. . . . [saying] ‘if I do not have a church here, I know that all my boys and young men will leave me, and then who will pay my taxes for me?’”45 And Mawoko was alone neither in his ambivalence, nor in his decision that teachers and schools were necessary: Etheridge received two other requests within a three-month period, a dramatic change from earlier years.46 This change was not unproblematic. Lloyd, another Church of England missionary, reported the debate in Makoni’s territory over whether the mission should establish schools. Those opposed to the schools argued that schooling would make girls disobedient, and lead to a loss of reverence for the dead. Makoni, though, accepted the necessity of schools once they had been defended by an evangelist, reportedly saying “we do not know what they are doing. Their teachers must know more than we do.”47 Schools, though, were clearly an issue that separated older and younger men. Older men expressed reluctance to give up beer and polygyny.48 These issues were less troublesome for the young men who could afford neither drunkenness, a privilege generally reserved for older men and festivals in customary culture, nor more than one wife. Older men, when asking for schools, asked for schools for these young men, and they asked under pressure from the young men. Four “big chiefs” in the Shangani Reserve, a missionary reported, “are ready to receive us with open arms. They told me ‘The young men and the girls demand God and education
much against our wishes, so we might just as well make the best of it.’” Missionaries initially accepted this stipulation that their work would be primarily, if not exclusively, with children and youth. They told older men that while restrictions on polygyny applied to church members, elders could stay outside the church. And missionaries and evangelists assured older men that Christianity taught respect for parents and husbands.

Only after establishing a school and beginning the process of developing a Christian community did missionaries begin to pressure older men to at least come to church on Sunday, and consider becoming Christians. Persuasion was not particularly effective. “You have had all my children and you can keep them, but I am not coming,” one headman reportedly stated during a missionary’s evangelical visit.

When records of debates over the establishment of schools exist, they generally exist because a European missionary was present, called in as a participant or, perhaps, a partisan for the young men. European missionaries clearly enjoyed the prospect of expanding into new areas, but they also felt somewhat ambivalent when they lacked the resources and trained teachers to build and staff new schools. The motivating force for the rapid expansion of schools was less the evangelizing missionary than the young men. Faced with the prospect of an entirely new region, Etheridge admitted that during 1914, “I have been trying to put off repeated deputations of boys from this district [Mrewa] with vague promises that we would do something for them. At last they took the matter into their own hands, and began to put up a building, and then triumphantly came down and demanded books and a teacher.” And well into the 1930s, the Church of England was notorious for its inadequately trained teachers.

Leaders such as Mawoko, Makoni, Chaparadya, the chief of Mashanedza, and others, were in some ways undiscriminating consumers of education. They were interested more in its sociology than in its curriculum. Repeatedly, they demanded education that would come into the community under their sponsorship, recognizing their authority, but they made few stipulations about the content of that education. And they frequently negotiated for that education by asserting that while it was not something for themselves, their young men wanted it, and they had to distribute it to satisfy these young men who could bring wages and purchased goods home to rural communities.

Schools and education were double-edged for older men. Acquiring them could demonstrate a leader’s ability to attract patronage and opportunities, but once schools were in place, their existence and what
they taught could be highly disruptive. Unwilling to attend school or accept any form of Christianity for themselves, these older men frequently felt no commitment to support the schools once they were established, especially when they faced teachers who were providing alternative sources of authority within the community or seducing their daughters or wives. Teachers who rejected chiefly authority could recruit younger men and become dangerous rivals to seniors’ authority. And older men whose authority rested at least partially on their ability to control daughters and wives frequently opposed opportunities for girls and women to attend schools, fearing seduction by teachers and students and the breaking of long-standing, sometimes polygynous, marital agreements. As heads of household who had to allocate daily tasks, senior men were also reluctant to lessen the workloads of children and youth, leaving missionaries to complain that all too often children might come only three days a week, dropping out altogether at critical points in the agricultural cycle, when it was important to scare birds from the ripening harvest, look for wild foods and animal fodder during droughts, or move seasonally with the cattle to alternative grazing areas.

Furthermore, a chief or headman might request a school, or accept one, and then become opposed to it when he realized the effect of the mission on the community. Mawoko, who in 1907 had requested a teacher under pressure from his young men, evidently thought better of the idea when a teacher actually arrived; he was remembered years later for his opposition and resistance to mission and school rather than his initial, reluctant, request. Young men could be enthusiastic consumers of education who initially had little sophistication as to what, exactly, they were consuming and how it might be useful. Immediately before the First World War, education was something of a fad in certain areas of Mashonaland. Young men had very good reasons, however, for pursuing some kind of education. Young men were entwined in the new, European-dominated economy of wage labor. Unlike older men, who could sell cattle, or grow crops for sale, unmarried men without independent access to land and the labor of wives and children had few choices but to go out to work to make tax payments and earn money for bridewealth. And men very quickly discovered that not all jobs were alike. Unskilled labor on neighboring farms paid poorly and sometimes left workers subject to the abusive whims of their employers. Unskilled labor on mines and in towns was not much better. Conditions remained poor. It was easy to break pass laws—even accidentally—and find oneself sentenced to unpaid hard labor. And saving money for various consumer goods, taxes,
cattle, and bridewealth could be difficult. But workers who could acquire some knowledge of English, a familiarity with construction work, or basic craft skills could become relatively prosperous as servants, clerks, or assistants to European craftsmen, or even as independent craftsmen or storekeepers.

But, as with the older men, it was frequently the sociology of education—the role of being an educated African—rather than specific knowledge that transformed both the young man and his economic and social opportunities. An Anglican Director of Missions observed “a tendency on the part of the people to consider secular education the open sesame to the comforts and riches of the world.” Such critics imagined education as a way for young men to avoid the honest physical effort of manual labor, and at the same time acquire the money and goods necessary for a “civilized” way of life. Graduates of the government’s school at Domboshawa, skilled in building, farming, and carpentry, took jobs as clerks or interpreters rather than putting their new manual skills to use. The messengers, native policemen, teachers, and ministers who pedaled hundreds of miles on their bicycles, or the builders who sought out contracts and coordinated construction, might not avoid physical effort or use any specific knowledge or skill from their education, but they wore uniforms or suits, and their work marked them as important community leaders. European employers, while hardly disinterested observers, also ignored the specific content of Africans’ educations when they categorized men as “mission boys” or “raw natives,” without acknowledging the enormous variations in quality and quantity of different individuals’ schooling. Even missionaries, the region’s primary providers of education for Africans, were slow to attend to the specific content of education, improving the academic quality of education only very slowly and being reluctant in many cases to phase out older teachers of good moral character, but little formal knowledge, in favor of book-educated younger men with more dubious loyalties.

The Umchingwe demand for a school was unusual because the petitioners specified the content of the education they wanted. They wanted higher education, as opposed to the increasingly plaintive requests for even a rudimentary outschool that the Native Board in Gwaai put forth, or the requests for a school sponsored by the government rather than the mission at PlumeTree and Gtu. As the men requesting the education—and volunteering to pay substantial sums for it—had never, themselves, experienced such a “higher” education, it is worth asking where the idea came from, and why they insisted on such a content in the face of offi-
cial attempts to steer them toward a more socially appropriate and imme-
mediately useful curriculum.

Officials blamed the idea of higher education on the ICU. In asso-
ciating Masoja Ndhlovu’s speeches with the request, and ICU opposi-
tion with the school’s failure, they may have been accurate. But merely
assigning blame does not explain why the men of Umchingwe lis-
tened and were then prepared to devote their own resources to the
new schooling. Furthermore, the NC Insiza reported by the end of
1931 that the ICU had become less popular rather than more so over
the previous year, and attendance at ICU meetings declined as indi-
viduals had paid subscriptions, failed to receive the results they
wanted, and begun to ask where the money went.59 ICU involvement
was a symptom, rather than the underlying cause, of the economic,
social, and political difficulties that led the men of Umchingwe to
request a government college.

A more complex possibility is that Chief Mdala and his colleagues
were not being revolutionary in requesting a school, but were instead
attempting to meet long-standing obligations and responsibilities in an
unstable and complex environment, where it remained important to
establish a son as a mature farmer and father, but where older men no
longer had the cattle, money, or land to help provide bridewealth and
a farm. It has become common, in assessments of the social tensions
brought on within the African communities of Southern Africa with
colonialism, migrant labor, and market agriculture, to argue that the
new system promoted generational conflict, pitting fathers against sons
as relationships within patriarchal families were challenged by sons’
ability to earn money for their own bridewealth, move away from a
father’s control, acquire knowledge from mission schools rather than
from elders, and marry as individuals, without the mediation of a fam-
ily.60 Assertions of fathers’ reluctance to allow children to attend
schools are frequently part of this argument. This may be a factor in
the Umchingwe case, but if so, the fathers pursued a peculiar strategy
indeed to retain or gain control of their sons. Instead of fighting a
school capable of promoting individualism and outward migration,
they asked for it, and offered to finance it.

This suggests that Chief Mdala and his colleagues may have, in-
stead, been emulating Chief Mawoko, or the four “big chiefs” of
Shangani, who asked for schools in order to retain young men.61 Unlike
such earlier requests, though, Chief Mdala and the others knew enough
to specify the content of education that they wanted. Their request
reflected their specific goals for the young men of the region—not
the simple education of an outschool, which, as they already had had a chance to observe, was of limited usefulness, but higher education in English, in a government college. Discussing a more recent time period, Angela Cheater has argued that farmers on Native Purchase Areas in Rhodesia could follow one of two strategies—"idioms of accumulation." They could follow a "traditional" pattern, investing in wives, farming with family labor, and avoiding expensive capital improvements. Or they could pursue a more modern pattern, investing in technology and paid labor, marrying monogamously, and sending children to school, rather than to the fields.62 The Umchingwe request for a government college, occurring as the Depression deepened, in an area of insecure land tenure, may have been the "traditionalists" acknowledgment that though they might have "traditional" goals of setting their sons up in life, they would have to use novel means. Chief Mdala and the others were preparing for the sort of paradigm shift Cheater suggests, from prosperity defined through agricultural and paternal success, to prosperity achieved through education and paid work.

In addition to seeing education as an important resource for their sons' success, Chief Mdala and the others may have seen a government education as a critical source of future patronage in an economic, social, and political climate where the administration's effective power had increased dramatically over their lifetimes, even as the resources of the missions had proven regrettably fickle. As jobs became increasingly difficult to find during the Depression, some senior Africans informed the administration that it was the government's responsibility to provide suitable jobs for educated Africans. Mbizo, speaking before the Native Board in Gwaai, asked that the government provide all educated natives with suitable work as storekeepers or office clerks.63 Hotsha, speaking before the Native Board of Shashani and Semokwe, provided a concrete example of the difference between mission and government education and patronage. Those who had paid £5 per year to be educated at the mission college, qualifying as teachers, might be paid as little as £1/10s/- a month, less than a common laborer. Tjolotjo government school graduates who had paid less in tuition, on the other hand, had built a hospital at Fort Usher and earned £6 to £6/10s/- a month.64

Umchingwe was not typical. But in the request, the administration's response to that request, and the failure of its industrial demonstration project, it may have marked out the limits of consensus-based development policies. Later demands, from older men, educated Africans, offi-
cials, missionaries, and settlers, acknowledged increasingly real conflicts of interest and the impossibility of meeting all needs simultaneously.

CONSEQUENCES OF AFRICANS’ DEMANDS FOR SCHOOLS

Umchingwe failed because the young men refused to attend, and could not be talked—or pressured—into attendance. Officials and some of the older men attributed this refusal to laziness. Accusations of laziness fit well into a social picture of Southern Rhodesia as a region increasingly characterized not by cooperation between generations, but by intergenerational conflict. “Laziness,” or slow and ineffectual work, was an important, nonconfrontational way of protesting conditions and a lack of incentives without challenging the potentially useful relationship of patronage and even affection between worker and employer, son and father. Older men asserted that young men not only refused to attend schools that demanded physical labor, but were migrating away from the rural areas to avoid manual work and seek higher wages.

Older men also found themselves less and less able to control junior members of their communities and make them do anything that the juniors did not choose. As juniors departed, older men lost access to key resources, and the government blocked resort to force and familial violence. Young men who went to work in the towns, mines, or even in South Africa, left the old men responsible for the entire family’s taxes, a responsibility that became increasingly onerous as cattle and corn prices dropped, and the older men had less and less money available. In areas such as the Umchingwe block, everyone, old and young, was uncertain about continuing access to land, and the older men’s knowledge and experience became less critical to young men’s success than schooling or knowledge of Europeans. Evasion and lack of resources left senior men with few options other than force. But with increased levels of official oversight, force was becoming problematic as a way of controlling wayward women and juniors. The image of a Native Commissioner suggesting that parents at Umchingwe compel their sons to attend this school is therefore deeply ironic, as it can be juxtaposed with the voices of some Native Commissioners chiding old men for their desire to brand, beat, rape, or otherwise punish disobedient daughters and wives.

The officials who suggested forcing pupils to come to school were, however, leaders in a minority, but increasingly vocal, group among the most “progressive” or educated Africans and officials, and who asked
that the government use force to compel universal education for African children.

For the Europeans of the region, the idea of forcing children to attend school was not new. Many discussions of compulsory education, indeed, refer to European parents forcing their children to attend even when the children would rather play. But in the Southern Rhodesian context, school only became compulsory for European children in 1930, despite decades of complaints about white parents who did not ensure the education of their children. And education became compulsory for Europeans within a context of publicity about white degeneracy and illiteracy, Melsetter farmers asking mission-educated Africans to read letters for them, and the graduation of one of the country’s earliest Standard VII classes of Africans at Mount Silinda mission. Compulsory education for white children was a matter of racial pride, and racial solidarity.

Africans’ motivations in the cases where they requested compulsory education were apparently quite similar. In some cases, the requests used traditionalist imagery but acknowledged compulsory education as a rational response to changing social conditions. Advocates of compulsory education, though, ultimately blamed themselves and their own communities for the difficulties Africans were having as segregation intensified. Furthermore, to compel school attendance, they threatened violence against African truants and parents. Solomon Zwana complained to the Plumtree Native Board that when school was voluntary, boys deserted, leaving only the girls in class. “The root of the tribal tree is dead; the people as a community will perish owing to the disregard of tribal institutions,” he argued, and Chief Mpini, listening, suggested that boarding school might substitute for some of the traditional forms of tribal discipline as a way of keeping young men under control. In other cases, the demand for compulsory education was led by individuals fully convinced that Africans needed to learn to work within a European world, and that that could best be done through schooling. Philip Dube told the Chipinga board that education was at least as necessary for blacks as for whites, and should be compulsory for both, as he informed the meeting that “Ignorance was the greatest enemy of mankind, and the only way to destroy that enemy was to compel all parents to send their children to school.”

Mission-dominated Gutu, however, may have been the region closest to a compulsory school system and in Gutu, the violence, controversy, and stagnation of the school system showed that, far from producing a strong and successful African community, it could cleave the region
into mission adherents and mission enemies, leading to arguments at the Native Board meeting and ongoing conflict in the local community.  

**UNSUCCESSFUL DEMANDS AND THE LIMITS OF COMPULSION**

Education was a compromise and an attempt at peaceful, or superficially peaceful, mediation of extremely real social conflicts between settlers and Africans. Africans’ demands for schools were attempts to achieve a respectable and responsible position within the new Southern Rhodesian society, attempts with the potential to unite older and younger men who sought to ensure the survival and prosperity of their communities. But these attempts to ensure communal survival could also pit old against young when older and younger men disagreed over what sort of negotiated settlement would be acceptable.

As the Umchingwe program ended, with admonitions of force, it testified to the inability of this community, led by senior men, to convince young men with words. And it showed the power young men were acquiring to renegotiate their position within their home communities. The young men won. Whether their refusals to work at the school were lazy or resistant, their refusal to accept the school on the terms the government offered led to the school’s closure. But the community also lost as, divided, it was crippled in its efforts to resist the government’s enforcement of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930.

The Umchingwe story did not end happily. By 1934, the school was gone and the agent for the railway company that owned the land had given the African community notice that it must leave the area as rents, effectively increased from 20 shillings per year to 35 shillings, had gone unpaid. The Native Commissioner could offer no local land as a replacement; the community would have to travel. Chief Mdala and others protested, asking for land, explaining that they could not pay for it and pointing out how very little they could do when the price of maize was only 4 shillings a bag, and maize control regulations limited their marketing. Chief Mzamane agreed with Chief Mdala’s complaints, argued that the older men were losing control over the people, and asked for “land where we can reside, where there are no Europeans.” The community’s bid to remain on private land, educate its sons, and allow a new, well-educated generation to be upwardly mobile within an integrated society had failed, leaving the old men to negotiate the terms on which they would accept a segregated society.


3. Woods (NC) to SoN Bulawayo, 4-12-30, National Archives of Zimbabwe (NAZ) S1561/59.

4. CNC to DND, 27-2-31, NAZ S1561/59. Mission teachers—qualified ones—generally earned at least £25 per year. He may have been assuming that more revenue could be earned through the sale of produce from student-worked farming projects or products and services from an industrial shop, both of which were steady contributors to many mission schools' finances. Or he may simply have assumed that once started, the school would continue to expand. In any event, the industrial demonstrator who was eventually placed in the region earned a government salary of £48, plus a £5 cycle allowance, during 1933. Accounts of Expenditures, NAZ S170/1171. Even during 1927, wages for reasonably skilled African teachers qualified to teach industrial subjects ranged between £4 and £7 per month. Not even counting equipment and building expenses, contributions of 5 shillings each from 83 sponsors could not pay most or all expenses of the enterprise they proposed.


6. CNC to DND, 27-2-31, NAZ S1561/59. The CNC was mistaken in this contention as well.

7. Quoted by Jowitt to Colonial Secretary, report of meeting with leaders of ICU and memorandum re Umchingwwe Industrial Block, 15-7-32, NAZ S1561/59.

8. Most of the African requests emerge in discussions of meetings. As I will point out later, Native Department officials tended to focus on the requests they approved of, and to downplay or drop those—like higher education—that they considered misguided and inappropriate. For evidence of the meeting's explanation of the desired curriculum, see Jowitt to Colonial Secretary, 10-6-30; Woods (NC) to SoN Bulawayo, 4-12-30; Alvord to DND, 4-6-31; and Acting DND to Inspector, NDD Matabeleland South, 19-6-31, all from NAZ S1561/59.

9. CNC Carbutt to DND, 16-12-30, NAZ S1561/59.

10. Regarding land, see the minutes, Native Board Meeting, Insiza (Fort Rixon), 27-3-31, and CNC to Sec. to Premier, 13-3-31, NAZ S1542/N2 H-1; regarding ICU, see Woods (NC) to Supt. of Natives, Bulawayo, 9-7-31, NAZ S1561/59.

11. H. Jowitt to Colonial Secretary, 10-6-30, NAZ S1561/59.

12. For examples of his rhetoric, see any of his annual reports as Director of Native Development from 1928 through 1933. His desire to get involved in commu-
nity development led him to push to change his department’s name from the Department of Native Education (as it was in 1927–28) to the Department of Native Development.

13. Jowitt to Colonial Secretary, 10-6-30, NAZ S1561/59.
15. J. White (Wesleyan) and Neville Jones (LMS), Minutes of the Southern Rhodesia Advisory Board for Native Development, 1930, NAZ S235/484.
16. Statement from the SRMC executive, Minutes of the Native Advisory Board, 1931, NAZ S235/484.
18. See chapter 3.
19. DND to Principal Domboshawa, 27-4-31, NAZ S1561/59.
20. DND to Principal Domboshawa, 27-4-31, NAZ S1561/59.
21. Jowitt consistently emphasized the power of education as a communal rather than an individual phenomenon. See his annual reports, for example: “the native community . . . however inarticulate they are . . . must ever be borne in mind in prescribing for the educational needs of their children.” DND, Annual Report (1929), 11.
22. Alvor to DND, 4-6-31, NAZ S1561/59.
23. Alvor to DND, 4-6-31, NAZ S1561/59.
24. Alvor to DND, 4-6-31, NAZ S1561/59.
25. Woods (NC) to Supt. of Natives, Bulawayo, 9-7-31, NAZ S1561/59.
26. Woods (NC) to Supt. of Natives, Bulawayo, 9-7-31, NAZ S1561/59.
27. Mhlanga to NC, 14-8-31, NAZ S1561/59.
29. Woods (NC) to Supt. of Natives, Bulawayo, 25-8-31, NAZ S1561/59.
32. G.S.B. Woods (NC) to Supt. of Natives, Bulawayo, 29-10-31, and Alvor to DND, 8-12-31, NAZ S1561/59.
33. G.S.B. Woods (NC) to Supt. of Natives, Bulawayo, 29-10-31, NAZ S1561/59.
35. It seems remarkable that a population of 400 could have produced 80 men willing to sign a petition and pledge money for a school, so Alvor may have been mistaken in his population estimate. Or the area may have been undergoing a rapid change as, in the aftermath of land apportionment, families were forced off land and sent to reserves. If, indeed, Umchingwe was experiencing rapid depopulation, that would explain both the difficulties the school experienced, and the sense of urgency expressed by Chief Mdala and the school’s original sponsors. None of the materials, however, provide any evidence of depopulation. Alvor to DND 8-12-31, NAZ S1561/59. For discussion of some of the region’s complexities, see Jocelyn Alexander, “The State, Agrarian Policy and Rural Politics in Zimbabwe: Case Studies of Insiza and Chimanimani Districts, 1940–1990” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1994).
36. S.S. Woods (NC) to Agriculturist NDD, 3-3-32, NAZ S1561/59.
37. G.M. Mhlanga, Industrial Demonstrator, to Agriculturist, 2-3-32, NAZ S1561/59.

38. Sibezwile had arrived in Umchingwe after being forced to leave his post as a preacher for the unofficial Christian Catholic Apostolic Church in Zion, where he had acquired a reputation for sleeping with the married women of his congregation. NC Insiza, Annual Report for 1927, NAZ S235/505.


40. Jowitt to Colonial Secretary, report of meeting with leaders of ICU and memorandum re Umchingwe Industrial Block, 15-7-32, NAZ S1561/59.

41. The extent to which these government-appointed headmen represented popular African views has been, and is likely to remain, moot. By virtue of their position, however, they represented the most stable parts of the community, while the more volatile young men, without access to land, wives, or agricultural means of production, were likely to have the ability to move to places with schools or better jobs, rather than being forced to pull schools into any specific area.


43. Chief Muroyi complained about the schools in his area of Ndanga Reserve during the Ndanga Native Board meeting, 25-4-32 (Minutes). Subsequent correspondence between the Native Department, Native Development Department, and missionary, ended up concluding that his complaints were not justified. The inspector, Mather, argued that the schools were relatively good, and Muroyi’s complaint was only being attended to because of his senior political position. DND to CNC, 14-6-32, NAZ S1542/N2 W-Z.

44. NC Gutu to Superintendent of Natives Victoria, 19-1-33, and Native Board Minutes, Gutu, 12-4-33, NAZ S1542/N2 G.44.


46. Ibid.


48. Etheridge, 1911; Lloyd, 1914.

49. The “big chiefs” were Sivalo, Ndabambi, Tshoko, and Mazwi. They were nervous, having recently experienced substantial in-migration to the reserves as Africans on land designated for Europeans were increasingly pushed off that land and relocated in their reserve. Reverend Williams, untitled, Mashonaland Quarterly 89 (August 1914): 12.

50. For examples, Lloyd, 1914; Etheridge, 1911; “EWL,” 1909; Etheridge, 1907.

51. Etheridge, November 1914.

52. Etheridge, August 1914.

53. In 1929, only 17.4 percent of its 258 African teachers had passed Standard IV or higher. Standard IV was the Native Department’s notion of a minimally qualified teacher. Of major mission societies, only the Roman Catholics (8.6%) and the Dutch Reformed Mission (9.3%) had lower percentages of Standard IV and higher teachers Annual Report of the Director of Native Development (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1931), 56. The Anglican teachers’ problems were so severe that, with government approval, the denomination began an intensive program of vernacular
certificate training at Saint Faith’s in short courses that were described by some as
designed to either bring older teachers up to Standard III or kill them in trying (17–
18).

54. These older men had cause. Christian girls were frequently offered shelter
by missionaries who opposed polygyny. Girls would be directed to central sta-
tions, such as St. Monica’s, or St. Faith’s (Rusape) for the Church of England,
where they could be removed from home, educated, and married off monoga-
mously in Christian marriage to Christian men. For example, Mother Annie,
Mashonaland Quarterly, 1907 and 1915. For more general discussions of this
problem, see Summers, “‘If You Can Educate . . .’” and Schmidt, Peasants,

55. P. Reynolds, Dance Civet Cat: Child Labour in the Zambezi Valley (Harare:
Baobab, 1991), and Schmidt, “Patriarchy, Capitalism and the Colonial State in Zim-
78 (November 1911): 11.

56. Etheridge, Mashonaland Quarterly 1907; G.E.B. Broderick, Mashonaland
Quarterly 89 (August 1914): 10–11.

57. Report of the Director of Missions, 1936, NAZ ANG 1/1/19 vol. 2.

58. Note that no secondary education was available for Africans within Southern
Rhodesia until the late 1930s, when St. Augustine’s opened up an independent sec-
ondary school. The first government secondary school, Goromonzi, did not open until
the 1940s. For examples of demand for any education, or for government schools,
see Minutes, Native Board of Gwaa Reserve, 26-2-36; and DND to CNC, 7-7-34
(re Plumtree Native Board Meeting), NAZ SI542/N2.

59. NC Insiza (Woods), annual report for 1931, NAZ S235/507.

60. Patrick Harries, Work, Culture and Identity: Migrant Labourers in Mozambique
and South Africa c. 1890–1910 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1994); Diana Jeater,
Marriage, Perversion and Power: The Construction of Moral Discourse in Southern
Rhodesia, 1894–1930 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Summers, From Civilization
to Segregation; Belinda Bozoli, Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy

61. Etheridge, Mashonaland Quarterly, 1907; Williams, 1914.

62. Angela Cheater, Idioms of Accumulation: Rural Development and Class For-
mation among Freeholders in Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1984).

63. Gwaa Native Board minutes, 23-35, 1935, NAZ S1542/N2 G.

64. Shashani and Semokwe Reserve Native Board minutes, 15-12-32, NAZ S1542/
N2. This criticism appears to have been leveled at Tegwani, a central school under
the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society. This difference does not merely reflect
gaps in pay between artisans and teachers. Even within the teaching profession, those
who could acquire work at the government schools received steady wages substan-
tially higher than the pay at most missions. For evidence of the paltry, and sporadic,
pay missions offered teachers, see (for example) the correspondence in NAZ S2307/
2. For examples of the more substantial pay at Domboshawa and Tjolotjo, see NAZ
S170/ 1169 and NAZ S1542/S3.

65. For example, Mpini, Bulalima-Mangwe (Plumtree) Native Board minutes, 12-
12-35.
66. For examples, minutes of Native Boards of Bikita (9-5-33) and (6-5-35); minutes of Native Board, Bulalima-Mangwe (at Plumtree, 12-12-35); minutes of Native Board, Shabani Reserve (13-5-37), NAZ S1542/N2. There were, however, more complaints about runaway women than runaway sons.

67. Branding was a popular proposal at the Plumtree Native Board meeting, 13-5-37. The role of other punishment was most extensively discussed at the meeting of the Mazoe Native Board, 28-4-31, NAZ S1542/N2.

68. Minutes, Plumtree Native Board, 12-12-35, NAZ S1542/N2 M.

69. Philip Dube to Native Board meeting, Chipinga, reported in Nielsen to CNC, 28-2-31, NAZ S1542/N2.


71. Rents were 20 shillings per year when Umchingwe was a government-owned block. Transferred to private owners, however, rent was increased to 30 shillings per year, plus a 5 shillings per year private locations fee. NC Insiza to Superintendent of Natives, Matabeleland, 26-2-30, NAZ S138/32.

72. NC Insiza to SoN Bulawayo, 11-9-34, on Native Board meeting, Insiza, NAZ S1542/N2.
PART II

RECONSTRUCTING AUTHORITY

Colonialism—both its political and economic components—challenged and changed the nature of authority in African communities in Southern Rhodesia. Politically, colonial authorities reconstructed chiefship from a position of leadership that was negotiated between local elders and lineages, into an office held through a relationship with the colonial state. Economically, colonial authorities’ technical and professional initiatives offered individuals and groups new potential sources of authority based on training and education, rather than seniority and political support. This was not entirely a top-down process: as individuals explored the opportunities and perils of newly professional and training-based models of authority, they challenged and reworked older ideas of cooperation and community.

Teachers were at the center of much of this social reconstruction. Their existence, and the schools they operated, were vital to senior men and government-appointed chiefs who tried to reinforce their prestige as providers and maintain the strength of their people under pressure from the segregationist state. But schools were also expensive, and teachers, as individuals who increasingly claimed authority based on their connections with the new world of mission- and European-dominated society, were potentially destabilizing. Teachers’ own sense of community, increasingly rooted in their professional status, led them toward the innovations of Christian mission identities, and unions, rather than solidarity with farmers, chiefs, or those pushed off land by segregationist initiatives.

As officials recognized teachers’ and professionals’ connection to change, and the potential destabilizing effects of that change upon the structures of native government ordained by the Native Department, the teachers most closely associated with new types of African authority—male Jeanes teachers—became the center for an administrative debate over who had authority and the power to give orders in African communities.
Controversies over teachers’ status, and Jeanes teachers’ power to give orders, did not produce a technocratic revolution in Depression-era Southern Rhodesia, but they did provoke African chiefs and teachers, European missionaries, and administration officials to think seriously about how authority changed over time and must be reshaped to the needs of people engulfed in change. Teachers themselves, in their classrooms, material culture, associations, and potentially political associations with other educated Africans, used the official positions that they earned to build new ideas of merit, respectability, and influence.
By the 1930s, Africans in Southern Rhodesia were becoming skilled at working within a segregated, white-dominated colonial system. In their efforts to survive and prosper, education mattered. Schooling taught time discipline, basic English, literacy, arithmetic, and other essentials of European culture, ranging from the new forms of cleanliness to the complex codes of manners and dignity inherent in furniture and clothes. Parents and elders had sometimes resisted the expansion of schools during the first years of the century, but by the late 1920s and early 1930s opposition was rare. Youth and children did not always attend schools as consistently and attentively as missionaries might wish, but by the late 1920s schooling had become a desired part of juvenile life. In this context, teachers emerged as exemplars of success and potential catalysts for change. As teachers negotiated their roles and status, they both challenged and accommodated white dominance, modeling and experimenting with new sorts of status and influence within the colonial state.

