Rules and Standards in Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment

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INTRODUCTION

When looking at Justice Scalia’s approach to the Fourth Amendment, most would say he was an originalist and a textualist. Justice Scalia himself would like to explain, “I’m an originalist and a textualist, not a nut.” Although originalism and textualism were often prevalent in his Fourth Amendment decisions, even more important to his decision-making was his disdain for judicial activism. To limit judicial discretion, Justice Scalia frequently opted to
impose bright-line rules rather than vague standards.\(^4\) This is apparent not only within his jurisprudence as a whole, but also specifically in his Fourth Amendment decisions.\(^5\)

In his article *Originalism: The Lesser Evil*, Justice Scalia denounced nonoriginalists because their approach invites judicial activism.\(^6\) Though Scalia acknowledged that originalism had its defects,\(^7\) he argued that it was strongly preferable to nonoriginalism because it constrained a judge’s ability to impose his or her own moral or political values onto the law.\(^8\) Making decisions about current social values, Scalia argued, was better left to the elected legislature.\(^9\) Originalism was superior because it required judges to justify their rulings with something external to themselves.\(^10\)

In his book *A Matter of Interpretation*, Justice Scalia further disparaged the common law—or as he would call it, judge-made law.\(^11\)

the rule’s the thing; originalism and traditionalism are means, not ends.”).  
5. Professor Orin Kerr, in a panel discussion at the 2016 Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, noted that Justice Scalia’s impact on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been partially overlooked. See David Stras, Orin Kerr, Rachel Barkow, Stephanos Bibas & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Justice Scalia and the Criminal Law, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 743, 744 (2018).  
7. In 1989 Scalia admitted that he might be merely a “faint-hearted originalist” because he could not imagine himself upholding a statute requiring flogging—even though it would have been upheld in 1791. *Id.* at 864. By 2013, though, his faint-heartedness had receded. In an interview with *New York* magazine, he stated that he would, in fact, uphold a law permitting flogging because though “it is immensely stupid . . . it is not unconstitutional.” Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, NEW YORK (Oct. 4, 2013), https://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/ [https://perma.cc/2PKG-W2F4]. Instead of faint-hearted, he now referred to himself as an honest originalist—that is, one who “take[s] the bitter with the sweet.” *Id.*  
8. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 6, at 863 (“It is very difficult for a person to discern a difference between those political values that he personally thinks most important, and those political values that are ‘fundamental to our society.’”).  
9. *Id.* at 854.  
10. *Id.* at 864 (“Originalism does not aggravate the principal weakness of the system, for it establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself.”).  
11. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 4 (1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION] (noting that the common law does not necessarily reflect people’s practices but is rather law created by judges).
Describing a first-year law school class discussing a series of hypotheticals, he wrote mockingly, “What intellectual fun all of this is!”12 He noted law school is exhilarating because it consists of “playing king”—that is, playing common-law judge—by deciding how and what the law should be.13 All of this would be well and good, Scalia said, if it weren’t for a little thing called democracy.14

In the criminal context, one justification for choosing between a standard and a rule is the need to safeguard the rights of unpopular criminal defendants.15 Justice Scalia discussed this issue in The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. He wrote that one of the utilities of bright-line rules was that they allowed judges to serve counter-majoritarian interests.16 Firm rules are most important, he said, in cases where the popular will might come out the other way:

> It is very difficult to say that a particular convicted felon who is the object of widespread hatred must go free because, on balance, we think that excluding the defense attorney from the line-up process in this case may have prevented a fair trial. It is easier to say that our cases plainly hold that, absent exigent circumstances, such exclusion is a per se denial of due process.17

Bright-line rules, Scalia argued, allowed judges to be “courageous”—that is, to stand up to “occasional excesses of [the] popular will.”18

Justice Scalia didn’t only condemn judicial activism in his extra-curricular writing, but also—often quite sharply—in his decisions. In his dissent in Dickerson v. United States, for example, he re-

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12. Id. at 7.
13. Id. (“[First-year law school] consists of playing king—devising, out of the brilliance of one’s own mind, those laws that ought to govern mankind. How exciting! And no wonder so many law students, having drunk at this intoxicating well, aspire for the rest of their lives to be judges!”).
14. Id. at 9.
17. Id. (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)). Justice Scalia expressed a similar sentiment in Arizona v. Hicks, when he stated that “the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.” 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
buked the majority for holding that the rule from *Miranda v. Arizona* was constitutional and therefore could not be superseded by Congress. The *Miranda* decision, Scalia argued, was pure judicial activism: it was in no way required by the Constitution. He accused the majority of violating the separation of powers and becoming “some sort of nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs-down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends its collective fancy.” Justice Scalia’s concern with judicial discretion also manifested in his theory of statutory interpretation. For example, in *Zuni Public School District Number 89 v. Department of Education*, he dissented, berating the majority for purporting to interpret “unenacted congressional intent.” He characterized the majority’s theory of statutory interpretation as “sheer applesauce,” and voiced his concern that when a judge purports to interpret congressional intent, the interpretation tends to have a remarkable similarity to whatever judges think Congress *should* have meant. Though *Zuni Public School District* dealt with per-pupil expenditures—a relatively apolitical issue—Justice Scalia noted his concern with the impact that interpreting so-called congressional intent would have in cases “more likely to arouse the judicial libido” such as voting rights or antidiscrimination. He preferred bright-line rules that would restrict judges’ ability to impose their own morals, ethics, and politics onto the law.

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20. See id. at 448–49.
21. Id. at 455. He called the majority opinion “antidemocratic” and wrote that it “converts *Miranda* from a milestone of judicial overreaching into the very Cheops’ Pyramid (or perhaps the Sphinx would be a better analogue) of judicial arrogance.” Id. at 446, 465.
23. Id. at 113, 117.
24. Id. at 118.
25. Justice Scalia further criticized activist judging in the civil procedure context in *Burnham v. Superior Court*, 495 U.S. 604, 623 (1990). Writing for the plurality, he denounced Justice Brennan’s concurrence for relying on “contemporary notions of due process.” Id. He argued that this formulation gave judges license to break with the test of “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” and replace it with merely their notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id. In his formulation he focused on the term “tradition” to argue for a historical approach. Id. at 621. He thought we should formulate rules of jurisdiction the way we have always done it. See id.
This Article examines Justice Scalia’s effort to limit judicial discretion through the lens of the debate between rules and standards. It is the first article to situate Scalia’s goal of limited discretion within the framework of the debate between rules and standards, as well as the first to discuss this issue specifically with respect to his Fourth Amendment decisions. Rules are binding directives that leave little room for considering the specific facts of any given situation. Critics argue that they tend to be over- or under-inclusive, but the value of rules is that by taking power away from the decisionmaker, they limit judicial discretion. Further, some argue that rules promote democracy because they properly leave the power to make decisions based on politics or value judgments to the legislature. On the flip side, proponents of standards argue that standards produce judgments that are less arbitrary and more substantively fair because they allow decisionmakers to consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case.

26. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 57–121 (outlining the debate between rules and standards as a debate around how much discretion judges should have and by what means courts should keep discretion in check). Professor Kathryn Urbonya has analyzed the implications of how modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence vacillates between rules and standards. See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme Court’s Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1387–89 (2003).

27. Other scholars have analyzed Justice Scalia’s interest in judicial restraint in his jurisprudence writ large, but to our knowledge no one has situated it within the framework of rules and standards. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 3, at 748–50 (discussing what he calls Scalia’s “anti-discretion principle”); Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4 (critiquing Justice Scalia’s preference for rules from an originalist perspective); David A. Strauss, On the Origin of Rules (with Apologies to Darwin): A Comment on Antonin Scalia’s The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 997 (2008) (discussing Scalia’s preference for rules). Further, various scholars have discussed Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, yet have not specifically analyzed his preference for rules in the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., MacDonnell, supra note 1 (analyzing Scalia’s Fourth Amendment decisions through an originalist and textualist lens); Steven Wisotsky, The Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, 52 CRIM. L. BULL. 531 (2016) (cataloging and summarizing all of Scalia’s Fourth Amendment decisions); see generally Stras et al., supra note 5, at 744 (panel discussion where Professor Orin Kerr argued that the two broad themes in Scalia’s jurisprudence were originalism and limiting judicial discretion).


29. Id. at 62–66 (listing arguments for rules as fairness as formal equality, utility, liberty, and democracy); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353, 369 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[B]alancing tests amount to brief nods by the Court in the direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will.”).


31. Id. at 66–69 (listing arguments in favor of standards as fairness as substantive justice, utility, equality, and deliberation).
Justice Scalia has been called the leading supporter of the “rules-as-democracy argument.” He argued that rules were preferable because they are more likely to ensure equal treatment among like cases, they make the law clear in a system where the Supreme Court can review only a small number of cases, and they ensure predictability.

How does this philosophy of limited judicial discretion manifest in the Fourth Amendment context? Because the Fourth Amendment specifically prohibits “unreasonable” searches—which arguably dictates a standard—Justice Scalia often sought to construct rules that could curb a limitless interpretation of “unreasonable.” Further, the Fourth Amendment context is unique because of the strong interest for police to have intelligible rules dictating the scope of any potential search.

In criminal Fourth Amendment cases, Justice Scalia usually applied rules. He noted that rules allowed judges to serve counter-majoritarian interests by protecting the rights of unpopular criminal defendants. However, Scalia occasionally strayed from his rules-oriented philosophy and applied a standard. This was especially true in cases involving civil special needs as well as cases dealing with remedies for Fourth Amendment violations. Attempts to classify Justice Scalia as favoring the government or favoring individual Fourth Amendment rights are fraught with difficulty. It is probably best to characterize him as in favor of rules in the criminal context, and in favor of standards in other contexts.

32. Id. at 65.
33. See Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1178–79. He stated that sometimes “even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.” Id. at 1179. He argued that general rules that constrain judges are good—not only because they constrain lower courts, but also because they constrain future Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 1179–80.
34. See infra section I.B.2.
36. See infra Part I.
38. See infra Part II.
39. See infra Part II.
Part I of this Article discusses Scalia’s Fourth Amendment cases in the criminal context. It first discusses his methodology when approaching Fourth Amendment cases, and then outlines the cases where he advocated for bright-line rules that would limit judicial discretion. Part II demonstrates his departure from the rules approach in civil special needs cases and cases involving remedies for Fourth Amendment violations.

I. RULES: “FIRM BUT ALSO BRIGHT”

In his Fourth Amendment decisions, Justice Scalia favored bright-line rules that would limit judicial discretion. He spoke frequently about the need to root decisions in something external to a judge’s own political predilections. In his Fourth Amendment cases, he rooted his bright-line rules in probable cause, textualism, and originalism.

Section A of this Part outlines Justice Scalia’s basic Fourth Amendment philosophy. Section B discusses the relationship between the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment and lays out what we will call Scalia’s “probable cause presumption.” Section C looks at cases where Justice Scalia used originalism and textualism to limit judicial discretion. Finally, Section D discusses Justice Scalia’s revival of the trespass test for when a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred, and discusses its lasting legacy as the Court grapples with how to apply the Fourth Amendment in the digital age.

40. See infra Part I.
41. See infra Part I.
42. See infra Part II.
43. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“That line . . . must not only be firm but also bright.”).
44. See, e.g., Scalia, Originalism, supra note 6, at 864.
45. See infra Part I.
46. See infra section I.A.
47. See infra section I.B.
48. See infra section I.C.
49. See infra section I.D.
A. Basic Fourth Amendment Philosophy

Justice Scalia hated Fourth Amendment cases. He did not like the often fact-specific inquiry of determining what was “reasonable,” but because the Constitution specifically prohibits “unreasonable” searches, as a textualist he could not avoid it. He preferred to leave lower courts to determine “reasonableness,” and wrote that the Supreme Court should only take Fourth Amendment cases periodically to indicate the limits of acceptable variation.

