1-20-2016

Anchors, *Habitus*, and Practices Besieged by War: Women and Gender in the Blockade of Leningrad

Jeffrey K. Hass
*University of Richmond, jhass@richmond.edu*

Follow this and additional works at: [http://scholarship.richmond.edu/socanth-faculty-publications](http://scholarship.richmond.edu/socanth-faculty-publications)

Part of the *History Commons, Sociology Commons*, and the *Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Commons*

This is a pre-publication author manuscript of the final, published article.

**Recommended Citation**

*Sociology and Anthropology Faculty Publications*. 51.

This Post-print Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology and Anthropology at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology and Anthropology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
ANCHORS, HABITUS, AND PRACTICES BESIEGED BY WAR: WOMEN AND GENDER IN THE BLOCKADE OF LENINGRAD

Jeffrey K. Hass

First published in Sociological Forum, vol. 32, no. 2 (June 2017)

1 Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 28 Westhampton Way, University of Richmond, VA 23173, United States; and Faculty of Economics, Department of Economic Theory, St. Petersburg State University, 7/9 Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg 199034, Russian Federation. My thanks to the following for invaluable help: the National Endowment for the Humanities (Grant #FB-57514-14), the Nuffield Foundation (United Kingdom) Grant #SGS/00740/G, the University of Richmond (faculty research committee), ACTR/ACCELS, and the Mednick Foundation for financial support; Nikita Lomagin, Kirill Boldovskii, and many Russian colleagues for ideas about the Blockade; and to the editor and anonymous reviewers for Sociological Forum for thought-provoking suggestions.
ABSTRACT
As war challenges survival and social relations, how do actors alter and adapt dispositions and practices? To explore this question, I investigate women’s perceptions of normal relations, practices, status, and gendered self in an intense situation of wartime survival, the Blockade of Leningrad (1941-1944), an 872-day ordeal that demographically feminized the city. Using Blockade diaries for data on everyday life, perceptions, and practices, I show how women’s gendered skills and habits of breadseeking and caregiving (finding scarce resources and providing aid) were key to survival and helped elevate their sense of status. Yet this did not entice rethinking “gender.” To explore status elevation and gender entrenchment, I build on Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and fields to develop anchors: field entities with valence around which actors orient identities and practices. Anchors provide support for preexisting habitus and practices, and filter perceptions from new positions vis-à-vis fields and concrete relations. Essentialist identities and practices were reinforced through two processes involving anchors. New status was linked to “women’s work” that aided survival of anchors (close others, but also factories and the city), reinforcing acceptance of gender positions. Women perceived that challenging gender relations and statuses could risk well-being of anchors, reconstructing gender essentialism.

Keywords: gender; fields; war; habitus; anchor; Leningrad; USSR.
WAR, SURVIVAL, AND SOCIAL PRACTICE: GENDER IN THE BLOCKADE OF LENINGRAD

How do major shocks, such as war and war-related duress, affect senses of self, practice, and positions within social contexts? To what extent do challenges of survival alter or erode dispositions and assumptions of normal practices and relations, versus reinforcing them? How much autonomy do we gain when circumstances impose changes in what we do and who we think we are—and what might be lasting social effects? When people’s backs are against the wall during a major shock, what happens to habits, assumptions, practices, and relations? In a significant geopolitical conflict, political authorities rely on the loyalty of civilians and soldiers, not only to obey commands and maintain social order, but especially to sacrifice effort and even lives for the war effort. While war can lead citizens to rally around leaders and flags, extended duress can breed strife and reduce state capacity to enforce order. Underneath institutional and structural veneers, war can provoke shifts in dispositions and practices (habitus hysteresis), threatening institutions and immediate habits. Yet most studies of fields, practices, and habitus examine stable contexts—what of cases when severe system shocks challenge fields and erode enforcement of practices and norms? As people’s positions shift in wartime, how do dispositions and practices shift? We understand how shocks (e.g. wars, depressions) provoke meso- and macro-level change. What of dispositions and micro-level relations and practices in the violence, dislocation, and threat of total war, with? How do physical well-being, perceptions and beliefs of challenges and responses, and fields of individuals’ signals and practices intersect?

If any wartime context would shock dispositions, perceptions, and practices, the Blockade was it—we should expect desperation unleashing homo economicus or degrading norms (Sorokin 1975; Iarov 2011). For 872 days (September 1941-January 1944), German and Finnish armies isolated the city. Material scarcity was extreme: December 1941 rations (the nadir) were
250 grams of bread daily for military workers and 125 grams for everyone else. Leningraders ate cats, glue, in some cases human flesh. More than 800,000 civilians died, most from starvation and more than half in the first winter. While state and Communist Party authority did not collapse, myriad relations of meaning and empathy coalesced in fields of positions and practices Leningraders were hesitant to challenge or let die. To explore what happens under extreme duress, I turn to Leningrad women in the first winter of the Blockade and the nexus between shifting field contexts and individual perceptions, dispositions, and responses. Building on Bourdieu’s (1990, 1998) field framework, I argue that change and continuity in perceptions, dispositions, and practices are related to tensions between 1) degree of change in actors’ field status, and 2) actors’ senses of self in relation to anchors of valence through which habitus and fields work.

**Women in the Blockade of Leningrad: Shifting Field Status but Durable Dispositions**

Women began the war with positions and experiences that bequeathed particular dispositions and practices as potentially normal for everyday women’s lives—including demands of the second shift. In the 1930s deficit economy, this provided them with crucial survival skills and dispositions: caregiving and “breadseeking.” If men are “breadwinners” receiving exchange-value rewards (money), the second shift can make women “breadseekers” who seek scarce goods and organize their economical use at home. While caregiving and breadseeking might have lower status in the domestic division of labor, wartime scarcity, such as the Blockade, can raise the premium for such dispositions and increase the relative value of women’s labor and skills. The ability to find scarce food and use it efficiently was one key to survival that Leningrad women did well. Sure enough, in homes, hospitals, and schools, women made sure families, soldiers, and children had food, warmth, and company. As in other belligerents in both world wars, the home
front was feminized demographically. Men joined or were drafted into the Red Army (where many died), and men succumbed to starvation more quickly than women, accounting for 73 percent and 60 percent of deaths in January and February 1942 (TsGAIPD SPb24/2b/1322/51). The ratio of men to women in Leningrad shifted from 45.6/54.4 in 1939 to 25.6/74.4 in June 1942 (Cherepenina 2006). If women were 47 percent of Leningrad’s labor force on the eve of war, by 1942 they made up 75-80 percent (Manakov 1961: 62). By late 1942, women were the majority of workers in military production (61.3 percent), tank production (64.3 percent), and land mine production (77.7 percent) (Dzeniskevich 2005). They staffed factories and organizations to produce weapons, clothes, and services. Skeptical male managers came to appreciate women’s abilities and efforts (e.g. TsGAIPD SPb 4000/10/539/7). Unlike in other famines—when women’s material well-being worsened due to fewer economic rights (Sen 1985, 1987; Maddox 1996; but see Edgerton-Tarpley 2004)—Leningrad women’s rations improved as they took men’s jobs. As they faced disorder and threats to survival, women came to perceive new worth of their efforts in homes and factories, as individuals and a collective (gendered) group (as I will show). Observing their own contributions and those of others—suggesting a field effect—Leningrad women concluded that their Blockade efforts and abilities demonstrated they were certainly equal to men, perhaps superior in some ways. Leningrad mothers showed pluck when, against Party orders, they set out in August 1941 to retrieve children evacuated towards the advancing German army (Dzeniskevich 1998: 48-49). Women individually and collectively wrote scathing letters to Leningrad leader Andrei Zhdanov about everyday injustices. Being the “second sex” did not mean quiescence: the rising value of their efforts enhanced senses of status.