From 1907 onward, government capitation grants for schooling provided missions with a financial incentive to extend webs of schools throughout the country, so that a single white missionary could be responsible for dozens of outschools in addition to the "first-class" boarding school at the central mission station where he or she lived. In this atmosphere of expansion, government grants and missions' competition
provided opportunities for early teacher/evangelists to open their own schools and run those schools with minimal supervision. But by the late 1920s, the government was denouncing the teachers who had proliferated under this laissez-faire grants-in-aid system. “The teacher,” the Director of Native Education asserted,

is a man of reputable character, who ten or twenty years ago read a standard II reader of unsuitable type, and who could not read it today. This teacher holds up the torch of learning in the community, gives the children the smattering he possesses, gives them with it Church doctrine, strives with varying degrees of success to uphold the Christian ethic, and probably assumes, next to the local chief, precedence in society. . . . It is unnecessary to describe the technique of the teacher or the human wastage which results.¹

Concerned about the rapid growth of these low-quality schools, the new Department of Native Development pushed for inspections, effective supervision, and more highly qualified teachers. And by the late 1920s, increasing numbers of certificated teachers, with Standard VI and formal teachers' training, were beginning to emerge from the elite mission schools such as Mount Silinda, Waddilove, Old Umtali, and Hope Fountain.

These new trained teachers were not the barely literate mission servants condemned by the Native Development Department, but they had their own government critics. A Native Commissioner who observed the changes in the teaching corps remarked scathingly:

During the recent past, particularly the last two years, the type of kraal school teacher has . . . altered for the worse from the older responsible type of native with moral force and great personality to whom the heathen Natives could and did look up to with respect. In his stead appears a very young man who, although better educated, has obviously but little experience. He certainly commands but little respect from the elders but perhaps exerts some influence on the younger people, most particularly the girls.²

New men—or boys—sometimes as young as 12 or 14 years old, emerged from training programs and pursued teaching careers that took them from mission to mission in search of better conditions and higher wages, providing them with webs of acquaintances and colleagues not just from their own homes or schools, but beyond their denomination and across the region. These men had higher expectations for success
within the school systems than their predecessors. They were teachers, not just mission servants who taught, farmed, and evangelized. These teachers pushed for professional status, respect, and opportunities, and built new communities within the mission and government schools where they taught. Both individually and collectively, they tried to use their status as teachers to create a model for modern African men.

During the 1930s, Southern Rhodesia's educational system experienced crisis as a number of contradictory tendencies collided. Parents and students called for effective schools that would allow students to command better jobs. Teachers called for wages reflecting their improved training. Government officials called for disciplined schools under trained teachers. Missions concerned with evangelical opportunities sought to expand schooling rapidly. But the Depression, with falling producer prices, lower government revenues, and diminished mission funds from England and America, tightened resources. Observers increasingly saw expansion of quantity and improvement of school quality to be in conflict. In this context of widespread, vehement demand for education and respect for the educated amid limited economic resources, teachers emerged as central figures both in the reconstruction and survival of African communities and in administrative and ideological control over potentially restless sections of African society.

As Africans, government officials, and missionaries recognized the importance of teachers to survival, prosperity, order, and change in African communities, they debated and struggled over the role and status of these teachers. Teachers could be walking models of successful achievement. Teachers could serve traditional leaders and, through this strategic alliance, provide new life to old structures and new strength to communities endangered by segregationist land policies. But the education and affiliation with the European context that gave teachers prestige and power could also encourage them to act as individuals, pursuing equality with European colleagues. Or, realizing their importance to central social institutions such as the school and mission, teachers could organize collectively along professional lines, rejecting segregationist concepts of the supremacy of racial identities in favor of a new identity based in professional training.

Over time, under the pressure of segregation and the Great Depression, teachers filled all of these roles. In the process, they provided both the essential staffing for white rule and the training and experience in organization that eventually prepared students, and the popu-
lation at large, for nationalism and organized resistance to that rule. Teachers’ various roles and complex experiences produced deadlocks and crises. But these crises promoted communication and sometimes even understanding as traditional leaders, teachers, parents, government officials, and missionaries interacted to keep schools open or shut them down. And this communication undermined strictly hierarchical or racially based notions of control and order in ways that ultimately made radical change thinkable.

TEACHERS’ STATUS

Stanlake Samkange’s novel The Mourned One vividly depicted the schools of the 1920s and 1930s. Samkange described how the evangelist recruited children by going through the area each morning with a drum, calling the children to come. School then began with devotions and students’ chanting recitation of meaningless syllables from wall charts. Students promoted to books gained rapidly in prestige as they became the teachers of their slower peers. In this context, where relative rank was reinforced daily and the teacher was the clear master of the school, the teacher’s image was powerful and extended beyond the walls of the classroom. Samkange evoked this image of the prestigious teacher in his vivid depiction of Mr. D.D. Kamuriwa who

walked alone in front. This gave the boys an opportunity to feast their eyes on him: to admire his dignified gait and listen to the regular drum-like thud of his boots which seemed to say, with each step he took, “Standard four! Standard four! Standard four!”

Boots, rather than bare feet, were one sign of both status and Europeanization. Material objects from European stores were essential to teachers’ declaration of status and identity in rural communities. Teachers wore suits and hats. They slept in beds, rather than on mats, sat on chairs, and worked at tables. Poverty prevented these material signs from being available to all: frequently a teacher’s chair and table were the only furniture in a school. Samkange’s Mr. Kamuriwa provided a model for more than clothes and furniture, though. The “dignified gait” and the careful reference not merely to a single name, but to an honorific, plus initials, pushed forward an image of a substantial, impressive man as opposed to the gawking boys or their evasive parents.

Government officials, however, found it surprisingly easy to mock Mr. Kamuriwa, the teachers he stood for, and the dignity he embodied. In his
1921 annual report, the Chief Native Commissioner argued that African teachers’ training was poor, and “their influence on the pupils has not been beneficial.” By 1929 a new explicitly segregationist CNC was arguing this point vehemently, asserting that teachers had lost control of their schools, which had become hotbeds of sex, alcohol, and destruction of parental and marital authority.

Unlike Native Department officials, the Director of Native Development acknowledged teachers’ importance and tried to defend them against broadside attacks. But his standards were diametrically opposed to those of the Native Department. His criticism of teachers was not of the young men, but of the older, untrained teachers. Though he called for standardized wages based on qualifications and the gradual phasing out of teachers with substandard qualifications, neither the administration nor the missions were willing to fund such expensive transformations. In 1929, 41 percent of the African teachers employed in Southern Rhodesia had qualifications of Standard II or lower. Formal qualifications improved gradually as low-standard teachers were forced out of the schools or pushed through remedial education programs. But despite these improvements, the complaints continued.

Faced with both communities’ demands for teachers who were men of substance, and official demands that teachers pass academic standards, the missions that actually hired the teachers of Southern Rhodesia sought to phase out “the older type” of teacher in favor of formally educated younger teachers. But they tried to do so without losing the religious and moral basis of the school/church or spending more money. This proved difficult. While some missionaries defended the older untrained but faithful teachers, others argued that they must train a new class of teacher/evangelists appropriate to the changing conditions of the region. Pushed by government regulations, the missions gradually moved to improve training and hire more qualified teachers. But untrained senior teachers, newly unemployed, proved a disturbing pressure group. And when older men lacked the education to succeed as teacher/evangelists under the new conditions, they sometimes left the church, either abandoning the denomination or becoming part of new Zionist churches where they were valued for their spiritual gifts rather than their academic training.

Government officials and missions argued over who was qualified to be a teacher as they sought to fit teachers to their aims of orderly communities, progressive change, and evangelistic expansion. The Native Department asked for older, settled, deferential, reliable men. The Native Development Department asked for academically trained
men with a vocation to teach. The missions sought enthusiastic Christians with blameless social lives and evangelical vigor.  

In the midst of these European controversies over teachers’ roles, various Africans experimented and pushed for their own notions of what it meant to be a teacher. Innovative traditional leaders recruited teachers to back their personal influence and form a new development alliance, as discussed earlier. Ambitious young men sought to use the status of teachers as a path to individual success and respect. And groups of teachers banded together to announce themselves as professionals with qualifications and rights.

INDIVIDUAL TEACHERS AS PROFESSIONALS

The lives and careers of individual teachers, however, show quite clearly how difficult it was for highly trained teachers to work out a status as professionals and earn respect from their employers. The early career of George Mhlanga, who rapidly left teaching in favor of government service, exemplified the difficulties individual African teachers had in forcing their employers to grant them professional status.

On March 4, 1929, George M. Mhlanga wrote to A.R. Mather (the inspector of native schools, Gwelo circuit) to complain. Mather had helped him find a job with a Dutch Reformed school at a time when the mission that had trained him, the American Board, was no longer able to employ and pay all its certificated teachers. But Mhlanga was sadly disappointed in conditions at the DRC’s Chibi mission under Reverend Hugo. Mhlanga’s first complaint was that Hugo reneged on his contract. Instead of the agreed on £3 per month, Hugo unilaterally decided to pay only £2 per month. Furthermore, when Mhlanga rejected this wage and attempted to leave, Hugo refused to allow him to go and held on to Mhlanga’s pass. The mission, Hugo asserted, could not afford to lose its African head teacher. More complaints followed this first letter. On March 11, Mhlanga wrote complaining of Hugo’s stinginess and lack of appreciation for his teachers. Hugo refused to provide the lamp fuel that Mhlanga needed in order to prepare lesson plans at night. And Mhlanga pointed out that with a wage of only £2 per month, he was not sure he could buy necessities, such as furniture, and still manage to feed himself. Mhlanga became even more discontented at Chibi during the term, as the mission underlined very forcibly to him that despite his Standard VI education, he must not presume to be European. Hugo added to Mhlanga’s duties, expecting
him not only to teach but also to do repairs, supervise boys’ agricultural and industrial work, and act as a disciplinarian boarding master.20 As the term ended and the students left on holiday, Hugo and Mhlanga clashed for the last time: Hugo expected Mhlanga to stay on at the mission, do repairs and industrial work, and cement his ties with the mission community at Chibi where he was surrounded by teachers who spoke a different dialect from Mhlanga’s and lacked Mhlanga’s level of education. Mhlanga wanted to go to town, see his former classmates from the American Board school at Mount Silinda, and acquire the material goods he needed to shore up his status as an educated, prosperous man. After a difficult term, Mhlanga expected a salaried holiday. Hugo, however, considered the request for a salaried holiday to be unwarranted, believing Mhlanga should only be paid for actual work measured by hours on the job. By the end of June, Mhlanga declared that he would definitely leave Chibi.21

This clash between Mhlanga and Hugo over Mhlanga’s status as an educated adult and teacher is one of the few well-documented controversies over what difference an education and formal qualifications could make in an African’s status and way of life, but it was not unique. During the 1920s and 1930s, even as the administration and settlers of Southern Rhodesia developed and began to institutionalize segregation, arguing that white and black were fundamentally different, growing numbers of Africans identified themselves as something other than a part of the African masses, encouraged by missions and some employers and officials who argued that without these educated African leaders the country could not continue to develop.22

Mhlanga’s experiences point to several key characteristics of this evolving category of educated Africans. First, Mhlanga’s image of himself was closely tied to certain types of material goods. Lamps, beds, and furniture were essential to his identity. Nor was he unusually materialistic in this regard. Africans arguing for their status as educated men frequently focused on household goods rather than any internal or personal qualities.23

Mhlanga’s food set him apart. For Mhlanga, food was purchased. His diet may have included items beyond sadza and the minimal relishes provided by rations. Purchasing food, in any case, distinguished that food from food obtained through relationships with family members or with the mission. On other occasions students and teachers proved highly sensitive to questions of diet, arguing that they were entitled to plenty of food, that mealies had to be ground properly, that tea should be accompanied by plenty of sugar, and that no substitutions should be made without extensive negotiations.24
Second, Mhlanga argued that his contract should bind not merely him, but also his employer. Mhlanga did not seek a paternalistic, patronage-based relationship with Hugo, though Hugo appears to have attempted to sponsor such feelings by calling for Mhlanga to sympathize with the school’s difficulties when another teacher fell ill, offering to pay Mhlanga out of personal (rather than mission) monies and emphasizing to Mhlanga that he would intervene with the mission committee on Mhlanga’s behalf. In his complaints to Mather, Mhlanga offered a shilling-by-shilling accounting of what he believed Hugo owed him.

Mhlanga apparently had no real objection to industrial work, repairs, or agricultural work. He had received special agricultural training at Mount Silinda. Pressed for money at Chibi he sought to make extra money by making and selling brooms on his own account. After he left Chibi he went into the training program for agricultural demonstrators at the government school at Domboshawa, accepting a job only two years later where his primary responsibility was industrial work rather than academic teaching. The problem was not the work as such but that

Rev. Hugo did not tell me all the works I have to do here before I came. He wanted me for teaching work . . . [but] now he had given me carpentry work to look after the boys at work and he said I may teach agriculture. Sir, do not think that I am not happy to do all these works, no I am very happy surely to do all what I can for them all the time I am here. I want them to do this[:] when they add more works they ought to add my money too.25

Mhlanga made clear that he was employed by the mission to teach, a specific job, rather than being employed as a servant to do whatever needed doing. Hugo was a man without specific qualifications who was willing to try most tasks.26 Without the unassailable status conferred by Hugo’s whiteness, however, Mhlanga sought to maintain his status through a limited professional view of his responsibilities. Mhlanga’s faith in contracts, job descriptions, and official relationships distinguished him from the other teachers, the members of Hugo’s church, or other mission clients.

Third, Mhlanga evidently believed that the combination of material improvements and race-blind contracts should provide him with a status such that he would be as respected for his acquired professional identity as any white DRC missionary. In his letters to Mather, a government inspector who had originally come to Southern Rhodesia as a
missionary for the American Board, Mhlanga appealed outside the mission structure for his rights, invoking connections with the government and comparisons with his former mission sponsors at the American Board mission. Mhlanga also distanced himself from the less-educated teachers at Chibi. And he sought to maintain his personal network of friendships and contacts with other educated Africans.27

Mhlanga’s problems with Reverend Hugo were not unique. And they were a problem for Hugo and for the other DRC missionaries who were under pressure from the Department of Native Development to hire teachers with academic qualifications unobtainable in the DRC schools of that time. Many long-term missionaries in Southern Rhodesia expected to rule within their territories.28 Mission societies allowed missionaries nearly dictatorial power on the assumption that their paternalistic authority would push African communities into Christian conversion. Within the Catholic Church, the Trappists were accused of kidnapping children and keeping them in school without parental consent or even the children’s own consent. The Jesuits, too, were proud of the opportunities they had taken to remove children from families, penalize those who did not attend school, and force marriages on those who became pregnant out of wedlock. Even more liberal missions could be guided by missionaries who wielded nearly unchecked power and reinforced that power symbolically in ways that would be familiar to any white settler or government official: Mr. Butler of the Wesleyan Methodist Missionary Society (MMS), for example, would not allow any Africans, even teachers, into his study, but would speak with them through the window to give orders.29

Educated African teachers, able to make demands, and to develop their own communities, culture, and political activities, challenged these autocratic, paternalistic tendencies of missions even more immediately than they confronted administration or settler skeptics. During the earliest years of mission educational initiatives, missionaries had defended their schools to officials, settlers, and African elders by arguing that thorough education, which taught Christianity and culture rather than just a smattering of book learning, would not cause social difficulties.30 These optimistic missionaries were proven wrong.

Mhlanga and others like him did not fit neatly into the segregationist social categories of Southern Rhodesia. Mhlanga made no claim to speak for the people in general. He spoke for himself. And he spoke in English, mobilizing as many potential supporters as possible. Mhlanga made no pretense that he was a mission servant, as the earliest teachers and evan-
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gelists had. Nor did he make claims on behalf of community and tradition; his correspondence both from Chibi and from his first government posting at Umchingwe is remarkable for his lack of local, community connection and for his impatience with those he was supposed to work with and teach. His nearly total dissociation from the Chibi community is striking because later Zionist activity and widespread discontent with DRC administration in that area suggest that it would have been possible to find allies there if Mhlanga had redefined himself as a servant and representative of Africans in a struggle with the missionary, as another teacher, Nqabe Tshuma, evidently did at Inyati. But Mhlanga did not choose that course. Presenting himself as an educated professional in a sea of commoners, Mhlanga promoted a new vision of teaching in which the teacher was an independent power worthy of respect, rather than a mission servant, racial example, or internal community leader and representative.

By the 1930s, teachers as individuals and as a group were increasingly alienated from both common African society and from the dominant society of Southern Rhodesia. This alienation emerges from the stories of struggling individuals such as Mhlanga. But by the middle of the decade individual problems were becoming group problems and the contradictions of the teachers’ collective position had become increasingly stark.

George Mhlanga was not the only educated African to scorn those who were uneducated and unwilling to defer to his elite status. When he characterized his time in Umchingwe as “wasted” because of his pupils’ willful ignorance, he expressed a common frustration. Several early Jeanes teachers alienated important parts of the communities in which they worked as they sought to push aggressively for what they saw as changes essential to civilized living. This scorn for customary authorities and community practices made problems for a Native Administration keen on order and control. Too many teachers, NCs complained, did not see themselves as under the control of chiefs and headmen in the areas where they taught. And sometimes these teachers even believed themselves independent of the NC’s authority, seeing themselves as respected members of the mission community.

Alienated from African society and held at arm’s length by segregationist policies of both the government and missions, teachers became a volatile class. The 1930s were characterized by increasingly numerous and intense conflicts between individual teachers and both missions and government. Even as teachers’ qualifications increased and their training was improved in ways that should have prevented
the older problems of indiscipline and ineffectual outschools, the number of cases of teachers dismissed for moral—and sometimes criminal—offenses rose. Perceiving this as an increasingly serious problem, the Native Development Department began a formal blacklist of teachers who, for one reason or another, should be shunned by future prospective employers. Not all teachers’ violations made the same statements. Some teachers were dismissed for insolence. Others were condemned for tax avoidance. Seduction, polygynous marriages, and sexual offenses were probably the most common problems. But problems could be much worse: Paul Moyana was arrested for murder, and Kamba Simango and Carol Kincheloe’s adulterous interracial affair became a hushed-up scandal. Relatively high levels of violations indicated the fundamental awkwardness of the teacher’s position, especially when combined with other more prosaic indicators such as the velocity with which teachers moved from job to job in search of slightly more pay or better working conditions, or the high rates at which teachers left the profession altogether in favor of more lucrative nonscholastic employment.

TEACHERS’ COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Teachers, frequently isolated at rural schools, involved in patronage relationships with the missionary societies that trained them and those that employed them, and under pressure of various sorts from local communities and the Native Department, were not well-distributed for unified action to improve their position. But several documented cases of collective action by frustrated teachers do emerge from the records by the late 1930s, the most notable of which was the teachers’ strike against the American Board that eventually led to the Board’s acceptance of a formal teachers’ union, the Gazaland African Teachers’ Association. This early strike hints at both the problems of teachers in Southern Rhodesia during the 1930s and why formal, collective resistance was not more common and more successful.

The American Board missionaries’ comments on the teachers’ protest at the beginning of the 1937 school year focused on their own surprise. Missionaries argued that the striking teachers must lack understanding of the mission’s economic crisis. By the late 1930s, student unrest was sufficiently common at missionary central schools that most annual reports indicated whether or not the year had avoided student agitation or strikes. And administrators frequently managed strikes in ways that did not, at least by their own reports, seriously
undermine or threaten the schools' work, or the lines of authority within the mission.

*Teachers*’ strikes, however, were not common. Individual teachers left their jobs and the profession. Disgruntled teachers might skip class preparation and spend half the school day taking roll and the remainder supervising student work in gardens or on roads. But in December of 1936, teachers’ collective activism was new. It should not have been unexpected. By the end of the 1936 school year American Board teachers had a variety of serious grievances against the mission. The mission’s financial crisis of the late 1920s had restricted the mission’s territorial expansion and limited teachers’ opportunities for personal advancement. Without new evangelical regions, fewer men could become ministers and heads of churches, work that provided prestige and autonomy without requiring the academic credentials of teachers or agricultural demonstrators. At the beginning of the 1930s, teachers’ problems became even more severe when the government, facing a budget deficit, passed an across-the-board restriction in educational funding for Africans. This restriction was passed along from the Native Development Department to the missions through what was called the “quota system.” Grants in aid to missions were reduced regardless of teachers’ training. This reduction hit a demanding mission such as the American Board more severely than the minimal systems operated by the Roman Catholics and the Dutch Reformed Church. After trying, despite grim local economic conditions, to make up the losses by imposing a new school tax on African farmers on land officially held by the Board, the American Board chose to pass the reduction in grants directly on to the teachers in the form of a salary reduction. In 1932, the Mount Silinda school circuit unilaterally cut the salaries of all teachers by 15 percent. And when the government did not immediately restore grants, this reduction deepened. By the end of 1933, teachers’ salaries had been cut by 25 percent from 1931 levels and with school closures and the reduction of the numbers of teachers per school, more teachers were trying to cope simultaneously with three or four classes, sometimes containing totals of 50 to 70 children.

Worse yet, the mission showed few signs of sympathy with the economic position of its employees. Whenever drought hit a school, leading to lower enrollments and a reduced government grant, the mission closed it without necessarily warning or reassigning the teachers. Calling for voluntary sacrifice, the mission encouraged the teachers to stay in the rural areas, and do what they could. But it did not offer salaries. A few
teachers, particularly older ones with few academic qualifications, accepted this call and remained on site. For those who returned to the mission station at Silinda or who retained their jobs the mission had another request: it called for public voluntary offerings to support the mission’s work. Some gifts totaled more than a pound—substantial offerings from people who might lose their jobs at any time, and who had just suffered a pay reduction.\textsuperscript{43}

Under these austerity conditions, where the mission was making substantial demands on teachers and communities, the mission’s problems grew. Student unrest at the central schools increased. The mission response was to dismiss pupils it regarded as troublemakers and to increasingly select incoming students on the basis of temperament, rejecting those it felt might make trouble. The mission also faced new Zionism from within the mission’s churches as church members began to resent listening to the missions and tried to choose their own ministers or reject key mission teachings on subjects such as polygyny. Important African mission leaders were expelled from the mission within this context of austerity and moral failings.\textsuperscript{44}

Dorothy Marsh, however, who left the most extensive report of the 1937 conference protest and strike, depicted the teachers’ protest as a shocking surprise, breaking with expectations that teachers would be grateful for all the efforts the missionaries had put into preparing for the summer teachers’ conference. Her description is worth quoting at length and analyzing with care:

\begin{quote}
The teachers arrived on Monday evening. . . . The blow fell the next morning. . . . A delegation of two was sent to meet John [Marsh] . . . and said they were not coming to classes until the matter of a raise in salary was taken up. From there it was just nightmare for two days. The girl teachers did not join in (due much to the efforts of Mbirí and Lucy, Jiho’s daughter). . . . Mr. Curtis and John met the group of men in session after session—in the church and outside the school in the field. I watched the whole bunch come up the center road of the station Tuesday morning talking in loud tones and gesticulating (evidently there wasn’t agreement among themselves) and then for an hour or more while they sat under the big bamboo tree in our yard. In the meantime they went right on eating our food.

The missionaries kept on explaining that there just wasn’t any money to give them more or restore the cut taken from their salaries a couple of years before and they kept right on thinking we were bluffing. . . . And so things went right on until the dramatic
moment when about twenty-five walked up and laid their gunwes [sic, passes] on the table and when Mr. Curtis quietly asked if this meant they wanted to be signed off—they answered yes. It was decided that they should come one by one to be signed off—but to this they did not agree—I suppose they sensed that “United we stand, divided we fall.” Anyway on Wednesday afternoon with things still at a deadlock at about four o clock the Teachers’ Conference was declared closed and all of those who lived near enough were told to go home at once before sundown. The others were told they could have food that evening but must clear out at once in the morning. . . . It looked as though most of our schools would close or be manned (!) by the few girls. We most of us congregated at the tennis court for mutual strength and even started a set when about 5:00 or so a delegation of two with bicycles waited upon us from the group still gathered down at the school. They capitulated and said they would go back to their schools and teach until June and see what we could do then. And what of the Conference? “The Conference is ended” was the answer sent back to them.45

Marsh’s description of the strike is interesting for several reasons. She pointed directly to the impact of unified action, while also showing insight into why it was so difficult for teachers to organize for unified action: isolated in schools throughout the region with different rules for men and women, organizing a strike was both logistically difficult and risky since some individuals might be marked as dangerous ringleaders who would then immediately lose their jobs, and possibly their ability to get work anywhere. The strike threat left the teachers divided between those who accepted personal relationships with the missionaries in the form of assurances and patronage, and those who wanted more formal protections. It is unsurprising that women, always the first fired, usually with only short teaching careers prior to marriage, did not show the militance of the men. The American Board mission’s relatively egalitarian attitude toward women may also have contributed to the women’s rejection of a dramatic strike.46 It is also noticeable that the women, who did not carry passes and were legal minors without formal ability to make contracts, could not have made the dramatic gesture the men made, of throwing their passes on the table and asking to be signed off.

Within a Rhodesian context, however, the most interesting aspect of this incident was the discussions that took place during the two days that Marsh refers to as a nightmare. Interactions between European employers or officials and Africans were rarely portrayed as dis-
discussions. Instead, there were the Native Board meetings and official visits, where the European authority announced things to the people, the people asked deferential questions, and the meeting ended if a confrontation began. Or individuals might meet with a missionary or other employer, be told of a job, and sign a contract. Or a missionary might preach to an African crowd. Under most meeting conditions, however, the Europeans were expected to show a united front to the Africans. And the Europeans would have the power to end the discussion. Marsh’s description of a discussion that went on and on, in church, and outdoors, whether people were standing, sitting, or walking, implies a fundamentally different relationship. This interaction was not a performance by Europeans for Africans, choreographed by Europeans, nor was it a carefully scripted interracial interaction. Instead, in its mobility and structural flexibility, it suggested a relationship where the Europeans acknowledged a need for the individual African men they spoke with, rather than just a need for African labor in general. Racial images were clearly important to this discussion, as Marsh indicated with her description of European missionaries playing tennis while contemplating disaster, and the capitulating delegates visiting not as pedestrians but as delegates with bicycles, indicating their prosperity and status as mobile and employed men. But the blunter forms of state power did not necessarily serve the Europeans. The teachers might not have had a legal right to strike, but they did have the right to ask to be signed off. And the passes made any individual teacher’s stand a public matter.

Marsh’s description is particularly poignant in her acknowledgment that the teachers did not believe the missionaries who told them that there was no money. It is easy to sympathize with the teachers: Marsh’s comment that the missionaries played tennis during the conflict indicated that the missionaries were not suffering subsistence-level living. Marsh understood the confrontation as not just a situation of discussion and reason, but also one of bluff and belief. Disbelief fundamentally undermined the missionaries’ position: after all, they were in the region to teach belief, and they needed credibility. Unwilling to do anything which might imply that the mission had lied about its budget crisis, the missionaries created a compromise out of talk, with little substance. Many missionaries held it as an article of faith that if they talked long enough, problems could be worked out. Successful missionaries had stamina, and frequently explained unsuccessful confrontations by accusing the missionary who lost control of lacking patience or of not explaining—and listening—sufficiently. In
this case, a compromise spun from talking and listening bought time, six months in which the mission could divide the teachers from a disgruntled collective into various individuals competing for merit awards.

Dorothy Marsh continued her description by explaining the confrontation’s immediate aftermath:

It was not until Friday that we . . . began to realize the seriousness of the whole thing . . . we were sort of numb for a while and terribly disappointed. The feeling began to come back and we decided something must be done. And so we had a not-soon-to be forgotten meeting. . . . There were those who favored dismissing the ring-leaders at once—there were some who had doubts that we could be sure of getting just the ringleaders. And finally—as we so often do—we hit a compromise. . . . A committee was appointed of three, when possible, to see every single male teacher by himself and find out his attitude—what he thought about the method of striking to get one’s end—and what that teacher intended to do in the future—where his loyalties lay, etc. The big thing was to nip in the bud right now any further strike business. . . . Those interviews have been dragging on now for almost two months—three teachers have been dismissed to date—all of the central school and all youngsters who showed a very unsatisfactory spirit—even insolent. The final decision has not been reached about the others—but Thodhlana’s son at his own request I believe is going soon. He was polite but couldn’t see the point at all even after two interviews. It has been an eyeopener to all of us. We have evidently been going too fast in the last few years—in some directions and not deep enough in the others. There was not the loyalty and spirit of sacrifice we had thought there was. We must gird up our loins and be advised. Where have we failed?47

In 1937, surprisingly little changed. The Chikore school circuit was marked by some teachers “with very low qualifications,” after resignations both at the beginning of the year and in June from some of the more highly trained teachers. And some of the teachers may well have been tacitly striking even when on the job, given some dismal efficiency reports on some highly qualified Standard VII teachers.48 The training school at Mount Silinda worked harder to restrict acceptance as teacher candidates to potential teachers with the proper temperamental and moral characteristics. Instead of training as many people as possible, Silinda was now to concentrate on making the central institution
a school where young men and women of promise will want to come, where it is a privilege to come, where the training, atmosphere, morale and traditions of the school are so excellent that out of it must come Native leaders with minds and hearts and hands equipped for a better way of living and serving among their own people.\textsuperscript{49}

Yet even as the missionaries spoke this language of reconstruction, they had to cope with the knowledge that their old ways of viewing converts and the growth of a Christian community might have been based on self-delusion. Marsh’s description, which identifies one of the hard-core resisters as “Thodhlan’a’s son,” suggested a man whose family had been associated with the mission for at least a generation, but who identified with the disgruntled teachers. The strike forced the mission to acknowledge tensions it had tried to suppress, tensions caused by the reality of divergent interests between teachers, Christian parents, students, and European missionaries.

By the late 1930s, teachers had become a coherent group. Educated at one of a small number of training institutes, moving from mission to mission in search of work that paid as well as possible, and failing to form close connections with either the missions who supervised them or the communities that sponsored their schools, they increasingly began to try to shape the educational process themselves. Within the classrooms, their actions became increasingly constrained as the administration developed new school codes, began to distribute formal curricula, and then upped the level of inspection to ensure that its new regulations were followed. So teachers, rather than fighting this, worked to gain respect as professionals and access to the administrative system of oversight. Teachers wanted a place at the tables around which the sponsors of educational change and control in Southern Rhodesia talked. During 1938, the Native Missionary Conference, speaking for the teachers, rejected the Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference’s conclusion that the time was premature to admit African teachers as full delegates to the Joint Conference of Inspectors and Missionaries. It argued that “there are many among our African teachers to-day who have a thorough understanding of the broad principles of education, and whose professional qualifications and practical teaching experience will be of vital importance to the deliberations.”\textsuperscript{50} But the Native Missionary Conference made progress. Caught between teachers, officials, and communities, missionaries were increasingly willing to allow African teachers to attend the meetings as their allies
in petitions to the government for more funds and complaints that "The Government continues to demand skilled work at unskilled rates."\textsuperscript{51}

The missionaries were slow to accept the new types of conversation with teachers and the new demands that pupils and teachers were making upon the white missionaries and the missionary society. But they did begin to acknowledge by the 1940s that the old ways of managing missions were dead. Individual teachers trained in the debating societies and student government associations of mission schools began to voice collective demands and network a community of teachers that crossed denominational lines.\textsuperscript{52} In 1942, the annual meeting of the American Board missionaries accepted and recognized the Gazaland African Teachers' Association (GATA) as a representative of mission teachers who were tied not merely to the mission, but to the larger Southern Rhodesia African Teachers' Association (SRATA).\textsuperscript{53} And by 1942, the SRATA began to negotiate with missions and government officials for teachers' collective interests.\textsuperscript{54}

**TOWARD A NATIONAL UNION**

The teachers' strike at Mount Silinda was a dramatic example of teachers' collective activism under Depression conditions, but available sources give only hints to how strikers—as opposed to their missionary employers—understood strike actions and demands. To understand professional teachers' growing frustration, the self-images that fueled it, and the skills that focused it, we must turn to life histories. Gideon Mhlanga and John Daniel Rubatika, two of the founders of the Rhodesian African Teachers' Association, have left behind explanations of their lives and actions that provide insight into how their selves and possibilities were shaped by their own experiences of schooling, how they understood teaching, and why they moved from simple positions as successful clients of mission and government sponsors, to begin active protests against segregationist and restrictive government policies. In their lives, we can see both the possibilities that teachers learned and made, and the limits that educated men in Southern Rhodesia contended with on a daily basis.