Justice Scalia prescribed a two-step analysis for Fourth Amendment cases:

[W]e inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed. Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.

In other words, first he asked whether there was an analogous practice when the Fourth Amendment was adopted in 1791. If so, then that answer remains true today. On the other hand, for novel questions where there was no equivalent practice in 1791, the

50. See Stras et al., supra note 5, at 744 (citing Interview by Susan Swain with Antonin Scalia, in Washington, D.C. (June 19, 2019), https://www.c-span.org/video/?286079-1/supreme-court-justice-scalia [https://perma.cc/U4T2-KYCZ] (“I just hate Fourth Amendment cases. It’s almost a jury question, you know, whether this variation is an unreasonable search or seizure. It’s variation 3,542. Yes, I’ll write the opinion, but I don’t consider it a plum.”)).

51. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Other legal standards that use “reasonableness,” like the “reasonable man” in torts or the “reasonable expectation of privacy” from *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), are not specifically prescribed by the Constitution. See Scalia, *Law of Rules*, supra note 16, at 1181–82 (discussing the differences between the “reasonable man” and “reasonable search” analyses); infra section I.D (discussing the *Katz* test).


53. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“To determine what is an ‘unreasonable’ search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, we look first to the historical practices the Framers sought to preserve; if those provide inadequate guidance, we apply traditional standards of reasonableness.”).

54. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is assuredly room for such an approach in resolving novel questions of search and seizure under the ‘reasonableness’ standard that the Fourth Amendment sets forth. But not, I think, in resolving those questions in which a clear answer already existed in 1791 and has been generally adhered to by the traditions of society ever since.”).
Court should apply “traditional standards of reasonableness” by balancing the degree of privacy intrusion against the governmental interest.\(^55\)

This balancing should ostensibly be geared towards what would have been “reasonable” in 1791, not merely what is expedient today.\(^56\) Justice Scalia believed that the Fourth Amendment must protect the same degree of privacy that was protected in 1791, regardless of what new ways technology has found to invade our privacy.\(^57\) To determine whether a novel type of search or seizure is “reasonable” requires balancing the competing concerns of the privacy interests of individuals versus the needs of law enforcement.\(^58\) Nevertheless, Justice Scalia limited his use of the balancing approach to civil special needs cases and cases involving remedies for Fourth Amendment violations.\(^59\) In criminal cases, he would often turn to the second clause of the Fourth Amendment to help him

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\(^55\) See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300. Justice Stevens criticized this approach in his dissent in Wyoming v. Houghton. Id. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He argued: “[W]e have never restricted ourselves to a two-step Fourth Amendment approach wherein the privacy and governmental interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-century common law ‘yields no answer.’ Neither the precedent cited by the Court, nor the majority’s opinion in this case, mandate that approach.” Id.

\(^56\) Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable” searches and seizures “is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted” (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925))); see also Lawrence Rosenthal, An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism: Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence During the Career of Justice Scalia, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 75, 90–91 (2018) (discussing the original public meaning of “unreasonable”).

\(^57\) United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (“At bottom, [the Court] must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001))); Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 380 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The purpose of the provision, in other words, is to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of their property that existed when the provision was adopted—even if a later, less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of intrusion ‘reasonable.’”); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common law afforded.”).

\(^58\) See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“In determining the reasonableness of the manner in which a seizure is effected, ‘we must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983))); Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995) (“[W]here there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989))).

\(^59\) See infra Part II.
define the vague term “unreasonable.” In this way he often looked to the probable cause standard in the second clause to give meaning to the term “unreasonable” in the first.

An example of Justice Scalia’s two-step approach can be found in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin. There, Justice Scalia based his opinion in the first part of the two-step analysis. He dissented, berating the majority for engaging in a balancing test even though a clear answer existed in 1791. In that case, the majority held that someone who is arrested without a warrant must be brought in front of a judge no later than 48 hours after the arrest. Justice Scalia criticized the majority for engaging in a balancing test—between public safety on the one hand, and the need to avoid prolonged detention on the other—when a clear answer existed in 1791. In 1791, Scalia said, a suspect arrested without a warrant was required to be put in front of a magistrate “as soon as he reasonably can.” Scalia argued that different courts would strike the balance in different ways, and that the Fourth Amendment served to “put this matter beyond time, place, and judicial predilection.”

Justice Scalia favored bright-line rules because they limited judicial discretion. But not just any bright-line rule would do. The rule needed to be faithful to the text of the Constitution and based on something external to the judge’s own will. In McLaughlin,

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60. See infra section I.B.2.
61. See infra section I.B.2.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 56 (majority opinion).
66. Id. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 61 (citing 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 95 n.13 (1847)).
68. Id. at 65, 66.
69. Professor Manning argued that contrary to popular opinion, Justice Scalia did not care only about rules qua rules. Manning, supra note 3, at 748–49. Rather, his philosophy was based more deeply on the insistence that judges must justify their decisions on something external to their own wills. See id.
70. See id. at 770. For an example outside of the Fourth Amendment context, see Justice Scalia’s dissent in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). There, Justice Scalia sharply criticized a bright-line rule—the requirement of Miranda warnings—because he found it had no basis in the text or history of the Constitution. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 450 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). He argued that the clear rule from Miranda was no easier to apply than a totality of the circumstances test. See id. at 463 (“It is not immediately apparent, however, that the judicial burden has been eased by the ‘bright-line’ rules adopted in Miranda . . . Moreover, it is not clear why the Court thinks that the ‘totality-of-the-circumstances’ test . . . is more difficult than Miranda
the majority’s judgment was indeed a bright-line rule, but it was a rule that was not faithful to the original meaning of the Constitution: the 48-hour rule conflicted with the practices used at the time the Fourth Amendment was enacted.71 Thus, Scalia criticized it, finding that it eliminated a right that existed at the time of the framing.72

Justice Scalia touched on this distinction in his essay The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules.73 He noted that it was possible to establish a general rule that was not based on something external to the judges’ own wills, but only because “with five votes anything is possible.”74 He found that if a general rule was not based on a “solid textual anchor or an established social norm” then there was no difference between it and rule-making properly done by the legislature.75

B. Limited Reasonableness: The Warrant & Probable Cause Presumptions

1. The Warrant Presumption

A critical issue for interpreting the Fourth Amendment is whether its two clauses should be read separately or together.76 The first clause dictates the right to be free from “unreasonable” searches and seizures and the second clause states that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”77 The traditional view was that the second clause gave meaning to the first: a search without a warrant was presumptively unreasonable.78 This view is also

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71. 500 U.S. at 60 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (arguing that the majority opinion “eliminates a very old right indeed”).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1185.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For a comprehensive analysis of the two views of the Fourth Amendment, see Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985).
referred to as the “warrant preference” school of interpretation. It is exhibited in the frequently cited line from *Katz v. United States*, a Warren Court decision, where the Court stated that warrantless searches were “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”

The Warren Court preference for a warrant was later displaced by the Burger Court’s approach, which expanded on existing exceptions to the warrant requirement. In his 1991 concurrence in *California v. Acevedo*, Justice Scalia noted that the warrant requirement now contained so many exceptions that it was practically unrecognizable. He noted that while it was “textually possible” that the word “unreasonable” implicitly contained the requirement of a warrant, the general rule requiring a warrant in all circumstances had no basis in the common law. This view is often referred to as the “reasonableness” school of interpretation. A majority of the Court has, at times, adopted this view, stating that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is merely “reasonableness.” Under this view, the Warrant Clause does not modify

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79. See, e.g., BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 76, at 12.
83. Id. at 582–84.
84. See, e.g., BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 76, at 12. An early expression of the reasonableness school appears in *United States v. Rabinowitz*, 339 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1950) (“A rule of thumb requiring that a search warrant always be procured whenever practicable may be appealing from the vantage point of easy administration. But we cannot agree that this requirement should be crystallized into a sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search . . . . The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.”).
the Reasonableness Clause; the Warrant Clause solely lays out the requirements of a valid warrant. Various critics have stated that Justice Scalia endorsed the “reasonableness” school of interpretation.

As evidence, these critics cite the fact that, in 2004, Justice Scalia signed on to Justice Thomas’s dissent in *Groh v. Ramirez*, which endorsed the reasonableness school. There, a federal agent applied for a warrant to search a large ranch in Montana, but did not properly list with particularity the items he intended to seize. The majority held that the warrant was plainly invalid because it did not meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. It stated that because the warrant was so obviously defective, the search was essentially warrantless. It adopted the “warrant preference” view of the Fourth Amendment, stating that warrantless searches were presumptively unreasonable. Thus, it held that the search at issue in the case was unreasonable.

Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas’s dissent, arguing against the warrant presumption. Justice Thomas cited a long line of cases vacillating between requiring a warrant and recognizing some exception to the warrant requirement. He wrote that though the precise relationship between the clauses was not certain, neither clause explicitly required a warrant. He followed the

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87. See MacDonnell, *supra* note 1, at 194–95 (noting that Scalia believed the Fourth Amendment did not contain a warrant presumption); Seamon, *supra* note 81, at 1026–29 (noting that Scalia has played a “major role” in the trend away from a broad warrant presumption). Each of these analyses, though, was published before Scalia’s 2015 dissent in *Los Angeles v. Patel*, 576 U.S. 409 (2015), which provides greater clarity on his view of the relationship between the two clauses.
89. *Groh*, 540 U.S. at 554. The application for the warrant listed various types of weapons and was supported with a detailed affidavit. *Id.* The warrant itself, however, was much less specific: it described only the house the agent intended to search, but did not describe the weapons he intended to seize. *Id.* It did not incorporate by reference the detailed list of weapons he had provided in the warrant application. *Id.* at 554–55.
90. *Id.* at 557. Though the application listed the “things to be seized,” that did not rescue the warrant from the failure. *Id.*
91. *Id.* at 559.
92. *Id.* (citing *Payton v. New York*, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
93. *Id.* at 563.
94. *Id.* at 571, 573–74 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
95. *Id.* at 572–73.
96. *Id.* at 571.
reasonableness school and argued that the search in the case had been reasonable, and therefore was constitutional.97

Justice Scalia’s own views on the warrant presumption, however, were slightly more nuanced. In his 2015 dissent in *City of Los Angeles v. Patel*, Justice Scalia expounded on the relationship between the two clauses.98 There, a group of motel operators in California facially challenged a municipal code that required hotel operators to keep records with identifying information about their guests and let police officers inspect the records on demand.99 The majority held that the statute was facially unconstitutional because it did not afford an opportunity for motel operators to seek judicial review before being required to turn over requested records.100 It adopted the warrant preference interpretation, citing the clause in *Katz* stating that warrantless searches were “per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”101 The search at issue did not comply with the requirements of the administrative search exception because it did not provide an option for precompliance review, and thus the Court struck it down.102

Justice Scalia dissented. He argued that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment was “reasonableness” and that the search at issue was reasonable because it was constitutional in almost every instance.103 Despite appearing to endorse the reasonableness school of interpretation, though, Justice Scalia suggested that two clauses of the Fourth Amendment were not wholly separate:

Grammatically, the two clauses of the Amendment seem to be independent—and directed at entirely different actors. The former tells the executive what it must do when it conducts a search, and the latter tells the judiciary what it must do when it issues a search warrant. But in an effort to guide courts in applying the Search-and-Seizure Clause’s indeterminate reasonableness standard, and to maintain coherence in our case law, we have used the Warrant Clause as a guide—post for assessing the reasonableness of a search, and have erected a