2 Central State Archive of Historical-Political Documents, St. Petersburg. Archival data are ordered as fond (collection), opis (register), delo (file), list (page). For citations, I use ARCHIVE fond/opis/delo/list (collection/register/file/page).
Given contextual shocks and shifts in women’s positions and value of their skills, and consequent rise in status, one expectation is that the Blockade could trigger at least beginnings of **habitus hysteresis**: shifts in dispositions, knowledge, and assumptions of normal practice. Feminization of Leningrad and shifts gendered skills and practices could have given women advantages to rectify some aspects of unequal status, at least in backstages and passive resistance that mediate loyalty. This is one dynamic in other cases of gender and war that reveals complex relationships between **habitus** and fields. Other wartime experiences forced women to take on new positions and labor in families, workplaces, and various social groups, expanding their experiences and facilitating shifts in gender consciousness (e.g. Viterna 2013; Honey 1984; Faust 1996; Smith 2000; Stern 2010). In the American Civil War, women’s wartime efforts—maintaining homes, staffing factories or other organizations—raised their senses of status and sparked efforts to expand their positions in the labor market and polity. In World War I, British and French elites had to contend with women’s contributions and status (Grayzel 1999). This led to women gaining suffrage in Great Britain and almost in France. It provoked public discourse on women’s “natural” positions, including increased effort to defend the claim that home was a woman’s place. That such discourses were forthcoming indicates men were aware of a potential shift in women’s positions and rules of the fields of labor and home.

An alternative is that such a context can reinforce gendered dispositions and perceptions of a natural gendered order, albeit with new status distributions. In her study of women’s strikes in Barcelona before and after World War I, Temma Kaplan suggested that social position inculcated a “female consciousness” of caregiving that provided an alternative political culture in which well-being had top priority: “all classes of women understand what their society’s division of labor by sex requires of them: the bedrock of women’s consciousness is the need to preserve
life” (Kaplan 1982: 546). Spanish state policies hindered Barcelona working women from fulfilling perceived caregiving duties in this gendered division of labor. As they took caregiving seriously as a source of identity and dignity, these women mobilized to demand the Spanish state help them fulfill maternal practices. In her study of women in El Salvador’s civil war, Viterna (2013) notes that the more non-traditional a combatant woman’s gender practices, the more likely she was in a structural position that did not benefit her later, and vice versa. Dispositions about women’s “natural” positions changed as a result of shifting positions, but in a counter-intuitive fashion. Not just “war,” but wartime positions, practices, and rewards affect gender habitus.

The story of Leningrad women seems to combine facets of both contexts and outcomes described above: wartime challenges and positional shifts, rethinking of status, and continuity of “traditional” dispositions. In Leningrad we see both possibilities. Changes in women’s positions, practices, and rewards affected perceptions of dependency and status vis-à-vis men, state, and city. Yet traditional perceptions of the inherent nature of gender were reinforced. Leningrad women witnessed suffering and death of children and other innocents amidst material deprivation the state did not address adequately. Like Kaplan’s women, Leningrad women’s traditional gender notions not only survived but seemed supported by wartime experiences. Like Viterna’s subjects, Leningrad women’s sense of status could shift with contextual changes. “Woman” as social position, dispositions, and practices was viewed as natural, even when women were no longer confined to previous particular tasks and jobs. So we have a paradox: contextual shocks and shifts in status, and durable assumptions of fundamental identity and position. How do we make sense of this? We could posit a “strong habitus”: Leningrad women’s gendered habitus contained strong dispositions to cooperative, collective behavior and an “ethic of care.” This is not unreasonable (Bourdieu 2001; Reay 2004), yet relying on habitus alone in such contexts
risks tautology: *habitus* is as strong or weak as needed to explain the issue at hand. As well, Bourdieu admitted *habitus* is “durable, but not eternal,” and hysteresis is possible if fields allow (McNay 1999, 2000). Something more must be at work.

*Habits, Fields, and Anchors*

This story might not be unfamiliar to some gender scholars (e.g. Braybon 1989; Chafe 1991; Ridgeway 2011; Berry 2015a). We know gender operates through a combination of dispositions, power relations, and concrete practices (West and Zimmerman 1987). Our issue is what happens to gender when such shocks as war and famine (i.e. the Blockade) perturb these—and what this might tell us about dynamics of change and continuity in frames and dispositions when contexts are in flux. Feminization of Leningrad—the movement of women into new positions in divisions of labor and practices—was structural, but structure does not translate so easily into dispositions. Social context matters by way of *sensuality*—how actors sense and perceive forces, and whether and how they resonate. This points to John Martin’s embryonic field framework, in which social life involves habits and fields, “concrete set[s] of individuals oriented by similar motivations” (Martin 2011: 253) that operate at various levels of organization. Fields are not only arenas of competition and contestation (“field of battle”) or organized forces that induce dispositions (“magnetic field”), but also organized signals and sensations of rules of behavior (“field of vision”).³ Actors do not abandon knowledge, dispositions, and interests (*habitus*) upon entering a field, but they do adjust according to position and relations.

This leads to an interesting issue: might there be *texture* to fields that could account for variation and paradoxes? Drawing on valence and habit from Kurt Lewin and *Gestalt* psycholo-

---

³ This suggests fields exist for any significant social interaction. Perhaps the real issue is not whether fields as such exist, but rather variation in their structure, force, and content.
gy, Martin (2011: 317-320) suggests that actors in a field are drawn to particular entities (objects, others), and relations or desires to said entities are vectors that compose fields. Yet while various entities can have valence properties, not all valences are equal. I suggest we call anchors those entities imbued with valence of significant strength and centrality, that reduce capacity for reflexivity and that orient practices and dispositions that reproduce fields or structures. In psychology and economics, “anchors” and “anchoring” mean an abstract baseline for expectations and judgments about future states (e.g. likelihood of stagnation versus inflation), normal prices, and strategies to adopt (Strack and Mussweiler 1997; Gürkaynak et al 2007; Furnham and Boo 2011; but see Fudenberg, Levine, and Maniadis 2012). A set of significant observations and beliefs inform expectations and strategies to reduce uncertainty. In his work on frames, Goffman (1974: chapter 8) claimed actors invoke concrete routines to anchor actions vis-à-vis frames of reference, to stabilize routines, frames, and meanings. Note that these approaches employ the gerund (anchoring) and embed an actor’s perceptions and decisions in general, abstract routines or signals rather than vis-à-vis concrete, contextualized entities. These are not unimportant, but perceptions, habits, and decision-making are also embedded in concrete relations with concrete entities, in “sensuous” relations that Marx (1978) found so key to relations of the self to labor.

More precisely, I suggest anchors are entities imbued with emotion and meaning significant to one’s sense of self and position, and which are sufficiently crystallized around that entity so that its meaning and import seem natural and objective. Thus, these anchors also contribute to perception and decision-making, much as perceptions of information and resulting expectations do—only now I know about what I am calculating. It seems anchors might be part of a dynamic posited by “attachment theory” (Bowlby 1982; Mikulincer, Shaver, and Pereg 2003). Human infants instinctively identify with supportive others. Such behavior, continuing into adulthood,
likely evolved to facilitate survival and to reduce insecurity so that one can take risks necessary for exploring one’s environment. At heart, we might have a natural inclination to use particular entities as anchors to ensure certainly for survival and beyond—except that those anchors are not only linked to individuals (actor-to-anchor), but also to other anchors and contexts (actor-to-anchor-to-field). Finally, anchors involve not just interests—they are, perhaps more, investments of emotion, empathy, and identity. That is, anchors structure not only our sense of self and position, but also the distribution of our sympathy and antipathy—in doing so, situating the quality of our sensations and relations vis-à-vis the external world.