**Two Educators' Careers**

Gideon Mhlanga, the older of the two, was born sometime between 1908 and 1910, according to an undated life history. His life reflected many of the themes of this book. Mhlanga grew up with his family
near an American Board village school on a mission farm where education was compulsory. Nevertheless, Mhlanga remembered the early days of his schooling as difficult. Some parents objected to mission schooling and recruitment, beating children who became Christians. Teachers, too, "were hard and their slogan seemed to have been 'spare the rod and spoil the child.'" Without a choice, Mhlanga began school. Though Mhlanga did not become a Christian initially, he did convert under the influence of a particularly charismatic preacher, Ngangeni Dhlakama, who baptized him. As a bright, Christian youth, he continued his education by moving on to Mount Silinda central school. Like other students, he did more than study: at Mount Silinda he worked in the principal's home in the quintessentially African tasks of gardening, chopping wood, and fetching water.55 In 1922, however, when he had passed Standard IV, he hit a snag. He and his fellow students had expected to take Standard V using a specific reader, a Longman's Standard V reader, "a book we all coveted for its long words but contrary to our expectations we were given another book we looked down upon... and we would not have it."56 The mission punished the protesting students for their small-scale student strike. Mhlanga, either dismissed or discouraged, left the mission. He traveled through the country's three principal cities, Umtali, Salisbury, and Bulawayo, before opening a carpentry shop in Bulawayo with other former students from Mount Silinda. Mhlanga had learned carpentry and business skills—if not long words—during his school days. By 1924, he and a cousin had saved enough money to attend Lovedale school in South Africa, despite a lack of scholarships or any help from his parents. Mhlanga's ability to move geographically—despite a pass system—from one area of the country to another, and economically, using the school's old boy network to form a highly profitable business, demonstrated conclusively that Mhlanga had mastered key necessities for success in Southern Rhodesia.

In South Africa, though his lack of family or mission sponsorship meant that he had to spend all his nonacademic time working for school staff members, he passed Standard VI in 1925 (possibly skipping Standard V) and won a bursary for Form II. With little money, he was unable to study toward matriculation at Fort Hare University, instead being forced into teacher training. By 1930, he was a qualified teacher. After seven years in South Africa, however, he wanted to come home. He returned to Southern Rhodesia to teach at Domboshawa government school in 1931. Already, he was one of the best-educated Southern Rhodesian Africans in the country. He taught for four years at Domboshawa. While teaching, he studied for his matric
exam, the entrance qualification for university-level study. He passed it. In 1936, he went to Fort Hare to study toward a university degree. After one year, he ran out of money and returned to teach at Domboshawa. While teaching, he again studied, successfully enough to pass all five subjects for the first year of a Bachelor of Arts degree.

Mhlanga finally married in 1941, marrying the daughter of a Methodist minister at Old Umtali, whom he immediately sent off to Inanda Seminary in South Africa for further education. He also passed his second year of university studies through correspondence courses and then, during a year’s study leave in 1944, completed his degree at Fort Hare. He recognized this as a momentous achievement, noting that he was the second African in Rhodesia to earn a B.A.\textsuperscript{57} Returning to Rhodesia, he continued for decades to teach in government schools.

J.D. Rubatika, though younger than Mhlanga (Rubatika was born in 1918) and born to a Christian family, also told a story of remarkable educational successes. With his father’s support, Rubatika started school in local village schools but quickly moved on to the central school at Waddilove. Like Mount Silinda, Waddilove was among the best schools for Africans in Rhodesia, and there Rubatika passed Standard VII before his father, who supported his education, sent him to Adams College, in Natal, South Africa. At Adams, Rubatika took the Junior Certificate (ca. 10th grade) and, like Mhlanga before him, wanted to go on to matric. The Rhodesian Director of Native Education, however, wrote to the principal at Adams, objecting to Rubatika’s ambition, asserting “we do not want graduates here; he should take the T3 [Teachers’ Training] course.”\textsuperscript{58} Blocked from further study, Rubatika completed his normal course in 1940 and returned to Southern Rhodesia to staff the new, unapproved Anglican secondary school at St. Augustine’s. After two years, he moved on (probably in search of higher wages) to teach at the Domboshawa government school. But, though his qualifications made him one of the more thoroughly trained teachers in the country, Rubatika found trouble. He left Domboshawa after one year because of conflict with C.S. Davies, the principal.\textsuperscript{59} From Domboshawa, Rubatika went to a far less prestigious and probably less lucrative job at Maseese Mission, where he taught Standards V and VI, replacing a white missionary who had left for the war. His time there was difficult: an African teaching higher standards was unusual, and he complained that the mission tried to brand him as an ineffective teacher. He claimed, however, that he ultimately left Maseese because the mission was not giving the girls enough food. From Maseese, Rubatika went to teach at Hope Fountain, declaring that
he wanted as colleagues the other highly educated African men that taught there. Despite Masese’s attempts to brand him as a bad teacher, he reminisced that “no matter what class I was given my pupils came first” in exams. By 1950, Rubatika was a full-time activist, leaving his teaching job. But his message remained far from revolutionary. Instead, he asserted Africans’ loyalty to the colonial government and willingness to work within the law. He declared Africans’ need to petition the colonial government to redress the rural problems that were making life unbearable, and he called for more and better schools.

**Teachers’ Lives**

Both Mhlanga and Rubatika, however, were more than just teachers. Though proud of the respect they commanded in their classrooms, both became teachers for lack of other options for educated, ambitious Africans in segregated Southern Rhodesia. Mhlanga and Rubatika, along with others, founded the Rhodesian African Teachers’ Association (RATA), drawing on the expertise in organization and negotiation they had gained through lives of struggle. Mhlanga, member, had left school in Standard V over a student strike about curriculum, one in which he was probably one of the spokesmen. Rubatika had been a popular member of the student representative council at Adams, despite being a foreigner, and had quit teaching jobs at Domboshawa and Masese over what he saw as administration abuses of students. Both Mhlanga and Rubatika understood that a teachers’ union was potentially risky—both had experienced the loss of opportunities when they had taken stands. But both had also managed to overcome those difficulties and define themselves as sufficiently important men so that the missions and government were willing to overlook a measure of independence.

The roles that Mhlanga and Rubatika took on as important men speaking for other professionals, whom even missions and the state had to respect, were the results of decades of education, contestation, and cultural construction in the interwar years. These new roles and identities and the respectability they acknowledged were possible because schools had become complex institutions. They were not simply the tools of segregationist power and control. By the 1940s, as budding political activists, Mhlanga and Rubatika made political claims and sought negotiation using the models of power they had experienced in years of schooling. They invoked paternalism, respectability, and relationships.
Mhlanga and Rubatika had started their educations in third-class schools, learning how schools were places for experimentation with power, authority, and identities. They remembered their early teachers as powerful father figures. They learned connections to a broader world through the central mission schools that, in their organization and discipline, broke radically with the local family setting of the village schools. At Mount Silinda, Waddilove, and Adams, Mhlanga and Rubatika experienced new sorts of patronage in schools organized around notions of a British public school, with housemasters and prefects to ensure student discipline, and teachers’ councils under headmasters and principals to ensure academic standards. Under the authority of these structures, they learned to negotiate with the powerful, pursuing personal claims for respectability and rights. As students they held meetings, and coordinated protests over food, curriculum, housing, or other problems. Even rhetoric and public speaking were explicit parts of the curricula as students participated in debating clubs, and perfected their organizational and political abilities on vacation-time evangelical tours through surrounding areas.

Mhlanga, Rubatika, and others like them were the new African leaders seen by government officials and by missionaries in the late 1930s and early 1940s as the men who would make segregation—or at least segregated education—work. Yet the very experiences that made them potential leaders—the knowledge, connections, experience in school social contexts, and in school government—made them potential dissidents. Mhlanga and Rubatika were frustrated and controlled by the segregated system of racial preference even as they upheld the values that the system promoted, such as teacher professionalism. They were victims of life under segregation, but they found pride in the respect they had earned as educated individuals, family men, and exemplars of their people.

More significantly, however, Mhlanga and Rubatika, and others like them, were successful survivors. Rarely meeting the power of the segregated state directly, they redirected it by changing the conditions and nature of the people over which it ruled. This was not entirely a form of resistance, as they taught students to be better subjects. But in the process, they challenged white notions that white power was synonymous with progress and civilization, developed an educated African language of respectability and possibilities, and constructed a class basis for a new form of African leadership.

The teachers’ association that Mhlanga, Rubatika, and others formed was not a particularly revolutionary organization. It was instead guided
by skilled negotiators and manipulators with a repertoire of struggle that emphasized not aggressive political confrontation, but professional negotiation, petitions for patronage, and assertions of common interest between all parties interested in education and schooling in Southern Rhodesia. Describing RATA’s origins, Mhlanga emphasized that its founding had been hampered by both “lust of power” of leaders of smaller regional teachers’ associations, and missionary fears that it provided “a threat to their age-long control over teachers.” Yet despite acknowledging opposition, Mhlanga saw the union itself not as battling for recognition, but as persuading everyone of “the wisdom and the necessity for an association.” After 25 years, he cited five very basic victories—payment of teachers by the state, paid vacation and sick leave, pensions, teachers’ representation on the advisory board, and African headships and positions as inspectors. Mhlanga, an exemplar of what was possible within the constraints of segregation, seemed, however, to acknowledge by 1969 that notwithstanding his status as “Life President” of RATA, his emphasis on professionalism was inadequate and increasingly irrelevant. He complained about a deterioration in teachers’ behavior and standards. More bluntly yet, he objected to the children of the 1960s, asserting “We have to do something or else the backbone of the nation deteriorates. It is therefore the duty of every man to curb and suppress forms of bad behavior amongst our children.”

TEACHERS AND AMBIGUITIES

As teachers and others within Southern Rhodesia worked out what it meant to be a teacher, they both challenged and reinforced the region’s dominant ideology of segregation. Teachers, with their increasing organization and insistence on a level of professional respect, challenged clear hierarchical division of the world into white power and black obedience. They occupied a gray, intermediate status earned through qualifications, not coloring. Teachers’ successful professional organizations, therefore, which worked for higher wages, better conditions, more African headmasters, and a less capricious administrative structure, used the rhetoric of qualifications and elitism against any assumption of exclusively white power.

Yet in accepting the rhetoric of professionalism and qualifications, teachers rejected potential alliances with less-educated segments within African communities, whether those were traditional leaders or religious enthusiasts. And in their acceptance of government authority, they opened
themselves to accusations that they were sellouts and betrayers of community hopes and needs.

Teachers’ ambiguous status made them difficult to control or categorize. But they were not neutral. In the small-scale struggles concerning what a teacher was supposed to be, the terms of social possibilities in Southern Rhodesia were redefined by ambitious senior men, rebellious students, status-conscious teachers, frustrated missionaries, and confused government officials.

NOTES


4. Ibid., 55.
5. The Methodists acknowledged this linkage in their synod resolution of 1921, which asserted that each native minister should be supplied with a prescribed list of home furnishings, at church expense. “Minutes of the Synod of the Methodist Church, Rhodesia District, 1921,” Methodist House, Harare, Zimbabwe. Not until 1929, however, were schools actually supplied with tables and chairs for teachers. Quarterly Meeting Minutes, 28-9-29, in scrapbook of “Epworth Circuit Quarterly Meeting,” Methodist House. The strength of missions’ adherence to these physical signs of prestige can be seen in the sanctions passed against a preacher who had appeared in a pulpit without a coat in 1937, in the midst of the summer. QM 20-3-37, Epworth Circuit Minutes, Methodist House. This concern with the teacher’s material objects also emerged in Ndabaningi Sitoile, The Polygamist (New York: Third Press, 1972), in which a son returned from Tegwani and convinced his father to spend savings of £800 on goods, ranging from clothes for the family to a car.

6. See for the contrasting description of the parents, Samkange, Mourned One, 44–45. Samkange’s fictional Mr. Kamuriwa may have been modeled on his own father, Reverend T.D. Samkange, but also provided an archetypal image of the dignified African teacher. See the discussion in Terence Ranger, “Are We Not Also Men?”: The Samkange Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1920–64 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995).

8. Chief Native Commissioner of Southern Rhodesia’s Annual Report for 1929 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1930), 7. Schools undermined parental and marital
authority insofar as schoolgirls could reject arranged marriages. The Director of Native Development objected, in writing, to this characterization of African schools, only to receive a collection of reports from around the country on problems in mission schools, problems ranging from schoolgirl pregnancy through allegations that schools promoted prostitution. See NAZ S1561/64.


10. DND Annual Report for 1930 (statistics delayed one year), 55. This was 902 teachers out of a total of 2,195 African teachers in Southern Rhodesia. Standard II would be approximately equivalent to U.S. 3d grade.

11. The Director of Native Development defended St. Faith’s remedial teacher education program against critics who saw it as trying to bring teachers up to Standard III or to kill them in the process. “Report of the Director of Native Development for 1930,” 17–18.


14. This could be difficult, and sometimes schools closed because the mission and teachers were unable to cope as “The rules, regulations and red tape are so drastic.” Olive Lloyd to Family and Friends [From St. Faith’s Rusape], 24-5-33, NAZ ANG 16-11-1.

15. Teachers’ voices on this subject are absent from government records. But for suggestions of grassroots controversies, see Minutes of the Quarterly Meeting of Bulawayo Native Church, 4-4-25, or the Minutes of the Quarterly Meeting of Wedza Church, 15-6-37, Methodist House, Harare. The profusion of short courses by the Dutch Reformed Church, the Anglicans, and the American Methodists also testified to the problems of what to do with older teachers who were unwilling to uproot themselves and study for years at the central schools. “Rhodesia Methodist Conference,” 11th Session, 14–21 June 1927, Old Mutare Archives.


17. Missions were intolerant of moral failings but could be more flexible than the government regarding political independence, or teachers who were insufficiently deferential. The conservative Dutch Reformed Church, for example, stood behind Lysias Mukahleyi, a Jeannes teacher accused by his Superintendent of Natives of arrogance and interference. See chapter 4.

18. G.M. Mhlanga to Inspector of Native Schools, 4-3-29, NAZ S2307/2.

20. Mhlanga to Inspector, 11-3-29, 22-3-29, and 20-5-29, NAZ S2307/2.
23. Thus, for Walter Chipwaya, his organ, table, bookshelf, and chairs were more relevant in declaring his status than his church membership (Walter Chipwaya to CNC, 20-5-30, NAZ S138/41/1926–31). And Ndambi Hliziy, Mhlanga's successor at Chibi, also specifically emphasized that on DRC wages he would be unable to buy the goods he wanted (Ndambi Hliziy to Mather, 23-6-29, NAZ S2307/2). This concern with household goods, rather than with clothes or consumption goods (e.g., soap), may seem unusual in unmarried men. But the emphasis on the household appears to be closely associated with identity as a Christian progressive, as opposed to a flashy egotist. It is unsurprising that he chose to emphasize his respectable wants and needs to the inspector, rather than dwelling on clothes and ornaments associated with impressing women and girls. For a discussion of how mission students saw their female audience, consider comments by Dumiseni Hliziy: "If there were no girls in this school I would not comb my hair nor press my clothes. There are two lorries a week bringing in and taking out post from Silinda. If there were no girls at all here the boys would send a letter by every lorry to their girls wherever they were. They would use up much postage." Reported in Louise Torrence to "Mother," 22-4-31, ABC 15.6, vol. 3, item 185.
24. See Chapter 1.
25. George Mhlanga to Inspector, 22-3-29.
27. Mhlanga, for example, reported a letter from Henry Makuyana describing conditions at another school. Mhlanga to Inspector, 22-3-29. His successor at Chibi, Ndambi Hliziy, also had apparently heard details of the position before he arrived. Ndambi Hliziy to Mather, 23-6-29, NAZ S2307/2. Earlier letters in mission files also give evidence of a correspondence network, though few actual examples of this correspondence survive. For example, Jonas Hlatywayo to Gilson, 21-3-1901, ABC 15.4, vol. 25, item 221. Furthermore, even parts of Mhlanga's courtship of Mary Nkomo were evidently carried on by mail. See Larkins to Friends, 12-1-32, ABC 15.6, vol. 3, item 335. For any literate African who had failed to learn to use the postal services by the early 1930s, the first issue of the Native Mirror (vol. 1, 1-1-31), a periodical distributed free to all teachers for use in schools, provided detailed information on how to post letters.
28. See chapter 1, and Benjamin Davis and Wolfgang Doepcke, "Survival and Accumulation . . .," for more thorough discussions of the DRC reputation.
29. Stanlake to MMS, 20-1-21, MMS 827/4. For more examples: Alvord accusing Mather, Alvord to ABC, 20-2-22, ABC 15.4, vol. 36, item 218; discussion of
Mather’s “arbitrary attitude toward the natives,” Sec’ty (Meacham) to Mather, 8-1-23, ABC 15.4 vol. 36, item 38; and Rev. and Mrs. King, rejected from the mission for their coercive ways of managing African workers, Minutes, 1-1-24, ABC 15.4, vol. 35, item 28.


31. See Secretary of Native Education to Secretary for Native Affairs, 25-5-39, and Lieut. Staff Officer to Commissioner of Police to CNC, 14-12-39, NAZ S1542/S2 1936–1939. For Tshuma’s career, from Inyati striker to Sofasonke activist, see Terence Ranger, *Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 147–76.

32. G.M. Mhlanga to NC Insiza (Woods), 2-3-32, and George Mhlanga to Native Agriculturist (Alvord), 2-3-32, NAZ S1561/58.

33. See the next chapter.

34. For example, NC Charter to CNC, 21-3-35, NAZ S1542/S2; Chapter 4.

35. See, for example, the case of Chigwada Tsiwa, a teacher/pupil at Howard. NC at Amandas to CNC, 9-8-34, and Major Furman to Major Wane, 8-8-34, NAZ S1542/S2.

36. For example, Tapesana, discussed by NC Fort Victoria to CNC, 7-8-34, NAZ 1542/S2.

37. See, for example, the case of Gilbert Ringai, which went to the NC’s court. NC Umtali to CNC, 21-3-34, NAZ S1542/S2.

38. Moyana case noted in “Gazaland Gazette,” ABC 15.6, vol. 5, letters 1935–7, item 193. The Kincheloe/Simango case summarized in Orner to Board, 4-4-33, ABC 15.6, vol. 4, letters 1933–4, item 121.

39. One extreme case of this that may have been a precursor to unified action was the high turnover of instructors at Domboshawa Institute in 1927. Domboshawa teachers probably received higher pay than African teachers in any other institution in the region, yet incidents of reported impertinence, and protests over the lack of pay increases, led to the dismissal or resignation of Cyril Gona, S. Zidlele, Mrs. Zidlele, Edward Masinga, Wilson Ntuli, Basil Nyabanga, and Caiaphus Mdinwane. This was a dramatic level of departure, especially when the most senior member of the African staff, Titus Hlazo, also left the following year (temporarily) to be replaced by his wife, Rachel Hlazo. Edward Masinga rejected a salary of £5 per month. S. Zidlele was a stockman who left despite an offer of £7 per month. Mrs. Zidlele’s salary was £5 per month. NAZ S170/1187–1188.

40. Ministers tended to be men of good character who took a Bible and ordination class. After ordination, they then could accept calls from churches. Teachers who had Standard IV qualifications in 1929, however, would have watched their status go from one of respect due to some of the teachers being the most highly educated in the region, to that of being understood as bringing up the rear of educational qualifications as Standard VII graduates emerged from the schools, students returned from South Africa with matric exams, and the colony planned an African secondary school. These men might well have a sense of being passed
over for their juniors. Meanwhile, entry qualifications to the Jeanes teacher and agricultural demonstration programs rose precipitously during the 1930s, and each of these programs represented several years’ worth of post–Standard VI work.


42. Minutes 6-6-33, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 277.

43. Orner to Board, 22-3-32, ABC 15.6, vol. 3, item 376.

44. For a discussion of examples, see chapter 6.

45. Dorothy Marsh to Friends, 20-3-37, ABC 15.6, vol. 5, letters 1935–7, item 309.

46. The American Board paid women teachers nearly as much as men, and employed married women. European women held prominent positions of authority, even if married.

47. Dorothy Marsh to Friends, 20-3-37, ABC 15.6, vol. 5, letters 1935–7, item 309.


51. SRMC resolution, quoted in Secretary for Native Affairs to Secretary for Prime Minister, 5-8-38, NAZ S1542/S2 1936–1939.

52. See chapter 1.


55. See early discussions of African education, which revolve around the question of how education relates to “hewers of wood and drawers of water.” Summers, \textit{From Civilization to Segregation . . .} (1994).

56. This, and previous material on Mhlanga, is from G.D. Mhlanga, Autobiography, Folder “Persons,” #252, Old Mutare Archives.

57. The first, he said, was C. Hlabangana. Mhlanga may have been mistaken if American and other degrees are taken into account. Kamba Simango (possibly considered Mozambiquan rather than Rhodesian) earned degrees in the United States.

58. This, and other material for Rubatika’s life history, is from an oral history of John Daniel Rubatika, interviewed by Dawson Mujeri, 3-7-79, NAZ AOH/57.

59. He retrospectively labeled this conflict as one over racial discrimination.

60. Ibid.

61. Rubatika’s (referred to as P. Rubatika, a teacher at Hope Fountain School) speech reported in N. Bhebe, \textit{B. Burombo}, 80–81.

62. Mhlanga remembered that his students called him father, and he never had any strikes; Rubatika, that his students learned more from him than from any other teacher and performed well on exams. Both found teaching prowess a source of pride.
63. Oral history interviews hint that first-class and government schools' closed environments could also make them places where violent hazing could shape student life. See (for a suggestive denial) M.S. Chibvongodze, interviewed by D. Munjeri. 14-7-78, NAZ AOH. Chibvongodze, apparently in response to a direct question, asserted that he did not see initiation at Domboshawa that involved heavy beating and that, since he had worked at Domboshawa before attending school there, he had not been beaten himself.

64. Gideon D. Mhlanga, “25th Anniversary Address to RATA.”

65. Ibid.
GIVING ORDERS: CONTROVERSIES OVER AFRICANS’ AUTHORITY IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, 1928–1934

In Southern Rhodesia during the 1920s and 1930s, government officials, missionaries, and educated Africans saw African communities in crisis. Individualism threatened communal identities. Customs and values were mutating under economic, social, and political pressure from an increasingly segregationist settler-dominated state. In this context, policymakers held two potentially contradictory values: order and progressive change. And they saw schools and their surrounding communities as the most important potential sources of ordered change. The Jeanes program, imported from the United States in the wake of the Phelps-Stokes Commission, was the single most prominent effort to reconcile order and change, communal values and ambitious individualism.

From 1928 to 1935, through the depth of Southern Rhodesia’s Depression years, Harold Jowitt was Director of Native Development. During these years, debates over the Jeanes teacher program, and specifically over the careers of Matthew Magorimbo and Lysias Mukahleyi, exposed both the needs that drew the administration and missions toward community-based development, and the questions of power, authority, and resources that blocked community development, and more specifically the Jeanes teacher program, from achieving its stated aims.
NATIVE DEVELOPMENT POLITICS

In 1928, Harold Jowitt inherited a troubled program. Many within the administration had some concept of native development, but the bureaucratic structure of development programs was confusing, chaotic, and conflict-provoking. An ambitious and articulate specialist in African education and development, Jowitt’s first task as director was to expand the scope of his department. He rewrote the Native Education Act of 1928 into a far more sweeping Native Development Act of 1929 and hired a staff of government native-school inspectors. Native development, he argued, was based on education but extended far beyond the classroom. Jowitt’s Native Development Act defined the department’s scope as “the education of Natives and any other work primarily designed to further the agricultural, industrial, physical or social advancement of Natives.”

Jowitt’s broad definition of native development, and his ambitious attempts to pursue it, outstripped his new department’s limited funding. By the end of his first year, he was campaigning for more resources. The department’s inspectors could not visit all schools. The missions could not intensify their efforts without higher government grants. And teachers needed increased and standardized salaries if missions were to promote teacher effectiveness and attract and retain teachers with higher qualifications. Jowitt quickly realized, however, like others before him, that the administration was not willing to provide more money for African education and development. He therefore attempted to pair economy with expansion by recruiting allies for his visions from outside the administration and settler elite: he attempted to produce regulations that would transform missionaries and the mission school system into a more effective tool of government; he sought to upgrade the education of African teachers to make classrooms more effective, disciplined, and regulated; and he reached out to the international educational development community to seek external models and sponsors for development on the cheap.

The Jeanes teacher program, one of the most focused attempts at community development, brought these three sources of extragovernmental support together. It was modeled on a program that trained visiting teachers for African American schools in the segregated American South. Southern Rhodesian candidates were educated Christians, ideally with some teaching experience, nominated by their missions, and admitted to training. Jeanes programs sought to give African men and women advanced training in the basic skills of community development: hygiene, school improvement, industrial skills, medical
aid, and domesticity. After a course at Domboshawa school and a community-based internship, the men would go back to the missions that sponsored them. Working under a missionary supervisor, each man would have responsibility for a circle of rural schools. He was required to visit the schools, help teachers improve their techniques, sponsor school garden plots, and direct the students in manual and industrial work. But he was to do more, reaching out from school to community: helping with cleanups, overseeing latrine digs, and providing suggestions for cooperative organizations ranging from the schools’ parent committees through communal work parties. The male Jeanes teacher would work with denominational schools and report to a mission supervisor, but he would be paid by the Native Development Department at a substantially higher level than a regular mission-employed teacher.4 Jeanes women, nominated by mission superiors and then trained at Hope Fountain, filled a slightly different role. Their curriculum skipped training in teacher supervision, and they were not tied to specific schools. Instead, they were encouraged to live with their families, transform their homes into models of domesticity, and reach out from that home base through demonstrations of domestic hygiene, cookery, and sewing, and through providing health services ranging from dispensing to wound-dressing to midwifery. Jeanes women were also supervised by missionaries but paid by the Native Development Department.5

Ideally, the Jeanes program was supposed to be catalytic and participatory as the teachers used schools and reformed and cleaned up homes to spark off a revolution of progressive development by African observers who saw, believed, and copied the teachers’ initiatives. Impressed by this vision, missions sent some of their most promising young men and women, the Carnegie Corporation provided external aid money, and the Native Development Department developed the new training programs at Domboshawa and Hope Fountain.

The program provoked controversies within the administration, however. Even before Jowitt’s Jeanes program, the Native Department had fought against the Native Development Department for control over the training and stationing of all Africans involved in developmental work, such as agricultural demonstrators. Under Native Department pressure, as the first agricultural demonstrators at Domboshawa completed what they had expected would be a two-year training program, their supervisor, E.D. Alvord, declared them woefully unprepared for the tasks ahead of them and proposed a third year of apprenticeship near the school with close oversight.6 Following Native Department ideas despite his own background at the American Board mission,
Alvord continued the pattern of condemning mission training, standards, and achievements with scathing commentary suggesting that mission schooling was not up to standards either academically or agriculturally. The discussions and disagreements over the agricultural demonstration program were resolved, uneasily, by a bureaucratic rearrangement that accepted the Native Department’s hegemony: Alvord and all his demonstrators were placed in the Native Department, under the command of the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC), and, in various localities, under the relevant Native Commissioner. Alvord followed an aggressive program of oversight, holding before- and after-harvest meetings with each demonstrator and monitoring plowing, planting, and land management.

The training program for Jeanes teachers began in 1929 in this context of the controversy over the training of and control over African agents. Even more than the agricultural demonstration program, Jowitt tailored the Jeanes program to his own notions of how the government, missions, and progressive Africans could work together for development. Jowitt was blunt in pointing out that he had written the grant proposal that funded the program and that the missions had sent on their best people with the assurance that these people would be returned to them.

Some early, glowing reports provide glimpses of the types of community improvement the program was designed to produce. John Marsh, the supervisor of the American Board’s Chikore mission circuit reported that “this venture is one of the most significant single steps in the progress of Native education in Rhodesia.” Other supervisors agreed, providing specific examples to back this claim. Titus Mngadi, a London Missionary Society (LMS) Jeanes teacher working in the Hope Fountain district, had organized materials and supervised the construction of a dispensary to be run by the local Jeanes woman. Jeanes teacher Zhakata, working in the Selukwe Reserve, ran monthly teachers’ meetings with demonstration lessons and promoted the establishment of school gardens carefully fertilized by manure. Mac Sitole pushed teachers to institute “hand work” lessons in the schools and managed a circuit of schools without European oversight while his missionary supervisor went on furlough for three months. Jeanes teacher Ndebele worked to improve roads and establish vegetable gardens for each school. He also met with parents and headmen and, like his colleagues, gave demonstration lessons to teachers, providing academic and pedagogical suggestions of how to understand and teach the newly revised curriculum. For their missionary supervisors,
Jeanes teachers’ most impressive achievements were the large community meetings they called, at which they lectured on “the aims and objects of the school and the necessity of the children having proper equipment and being clean always.”

Mission supervisors were impressed by Jeanes teachers’ ability to involve the larger community with the school and the school with the larger community. Jeanes teachers sponsored parental involvement through parent committees and called for parents to show their support by providing manure for school gardens, helping with plowing or road building, and buying school materials to equip their children properly. Jeanes teachers also called for students to bring the school values to the broader community by doing cleaning raids, where a group of students would go out and clean up a “kraal,” sweeping away clutter, possibly building a latrine, and sometimes planting trees, flowers, or vegetables.

Even the most muted supervisors’ reports were positive, indicating the missionaries’ hope that the Jeanes teachers would be effective in their awkward position as trained generalists working to bridge the gap between the more elderly and reactionary elements in African communities and the mission and NDD agendas of progress. Missionaries sometimes decried the “indifference of parents” or accepted a frustrated Jeanes teacher’s conclusion that “his people are not going to change customs over night. He realizes that he is fighting the inertia prevalent among the native people—an unwillingness to do that which requires added effort, even though they are told that benefits may be derived.”

