A Necessary Evil: A Leadership Analysis of Major League Baseball's Best Managers

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A Necessary Evil: A Leadership Analysis of Major League Baseball’s Best Managers

By

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Honors Thesis

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Table of Contents

- Acknowledgements - 3
- Introduction - 5
- Chapter 1: The World Series Era (1903-1920) – 20
  - Part 1: Connie Mack – 20
- Chapter 2: The Landis Era (1920-1947) - 36
  - Part 1: Joe McCarthy, Miller Huggins, and John McGraw - 36
- Chapter 3: The Integration Era (1947-1968) - 68
  - Part 1: Casey Stengel and Walter Alston - 68
  - Part 2: Integration, Team Movement, the First Televised World Series, and The Civil Rights Movement - 82
- Chapter 4: The Collective Bargaining Era (1968-1976) - 89
  - Part 1: Sparky Anderson - 89
- Chapter 6: The $100 Million Contract Era (1998-Present) - 114
  - Part 1: Joe Torre, Tony La Russa, and Bruce Bochy - 114
  - Part 2: Increased Financial Stakes, New Media Scrutiny, and a Renewed Focus on Analytics - 139
• Conclusion – 146

• Appendix: Manager Biographies – 151
  o Connie Mack – 151
  o Joe McCarthy – 152
  o Miller Huggins – 153
  o John McGraw – 154
  o Casey Stengel – 155
  o Walter Alston – 156
  o Sparky Anderson – 157
  o Joe Torre – 158
  o Bruce Bochy – 159
  o Tony La Russa - 160

• References - 162
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Introduction

* A baseball manager is a necessary evil.*¹

- Sparky Anderson

Once described as “the most serious pleasure ever invented” by the Chicago Tribune’s Hugh Fullerton, baseball has played an essential role in the fabric of the United States since its slow development after 1839.² Only two decades later, experts described the fledgling sport as the United States of America’s “national pastime.”³ The emergence of increased leisure time towards the end of the nineteenth century created the environment for the growth of the entertainment industry and professional sports. Industrial employees benefitted from decreased working hours and the implementation of a Saturday half-day holiday. Furthermore, the rise of the Progressive Era helped highlight the importance of leisure time for workers.⁴ Baseball served as a foundational piece of identity for a nation that was less than a century old. Its hollowed status came from an era when the United States attempted to develop an identity separate from

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its British roots and was thus desperate to separate baseball from its British counterpart, Rounders. Yet, baseball's popularity has been decreasing since its peak in the aftermath of WWII, and American Football overtook it as America's favorite sport in the mid-1960s. But, despite baseball’s declining popularity relative to other “American” sports, such as American Football and basketball, it has maintained its status as the quintessential American pastime.

The story of baseball’s development has been a matter of intense historical debate. Historians argue that Abner Doubleday, who eventually became a Civil War hero, invented baseball in Cooperstown, New York, in 1839. However, that theory has since been disproven, as its origins are much older. Different versions of the game existed across the country as early as the eighteenth century. Players in New York, Philadelphia, and Massachusetts propagated their version of the game, each with nuances and idiosyncrasies. Still, it was not until the incentive of money became involved through professional gamblers that the game evolved into a sport for men. Gamblers rightly hypothesized that adults would be more interested in baseball if they could bet during games. Historian John Thorn posits that it is because of gambling that baseball staples such as the box score exist. Furthermore, Thorn argues that gambling was responsible for the beginning of player movement among teams and scouting. The New York version of baseball eventually gained the most traction, and Alexander Joy Cartwright of the Knicker Bocker Base Ball Club in New York City established the foundation of the rules of baseball in 1845. From that point onwards, baseball’s structure, as it is now known, developed rapidly. The

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8 Thorn, “The ‘Secret History’ Of Baseball’s Earliest Days.”
Cincinnati Red Stockings took the field as the first all-professional baseball team in 1869. The National League (NL) was established in 1876. Cy Young debuted in 1890. The American League (AL) was created in 1900 as a competitor to the NL. And the Boston Pilgrims and Pittsburgh Pirates played the first World Series (WS) in 1903. Various rule changes, mergers, and expansions occurred over the intervening century-plus, but the sport’s core had been established.