Anchors are entities that are 1) imbued with meaning and significance that resonate with sense of self, and 2) a touchstone for feelings and judgments (e.g. moral, aesthetic). Anchors (e.g. children or mates) mediate relations between actors and fields; dispositions and practices persist in part because we invest identities and emotions in anchors. Properties of anchors stem from how actors perceive and relate to their worth vis-à-vis themselves and others in the field (e.g. “family” as my relations and a social/legal construct). My responses to context are grounded in how I relate to anchors, and how others respond to anchors (i.e. defending anchors supports my identity). Actors impart gendered meanings onto relations and entities, and these have some staying power, such that actors feel impelled to reproduce them. The self context relation works through anchors in a way that echoes de Beauvoir’s (1952) thesis of woman as “Other,” whose identity and interests extend to others. This approach seems to resonate somewhat with other gender scholarship, especially “doing gender” and dramaturgy of caregiving and domestic work (e.g. DeVault 1994): gender as positions and identities exist in practices vis-à-vis an Other, which only works if dispositions, practices, and relations are interconnected—a field dynamic.
Back to Leningrad women retaining essentialist conceptions of gender despite 1) radical shifts in social and material contexts (feminization, institutional weakness), and 2) women’s growing perceptions of their strengths. I suggest two dynamics, related to anchors and the extent to which they reproduce habitus, practices, and field logics. First is an opportunistic response: augmenting the influence and status of anchors by augmenting status and dignity inherent in relations between self and anchor. Second is a defensive response: averting risk to anchors core to one’s sense of self and the social order. Both are related, as anchors are linked to one’s sense of a meaningful and stable self; both might act simultaneously, or one might follow the other (i.e. risk aversion then rationalized by raising status of relevant practices and dispositions).

**Fields, anchors, and status.** The first dynamic is how shifts in field positions, and in perceived value of one’s skills and practices in those positions, can raise one’s sense of status and dignity. Worth and status can be constructed in part through relations between actors and anchors, and through an actor’s observations of others’ practices and responses—e.g. women noticing value of their efforts, of other women’s efforts, and of men’s new dependence on such efforts. As Ridgeway *et al* (2009) note, status emerges when beliefs transform banal “differences” into real dissimilarities or disparities of esteem and competence and impart greater worth to people of one category—and this group then believes there is something intrinsic to such qualities that merits a premium for effort and output. I suggest that perception of deserved status can arise among one group when they perceive others of their group performing above an expected norm. From this, fields and anchors might enter the picture in two ways. First, the value of one’s role vis-à-vis an anchor might be greater than expected, such as women surviving better than men and performing caregiving duties under wartime duress. Enhancement of dignity and sense
of status is related to anchors that define roles and self: if value of a practice vis-à-vis an anchor rises, then the value of that individual vis-à-vis the field of which the anchor is part rises as well. And if that rise is due to possessing a form of capital—e.g. breadseeking as human capital—then field positions linked to that capital rise vis-à-vis others, improving influence and status. Care-giving and breadseeking not only would save anchors that were key to a Leningrad woman’s sense of identity and worth. These women also could (and did) code such actions as central to the war effort, elevating their status as “women.” Second, performing new tasks well, while maintaining relations to anchors, can create the perception that this group in question has superior qualities that enable them to undertake new challenges. This might include Leningrad women entering factories and taking on new labor often associated with men, while also continuing to provide care and breadseeking for husbands and children: Leningrad women would take on the stereotypical male and female roles, altering their perceived relative qualities vis-à-vis men.

**Anchors and risk.** Let us now consider anchors and risk, our second dynamic. Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1981) claimed people are risk-averse—perhaps due to cognitive asymmetries by which we find it easier to imagine concrete positive rather than negative futures (Cerulo 2006) and cannot easily identify concrete sources of risk. But we avoid risk to what? If relations and identities incorporate others’ interests and well-being and are imbued with emotion, averting risk to those others and the self becomes an impediment to changing dispositions and practices—such change could risk the well-being of those anchors. A risk to an anchor that resonates with one’s deeper emotions, such as a mate or child (among others), can provoke responses to reduce risk that as a consequence shape choices and capacity for change. This can lead to conservative practices and strategies. Defending anchors of valence might mean supporting norms, practices,
and relations in which anchors and self are embedded and that contribute to well-being: i.e. defending an anchor might require defending the gender order. Averting risk to anchors amidst uncertainty can also mean rejecting an important tactic for gaining status. Depriving the dependent of needed resources—e.g. gains of women’s breadseeking and caregiving—could be a useful bargaining chip for renegotiating the status order, even at the personal level, if such tactical threats are credible and even conceivable. Yet employing this tactic brings risk of harm to those anchors one would try to defend. Defending anchors and employing dependency advantages simultaneously is difficult and even contradictory. Leningrad women could perceive and articulate their greater skills and status—and still accept or embrace a traditional, essentialist notion of gender, not only out of status gains but also because challenging the gender order meant visiting risk on anchors, and thus on themselves as well. Defending those others, who contributed to these women’s senses of self, meant defending gendered meanings and logics of practice.

**Change and stasis.** Women perceived their contributions vis-à-vis anchors, especially children and men (mates, siblings, fathers), which augmented a shift in perceived status. Yet status was attached to gendered labor and positions, to women as “women” and not as autonomous agents, because anchors embedded women’s understanding of status in concrete, gendered relations. Women were concerned about threats to these anchors should they not fulfill caregiving and breadseeking tasks. We have change in qualities attributed to positions and relations (i.e. women to mates, each other), to practices (e.g. caregiving or labor), and to rules (“women’s work”)—all facets of fields (Martin 2011). Yet we also observe relative stasis in dispositions and assumptions of normal gendered positions and practices throughout social fields. I posit that a combination of dictates of survival, positive relations to anchors, and compulsion (from the state,
other women, and dependents’ needs) reinforcedessentialist notions of gender as women’s positions in Leningrad’s fields and divisions of labor shifted. Anchors were key to this paradox of shifts in field relations and meanings, but far less in internalized dispositions of *habitus*. If this idea has validity, it might shed light on forces of reproduction and change. Anchors might contribute to sunk cognitive, personal, and emotional costs that complicate conceiving of and carrying out change. If we think of gender as frames and practices that order individuals and power, and if we accept people are risk averse, we see why there might be resistance to fundamental shifts in gender notions: people might lose not only goods or status, but also something of symbolic or emotional value. If shocks such as war accentuate opportunities or perceptions that one’s only option is to save one’s skin, they also provide visible risks not only to oneself, but also to anchors that shape senses of self. This implies *habitus* can survive shocks if perceptions of risk to core anchors overcome a threshold. Further, minimizing risks from change and elevating status can be an act of resistance. If shocks to fields and institutions help actors think of individual interests and survival, they can also create their own defense, i.e. actors who reinterpret senses of self to identify with preexisting *habitus* and practices. Note that enhancement of status can preclude alternative sources of gain: When women’s roles and practices are imbued with status—women perceive only they can fulfill caregiving and breadseeking tasks—and perceptions of risk are weighted with emotion, women might perceive their practices as significant and natural.