Missionaries, though, generally praised Jeanes teachers’ energy, even when that energy produced such serious antagonisms that the teacher had to be transferred to another region. The missions expected a Jeanes teacher, after a broad training, to examine the specific area he found himself in, to work out his own goals, and to do whatever was necessary to accomplish them. By the 1930s, some missionaries were disgusted with the slow pace of change in African communities. Missionaries were limited in numbers and racially conspicuous. They thus found themselves at least on occasion constrained by government involvement when they tried to push through measures ranging from compulsory attendance through unpaid community labor. Beating parents to force pupils to attend school was technically illegal. Forcing schoolchildren and their families to contribute unpaid labor to road building and gardening could not be insisted upon if the Native Department intervened. Jeanes teachers in pursuit of their goals, however, might be able to get away with such coercive acts without directly implicating missionaries.
And missionaries had compelling financial reasons for welcoming the Jeanes teachers and portraying them as successes. The program offered missions the opportunity of having the government pay salaries to teachers under mission patronage who would otherwise probably have left the mission in pursuit of wages commensurate with their qualifications. The missions were, by the 1930s, deeply concerned with the problem of attrition. Teachers’ salaries, never high, actually dropped as the Jeanes teacher program grew. Missionaries expressed their desire to retain the best and brightest of their pupils, but they also acknowledged that these pupils could earn more as clerks, dip supervisors, foremen, or even independent builders. Sponsoring prize pupils into the program, however, offered the prospect of the administration paying for the missions to retain their top talent, the men and women missionaries expected to become leaders. 18

The program also offered the vision of another monetary benefit: with Jeanes teachers working to upgrade the outschools, the mission might be able to expand further with less investment of increasingly scarce mission funds. Mission operations were expensive primarily because of the high cost of European skilled labor. A white male missionary supervising a school circuit (as required by the government in return for capitation and supervision grants) could earn a salary of hundreds of pounds a year. And in addition to salary, he would expect a substantial house, a garden, plentiful domestic help, education allowances for his children, a pension plan, health insurance, paid transport, and a salaried furlough (sometimes a year long, going as far away as the United States). Missions might be able to economize by substituting Africans for Europeans as school supervisors and development workers. And some missionaries even admitted that Africans, fluent in the local language, and understanding local situations, might actually be more effective than European community workers.

This vision of Jeanes teachers as Christian, African leaders—effective African leaders—expanding the influence of civilization and Christianity from the school to the community as a whole, was too promising for missionaries to drop, even in the face of practical difficulties. Missionaries from Southern Rhodesia did diverge from other regions’ delegates to a regional Jeanes teacher conference and argue the need for supervision or an emphasis on practical rather than academic training for Jeanes teachers. But they encouraged as many as possible of the local men and women working as Jeanes teachers to attend, and give papers in English describing their work. Such teachers provided powerful images of Africans as experts, authorities, and
professionals. And supervisors accepted the implications of this model of African leadership. 19

Despite missionary and Native Development Department hopes, however, the Jeanes teacher program ran into difficulties. The program produced community workers who arrived in areas already affected, sometimes traumatically, by the changes of the previous 30 to 40 years of European interventions. Experience with other government workers and mission activities produced some acute skepticism and resentment in the communities the Jeanes teachers were supposed to serve. Communities suspected that the program served not just African communities, but European power as well. Both European officials and indigenous chiefs and messengers explicitly linked the Jeanes teacher program, like the agricultural demonstration initiatives, with land apportionment and the forced resettlement of large numbers of Africans onto distant, dry, overcrowded lands. Development programs allowed government officials to claim that they continued to take responsibility for the prosperity and progress of the African population even as they passed increasingly restrictive legislation on land, marketing, and cattle. 20 More immediately, however, those who lived in the reserves observed a whole series of levies, ranging from dog taxes through dip fees, school taxes, and proposed taxes on men who were not employed outside the reserves. In theory, these monies were all earmarked for development. 21 Those who paid, however, saw little immediate result, and were unable to control what forms of development the money went to. 22 Senior men may also have resented being lectured at by young teachers, and by Jeanes teachers and demonstrators. Worse yet, some senior men clearly viewed Jeanes teachers and demonstrators as government agents, sent to sniff out the best land and make new expropriations possible. Paramount Nema of the Selukwe Reserve, for example, argued that the government was only trying to take land and that people needed more land rather than development lessons. 23 Jeanes teachers were also perceived as new, higher level, mission servants. In areas with substantial tensions between senior men and mission youth, such as Gutu, this led directly into confrontations that damaged the teachers’ credibility with elders and with the Native Department officials. 24

Jeanes teachers, therefore, could be troubling for financially stressed communities: they represented outside influences in the form of government and mission standards and rules, but they made demands on the local population in terms of labor, loyalty, and money. Rather than bringing money and resources into rural areas, Jeanes teachers called for self-
help. They recruited children and parents to labor on schools, roads, gardens, and community layout. They created new political organizations in the schools' parent committees, which divided communities between those who sent children to school and those who did not. And they called for the use of new types of consumer goods that had to be paid for with money, ranging from the soap essential to their message of cleanliness to the slates and books required by schoolchildren, to the cloth and equipment that Jeanes women called for in lessons on sewing, knitting, and cooking.

Conflicts over Jeanes teachers made their way into archival sources when they involved more than the immediate community. Government-appointed headmen and "chiefs" could complain to their Native Department officials, and these officials responded. During 1934, two Jeanes teachers, Matthew Magorimbo and Lysias Mukahleyi, became sufficiently controversial that the entire program design had to be revised.

MATTHEW MAGORIMBO

Matthew Magorimbo was a Salvation Army Jeanes teacher, assigned to the Chiweshe Reserve in the Mazoe District under the supervision of the Salvation Army's Major Stoyle. The Salvation Army (SA) was one of the most aggressively evangelical missions in Southern Rhodesia. In 1929, it employed 120 teachers, only 28 percent of whom had passed Standard IV (the government's proposed minimum standard for teachers) or higher. This did gradually improve, so that just over half of the teachers it employed in 1931 had at least Standard IV. But at that point the educational improvements stalled, despite mission efforts to increase recruitment and retention of higher standard teachers. Improvements in teachers' qualifications produced tensions in the school communities. According to the Native Commissioner of Mazoe (NC Mazoe) in 1932:

During the recent past, particularly the last two years, the type of kraal school teacher has . . . altered for the worse from the older responsible type of native with moral force and great personality to whom the heathen Natives could and did look up to with respect. In his stead appears a very young man who, although better educated, has obviously but little experience. He certainly commands but little respect from the elders but perhaps exerts some influence on the younger people, most particularly the girls. At any rate it can safely be said that his manners and actions are not conducive to that good
feeling which appears to me so necessary to a thorough understanding between the Missionary and the older and more influential natives. Whilst admitting that the present system of examination is a necessary one, I would submit that educational qualification is not the main criterion and that the older fashioned grey headed native teacher was in real Christianity and in the uplift of the Native races more successful than his more modern and more scholastically educated brother. 27

Faced with these tensions between senior men and younger, educated, Christian teachers, the Salvation Army backed its converts against the elders and government, increasingly acting in ways the Native Commissioner perceived as adversarial rather than working toward order and cooperative development.

Under the pressures of the Depression and without increased government support for schools, the Salvation Army began to move away from the standard local school-centered mission toward a more international evangelical model. Thus it applied to open schools that would provide only religious training, not even attempting the basic school code. 28 The Army worked to stake out territory, even in the face of community opposition, to block the expansion of rival missions such as the Wesleyan Methodists. 29 And it held revivals and night meetings to generate enthusiasm and converts, producing more than its share of parental complaints. 30

Even more than some of the more conventional missions, the Salvation Army embraced the idea of the Jeanes teachers as a way for Africans to accept some of the burden of mission leadership, sparing white missionaries from school administration and teaching. Missionaries also saw these programs as ways of promoting development based on community, rather than mission, resources. Reflecting Salvation Army concerns about territory, rather than school content and quality, Matthew Magorimbo began his Jeanes work not just with school lessons, but with public works projects. 31 In 1933, he coordinated the construction of roads to schools in his area. In 1934, he called up work parties to “terrace” (reinforce) the new roads to prevent them from washing away in the rains. 32 He also worked to establish school gardens for each of the schools under his supervision. In the Chiweshe Reserve, an area that was becoming increasingly densely settled, he marked out school plots ranging from 4 acres for Kanokamwe school to 8.1 acres for Gunguwe school. These school plots, most of which were nearly 5 acres, defied government regulations that a school could occupy no more than a 2-acre plot with an
additional 5 acres for the teacher. Magorimbo's designation of school
plots was in addition to the private gardens cultivated by teachers and
their wives.\textsuperscript{33} The school gardens were probably plowed by parents
and cultivated by student labor, with the proceeds going to the mis-

sion.\textsuperscript{34} Magorimbo also reported constructing a new school building
of Kimberly brick, an improvement over the wattle and daub of the
earlier structure, and a building that provided a model for community
improvement by encouraging the construction of Kimberly brick
houses for several important men.\textsuperscript{35} According to a highly critical
Native Commissioner, Magorimbo was pushing for people to change
"their entire way of life."\textsuperscript{36}

The NC Mazoe was never really in favor of the Jeanes teacher experi-

ment, as he worried about alien natives, new ideas, and how to maintain
control. When Magorimbo first came into the area, the NC complained
that he did not understand the program and had not been properly noti-
fied as it developed. As for Magorimbo himself,

I am entirely in the dark as to whether he is to be under my control or
merely a free lance wandering at will and possibly teaching at will any
subject his fancy dictates. . . . it is more than likely that the teacher
would have been arrested by my Native Messengers for removing to
this District from Charter without my permission, for I have given them
strict instructions to arrest all Natives of other Districts who are resi-
dent in this district without my permission.\textsuperscript{37}

Magorimbo's presence and authority violated the NC's ideas and meth-

ods of native administration. He went on to imply that Magorimbo was
truly dangerous:

I feel it hardly fair that a Native Commissioner should be held re-
sponsible for the behavior of the Natives of his district when individu-
als such as these are allowed to wander through Reserves under, as far
as I am at the moment aware, no control . . . certainly not under the
control of the official responsible for the welfare and good behavior of
the Native population.\textsuperscript{38}

By 1934, Magorimbo's initiatives had led the Jeanes teacher into con-
flict with senior local men and with the Native Department, and pro-
duced a clash between the Native Department (which backed the senior
men) and Native Development Department (which sided with Magorimbo
and the mission). Two local men, Gweshe and Chirwanemuka, swore out
affidavits that Magorimbo had not, indeed, constructed the Kimberly brick buildings he claimed to have built. The new school, Gweshe claimed, was built by Thomas, a local builder. Magorimbo’s only involvement was coming and telling Thomas to build it. In February 1934, the tension became acute when, responding to local complaints about the amount of land the schools were fencing, the NC Mazoe wrote a message calling Magorimbo into his office for discussions. Magorimbo did not show up on the appointed day, nor did the NC receive any excuse. Magorimbo’s failure to respond to this summons provided the NC with a legal rationale for prosecution, and the Chief Native Commissioner with a test case on the issue of who had what authority in the reserves.

Both Magorimbo and his mission sponsors viewed Magorimbo’s position in the Chiweshe Reserve as one of authority, not obedience. And while he was nominally under the control of Major Stoyle, his local supervisor, and the Salvation Army’s territorial commander, Magorimbo had a substantial measure of independence to design his own projects, decide what to do on a day-to-day basis, and coordinate other Africans in projects involving semiforced labor. When peremptorily summoned to attend on the NC, Magorimbo waited to consult Major Stoyle, who called in his own superior. The superior wrote a sharp letter to the CNC, rebuking the local Native Commissioner for his interference in educational activities. And when the Native Commissioner began to order teachers to take down fencing around school gardens that had exceeded the two-acre limit, at least one teacher responded that he would have to talk to Magorimbo first. The NC Mazoe, who felt that Magorimbo’s powers were diametrically opposed to the order necessary for proper administration, was appalled, as were his superiors in the Native Department and other officials.

The correspondence regarding this dispute went up the administrative hierarchy all the way to the premier, who held the portfolio for Native Affairs. The most serious issue, the CNC emphasized, was that of control, and “as far as the Natives are concerned, Major Stoyle and his Jeanes Teacher have publicly flouted the authority of the Native Commissioner.” The CNC attempted to quash Magorimbo’s missionary defenders by emphasizing to Major Stoyle that “I wish it to be clearly understood that we cannot tolerate direct interference with the orders of a Native Commissioner, which is bound to cause confusion in the Native mind.”

For the Native Department, the problem was not Magorimbo’s actual relationship with the local community or the specific programs he put in place. Instead, Magorimbo was a problem because of his
independence, and his independent delivery of orders to local people. Understanding this, the Native Department officials did not block Magorimbo's initiatives or prosecute him as an individual; they sought a settlement that would address the pertinent issue of face. Stoyle and Magorimbo attended the NC in the NC's office and apologized, and then the NC “insisted on informing Magorimbo in his, Major Stoyle's presence, that he must in every instance obey my instructions in future and that unless he did so he would be prosecuted, this no matter what instructions he had received from other sources.”

LYSIAS MUKAHLEYI

Lysias Mukahleyi's experiences provided another test case for the Jeanes teacher initiative. Mukahleyi was a Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) Jeanes teacher who trained in the same cohort as Matthew Magorimbo. He proved even more controversial than Magorimbo. Magorimbo had gotten into trouble by following the mission line and working to implement his training. Mukahleyi apparently perceived his goals of community development in more political terms. Mukahleyi was one of the best-educated Africans affiliated with the Dutch Reformed Mission in Southern Rhodesia, a mission notorious in the region for its deplorable schools. Early inspectors wrote scathing descriptions of schools where the 53 out of 97 enrolled students who actually attended a rural school shared among them one teacher and six slates, where a school of 66 pupils was open for a year without a schoolroom, or where a group of 48 children spent three months staring at Chart I, to the point where they could recite it by heart, but not read it. In 1929, the DRC employed 425 African teachers, making it one of the most important missions in Southern Rhodesia in terms of numbers. But fewer than 10 percent of those teachers had passed Standard IV or higher. The mission expanded, despite its poor advanced education, through its careful use of structure. The DRC was probably the first mission to introduce printed books of curricula, called “schemes of work,” for a three-year course prior to Standard I. These schemes were rigid, and DRC education notoriously inflexible. But with the schemes, teachers far below the government's Standard IV requirement could nevertheless expand and operate schools that at least brought children up to the level of education required for baptism. Under government pressure, the DRC also provided vacation courses designed to bring substandard teachers up to a level referred to as the “vernacular certificate”—professional preparation in teaching with academic work approximately equivalent to Standard IV, but
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without the training in English. Nor was the mission’s disciplinary structure entirely academic. DRC missions employed attendance officers who went out around the schools to enforce school attendance, which was recorded carefully in the school registers submitted for the government’s capitation grants in aid. DRC missionaries also tried to control their people’s lives in ways that could be highly intrusive as they leveled fines for “moral offenses,” rearranged marriages, or called for fees, fines, and tuition and book money in ways that made some DRC missionaries personally wealthy.

By the early 1930s, under government pressure, the DRC was beginning to hire a few better-educated teachers, particularly from the American Board schools. But it only gradually yielded ground to the Native Department’s attempts to restrict missionary power. Despite a substantial demand for better schools in areas dominated by the DRC, a government investigation into DRC finances and usurpation of state power, and the expulsion of one missionary as a bad influence, the mission held on.

In the early 1930s, conditions in the district changed in response to a new government program: that of the agricultural demonstrators. These were men who, like the Jeanes teachers, studied an advanced course at Domboshawa and were then sent into rural areas to work for community development. But there the similarities ended. The agricultural demonstrators were government employees, supervised by the government agriculturist for natives, E.D. Alvord, under the direct control of the Native Commissioners, and the program was funded locally, through the Native Trust fund rather than through external philanthropic organizations. Agricultural demonstrators were also supposed to be independent of the missions. In the Fort Victoria District, however, they were not. Initially met in the Zimutu Reserve with skepticism and hostility, the demonstrators chose to demonstrate on the lands of mission schools, rather than following the prescribed path of recruiting cooperators from among various people in the community, each of whom was to farm an acre according to the demonstrator’s directions. Demonstrators’ cooperation with the mission led to suspicion and conflict with the Native Department. The Superintendent of Natives of Victoria (SoN Victoria) wrote to Alvord that it was “not good policy to allow the Demonstrator to get so involved with mission schools. This fact alone would account for his unpopularity with the kraal natives.” He went on to assert that “No demonstrator will be a success without the active support and cooperation of the Native Commissioner.”

The agricultural demonstrators did not act as a pacifying influence in the Victoria region. The SoN Victoria not only complained about
their connections to mission schools, but also emphasized that they had poor manners, complaining that "I have often been particularly struck with the clownish ill-manners of those I have come across. I gather that they are often insolent to their elders and look down on those who have not been to school." Some demonstrators not only antagonized elders and officials through "insolence" and mission involvement, but also irritated their sponsors by becoming politically involved. At least one of the first agricultural demonstrators in the Victoria circle was an active member of the Southern Rhodesia Bantu Association, a legal organization pushing the advancement of the rights of educated Africans. Local European settlers, furthermore, apparently deeply resented any programs that would help Africans raise and sell maize on the local market.

Despite these inauspicious beginnings, however, agricultural demonstrators did rapidly build a following in the Zimutu Reserve. By 1932, the agriculturist was referring to demonstration work in the region as "very popular." Demonstrators acquired this popularity by helping local farmers expand their production and sale of maize and other cash crops. Evidently they did so by de-emphasizing the crop rotations and careful soil conservation provisions of their training. Instead, according to their critics, they became "farm managers for those who grow maize for sale." Alvord, however, instead of objecting to this local deviation from his teaching, emphasized the usefulness of a substantial market for Africans' maize in the region, especially in Zimutu, where Africans sold maize to European farmers and storekeepers who then either used it as cattle feed or resold it for higher European prices.

After several years of successful demonstration activity, the Native Department began to use the demonstrators to coordinate the "centralization" of the reserves. This meant that arable land would be distinguished from grazing land and land holdings would be fixed, rather than being subject to change as individuals came and went and practiced long-fallow agriculture. Centralization, however, also restricted the growth of the most successful market farmers of the region.

Beginning his work as a Jeans teacher, Lysias Mukahleyi found himself in the midst of the controversies over who was in control of the DRC-dominated regions. Being paid by the government and working for the DRC in ways that were intended to serve the African community, Mukahleyi found himself in the midst of a triangular contradiction: the government and DRC mistrusted each other, and both mistrusted Africans, who returned the sentiment to varying degrees, sometimes choosing to pursue Zionist strategies or explicit po-
litical involvement, which irritated both government and mission. The Jeanes ideal of nonpolitical cooperative development in a Christian framework was probably never a real possibility in such a politically muddled region. Mukahleyi apparently did not even try to avoid politics.

Mukahleyi was an early member of the Southern Rhodesia Native Association (SRNA), becoming the secretary of the local branch even as he moved into the Victoria circle to begin his work as a Jeanes teacher. For conservative Native Department officials, this political involvement immediately made him suspect. The SoN Victoria complained at the beginning of 1934 that a "Weak streak in [Lysias'] mental capacity . . . coupled with his political leanings, quite unfit him for any position of independence. . . . he lacks balance." The SoN complained of more than just Mukahleyi's personal attitude, however. He complained that within the sensitive political atmosphere of the Zimutu Reserve, the Jeanes teacher was causing trouble for the community and region at large. The SoN had been an early opponent of the Jeanes teacher program, responding to a query about how the program could serve his region with a scathing rejection:

I do not want the Jeanes Teacher to do anything for me so long as he remains outside my control. I do not know what community work means exactly but if it consists of pester ing the village dwellers to adopt European methods of hygiene, sanitation, etc., I do not think it worthy of our support. The Jeanes Teacher comes to visit me once a month but I really would prefer that he did not do so as he will only trade on the official connection to impose his will on the villagers. In this context, he objected to Mukahleyi not because of involvement in some protonationalist politics, but because regardless of Mukahleyi's specific politics, the Jeanes teacher's job was to push change. Mere membership in the SRNA would not necessarily have been a problem: Mukahleyi pointed out in his own defense that a number of messengers and interpreters in government offices were also members, and that the organization was for the benefit of all, rather than being inherently hostile to the Native Department. The SoN Victoria repeatedly expressed a desire for control and the notion that the Native Department must back its own people, whether those people were NCs, chiefs and headmen, or merely agricultural demonstrators, rather than supporting the Jeanes teachers who were semi-independent and under mission supervision.
The situation went from tense to directly confrontational when reports began floating into the Victoria circle office from the Zimutu Reserve that Mukahleyi was trying "to arrogate powers." Initially these reports were vague. The SoN reported an absence of complaints from agricultural demonstrators of interference in the centralization program and in fact stated that while he would like to ask for Mukahleyi's removal, "it will first be necessary to procure some direct evidence of wrong-doing." The SoN's letter indicating his desire to get rid of Mukahleyi and his lack of evidence was dated 10 March 1934. The next letter in the file, however, with the same date, indicates that the superintendent found some evidence, or at least a pretext, with which to accuse the Jeanes teacher. After speaking with the agricultural demonstrators he accused Mukahleyi of misleading the natives, disobeying a direct order which I gave him personally and flouting the authority and orders of the Demonstrators who are directly responsible for the good order and wellbeing of agriculture in the reserve. I definitely instructed him not to interfere in any way with agricultural operations in the Reserve or give the natives the impression that he was carrying out orders received from me.

Lysias Mukahleyi, according to the SoN, had told people to violate the centralization land-use plan by granting permission to plow in the land designated for grazing. Later, the superintendent went on to state that eight groups of men that he had seen had stated that Mukahleyi had given them permission to plow.

This superintendent's acute hostility makes Mukahleyi's case somewhat difficult to sort out, but there are several odd features of this file. Unlike the official files compiled on most complaints, especially with regard to mission malpractice or teachers' malfeasance, there is a notable lack of affidavits sworn out by witnesses and an equally notable lack of specific names given as references. The SoN implied that he was responding to local complaints but his early letters indicated a desire for a pretext, any pretext, on which to expel Mukahleyi. Once he had his pretext, he acted bluntly, with all the power his position gave him: he sent Mukahleyi, in the custody of a messenger, to go about in the communities where he had worked, and ordered the Jeanes teacher to publicly proclaim himself "an untrustworthy person." Acknowledging that this would destroy Mukahleyi's ability to do his job, the SoN went on to ask for Mukahleyi's removal.
Mukahleyi tried to defend himself and mobilize potential support not merely among the SRNA (which might have been counterproductive as it would emphasize his political connections) but from his mission supervisors and the Department of Native Development. He pointed out in the official record that the SRNA was a legitimate organization, with many government-employed members. And he flatly denied the most serious charge, that he had “interfered in any way with the administration of the Reserve.” The SoN made the charge of interference explicit by pointing to several violations: Mukahleyi, he said, had allotted land for trees and school gardens; persuaded children to weed his own garden; and “constantly organizes meetings” to discuss the work of headmen and the division of land by the headmen and chiefs.

These charges, however, are notable for how easily they can be explained within the prescribed work routine of the Jeanes teacher. Jeanes teachers were supposed to encourage the planting of trees and school gardens. Persuading children to weed was also well within their duties, especially, as Mukahleyi’s diary indicated, when the weeding was not on private land but on demonstration plots for community benefit. And calling meetings of parents and community members to discuss how the community could improve itself was essential to improving schools and providing the workforce necessary for larger community projects involving hygiene, roads, or anything else. Mukahleyi himself complained that the SoN and others apparently misunderstood his attempts to create parents’ groups for school improvement and community discussions of development. Mukahleyi described some of the meetings in his diary as being to encourage obedience to chiefs and headmen. Apparently some of the discussions at Mukahleyi’s meetings got fairly heated. Mukahleyi himself, however, was apparently more important as a facilitator who provided community members with a venue to express their disagreements than as an agitator who told them that they should feel dissatisfied.

Official efforts to get rid of Mukahleyi did not work smoothly. Mukahleyi not only defended himself in petitions to the Native Development Department, but also mobilized supporters among his employers. His missionary supervisor tried to retain his services by appealing above the superintendent’s head, arguing to the Chief Native Commissioner that “Lysias has had a good training and is undoubtedly intelligent and progressive . . . [concerning] the education and uplift of his own people. This may have made him too self-confident to the Natives in the Reserves.” But this moderate admission of
problems was as far as Reverend Louw was prepared to go. He went on to critique the Native Department’s handling of the situation, at least implicitly, by arguing that a minor incident had been blown out of proportion by agricultural demonstrators who were from different missions and regions and by authorities who had acted without seeking reconciliation. “Lysias has, . . . always been most submissive” and would have listened if the authorities had asked rather than ordering him about. 76 Jowitt, the Director of Native Development, also intervened with the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC), complaining that “it is difficult for me, without clearer evidence, to appreciate that the actions of the Jeanes Teacher warranted instant dismissal without reference to those primarily concerned.” 77

Both Louw and Jowitt, like Major Stoyle in the Magorimbo case, were attempting to defend a notion of the chain of command that ran from the Native Development Department through the missions to the Jeanes teachers and finally the community. The Native Department’s opposition to any loss of the Native Commissioner’s authority in the reserves was clear from the responses of both the NC Mazoe and the SoN Victoria. And the CNC, Colonel Carbutt, stated the supremacy of his department forcibly when he argued to Reverend Louw that the department had to act immediately and was unable to inform the mission in advance because “I cannot forsee when any person is going to misbehave.” 78

The most serious issue, however, was not that of consultations, but of whether Africans, even those who were educated and as prepared as Jeanes teachers were, could be allowed to wield actual authority, or whether they must remain mere supervised underlings. On this, the NDD and the mission sought to portray Mukahleyi as an actor, an educated, responsible human being who should be granted some autonomy. But the CNC argued that Africans’ autonomy was inherently suspect:

the system under which the Jeanes Teachers work will always be fraught with the danger of their exceeding their legitimate functions, because experience has shown that Natives, when clothed with any sort of authority, nearly always abuse it, unless they are kept under the closest supervision, which is not possible in the case of a Jeanes Teacher. 79

The CNC stated that he was willing to allow Mukahleyi to continue to work only under direct supervision at a mission station.
Yet by the beginning of the 1935 school year, even that compromise was falling apart. Reverend Louw proposed to move Mukahleyi back to the Zimutu Reserve to work directly under Reverend Moller’s supervision. But both the CNC and Director of Native Development concluded that such a move would be unwise as it would put Lysias directly back into the midst of a battle over centralization and the authority of agricultural demonstrators. And Lysias himself acknowledged the difficulties of his position when he noted that he did not like and probably could not work with Reverend Moller and that key native messengers, especially the Head Messenger, Mahachi, were planning to get him expelled from Zimutu if he went back.

**BUREAUCRATIC SQUABBLING**

Magorimbo and Mukahleyi provided sharp examples of cases where the Jeanes teacher program became controversial. Both cases ended in ceremonial gestures to the Native Department. Magorimbo was forced to make a formal apology to the Native Commissioner. Mukahleyi was put under direct mission supervision after being forced to declare himself an untrustworthy person. Neither man had a long career in the program, though both survived initial attempts to oust them and Magorimbo, at least, went on to a successful career as one of the first African school supervisors. But neither Magorimbo nor Mukahleyi, nor any of the other Jeanes teachers who confronted local powers, was immediately and permanently dismissed for disrespect to white or black Native Department authorities or to “traditional” authorities. Individual Jeanes teachers held their jobs amid accusations of forcing labor, illegally mediating disputes, and reallocating land.

Indirect Jeanes teachers survived episodes of Native Department opposition not through community support or even mission support, but due to intensive interdepartmental conflict between the Native Department and the Native Development Department. The wars were fought in minor battles over Jeanes teachers such as Magorimbo and Mukahleyi, over teachers who had not paid taxes or who appeared to an NC as too young to teach, and over depictions of teachers and schools in annual departmental reports. The friction between the two departments may have been partially due to personal animosity between the two rival strong-willed department heads, Colonel C.L. Carbutt and Harold Jowitt. But it was also institutional, sparked by the two departments’ fundamentally different notions of how authority should be constructed in the African communities of Southern Rhodesia.
The Native Department cultivated and defended a concept of authority in which communities were headed by “traditional” elders, headmen and chiefs, who were, if suitable, granted official recognition by the department and kept in line through a steady diet of ceremonial gestures ranging from salaries through Native Board meetings and official visits. On a daily basis, the Native Commissioner would coordinate the population by using his native messengers as go-betweens to deliver his directives to the “traditional leadership.” The Native Department pushed legislation that made the Native Commissioner of the 1930s effectively supreme within his territory: the Native Affairs Act mandated that all Africans must obey his reasonable requests. Above the Native Commissioner was the regional Superintendent of Natives, the Chief Native Commissioner, and then the non-professionals: the governmental ministers and their staffs. Native Commissioners appear to have seen this structuring of power and authority as effective and strong, but also somewhat brittle. They feared damage to any one of the system’s key points, whether that would be the prestige of the elders, the menace of the messengers, or the independent superiority of the Native Commissioner. The structure was not constructed to bend and move. It had no place for ambitious young men who sought to gain power through their achievements or expertise as teachers, skilled craftsmen, prosperous farmers, or mission employees.

The Native Development Department, on the other hand, was built around a goal of change. It promoted a concept of development and progress rather than Native Department ideals of order, and sought to reconfigure notions of authority within communities from a static value determined by age and inherited position, to authority as a function of schooling, skill, way of life, and achievement. Order and good administration were not the highest values of the Native Development Department. Instead, the Department valued its own concepts of progress, and improved quality of life.

PARTICIPATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The program’s problems, however, were not merely at the level of interdepartmental bureaucratic competition: they involved the very notion of authority in rural Southern Rhodesia. In its ideal form, the Jeanes teacher program was supposed to be highly voluntary as parents and community members observed, decided what they wanted, and then developed their community’s resources and institutions. This model of consensus-based voluntary development, however, did not
fit the realities of reserve communities. Within the increasingly controlled and segregated context of Southern Rhodesia, authority and economic well-being in the reserves did not come from popular cooperation and consensus but through preferential access to outside patrons and connections. The idyllic assumption that rural communities would automatically work together to promote better lives was quite simply fantastic within a context where individuals and families increasingly competed for land, access to markets, jobs, building contracts, labor, and government positions.

The Jeanes teacher program, and the other demonstration programs as well, were based on the idea that rural communities merely needed to see what was possible, and they would voluntarily sacrifice and work to achieve better lives and conditions. But the principal demonstration that younger educated men observed was that of Europeans' accumulation of goods and ostentatious display of status.