97. *Id.* at 573.
99. *Id.* at 412–13 (majority opinion).
100. *Id.* at 418. The statute provided that hotel operators who did not comply with police requests could be arrested on the spot. *Id.* at 421.
101. *Id.* at 419 (quoting *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
102. *Id.* at 421.
103. *Id.* at 430–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
framework of presumptions applicable to broad categories of searches conducted by executive officials. Our case law has repeatedly recognized, however, that these are mere presumptions, and the only constitutional requirement is that a search be reasonable.\textsuperscript{104}

Though Scalia argued that the clauses were technically separate, he stated that the second one was a “guidepost” to understand the word “reasonableness” in the first.\textsuperscript{105} Justice Scalia did not believe in a warrant requirement, but appeared—at least at the end of his career—to believe in a warrant presumption.\textsuperscript{106}

A warrant presumption, though, does not add much utility in crafting bright-line rules because there are so many exceptions to the warrant requirement.\textsuperscript{107} In 1991, Justice Scalia wrote that the warrant requirement “had become so riddled with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable.”\textsuperscript{108} It has essentially reached the point that it is no longer a rule at all, but rather a standard.\textsuperscript{109}

Nevertheless, in his concurrence in \textit{Bailey v. United States}, Justice Scalia argued that extending an exception to the warrant requirement should be limited.\textsuperscript{110} He argued that the categorical bright-line rule which allowed for the temporary detention of occupants during the execution of a search warrant should not be extended to include an occupant who had recently left the premises.\textsuperscript{111} He quoted the language of \textit{Michigan v. Summers}, stating that, “If police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the competing interests . . . ‘must in large part be done on a categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual police officers.’”\textsuperscript{112}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{104} Id. (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{105} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{106} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{107} See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 572 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (citing the following exceptions to the warrant requirement: searches incident to arrest, automobile searches, searches of “pervasively regulated” businesses, administrative searches, exigent circumstances, mobile home searches, inventory searches, border searches).
\item \textsuperscript{108} California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
\item \textsuperscript{109} See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 58 n.231 (noting that the difference between rules and standards is a continuum, not a divide; at some point a rule can have so many exceptions that it becomes a standard).
\item \textsuperscript{110} 568 U.S. 186, 203 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
\item \textsuperscript{111} Id. at 204.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Id. at 206 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)).
\end{itemize}
2. The Probable Cause Presumption

The warrant presumption is not the only part of the second clause that Justice Scalia appears to read into the word “reasonableness.” Many of his cases evince what we will call a “probable cause presumption”: often, when deciding whether a search is reasonable, Justice Scalia based his decision on whether there was probable cause. This method gave him a benchmark with which to craft bright-line rules.

As with the notion of warrants, from the second clause, Justice Scalia appeared not to believe in a probable cause requirement, but rather a probable cause presumption. He acknowledged that there were categories of cases, such as administrative searches, that required less justification than probable cause. And yet in the criminal context, Justice Scalia chose to root his analysis in probable cause again and again. If there was probable cause, he declined to engage in a balancing analysis and found the search was “ipso facto” reasonable. This strategy facilitated making bright-line rules that limited judicial discretion.

For example, in Arizona v. Hicks, Justice Scalia rooted his opinion in the need for probable cause. In that case, a bullet was fired through the floor of James Hicks’s apartment. Police entered without a warrant to search for the shooter, and found and seized three weapons. While in the apartment, one of the officers observed some expensive stereo equipment, which he deemed out of

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113. See Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409, 431 (2015). The probable cause presumption should be distinguished from the probable cause requirement, which various scholars have examined. See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 78, at 304–09. The probable cause requirement is the idea that even warrantless searches must have probable cause to be reasonable. Id. Under this view, the real harm the Framers sought to protect against was not warrantless searches, but rather searches done without probable cause. Id. Professor Akhil Reed Amar has criticized this view. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 782–85 (1994). He argued the idea of a probable cause requirement was nonsensical both because it is not textually required by the words of the Fourth Amendment, and because there are numerous searches for which probable cause is not required, such as consent searches, administrative searches, and weapons pat-downs. Id. at 783.
117. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
118. Id. at 323–34.
place in the otherwise “squalid” apartment.\textsuperscript{119} To determine if the equipment was stolen, the officer moved the stereo slightly so he could record its serial number.\textsuperscript{120} He reported the serial number to police headquarters by phone, was advised that some of the equipment had been stolen in a recent armed robbery, and seized it.\textsuperscript{121}

Justice Scalia noted that though the officer had lawfully entered the apartment pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception, moving the equipment to inspect the serial number was an unrelated “search.”\textsuperscript{122} And that search required probable cause.\textsuperscript{123}

The dissents made policy arguments: Justice Powell argued that the distinction between “merely looking at” an item in plain view and slightly moving it was trivial.\textsuperscript{124} Justice O’Connor argued that the case presented a mere “cursory inspection” and not a “full-blown search” and balanced the government and individual interests to find that it was justified.\textsuperscript{125} She accused Justice Scalia of ignoring precedent and placing serious constraints on law enforcement in order to establish a bright-line rule—something which, she argued, had only theoretical advantages.\textsuperscript{126}

In response, Justice Scalia stated that the standard Justice O’Connor proposed would “send police and judges into a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of uncertain description that is neither a ‘plain view’ inspection nor yet a ‘full-blown search.’”\textsuperscript{127} “A search is a search,” he wrote, “even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.”\textsuperscript{128} He resisted the use of any policy-inflected balancing tests, even acknowledging that there might have been no lawful way for the officer to have ascertained whether the equipment was stolen if he did not have probable cause.\textsuperscript{129} “[T]here is nothing new,” he wrote, “in the

\textsuperscript{119} Id. at 323.
\textsuperscript{120} Id.
\textsuperscript{121} Id.
\textsuperscript{122} Id. at 324–25.
\textsuperscript{123} Id. at 324–26.
\textsuperscript{124} Id. at 328, 333 (Powell, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{125} Id. at 335 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{126} Id. at 339.
\textsuperscript{127} Id. at 328–29 (majority opinion).
\textsuperscript{128} Id. at 325.
\textsuperscript{129} Id. at 329.
realization that the Constitution sometimes insulates the crim-inality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.”130 Instead of allowing Justice O’Connor’s flexible standard of something less than a “search” that would require some lesser justification, Justice Scalia firmly rooted his bright-line rule in the requirement of probable cause.

Similarly, in California v. Acevedo, Justice Scalia again rooted his decision in probable cause presumption.131 There, officers observed a man leaving an apartment known to contain multiple packages of marijuana.132 The man carried a paper bag, got into his car, and began to drive away.133 Officers stopped and searched the man’s car—including the paper bag—where they found marijuana.134 The majority found that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applied to this search, and therefore it was lawful.135 It eliminated any separate container analysis, noting that a clear-cut rule was preferable: police officers can search cars—including containers therein—without a warrant if they have probable cause.136 The majority endorsed the warrant preference interpretation in dicta, noting that the automobile exception was merely one of the “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”137

Justice Scalia concurred, but disagreed with the majority’s warrant preference approach.138 He stated that the Fourth Amendment contains no warrant requirement; it merely prohibits “unrea-sonable” searches.139 He acknowledged that it was “textually possible” to consider that the word “unreasonable” implicitly con-tained the requirement of a warrant.140 But, he noted that the

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130. Id.
132. Id. at 567 (majority opinion).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 579–80. The majority held that there was no distinction between a standard search of a vehicle, and a search of the closed containers within that vehicle. Id. So long as there was probable cause to justify the search, each is constitutional. Id.
136. Id. at 579.
137. Id. at 580.
138. Id. at 581–85 (Scalia, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 581 (“The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are ‘unreasonable.’”)
140. Id. at 582.
Court had “lurched back and forth” between the two views, such that the “warrant requirement” was so “riddled with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable.”\textsuperscript{141} He went on to say that a general rule requiring a warrant in all circumstances had no basis in the common law.\textsuperscript{142} Like in \textit{Hicks}, Justice Scalia allowed a warrantless search so long as it was based upon probable cause.\textsuperscript{143} Though he professed to adopt the view that the clauses were separate, he nonetheless required that the warrantless search be based upon probable cause.\textsuperscript{144}

In \textit{Wyoming v. Houghton}, too, Justice Scalia rooted his analysis in probable cause.\textsuperscript{145} There, David Young and his girlfriend, Sandra Houghton, were stopped by Wyoming Highway Patrol for a traffic violation.\textsuperscript{146} During the stop, the officer noticed a hypodermic syringe in Mr. Young’s shirt pocket.\textsuperscript{147} He asked Mr. Young why he had the syringe, and Mr. Young replied candidly that he used it to take drugs.\textsuperscript{148} The officer then searched the vehicle, and found Ms. Houghton’s purse which contained methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.\textsuperscript{149}

The trial court denied Ms. Houghton’s motion to suppress, holding that the officer had probable cause to search the car, and therefore could search all closed containers in the vehicle.\textsuperscript{150} The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, holding that probable cause did not extend to the personal effects of a passenger who was not suspected

\textsuperscript{141}. \textit{Id.} In 2001, Professor Seamon noted that this criticism had apparently resonated, as at that time the majority's opinion in \textit{Acevedo} was the last time the warrant preference school appeared in a majority opinion. Seamon, \textit{supra} note 81, at 1027. He posited that “the broad version of the presumption seems to have died from embarrassment.” \textit{Id.} In more recent years, though, this prediction has not borne out. Since 2001, the Court has continued to fluctuate between the warrant preference school and the reasonableness school, and has adopted the warrant preference school in various cases. \textit{See, e.g.}, \textit{City of Los Angeles v. Patel}, 576 U.S. 409, 419–20 (2015); \textit{Arizona v. Gant}, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); \textit{Groh v. Ramirez}, 540 U.S. 563 (2004).

\textsuperscript{142}. \textit{Acevedo}, 500 U.S. at 583–84 (Scalia, J., concurring).

\textsuperscript{143}. \textit{See id.} at 585.

\textsuperscript{144}. \textit{See id.}


\textsuperscript{146}. \textit{Id.} at 297–98.

\textsuperscript{147}. \textit{Id.} at 298.