The many changes to managers’ roles were undoubtedly influenced by changes within the game. However, factors outside the control of major league baseball also played a significant part in the evolution of the manager. America’s National Pastime is not immune to the context that has shaped American history. Managers have been omnipresent since the beginning of the sport. But, while their baseball experience matters, so does their ability to adapt to changes within the sport and society. Across its nearly one-and-a-half-century existence, Major League Baseball has had to evolve beyond its exclusionary past to contend with a changing world. Across the 20th and 21st centuries, international conflict, the rising tide of racial equality movements, increased internationalization, the implementation of free agency, heightened financial stakes, escalating media exposure, and the dawn of analytics irreversibly altered Major League Baseball. Yet, despite the game’s shifting landscape, managers’ importance has continued mostly unabated. Beyond the individual talent on a team, the team’s interpersonal dynamics and management have often been the differentiating factor between success and failure. In fact, the characteristics, traits, and leadership styles, such as charisma, perseverance, situational leadership, and a balance of task and relationship-focused leadership, that shepherd success and mark the presence of the best managers are universal.

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9“The History of Baseball.”
As the game of baseball developed over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so too did the hierarchical structure of the sport itself. In time, managers became essential to the sport. Not just tactically but organizationally. However, the manager’s roles and responsibilities have fluctuated widely since the 1870s. In the early days of baseball, the concept of managers revolved around gathering and teaching players. A manager had to be a scout and a salesman. They were responsible for the team’s attitude and represented its values.\(^{10}\)

The turn of the twentieth century saw managers take a more hierarchal approach to the organizational structure of baseball clubs. These men became the face of the franchises and, as such, the main spokespersons.\(^{11}\) As front offices gained traction in the sport, managers’ roles in non-gameday activities lessened. By 1940, the manager no longer controlled trades.

Furthermore, managers were no longer required to be scouts and salesmans to recruit fresh talent.\(^{12}\) As the size of coaching staff increased between 1960 and 1980, a more formal hierarchical structure developed, with the manager at the top of the pyramid.\(^{13}\) The evolution to a more hierarchical power system shifted managers away from the teaching-heavy role that was common after front offices became rampant and back towards the overseer role that was common at the beginning of the 20\(^{th}\) century. There was an even greater return to past roles with the beginning of free agency. Managers were once again forced to be more salesman-like to convince both current players to stay and free agents to want to join the team. Present-day managers derive much of his role from the paradigm shift of free agency.\(^{14}\) Because it was no longer feasible for a team’s core to remain together indefinitely, the manager often became the

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\(^{11}\) James, 67.

\(^{12}\) James, 109.

\(^{13}\) James, 308.

sole constant figure on the team. The modern day has brought a decrease in the manager’s role in strategic on-field decision-making as analytics has increasingly dictated in-game strategy.

It is widely assumed that analytics and statistics’ role in baseball is a phenomenon that arrived in the last two decades. However, baseball has its roots in scientific management and, thus, statistical analysis. The term “scientific baseball” first gained prominence in the 1890s after emerging two decades earlier. Scientific management principles, such as using the best workers at hand to accomplish specific tasks, are still prevalent in baseball today through platooning and the bullpen, despite scientific management largely disappearing from the business world. Baseball both reflects the popular style of management of the time and predicts future trends. John McGraw is seen as a peddler of scientific management as he “took responsibility for all decisions made by his players and asserted absolute authority over his players both on and off the field.” Furthermore, Connie Mack’s managerial style, defined by Bill James as “you get good people, you treat them well, and you’ll win,” was predictive of the human relations school of management that would gain prominence at the cost of scientific management. Managerial styles have not remained static but instead have changed as baseball has grown, analogous to the evolution of management style in society.