When the idea of teaching by demonstration and voluntary emulation failed, therefore, the Jeanes teachers and demonstrators followed the model of authority that dominated the region's culture, society, and economy: they claimed authority based on position and connections, and gave orders, regardless of whether they actually had the legal authority to do so. Though the program began as a cooperative, voluntary, development initiative, it rapidly became an early exercise in what Leslie Bessant calls "coercive development," relying on orders and force rather than education and collective interests.83

Community development programs in Southern Rhodesia suffered because they were based on an ideal of community that failed to fit the realities of Rhodesia. They assumed a community solidarity that—if it had ever existed—had been undermined by years of colonial initiatives. Community efforts to mobilize, efforts that involved both senior men and younger men and women, had been repeatedly blocked by mission and government efforts to reinterpret demands and actions. When senior men called for better schools and offered to pay for them, government underfunding and the depression of the economy through maize control, destocking, and restrictions on cattle sales thwarted their aims. When younger and older men mobilized and petitioned for useful education, government reinterpretations of their wants led to the imposition of a project that failed to meet their goals.

The Jeanes teacher initiative was designed to encourage communities to develop suitable wants and provide them with nonpolitical, nonthreatening ways of pursuing these goals. In a politicized environment, however, where wants could only be achieved by demanding more or taking from one group to give to another, the Jeanes teach-
ers' close ties to the administration and missions hampered their ability to build coalitions with local parents and community leaders. And teachers' mobilization of communities to discuss political problems created suspicion in administrative officials, ranging from the Chief Native Commissioner to the staff of messengers who coordinated the information flow into local Native Commissioners’ offices. Caught between the various interests they were intended to serve, Jeanes teachers resorted to orders and force to produce results, increasing antagonisms in the process, antagonisms that further broke apart the communities they were supposed to coordinate and build.

The most successful Jeanes teachers proved to be among the least ambitious. The female Jeanes teachers who provided classes, one-on-one medical help, and hygiene advice proved little threat and provoked little controversy. The male Jeanes teachers who focused on the mission schools and functioned strictly as teacher supervisors, rather than large-scale development workers, survived to be promoted into African superintendents when the Jeanes teacher program was phased out in favor of more specialized education and development workers. This sharply delimited pattern of success, however, raised questions about the program’s central logic. The Native Development Department and the missions failed to develop and sustain a program capable of allowing cooperative, voluntary, rural development to produce changes in the power structure and ways of life of rural Africans. Rather than bringing Africans together or taking advantage of any common interests they might have, development programs such as the Jeanes teacher program split them into groups battling with each other for control of time, labor, resources, and authority. Ultimately, the programs promoted faction and dispute about obligations and the distribution of existing resources, rather than providing mechanisms through which communities could bootstrap themselves to comfort and affluence. Even the program’s controversies revolved around the question of power and who had the authority to give orders, rather than around any question of what would benefit the most people or create new communal institutions for development.

NOTES

1. Report of the Director of Native Development for 1929 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1930), 1. Jowitt earned a reputation in Southern Rhodesia as an empire builder. In his subsequent career in Uganda, observers were even less charitable because they considered him anti-Protestant (his formal conversion to Catholicism actually calmed Protestant missionaries down as it confirmed their suspicions) and
incompetent. His working relationship with Governor Philip Mitchell was extremely poor, and both missionaries and government officials tried to come up with ways to fire him. Carol Summers, Uganda Notes (from PRO CO536 and Grace correspondence SOAS CBMS).


3. Unlike the Native Department’s spending, which could be characterized as essential to law, order, and tax collection, education and development were discretionary expenses without strong white constituencies.

4. The mission salaries for certificated teachers ranged as low as £2 per month for 9 or 10 months of the year. (Chibi Mission, DRC. See correspondence of George Mhlanga and Ndambi Hliziyo to A.R. Mather, NAZ S2307/2). Jeanes teachers, however, were paid a probationary salary of £60 per year for the first year, and offered at least the theoretical possibility of increasing, in steps of £3 per year of experience, with three grades based on merit, to a ceiling of £120 per year. They also received bicycle allowances of 7s./6d. per month and at least the possibility of a future pension. Colonial Secretary to DND, 17-7-30, NAZ S170/1225.

5. For a discussion of the roles played by Jeanes women, see Timothy Burke, Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption and Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), 44–57. The government established three grades of pay for female Jeanes teachers, ranging from a low of £15 per year for beginning teachers to a high of £48 per year for top-ranked, experienced, Jeanes women. It is not, however, clear whether anyone ever actually received the top salary allowed before the program was ended. Public Services Board to Colonial Secretary, 11-8-30, NAZ S170/1124.


7. NAZ S138/69, Alvord to CNC on training of demonstrators at Domboshawa, 10-10-27.


14. For a description of one particularly dramatic cleanup and construction party involving several Jeanes teachers, see J. Marsh, circular, Community Work at Mount Silinda, 1-10-30, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (henceforth ABC), 15.4, item 15.


17. See the Report on Jeanes Teacher Work at All Saints’ Mission Wrenningham for half year ending June 1934, NAZ S1542/J1 v.1, which described an “excellent”...
Jeanes teacher in a region of "especially bad" schools, who "may have been possibly a bit hasty in some of his methods of presentation" and should therefore be relocated.

18. See the CNC's description of meetings in 1932 with various missionaries, including the Bishop of Mashonaland (Anglican). CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 12-4-34, NAZ S1542/S2.

19. See the Report of the Inter-Territorial "Jeanes" Conference Held in Salisbury. Southern Rhodesia on 27 May to 6 June, 1935 (Lovedale, South Africa, 1936). African delegates did, however, stay at Domboshawa, a government school for Africans, rather than in Salisbury, and their talks were far more limited in time than those of the white speakers.

20. Correspondence between the Director of Native Development (Jowitt), the Colonial Secretary (Leggate), and H.U. Moffat, NAZ 170/1171/1933-4.

21. As an example of this rhetoric, see the Rhodesian Agricultural Union (RAU) Committee Report on "The Growing Shortage of Native Labor," Rhodesia Herald, 18-2-27 (filed in NAZ S170/164), which proposed a 30 shillings per year surtax on all men not employed outside of the reserve, to be paid into a fund for development. The RAU development tax was merely a proposal, and not implemented. Missions, however, did extract development taxes in the form of dip fees, school taxes, and farm rents. Any mission designated as a private location (most missions) was able to raise taxes at will. And for headmen's responses to the escalating taxes, see NAZ N9/5/3, a record of official visits between the administrator and various government-recognized chiefs and headmen. They complained of dog taxes, constant dipping fees, and the lack of markets for their cattle. Fogg in, the Director of Education, claimed in 1921 that the Anglican mission had pioneered school rates. Fogg in to Administrator, 21-5-21, NAZ S840/1/33.

22. The Native Boards, headed by the local Native Commissioner, were in theory responsible for local development spending. In practice, they rarely, if ever, were permitted to make investments that would actually benefit people: schools, cooperative shops paying for grain in cash, or subsidized bus and transit services. See Leslie Bissant, "Coercive Development." Bissant focuses on a later time period, but points to a lack of community control extending back into the 1930s.

23. E.D. Alvord (Director of Native Agriculture), "The Development of Native Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia" (undated typescript memoir, USDA library, Greenbelt, MD), 19.

24. See the controversy over Hannis Mungazi's role in Gutu.

25. This preceded the Jeanes teachers. See CNC Report for 1927, p. 5, where he records NCs' reports of parental objections to mission teacher, and schools' demands for obligatory, unpaid labor on teacher or school plots.

26. See the statistical appendices for the Annual Report of the Director of Native Development, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933. The SA tried to retain teachers by requiring students in the upper levels to sign contracts promising to teach for the mission. For evidence of the Howard contracts, see Major Furman (SA) to Major Wane (NC), 8-8-34, NAZ S1542/S2. Students agreed to teach one year for each year of training, and remit 10s/- a month to Salvation Army until training fees were paid in full. If a teacher was dismissed, unpaid fees were to be paid immediately, rather than in installments. Fees were £6 for each year of training.
28. Assistant NC Goromonzi to NC Salisbury, 13-9-33, NAZ S1542/S2. The schools were Mupandawana and Mashambanaka. The aNC recommended authorizing these schools.
29. See Assistant NC Goromonzi to NC Salisbury, 8-4-35; and Assistant NC Urugwe to NC Lomagundi, 19-5-33, NAZ S1542/S2.
30. Report of the NC Mazoe for 1929, NAZ S1561/64. Recently, Titus Pressler, Transfigured Night: Mission and Culture in Zimbabwe’s Vigil Movement (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 1999), 1–64, has argued that night vigils were rooted in cultural traditions and constituted a vital form of indigenous spirituality, accepted and deployed by Zimbabweans from the precolonial period through the recent past. Colonial sources, however, indicate strong objections by some Zimbabweans to some revivals and night meetings.
31. The NC did accuse Magorimbo of laying stress on the religious and scholastic aspects of school life rather than appropriate industrial training. Annual Report of the NC Mazoe for 1933, NAZ S235/511. The scholastic and religious aspects of Magorimbo’s role, however, are not well documented.
33. NC Mazoe to CNC, 6-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 3. The new regulations were spelled out in DND to missionary superintendents, circular 1/34, 15-1-34, NAZ Historical Manuscripts, MET 3/18/1/1, a file that includes the circulars sent by the DND to missionary superintendents.
34. This was the common pattern until regulations were passed to restrict obligatory unpaid labor and specify that the pupils and/or teacher received the produce.
35. Annual Report of Matthew Magorimbo, as reported by the NC Mazoe to CNC, 1934, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 3.
37. NC Mazoe to CNC, 1-2-33, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.
38. Ibid.
40. CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 3.
41. Territorial Commander, Salvation Army, to CNC, 15-3-34, S1542/J1 vol.3.
42. CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, S1542/J1, vol. 3.
43. For the NC’s reaction, see the NC Mazoe Annual Report for 1934. For the reactions of Major Wane’s superiors, see CNC [Carbutt] to Minister of Native Affairs, 12-4-34, NAZ S1542/S1.
44. CNC to Minister of Native Affairs, 9-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2. Note that the CNC did not specify what sort of control he was concerned about. Instead, he evoked a more general (and somewhat fantastic) concept of the Native Commissioner’s full knowledge of and authority over all happenings in a given territory.
45. CNC to Maj. Stoyle, 13-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.
46. NC Mazoe to CNC, 22-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 3.
47. Lysias’ surname is spelled in a variety of different ways in different sources, and in many documents he is merely referred to as Lysias. Variant spellings include the following: Mukahlehi; Mukartyei; Mukahleyi; Mukartyoyi. Lysias himself employed various spellings in different surviving documents.
48. Both men were in the group of Jeanes teachers given official appointments (on probation) on 15-2-33. Secretary to DND, 15-2-33, NAZ S170/1225. The most senior Jeanes teachers had, by this time, completed two years of probation. Colonial Secretary to DND, 15-2-33, NAZ S170/1225.

49. Lenfestey, Inspection of DRC Mission Morgenster, 9-4-23, NAZ S840/1/37.

50. Statistical appendices, Director of Native Development Annual Report for 1930.

51. DND Annual Report for 1929, p. 41.

52. See Director of Native Development, Annual Reports.

53. The DRC received a grant of £7,125 in 1929, making it the largest Protestant recipient of government educational money.

54. See the investigation into the finances of the DRC in Gutu, NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 28-4-33, NAZ S1542/M8, discussed in chapter 1.

55. Jowitt to CNC, 11-1-32, NAZ S138/72. Jowitt was reporting Alvord’s defense of this deviation from policy. Alvord argued that initially almost no one was willing to have plots, so demonstrators worked on mission plots to keep busy and that this was the only case in Rhodesia where the program became so heavily involved with the schools. Alvord accepted that it was not good for agricultural demonstrators to become mission farm managers.


58. Jowitt (DND) to SoN Victoria, 14-2-30, NAZ S138/72. The demonstrator was reproved for his political involvement by both Alvord and the SoN Victoria.

59. See Alvord, memoir.


61. Assistant NC Gutu to SoN Victoria, 9-6-33, NAZ S138/72. This file contains other evidence from around the region that the most popular demonstrators were those who provided people with what they wanted—help expanding their maize yields—rather than the soil conservation tactics and training in intensive farming that the government thought they needed. See NC Mtoko to CNC, 1-6-33, and NC Zaka to SoN Victoria, 29-4-32. See also Alvord’s statement that any rotation that did not emphasize maize would be very unpopular (reported by Jowitt to CNC, 11-1-32) and also his defense against charges that he was suffering from a “maize complex” (Alvord to DND, 8-6-31).

62. Alvord to DND, 8-6-31, NAZ S138/72.

63. SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.

64. SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.

65. SoN Victoria (Howman) to CNC, 6-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.

66. Lysias Mukahleyi to DND, 16-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.

67. SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34; Alvord to CNC, 24-2-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.

68. SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2. Howman admitted that he had “received no complaints from the Demonstrators in regard to Lysias interfering with their work, neither have I had any reports from them that the Natives are ploughing land reserved for grazing.

69. SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.
70. SoN Victoria to CNC, 29-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.
71. SoN Victoria to CNC, 10-3-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.
72. SoN Victoria to CNC, 29-3-34.
73. Ibid.
74. Mukahlehi—Diary, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2. This heavily underlined document in English does not provide the evidence Howman asserted it did. All Jeanes teachers were required to keep professional diaries of how they spent their time, and to submit these regularly to their mission supervisors.
75. He repeatedly asserted that while many people had spoken at the meetings, and all sorts of comments were made, he had only encouraged obedience, and had done nothing that could be construed as obstructing the demonstrators’ program. Lysias Mukahleyi to DND, 16-4-34, ibid.
76. Rev. Louw to CNC, 11-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.
77. DND to CNC, 18-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.
78. CNC to Rev. Louw, 18-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.
79. CNC to Rev. Louw, 18-4-34, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 2.
81. Lysias Mukartyoyo to CNC, 10-3-35, NAZ S1542/J1, vol. 1.
PART III

CULTURAL INNOVATIONS

During the 1920s and 1930s, Zimbabweans saw educational and social initiatives end in stalemates. And they became increasingly conscious of white Rhodesians' opposition to any changes that might give African individuals or communities real power over their own lives. In this context, creative individuals and new communities explored forms of cultural reconstruction that addressed local values, hopes, and needs outside the official and mission models of progress. As educated, skilled individuals became sophisticated in the values of the missions, settlers, and officials that employed them and ruled, they used the material and conceptual tools of the new order—such as money and domesticity—to shape their own values, families, and positions of status. They built a terrain of struggle and contestation out of the symbols and status that colonialism offered. The middle ground, whether in concrete institutions such as schools, or abstractions such as professional status, held together in new ways through new symbols and rituals.

In this section, I explore two of many ways Africans worked to give structure and meaning to their lives within the social space dominated, but not fully controlled, by the administration and missions. By exploring how Africans in the Wesleyan Methodist Church marked out new community identities through a variety of monetary transactions, we can see Africans deploying tools of colonization—such as cash, accounting systems, and Christian faith—with flexibility and skill. And in looking at men's marriages in the American Board's churches, the reconstruction of marriage around a male-headed companionate partnership emerges as a pattern that facilitated a husband's ability to balance older local expectations of male status and masculinity with newer missionary restrictions on marriage and sex.

These cultural innovations were important aspects of Africans' ability to build something substantive, rather than to just react to the overwhelming pressure of colonization and subjugation. These innovations,
like the struggles before them, were not precisely about resistance to colonial power. Instead, they involved communities’ and individuals’ relationships with a state, bureaucracy, mission framework, and system of economic subordination that they could not overthrow, but whose resources and tools they could sometimes appropriate.
Today, Zimbabwe can be referred to as a Christian country. This does not mean that every individual is a committed believer. Instead, it implies a change in dominant cultural connections and their ideological significance from the complex and varied patterns of precolonial, pre-Christian Zimbabwe, to a new and equally complex mosaic of personal belief and institutional practice in which Christianity, in one form or another, is normative. This change—a sort of communal conversion—happened during the first half of the twentieth century, especially during the period from 1908 to 1945. During these years, the African majority of Zimbabwe increasingly accepted, and began to rely on, Christian institutions, models of leadership, charisma, and spiritual authority, and a mission- and education-centered vision of a progressive future.

Along the path to this communal transformation, some individuals experienced personal spiritual transformations, and some worked in creative ways to connect Christianity to older forms of religion, incorporating mediums, ancestors, and rain. Yet despite the existence of individuals with deeply spiritual personal conversions and others who pursued inculturation strategies, the interwar period was characterized principally by the power of very conventional, institution-building, mission-centered
models of Christianity. At least in the early years, it was the conventional Christianity that grew, sometimes pulled into new villages and regions by African activists even faster than the European missionary leadership could push their preachers, schools, and institutional leadership. Missionaries were daunted by the demands African activists put on the missions as community spokesmen requested schools, teacher/evangelists, and mission affiliation.

It is worth exploring how this new identity emerged. In standard, mission history narratives, European missionaries emphasized their own role and that of God, appealing for more funds from Europe and America within a heroic evangelical narrative that characterized missionaries as pioneers harvesting African people, like ripe grain, for Jesus. This theme has been echoed by African Church historians who have tended to focus on church leadership and the ways officials have overcome challenges and built institutions. More recently, anthropologists and historians have emphasized how communities under pressure from colonial contact, conquest, and institutionalization found in Christianity a way of shaping the trajectory and consequences of the forces pushing for change. But instead of following or simply critiquing these standard narratives, I offer here another, potentially more polyvalent, somewhat more impressionistic, image of how people and their communities became Christians. In this chapter, I explore the symbolic and sacramental ways missionaries, preachers, believers, and officials in colonial Zimbabwe marked out a new Christian world through cash payments.

To explore the connections between money and Christian identity and meaning, I narrow my focus to the British Wesleyan mission and its adherents. This mission and the churches it sponsored have left behind accessible records not merely in Britain, but also in Zimbabwe, two bodies of mission records that differ in significant ways but, together, provide glimpses of not merely the planning and planting of mission activity, but also the processes and prospects of grassroots growth and the weeds of dissent. And the Wesleyans were neither the most nor the least successful of the missions active in Southern Rhodesia during the difficult years of the 1920s and 1930s. Instead, they were entirely ordinary and mainstream.

By looking closely at money in this mission, it is possible to begin to sort out what happened during the critical years of mission institutionalization, community transformation, and the construction of a new relationship between Christians and the state. Money—getting it, spending it, and auditing it—was central to Zimbabweans' construc-
tion of this new world. I do not propose a strict materialistic functionalism. Instead, I suggest that in the boom and bust (and mostly bust) economy of interwar Southern Rhodesia, where segregation intensified Africans’ understandings of what they did not have and were increasingly barred from getting, money was critically important not merely as a way of surviving, but as a way of defining individual identity and status and pursuing community values. James Ferguson has suggested that culture, particularly cultures in the midst of change, are complex, and may be best understood not by general questions regarding belief or assumptions, but by the concrete signs and objects that congeal these changes, at least momentarily. “Publicly exhibited signs,” he emphasizes, provide possibilities of insight into processes otherwise “fundamentally unstateable.”

Hats, coats, shoes, and books have marked out change—in highly ambiguous ways—for both early African and European observers and present-day historians and anthropologists. Money—the cash that could buy these commodities, pay tribute or taxes, or go in a variety of other directions combining either selectively or promiscuously with funds from other sources—marked off change by its existence as congealed value, and through its transfer as tithing money, enthusiastic concert contributions, and dedicated payments for future schooling. It provides an important beginning point in our analysis of new Christian identities not simply because of what it did or what people did with it, but because it was central to a wide variety of debates, and points us toward significant meanings and images. In a discussion of the historical anthropology of money, Maurice Bloch and Jonathan Parry have suggested that historians and anthropologists have often viewed money as an impersonal form of value that, as it comes into circulation, draws a distinction between the earlier personal economic interactions of a traditional world, and the abstract and impersonal transfers of a newly modern world.

But in colonial Zimbabwe, money was scarce, and far from impersonal. Instead, in earning it, spending it, and donating it, Zimbabweans attached money to people (e.g., her bridewealth, his tax money, their school fees) and marked out new types of relationships and identities. Thus, by following discussions and fights over money in the Wesleyan Methodist churches of interwar Southern Rhodesia, we can track a changing community, and begin to sort out the mechanisms and meanings of its transformations.

Missions in Southern Rhodesia operated in a competitive and crowded environment. Climate and government support, in an atmosphere of hopes (not always fulfilled) for rapid economic develop-
ment, helped create a region full of competing missionary organizations. Most mission centers were on mission farms where the missions leased land to tenant farmers, often insisted on mandatory school attendance, and could enforce a church-dominated disciplinary system outside the state. Wesleyan Methodist missions that fit this model included Tegwani, (on the line of rail in Matabeleland), Nengubo/Waddilove (near Marandellas, in a prime highveldt settler farming area), and Epworth (outside the rapidly growing regional capital of Salisbury). Each of these circuits was in an area of intensive economic change. Other circuits, such as Wedza (more closely tied to peasant agriculture) and Selukwe and Gatooma (near mining development), were not as prosperous, and did not receive as much investment in educational and physical development as the three main circuits. Wesleyan Methodism in Southern Rhodesia began and remained closely tied to urban and industrial development. South African Mfengu leaders pushed its early development, and both Waddilove and Tegwani, institutes classified by the government as “first-class schools” trained local young men as workers for the new settler-dominated economy. From the earliest years of the mission, schools and stations expanded specifically into areas with African patrons able to pay for teachers and construction costs. And schools and churches closed when communities failed to meet their pledges, whether because parents disapproved of a specific teacher, or because economic downturns had destroyed cash reserves. Truly poor or distant areas were left out of the mission boom until much later.

MISSIONS AND MONEY

Missions and mission churches often had problematic relationships with money. Missionaries almost invariably perceived themselves as self-sacrificing and starved of the funds essential to their lives and work. They portrayed themselves as spiritually rich, but materially poor, and encouraged their followers to be likewise. Abel Muzorewa, for example, born into a devout Methodist family, remembered growing up singing a hymn asserting “I don’t want much money” and a favorite hymn calling for believers to “Take the name of Jesus in all your poverty.” New mission adherents, on the other hand, frequently looked not at what missionaries said about the need for new funds, but at the resources missionaries seemed to command not just spiritually, but in the intensely materialistic sense of cloth, sweets, and cash. This unequal relationship was a fundamental root of much mission success, as it provided inquirers with sensible, concrete reasons to pay
attention to missionaries’ more spiritually based appeals. Cynics, indeed, may argue that materialism and monetary advantage have been basic to Christianity’s appeal to generations of Africans seeking to make survival, profits, and selves out of a challenging colonial and postcolonial context. Muzorewa himself, despite his years of hymn singing, rejected what he saw as the missionaries’ “pie in the sky by and by” emphasis on self-sacrifice. Instead, he noted that he and the other men he trained with found more appealing those programs aimed at producing material results. “The crops which our parents sold to buy clothes and bicycles and to pay our school fees—were these not also blessings from God?” Muzorewa asked rhetorically, going on to emphasize a “whole gospel for the whole man that would speak to what was going on in the day-to-day life of our people.”

As a type of Christianity that emphasized Bible reading, Wesleyan Methodism would have exposed neophyte Christians not merely to the material civilization of settler life, as lived by British missionaries and observed by young men employed in homes, towns, and mines as they earned their tuition and tax money, but also to the seemingly more radical observations and prescriptions of scripture, such as:

Do not lay up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and rust consume and where thieves break in and steal, but lay up for yourself treasure in heaven. . . . For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also. . . . You cannot serve God and mammon. Therefore I tell you, do not be anxious about your life, what you shall eat or what you shall drink, nor about your body, what you shall put on. . . . Look at the birds of the air; they neither sow nor reap. . . . Consider the lilies of the field . . . they neither toil nor spin. . . . seek first God’s kingdom and righteousness, and all these things shall be yours as well. [Matthew 6: 19–33]

Yet while white missionaries might understand themselves as providing, through lives of sacrificial service to Zimbabweans, a literal reading of this admonition, local Christians appear to have extracted an entirely different meaning. “Treasures,” earthly and spiritual, were too closely entwined to disentangle in the local institutions and spiritual manifestations of faith. Thus, local Christians wore jackets, paid for hymnals, took jobs with regular salaries that supported both their secular and church obligations, and celebrated enthusiastically with song and contributions when God provided the necessary funds to the people and church. They sought to lay up treasure in heaven through individually and communally collecting money on earth. In becoming
Christians, Africans in Southern Rhodesia converted not just to a faith, but to a pattern of monetized materialism, in which they marked out the new community of the present in the coins of ticket money and concert contributions, and prayed for a new future through their children’s school fees.

Though the mission church sponsored this monetized transformation, and pushed it on when individual preachers or believers sought different ideas of faith, this monetized Christianity, again as Matthew suggested, carried its own drawbacks:

Truly I say to you, it will be hard for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven. Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. When the disciples heard this they were greatly astonished, saying “Who then can be saved?” [Matthew 19: 23–25]

While new Christians were hardly rich, their aspirations frequently were. The school system, with its hope of civilized status and higher wages, was the key to this much-wanted transformation. As the school system was increasingly funded and regulated by the administration, its intimate tie with the Christian community was undermined. As parents and students pursued Christian-style prosperity by investing in education, schools desperate for funds accepted increased levels of government control, and parents and students increasingly lost authority over mission schools. By the 1940s, schools, funded but twisted under segregationist regulations, could no longer provide a straightforward entry into the hoped for future on earth or heaven.13

A materialist analysis cannot explain Africans’ individual and communal identities in the interwar years. Money and things, however, provide an excellent place to begin a close look at the bones and glue of an expanding Christian community. In this chapter, I wish to follow the money within a Wesleyan context and look at the ritual and sacramental implications of not merely a generalized concept of materialism, but the solid cash and goods that were collected and distributed in Christian contexts. Doing so, I explore how management of money delineated Christian identity and community aspirations in colonial Zimbabwe.

Money and wealth in a region determined where Methodists evangelized. And three central issues in Wesleyan mission Christianity during the 1920s and 1930s—tickets, concerts, and school fees—provide points of entry illuminating various aspects of Wesleyan Method-
Tickets, Concerts, and School Fees

ists’ Christianity and communities. Through these three issues, we can explore the meanings of money to Christian belief and institutional affiliation in the 1920s and 1930s in Southern Rhodesia. Tickets, mandatory for church members, conveying membership in a participatory form of church governance and producing an audited, regulated pool of locally raised money, were central to the institutionalization of Wesleyan churches in the region. Concerts, enthusiastic fund-raisers planned and coordinated by ambitious and organized African evangelists, producing inspirational moments, were part of the charismatic and unaudited authority of individual African church leaders. And school fees constituted the mission’s and the people’s payments for a future, negotiated with the government, within the rules of a segregationist administration.

MISSION ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND

Like the members of other government-recognized missions of Southern Rhodesia, the Wesleyans worked within a set of administrative regulations that demanded white oversight. Fearful of the political and military implications of Zionism and African independency, the government demanded white oversight and authority at each level of mission and school. White missionaries accepted this requirement that they maintain the last word in the new churches, schools, and institutions they worked to build. They met separately from African ministers and lay leaders, and elected white missionary representatives to the interdenominational Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference, which both cooperated with and lobbied the administration on African social policy issues. More parochially, white missionaries were automatically part of the interracial synods that constituted the official governing body of the local church. Unofficially, they dominated these meetings. Below the level of the synod, Wesleyan activity was divided into circuits, each under the supervision of a minister. Since these circuits were circuits of schools, as well as churches, and the government demanded that a white missionary be in charge of inspecting schools and auditing attendance records, each was headed by a white missionary. From the perspective of white missionaries and the government, the Wesleyan Methodist Church in Southern Rhodesia was a formal structure directed by missionaries, paternalistically working for the benefit of Africans. When the Southern Rhodesian Missionary Council defended Africans against egregious tax increases or objected to the Land Apportionment Act, missionaries spoke as white paternal-
ists, not as delegates of their discontented African population. Missionaries’ salaries, and ultimately their loyalties, were seen by them, and by the administration, as coming from Britain and the British church.

But to understand the Wesleyan Church in Southern Rhodesia, it is essential to look below the level of missionary councils, synods, and circuits to the center of local Christian life, the churches that were also schools. This double status was not an accident: the evangelists and local preachers who coordinated Sunday activities were teachers during the week, and the Sunday church sanctuary was the weekday schoolroom. Preachers were even admonished to make sure they held active Sunday school meetings as well as praise and worship services, and student attendance at Sunday worship services was generally mandatory. Practices within the space—attendance taking, singing, catechism, and Bible reading—also characterized both church and school. Those interested in Christianity, but not yet church members, were given labels with clear indications of the connections between school and religious practice: individuals began as listeners, and moved up as readers, before being eligible for baptism and confirmation and becoming members on trial, organized into “classes,” each of which met for examinations of conscience and spiritual growth, and played a role in church maintenance and governance as well. The structure paralleled the “monitor” structure used in nineteenth-century schools in England, but it persisted much later in Southern Rhodesia, as more advanced pupils and Christians were employed to lead newer pupils and converts to higher levels. Without the school, there could be no church, as missionaries generally required literacy for baptism, confirmation, and church membership. In the Rhodesian context, however, the most important characteristic of this grassroots Christianity was that it constructed and institutionalized an African community of believers that white missionaries visited, but where they did not belong. Each of the various forms of membership in this local African Christian community was marked out by the regular and public payment of money.

During the week, the local teacher/preacher would supervise a schoolroom of 20 to 150 students probably in First Year, substandards A and B, and maybe also Standard I. Large schools frequently supported an assistant teacher as well as the teacher in charge. The teacher and his wife could legally cultivate up to five acres around the school, with part of that designated as the “school garden,” worked on by students and their parents, the students as part of their industrial education, the parents as a form of tuition payment. And students were responsible for school fees.
At least four times a year, the school would be visited by the white missionary school superintendent, who would check to ensure that the attendance register had been kept, audit school accounts, examine students, and listen to their singing.¹⁵

On Sundays, the building would be transformed into a church. Evangelists and local preachers, licensed and with paid-up tickets from the Methodist mission, would preach and lead the congregation in a worship service that could go on for hours, with several sermons. Women’s groups would have a separate women’s association (Ruwadzano) meeting, and women paid for both the physical markers of their association—the red blouses of respectable women, for example—and a regular membership fee. Women, men, youths, and girls would have separate “class” meetings at which they would study the Bible, talk about their spiritual lives, and collect and record church contributions, or “ticket money.” Individual evangelists and church activists also founded additional societies that evangelized, and helped with the day-to-day maintenance of church facilities.¹⁶ And each quarter, probably combining church visits with school inspections, an ordained minister would come by, meet with members and delegates in a quarterly meeting, check members’ tickets, and perform sacraments, such as communion, baptism, and confirmation, for those who qualified.

In practice, therefore, rather than accepting the top-down vision of the African church as a white-led paternalistic institution given from on high, local Wesleyan Christians were expected to see schools, churches, class meetings, local preachers, class leaders who monitored ticket money, delegates elected to synod, and an intricate social web of women’s groups and student choirs as their own community’s church. This vision was somewhat convincing even in the face of white power and a segregationist administration because members, holding their tickets and taking pride in their voting rights in synods and meetings, linked money, voice, and control.