\textsuperscript{148}. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{149}. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{150}. \textit{Id.} at 299.
of criminal activity.\textsuperscript{151} Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reversed the decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court, holding that the search did not violate Ms. Houghton’s Fourth Amendment rights.\textsuperscript{152} He focused on the fact that officers had probable cause to believe the car contained drugs.\textsuperscript{153} He cited \textit{Carroll v. United States} and \textit{United States v. Ross}, which discussed historical legislation that let customs officials search ships if they had probable cause.\textsuperscript{154} Because merchandise was shipped in containers, the authority to search with probable cause must have included the authority to search closed containers; officers could not have needed a separate warrant for each shipping container.\textsuperscript{155} Thus, he held that neither precedent nor historical evidence recognized a distinction between closed containers based on who owned them.\textsuperscript{156} He laid down a bright-line rule that where there is probable cause to search a car, it is reasonable for officers to search all closed containers in the car—including the passenger’s personal possessions.\textsuperscript{157}

In \textit{Arizona v. Gant}, Justice Scalia again used the notion of probable cause in the second clause to inform his interpretation of “reasonableness” in the first.\textsuperscript{158} In that case, Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license.\textsuperscript{159} After he was handcuffed and placed in the backseat of a police patrol car, two officers searched his vehicle.\textsuperscript{160} They found a gun and a bag of cocaine.\textsuperscript{161}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[151.] \textit{Id.}
\item[152.] \textit{Id.} at 302.
\item[153.] \textit{Id.} at 300.
\item[154.] \textit{Id.} at 300–01 (first citing \textit{Carroll v. United States}, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); and then citing \textit{United States v. Ross}, 456 U.S. 798, 820 n.26 (1982)).
\item[155.] \textit{Id.} at 301 (citing \textit{Ross}, 456 U.S. at 820 n.26).
\item[156.] \textit{Id.} at 302.
\item[157.] \textit{Id.} Justice Scalia then went on to say that even if the historical evidence was unpersuasive, a balancing of interests also weighed in favor of allowing the search. \textit{Id.} at 303. He noted that passengers in cars on public roads have a reduced expectation of privacy, whereas the government interest in being able to search a vehicle—which could easily leave the scene if officers were required to wait for a warrant—was substantial. \textit{Id.} at 303–04. He noted that a criminal could easily hide contraband in his passenger’s belongings—even without the passenger’s knowledge or permission—to evade a potential search. \textit{Id.} at 304–05. He stated that the gray area of this rule would invite a flood of litigation about various factors showing whether an item was owned by the driver or a passenger. \textit{Id.} at 305–06. He wrote that this practical reality must be accounted for in the balancing analysis. \textit{Id.} at 306.
\item[159.] \textit{Id.} at 336 (majority opinion).
\item[160.] \textit{Id.}
\item[161.] \textit{Id.}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Mr. Gant moved to suppress the items, arguing that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment. The majority adopted the warrant preference school, citing the statement in Katz that the warrant requirement is “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” One of those exceptions, it noted, was a search incident to a lawful arrest, which was espoused in Chimel v. California.

In 1969, in Chimel, the Court had held that a search incident to arrest extends not only to the arrestee’s person, but also to the “grabbable space” around him. In 1981, in New York v. Belton, the Court applied this exception to people arrested while driving. There, the Court held that the Chimel exception extended to the interior of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, even if the occupant was no longer in reaching distance of it.

In Gant, the Court rejected this broad reading of Belton, and held that the Chimel rationale only applies where the arrestee is “unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.” The majority stated, alternately, that a search of the interior of the vehicle could be justified if it was “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” In this case, the majority

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162. Id.
163. Id. at 338 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted)).
164. Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
165. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
167. Id. Much of the rationale in Belton was regarding the necessity of clear rules in the Fourth Amendment context. Id. at 458. The Court cited Professor LaFave’s article, arguing that Fourth Amendment protection is futile unless law enforcement is bound by a set of clear rules. Id. (citing Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus “Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142). The Court stated: “When a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority.” Id. at 459–60. The dissent called the majority’s bright-line “arbitrary,” and argued that the mere fact that a rule is supposedly more efficient for law enforcement “can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent argued, moreover, that the majority’s rule abandoned the primary justifications from Chimel because it applied whether or not the occupant was, in fact, still in reaching distance of the interior of the car. Id. at 470.
168. 556 U.S. at 343. The Gant opinion was 5–4; Justice Scalia’s concurring vote was necessary to reach a majority.
stated that the defendant was arrested for a traffic violation, and therefore there was no reasonable basis to believe the vehicle would contain evidence of that crime.170 Thus, because Mr. Gant was secured in the backseat of a police vehicle, and there was no reason to believe his car would contain evidence of the crime of arrest, the majority held the search was unreasonable.171

Justice Scalia concurred, arguing that the Court should “simply abandon the Belton–Thorton charade of officer safety and overrule those cases.”172 Justice Scalia was needed to make up a majority, and characterized the majority concession to probable cause as an artificial narrowing of the majority opinion. He agreed only with the majority’s second rationale: that officers could search a vehicle incident to arrest if they had probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest would be found.173 He stated that such a search was “ipso facto ‘reasonable.’”174 This statement is consistent with the idea that the word “reasonable” contains within it a presumption of probable cause.175 Justice Scalia used this analysis to cut through the uncertainties produced by the majority’s holding, which allowed “reasonableness” to be proven in multiple ways.176 The rule he professed was simple: if officers had probable cause that evidence would be found in the vehicle, they could search it. If not, they could not.

In Whren v. United States, Justice Scalia once again rooted his analysis in probable cause.177 There, plainclothes officers were patrolling a “high drug area” of Washington, D.C. in an unmarked car.178 They noticed a truck with temporary license plates and “youthful occupants” stop at an intersection for an “unusually long time.”179 The officers did a U-turn to follow the truck.180 The truck turned right without signaling and took off at an “unreasonable”
speed. The officers followed, eventually pulled up next to it, and directed the driver to pull over. The officer then noticed two large plastic bags he believed to contain crack cocaine in Michael Whren’s—the passenger’s—hands. Mr. Whren and the driver—James Brown—were both indicted on various drug charges.

Mr. Whren and Mr. Brown moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the alleged purpose for the stop—giving the driver a warning about traffic violations—was pretextual. They pointed out that it was not common for vice detectives to worry about traffic violations. Though they acknowledged that the officers had probable cause to believe they had committed a civil traffic violation, they argued that “in the unique context of civil traffic regulations’ probable cause is not enough.” They argued that because the civil traffic code was so vast, officers will almost always have reason to stop someone for some technical violation. This created an environment, they argued, where police could choose whom to stop based on discriminatory factors—such as race—as both Mr. Whren and Mr. Brown were African-American.

Mr. Whren and Mr. Brown proposed a balancing analysis, arguing that the Court should determine “whether the officer’s conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop for the reasons given.” They asserted that the Court should engage in a balancing analysis, and weigh the governmental and individual interests.

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, refused to adopt the balancing analysis. While he acknowledged that various Fourth

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 808–09.
184. Id. at 809.
185. Id.
187. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 814.
191. Id. at 816.
192. Id. at 817. He also stated that while the petitioners’ proposed standard claimed to be objective by not looking at the officer’s subjective motivations, it was nonetheless a subjective standard. Id. at 813–14.
Amendment cases did rely on balancing analyses, he stated that if the search or seizure was based upon probable cause, the balance clearly weighed in favor of the government.\textsuperscript{193} He noted that the searches in the cases petitioners cited all took place without probable cause, and thus balancing had been necessary.\textsuperscript{194} The only exceptions to this rule, he said, were "extraordinary" searches or seizures—such as seizures by means of deadly force—where the Court should balance interests even though there had been probable cause.\textsuperscript{195} But for the ordinary case, Scalia said, the rule was that probable cause justifies a search and seizure.\textsuperscript{196} Thus, because here the officers had probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated a traffic code, the search and seizure was reasonable.\textsuperscript{197} Instead of determining whether an officer’s action was "reasonable" based on a variety of factors, Scalia again rooted his analysis in the bright-line rule of probable cause.

C. Originalism and Textualism

Justice Scalia also used originalism and textualism to limit judicial discretion. This framework aided him in formulating bright-line rules. He argued that this method made it easier for him to develop general rules, because without grounding one’s reasoning within a textualist or originalist framework, rules could sound eerily like legislation.\textsuperscript{198} He thought that nonoriginalism left judges too much discretion to impose their own politics and morals into their decisions.\textsuperscript{199} In this context he was a true textualist, turning

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{193} Id. at 817 ("It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a ‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare exceptions not applicable here, however, the result of that balancing is not in doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.").
\item \textsuperscript{194} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{195} Id. at 818.
\item \textsuperscript{196} Id. at 819.
\item \textsuperscript{197} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{198} See Scalia, \textit{Law of Rules, supra} note 16, at 1184–85.
\item \textsuperscript{199} See Scalia, \textit{Originalism, supra} note 6, at 854–56. Scalia’s originalist and textualist philosophy was not without its critics. Professors Lawrence Tribe and Ronald Dworkin have argued that they, not Scalia, are the genuine originalists and textualists. David M. Zlotnick, \textit{Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology}, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1406 (1999). Professors Calabresi and Lawson, further, have examined to what extent the Constitution itself prescribes rules over standards. \textit{See Calabresi & Lawson, supra} note 4, at 489–97. They determined that there are many places where the Constitution itself prescribes standards—such as “due process,” “speedy” trials, “impartial” juries, bails that are not “excessive.” \textit{Id.} at 497. In many cases, though—such as
to the words of the Fourth Amendment itself. In these cases, he was not determining whether a search or seizure was “reasonable,” but whether a search or seizure had even occurred in the first place.

For example in *California v. Hodari D.*, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, replaced the vague standard from *United States v. Mendenhall* with a bright-line rule.\(^{200}\) In that case, a group of young men in Oakland, California, saw officers patrolling the area, panicked, and ran.\(^{201}\) The officers, suspicious, chased the men.\(^{202}\) While running, one of the men—Hodari D.—tossed away a small item.\(^{203}\) One of the officers subsequently tackled Hodari and handcuffed him.\(^{204}\) Hodari moved to suppress the item, which was discovered to be cocaine, on the basis that he had been “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment while the officer was chasing him.\(^{205}\) Hodari argued that by chasing him, the officer had engaged in a “show of authority.”\(^{206}\) He cited the plurality in *Mendenhall* to argue that a seizure occurs where “a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”\(^{207}\)

Justice Scalia found that the language of the Fourth Amendment did not support Hodari’s argument.\(^{208}\) “Seizure,” Scalia said, meant some application of physical force; a mere “show of authority” was not sufficient.\(^{209}\) The *Mendenhall* test was a necessary, but not sufficient, factor for a seizure to have occurred.\(^{210}\) Justice Scalia held that a “seizure” required either physical force, or, not only a show of authority but submission to that authority.\(^{211}\) Merely being

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\(^{201}\) *Hodari D.*, 499 U.S. at 622–23.

\(^{202}\) *Id.* at 623.

\(^{203}\) *Id.*

\(^{204}\) *Id.*

\(^{205}\) *Id.*

\(^{206}\) *Id.* at 625–26 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).

\(^{207}\) *Id.* at 627–28 (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).

\(^{208}\) *Id.* at 626.

\(^{209}\) *Id.*

\(^{210}\) *Id.* at 628.

\(^{211}\) *Id.* at 626.
chased by the police and not complying did not constitute a seizure because there was no submission.212

Justice Scalia discussed the definition of “seizure” two years prior in his essay *The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules.*213 He criticized the *Mendenhall* test as it was applied in *Michigan v. Chesternut.*214 There, the majority applied the *Mendenhall* test and found that a “seizure” had occurred when “a person in the defendant’s position would not have felt that he was free to disregard the police and go about his business.”215 Justice Scalia called this “a rule of sorts,” but found it was not as precise as it should be.216 He instead joined Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, stating that there had been no “seizure” until there was a “restraining effect.”217 Scalia noted that his textualist methodology made it easier for him than for other judges to develop general rules.218

Similarly, in *Minnesota v. Carter,* Justice Scalia turned to the wording of the Fourth Amendment.219 In that case, a police officer looked in an apartment window through a gap in the closed blinds and saw two men bagging cocaine.220 The Court held that one of the men, Mr. Carter, did not have standing to contest the alleged search.221 Mr. Carter did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, the plurality contended, because he was merely at the apartment to engage in a short-term business transaction.222 There was no suggestion, the plurality stated, that Mr. Carter had a previous relationship with the person who lived in the apartment, or anything akin to the relationship of an overnight guest at his host’s

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212. *Id.*
214. *Id.* (citing *Michigan v. Chesternut,* 486 U.S. 567 (1988)).
215. *Id.*
216. *Id.*
217. *Id.* (citing *Chestenut,* 486 U.S. at 576–77 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
218. *Id.* Professor David Strauss, though, argued that Scalia’s interpretation of the word “seizure” is not based on its plain meaning. Strauss, supra note 27, at 1005. Strauss noted that in context, a “seizure” applies to police action, and there are plenty of circumstances in which an officer has “seized” someone though he has not physically grabbed or taken possession of him. *Id.* For example, when an officer points a weapon at a person and orders him to stop. *Id.* Professor Strauss argued that instead of deriving the rule from the text, Scalia first decided he would like to use a rule, not a standard, and second crafted a rule that could then be made compatible with the meaning of “seizure.” *Id.* at 1005.
220. *Id.* at 85 (majority opinion).
221. *Id.* at 90.
222. *Id.* at 91.
apartment. While an overnight visitor might have a reasonable expectation of privacy, someone who visited an apartment only to participate in a brief business transaction did not.