**Dynamics of Anchors and Habitus, and the Story of Gender in Leningrad**

I begin with a modest overview of gendered status and practices in pre-war Leningrad and the USSR that, if it cannot do justice to this topic, can situate the Blockade in historical context (cf. Schwartz 1979; Lapidus 1978). Soviet society was patriarchal, easily reflected in policies, oppor-
tunities, and practices. While Soviet women had the right to vote and to work, and the Soviet state provided childcare, other aspects of Soviet law were regressive, e.g. outlawing abortion and making divorce difficult (de jure, but not de facto). Patriarchy worked through an underdeveloped economy that hindered the regime’s attempt to fulfill material provision. Discriminatory practices and worldviews meant women were relegated to lower-status jobs (Goldman 1993, 2002). Organizing the home and raising children was the job of the wife, mother/grandmother, and/or sister, linking women to the family collective. This private-public split between women and men operated even through recruitment into the Komsomol (Communist youth league), as girls and young women were supposed to be linked to home and domestic work (as well as formal jobs), while boys and young men were expected to be in the public sphere (e.g. formal work or military service). Archival materials from the 1930s (especially NKVD reports on public mood) suggest women were more passive in shopfloors and public meetings, and when they spoke up, it was usually to articulate concerns about poor provision of material necessities for homes and children (Davies 1997: chapter 3). That Party and Komsomol bosses thought little of the second shift (activists saw it as a sign of “backwardness”) only supported gendered divisions of labor and status (Gorsuch 1996). As the state clamped down on employment outside the formal sector and drew women into formal work, second shift burdens increased, such that women might spend three times more work at home than men (Sacks 1976). Making do with low wages and deficit goods demanded skills in determining when and where food and other goods might be available, navigating multiple queues and odd store hours, and negotiating exchange with acquaintances. Yet despite Stalin’s retrenchment (e.g. tougher laws on abortion and divorce), earlier gains were not entirely reversed, and women were joining ranks of engineers, skilled workers, Party officials, and professions (Goldman 2002).
My data for the Blockade story are from primary sources: Blockade-era diaries, interviews Daniil Granin conducted late 1970s with Blockade survivors, and personal accounts published after 1991. Over one hundred Blockade-era diaries are in former Leningrad Party archive (TsGAIPD SPb). Some survivors or families gave diaries to this archive during Khrushchev’s thaw of the early 1960s, when the Leningrad Party organization was compiling stories on the Blockade and accounts appeared in newspapers about real suffering (Kalendarova 2006). Other diaries were retained by authors or their families and published after 1991 or given to the archive at the Museum of the Defense of Leningrad. While many diarists knew writing certain thoughts was dangerous (e.g. criticizing Stalin), they did not shy away from noting observations or criticizing other aspects of Leningrad institutions. Neither did diarists regurgitate propaganda. In his studies of 1930s diaries, Hellbeck (2006) suggests diarists did not always hide “subversive” thoughts, but took seriously the Party’s urge to use diaries for self-criticism. In the 1930s and 1940s, Soviets did criticize Party and state because they took the Soviet mission seriously (Kotkin 1995), and it is not clear how many Soviets were traumatized by the Terror. Another key source was Blockade survivors’ recollections in interviews that respected author Daniil Granin conducted in the late 1970s for his book on the Blockade (Adamovich and Granin 1982). He left these materials with Central State Archive of Literature and Art in St. Petersburg (TsGALI SPb).

---

4 It might be worth commenting on using data from different periods (1941-44, 1970s, post-1991). These three sets of data are not perfectly equivalent, as they were produced at different points in time. As a rule, Blockade-era diaries—my primary data source—are the most detailed and cover more themes than Granin’s interviews. (Some Blockade-era diaries were published after 1991, and they reveal no significant differences in details or themes, reducing suspicions that they were doctored before publication—a problem with diaries published in the Soviet era.) However, general narrative structures, themes, and content are strikingly similar, e.g. regarding stories of cannibalism, accounts of sharing or stealing food, death, men’s and women’s behavior, and so on. The most significant difference I could discern was degree of conscious reflection on the Blockade as an event. This was more prominent in later data—although usually circumspect and at the end of any interview or account. While we should be cognizant of contradictions arising from data collected at different times, my impression is that these are minor.
Granin and colleagues asked open-ended questions about survival strategies, the state and Party, death, work, and general events. Interview contents were similar to those in earlier diaries.

These data are closest we have to personal discourses and hidden transcripts. Following grounded theory (Denzin and Lincoln 1994), I use diaries and recollections in a manner similar to how anthropologists and qualitative sociologists use observation and ethnography; these are sources for historical ethnography, through a close reading of material, paying attention to a variety of characteristics. In particular, I focus on what Leningraders wrote, and language and logic of accounts—especially as Leningraders seemed willing to write about what they and others did (within some limits). Diarists wrote of costs and norms violated: e.g. dispassionate accounts of prices of food at quasi-legal markets (rynok) with condemnation of speculation (Hass 2009).

Leningraders reflected on their and others’ behavior and what the Blockade was doing to them. Further, triangulating between Leningraders’ recollections and material and institutional contexts, I considered whether alternative practices and tactics were possible, and how counterfactuals square with what Leningraders did and how they framed experiences. When women could have negotiated status or positions, what did they do? Where and when did language of gender emerge, or not? Finally, I scrutinized justifications for acts (or their absence) and criticisms of one’s own and others’ actions to ascertain logics of practice. Rather than apply a rigid coding structure (and possibly miss data or force them into a preconceived scheme), I allowed content and meanings to “speak.” In this way I sought both practices and framing, and from there logics of practice and dispositions. This allows us to elucidate logics of seeming challenges and contradictions, and what kinds of logics governed practices (e.g. cost-benefit calculation or “culture”). For sake of space I use data that best illustrate general tendencies in the data.
Gendered Patriotic Duty, Anchors, and Shifting Status

Not all Leningrad women were keen on defending Stalin’s regime: police and civilians recorded conversations in which women complained about authorities and even suggested that life might not be so bad under the Germans (e.g. RNB OR⁵ 308/1/58; TsGAIPD SPb 4000/11/57/13). Even though only a small minority held such views, the authorities were concerned about such views spreading—or even of a decline in morale or sacrifice for the war effort. Thus, propaganda aimed at women framed proper behavior through emotional appeals to patriotic duty in which concrete others close significant to women’s identities—fathers, sons, and husbands serving at the front—were as important as the abstract Motherland (cf. Ament 2006; Corbesero 2010).

Women were encouraged to fulfill patriotic duties for kin as well as country. In one early radio statement, a factory worker’s wife challenged other women:

I appeal to soldiers’ mothers and wives. Dear sisters! My husband left for the front, as did two brothers…Many of our fathers, husbands, and brothers are fighting for our native land, for our children’s happiness. And our duty, the duty of Soviet women patriots is to take men’s places in production, to work as Stakhanovites, not considering time or any hardships. I call on you, dear sisters: go to factories, go to plants…We women will learn: how to heat steel, to drive trains, to make weapons! (Kovtun and Osinskii 2001: 11-12)

Newspaper Leningradskaia pravda fused gender and patriotism, linking the war effort with support for husbands, sons, and brothers at the front. One article described selflessness amidst deprivation: “…Soldiers of the Red Army should know that all is reliable behind the lines. Let them take from that new strength in the fight with the enemy…” said comrade Danilova, a non-Party worker at the factory. Danilova’s voice is the voice of the patriotic woman who understands we can attain victory only at the price of momentary victims and deprivations” (Leningradskaia Pravda, December 12, 1941, p. 1). Another form of propaganda, the radio series “Letters to and

---

⁵ Russian National Library, Written Records Collection, St. Petersburg. For RNB OR files, opis is absent, and so citations refer to fond/delo/list (collection/file/page).
from the front,” involved mothers, sisters, and wives writing to their fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons in the army—a clear articulation of positions, emotional-imbued relations, and statuses, with civilian women supporting men bearing the brunt of war (cf. RNB OR 1273/72/47).