**TICKETS**

Tickets were the central concrete objects that provided a focus for the participatory and democratic features of this African church. The word “ticket” has a variety of meanings in Southern African English. In the most common usage, a “ticket” was a work-related document. Men would accept or be forced into a contract to work for six tickets of, for example, 30 days each. Sometimes referred to as a six-month work contract, this was nothing of the kind. An employer only marked
an employee’s ticket when the day’s task was done to his satisfaction. Sickness, rest days, broken tools, inefficient work, or temperamental and stingy employers, all could lead to a worker not receiving a signing of his ticket for the day. The ticket was seen as a means for employers to exercise control and quality assurance over a difficult workforce. This, however, was not what the church meant by the word. A secondary meaning of the word ticket implies the token of payment for transport or admission to entertainment, but church members would probably have rejected this interpretation of the church tickets as well.

Instead, Wesleyan tickets marked off regular payment of the quarterly “class money” that provided the basis of a self-supporting and self-governing African church. In Rhodesia, however, the ticket system was also the mechanism through which membership in not merely a bureaucratic church structure, but God’s community itself, was defined. Membership was not a function of belief alone; even the sacrament of communion became contingent on the believer’s ability to pay, and pay on schedule, in money rather than cattle or work.

From at least 1913 onward, membership in a Wesleyan church had implied the regular payment of quarterly—four times yearly—fees. These were generally collected at big, celebratory services where a minister, either European or African, visited the service to check tickets, audit accounts, administer sacraments, and chair the quarterly meeting, linking money, sacrament, and community not just conceptually, but temporally and in a very concrete way as a congregation effectively paid for communion. In 1913, payments were set at 6 pence per member per quarter. By the 1920s, Epworth charged 1 shilling a quarter for rural members and 2 shillings a quarter for those in towns. By the 1930s, as the government cut back on its funding for teachers’ salaries, some African ministers pushed for ticket money to be raised to 2 shillings per quarter regardless of location. This money covered the basics. Additional sacraments, baptisms, and Christian marriage were subject to additional fees. In 1913, fees for baptism were only 1 shilling, and for Christian marriage, 10 shillings, paid by the groom. But by 1941, Epworth charged 6 shillings for baptism. Members were also pushed to pay contributions to the Annual Missionary Collection and other special collections. Membership in the active church women’s organization had a separate additional set of costs. Under normal circumstances, class money—tickets—were relatively trivial, especially for wage earners who were generally earning at least £1 to £2 per month. But class money applied to all church members, men, women, and adolescents. And the church did not offer
remittances in times of hardship, falling commodity prices, or ongo-
ing unemployment. Instead, during the financial crises of the 1920s and 1930s, the mission pushed for more systematic payment of ticket money. Administrative decisions involving ticket money were guided explicitly by the needs of the church, not by believers' poverty or ability to pay.

Repeatedly, missionaries and ministers admonished local evangelists to collect ticket money systematically. African ministers and evangelists found that their mission superiors, the white missionaries who controlled staffing, salaries, and placements, judged them according to how effectively they managed to collect the ticket money. Rapidly, ministers' visits became closely associated with payment of money. In situations where this payment was seen as necessary rather than onerous, circuit quarterly meetings might even request more visits by European ministers to spur giving, or at least provide the ministers with a firsthand understanding of how congregations were sacrificing to pay.

European missionaries emphasized ticket money not merely for its own sake, but as a sign that the congregations were committed to Christian lives and identities. The money was the key symbol of Africans' commitments and priorities, rather than primarily a resource for white missionary use and control. It was the basis for Wesleyan hopes of an African self-supporting church, as opposed to a church supported out of charitable contributions from abroad. Missionary salaries, however, came from Britain, with government co-payments for those who performed educational duties. The bulk of the money to operate and expand the Wesleyan churches/schools of the 1920s and 1930s came from the government, which effectively subcontracted almost all education for Africans out to missions that received government grants-in-aid in return for meeting certain minimal educational standards.

Ticket money was explicitly earmarked for African agency, and translated directly into salaries and resources for African ministers, evangelists, and local preachers. At six pence per church member per quarter, an evangelist needed at least 120 paying members to fund a minimal, £1 per month, salary. Few if any congregations were this large. And better-qualified evangelists and ministers asked for notably higher salaries, or found employment as teachers with other missions prepared to pay better wages. Initially, the concept of a self-supporting, self-reliant, self-governing African church was something that European missionaries simply approved of on general principles. But during the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, as remittances from England decreased and government funding became uncertain (the
quota system led to across-the-board cuts of 25 percent during the early 1930s), European missionaries did increasingly emphasize local fund-raising and the ideal of a self-supporting African church, and their own successes in maintaining and expanding the network of Wesleyan evangelism became increasingly contingent on Africans' payments. In 1929, for example, Reverend Hardaker "appealed for support from all evangelists and other workers in raising circuit funds . . . so that the work of God can proceed . . . money must be raised by the people themselves—it is their work to help themselves." By the 1930s, rural circuits in need of money were engaging in complex maneuvers to transform local believers' agricultural efforts into the cash the system required. By 1931, the missionaries of the Nengubo circuit were acting as marketing agents for local maize so that growers could turn produce into cash.

For European missionaries, who prized conversions and evangelical expansion above notions of quality and elite class formation, ticket money was an important symbol. But for African ministers and evangelists who were being judged according to how effectively they extracted and managed it, and whose salaries were being paid through ticket funds, tickets had an even more serious importance. One of the earliest and most dynamic African ministers of the region, Moses Mfazi, was dismissed primarily for his political views, but the excuse the missionaries gave was that his account books were unclear. Esau Nemapare left the Methodists under similar circumstances. And the same charge was used against Thompson Samkange, another early African minister. For these men, ticket money became a form of tribute. Missionaries expected it, and when it was diverted to local congregational needs, or collected in an irregular fashion, ticket money became a flash point for the dangers and disloyalty of African church leaders.

At lower levels within the church, mission employees resented missionaries' understanding of ticket money as a symbol of church loyalty and affiliation, rather than a sacrificial payment. Ministers who administered and guided circuits, but were not local church members, had the ticket payment requirement waived or received "free tickets" for their full-time devotion to Christian activity. Missionaries insisted, however, that local preachers pay their ticket money and show their tickets at meetings and sacraments, setting a good example for the congregations, of which they were members, not superiors. These lower-level employees however, local preachers who drew little or no salary and experienced serious financial difficulties during the Depres-
motion, argued that if European ministers did not pay ticket money, they, too, should be exempt as church leaders. Both European and African ministers tended to interpret this activism as disloyalty, a failure to deliver on a token payment that constituted a basic form of tribute and membership.36 During the 1930s, quarterly meetings repeatedly forwarded resolutions for the reinstatement of salaries that missionaries had unilaterally cut under the financial strain of the Depression. By 1935, local preachers were refusing to take tickets, rejecting the most basic symbol of adherence to the church, and in some places calling for increased African authority within church governance, effectively suggesting that through unilateral salary reductions the mission had undermined their communal connection.37

Under pressure to collect money despite depression, crop failure, and lack of markets for agricultural commodities, classes began to use creative methods of collecting ticket funds. In areas where local traders had begun to refuse to pay cash for crops, offering only store credit, local churches became marketing agencies. Members were allowed to pay ticket money in grain and requested to do so at the beginning of the harvest in order to yield the best prices.38 The synod even considered altering the Wesleyan rulebook to allow harvest payments to substitute for the four-times-yearly quarterly ticket money.39 Other churches pushed members to either work on a church market garden, or set aside specific gardening plots of their own to grow produce to sell for church fees.40 These, however, were local African initiatives at odds with the Wesleyan image of the church as a community of people who understood how to manage money and resources. White missionaries blocked local efforts to collect ticket money only once a year with the payment of all four quarters’ contribution at harvest time. Though a logical move for people whose incomes were agrarian and annual, such a system would undermine the ongoing, ritually periodic nature of quarterly class money.

The most controversial aspect of this aggressive effort to collect ticket fees even in difficult times, though, was that tickets were enforced not merely by moral suasion or persuasive pleas, but by denial of the benefits of church membership. During the 1920s and 1930s, the mission increasingly purged the membership rolls of one-time members who failed to keep up their ticket money, as well as those who got caught with second wives, beer-brewing operations, or nonmonogamous sexual affairs. Missionaries also used their veto over quarterly meeting resolutions to exclude from participation in the quarterly meetings those church members who had failed to take tickets,
whether through poverty or act of protest, just as they ruled out of order efforts to rewrite mission attitudes toward marriage and alcohol. Missionaries and ministers were intransigent not merely regarding bureaucratic participation, though, but also regarding sacraments. In 1933, Nengubo circuit ruled that no one could take communion without showing their paid-up ticket to the minister officiating. Similar policies were apparently followed in other circuits as well. This restriction of the sacraments to those with money happened despite missionaries’ and ministers’ acknowledgment that under the poverty conditions of the Depression, ticket money was more than many people could afford.

In denying both the quarterly meeting vote, and communion, the principal symbols of community and personal connection with God, the mission was making explicit the connection between money, the Christian community, and God: those who paid gained access. Those who could not or would not pay were put out of the community and kept from approaching God. The connection between fees and God was particularly clear since in the parallel case of nonpayment of school fees, the mission ordered teachers to keep children in school nevertheless: it needed the government grant that was earned by attendance of a given number of students. Since God did not pay directly for those taking Communion, however, nonpayers were turned away in a judgment parallel to the morally based turning away of adulterers, polygynists, beer-brewers, and others who violated church rules.

CONCERTS

Tickets, though, and the organized, institutional apparatus that they supported, were not the only way to approach God, or to connect God and finance. By the 1920s, hard-pressed teacher/evangelists were experimenting with new fund-raisers that were under their own control, unaudited by unsympathetic European ministers. Concerts proved the most successful fund-raisers and community-builders for the more energetic teachers of the Wesleyan Church. From early in the mission encounter, music had been a major constituent of evangelization and school. Government inspectors, indeed, sometimes complained that even reading classes were a form of chanting. These inspectors regularly made fun of the amount of time devoted to singing not merely in Shona or Sindebele, but also in some unintelligible version of English. Church services, too, were very extended, and involved not merely preaching, but also singing and general celebrations that could easily last five hours. Concerts of mission music as fund-raisers for
specific churches and circuits, though, appear to have become prominent only in the 1920s, and grown essential to circuit finances in the 1930s.

The earliest records of fund-raising concerts I have found date to 1908, when someone coordinated an apparently successful fund-raising concert in Bulawayo. Less systematic and controlled than other aspects of church life, concerts were not well recorded in mission records, and African teacher/evangelists may even have actively tried to conceal the scope of their activities as impresarios. By the 1920s, though, evangelists were regularly holding concerts as fund-raisers. And as evangelists became increasingly organized, attending school, training sessions, and evangelists' conventions together, they had increased opportunities to organize joint concerts. From Bulawayo, concerts spread to Epworth (just outside Salisbury), Nengubo circuit, and beyond. Concerts were most effective when held near a labor center, where labor migrants would have actual cash to contribute to the choir they considered the best or to pay the concert coordinator to have their chosen choir sing for longer than the other groups. Whatever side payments or embezzlement occurred, concerts made substantive contributions to circuit funds that became subject to auditing and accounting rules. Nengubo circuit balanced its budget in the 1930s through concerts. In 1935, for example, desperate to stop a string of deficits, Nengubo circuit had at least six concerts between 31 April and 6 July.

Concerts raised substantial amounts of money. Missionaries therefore accepted them reluctantlly. Concerts, though, had consequences. The teacher/evangelists who scheduled and coordinated the concerts sought to maximize revenue by holding the concerts on Saturday night, when most workers could come. They also allowed the concerts, which were not merely performances, but competitive events, to go on and on. Mission and government injunctions that concerts should end by 11:00 P.M. were routinely ignored. Not only did concerts not end by dark (which would have been around 6:00, making it impossible for workers to attend); they frequently did not end by midnight. Sometimes they only broke up at dawn. This created some interesting problems for the missions. Technically, concerts were alcohol-free. The Wesleyan mission was supposed to be dry. Not all concertgoers, though, would be church members, and it might be difficult, after dark, to monitor who was drinking what, especially as the atmosphere sometimes paralleled that of a traditional beer-drink, with singing, dancing, and socializing. Choirs competed with each other as popular entertainment, and might include in their performances elements that
evoked the dance and music of traditional religions, or the sexually suggestive maneuvers of European dance.\textsuperscript{49} Missionaries also complained about smoking (presumably tobacco), which was also off limits to church members, at least at religious events.\textsuperscript{50} Worse yet were community perceptions of the event. Youth traveled to the concert site, sang, listened and spent the night.\textsuperscript{51} Elders skeptical of mission activities found it easy to complain about the moral implications of such events, even if they were chaperoned.

The money concerts raised, though, was so important to evangelists that they repeatedly ignored mission rules intended to bring concerts more closely in line with notions of decorous entertainment. Evangelists flatly rejected efforts to move concerts from Saturday nights to Fridays. Saturday night concerts effectively destroyed any hope of energetic church services on Sunday mornings. Most people went home to sleep. Some people slept through church. Missionaries therefore repeatedly pushed regulations through the synod demanding that concerts be held on Fridays, and end at a reasonable hour. These regulations were ignored in practice, and in 1937 evangelists actually confronted the synod, explaining that all of them had held concerts on Saturdays despite repeated admonitions to stick to Friday.\textsuperscript{52} Nengubo and Epworth, in particular, were known for concerts that were effectively illegal, as youth traveled too far, concerts were held too late at night, and the atmosphere was distinctly different from that of a controlled, disciplined, school classroom or church service.

If ticket money became a form of tribute and a symbolic linkage of African Christians to the institutional structure of the church as a way to God, concerts represented a different form of Christianity, one coordinated by African evangelists rather than white missionaries, and relying on enthusiasm and sensory appeal, rather than reason, schoolbooks, and bureaucratic order. No other mission’s evangelists appear to have pursued the concert strategy as diligently as the Wesleyan Methodists did, but the Wesleyan movement parallels closely in time the emergence of other more charismatic approaches to Christianity under African leadership. Dutch Reformed evangelists became Zionist leaders. American Methodists started having camp meeting revivals. Even Anglicans pursued a revitalization movement. The American Board imported an American evangelist to hold spiritual awakening meetings.

The concert movement, however, complemented rather than rejected hierarchical structures within the Wesleyan Church. For all the defiance of synod regulations, concerts were coordinated by African evan-
elists and local preachers and teachers not as an independent movement, but as an entrepreneurial version of Wesleyan Christianity in which mediation between God and the community was not the European-controlled formal mission structure, but the inspirational moments arranged by African evangelists and impresarios. The ticket money, with its systematic structure and association with methods of labor control, constructed money as a link between a disciplined people and an institutionalized God. The concert movement spurred entertainment and enthusiasm, unsystematic gifts to those who provided the entertainment, and moments of inspiration.

SCHOOL FEES

If ticket money was about institutions, and concerts about the enthusiasm and inspiration of the moment, school fees were about the construction of a future. From the beginning of the twentieth century, the Wesleyan mission supplied teachers to communities in response to communities’ requests, gifts, and payments. If communities paid more, they got more highly qualified teachers. If payments fell short, and parents failed to volunteer work on school gardens, the mission withdrew its teachers, and sometimes closed the schools. In Wesleyan areas, close to wage work opportunities in Bulawayo and Salisbury, parents were generally willing to pay for even preliminary education in very basic outschools. Furthermore, the Wesleyan central institutions, particularly Nengubó/Waddilove, rapidly gained status, to the point that parents paid quite hefty tuitions of several pounds a term to send their sons to this elite school.

The mission received money for schools not merely from students and parents, but also from the government, under a system of administration that paid a capitation fee for each student. By the mid-1920s, therefore, Wesleyan school financing rested on local sources: parent and student payments, government capitation grants, and the sale of school garden products. The British mission society provided only capital improvement grants, and the salaries of some missionaries and a very few African agents.

In some ways, the school became even more central than the church as the fundamental institution of Rhodesian Wesleyan Christianity. The evangelists and local preachers, who staffed the preaching circuits on Sundays, worked five days a week running a variety of outschools. The government helped fund the mission’s training program for evangelists only when that training program increased the qualifications of
teachers. By the mid-1920s, financial discussions reflected this lack of distinction between school and church activities by amalgamating school fees and ticket money and rejecting would-be evangelists and local preachers if they lacked government-recognized academic qualification as suitable teachers. Evangelists and ministers were key participants in the formation of the teachers' unions; though some ministers and evangelists wished for a more spiritual church, the school was the place where African Christianity in Southern Rhodesia happened.

Under the tight financial constraints of the Depression, the mission made even stronger efforts to extract school fees than it had to secure ticket money or concert fund-raisers. It experimented with a variety of approaches. Initially attempting to maximize government grants even when parents became unwilling or unable to pay school fees, it ordered that students be pressured to pay, but allowed to attend school even without money, in order to secure the government capitation grant. This strategy proved problematic, though, given government cuts in funding under the “quota system” (25 percent across-the-board funding cuts), and parents’ reluctance or difficulty in paying for their children’s education, as they rejected unpaid work on mission gardens and in mission construction projects. By 1936, this strategy had proven untenable. In Wedza circuit, therefore the mission threatened to close schools, and began demanding that students without books and slates be expelled. This policy of school closings and expulsion grew when the government began demanding that all students have books and slates, and that those without them be supplied with equipment from the teachers’ own salary. The idea was to make teachers enforce the regulations. In practice, however, teachers were squeezed as the amounts of money coming in decreased, while demands from missions continued. In this context, the popularity of the concerts among teachers desperate to raise cash becomes understandable, as does parents’ contentions in some areas that teachers were embezzling money from concert receipts.

In the schools, the linkage between payments and control became bluntly clear, however, as the schools moved from the parent-funded institutions of the 1910s to the government and regulated institutions of the 1930s. In the process, the mission which initially built schools as churches, and continued to view schools as primarily evangelical institutions, watched but was unable to fund intervention as its native agents redefined themselves from being the evangelical agents of the early years, into teacher/evangelists, and then into the increasingly professional teach-
ers of the 1930s who formed teaching associations and identified themselves according to education.

ISSUES

The Wesleyan Methodists in Southern Rhodesia were one of the most progressive, even radical, missions in the country. Early on, missionaries such as John White and Frank Noble had exposed the British South Africa Company abuses and fought government forced labor, high taxes for Africans, and segregationist land policies. Heads of their mission, especially John White, were among the most prominent local spokesmen for African rights in the region. And at Waddilove they provided some of the best education for Africans available in Southern Rhodesia. Yet the mission paralleled the conservative Dutch Reformed Mission in its aggressive efforts to assess and regularly collect "donations," its innovative efforts by teachers to raise funds from the African community independently of mission audits, and its increasingly harsh efforts to collect school fees from all scholars, from the elite at the central schools to the first-year students learning the alphabet and catechism.

The close structural parallels between the Wesleyans and the DRC suggest that the mission’s obsessive focus on money was a function not of some racist or exploitative attitude toward the African population, but of a deeper, less malleable sense accepted by both white missionaries and local Christian communities that money and Christianity were intimately and inextricably connected.61

Mission rules regarding tickets implied that, for the Wesleyans, no African without money was worth being included in the Christian community. And this was more than just an implication: Christians required ticket money, tax money, funds for clothes, soap, and children’s school fees. They had to forswear revenues from their daughters’ bridewealths, and find some way other than beer parties to collect the labor necessary for harvesting and land clearance. Being wealthy in the traditional sense, with plenty of family, wives, children, and cattle, with sufficient funds to throw the occasional beer party, was not a Christian characteristic. Instead, Christians required monetary wealth. They expected God to provide it. Often, God did, as "mission boys" frequently had skills in English, crafts, arithmetic, and literacy, which facilitated monetized life. Money, therefore, became the key link between Christian status and the Christian God.

The tickets and class monies linked church members to an audited church community, carefully structured with a responsible hierarchy.
Money was so important as a part of the Christian message, though, that it did not vanish even when teachers and evangelists sought to move outside of the disciplined structure, and into the world of concerts and charisma. Money and the maximum return on investment, rather than church regulations or the needs of the Sunday church services, dominated this spiritual interaction as well. The linkage was, indeed, not merely a function of teachers’ efforts, but so deeply embedded in the consciousness of those who attended that when a rival mission held a revival meeting at which they failed to collect an offering, the listeners reportedly felt cheated of their chance to thank God.\(^6^2\) The close tie between money and God, however, meant that when the money came from government, as it did in mission schools fallen on hard times, the schools became increasingly secular no matter how many pronouncements the government made regarding the need for a Christian message in the schools.

Mission efforts during the early years of the twentieth century taught a solid connection between God and money, a connection that proved one of the most enduring facts of the mission legacy, a connection that persisted even when it failed to serve missionary purposes. Initially, ticket money was a form of tribute, a linkage to God, and a way of providing for commoners’ connections to the institutions of Christianity. Ticket money indeed provided the basis for more participatory and intense organization in the Methodist Church than was common in other denominations. Building on this conceptual linkage, teacher/evangelists had, by the 1920s and 1930s, begun to promote money as a form of prayer. The concerts, with the enthusiasm and donations they promoted, provided for a less institutional, more spontaneous connection between the individual believer and God, but they remained fund-raising concerts, and that connection was mediated by cash. In this context, where both institutionalized belief and spontaneous prayer were intimately tied to money, missionary efforts proved untenable when missions tried, in the face of decreased missionary funds and increased reliance on government grants, to convince evangelists that they could be faithful to God and serve as Christian leaders without reasonable amounts of money. These Christian leaders had absorbed the conceptual linkage between money and God. For them, increasingly secular efforts to pursue better training, more respect, and higher wages were necessary parts of their faith. Modeling themselves on the missionaries who had consistently judged loyalty, taught faith, and pursued evangelism through audits and fund-raising, they, too, followed money.
Teachers’ increasing secularization, organization, and pursuit of money rather than evangelization during the 1930s and 1940s were not contradictions of their mission role as evangelists and local preachers. Instead, this pursuit of money grew directly from long-standing mission traditions. It was the European missionaries, rather than the African believers, who suddenly switched their policies when earlier practices began to fail them. But in the segregated, white-dominated context of Southern Rhodesia, it was hard for missionaries, however self-sacrificing they perceived themselves to be, to be convincing when they lived on salaries 5 to 10 times that of the highest paid Africans, with housing and school benefits denied to even elite African ministers, and informed African agents that they must pursue faith, not money. African agents tended to retain a belief in pursuing their faith by making money, and saw a moral and religious connection between money and God.63

Southern Rhodesian mission Christianity was an immensely worldly phenomenon, embedded in a specific colonial context, a local pattern of racism, and the economic realities of Rhodesia’s monetization, boom and bust. In this context, the explicit linkage between money and faith mostly served the missions well. Though congregations rarely proved affluent enough to achieve full self-support without mission subventions and government schooling grants, the ideal of responsible government by ticket-takers was a remarkably democratic, though frequently overruled, method of assuring that members would cultivate their church and circuit rather than seeing it as a gift, a source of plunder, or an otherworldly patron. The concerts and similar revival meetings allowed people to experience the more ecstatic aspects of faith, while nevertheless keeping afloat the institutions that provided a context and support for people’s momentary inspirations. Even school fees, which were to become a flash point for controversy as families found them difficult to pay, forced families to take education seriously as investments for their children’s future.

Yet the emphasis on money, which gave church members, evangelists, and parents such strong stakes in and senses of ownership over church resources, proved fundamentally problematic for missions over the longer term. Terence Ranger, in his book, “Are We Not Also Men?” has emphasized how the Wesleyan mission provided a basis for an African nationalism, growing out of Africans’ resentment of white missionaries, a resentment that grew as privileged missionaries cut Africans’ salaries, proved reluctant to actually hand authority and resources to Africans, and blocked African teachers’ efforts to innovate.
and develop the churches. J. Keith Rennie emphasized similar points in his study of the relatively liberal American Board mission, and M.L. Daneel’s examinations of the roots of breakaway Shona churches point to parallel tensions.

Mission emphasis on money and control, though, was more than just a general phenomenon producing general resentments. It, like much of the display of white power and African deference in the region, was most explicit in its use of specific, concrete objects. The communion ticket, without which a believer had no right to the sacrament, paralleled the poll tax and pass, without which an African man could not move around the country. Concert funds provided a concrete way to judge religious enthusiasm in pounds, shillings, and pence, analogous to the way European observers noted workers’ more worldly enthusiasm by their store purchases, put away in boxes and paid for on time. And the school fees, in a region that provided free education for white children, expressed both marginalization and aspiration, as Africans faced the reality of denial of resources and the hope that in the future they would be able to do more.

Christianity, morality, and money were inextricably linked in the Southern Rhodesia of the early twentieth century, to the point where violations of the material code, such as a preacher talking without his jacket on a warm summer day, or an evangelist unable to afford his own hymn book and gospels, counted as a violation of the faith. When poverty made it difficult for some congregation members and evangelists to adhere to Christian material codes, their failures were judged not as poverty, but as moral failings.64

Becoming Christian in Southern Rhodesia in the interwar years was a clear, formal process for both individuals and communities. From the individual’s perspective, it meant going to school long enough to become literate, finding some way to earn the money necessary for not just taxes, but also school fees, church contributions, and the material necessities of Christian life, ranging from key books to Westernized clothes and soap. From a community’s perspective, becoming Christian meant assembling the money necessary to sponsor and maintain a school, with teacher/evangelist and school farm. Individuals and groups celebrated and subsidized this institutional conversion through the concerts that peaked during difficult times. And conversion transformed the way Christians raised their children as they sent children to others for schooling, rather than raising them at home, in a material and substantive declaration of how the future would be one of change rather than continuity. Money did not simply sponsor missionization; it was woven into the many meanings of what Chris-
Christianity could bring, not in a mere quantitative sense, but in the qualitative reconstruction and re-creation of community it brought as individuals, families, and congregations, getting and spending money in new ways for new wants and needs, remade their society.

NOTES

1. For example, see David Maxwell, Christians and Chiefs in Zimbabwe: A Social History of the Hwesa People (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), which focuses on the 1950s and 1960s in a remote part of Rhodesia, but describes the processes of conversion admirably.

2. See chapter 3.


4. Important works employing variants of this theme include T.O. Beidelman, Colonial Evangelism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982; Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, vols. 1 and 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 1997); and, perhaps most powerfully, Paul S. Landau, Realm of the Word (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995). In addition to these book-length studies, a conference, “Africans Meeting Missionaries,” at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis MN, 1997, assembled a variety of works in progress on similar themes.

5. For many other well-documented missions, either locally held records (as in the case of the American Board mission at Mount Selinda, on the Mozambiquan border) or home records (as in the case of the Jesuits) have been inaccessible.


7. For example, a quarterly meeting which was sufficiently liberal that it endorsed Mrs. Efa Mavu as a local preacher nevertheless exclaimed in horror that “A preacher had appeared in a pulpit without a coat” and reminded all local preachers of the need for suitable dress. Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Epworth, 20-3-37. Methodist House, Harare (MHH). Note that MHH materials are not indexed or boxed in a standardized form.


9. For an early example of this pattern, consider the case of a teacher recruited and initially paid for by the parents of students at Bembesi school, Bulawayo circuit in 1908. According to plan, 30 homes would contribute 15s/- a year (or individual students, six pence a month) in school fees to provide the teacher (probably Robert Njokweni) with an annual salary of £20. But parents stopped paying his salary. By 1911, the school was “very unsatisfactory” and the teacher had resigned. The missionary, however, offered to send John Faku, a highly qualified Mfengu teacher, if
the people would pay at least half his salary. The community agreed, but they failed to keep their agreement. So the mission substituted Thomas Mniki, a less qualified man, at a lower salary, threatening that if the community did not pay at least enough to support Mniki, the mission would close school and church, since “the people were in a position to pay for the education of their children,” and the region suffered from an acute teacher shortage. At other locations, such as Sipongweni, the mission carried through on its threatened closures. Quarterly Meeting (QM) Minutes, Native Church, Bulawayo, 16-7-07; 17-10-07; 16-7-08; 4-7-11; 13-9-11; 27-12-10; 9-9-13; 19-3-14; 23-12-14. MHH.

10. See David Maxwell, *Christians and Chiefs*, who discusses the Hwesa as Cinderella people, only brought into the movements in the 1950s.


12. Muzorewa, *Rise Up and Walk*, 33. This approach went back to David Livingstone, and had been reinforced in the 1920s by the Phelps-Stokes Commission.

13. I’ve written about these disappointments in chapter 1. For a Methodist example, however, consider the wave of school strikes and student activism that hit Tegwani and other institutions in the late 1930s and early 1940s. See for example, Principal’s Interim Report, 21-3-39, MHH, which reported eight students implicated in a break-in and burglary of the school safe and a strike by all students except prefects and evangelists. Epworth, meanwhile, reported a fire that might have been arson during a period where government inspectors complained of the school’s inefficiency and wastefulness. Minute Book of the Epworth Committee, July 1941, MHH.

14. John White, Chair, Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Nengubô Circuit, 26-9-24, MHH.

15. Records were not always well kept. For example, one of the most frequent injunctions in the minutes of the Quarterly Meeting, Bulawayo, was for teachers to keep records more systematically. See Minutes of the Quarterly Meetings, Native Church, Bulawayo, 5-4-11; 4-7-11; 26-3-12; 7-8-15; 24-5-16, MHH.

16. The Wedza circuit was particularly vocal on the subject of congregations who failed to maintain churches and cultivate for the school. (Wedza Circuit materials: Quarterly Meeting Minutes, 1935–40, MHH). Minutes of the Synod held 11–17 January 1922, MHH, discusses (and approves) the formation of local societies.


18. Discussions of how to collect ticket money came up regularly in Quarterly Meeting Minutes. The Nengubô Quarterly Meeting, 2-12-33, resolved unanimously that church members must show their paid-up tickets before Communion. Minute Book, MHH. Others followed the same rules, and, when they became lax, remembered earlier times of checking tickets before Communion with nostalgia. Epworth Circuit, Quarterly Meeting Minutes, 29-3-41, MHH. Barbara Moss, in her excellent study of the Ruwaldzano movement (Methodist women’s movement), refers to tickets as the basis for rights to land on mission farms, rather than access to mission services (“Holding Body and Soul Together: Women,
Autonomy and Christianity in Colonial Zimbabwe” [Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1991]). This explanation does not work well, however, given that even in urban areas where individuals held no land from the mission, they were still obliged to take out tickets. Tickets were a function of membership. Individuals paid additional rents for mission lands.

19. Epworth Circuit Quarterly Meeting Minutes, 28-12-24, MHH.

20. The African minister who proposed this received a free ticket by virtue of his status in the church. Nengubo Quarterly Meeting Minutes, 2-12-22, MHH.