This study aims to contribute to the literature assessing the success of baseball managers relative to the context that governed their roles. More specifically, it seeks to address the presence of universal leadership styles, traits, and characteristics that have persisted across

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15 James, The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers, 549.
different eras and contexts. I hypothesize that charisma, perseverance, situational leadership, and a balance of task and relational leadership are universal among the best managers. The study shows these traits and styles in the ten best Major League Baseball managers, as measured by World Series titles won: Joe McCarthy, Casey Stengel, Connie Mack, Walter Alston, Joe Torre, Sparky Anderson, Bruce Bochy, Miller Huggins, Tony LaRussa, and John McGraw. It analyzes snapshots of different eras in baseball history to establish era-specific trends. The era analyses then stitch together to form a cohesive narrative of the evolution of leadership in baseball managers. Again, I contend that perseverance, charisma, situational leadership, and balancing both task and relationship leadership have been essential features of managerial leadership in every era.

Charisma has the power to inspire devotion to the utmost level in followers. It is defined as “a special power to attract and inspire followers through a compelling vision and perceptions of extraordinary capabilities” and is based in followers’ perceptions. Showing sensitivity to environmental conditions is essential for a charismatic leader, allowing for better persuasive ability. For example, managers must be attuned to league standings or roster make-up to maximize their charismatic effects. The more attuned to the group’s needs a leader is, the more

19 Strong showings of conviction and self-confidence, gesticulation, and masterful rhetoric are all common traits of a charismatic leader. These traits are most likely to appear to the public in managers during press conferences, dugout interactions, and in-game decisions. Clubhouse inspirational speeches would also combine the aforementioned common charismatic traits. While it is not a necessary prerequisite to be knowledgeable or an expert in the prescribed field, appearing as such is almost always required. Previous success or other demonstrated success can accomplish the veneer of knowledge. Experience at the major or minor league levels or a playing career lends credence to a manager’s credentials. Additionally, a strong vision for the future, typically idealized, is needed. The benefit of a strong vision can occur independently of the outcome prescribed in the vision. The act of demanding change is the true catalyst. The most common vision outlined by a Major League Baseball manager would be winning the World Series. Twenty-nine out of thirty teams will fail in that endeavor, but the motivating effects are still present.; George Goethals, Georgia Sorenson, and James Burns, “Encyclopedia of Leadership,” by pages 163-167 (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2022), 162–63, https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412952392.
likely they will be able to take advantage of charismatic leadership. Charismatic leaders are also “highly expressive.”

Evocative press conferences, flamboyant ejections, and unique maxims would all qualify for Major League Baseball managers. Additionally, charisma is not an inherited trait. Instead, it is a learned one. Leaders can be born with traits that are associated with charisma, such as a predilection to gesticulation or above-average height. However, leaders must hone their charismatic skillset to maximize its effectiveness and become charismatic.

There can be little understanding of how baseball managers do their jobs without leadership studies and leadership theory. More specifically, they provide insights into the forms managers’ communication and man-management take. Furthermore, they allow for more explicit categorization of managers leadership tendencies which allows for more robust comparison.

Task and relationship leadership and behavior are the basis of many leadership theories. Relationship leadership is defined as “actions that maintain and enhance positive interpersonal relations in the group.” As leader of men, managers must cultivate or disregard relationships with players to maximize their effectiveness on the field. Examples of relationship behaviors include being supportive and fostering an equitable and approachable environment. Managers who suggest themed-outfit road trips, have an open-door policy, and conduct intake and exit interviews with players reinforce these relational leadership tactics.

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20 Goethals, Sorenson, and Burns, 165.
21 Twelve tactics help individuals become more “leader-like” in followers' eyes. Verbal tactics include metaphors, similes, analogies, stories and anecdotes, contrasts, rhetorical questions, expressions of moral conviction, reflections of the group’s sentiments, three-part lists, the setting of high goals, and conveying confidence that said goals can be achieved. Non-verbal tactics are an animated voice, facial expressions, and gesticulation. While other tactics can help achieve a charismatic persona, such as humor and repetition, the twelve listed above work in almost any context and have proven to have the greatest impact.: John Antonakis, Marika Fenley, and Sue Liechti, “Learning Charisma,” Harvard Business Review, June 1, 2012, https://hbr.org/2012/06/learning-charisma-2.
Task leadership is any behavior that encourages or furthers the completion of tasks. Examples include feedback, critical or otherwise, and coordination. In a game that has black-and-white outcomes, wins and losses, winning games is the task that managers must accomplish. Task leadership aids in that aim. Managers that provide incentives for drill or in-game performance meticulously schedule players during off-time and provide statistic or analytical breakdowns to players are examples of embracing task-focused leadership. These activities would be intended to improve player motivation, readiness, and performance which would increase the likelihood of winning ballgames.