Justice Scalia concurred, rooting his analysis in the meaning of the word “their” in the Fourth Amendment. He analyzed founding-era materials to determine that the phrase “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” meant that each person had a right to be free in “his own person, house, papers, and effects.” He concurred with the majority that because Mr. Carter was not in his house, or even any house that he could have considered a temporary residence, the Fourth Amendment was not violated. Thus, Justice Scalia used textualism to formulate a bright-line rule.

D. Keeping Easy Cases Easy: The Trespass Test and Its Applicability in the Digital Age

Probably the most significant contribution Justice Scalia made to future Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was reintroducing the trespass standard. Some argue that this standard could provide a more predictable way to analyze searches in the digital age. Justice Scalia favored the trespass test over the test from *Katz v. United States*, which analyzed expectations of privacy. The *Katz* test originated in Justice Harlan’s 1967 concurrence in *Katz*. It established a two-fold requirement: first, that one have a subjective expectation of privacy; and second, that society recognizes this

223. Id. at 90–91 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 92–93 (Scalia, J., concurring). He rejected the majority’s reliance on the *Katz* test to determine if a search had occurred. Id. at 91–92.
226. U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 97 (noting that it is implausible to call an apartment someone uses only to package cocaine his “temporary residence”).
230. See infra notes 308–13 and accompanying text.
expectation as reasonable. For years, the *Katz* test was considered the only standard.

Not surprisingly, Scalia loathed the *Katz* test. It allowed for judicial activism to an extreme. Even before reviving the alternative trespass test to use in its stead, he repeatedly questioned *Katz*'s validity. For example, in 1987 in *O'Connor v. Ortega*, the majority opinion used *Katz* to hold that searches and seizures by government employers of the offices of their employees should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Scalia—then in only his second term on the Court—concurred, writing that the majority’s standard was “so devoid of content that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty in this field.”

In 1998, Justice Scalia attacked *Katz* even more explicitly in *Minnesota v. Carter*. The majority rooted its analysis in *Katz*: it stated that one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment which one has entered only to engage in a short-term business transaction—in this case, bagging cocaine. Justice Scalia concurred, criticizing the plurality for using the *Katz* test, which he called not only “fuzzy” but also “self-indulgent.” He argued that the second prong of the *Katz* test—whether society recognizes an expectation as “reasonable”—bore an “uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers reasonable.” He saw *Katz* as a means for judges to impose their

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233. *See id.* at 361.
235. *See Jones,* 565 U.S. at 406–07. Justice Scalia did, however, occasionally employ the *Katz* test, most notably in *Kyllo v. United States* and his special needs cases. *See infra* notes 246–57 and accompanying text; *infra* Part II.A.
236. 480 U.S. 709, 717–18 (1987) (“Given the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”).
237. *Id.* at 730 (Scalia, J., concurring).
238. 525 U.S. 83, 97–98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); *see also supra* notes 219–28 and accompanying text.
240. *Id.* at 91, 97 (Scalia, J., concurring).
241. *Id.* at 97.
own values and policy views onto the Fourth Amendment, and argued that such decisions should be more properly left to the legislature.242

In other instances, however, Scalia did allow the Court to determine what was “reasonable,” because the determination was based on the text of the Fourth Amendment. Analyzing whether a warrantless search is “unreasonable”—in contrast to whether one has a “reasonable expectation of privacy”—is based on the text of the Fourth Amendment itself.243 Justice Scalia noted that the *Katz* test might have some utility in determining whether a search was “unreasonable.”244 But he thought that employing a “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis to determine whether a search had even occurred, in contrast, had no justification in the text of the Fourth Amendment.245

When Justice Scalia was tasked to write the majority opinion of the Court, he would occasionally give lip-service to the *Katz* test. For example, in *Kyllo v. United States*, federal agents became suspicious that Danny Kyllo was growing marijuana in his triplex and used a thermal imager to scan the building from the outside to detect whether it contained high-intensity lamps typically used to grow marijuana.246 The scan showed that parts of Mr. Kyllo’s home were substantially warmer than the neighboring apartments, and based on that information—as well as tips from informants and utility bills—the officers applied for and were granted a warrant to search his home.247 The search revealed more than one hundred marijuana plants and Mr. Kyllo was charged with manufacturing marijuana.248

242. *Id.* at 97–99.
243. *See* U.S. CONST. amend. IV; *supra* section I.B; *see also* Calabresi & Lawson, *supra* note 4, at 497 (noting that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable” searches and seizures is an example of when the Constitution prescribes using a standard and not a rule); Scalia, *Law of Rules*, *supra* note 16, at 1181–82 (expounding on why a “reasonable search” is a question of law, yet “reasonable care” in a torts case is a question of fact).
244. *Carter*, 525 U.S. at 86, 91–92 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the “legitimate expectation of privacy” analysis “is often relevant to whether a search or seizure covered by the Fourth Amendment is ‘unreasonable’”).
245. *Id.* at 91, 97 (Scalia, J., concurring).
246. 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001). Scalia also used *Katz* in special needs cases. See *infra* section II.A.
248. *Id.*
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, used the *Katz* test despite his distaste for it. He wrote that while in other areas *Katz* was difficult to apply, in the home—the “prototypical” area of protected privacy—it was clear what baseline expectation of privacy was reasonable. Here, applying *Katz* was consistent with the wording of the Fourth Amendment, which specifically protects “houses.” Justice Scalia employed *Katz* to protect the amount of privacy people enjoyed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. He held that when the government uses technology not in general public use to glean information about the home that would formerly have been unknowable without physically entering the home, “the surveillance is a ‘search.’”

Though in *Kyllo* he used *Katz*, Scalia formulated a bright-line rule, not a “fuzzy standard.” The line he chose was at the entrance to the home. “That line,” he wrote, “must not only be firm but also bright.” Despite the fact that Justice Scalia intended to implement a bright-line rule, Justice Stevens commented on the use of technology not in general public use and argued that it was not as clear as Scalia had intended. Justice Stevens wrote that “the contours of the new rule are uncertain because its protection apparently dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is ‘in general public use.’”

In *United States v. Jones* in 2012, Justice Scalia renewed his attack on *Katz*, this time reviving an alternative test to use in its stead. The common-law trespass test, which Scalia revived, had dominated Fourth Amendment law until the second half of the

249. See id. at 32–33. Justice Scalia cited his concurrence in *Carter* and acknowledged that the *Katz* test had “often been criticized as circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable.” Id. at 34 (citing *Carter*, 525 U.S. at 97).

250. Id.

251. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; *Kyllo*, 533 U.S. at 32.

252. *Kyllo*, 533 U.S. at 34; see Rosenthal, supra note 56, at 117 (describing *Kyllo* as originalist because it insisted on preserving original degree of privacy). Here, Justice Scalia was employing the second part of his two-step methodology: because thermal imaging did not exist in 1791, there was no clear practice to look to. See *Arizona v. Gant*, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, he proceeded to the second step, and determined “traditional standards of reasonableness.” See id.


254. See id.; see also *Carter*, 525 U.S. at 91 (criticizing *Katz* for being a “fuzzy standard”).


256. Id.

257. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion).

20th century.\textsuperscript{259} In \textit{Jones}, the FBI suspected nightclub owner Antoine Jones of drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{260} The government obtained a warrant to install a GPS tracking device on Mr. Jones’s wife’s Jeep.\textsuperscript{261} The warrant was valid in the District of Columbia for ten days.\textsuperscript{262} On the eleventh day—and in Maryland, not D.C.—agents physically installed a GPS tracker on the bottom of the Jeep while it sat in a public parking lot.\textsuperscript{263} The government proceeded to track the Jeep for the next twenty-eight days.\textsuperscript{264} The government then used the location information to indict Mr. Jones on various drug distribution charges.\textsuperscript{265}

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the government “search[ed]” Mr. Jones’s vehicle when it physically installed the GPS tracker.\textsuperscript{266} The government invoked \textit{Katz} and argued that Mr. Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the underside of the Jeep.\textsuperscript{267} Justice Scalia rejected this argument, stating that “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the \textit{Katz} formulation.”\textsuperscript{268} Instead of using \textit{Katz}, Scalia revived the common-law trespass test.\textsuperscript{269} This test dictated that when “the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area . . . a search has undoubtedly occurred.”\textsuperscript{270} As in \textit{Kyllo}, Scalia was concerned about preserving the degree of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{259} Id. at 405.
\item \textsuperscript{260} Id. at 402.
\item \textsuperscript{261} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{262} Id. at 402–03.
\item \textsuperscript{263} Id. at 403. The government conceded that the warrant had not been complied with. Id. at 403 n.1.
\item \textsuperscript{264} Id. at 403.
\item \textsuperscript{265} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{266} Id. at 404.
\item \textsuperscript{267} Id. at 406.
\item \textsuperscript{268} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{269} Id. at 405–07. Note, though, that despite relying on the common-law notion of “trespass,” under this test the Fourth Amendment does not protect against all common-law trespasses. See id. at 411 n.8. In \textit{Jones}, Justice Scalia replied to the government’s concern that intrusion onto an open field in \textit{Oliver v. United States} had been a “trespass” and yet the Court had held it was not a “search.” Id. at 410–11 (citing \textit{Oliver v. United States}, 466 U.S. 170, 176–77, 183 (1984)). Justice Scalia noted that the Court’s theory was “not that the Fourth Amendment is concerned with ‘any technical trespass that led to the gathering of evidence.” Id. at 411 n.8 (quoting concurring opinion). Rather, he stated that the Fourth Amendment only protects against trespasses of those areas enumerated in the Fourth Amendment. Id. An open field is not a person, house, paper, or effect, and thus a trespass onto an open field is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 411.
\item \textsuperscript{270} Id. at 406 n.3.
\end{itemize}
privacy citizens enjoyed at the time the Fourth Amendment was enacted.\textsuperscript{271}

He did not, however, go as far as to eliminate \textit{Katz.}\textsuperscript{272} He stated that it still had some utility as a secondary test.\textsuperscript{273} He added that the \textit{Katz} test had been “\textit{added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.}”\textsuperscript{274} This may be because he was writing the majority opinion.\textsuperscript{275} Professor Timothy MacDonnell has called this analysis the “trespass plus” test: first, determine whether the government has trespassed on some constitutionally protected space; if not, second, determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has been violated.\textsuperscript{276}