21. Rhodesia District Synod Minutes for 1913, MHH.

22. Epworth, Quarterly Meeting Minutes, 29-3-41, MHH.


25. Moss argues that prior to 1931, ticket money was sometimes waived for widows living on mission farms but that after that, it was systematically required for all. Moss, “Holding Body and Soul Together,” 115. Quarterly Meeting and Synod minutes from the 1930s recorded an increased demand for systematic collections of ticket money, as well as an increase in ticket fees. For examples, see the minutes from quarterly meetings at Epworth, Nengubo, and Wedza, where the meeting announced “Christians must show faith with gifts,” Wedza Quarterly Meeting Minutes, 27-2-37, MHH.

26. For examples, see the minutes of Quarterly Meeting at Bulawayo (5-1-24); Discipline Cases Notebook for Kwenda (Historical Record, 1927); and Epworth Quarterly Meeting, 6-6-25 and 21-9-25, MHH.

27. Report of the Chimanza Circuit and Report of the Bulawayo Circuit, Minutes of the Synod of the Rhodesia District, 4–12 January 1921. SOAS WMMS Box 349. From Chimanza, the minister complained that because he only visited most congregations when they were collecting ticket money, his visits were associated with payment. And in the Bulawayo circuit the minister reported, “The native ministers of the circuit are of mind that more frequent visits by the European minister are necessary . . . [and would produce more ticket money].” See also, for Anglican example, the way that congregations came to associate proper services with money in the Anglican Church: Olive Lloyd to Friends, 17-9-33, NAZ ANG 16/11/1.

28. The Wesleyan attitude on this, and I believe the attitude of most of the missions, was different from the practices of the Dutch Reformed Church or the Jesuits. In the DRC, individual missionaries became personally wealthy as a result of African contributions (see chapter 1). The Jesuit mission apparently used student labor in its quarry to finance mission expansion beyond Chishawasha (see L. Vambe, An Ill-Fated People).

29. Calculations are complicated because most evangelical workers also taught. Thus their salaries were underwritten to some degree by the government. A school, however, was supposed to have a teacher for every 40 to 50 pupils. Thus a congregation with 120 members might be sending 200 children to school, and need to pay
four teacher/evangelists rather than just one. Such schools were rarely fully staffed. Schools tried to make up the funding gap through freewill offerings, concerts, and, significantly, school gardens, at which parents and students were required to work. Complex revenue and expenditure patterns make even honest mission bookkeeping hard to follow. Account Books, MHH. In 1938, the quarterly meeting at Nengubbo/Waddilove joined the regular refrain from other missions complaining about “the growing tendency for . . . trained teachers to accept appointments in other Missions in preference to those available in their own church.” Minute Book, Nengubbo Quarterly Meeting, 20-9-38, MHH. I discuss teachers’ decisions in chapter 1 and chapter 4.

30. Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Epworth, 6-4-29, MHH.

31. See, for example, Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Nengubbo, 8-9-31, MHH, where the principal agrees to take mealies for class money at the rate of 4 shillings per bag. Produce from school gardens was also widely seen as a way of earning basic revenue. For example, QM Minutes, Nengubbo, 12-4-32; 4-9-32; 5-12-32; 4-4-44, MHH. By the late 1930s, the practice was sufficiently standardized that quarterly meetings merely reiterated that church contributions in maize should be given at the beginning, not the end, of the harvest period so that the mission would be able to sell the grain for the best prices. QM Minutes, Nengubbo, 2-4-38; 2-7-38, MHH.

32. Note that Mfazi was hardly the only minister with unclear accounts. Many of the European ministers were acknowledged by their peers as hopeless from an economic point of view. Missionaries Burman and Howarth lacked enough education and were merely craftsmen. And the mission chairman in Southern Rhodesia complained of James Stewart, D.W. Evans, and Frank Ockenden that “Indeed a great amount of my time is taken up in going to Circuits and trying to extricate these raw lads out of financial and administrative tangles from which a little common sense would have saved them.” Frank Noble to Thompson, 27-11-33, SOAS, WMMS Box 834.


34. Minutes of synod held 8–16 January 1919, MHH.

35. In his examination of the Samkange family, one of the most prominent early Methodist families in Rhodesia, Terence Ranger argues that accusations of financial improprieties were not based on real misappropriations, but on a failure to acknowledge local autonomy and local uses for church funds. See the discussion of how Thompson and Grace Samkange raised both their own and foster children, promoted education, and built local institutions with ties to nationalism, rather than mere patronage ties with the mission. Ranger, “Are We Not Also Men?”.

36. See the discussions at the Epworth Quarterly Meeting, 1935, MHH.

37. The mission needed local preachers (LPs), but viewed their level of commitment with suspicion. In 1921, for example, when LPs petitioned Epworth circuit for the mission to issue them hymn books, so they did not need to buy them, the missionary chair responded that “the question re hymn books and testaments should never have arisen. A man who did not possess them was not
equipped to serve as a local preacher." Stanlake, Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Epworth, 14-6-21. By 1925, local preachers were coming to quarterly meetings without tickets, as a way of putting pressure on the missionary in charge, who responded by issuing more stern warnings. QM Minutes, Epworth, 6-6-21; 5-4-30; 20-6-31, MHH. Local preachers and other delegates responded to their criticisms by arguing that church leaders with free tickets should give some offering at the time of the issuing of their membership tickets, showing Christian duty and love for God, lest they be accused of receiving the gifts of God all year, without giving back, a hypocrisy which would indicate that love was dead. Leaders' Meeting, 21-9-25, Epworth, MHH.

38. E.g., Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Nengubô Circuit, 1938, MHH.
39. See Quarterly Meeting Minutes for Selukwe and Wedza Circuits, 1936, MHH. This idea had been unsuccessfully suggested earlier by J. Butler who worried that "Whether our system of quarterly tickets is the best one for a community which grows and sells its crops once a year is, I think, open to question and it would be worth while considering whether it would not be better to have one yearly ticket and one annual payment. Chimanzu Circuit Report, 1921, in Minutes of the Synod of the Rhodesia District, 4 to 12 January 1921, WMMS Box 349.

40. E.g., Kwenda QM, 1935, Nengubô QM 1930.
41. Other missions pursued other alternatives. See chapter 1 for a discussion of DRC work parties, and the Jesuit lime quarries are discussed by L. Vambe, An Ill-Fated People. The LMS apparently relied on market gardening. Barbara Moss suggests that the American Methodist (as opposed to the Wesleyan Methodist) turn toward revivals and concerts was closely linked to the enthusiasms for fertility and motherhood and spirituality generated within the Ruwadzano movement ("Holding Body and Soul Together," p. 136). She may be right, but needs more evidence, especially since much of the scattered material suggests that teachers (and not their wives, who were Ruwadzano members) were the key organizers of concerts and spiritual meetings. Critics' fears about meetings (not an unbiased source, but a suggestive one) also seem to suggest that married women (Ruwadzano members) were not the key participants in charismatic meetings. Instead, critics emphasize teachers', male and female students', and young men's participation. Ranger, however, quoted Reverend Thompson Samkange as resisting government efforts to stop concerts by arguing that "Since I have been in the Ministry, I have never tried a case where the immorality took place at a concert. . . . It is said that concerts should be prohibited and that anybody holding a Concert be prosecuted. I feel it would be an injustice. Africans have night dances as well as Europeans . . . Concert is the only social entertainment which the Christian Africans have as all native dances have been condemned as HEATHEN." (Samkange, 1944, quoted in Ranger, "Are We Not Also Men?" 80.)
42. Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Bulawayo, 8-10-08, MHH.
43. Indeed, the best available institutional history of the Wesleyan Mission, CJM Zvobgo's work, does not discuss them at all. In a novel set around this time, however, concerts (along with football) are described as one of the major communal activities of young men in Bulawayo. Ndabaningi Sithole, The Polygamist (New York: Third Press, 1972), 112.
44. See, for hints of how the system worked, the discussion at an Epworth Staff Meeting, 10-11-38, MHH, where Mr. M'Kombacato said that choirs collected money to give to the concert chairman to sing, but the parents (who were requested to provide this seed money) generally thought that the teachers collecting it “have a chance of robbing a good deal of the money.” Other speakers asserted that money paid to the chair to enable choirs to sing “is their own choice.” As a reform measure, the meeting concluded that all children should individually pay for admittance, whether singing or not, and that “The man in the audience should be given the chance to offer for whichever choir he likes to listen to.” This attempt to bypass teachers’ role in collecting money and sponsoring choirs was evidently very controversial. Though accounting is sparse (and would include only money paid for entry or honestly declared by the concert chair, not paid to teachers), one concert at Epworth in 1925 collected receipts of £10/5s./9d., set against an expense of £2/19s./10d. Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Epworth, 1925, MHH.

45. Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Nengubó Circuit, 1935–6, MHH.

46. Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Epworth, 21-10-33, MHH.

47. See Mather’s complaint and Samkange’s response regarding all-night concerts. Ranger, “Are We Not Also Men?” 79–80.

48. Beer—less for concerts than for work teams at harvest time—was a serious point of tension between the mission and the local churches. Not just ordinary church members, but local preachers and even evangelists routinely violated the mission’s prohibition on beer-brewing and consumption. See, for example, Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Wedza, 6-10-36 and 21-6-47, MHH.

49. At Nengubó in 1931, for example, meeting participants objected to “some of the features of the big school-children’s gathering at Samriwo. Opinion was divided as to the character of some of the action songs.” Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Nengubó, 2-12-31, MHH. European dancing was generally seen by Africans in Southern Rhodesia as lewd, since men and women danced together, rather than separately.

50. Ironically, Europeans attending these concerts were the worst offenders regarding smoking. Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Epworth, 29-3-41, MHH.

51. For example, Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Epworth, 26-3-38, MHH.

52. Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Epworth, 16-3-33; 20-11-37; 26-3-38; Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Nengubó, 25-9-37, MHH.

53. Ranger’s study of the Samkanges does suggest linkages between concerts, schools, and nationalism. And the controversy over Pakame definitely brought all together. On the other hand, the Samkanges remained within the church. Their actions in this generation fit a model of entrepreneurial action better than one of breakaway nationalism, though clearly, by the 1940s, nationalist institutions were beginning to become a viable and attractive option. For a more generational model of African intellectual movements, see Flora Veit-Wild, Teachers, Preachers and Non-Believers: A Social History of Zimbabwean Literature (Harare: Baobab, 1993).

54. See, for example, the controversy over schools described in chapters 1 and 2.

55. Even non-Methodists recognized Waddilove’s prestige value: J.D. Rubatika remembered that despite his father’s fervent Anglicanism, his father had sent him to Waddilove as the best available schooling. John Daniel Rubatika, oral history interview by Dawson Munjeri, 3-7-79, National Archives of Zimbabwe, AOH 57.

56. For example, Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Bulawayo, 1924, MHH.
57. Thompson Samkange, for example, complained about this, wishing that things could have been more spiritual. Ranger, "Are We Not Also Men?" 81.

58. This was not a purely humanitarian gesture for the children. The financial motive was explicit in the directive. (1932 and Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Nengubo, 1934, MHH).

59. Note that education for European children was free, paid for from general tax revenues, to which African taxpayers contributed.

60. Quarterly Meeting Minutes, Epworth, 1938, MHH.

61. Colleen McDannell, Material Christianity: Religion and Popular Culture in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 4–16, evokes the connections between the spiritual and the material in the comprehension and practice of religion. She suggests that we explore material connections not as a means of denigrating popular faith, but as a means of reassessing a misleading dichotomy between spiritual and material. Her suggestions are directly relevant in the Rhodesian context.


63. This comes through clearly in Ranger’s discussion of the Samkange family in “Are We Not Also Men?” It can also be detected in the writing of elite Africans who evoked their status through their material possessions. See, for example, Walter Chipwayo’s inventory of what he lost in a house fire, or George Mhlanga’s discussion of the basics necessary for civilized life in his complaints about working for the DRC.

64. These judgments were made by African Christians as well as by missionaries. See, for fictional examples, Tsitsi Dangarembga, Nervous Conditions (London: Women’s Press, 1988), 122–48, where her narrator Tambudzai and the educated school superintendent saw close connections between poverty and dubious marriages, or the teacher’s horrified anticipation of his mission-educated fiancée’s reaction to the failure of his father to buy clothes and goods in the Christian style in Sithole, The Polygamist, 122–27.
MISSION BOYS, CIVILIZED MEN, AND MARRIAGE: EDUCATED AFRICAN MEN IN THE MISSIONS, 1920–1945

In segregated Southern Rhodesia, settler, government, and mission observers frequently perceived African men’s power as fundamentally dangerous to white-led development. Settlers complained when Africans sought recognition, whether as senior men or as “mission boys.” Government officials became irritated with senior men they viewed as old troublemakers and lost patience entirely with younger men who threatened headmen’s and messengers’ authority. Mission observers were explicitly manipulative in their relationships with senior non-Christian men and, despite missions’ reliance on African evangelists and teachers to spread networks of mission Christianity beyond the white-run mission stations, missionaries tended to regard African Christians as either objects of pity or, if powerful, potential threats. This chapter will—in an admittedly speculative fashion—explore how some African men used Christian marriages to educated women to establish identities for themselves as powerful, relatively independent Christian men. Not just as mission boys.

For African men tied to missions, achieving social maturity could be difficult. Maturity in the colonial Zimbabwean context tended to be rooted in material, social, and political characteristics. An adult man had his
own home, farm, cattle, and tools and worked for himself, rather than handing over wages to a father or patron. An adult man was married with children, and his wife or wives deferred to his authority and worked on his land. As he and his family paid _lobola_ (bridewealth) to acquire a wife and begin his family, received lobola for daughters as they married out, and helped a son to assemble lobola to marry and begin a new generation, the man became a patriarch tied into a social network of families who gave and received lobola. An adult man had his own pass, paid his own taxes, and spoke for himself before headmen and paramounts, rather than being spoken for in his absence by an authoritative father, teacher, or government official.

Teachers who pursued this relatively agrarian model of adulthood could be highly successful in the early years of mission activity in colonial Zimbabwe. Lorenzo, for example, earned money for teaching and evangelization while developing a farm, building a house, and establishing himself in local politics. He acquired enough maturity to reject missionaries' efforts to transfer him to a new field and direct the labor of his wife and children.¹ And Frank Sixubu, a South African immigrant evangelist, bought a 600-acre farm near Salisbury, established a private location, and employed dozens of people in minding his farm, cattle, and interests, giving him an uncontested status as an important man.²

But though early missionaries had no choice but to rely on such men, they tended to distrust their initiative, drive, and success. Whether it was Jesuit missionaries remarking suspiciously on Lorenzo's "houses" or American Methodist missionaries publicly declaring that they had considered how much authority could be safely entrusted to African church leaders, and had concluded the answer was not much,³ missionaries tried to maintain control and oversight over all activities of their African employees. They assumed, accurately or not, that their employees were not local notables, but servants detached from specific communities who could be moved from post to post. Regardless of African evangelists' ages, missions viewed them as employees subject to white missionaries' paternal control, not as fathers and patriarchs.⁴

By the 1920s and 1930s, though, missions were beginning to acknowledge, prodded by government demands for more efficient teaching and by their home committees' efforts at economizing, that the success of their activities relied on effective African teachers, preachers, and evangelists. Effectiveness, though, required the missions to accept new levels of independence and authority on the part of Afri-
can men. Effective mission training had to produce not permanent dependency, but the possibility of mature, successful, civilized, adulthood.

Under pressure from the government and home committees, reluctant missions such as the Anglicans and Roman Catholics began to fall into line. After years of pro forma discussion, the Anglicans at their 1924 meeting explicitly discussed educational policy (as opposed to mere evangelism). By the 1926 meeting, the missionaries had a policy, albeit a minimal one. The new policy granted pay increments to acknowledge every increment of piety and evangelical status. Rewards for academic achievement were less systematic, demonstrating the mission’s primarily evangelical concerns. Policy changes that favored trained teachers faced stiff opposition from missionaries who complained that the new teachers were less concerned with faith than the older, less educated men had been. By 1930, Jesuit missions, too, were complaining that they had fallen to the rear of the educational movement, noting that they had few effective teachers, and that too many of the more educated teachers (Standard V and above) were more trouble than they were worth, refusing moves because of poor health conditions in reserves, rejecting “Chizezuru” language schooling in Manyikaland, and modeling their teaching on “white” teachers, rather than on indigenous models.

As all missions, desperate for funds, worked to meet increasing government demands, they complained of government inspectors’ interference, of government requirements that demanded skilled work at unskilled pay, and of the government’s emphasis on academic and industrial over evangelical and religious values.

But while missions protested administrative regulation and, on occasion, flatly mocked the pretensions of government school inspectors, they recognized them as legitimate. The missions protested to each other, to their families back at home, and through channels in the administration. The administration, though, however unjust it might on occasion appear, clearly was able to make rules for its territory.

The period from the end of the First World War through the Second World War was, however, a period where the missions created a class of Christian men who were to challenge mission authority in far more threatening ways than the government’s educational policy had attempted. During this period, education was one of the most tumultuous aspects of mission activity in Southern Rhodesia. Students struck for a variety of reasons. Teachers struck. Parents kept children from mission schools in favor of alternatives. Communities fought (sometimes violently) over control of the local schools. Mission educational
development programs brought missions into direct conflict with government officials.

Within this context, dynamic, energetic, increasingly well-educated African men had opportunities. Missions needed teachers and ministers at outstations. Missions could not function without educated staff at central institutions. And missions also wanted Africans to take over administrative work such as supervising the boarding houses and administering mission farms and enterprises.

But missionaries' suspicion of Africans' power or success remained. African teachers who commandeered student labor, staked out extensive personal or school farms in land-poor regions, demanded higher salaries, sought skilled pay for sideline handicrafts, and sold school produce at a profit, all violated mission and government rules. Teachers who reinterpreted evangelical teachings to an African context, holding to lobola, supporting ideas of multiple wives, and rejecting missionaries' definitions of morality and Christian family life, violated mission rules. Even teachers who were in some way too uppity—who allowed untrained men to join the preaching on Sunday, demanded wage increases, rejected reassignments, or simply talked back and left the mission society that had trained them in favor of another that paid better wages—were problems. And missions justified draconian responses to relatively minor problems by pointing to major problems—sexual abuse of pupils and congregation members, explicit Zionist or political activity, and financial misconduct. Father O’Hea, a Jesuit priest, made the connections between all sorts of misconduct clear when he denounced pupil unrest and teachers’ political activity in 1930 in a letter to a colleague, complaining

Unfortunately, to my way of looking at it, they are treated FAR too softly. I wouldn’t give that chap [who had threatened to leave if demands were not met] a chance of giving up—I’D FIRE HIM AT THE TOE OF MY BOOT. Close his school and give a jaw to the Christians who were any good round about it letting them see that such Bolshies brought nothing but trouble and unhappiness. The older people see this like a shot . . . NOTHING but a rod of iron is any use for these people . . . they are utterly blinded by the most foolish vanity.10

Father O’Hea, like some of his colleagues, was relatively outspoken on the issue of mission discipline, linking basic economic demands to political dangers, generational upheaval, and the age-old problem of adolescent vanity. But it is nearly impossible to read through mis-
sion archives without becoming aware of widespread mission suspicion and fear of mission employees. Whether one is more impressed by vitriolic statements like O’Hea’s, by the direct violence of the DRC missionary Orlandini who blinded the recalcitrant father of one truant pupil, or by the actions of a missionary who habitually gave his teachers instructions through the window as they stood on the porch outside his home, evidence rapidly accumulates of the tensions in the relationships between missionaries and mission servants.  

MARRIAGE AS STRATEGY

Despite missions’ tension between need for African servants and fear of them, missions expanded during the 1930s and 1940s as they took responsibility for the education (not just the evangelization) of the African population. Missionaries and African church leaders continued to be able to work together because African men developed some effective strategies for coping with mission concerns, strategies that were more complex than just obedience and deference. These men worked to develop a model of legitimate African male authority within the white-ruled society of Southern Rhodesia.

In earlier chapters, I have examined how men used their educated status to demand respect as professionals, and how men used patronage ties to government and missions as ways of fighting for scarce resources. Here, I want to examine another of the most effective tools available to men who wanted authority and respect within the mission context: companionate marriage with a respectable, skilled, Christian woman and the establishment of a recognizably Christian domestic life. In the past, historians looking at prominent African Christian leaders have tended not to notice their interactions with their wives. If the wives are indeed mentioned, they tend to be viewed as leaders of women’s prayer unions. Barbara Moss’s work has highlighted these prayer unions as a vital part of African Christianity, but while her studies have recovered a history of women’s activity, a new emphasis on African women’s church organizations has not overturned the impression that the mission-run church was centered around men and male leadership.

In his study of the Samkange family, Terence Ranger wrote a history of a family that challenged the assumption that the men who were to become nationalists emerged as individuals: he put a 1929 picture of the Samkange domestic family on the cover, husband in suit and clerical collar, wife in long dress and stylish hat, son in suit, and baby on mother’s lap. Ranger’s work, combined with other works on African women’s
roles in the expansion of mission churches, their experiences of economic change, and the centrality of women to administrative initiatives, reemphasizes how central women were to the experiences of the African Christian community of men and women. But his narrative of Thompson Samkange's rise in the Wesleyan mission nevertheless discusses Grace Samkange primarily in her role as mother to Thompson’s children and foster children.

What I want to argue here, however, is that strategic, successful marriage was critical for African men as a way of not only achieving adulthood, parenthood, and success within African communities, but also managing missionaries’ fundamental discomfort with the autonomy of individual African educated men. Drawing on insights from Ranger’s study, and from other work within Zimbabwe and elsewhere on the meanings of marriage, it is possible to ask a new set of specific questions regarding how African men used Christian domestic marriage to defuse suspicions of mission and government superiors while pursuing a modified form of patriarchal power and authority.

The idea that Christian domestic marriage provided a safe new model for African men’s authority is not new. It is rooted closely in what contemporaries said they worried about, and how they proposed to deal with their problems. Government officials, after all, were uncomfortable with “mission boys” precisely because they were cut loose from traditional family structures, and were therefore, as individuals, harder to discipline and control than family men linked through webs of kinship. In reconnecting the severed man to a newly constituted Christian family, the teacher, evangelist, or clerk was again limited, needing housing, land, and wages, and subject to government administrative control. Missionaries, too, saw Christian marriage as critical to solving their problems with dangerously powerful African men. In early years, they hoped that marriage would prevent teachers’ sexual misconduct as wives would keep their husbands at home. This failed. But missionaries consistently justified women’s education because educated men needed educated brides if the men were not to revert in dangerous ways to earlier practices. Missionaries feared un-Christian girls and women would seduce their male protégés. Christian women, less threatening than men, could be a critical means through which the mission could maintain control over African men even as, by necessity, those men acquired increased autonomy and authority.

While it is fairly easy to locate evidence of officials’ and missionaries’ hopes that Christian marriage would facilitate control over African men, it is much more difficult to find evidence that African men deliberately developed marriage strategies for success within the mission institution.
Men clearly married for reasons that were not merely institutional or economic, but also personal.

Yet regardless of men’s consciousness of marriage as a way of managing their relationship with the missions, successful marriages appear in the various life histories as central to educated men’s ability to remain in good standing with their mission sponsors as they became increasingly powerful and vocal in local Christian communities. Marriage, indeed, sometimes seems to be a more critical factor than the individuals’ ability, deference, or local reputation. In a context with few educated, domestically skilled, eligible African women, winning one of the few represented one form of achievement. And with that achievement, a man acquired a partner who would help him defuse many different types of criticism and difficulties. Ranger’s discussion of Thompson and Grace Samkange’s marriage illustrates this well as he describes Grace Samkange as an underrated source of Thompson’s success: she cultivated a family that incorporated clients in search of an education; established herself as a Ruwadzano leader; and eventually built a family farm in a newly opened Native Purchase Area, a farm that provided the Samkange family with security and status essential in its increasingly tense interactions with mission and administration.

EXEMPLARY MARRIAGES

Ranger’s study of the Samkange family draws upon a unique private archive to reconstruct relationships within the small class of elite Christian Africans. His methodology works particularly well with the rich sources held by the Samkanges. His life-history approach can also, however, be used on skimpier material to explore the argument that African men’s marriages were key to their ability to combine mission approval and community power. American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions materials, which provide reasonable records of the lives of two leading African Christians, one who succeeded in remaining in the mission and one who left, can be examined for insights into how men’s marriages shaped their interactions with the mission during the tensions of the 1930s.

Reverend Dube

One of the men who pursued a marital strategy most effectively was Reverend Hohoza Dube. According to his 1934 autobiographical statement, Dube initially ran away from the rural school near his home. Only
after Simbini Nkomo, the first local man to go to America for school, visited Dube’s home to recruit, did Dube finally start attending regularly, and progress from the rural school to Mount Silinda Institute. In 1909 he went to South Africa for six years of study beyond what was available at Mount Silinda. With a South African teaching certificate, he returned to teach at Mount Silinda in 1915. In 1918, he married his first wife, Kokiwe. Possibly in search of higher wages to support an expanding family, he left the mission for a South African school in 1922. But by 1929, he was willing to return to Mount Silinda to attend a new Bible school designed to train the Board’s first generation of African ministers. The school began with seven men. Three completed it: Dube, Frank Dzukuso, and Magodi Sigauke.

While Dube was in Bible school, his wife Kokiwe died. With four children to care for, it is perhaps unsurprising that he promptly remarried. His new wife, Daisy Hlatywayo, proved critical to his ongoing success. Dube later described his first wife as “kind and good to us. She was a good advisor of mine.” Daisy Hlatywayo’s role, however, extended beyond kindness and domestic advice.

Dube himself was one of the best-educated local Africans employed by the mission in the early 1930s, but the missionaries who commented on him were not particularly impressed. In his early years, they had complained about students who only wanted to go to Natal to study, rather than working for the mission. And as he completed Bible school, the missionary-in-charge summed him up as “not phenomenal” and hinted that Dube and Frank Dzukuso were only ordained because of local pressure for African leadership of the two central churches at Silinda and Chikore. The best that mission commentators had to say about him was that he was reasonably steady.

After marrying Daisy Hlatywayo, however, Dube’s status within the mission community rose dramatically. Part of this was purely the prestige involved in becoming Daisy’s husband. Daisy Hlatywayo was a phenomenon within the American Board mission—a woman constantly pointed to as an ideal African woman. Born to the first local couple married by Christian rites, she attended Mount Silinda all the way up to Standard VI, becoming one of the first women in the country to achieve certification. After teaching at several schools, she went to Hope Fountain in 1929 for training as a home demonstrator. After training in health work and domesticity, she began work at Mount Silinda in January of 1931. In July, she married Dube. After her marriage, in addition to raising his children and their own, she administered a complex household full of foster children staying with her for their education, and continued to work as a demonstrator, doing midwifery, health demonstrations and dispen-
sary work, and talking about domesticity to mothers’ groups. Her marriage provided a home and family as a nucleus for her professional domestic activities.

Married to Daisy, Dube began to receive more favorable comments from missionaries. Shortly after his marriage, he was ordained in a ceremony apparently postponed until he could be ordained as a married man. By the end of 1931, missionaries were impressed by Dube’s success as chaplain and head of the boys’ boarding department. At a mission with poor boarding facilities, a minimal diet, and a history of strikes, he aired grievances by coordinating a student debating society while simultaneously teaching the students that, despite weevils and insufficiently fine meal, “we should learn to eat what is not quite good sometimes” rather than engaging in disruptive strikes.

By the end of 1932, his second year as chaplain, his superior reported:

Hohoza Dube... is directly responsible for conduct and the schedule in the Boarding Department, and though lax in some details is strong of character. His easy, happy-go-lucky way with the boys has produced a wholesome atmosphere and degree of contentment hitherto unknown in the Boys’ Boarding in the past.

The missionaries might see him as happy-go-lucky. Dube himself, however, was conscious of his role as paterfamilias. In his own report, he explained how he had made students attend to homework by reminding them of their families’ sacrifices in sending them to school. And he attributed the absence of food strikes to his efforts to tell students that weevils provided extra meat in their diets.

By the mid-1930s, the Dube family was prominent in the mission community. They worked effectively within the mission station: Reverend Dube administered the Boys’ Boarding Department, and Daisy continued to work as a home demonstrator. While Dube taught boys to eat weevils cheerfully, Daisy supervised as every Standard VII girl spent at least an hour a week in her home, learning domesticity through housework. And Daisy opened her home to visitors, inviting missionaries’ wives to observe her domestic demonstrations. Kenneth, the family’s oldest son, sped through school at the pace of a European, creating a crisis when he completed Standard VII by age 13. As a successful family, the Dubes also managed their connections with the community of African Christians. Dube was the Mount Silinda church’s pastor as well as the school’s chaplain. As head of the Mount Silinda Christian community he explained
mission rules and regulations to anxious parents and facilitated discussions between parents and missionaries on such tense concerns as lobola and polygyny.  

Married to Daisy, Hohoza Dube went, in the eyes of missionary observers, from being a pushy young man who was in the ministry for what he could extract, to a trusted Christian leader who performed a difficult job effectively and listened willingly to mission advice.  

In his actions, however, Dube continued to pursue opportunities as the leader of the Silinda church. By 1940, as more and more men had been ordained, and the disadvantages of being directly under mission supervision increasingly outweighed the prestige of being Silinda’s chaplain, Dube pushed for a transfer. And he did so with a firm sense of what he was entitled to, asking not only for permission to move, but for the mission to build him a suitable house. The missionaries rejected the idea of the mission building his house for him, but it accepted his desire to move away from direct missionary supervision into the center of an African Christian community.  

By the early 1940s, Hohoza and Daisy Dube were prosperous, prominent, and respected by mission and African community alike. When Dube wrote and spoke at conventions in the mid-1940s, he did so as a prominent spokesman of the African Christian community. And the mission responded by developing and clarifying regulations rather than objecting to his meddling. Dube’s marriage and position allowed him not only to continue as a minister of the American Board, rather than being defrocked in scandal like so many others, but to take initiative in the mission community, hold his own land, head a complex family of sons, daughters, and clients, and circumvent the suspicion with which the mission often greeted African success and initiative.  

Reverend Dzukuso  

Frank Hlabati Dzukuso, who attended Bible school and studied for the ministry alongside Hohoza Dube, was far less successful in walking this narrow path. Instead, his life history provides an indication of why so many educated, ordained, employed men left mission service.  