Much propaganda rhetoric might sound over-the-top, but its thrust could have affinity with women’s real concerns and experiences that were framed vis-à-vis those concrete others as the real face of war. Consider Mariia Prokhorova, a Komsomol secretary in Leningrad’s Primorskii district, where many single women lived who worked in textile factories that employed primarily women. Part of Prokhorova’s job was to ensure these young women were motivated and “cultured.” Before the war this meant being “proper” women who would “prepare themselves for future life, be able to prepare supper, sew, embroider, clean a room, and so on” (TsGAIPD SPb 4000/10/1017/4). As war broke out, Prokhorova mobilized her “girls” for the war effort, such as helping the draft board call up men into the Red Army, digging anti-tank trenches on the city’s outskirts, and filling men’s jobs at military factories. Women’s work also involved caring for home and homefront. She instructed her charges to organize a cafeteria, to deliver medicine to sick Leningraders, and to care for children brought in, including bathing them (TsGAIPD SPb 4000/10/1017/13-17). Doing so, these women would also fight the stereotype of women as weak (TsGAIPD SPb 4000/10/1017/12). Prokhorova was one person on a mission, but generally, organized efforts and personal dispositions dovetailed to produce gendered caregiving, reinforcing these dispositions, practices, and positions in the division of labor.

Caregiving was central not only to occupations where women predominated, such as nurses (TsGAIPD SPb K-1909/1/365/34-67). For civilian women, one important anchor for such tasks and practices was children, and there the authorities could appeal to caregiving and motherhood. Women did not always question this; accounts suggest they seemed to agree, as we see
in Sophiia Glazomitskaia’s reminiscences about work at the Rabochii textile factory. Factory workers’ children were dying from starvation and had to be protected from air raids, and as Party secretary there, Glazomitskaia was told to set up a children’s nursery at the factory in February 1942. As Glazomitskaia related, “We needed to begin sounding the alarm and to decide what to do with children! We were told this: ‘You women do not need to be taught what to do with children!!!’ So we began to solve this problem ourselves.” When special nurseries and orphanages refused to take in Rabochii children, the women decided to expand the existing factory nursery: “Women workers themselves understood the importance of this question. We did not adopt any formal decisions in the factory Party committee, we just said that the quicker we created a nursery, the more of our children would remain alive. And the women workers set out to work” (TsGAIPD SPb 4000/10/327/22, 24). When Stalin’s February 1942 instruction #55 ordered labor mobilization, an entire Rabochii shopfloor turned to cleaning and repairing soldiers’ clothes. Women workers, including Glazomitskaia, were proud of this contribution; 75 women worked full-time in the laundry shopfloor, and many brought their own sewing machines (TsGAIPD SPb 4000/10/327/27-29, 62). By August 1942 evacuations from the city were in full swing, but the Department of Public Education [RONO] was evacuating only the weakest children, and they were not so keen on taking Rabochii children “on purpose, thinking that textile workers are mostly women, and so they relate to children more attentively” (TsGAIPD SPb 4000/10/327/26).

Like Prokhorova, Glazomitskaia assumed particular norms and dispositions were natural bedrocks of women’s conduct, including caregiving vis-à-vis close others (factory children) and those more distant (soldiers) who still resonated because most Leningraders knew a male serving in the Red Army—the generic “soldier” had a concrete counterpart in a father, brother, husband, or son. While other women at the factory voluntarily helped with caregiving for children and
soldiers, they were not always so obedient of other gendered norms, such as codes of proper femininity. One woman at Rabochii was warned against having an illicit affair with a married sailor. A Party member requested a formal inquiry into the sailor’s background, and Glazomitskaia gave this woman a formal warning. Her comrades used this example to argue that she gave her whole life to Party work at the factory and was perpetually trying to get others to follow her lead (TsGAIPD SPb 4000/10/327/37). That is, her behavior followed a script in which gendered duty in the division of labor was proper and useful to her and in general. From her position as Party secretary at Rabochii, she attempted to support gendered relations and practices in this particular set of fields of labor. But we should also note that one set of traditionally defined gender practices (of intimacy) were being broken, while others (gendered duty vis-à-vis children) were supported, not simply by formal policies but also by voluntary actions oriented to anchors (children).

Women’s perceptions of the importance and status of their dispositions, skills, and labor were accompanied by a shift in attitudes to one set of key anchors—those civilian men who had higher status but required women’s aid to survive. Many women judged men as weaker in body and soul, opposite of usual stereotypes—yet this new reflexivity was refracted through gendered duty for them that augmented essentialism. As women observed many men, not just those close, exhibiting less energy and effort than women, they coded gender difference—grounded in new dependency relations—as general and natural. These judgments were not only normative but also explanatory, as they explained why men died more readily. In this Blockade myth, one needed to remain active, else one became idle and lost the will to live (e.g. TsGAIPD SPb 4000/11/34-35, 39, 74-77). Women’s acceptance of breadseeking, caregiving, and factory work—as they pursued first and second shifts and saved dying men, children, and factories with tireless effort (despite being hungry)—gave them the basis to construct a narrative of wartime heroism of them-
selves vis-à-vis these anchors, which revealed “natural” abilities as crucial to survival and superior to those of civilian men. Women were proud of newly discovered strength and abilities. It seemed the lower-status sex could rise to the occasion—and as a result, they were helping themselves survive as well as men and others. In contrast, men succumbed readily to hunger and did not remain active, and were often thought of as “dystrophics” (*distrofik*)—a medical term for a person physically wasting away that gained a quality of moral opprobrium. Women framed themselves vis-à-vis close others (men and children), now with status inverted.

In late 1941 and 1942, women contrasted their efforts and strength to stay alive with lack of such in men. Artist Anna Ostroumova-Lebedeva boasted, “yard-keepers cleaning the street and collecting snow are women. Most likely this is why everything is done quickly and accurately” (RNB OR 1015/58/1). Later she related “the impression that men are many times weaker than women in the struggle for life and resistance to death…The majority of men, if their wives are evacuated and they [men] remained alone (if they had not taken different wives!), very weakly resist difficulties of our life and die faster than women” (RNB OR 1015/59/71). While at the front, Vera Ryvina received a letter from her mother in Leningrad, who tolerated cold and hunger and cared for children: “But she, full of decisiveness, tolerates many burdens. She is a patient Russian woman” (TsGALI SPb 471/1/180/8). Antonina Liubimova claimed women “never were so helpless, never were such psychological dystrophics, as men. I never saw women begging for bread or ration cards. Men always begged for something, although rarely did anyone give them anything; those who did not leave for the front or evacuate and had not yet died had a look of complete idiotism.” Men stole bread from wives, “therefore wives never trusted them with their own and their children’s ration cards” (TsGALI SPb 114/1/5/35). School director Elizaveta Sokolova complained that a male comrade “is not acting heroically. It is not necessary for him to
leave Leningrad. His son (thirteen years old) already evacuated with his school and is safe…But
he is in his older years, and clearly he fears for his life and is hurrying to save himself”
(TsGAIPD SPb 4000/11/1009/3). A. A. Bardovskii died in January 1942; after the war his wife
gave his diary to the Party archive. She inserted this postscript: “The diary was always written in
an extreme mood, and so much in it does not correspond to reality. He, not I, suffered difficulties
of war quiet sharply…If there were moments of disappointment, this was only because he was a
very helpless, grown child who feared to admit that he had excessively weak health. All of his
burdens always ended up on my shoulders” (TsGAIPD SPb 4000/11/7/69).