In \textit{Jones}, Justice Scalia also rejected the so-called “mosaic theory” used by the lower court and seemingly endorsed by the concurrences.\textsuperscript{277} The mosaic theory, as defined by Professor Orin Kerr, is the idea that instead of analyzing the sequential steps of government activity, courts should look at the aggregate government action to determine whether a “search” has occurred.\textsuperscript{278}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{271} \textit{Id.} at 406 (citing \textit{Kyllo v. United States}, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
\item\textsuperscript{272} He was writing the majority opinion, so his disdain for \textit{Katz} was not as prevalent as in his concurrence in \textit{Carter}. See \textit{Minnesota v. Carter}, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
\item\textsuperscript{273} \textit{Jones}, 565 U.S. at 411 (“For unlike the concurrence, which would make \textit{Katz} the exclusive test, we do not make trespass the exclusive test.”).
\item\textsuperscript{274} \textit{Id.} at 409.
\item\textsuperscript{275} Scholars have questioned whether Scalia’s ultimate goal was to eliminate the \textit{Katz} test, leaving only the trespass analysis. \textit{See}, e.g., Stras et al., \textit{supra} note 5, at 746. Professor Kerr noted that if the \textit{Katz} test is retained, then Scalia’s revival of the trespass test does not make an obvious impact. \textit{See id.} It alters the analytical steps but may not change how cases come out. \textit{See id.}
\item\textsuperscript{277} \textit{See Jones}, 565 U.S. at 412 (describing the “vexing problems” posed by the approach of the concurrences); \textit{id.} at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that whether a search has occurred depends in part on “whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated”); \textit{id.} at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that long-term GPS monitoring is a search, even if short-term is not); United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561–62 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that prolonged surveillance may constitute a search because “the whole reveals far more than the individual movements it comprises”), aff’d sub nom. \textit{Jones}, 565 U.S. 400; \textit{see also Kerr, supra} note 234, at 313 (citing Orin Kerr, \textit{D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search}, \textit{VOLOKH CONSPIRACY} (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search [https://perma.cc/D2BQ-6AAM] (coining the term “mosaic theory”)).
\item\textsuperscript{278} Kerr, \textit{supra} note 234, at 313.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Because Justice Scalia decided *Jones* using the trespass test, he did not engage with the mosaic theory.279 The trespass test is rooted in what Professor Kerr called the traditional “sequential approach,” wherein courts analyze government action step-by-step to determine when a “search” occurs.280 In *Jones*, a search occurred the moment the officer physically installed the GPS tracker on Antoine Jones’s vehicle.281 Justice Scalia declined to look at the totality of the government’s action and instead focused on a single snapshot.282 Thus, the trespass test allowed Scalia to draw a bright-line rule instead of balancing the totality of the government’s action.283 He was critical of the mosaic test because there was no bright-line showing when a search became unconstitutional.

Justice Scalia employed the revived trespass test again the next term in *Florida v. Jardines*.284 There, two detectives approached the home of Joelis Jardines, who was suspected of growing marijuana.285 One of the detectives brought his drug-sniffing dog.286 When the detectives and the dog walked onto the porch, the dog signaled to the presence of drugs inside the house.287 At trial, Mr. Jardines argued that the dog sniff was an unreasonable search.288

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that because the government had physically intruded onto the curtilage of Mr. Jardines’s home, a search had clearly occurred.289 Thus, when the

280. Kerr, *supra* note 234, at 315–16. Professor Kerr cited Justice Scalia’s opinion in *Arizona v. Hicks* as an example of the sequential approach; there, the Court looked at distinct steps: the officer saw the expensive stereo equipment, he moved it, then he recorded the serial number. *Id.* at 316.
282. *See id.* at 412.
283. Not only is there a line-drawing problem regarding how prolonged surveillance would need to be to constitute a search, but Professor Kerr has detailed the numerous other uncertainties of the mosaic theory: the test that should be used to determine when a mosaic has been created, what surveillance methods are applicable, how to determine whether a mosaic search is reasonable, and what remedies apply to mosaic searches. Kerr, *supra* note 234, at 329.
284. 569 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2013). Note, though, that in *Jardines*, Justice Scalia did not explicitly use the term “trespass” anywhere in the opinion. *See generally id.*
285. *Id.* at 3.
286. *Id.* at 3–4.
287. *Id.* at 4–5.
288. *Id.*
289. *Id.* at 5–6 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)). As he did in *Kyllo*, Scalia expounded on the importance of the home. *Id.* at 6. He noted that the right to be free from the government in one’s home was at the “very core” of the Fourth Amendment
government “physically intrudes” on an area protected by the Fourth Amendment. Scalia said there was no need to even consider *Katz*.290 He noted that one feature of the property analysis was that it “keeps easy cases easy.”291 Either the government has physically intruded or it has not.292 This analysis eliminates the need to engage in the wishy-washy analysis from *Katz*.293

Justice Scalia’s enthusiasm for the trespass test and disdain for the fluffy *Katz* standard has had a lasting impact on the Court since his departure. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in *Carpenter v. United States* evinces many of the same concerns, and contemplates how Scalia’s reasoning could be applied in the digital age.294

In *Carpenter*, the Court examined whether the warrantless search and seizure of location information from one’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment.295 The majority used the rationale from *Katz* to determine that the Fourth Amendment had been violated.296 It held that even though individuals share their records with a third party—the cell phone company—they do not forfeit their reasonable expectations of privacy in the records.297 The majority thus refused to apply the “third-party doctrine”—a doctrine based on the *Katz* rationale where individuals lose their reasonable expectations of privacy in information when they share it with a third party.298

and called the home “first among equals.” *Id*. Because the curtilage is both spatially and psychologically linked to the home, he deemed it part of the home itself. *Id*. at 6–7.

290. *Id*. at 11.

291. *Id*. However, *Jardines* is one of the few cases where Justice Scalia acknowledged the need to look at an officer’s subjective intent. *See* MacDonnell, *supra* note 1, at 216. Subjective intent was relevant to the issue of whether the officers had committed a trespass. *Id*. at 216–17. He noted that visitors are generally implicitly licensed to approach a home on the front walkway, knock, and wait for someone to come to the door—as commonly done by girl scouts or trick-or-treaters. *Jardines*, 569 U.S. at 8. But here, Scalia noted, the officer’s conduct indicated that their subjective intent was not to enter the curtilage for some customary reason, but rather, to conduct a search. *Id*. at 10.


293. *See id*.


295. 138 S. Ct. at 2211 (majority opinion).

296. *Id*. at 2217.

297. *Id*.

Justice Gorsuch dissented. Not only did he argue that *Katz* was misguided, but he expressed concern that the majority’s reasoning required courts to perform not one, but two “amorphous balancing tests.” He argued that the majority required courts to first conduct the *Katz* analysis, then further balance the privacy interests to determine whether to apply the third-party doctrine. He argued that the majority opinion did not offer a workable test and was susceptible to the same fuzziness as *Katz*: “At what point does access to electronic data amount to ‘arbitrary’ authority? When does police surveillance become ‘too permeating’? And what sort of ‘obstacles’ should judges ‘place’ in law enforcement’s path when it does?”

In addition, Justice Gorsuch’s rationale was reminiscent of Justice Scalia’s abhorrence for judicial activism. He noted that judges should decide based on “democratically legitimate sources of law” and not “their own biases or personal policy preferences.”

Instead, Justice Gorsuch advocated for using the trespass test. He noted that in the digital age, the third-party doctrine—a legacy of *Katz*—is no longer tenable because we now store so much of our private information digitally on servers held by third parties. He argued that digital data is an “effect[]” under the Fourth Amendment, and its owner has a legal interest in it. That legal interest, he argued, “might even rise to the level of a property right.” Because the issue had not been briefed or argued before the lower

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299. *Carpenter*, 138 S. Ct. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
300. *Id.*
301. *Id.* at 2266.
302. *Id.* at 2268 (quoting Todd E. Pettys, *Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases*, 26 J.L. & Pol. 123, 127 (2011)).
303. *Id.* at 2267–68 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013)).
304. *Id.* at 2262, 2266.
305. *Id.* at 2269.
306. *Id.* at 2272. Justice Gorsuch noted that one issue that would need to be developed is what body of property law federal courts should apply. *Id.* at 2268. He posited that the answer might be current positive law, the common law at 1791, or some combination of the two. *Id.* Justices Thomas and Alito have also raised this concern. In *Byrd v. United States*, Justice Thomas concurred, and asked “what body of law determines whether that property interest is present—modern state law, the common law of 1791, or something else?” 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1531 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Alito raised this concern in his *Jones* concurrence, positing that under the property rationale, Fourth Amendment protections could differ from state to state. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 425–26 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). In *Jones*, the Jeep belonged to Mr. Jones’s wife, and therefore his property interest in it might depend on whether the state where the search took place recognized community property between spouses. *Id.*
courts, Justice Gorsuch did not decide whether the government committed a trespass when it seized Mr. Carpenter’s cell site location information, but he noted that it would have been Mr. Carpenter’s most promising argument that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.307

Scholars differ on the applicability of the trespass analysis to digital searches.308 Justice Scalia himself never advocated for its use for searches of digital data where there was no physical trespass; he said the Katz test was still applicable in those instances.309 Indeed, some scholars argue that under a narrow reading of the trespass test from Jones, it would not apply to searches of data without physical trespass.310 Others, though, argue that the property analysis is worthy of serious consideration and could offer broader and more secure protections than Katz in the digital age.311 As we look to the future, we should note that the majority of the current Supreme Court Justices have indicated a willingness to

309. In Jones, Scalia wrote that searches “involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 411.
310. E.g., Andrew G. Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 580–81 (2017). Professor Kerr has argued that the proper way to deal with digital searches is to use the standard from the Carpenter majority: courts should look at the type of data implicated and whether the disclosure was voluntary. Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter: The Digital Fourth Amendment 20 (USC Legal Studies Paper No. 18-29, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301257 [https://perma.cc/DD5U-GW XU]. In his concurrence in Jones, Justice Alito noted that in recent years courts had analyzed cases about unwanted electronic contact under a tort theory of trespass, holding that the transmission of electrons is a sufficient physical touching. 565 U.S. at 426 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing cases). Yet Justice Alito questioned whether that same analysis could also apply to Fourth Amendment cases. Id. at 426–27.
use the trespass test.312 Only Justices Alito and Breyer have been unwilling to use it.313

II. STANDARDS: “SLOSHING THROUGH THE FACTBOUND MORASS OF ‘REASONABLENESS’”314

Despite his avowed support of bright-line rules and disdain for totality-of-the-circumstances tests involving balancing, Justice Scalia acknowledged that “for my sins, I will probably write some opinions that use them.”316 He wrote a number of opinions which departed from his general preference for rules, and instead applied standards.317 But even though he acknowledged this inconsistency, he specifically declined to address what he called the “hardest question”: when is a standard avoidable and when is it not?318

312. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (praising the trespass test); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 13 (2013) (Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joining Justice Scalia’s majority opinion); Jones, 565 U.S. at 400 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Sotomayor joining Justice Scalia’s majority opinion). Further, Justice—then Judge—Kavanaugh was on the D.C. Circuit when it heard Jones. Judge Kavanaugh dissented from a denial of a rehearing en banc, arguing that the court should have analyzed the case using the trespass rationale. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769–771 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), denying reh’g en banc to United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Jones, 565 U.S. 400. He did not say definitively whether he thought the trespass rationale would have applied in that case, but asserted that it should have been briefed and argued. Id. at 771. We do not know what Justice Barrett’s position is as she did not have any cases involving this issue when she was a judge on the Seventh Circuit. However, as a former clerk for Justice Scalia, one can predict she would be a proponent of the trespass doctrine.


315. Professor Rachel Barkow, a former Scalia clerk, joked that if you wanted to make Scalia gasp, mention a totality-of-the-circumstances test. Stras et al., supra note 5, at 770. In one of his administrative law dissents, Justice Scalia jeeringly referred to such tests as “th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.” See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).


317. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4, at 495 (examining cases in which Scalia deviated from his stated preference for rules and referring to him as something of a “faint-hearted rule-ist”). In various cases, Justice Scalia balanced the rights of individuals versus the needs of the government based on what would make good policy, despite, on other occasions, disavowing the “good-policy-is-constitutional-law school of jurisprudence.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 4, at 484–95 (examining cases where Scalia used standards rather than rules).

This Part will attempt to tackle that question. In substantive Fourth Amendment decisions and in cases involving criminal defendants, Scalia usually applied rules. But in special needs cases that were largely civil in nature, as well as in cases regarding the correct remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, Scalia strayed and applied a standard.

Section A of this Part outlines Justice Scalia’s special needs cases, many of which use balancing tests. Section B examines cases involving remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, and Section C discusses the implications of choosing to apply a rule rather than a standard.

A. Special Needs

One exception to the warrant requirement is the “special needs” search. The special needs doctrine grew out of the “administrative search[]” framework, which originated in the 1960s. The term “special needs” was first used by Justice Blackmun in 1985 in *New Jersey v. T.L.O.* to refer to cases which required a lower standard of justification than probable cause. Because a warrant and probable cause are not required in these cases, reasonableness is determined by balancing governmental and private interests. The special needs doctrine is applicable in “exceptional circumstances” where there is a special need distinct from ordinary law enforcement. The term “special needs” is now a catch-all for many types of searches that require less than probable cause, such

319. *See supra* Part I (substantive Fourth Amendment); *infra* notes 353–71 and accompanying text (criminal defendants).

320. *See infra* sections II.A, II.B.

321. *See infra* section II.A.

322. *See infra* section II.B.

323. *See infra* section II.C.


326. *Id.*

327. *Id.* This distinction is not always clear or easy to apply. *See Barry Friedman & Cynthia Benin Stein,* *Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The Protections for Policing,* 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 295 (2016) (describing inconsistencies in special needs cases regarding “ordinary crime control”).
as administrative searches, border searches, and searches of closely regulated industries.\(^{328}\)

Justice Scalia wrote six special needs decisions while on the Court; in four of them he found for the government and in two he found for the individual.\(^{329}\) Unlike in other Fourth Amendment cases, where Scalia avoided balancing tests at all costs, in special needs cases he occasionally embraced them.\(^{330}\) Scholars have noted that the dispositive issues for Justice Scalia in special needs cases appeared to be (1) whether there was a real, documented special need behind the policy, and (2) whether the search was in a criminal context or predominately geared towards ordinary criminal wrongdoing.\(^{331}\) In special needs cases that dealt largely with civil issues, Justice Scalia appeared to be more amenable to using balancing tests. But where the issue was whether a search sought criminal wrongdoing, Justice Scalia was less open to balancing policy interests, and instead utilized his rule-based approach.

Two cases involving urinalysis drug tests—National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton—illustrate the first of those issues: whether there is a documented special need behind the policy.\(^{332}\) In Von Raab, Justice Scalia explicitly engaged in a balancing analysis.\(^{333}\) There, the majority held that it was reasonable for the U.S. Customs Service to randomly drug test its employees without a warrant and without probable cause.\(^{334}\) The majority weighed the government’s inter-

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\(^{328}\) Friedman & Stein, supra note 327, at 294–95.


\(^{330}\) See Manning, supra note 3, at 767–68 (noting that in special needs cases, Scalia “acted on a perceived invitation to exercise the kind of common law discretion he presumed judges generally should not have”).

\(^{331}\) See MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 221–26 (noting one distinguishing factor in Scalia’s special needs cases was whether the search was for ordinary law enforcement purposes); Kannar, supra note 116, at 1338–42 (distinguishing cases based on whether there was a documented special need).

\(^{332}\) See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662–63; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

\(^{333}\) Id. at 677 (majority opinion).
ests against the individuals’ interests and found that the government’s interest in public safety outweighed the individuals’ privacy interests.335

Justice Scalia dissented.336 But his issue was not with the balancing analysis. In fact, he endorsed it: he wrote that while there were “some absolutes” in Fourth Amendment law, “as soon as those have been left behind . . . the question comes down to whether a particular search has been ‘reasonable,’ [and] the answer depends largely on the social necessity that prompts the search.”337

Scalia dissented instead because he found that the case lacked “real evidence of a real problem” of drug use among customs officials.338 He noted that the government had failed to show even one example in which a customs employee used drugs and that use caused him to accept bribes, reveal classified information, or commit any other misconduct.339 Thus, Scalia found that the alleged policy interest behind the search did not exist, and therefore the search was not reasonable.340

*Vernonia* also dealt with urinalysis drug tests, but Justice Scalia came out in favor of the testing.341 There, a district-wide policy allowed random drug tests of student athletes in a school district in Oregon.342 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, first noted that there was no clear practice either approving or disapproving of urine tests for public school students in 1791.343 He then proceeded to balance the individual interests against the government’s.344 He noted that the case involved a supervisory relationship between children and their schoolteachers, similar to in loco parentis.345 He

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335. *Id.*
336. *Id.* at 680–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
337. *Id.* He cited *T.L.O.* as an example, and noted that there, the search was appropriate because drug use in schools had become a serious social problem. *Id.* (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)).
338. *Id.* at 681.
339. *Id.* at 683.
340. *Id.* at 683–84.
342. *Id.* at 650.
343. *Id.* at 652–53.
344. *Id.*
345. *Id.* at 654–55. Justice Scalia noted that the supervisory relationship here was akin to the one between a man on probation and his probation officer in *Griffin v. Wisconsin*. *Id.* (citing *Griffin v. Wisconsin*, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)).
wrote that to determine whether a search is “reasonable,” one must take that relationship into account.\textsuperscript{346} He described the manner in which urine samples were collected—male students used a urinal and were observed from behind; female students produced a sample in a stall with a female monitor standing outside—and found the privacy interests “negligible.”\textsuperscript{347} On the other side, he found that the interest in deterring drug use among school children was great, and that student athletes were at a particularly high risk of harm if they used drugs.\textsuperscript{348} He cited the district court’s finding that not only was drug use a serious problem in Vernonia schools, but that student athletes were among the strongest users.\textsuperscript{349} Not only did he do a balancing analysis, but he referenced the test from \textit{Katz v. United States}, writing that student athletes have even lesser expectations of privacy because they are accustomed to using public locker rooms and because they have voluntarily chosen to join a sports team and subject themselves to greater regulation.\textsuperscript{350}

Though both Vernonia and Von Raab dealt with urinalysis drug tests, Justice Scalia explained the divergence in his opinions: in Von Raab there was no evidence that customs officials were using drugs, but in Vernonia there was an “immediate crisis” of students indulging in drug use.\textsuperscript{351} As Professor George Kannar noted, these cases exhibit one of the dispositive issues in special needs cases for Scalia: whether there was, in fact, a documented special need.\textsuperscript{352} That need must be more than a mere policy interest, but rather must include a “demonstrated basis for a policy.”\textsuperscript{353}

\textsuperscript{346} \textit{Id.} at 656 (“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”).

\textsuperscript{347} \textit{Id.} at 658.

\textsuperscript{348} \textit{Id.} at 662.

\textsuperscript{349} \textit{Id.} at 648–49.

\textsuperscript{350} \textit{Id.} at 657–58; \textit{see also} \textit{Katz v. United States}, 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (expectations of privacy). Professor MacDonnell noted that in Vernonia, Scalia clearly deviated from his originalist approach, electing instead to use the \textit{Katz} test. \textit{See} MacDonnell, \textit{supra} note 1, at 222.

\textsuperscript{351} \textit{Vernonia}, 515 U.S. at 663; Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681 (1989) (Scalia, J. dissenting). The district court found that “a large segment of the student body, particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion, that disciplinary actions had reached epidemic proportions, and that the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as by the student’s misperceptions about the drug culture.” \textit{Vernonia}, 515 U.S. at 662–63 (quoting district court opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).

\textsuperscript{352} Kannar, \textit{supra} note 116, at 1338–42.

\textsuperscript{353} \textit{Id.} at 1342.
Justice Scalia’s dissents in two other special needs cases—Ferguson v. City of Charleston and Maryland v. King—address the second issue: whether the primary purpose of the search was ordinary criminal wrongdoing. In Ferguson, the majority held that warrantless urinalysis tests of pregnant women by a state hospital without their consent violated the Fourth Amendment. The majority found that the primary purpose of the policy was to detect evidence of criminal wrongdoing, and thus the special needs exception did not apply.

Justice Scalia dissented. He endorsed the lower court’s finding that the primary purpose of the urine tests was to protect both mothers and their unborn children, and noted that the finding was binding upon the Court unless it was clearly erroneous. He compared the doctors in that case to the probation officers in Griffin v. Wisconsin, and argued that they were concerned with public welfare, not law enforcement. Thus, he argued that the special needs doctrine applied.

In contrast, in King, Justice Scalia argued that the search did not seek anything beyond ordinary criminal wrongdoing and therefore the special needs exception did not apply. King dealt with whether the Fourth Amendment prohibited collecting DNA swabs from people arrested on felony charges. The majority engaged in a balancing test and found that the government interest (the need for law enforcement to safely and accurately identify people in custody) outweighed the “minimal” privacy intrusion of having one’s cheek swabbed for DNA.

355. 532 U.S. at 86 (majority opinion).
356. Id. at 81–84.
357. Id. at 98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 101.
359. Id. at 98.
361. Id. at 440–41 (majority opinion).
362. In addition, the majority cited the need to ascertain an arrestee’s identity and criminal history—in order to assess their level of dangerousness—as another government interest. Id. at 459–50.
363. Id. at 449, 461, 465–66.
Justice Scalia dissented, refusing to engage in a balancing analysis. He stated that balancing analyses were only appropriate in special needs cases where the primary purpose was not detecting criminal wrongdoing. Here, he argued that the primary purpose was to seek ordinary criminal wrongdoing: police were using the DNA data to tie arrestees to other, unsolved crimes. The lag in time between the arrest and the DNA results showed that the purpose could not possibly be merely to identify who was in custody. That purpose could be accomplished through standard fingerprinting. He ended his dissent on a forceful note: “I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.”

The divergence between Ferguson and King can be drawn on whether the primary purpose of the search was to uncover ordinary criminal wrongdoing. In instances where the purpose of the search was a civil issue, Scalia had no objection to warrantless searches without probable cause. But where the search sought to uncover criminal wrongdoing, Scalia objected. In King, he noted that no matter the result of a balancing analysis, a suspicionless search would never be appropriate if its subject was ordinary criminal wrongdoing. And in Ferguson, he noted that the “social judgment” was irrelevant—policy issues should be dealt with by the legislature.

364. Id. at 469 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“No matter the degree of invasiveness, suspicionless searches are never allowed . . . [for] ordinary crime-solving.”).
365. Id. at 468.
366. Id. at 470.
367. Id. at 471–76.
368. Id. at 480.
369. Id. at 482.
371. 569 U.S. at 469.
372. 532 U.S. at 92.
B. Remedies for Fourth Amendment Violations

In cases involving remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, Justice Scalia seemed to abandon his verve for limited judicial discretion. In this area he unapologetically used balancing tests and decided cases based on the “substantial social costs.”