Dzukuso volunteered for a new Bible school in 1921 at the American Board’s Chikore station, three years after the previous class’s graduation. Though Mount Silinda, the Board’s teacher-training and industrial education facility, was turning out qualified teachers regularly, the mission’s evangelical education system was more halting,
suffering major problems of recruitment and retention. The previous
class, its supervisor reported, had had a dubious record: two gradu-
ates died, one took a second wife, one definitely went crazy, another
was "reported not sound of mind," one sinned in a way that prevented
him from working effectively even after repentance, six had secular
work, and the mission employed only six as evangelists, teachers, or
both. Facing that history of two-thirds attrition over only three years,
the mission was disappointed in the crop of prospective students, not-
ing that at least one could not write at all. Dzukuso himself began
with some education at Chikore, the American Board's secondary sta-
tion.32

The missionary in charge of training evangelists stated both his feel-
ing of the students' inadequacy for the task, and his own inability to
do anything about it: though he "took unusual trouble to present the
ideal for the ministry and so for the evangelist, in order that the stu-
dents might have a clear understanding what is expected of them in
the ministry. I do not feel sure that any of them realize fully the res-
ponsibility and privileges of this work. Some of them I fear still are
in the class simply that they may get good money without too much
sacrifice on their part."33 A mere lecture, however, could not trans-
form men of dubious literacy into the qualified ministers to which the
mission aspired. So even as Chikore's academic schools finally began
to improve, the Bible school moved to Mount Silinda, the mission's
academic center, in the hope that this would facilitate recruitment of
more academically qualified men.34 After the move, the mission
worked to further tighten standards by insisting that only those prom-
ising to complete a three-year course should be admitted to the Bible
school and that these men should be helped by being offered self-
help—mission jobs, including teaching work—during their tenure as
students.35 During 1922, the Bible school dwindled to four students.
Dzukuso, one of the four, was probably the student who, in his sec-
ond year, "while an earnest preacher is not likely to ever be very use-
ful to the Mission work as he cannot be induced to study."36 And the
school continued to suffer dramatic attrition as pupils left, were ex-
pe1led, or sought work as teachers rather than further study.

By 1926, Dzukuso had graduated as an evangelist with enough
teacher training to be appointed back to Chikore central station to re-
place a formerly model teacher who "fell into adultery with a girl
teacher living in his house."37 This began a pattern for Dzukuso of
moving up as the mission chose him to replace superiors who stepped
outside mission regulations. In 1927, Chikore and Mount Silinda were
dynamic places as the mission debated again, amid strong pressure
from African parents, the issue of lobola and parental control over marriage, and mission enthusiasts began a series of revival meetings that stirred up spiritual enthusiasm even as people increasingly voiced their irritation with legalistic mission rules. Dzukuso, like most mission employees, was in the middle of the controversy as he benefited from the new positions opened by those expelled from the mission, worried about parents’ loss of lobola, and was irritated by regular movement from one station to another.

New mission taxes for schools and more restrictions on school access added to these tensions. An evangelical committee from South Africa complained that church seemed to be attended by mission employees and schoolchildren, lacking any community support. By the early 1930s, this tension was beginning to break out in the form of Zionist activity, particularly at Chikore. Chikore’s pastor, Munyaya Sibisi, was variously described as lacking control, letting anyone preach, having Zionist leanings, and rejecting mission suggestions. In his place, the congregation (under pressure from the white missionary supervisor) decided to call Dzukuso as their pastor. Dzukuso had been teaching at Mutema’s, a school and church that had previously experienced Zionist activity, but which had calmed down during his time there. The missionary-in-charge considered Dzukuso a major improvement at Chikore as his appointment led to the withdrawal of several men with Zionist tendencies and “a very marked improvement in the spirit and loyalty, and in attendance.” For Dzukuso, this was an advance in pay and prestige: teachers earned about £2 a month, pastors £40 a year. And as teachers became common, ordained pastors were more unique and prominent than teachers.

During the late 1930s, trouble between the mission and its ministers and teachers grew, producing turmoil in the annual meetings of teachers and ministers. The mission unilaterally cut wages in response to declining government grants, leading to both individual protests from demonstrators and a teacher’s strike. As the minister of the Chikore church, Dzukuso held one of the most prominent positions available to an African in the American Board mission. And he extended his influence beyond the specific mission through participation in the Native Christian Conference (NCC), an ecumenical organization that paralleled the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Association and spoke for the educated Africans of the country. Before 1937, he had become a regional secretary of the NCC.

Dzukuso’s first marriage and first wife fail to appear in missionary records. Nor was his wife mentioned as one of the African women who invited visiting white missionaries into their homes during evangelical
visits. Without firm evidence, only speculation is possible. Dzukuso may have been married before he began his education and work toward the ministry. If so, his wife lacked the education and qualifications her husband managed to acquire. Or Dzukuso may have married during his education, but if he did so, the marriage was not to one of the women named as mission protégés.

Dzukuso’s break with the mission began in 1936 when he challenged mission rules by accepting lobola for his daughter. Missionaries complained that this was not good for those who thought that ministers should demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice for their beliefs.47

Dzukuso rapidly progressed from challenging mission rules by accepting lobola to breaking a far more serious regulation. Dzukuso initially asked for and received a three-month leave from the mission in 1936. When he was scheduled to return, he informed the mission that he had paid lobola for a second, younger, wife. The head of the Chikore circuit reported Dzukuso’s “fall” more in sorrow than in anger:

His failure upset again the work of the church . . . Rev. Dzukuso’s failure is not the only one due to this temptation. Our church treasurer, our church scribe, and a member of executive committee of the church association have all been overcome in the last year and a half by this same temptation. The history of this mission would certainly be different if so many of its leaders had not fallen, and were not still falling, overcome by the allurement of this old custom. The loss has been not only of the leaders for their example has influenced many others to turn back or else not to become Christians at all.48

Though missionaries could understand the temptations and pressures that brought Dzukuso to marry a second wife, they could not forgive his choice. The mission wrote to the Native Christian Conference advising it to strip Dzukuso of his position as regional secretary.49 And even years later, the mission blacklisted him, blocking him from establishing a legal school or church in another area.50

Dzukuso’s departure was the act of a man who had decided to pursue the traditional patriarch’s role and enjoy the traditional rewards—accepting lobola for his daughter, taking a second wife, and establishing his own farm—rather than merely working for the mission on its terms. After years in the mission, however, this traditional pattern of patriarchal power was out of reach. Dorothy Marsh describes
his "defection" from the mission as a sad matter not for the political and evangelical reasons her husband noted, but for the aftermath as Dzukuso's first wife left him and went to become a housekeeper in a settler's home in Chapinga and Dzukuso, trying to persuade her to return home, sat on the employer's doorstep for days until the police chased him off. Dzukuso went on, after leaving the mission, to become a prominent leader in the African Congregational Church, a Zionist church that became known as the "old people's church" as it systematically rejected mission regulations to the point that, M.L. Daneel has argued, "traditional practices were incorporated virtually at random."52

WHY A MAN NEEDED A GOOD WIFE

Dube and Dzukuso, one a man who managed to succeed within the mission structure and the other, one who failed, do not by themselves provide enough evidence for definitive statements on what allowed some men to manage missionaries' distrust of African authority while others fell afoul of missionary regulations and ended up expelled and blacklisted. But, particularly when Dube and Dzukuso are looked at against the background of their time, a time when an astoundingly high proportion of prominent Africans within the American Board system ended up leaving the mission, they suggest some patterns.

If African men wished to remain in good standing with the mission, they had to demonstrate a variety of traits, some of which were only marginally related to academic qualifications or strength of character. They had to listen to missionaries and defer to mission instructions. They had to accept their social, economic, and political inequality with whites. They had to demonstrate willingness to make economic sacrifices in the name of faith. And they had to either follow a restrictive set of regulations constraining everything from beer-brewing, concerts, and child labor, to marriage, or else successfully conceal their violations from the missions.

The problem for African men was that filling all these requirements ate directly at their sources of authority and adulthood. If a man simply followed these rules he would remain, regardless of age, a mission dependent or, in local terms, a mission boy. Deference, sacrifice, and failure to establish marriage ties through lobola were antithetical to local celebrated concepts of patriarchal power.

Marriage to a good wife, however, offered select men a way around the restraints, a way to proceed from boyhood to civilized manhood while blunting mission criticism. With Christian marriage to an educated
woman, a man formed the nucleus of a new social unit. Insofar as educated women were scarce and presumed to be capable of saying yes or no to a husband, it was a unit where he was selected.\textsuperscript{53} And with the household that rapidly accumulated around an educated Christian man, he became a family patriarch, holding authority both over his wife, who was trained as his adviser and manager, and over the people who came to live with them. Unmarried female teachers frequently lived in the houses of married teachers while working as assistants in outschools. Nephews, nieces, cousins, and siblings might arrive to live in a house closer to a good school. Boarders might stay, working for their keep. And children of the house were almost certain to arrive quickly. Within this household, then, which could rapidly become as complex as some polygynous households and could rival missionary establishments for size, the husband acquired a realm of authority that the mission accepted. And it was a realm of authority that fit into more “traditional” community norms of what it took to become an important man, with clients and household.

Such a household also constituted a transformation of a man into economic adulthood. In terms of cash, most missions paid married male teachers more than unmarried men. And marriage brought additional perquisites. Dube’s insistence that the mission provide them with a house followed a pattern of the mission (or the community in the case of a teacher of an outschool) providing a married teacher with a house. Unmarried teachers were often expected to board with families, or to live in dormitories with students. For married teachers, however, missionaries accepted the need for a home. The home was more than simply a building. With marriage, men were less subject to relocation by missions that otherwise sometimes shuffled teachers between schools every year. And married teachers were able to claim land for a garden and, in some cases, a farm.\textsuperscript{54}

A wife such as Daisy Dube, or one of the other educated women whom the mission praised, brought additional benefits. Daisy and the other home demonstrators trained at Hope Fountain continued to work after their marriages, bringing in substantial government salaries to contribute to family finances that could be strained by efforts to manage on mission funds alone. Within the American Board, an educated woman who was not a home demonstrator could nevertheless often continue work as a teacher after marriage, working as an assistant teacher.

In addition to her salary, an effective wife transformed her husband from a wage servant of the mission to the head of an economic enter-
prise that included a home which could be run for profit, a garden, and possibly a farm. Daisy Hlatywayo Dube’s home was thoroughly staffed by Standard VII girls learning domesticity, and she may have received gifts and other benefits from accepting scholars into her home as boarders. As for agriculture, teachers on mission farms were preferentially allocated farms by mission land managers, and though teachers were technically barred from marking off more than five acres in a reserve for a school and teachers’ demonstration garden, violations were so common that missionaries informed of the regulations tended to assume that they meant that the school could have five acres, the teacher five acres, and any evangelist, or possibly even the wife, another five.\(^55\) Regardless of acreage, successful market farming in Southern Rhodesia required labor, and often labor beyond the household. Unmarried teachers who forced students and their parents to work on school plots and then sold the proceeds or allowed the mission to do so were clearly in violation of government regulations prohibiting teachers to round up forced labor. But married teachers required student and parent labor in the guise of development projects and extension education. Missionaries commented approvingly on a wife “bossing up the school gardens near the house,” even when parents might disapprove and official regulations made such child labor technically illegal.\(^56\)

Marriage was also critical in allowing men a way out of constant deference to the mission. It often brought physical distance from the missionaries as the married man became eligible for new posts as head teacher of an outschool, for which married men were preferred. And even for Reverend Dube, marriage meant that his household increasingly became its own center rather than merely an appendage of the missionaries. White missionaries were reluctant to allow African families, no matter how elite, to occupy homes built for white missionaries.\(^57\) This forced a spatial and social segregation that may have been demeaning but, given white reluctance to abandon demands for deference, may have offered African ministers more psychological space.\(^58\)

Removal from the central mission station to new, African centers tended to come with age and with the establishment of increasingly self-governing African churches. Distance offered more than simply psychological space: it facilitated concealment of dubious activities from mission view. Perhaps some of the African church leaders really did have nothing to conceal.\(^59\) At least some, however, considered the distance an opportunity. In the Methodist Church, this could take the form of organizing concerts.\(^60\) In the Dutch Reformed Church, this often involved coordinat-
ing labor gangs of schoolchildren, hired out to make money for the teacher through kwayira dances. In the Salvation Army and among the American Methodists, revivals were popular. For at least some men—notably Reverend Dzukuso and his colleague Reverend Edward Pahla—this new freedom facilitated the move from mission authority into Zionist activity.

Some Zionist beliefs and activities could be concealed for years, often producing tensions, as Dzukuso experienced within the Chikore church when he was called in to settle the Zionist problems. And, increasingly, the missions accepted a certain degree of African church governance. Mission governing committees in America and Britain pushed for the Africanization of the churches and, reluctantly, missionaries began to permit the establishment of Native Teachers’ Conventions, the Native Missionary Conference, the Native Christian Conference, and teachers’ unions.

Missionaries, however, insisted on their familial regulations, and second wives were harder to conceal than beer-brewing. Missionaries’ attention to the domestic life of their protégés, however, meant that a properly married man, who lived a domestic life with a wife who managed his household effectively, could believe nearly anything he wished, cultivate clients, and establish a farm and resource base, achieving a psychological and economic freedom within the constraints of mission life.

CIVILIZED HUSBANDS

To date, research on missionary activity and colonialism in Southern Rhodesia has effectively demonstrated how missions educated women and promoted domesticity to develop a new Christian class. And research has examined how women saw missions as places of opportunity and escape from unwanted marriages or an excessive workload. Scholars have even examined how women developed marriage strategies, campaigning for different forms of marriage, and pursuing elite-forming marital connections not merely for themselves, but also for their children. But little work has focused on what opportunities marriage to mission-approved, educated women provided for men. Kristen Mann’s study of the transformation of marriage in Lagos, Nigeria, from a model of familial alliances to one of individuals choosing domestic partners, has encouraged examinations of marriage not as a stable institution, but as a center of individuals’ and communities’ attempts to cope with the challenges of establishing and maintaining elite status in a colonial, changing world. Mann’s study raises
questions not merely about women's strategies, but also about men's concepts of marital success. 66 Within the radical constraints of Southern Rhodesia's segregated society, Mann's questions regarding the creation of a new Christian elite become transformed, leading to an exploration of the ways in which men's marriages produced not merely success, or demonstrable power, but survival and accommodation to the restrictions of a racially conscious official and missionary bureaucracy.

This chapter, in a preliminary way, has pointed to the ways in which strategic marriage addressed the principal tension within Southern Rhodesia's Africanizing missions of the late 1920s through the 1940s, between missionaries' fear and suspicion of Africans' authority, and their need for newly authoritative Africans to staff the expanding mission structure. Through successful marriage, a man was rendered safe.

Missions' vehement insistence on marriage regulations, beyond their emphasis on any other type of mission rules, demonstrated their commitment to this type of family and form of domestically based control. After 1930, missions increasingly pursued a form of progress which emphasized not individual achievement and charisma of the sort that led to embarrassing scandals, but, instead, forms of progress promising safe domestic peace.

Yet successful companionate, domestically oriented marriage was more than just a mission strategy for restricting African men. It also provided the African men with crucial social and economic resources. And it limited the costs to respect, autonomy, and adulthood, for men, of working within the mission sphere.

NOTES

1. Lorenzo rejected a proposed movement from his "cozy nest" at Mkaya to a white-supervised school post saying "who would put up his houses (notice the plural)." J.H. Seed, to Fr. Superior, 30-11-27, Box 126/4, Jesuit Archives, Harare.

2. Frank Sixubu, testimony before the Native Lands Commission, 1925, ZAH 1/1/1, National Archives of Zimbabwe, Harare. (Hereafter NAZ.)


4. After pointing out Lorenzo's reluctance to move, the priests went on to assure themselves that they could get around this. Or see Olive Lloyd's observations of mission life, especially the "Copy of letter from priest Elfric (native priest) to Demonstrator Benjamin, August 1934," Hist. Mss. ANG 16/11/1, NAZ, in which Elfric Matimba rejected the demonstrator's assumption of any government-granted authority to reallocate the plots he and his wife had farmed.
5. Missionary Conference, Bulawayo, 18–19 September 1924, Hist. Mss. ANG 1/4/5/1, NAZ.


7. Report of the Director of Missions, 1936, and discussions in synods throughout 1930s, ANG 1/11/19, vol. 2, NAZ.

8. See O’Hea to Brown, 13-2-30, Box 195/3; Collingridge to FS, 14-2-30, Box 124/3; O’Hea to Rev. Father, 20-3-30, Box 195/3; O’Hea to Brown, 11-9-30, Box 195/3; O’Hea to “Lord,” 5-3-34, Box 23; all from Jesuit Archives.

9. See, for example, Olive Lloyd’s correspondence during the mid-1930s, Hist. Mss. ANG 16/11/1, NAZ.


11. See chapter 1.

12. See chapters 1, 2 and 4.


15. T. Ranger, “Are We Not Also Men?”: *The Samkange Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1920–64* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995), paperback cover. This cover photo makes a rhetorical point, though the uncropped photo (29) shows a larger family which includes Thompson Samkange’s less stylish mother.


18. For example, “It has been hoped that as more and more married teachers were employed this problem might become less acute, but the experience of the past few years tends to indicate that male married teachers are as prone to fall as the single ones.” Report of Primary Schools for 1949, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Archives, 15.6, vol. 9, 2:5, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A. (Hereafter ABC.)


20. Dube, Sketch, Hack to Friends, 8-5-34, ABC 15.6, vol. 4.


23. Note that I am not arguing that Daisy Hlatywayo Dube’s success and drive allowed her husband to succeed. Her role was what was critical to his success. Daisy herself was regarded by missionaries as less energetic and effective than some of the other educated women of the mission, such as Mary Nkomo Mhlanga.
31. Semi-Annual Meeting of East Africa Mission, 29-12-40; Marsh to Board, 4-1-41; Report of Primary Schools for 1945, all from ABC 15.6, vol. 8.
34. Dysart to ABC, 3-10-21, ABC 15.4, vol. 35, item 11.
35. Minutes, 13-12-21, ABC 15.4, vol. 35, item 15.
39. Dzukusos may have been at Mutema as the station was transformed into one of the flag-bearing outschools of the American Board, where one of the early female Jeanes teachers, Mary Nkomo (later Mhlanga), worked diligently to promote domesticity and health in ways celebrated by her mission supervisors. Ivy Craig to Friends, 24-1-32, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 206.
40. Reverend Frank Hlabati Dzukusos’s name was written in various ways, but I’m reasonably confident they all describe the same man. J. Marsh to Board, 20-9-35, item 144, and Memo on meeting of executive committee of the association of churches of the East Africa Mission, 14-9-35, item 145, ABC 15.6, vol.1.
41. Annual Report of Kraal Schools, Mount Silinda Circuit, 1933 (June 1934), ABC 15.6, vol. 2, item 76.
43. Memo on meeting of executive committee of the association of churches of the East Africa Mission, 14-9-35, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 145.
44. See chapter 3.
45. Minutes, 9 to 13 Jan. 1938, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 300.
46. Ivy Craig to Board, 14-7-32, ABC 15.6, vol. 1, item 217.
47. John Marsh to Friends, 3-3-36, ABC 15.6, vol. 4, item 192.
48. Chikore Church and Evangelistic Work (June 1937), ABC 15.6, vol. 2, item 165.
49. Ibid.
50. 47th annual meeting of the East Africa Mission, 3-9-40, ABC 15.6, vol. 8.
51. Dorothy Marsh to Friends, 20-3-37, ABC 15.6, vol. 5, item 309.
54. See, for example, Ranger, "Are We Not Also Men?" 53–57.
55. See for examples correspondence in NAZ S1542/S2.
56. Louise Torrence to Friends, 1-2-29, ABC 15.4, vol. 2, item 504. On the unpopularity and legal status of such labor, see chapters 1, 2, 3, 4.
57. See, for example, the controversy over whether Reverend Thompson Samkange and his family would be allowed to occupy a mission house of the Wesleyan mission in Kwenda. Ranger, "Are We Not Also Men?" 26.
58. Psychological space is, admittedly, a vague concept. Novels, however, convey clearly the way in which people in this society shrank, confined, within contexts where white expectations ruled. See Tsitsi Dangarembga's powerful novel *Nervous Conditions* (London: Women's Press, 1988).
59. This seems to be Ranger's opinion of Reverend Samkange. Hohoza Dube, also, appears to have either abided faithfully by mission regulations or done a stunningly good job of not getting caught.
60. See chapter 5.
61. See chapter 1.
62. See NAZ complaints file on SA activity. American Methodist revivals were enthusiastically recorded in the annual journal, held at the Old Mutare Archives.
63. For examples, see Schmidt, *Peasants, Traders*; Ranger, "Are We Not Also Men?"; Tsuneo Yoshikuni, "Black Migrants in a White City: A Social History of African Harare, 1890–1925" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Zimbabwe, 1990); and Carol Summers "'If You Can Educate . . . .'
65. See Ranger, "Are We Not Also Men?" and Mann, *Marrying Well*.
This book has explored the possibilities that parents, chiefs, students, teachers, demonstrators, and clergy made for themselves in the interstices of Southern Rhodesia's settler-dominated society. Looking closely at the texture of routine struggle and negotiation, and exploring how elite Africans built identities and institutions that declared their respectability, significance, and relevance to local economic, political, and social discussions, this study portrays middlemen's ability to undermine the dichotomous thinking of segregation's sponsors. Chiefs Ziki and Mdala, students at Inyati and Domboshawa, teachers at Mount Silinda, and many other Africans used the limited resources segregationist institutions offered. They built status for themselves as essential leaders, and used their individual positions to shape policy debates, challenging, diverting, and channeling the realities of government programs, mission ideals, and economic hardship.

Despite these men's creativity and efforts to adapt and use colonial institutions, their children, grandchildren, and historians have judged them harshly, often labeling them as sellouts. Though teachers and schools of the 1920s and 1930s taught a vocabulary and set of tactics for Africans' struggles, they did not block Southern Rhodesia's move toward intensifying segregation in the 1950s, a white Unilateral Declaration of Independence in the 1960s, and guerrilla warfare for independence in the 1970s. The local, individual struggles over education did not work to produce a nationalist revolution or social transformation. When they were successful, education activists produced localized victories that shaped individual lives, rather than wide-ranging successes that challenged an increasingly aggressive state system.
By the 1960s, segregation threatened the professional identities and communities constructed by the educated, successful, exemplary men of the interwar years. Tsitsi Dangarembga has portrayed this tense decade in her historically resonant novel, *Nervous Conditions*. In it, Mr. Sigauke, a headmaster at Old Umtali school, has always done everything just as he was supposed to. His rural relatives saw him as a god. His missionary sponsors considered him a “good African.” His daughter, however, asked questions that exposed his fragility and insecurities, and through her examples and actions encouraged others to do likewise. By the novel’s end, Mr. Sigauke has been challenged by all those that he had relied upon for respect, obedience, and status. His daughter fought him, his wife renegotiated their marriage and temporarily left him, his foster daughter resisted him and critiqued him with new eyes, and even his sister-in-law’s pregnant unmarried sister spoke out of turn and stated her own mind.¹

By the 1960s, the middle ground of professionalism and negotiation was thoroughly eroded. The historical Gideon Mhlanga experienced the same sense of betrayal and irrelevance as Dangarembga’s fictional Mr. Sigauke as youth, and even young aspiring teachers, rejected the compromises, negotiation, and construction of languages of patronage and professionalism, in favor of demands for justice, backed by militant action. In his speech to the Rhodesian African Teachers’ Association, Mhlanga mourned that

Looking back over the past 25 years one regrets the deterioration in standards of behavior. . . . Time was when teachers stood head and shoulders above the average people . . . and the teaching profession was regarded as a noble one because of the high ideals it stood for. I doubt whether it can be said to be a noble profession today. . . . Some years ago the African child had a very fine reputation for having good manners and for good behavior. None of us can speak well today of their behavior.²

The disorderly youth that Mhlanga complained of became, during the guerrilla war and after, heroes of the struggle. In the process, Zimbabweans have lost the insights to be gained from a close examination of a different sort of struggle.

The nationalists and revolutionaries of the 1960s and after, like the most active segregationist social engineers, have tended to see schooling, education, and Native Development policy in Southern Rhodesia as relatively successful efforts to produce state control over Africans through
top-down initiatives that reached into every aspect of people’s lives. C.T. Loram, Southern Africa’s most prominent early-twentieth-century theorist of education, declared to a 1935 conference of Jeanes educators that “Education is the process by which a human being is changed from what he is to something that those in authority wish him to be.” The audience of teachers and education experts applauded approvingly. Through much of the twentieth century, policymakers and students of education in Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia, and Zimbabwe have generally accepted Loram’s definition. They have seen education as a tool, a way for government, settlers, missionaries and their successors to shape the subordinated.

Even in the years since Zimbabwe’s independence, while disapproving of specific colonial education policies, new government initiatives such as “Education with Production” have accepted Loram’s top-down, functional vision of education as a tool for social engineering and nation-building, and designed curricula and schools to make the sort of people the powerful think they want.

Education, however—the real learning and socialization that children and youth experience as they grow and that they use as the basis of their identities, values, and actions—is far more volatile than Loram suggested. R.J. Zvobgo, an analyst of the region’s educational system, argues that in 1939, education was “one area in which the state felt it could make concessions to create a loyal African elite without improving wages and conditions for the mass of the workers.” But, as Zvobgo goes on to note, despite seeming politically and economically innocuous, education in reality works to destabilize.

The teachers and students who participated in Southern Rhodesia’s educational system did not simply make youth into what authorities wanted. Consciously or not, they taught discontent, and struggle.

Education, both under the Southern Rhodesian government, and since, is often about control or attempts at control. But its informal curriculum included lessons in struggle, in evading segregationist limits, and succeeding through state and mission initiatives. In schools and around them, as segregation intensified in the interwar years, Africans practiced manipulating and co-opting institutional authority and resources. When men such as Jonas saw divination and mission education as conceptually linked, and teachers drew on their experiences in student government to protest, and push for government recognition of their union, they deployed mental maps of the local social universe that differed radically from the vision of unilinear disciplined progress proclaimed by officials and missionaries. Drawing on this informal curriculum, students, parents, teachers’ associations, and in-
novative "traditional" leaders shaped a new social landscape that neither the authorities nor educated leaders fully controlled.

It is therefore time to reassess the significance of the educated African middlemen of Southern Rhodesia's interwar years. Their ideas and actions did not just emerge simply and straightforwardly according to a model of resistance, or of collaboration with mission and government hegemonic initiatives. Instead, in building a culture of respectability and respect, and a vocabulary and repertoire of negotiation, they provided values, knowledge, and skills central to Africans' ability to make and survive the war for independence, and to construct a viable Zimbabwean society.

In Southern Rhodesia, and in the years since 1980, education has produced not discipline and progress, but a complex society of actors making loudly audible demands, using all the tools and techniques they learned in schools, and in fighting for the sorts of curricula, schools, and society they have learned to want. Africans who have participated in these struggles redefined state and missions policies and programs. Chiefs worked to mobilize government and missions as allies and patrons in their struggles for schools, access to land, and resources for their youth. Christian communities used mission identities to reject government-imposed chiefs who failed to serve their needs. Educated teachers deployed segregationist concepts of order, professionalism, and organization in order to simultaneously teach and undermine government categories.

Education in segregated Southern Rhodesia was one of the few spheres of society open to dreams, ideals, and creative responses to state power. Repression, injustice, and control, not to mention force, shaped the region. But these dominant realities were less stark in the realm of education than in the worlds of labor, tax collection, or mercantile exchange. The middle ground built by students, teachers, parents, demonstrators, and school sponsors, provided a restless, increasingly educated population with ideals such as respectability, and a vocabulary for invoking state and mission patronage. These provided resources for individuals and groups that maneuvered amid harsh segregationist realities. As long as Africans' negotiations centered on schools and remained at least partially successful, African leaders, parents, and students perceived education as a critical way to build a new highly valued future. Only after education repeatedly failed to produce transformation did leaders, teachers, and students begin to see education as schooling for subjugation and to shift the struggle to military means.
When RATA co-founder J.D. Rubatika quit teaching for politics in 1950, or, later, when students left schools to become guerrillas, schools and education had become eviscerated. No longer could students, teachers, parents, or African leaders see them as a credible path. The state, in blocking and aggressively channeling Africans’ educational maneuvers, destroyed possibilities of compromise by eliminating levels of complexity and nuance that had made it worthwhile to fight over schooling and to see education as a way to pursue individual and communal values.

Educational conflicts have always been frustrating for those with power. They seem chaotic. They disrupt the lives of children. They make plans for the future ineffective and unsuccessful. Fights over schools, teaching, curricula, and children’s futures are also frustrating for those who lack power, as they are repeatedly told that their wants are wrong—wrong because the experts know better, wrong because what they wish cannot be funded and staffed, or wrong because the methods create conflict and prevent communities from working together. Yet despite the disorder created within a context of educational struggle, these moments of contestation—and the fact that people of varying opinions and influence cared enough to participate—tied sections of a divided community together and made members of a divided society acknowledge their interrelationships despite varying interests and profound disagreements.

The disorder associated with inconclusive struggles and small-scale controversies over schools provided opportunities for special pleading, negotiations, and individual exceptions. This disorder produced repertoires of struggle that persisted even as the specific reasons for struggle, and the political context, changed. The educational policy of the 1920s and 1930s provided opportunities for African individuals and groups to negotiate places for themselves, and force government and mission administrators to consider issues they would really rather not have addressed, such as what forms of African leadership were acceptable, what counted as a community anyhow, and whether individuals who were educated should be recognized as professionals, or as African second-class near-professionals. The disorder of what has sometimes been called collaboration therefore can also be seen as the atmosphere that gave African agency real significance. Education and schooling, far from being a hegemonic system of control by segregationist authorities, provided space within disordered, underfunded educational institutions for Africans to reshape and challenge government and mission agendas.
The stories of individuals’ and communities’ struggles over schooling and education that form the basis for this book teach lessons about colonialism, and colonial struggles. These local, parochial, individual experiences undermine any grand narrative of a colonial history of segregation and domination. In individuals’ lives and local struggles, we can begin to see colonialism not as an arithmetic problem of power and resistance, but as a complex negotiation in which force was undeniably present, but creativity, both from above and below, also played a role, and middlemen built a complex social environment that fully satisfied no one and challenged everyone.

NOTES

4. See, for example, Fay Chung and Emmanuel Ngara, Socialism, Education and Development: A Challenge to Zimbabwe (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1985), 86, where these advocates of socialist education rephrase (with a few more words) Loram’s definition of education, diagnose past patterns, and go on to call for a transformative socialist education to make the new Zimbabwe.
5. Ibid., 105–9. See also Roger Riddell, Education for Employment (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1980), 5, and even R.J. Zvobgo, Transforming Education (Harare: College Press, 1986, 1990), 11, where Zvobgo, then deputy principal of Mkoba Teachers’ College, explained that he viewed education “as an instrument for development in terms of developing human resources needed to service the various socio-economic and socio-political structures.” R.J. Zvobgo maintained this position into the 1990s, explaining that an educational system had two main functions: “to impart skills, training and habits needed in the economy” and “to impart the cultural, moral and behavioral values of the society, notably appropriate attitudes of respect for the rulers, their institutions and their agents.” R.J. Zvobgo, Colonialism and Education in Zimbabwe (Harare: SAPES Books, 1994), 2.
6. R.J. Zvobgo, Colonialism and Education in Zimbabwe, 34.
7. Ibid., 34–35, 94–100. Zvobgo, however, implies that more effective planning could solve such problems.
8. For a postindependence example, see B.S.M. Gatawa, The Politics of the School Curriculum (Harare: College Press, 1990), 6–8, where, before beginning a structural discussion of the ideals of curriculum building, the author provides a glimpse into the pressures of real-life schools.
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