Appeals to caregiving, accepting caregiving duties, and perceiving new worth and status
did not mean women were entirely quiescent. This new sense of position and status led some
women to see their own contributions as increasingly important not only for men and Leningrad,
but also for the authorities. As they accepted wartime burdens, women felt male-dominated au-
thorities were not pulling their weight, and Leningrad women were not being treated fairly. This
led some women to send individual and collective letters to city authorities, especially Andrei
Zhdanov (Leningrad’s top authority) and Ivan Andreenko (in charge of the Trade Department
and food distribution). Sending letters to newspapers or authorities was not unusual, and Soviets
used the regime’s promises and language for claims and critiques. In some letters, women articu-
lated indignation over the regime’s underappreciation of their efforts, especially rations for
themselves and children, and at times they also invoked language of class justice and holding the
authorities to account. The regime’s most egregious sin was placing women in the ration level
“dependent” (izhdivenets), both because it meant the lowest amount of food received and implied
uselessness. One group of six army officers’ wives sent a letter (dated February 18, 1942) to An-
dreenko, in a less than respectful tone demanding authorities alleviate the food deficit:
You should not forget that our husbands, fighting at the front, think and fight for us, for the simple population, i.e. for their wives and children, but you do not think about us at all... You supply double rations to an entire army that does nothing. For example, janitors, technicians, or tram park workers. The majority of workers take sick leave and sit at home for two or three months, not bringing the state anything of use and having first category [rations], but, having half their bread and four times less meat and cereals, we are supposed to fulfill for them all of their work, for example cleaning snow from streets and bringing order to homes and entryways... and we are all without exception starving. We think that this is more than unjust—it is scandalous... We firmly believe that if we turn with this request to Joseph Vissarionovich [Stalin], that he would immediately answer us and in the Stalinist way decide this issue. (TsGAIPD SPb 4000/20/60/73-74)

In May 1942, one woman complained, using language that expressed barely contained rage:

What is this? It seems that no one needs to feed us mothers and wives. As the radio reports on distribution of food, we izdiventsy get nothing, not butter, not meat, not sugar... And the authorities are not ashamed! We give our sons and daughters and husbands to the front. When Leningrad needed to be cleaned from filth and uncleanliness, then housewives went out to fulfill that work, but we were not fed, because they do not consider us to be people (TsGAIPD SPb 4000/20/60/183).

As they berated civilian men and authorities for not stepping up, these women presumed gender positions and dispositions as natural templates for normal practice. This does not mean duress automatically meant retrenchment of gendered dispositions. Something mediated that process: perceptions that women’s qualities fit needs of the day. Caregiving and breadseeking from the second shift, in a desperate context, reversed previous relations of dependency—but then women linked work and its results—enabling others’ survival—to dispositions “natural” to them as women. Something else reinforced gender as natural and inevitable, reducing possible awareness of empowerment, even in shadows and hidden transcripts. This involved anchors and risk.

---

6 In the winter of 1942, civilians, mostly women, were mobilized to clean snow and filth from the streets. Given the cold, amount of snow, and low rations, this was difficult work.
Anchors, Caregiving, and Risk: Habitus and Dispositions Reinforced

Women sensed new value for their skills and status as women vis-à-vis others, such as husbands and colleagues but even the (usually male) authorities. Yet as many women began to see men in a new, and less flattering, light, this perception of weakness could alter perceptions of traits that would reinforce the sense of inalterable, essential gender dispositions and relations, especially as related to caregiving. Women might be more durable under Blockade duress, but that meant their lot as caregivers and breadseekers was inevitable, if status-worthy. In propaganda and many of their own self-conceptions, women were acting heroically in continuing to perform a variety of duties. In part this was because women gained such status from practices themselves, rather than from rewards for such practices. While women did receive rations and wages from their new work, they also continued to provide “goods” immediately consumed: not only did they gain wages, but they also sought out and prepared food, maintained homes, and the like. At the same time, there seemed little choice: to decline caregiving and breadseeking services or to challenge roles and practices of the status order could increase the risk of harm to women’s friends, mates, children, and even the city, and thus to women’s essentialist self-conceptions.

In fact, women continued to provide often without commentary, and clues to their dedicated caregiving often come from men’s observations or juxtapositions of women’s and men’s judgments. Take Varvara Vraskaia’s story. Her husband, a professor, was unwilling to accept survival strategies at odds with his higher-brow norms, expressions of masculinity, and intelligentsia dispositions. In contrast, Vraskaia wrote of greater willingness to sacrifice class norms to save their daughter Irina, not to speak of herself and her husband. Yet she did not force her suggestions on her husband—she does not say why, but it seems out of deference to his gender and professional status. She noticed Irina deteriorating from hunger earlier than he did, and she sug-
gested they trade their belongings at the *rynok* for food. (The *rynok* was the collective farmer’s market, where sellers sold scarce food—often stolen from state reserves—at speculative value in rubles or in kind, cf. Hass 2011.) He adamantly refused, as market barter was below his status (suggesting a class dynamic as well). She obeyed his wishes until his death from starvation in late 1941 both removed his obstructions and proved she had been right. Not long after his death, she began to trade family valuables for food, and when she, Irina, and her brother decided to evacuate Leningrad in summer 1942—something her late husband would not consider—she packed a suitcase of valuables to trade during the hard, month-long journey to Tbilisi (RNB OR 1273/13/31-38). Ultimately, breadseeking and pragmatism saved herself and her daughter; her husband’s less pragmatic attitude led to his death. Had he taken his wife’s concerns and suggestions seriously, he might have survived.

Other men noted the significance of women’s efforts, and they wrote that Leningrad women could be heroic as they aided men too weak or unable to help themselves—these men understood how dependent they were on women. Mikhail Pelevin related how he and his father, who lived in two different apartments, were too weak from hunger to get out of bed. Each day his mother went to work, then to seek food, and then to each abode to help son and husband. She always gave her son food from her own rations, even when she was in the hospital ill from malnutrition. His childhood love Alla (whom he later married) was the eldest daughter of a neighbor’s family. To keep siblings alive while her father was at the front, “good daughter” Alla traversed the city, from Voentorg (military trade organization) for food, to Smolny (Party headquarters) for her father’s wages (RNB OR 1273/49/4-5, 27-32). The diary of Lev Kogan, an older male worker, is peppered with comments of his wife coming home with dry rations, sugar, or other needed goods (e.g. RNB OR 1035/1/1, 3, 6). On March 23, 1942, Kogan wrote that his
wife brought home 50 grams of diluted port at lunchtime, and she immediately went back to the market for cigarettes. After two hours “in the cold, in tears, freezing, she brought home twelve cigarettes and, not stopping to rest, ran out for grain, which mostly likely she would not find because it was late…If she would lose her strength…we will all be lost” (RNB OR 1035/1/17).

When women did carry out breadseeking and caregiving, they were often likely simply to describe their efforts, with commentary generally pragmatic. For others, however, narratives reveal how important relations to such entities with valence could be. One powerful example of gender durability and anchors is the narrative of Olga Epshtein, a Communist Party member and skilled worker at a military factory, whose son Edik was only a year old when the war broke out. In her multi-volume diary, Epshtein never questioned “women’s work” or “woman” automatically as a caregiving mate and mother. While she did invoke gender and class in critical comments, class predominated in claims of injustices, while gender predominated in perceptions of challenges (e.g. TsGALI SPb 107/3/323/18, 22; 107/3/324/31, 33, 40, 46). When she raised gender, she quickly subordinated it to class (e.g. TsGALI SPb 107/3/324/39, also 107/3/324/72). In her detailed account, Edik remained the emotional center of her narrative and sense of caregiving self—even weeks at a time when he lived at a nursery. Strains of survival were so great that she considered suicide, but Edik’s dependency changed her mind (TsGALI SPb 107/3/323/42). Her brief time living in her in-laws’ cold pantry was degrading less because of her own suffering, than how those in-laws let Edik to suffer in that cold room where rats, as well as cold and hunger, tortured him (TsGALI SPb 107/3/323/58-61). Epshtein faced a repeat of such offenses when she lived temporarily with her friend Nina and Nina’s aunt Emma. Emma, the household authority, coded every interaction as a market transaction. Epshtein endured this, except when it affected Edik—when she would respond with indignation and sometimes challenge Emma (e.g.
TsGALI SPb 107/3/323/85, also 70, 75, 76, 78, 80-81). She moved to another in-law’s empty apartment, but had to leave Edik at a state-run nursery for weeks on end. His absence tore at her conscience and made her feel incomplete. When Edik was quarantined, her lone comment was “more grief” (TsGALI SPb 107/3/323/86-89, 95, 98). When she visited him he did not recognize her, which “broke my heart” and brought her to tears. When he recovered, she spent a few days at home with him but had to return him to the nursery: “Why do I, a mother, not have the chance to be with my own child? Somehow he is supposed to be with strangers. Again Olga you are like a lone wolf” (TsGALI SPb/3/324/10, 14). She found it too painful to visit Edik on his third birthday in 1943, and instead stayed home to clean (TsGALI SPb 107/3/324/82).7