*Murray v. United States* is an early indication of Justice Scalia’s concern with the exclusionary rule. There, police broke into a warehouse, saw bales of marijuana, then left and got a warrant without using the fact that they had already entered the warehouse and seen the marijuana. Writing for the majority, Scalia held that the marijuana should not be suppressed because although the original search was unlawful, the search pursuant to the valid warrant was an independent source. Justice Marshall dissented, pointing out that this would provide an incentive for officers to conduct illegal searches and then get warrants afterwards. He wrote that the majority’s holding “severely undermine[d] the deterrence function of the exclusionary rule.”

Justice Scalia’s disdain for the exclusionary rule crystalized in *Hudson v. Michigan*. Writing for the majority, he cited policy issues to justify not applying the exclusionary rule. In *Hudson*, police executed a search warrant at the house of Booker Hudson, searching for drugs and firearms. When officers arrived at Mr. Hudson’s home, they announced their presence, but waited only “three to five seconds” before opening his unlocked door. Mr. Hudson argued that the evidence obtained should be suppressed because the officers violated the knock-and-announce rule.

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373. *Hudson v. Michigan*, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006); *Anderson v. Creighton*, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); see *Friedman & Stein*, *supra* note 327, at 296 (noting the real curiosity of Scalia’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that he did not provide for a remedy); Stras et al., *supra* note 5, at 763 (“When you look to the remedy, he seemed to not necessarily be the friend of criminal defendants . . . .”).
375. *Id.* at 535–36.
376. *Id.* at 538.
377. *Id.* at 546 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
378. *Id.*
380. *Id.*
381. *Id.* at 588.
382. *Id.*
383. *Id.* at 588–89.
Michigan conceded that the knock-and-announce rule had been violated, but argued that exclusion of the evidence was too great a remedy.\footnote{Id. at 590.}

Justice Scalia agreed. He noted that the exclusionary rule generated “substantial social costs’ . . . which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large.”\footnote{Id. at 591 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)).} He also worried that excluding evidence distorted the truth-finding process because it suppressed reliable evidence.\footnote{Id.} He proceeded to balance the deterrence benefits the exclusionary rule provided against the social costs in the case.\footnote{Id. at 594.} The deterrence benefits, he found, were miniscule: law enforcement officials had little incentive to violate the knock-and-announce rule as they already had a search warrant.\footnote{Id. at 596–97.} Thus, deterrence was not paramount.\footnote{Id. at 596.} In contrast, the social costs were high: they would include not only releasing dangerous criminals, but also inviting a flood of litigation regarding the knock-and-announce rule.\footnote{Id. at 595.}

Further, Scalia noted that while perhaps in 1961 the exclusionary rule was a necessary deterrent because Dollree Mapp\footnote{See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).} could not file a § 1983 claim, now there were other remedies besides the exclusionary rule.\footnote{Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597.} Victims of Fourth Amendment violations could now file claims under § 1983 or \textit{Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics},\footnote{403 U.S. 388 (1971).} and moreover, they could find attorneys to represent them in such cases because Congress had authorized attorney’s fees for civil rights plaintiffs.\footnote{Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597–98.} Further, Scalia had confidence in law enforcement and did not think deterrence was necessary. He wrote that there is now “increasing evidence that police forces across the United States take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously” and stated that “modern police forces are staffed with professionals.”\footnote{Id. at 599.} He thought
that the threat of internal discipline for police officers would be a significant enough deterrent. After explicitly balancing these factors, Justice Scalia found in favor of the government. He considered the “massive remedy” of the exclusionary rule unjustified and thought other remedies, such as civil suits, were more appropriate.

But when faced with these civil suits, Justice Scalia denied recovery again and again. He wrote a total of eight Bivens and § 1983 Fourth Amendment decisions and found for the government in all but one of them. And in these decisions, he frequently used balancing tests.

For example, in Anderson v. Creighton, Justice Scalia held that FBI agents were entitled to qualified immunity after they violated an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. There, agents searched the Creighton family’s home without a warrant. The Creighton family was not the target of the search; rather, the agent believed that a man suspected of bank robbery might be there, but he was not.

Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity; they could not be held personally liable for the violation. He balanced the interests on both sides, noting that civil damages were often the only realistic remedy for constitutional violations. On the other hand, though, he wrote that allowing suits against government officials would lead

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396. Id. at 598–99.
397. Id. at 599.
398. Id. at 598–99.
400. 483 U.S. at 637–41.
401. Id. at 637.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 641.
404. Id. at 638.
to “substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.” He noted that qualified immunity addressed this concern and that it should be applied as long as the official’s actions were objectively “reasonable.” He relied not on textualism or originalism, but on precedent, and unapologetically stated that the doctrine of qualified immunity “reflects a balance that has been struck ‘across the board.’”

The plaintiffs put forward an originalist argument, pointing out that at common law officers were strictly liable if they searched an innocent third party’s home for a fugitive who was not present. Justice Scalia rejected this argument, calling it “procrustean.” He stated that “we have never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law.”

Scholars have pointed out how much this opinion contradicts Scalia’s commitment to originalism. Professor MacDonnell noted that Anderson is not only inconsistent with Scalia’s originalist approach, but seems to “dismiss core tenants of originalism.” Professor Kerr also stated that he had struggled to reconcile Anderson with Scalia’s originalist views, and wondered if it came out that way because it was only Scalia’s first term.

Anderson not only betrayed Justice Scalia’s originalism, but it also failed to limit judicial discretion. Because he did not root the decision in originalism or textualism, Scalia decided the case by balancing interests. It is unclear how Justice Scalia would or could have distinguished this decision from the legislating from the bench that he claimed to abhor.

405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 642.
408. Id. at 644.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 645.
411. MacDonnell, supra note 1, at 230.
413. 483 U.S. at 642.
Another civil suit where Scalia explicitly balanced individual and state interests was *Scott v. Harris*. When Mr. Harris did not follow officers’ directives to pull over, Officer Scott bumped his vehicle into Mr. Harris’s, causing him to spin off the road, flip over, and crash. As a result, Mr. Harris was rendered a quadriplegic.

Mr. Harris filed a § 1983 action, asserting that Officer Scott used excessive force which resulted in an unreasonable seizure and thus violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Harris argued that the Court should apply the bright-line rule from *Tennessee v. Garner*: use of deadly force is only reasonable when officers have probable cause to believe (1) the suspect “poses[] an immediate threat of serious physical harm,” and (2) “deadly force must have been necessary to prevent escape.” Justice Scalia commended Mr. Harris’s attempt to craft a clear test, but stated that instead of applying it, the Court “must still slosh [its] way through the fact-bound morass of ‘reasonableness.’” Here, he was not enthusiastic about a bright-line rule based on probable cause because it was in the context of a civil remedy, not a criminal case.

Instead, he turned to a balancing test. On Mr. Harris’s side, Scalia noted the high likelihood of serious injury or death that Officer Scott caused by bumping into Mr. Harris’s car. On the government’s side, he pointed out the actual and imminent threat that Mr. Harris’s driving posed to pedestrians, civil motorists, and the officers involved in the chase. Justice Scalia posed the question of how the Court should weigh “the perhaps lesser probability of injuring or killing numerous bystanders against the perhaps larger

415. 550 U.S. at 374–75.
416. *Id.* at 375.
417. *Id.*
418. *Id.* at 375–76.
419. *Id.* at 381–82 (citing *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)).
420. *Id.* at 383.
421. See *supra* section I.B.
423. *Id.* at 383–84.
probability of injuring or killing a single person." 424 Scalia decided that the Court should take into account the “relative culpability” of the lives at risk. 425 Mr. Harris, he argued, had caused the risk by engaging in the high-speed chase in the first place—and that was dispositive on the issue. 426 Thus, Scalia found that Officer Scott’s actions were reasonable. He laid down a rule: “A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.” 427

Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that the determination of whether the seizure was “reasonable” should have been left to the jury. 428 Justice Stevens noted that in the video of the incident, it was not clear whether there were even any pedestrians on the road who would have been at risk of injury. 429 Further, he noted that the chase was “hardly the stuff of Hollywood” and there were not any “close calls” in which innocent bystanders could have been injured. 430 Justice Stevens criticized the general rule that Scalia had put forth, arguing that it was not clear that Mr. Harris’s conduct had threatened the lives of any innocent bystanders. 431

CONCLUSION

Throughout his career, Justice Scalia was adamant about using bright-line rules instead of fuzzy standards. He was especially intentional about using rules when dealing with criminal matters,

424. Id. at 384.
425. Id.
426. Id. Earlier in the opinion, Scalia described the incident as a “Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort.” Id. at 380.
427. Id. at 386. The concurring Justices disagreed, though, about whether the holding constituted a per se rule. Justice Breyer stated that he disagreed with the majority insofar as it articulated a per se rule, arguing that statement of the holding was too absolute. Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg, though, noted that she did not consider the majority’s holding a “mechanical, per se rule.” Id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). She cited the Court’s balancing analysis, and argued that the inquiry was fact specific and did not lay down a clear test. Id.
428. Id. at 390 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
429. Id. at 392–93.
430. Id. at 392.
431. Id. at 396.
believing that rules could help protect the rights of unpopular criminal defendants.

And yet, in cases involving civil special needs as well as remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, Justice Scalia seemed to abandon his enthusiasm for rules. In these cases, he used standards that allowed for unbridled judicial discretion in balancing individual and government interests. He used balancing tests that let judges impute their own subjective preferences onto the law under the veneer of objectivity.432

Further, in these cases, Justice Scalia almost always sided with the government. Indeed, scholars have pointed out that when courts use balancing tests, the government usually wins.433 In civil special needs cases, Justice Scalia sided with the government as long as the search was not directed at criminal evidence. When dealing with remedies for Fourth Amendment violations, he chipped away at the exclusionary rule, arguing that police officers were “professionals” who did not need the deterrent effect of suppression.434 He argued there were better remedies, like civil suits, and yet when faced with those civil suits he repeatedly granted officers qualified immunity.435 Finally, though Justice Scalia professed to take seriously the rights of unpopular criminal defendants,436 his decision in Scott v. Harris—albeit a civil case— seemed

432. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 239 (1993) (“The very concept of balancing suggests that the Court must develop some objective measure for this task. It has never done so, leaving these opinions open to the criticism that the Justices are imposing their subjective preferences, while pretending that these judgments are the product of some neutral, objective, almost scientific process.”).

433. E.g., Friedman & Stein, supra note 327, at 297 (“In reality, the Court’s idea of ‘balancing’ is illusory—the test is rigged such that the government almost always wins.”); Cloud, supra note 432, at 280 (noting that in Fourth Amendment balancing cases, collective government interests tend to outweigh individual privacy interests); Strossen, supra note 15, at 1176 (arguing the Court overvalues government interests in balancing tests); T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 965 (1987) (“Balancing has been a vehicle primarily for weakening earlier categorical doctrines restricting governmental power to search and seize.”). But see Sullivan, supra note 3, at 95–97 (arguing there is no “conservative” or “liberal” bent to the choice of rules versus standards).


to depart from that rationale and had no problem taking into account the “relative culpability”\(^\text{437}\) of the lives at risk.

Justice Scalia’s lasting impact in insisting on a rule over a standard may be his reintroduction of the trespass approach to the Fourth Amendment. Especially as we move forward into the digital age, the trespass approach may offer a clearer rule showing when a search has occurred, alleviating the need to rely only on the open-ended standard from \textit{Katz v. United States}. Justice Gorsuch stated as much in his dissent in \textit{Carpenter v. United States}: “These ancient principles may help us address modern data cases too.”\(^\text{438}\) Not only has Justice Gorsuch argued to build on the reintroduced trespass test, but a substantial majority of the current Court has accepted its revival.

\footnotesize{437. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 384 (2007).}