Epshtein’s account presents another example of gendered anchors and risk that reveals how anchors need not be physically present: her husband Misha, who left for the front in July 1941 and never returned. (Even when Edik was at a nursery for weeks on end, Epshtein could visit him.) This quality of physical absence but emotional presence (a “Schrödinger’s other”) haunted her, and she made ethical judgments in reference to him: “Of course, as a good Party member I should not have judged him for volunteering [for the army]. On the contrary, I should have convinced him to go to the front, but for some reason I was convinced that all the bosses who clannishly speak at meetings and at the first to sign up as volunteers would remain at their places, while those like Misha would go to the front” (TsGALI SPb 107/3/324/10). As she juggled demands of work and family in September 1941, she expressed despondency in reference to

---

7 One might claim that Epshtein, as Edik’s mother, naturally would do what she could for his well-being—and why should Emma care about Edik? This presumes “mother” as either-or identity and risks essentializing gender, but it leads to a pertinent question: Are anchors universal, or is there variation contingent on personal histories? Emma did not care for her daughter and granddaughter as Epshtein cared for Edik (TsGALI SPb 107/3/323/72, 85, 87). Lidiia Okhapkina related how one mother, with whom she briefly shared her apartment, gave both her children’s rations to her son and let her infant daughter scream from hunger. This raised Okhapkina’s ire and led her to secretly feed the daughter some of her own food (TsGALI SPb 107/3/385/4-5).
Misha: “If he could only see how many difficulties I am suffering, he would quickly find a solution. With him everything would be easier” (TsGALI SPb 107/3/323/33). Refracting injustice through her absent husband was not necessarily dependency: before the war, she almost divorced him when she thought she was pregnant (TsGALI SPb 107/3/323/6-7). She did not actively seek a mate during the war, and she criticized women romantically engaged—although she wrote of the pain of seeing one woman’s husband return (e.g. TsGALI SPb 107/3/324/94, 107/3/325/9). Her yearning for Misha’s return was, as for Edik when he was at the nursery, for this anchor to be present to complete the family as meaningful field. Her concern for Misha’s fate also reflected concern and powerless: this was one anchor she could not defend. Only in November 1944 did she receive word he was missing in action (TsGALI SPb 107/3/325/71)—even then she held out hope that, maybe, he was really alive in a German POW camp (TsGALI SPb 107/3/326/19).

In January 1944 Leningrad was liberated. School administrator Kseniia Polzikova-Rubets cited author Aleksandr Fadeev, who wrote that Nikolai Tikhonov (a common friend) said his wife “had become a different woman, a woman of besieged Leningrad, and like all women of that city she calmly, freely, and naturally fulfilled everything she needed to.” Maybe she did, or maybe this was Tikhonov’s perception—but Polzikova-Rubets agreed with the sentiment: “[Tikhonov] suggested several times that I [evacuate], but I did not leave because I knew he needs me, and the city needs people like me, because I can bear everything” (Polzikova-Rubets 2000: 226-227). Most diaries end not long after the Blockade, but some women bequeathed later sentiments about gendered senses of self. If Leningrad women felt a shift in gendered dispositions and relations, we might expect some bitterness. In the 1970s women complained to Daniil Granin that the Soviet regime lied about the Blockade or did not provide adequate benefits (TsGALI SPb 107/3/336/17-18; 107/3/337/22-27; 107/3/347/28-33). If men used what military
experience they could for post-war status (e.g. TsGAIPD SPb 4000/10/565, 4000/10/327, 4000/10/762), women discussed caregiving contributions that remain underappreciated, even in Russia. As Evdokiia Vasilieva wrote, “the majority of people in blockaded Leningrad survived because they had to care for someone. How true that was!...I believed in miracles…but only now I understand what saved me. Caring for children helped me save myself and then children…Did I have the right to lose my spirits and think only of myself?” (TsGALI SPb 107/3/422/73-74). In a letter to Granin in 1976, one woman recalled, “I know many girls (now grandmothers) who were active in the Komsomol at that time, they can tell you quite a bit. They were ‘ordinary, usual’ factory girls, but when they it was necessary, such abilities and strength that no one suspected opened up inside of them. They never thought at all about themselves, but thought about people and deeds they were charged to do” (TsGALI SPb 107/3/422/12).

**Beyond Gender in the Blockade: Broader Promises of Anchors**

Women played no small role saving Leningrad—not only out of patriotic sentiments, but also out of dispositions to defend anchors and social relations, fields, and communities. Feminization of Leningrad and its social fields was a contingent combination of gendered military conscription, physiology of starvation, and skills and dispositions of the second shift crucial to a city under siege. First, male conscription and men’s earlier succumbing to starvation bred a demographic shift, increasing women’s responsibilities in new positions (e.g. factory jobs) and among kith and kin (caregiving). Second, women’s capacities to adapt to new demands aided survival of anchors, which created a sense of increased status and worth that women interpreted as a feature of themselves as women. This was reinforced by perceptions of men in their lives and in general, and of relations between women and men. New status and dependency augmented the sense of “wom-
an” as natural, which was embedded in myths of survival (i.e. keeping active) as well as everyday practices. Third, this heightened sense of gender status reinforced an essentialist logic, rather than calling gender into question. Status rewards made traditional gender relations seem positive, because new status and dependency were interpreted as duty—not only to the war effort, but to the survival of anchors underpinning status and senses of self. Women fought risks to anchors, which hindered rethinking gender.\(^8\) *Habitus*, fields (rules and discourses), positions, and practices of gender interacted via anchors—entities of significance that anchored one to position, practices, and meanings. In sum, Leningrad women felt empowered not by challenging gender rules *per se*, but because traditional gendered practices and dispositions (such as caregiving) vis-à-vis anchors bequeathed status and potential dependency power. This in turn reinforced those norms and relations that would reduce women’s newfound status once the context improved after the end of the Blockade and war, rather than providing an incentive or platform (at least in hidden transcripts) for at least beginning to rethink what being a “woman” meant more fundamentally.

The material here reveals gender was a powerful orienting logic, although it was not the single dominating logic of *habitus*, anchors, and fields. Leningrad women could feel competing relations to other fields and habits: e.g. gender versus class in home versus workplace. Sometimes these could be complementary (Glazomitskaia’s account above), and elsewhere be con-

---

\(^8\) Men deserve study, but I make only brief comments. One observation is that men’s dependency on women evoked gratitude and status threat. Gesel Gelfer acknowledged sister Tanya’s “good will” for bringing extra food home from work, but he also denigrated her efforts and character, e.g. “Tanya…was, is, and will be an egoist” (TsGAIPD SPb 4000/11/24/4, 17). One context in which men were less likely to act this way was when *children* were in the picture. Fathers could act similarly to mothers—but rather than employ breadseeking skills, they offered to sacrifice well-being, albeit this could threaten everyone’s safety. Valentin Baikov’s father gave portions of his meals to his children, although his wife worried this would kill him and leave them all worse off (Baikov 1989: 48, 61, 73). Perhaps men’s notions of self and anchors involve different orientations. Leningrad women felt an *actor* → *entity* vector, compelled to move “towards” anchors (e.g. caregiving). Men’s vectors might run in the opposite manner: *actor* ← *entity*. All else equal, men expect anchors to bestow status on them—even if they genuinely care for them.
flicting (Epshtein’s account). One constant was that gendered meanings, dispositions, and compulsions were powerful and linked to status and duty, caregiving and breadseeking, and risk. How women sensed and responded to compulsions varied by how actors framed and acted on them. Glazomitskaia and her women combined gendered caregiving/breadseeking and class (labor) because Glazomitskaia herself, a Party secretary, framed them as two sides of the same coin. She had authority to enforce that frame while supporting female employees as caregivers (gender) and workers (class/labor). Further, most of Rabochii’s workers were women (often the case in textile factories), and factory and Party bosses would be attuned to gendered practices and dispositions and the need to coordinate family and factory. Epshtein’s factory and Party superiors did not frame demands of family and factory, and gender and class, as related parts of wartime challenges. Those superiors helped (e.g. with nurseries or extra time off) only when Epshtein confronted them (e.g. TsGALI SPb 107/3/323/86-89). Yet dynamics in both cases reinforced gendered dispositions of caregiving and breadseeking and women’s “normal” positions in the division of labor. In both cases, women felt compelled to accept caregiving because someone had to save children, the city, and military production.

Might field-anchor-habitus be relevant for other entities and practices, including some beyond the context of the Blockade? I believe there is promise. Comparing across contexts might reveal significant dynamics of anchors and their relations to institutions—and from here, dynamics of change and continuity, the central issue of this article (using gender as a case). One theme implicit or explicit in literature on social change is that system shocks that perturb reproduction of structures, institutions, and collective practices can trigger change. Geopolitical con-

---

9 Data and analyses from my project suggest this was the case for disposal of the dead, another anchor (Hass 2015). My ongoing analysis suggests this might work for class: habitus, practices, and senses of position operated vis-à-vis relations to shared anchors such as bread.
flicts beget revolutions and contentious action; depressions and economic shocks breed hetero-
dox policies; shifts in economic relations, elite configurations, and geopolitics made Civil Rights
possible. We could posit that such shocks trigger reflexivity and *habitus hysteresis*. Blockade
desperation did induce shifts in perceptions of status—yet as we saw and Adkins (2004) notes,
status awareness need not automatically invoke “refashioning” gender (or any other logic).

This becomes even more curious if we compare war and gender across cases—such as
women in Richmond, Virginia during and after the American Civil War. While these women of
the upper strata of Southern society (who left material for historians) were not in great danger of
starvation death, they did have to cope with expanded tasks under duress. The combination of
domestic authority and practical, gendered knowledge as homemaker and hostess helped South-
erm women to innovate (Massey 1952), and Southern women overcame economic hardships that
made them feel more independent (Massey 1966: chapters 15, 16). Richmond women entered the
labor force in the South’s moment of need, and some of them were incensed enough at bread
prices that they sparked a one-day riot on April 2, 1863. Like Leningrad women, these southern
women held traditional concepts of gender during the war to maintain certainty: for example,
young girls clung to core norms of gendered romance “to [fulfill] their feminine duty” even as
they tested limits of those norms (cf. Ott 2008: 102, also chapter 4). When men returned and re-
asserted patriarchy in the South, women’s *habitus* had shifted enough that seeds of some eman-
cipation were planted (cf. Censer 2003). Accustomed to improved status and autonomy in the
Civil War, many Southern women quietly “wanted nothing more than to earn a decent living,
and they were resentful when denied the opportunity” (Massey 1966: 335). Some women turned
to civil service jobs, education, or nursing and medical practice, and others became active in civil
Interestingly, this comparison suggests the importance of anchors for post-war fields, *habitus*, and practice (in this case vis-à-vis gender), for which we must include institutions and organizational resources. In Leningrad and Virginia, experiencing war affected *habitus* and practice through gendered fields and, inside those fields, relations to anchors that amplified the effects of field positions, relations, and divisions of labor. What effect shifts in status, practice, and perceptions could have later depended on broader institutions and higher-level fields. Leningrad women under Stalin had little chance to act on post-war expectations. Virginia women had some opportunity to build on wartime experiences, although these were constrained by legal and informal (i.e. field) restrictions on participating in public realms of politics and labor. Women who survived Rwanda and besieged Sarajevo in the 1990s could build on new dispositions and experiences in formal movements in institutional, legal, and normative contexts conducive to mobilization (Berry 2015a, 2015b). Such civic organizations brought into the open women’s claims that they deserved better for efforts in those countries’ conflicts. Political field rules permitted organized efforts that provided opportunities for public exchanges of experiences, ideas, and even language of empowerment and action. Note that institutional variation would be meaningless without perceptions and dispositions that, in wartime, were shaped by relations to anchors.

Extrapolating from my narrative and brief comparisons above, I advance a proposition relevant not only to gender and war but perhaps to social change generally, that Leningrad’s story hints at but cannot test definitively. Because of the anchors-risk relationship, the potential capacity to rethink positions, statuses, and practices (i.e. *habitus hysteresis*) might appear as an inverted U-shaped curve, with degree of risk the *x*-axis and potential for change the *y*-axis. Increasing social disruption can produce retrenchment in the name of reducing risk. Severe deprivation augments instrumental rationality (saving one’s skin even at the expense of others), yet such in-
clinations are tempered by logics of practice embedded in anchors and enhanced by risk to others whose welfare is part of *habitus*. (This seems related to early days of war: rallying around the flag, the public accepting “us-versus-them” discourse, and so on.) This problematizes linear relationships between contextual and individual change, as well as across forms of relations.10

Shocks might be too marginal to facilitate significant change: anchors might buttress original *habitus* (traditional relations and practices), and fields might remain intact. Yet if shocks become too great and fields too uncertain, and risks to anchors become too existential, symbolic, and emotional, anchors can be important sources of stability that reinforce *habitus* at a moment of potential *hysteresis*. As institutions and structures weaken, opportunity and agency increase until uncertainty creates enough sense of risk that people fall back on what they know.

We know from de Beauvoir, Bem, DeVault, West and Zimmerman, and many others that gender involves dispositions and relations reenacted dramaturgically. My goal has not been to challenge this understanding of gender, but rather to provide additional ideas about how these dispositions, relations, and practices operate—and from here to create a springboard to other issues of position and relations, and of change and reproduction. Gender is in part embedded in “nodes” of meaning and position that link context and self and give fields texture. Specifying the nature of those nodes and relations, particularly those that became anchors, might help us better pinpoint how gender and other social relations operate. That traditional gender notions can persist under duress as dispositions and logics of *habitus* and fields is no small matter. When all is fairly stable, institutions can buttress gendered dispositions, positions, and practices. Duress and

---

10 As well, this might mean shifting how we think about explanation and prediction. Formalization might require less linear or log-linear regressions, and more equations like those for fluid flow or general relativity—vectors of movement and magnitude of an actor’s “next step” in fields. Alternatively, we might need to think more along the relational and contextual lines of organic chemistry. I leave this topic for a separate discussion.
challenges can weaken foundations: stimuli to act instrumentally increase (if survival demands calculation), and actors running institutions face steep learning curves. Yet if *habitus* is not eternal, it is durable. I argued that one source of durability is an actor’s relations to anchors of valence that ground senses of order and self. Based on evidence presented here about gender and the Blockade, anchors might be a “strong force” at the heart of social fields and relations—maybe not only for gender—as concrete social relations and particular reified field positions and meanings inscribed on the self. Hidden beneath the veneer of stable contexts, anchors are most clearly revealed when institutions are under assault—which suggests that fields might be more primordial and fundamental than previously believed. Relations are not abstract “networks” or individual attractions we rethink with ease. They are sensuous entities whose impressions are core parts of us, even as we look catastrophe in the face. Remaking or abandoning anchors when the world is not insane might be difficult but possible, as contextual stability provides security to create new relations and meanings, if fields allow. When the world is collapsing, anchors might be the last bastion of certainty and of who we are.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