Situational Leadership Theory is essential to understanding baseball management because it is predicated on the notion of a lack of a singular correct style for effective leadership. Instead, successful leaders react and alter their approaches to fit the situation best. Managers face new game situations daily, and roster make-up can fluctuate throughout the season and from one year to the next. Deploying varying leadership styles is essential to directing the ebbs and flows of a baseball season. Developed by Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard in the 1960s, the Situational Leadership model is characterized by its “core assumption that successful leadership depends on the leader’s style and the nature of the ‘situation within which the attempt to influence takes place’ remains intact.” The model

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23 Forsyth, 3.
24 Situational Leadership Theory falls under the umbrella of contingency theories. Contingency theories argue that the best leadership style is “contingent” on the situation and context of the scenario.
assumes that the two basic behavioral approaches of task and relationship behavior are used by leaders when trying to influence followers. The model argues that “task and relationship leadership behavior are not mutually exclusive forms of action.” As seen in the above diagram, leaders can range from S4-S1 in their leadership, and followers can range from R4-R1.

26 As seen in the below diagram, leaders can range from S4-S1 in their leadership, and followers can range from R4-R1. It is imperative to note that low levels of relationship or task behavior do not mean an absence but instead a low amount; Forsyth, 7.

27 Forsyth, 7.

28 S4 is coined delegating and connotes low task and relationship behavior. S3, also known as supporting, is high relationship and low task. S2 is coaching and is high task and high relationship. And S1, directing, is high task and low relationship. R1 followers, because of a lack of experience or commitment, are “not yet ready to engage directly in the group or organization’s work process.” The lack of experience may not be their fault and is easily fixed through training, but a lack of effort is harder to cure. A lack of confidence in their skill is also apparent. Common symptoms of R1 followers are procrastination, absenteeism, expressions of frustration, and defensiveness. Stalled prospects or bonus babies are examples of R1 followers in baseball. R2 followers have solved their confidence woes but still lack the fundamental skills to perform the required tasks. Followers in this category may show high levels of confidence that supersede their abilities. However, they remain reliant on the leader for assessment. R2 followers’ behaviors are defined by overconfidence, attentiveness to leader directives, an outward sign of interest in the work, and a peripheral understanding of the work processes. Prospects and young-players would typically fall under the R2 follower umbrella. R3 followers provide a distorted mirrored version of their R2 counterparts. Their confidence, motivation, or commitment levels are falling, but they have succeeded in achieving high skill in work processes. R3’s newfound skill level can lead to boredom with the tasks at hand. However, the flailing commitment levels may also result from the stagnation of work ethic or fears of additional responsibility. R3 followers are prone to focus on rewards, resist change, and slack off without direct supervision. Players whose production flags after signing a large contract would be an example of R3 followers. R4 followers have none of the weaknesses previously mentioned: “R4 followers are able, confident, and willing. They have reached complete readiness to perform, even in situations where the leader is absent.” They are proficient in teamwork and resource allocation and emphasize results and high
Managers often adapt their leadership to both individual players and the team at a whole. For example, prospects, veterans, journeyman, and star all require differing levels of task and relational leadership because of their differing talent levels and experience. When a variety of players is combined into a team, the impetus falls upon the manager to alter his leadership to best match what unique environment requires.

Positive psychologists define perseverance as “the voluntary continuation of goal-directed action despite obstacles, difficulties, discouragement, boredom, tedium, or frustration.”\(^{29}\) The best teams in baseball still typically lose sixty or more games per season. Furthermore, only one team can win the World Series each year. Regardless of these setbacks, among others such as player injuries, managers must continue to strive towards the goal of winning. The term grit is analogous to perseverance in social psychology, and it emphasizes a “continued pursuit of a challenging goal in spite of initial failures, adversity, and plateaus in progress.”\(^{30}\) The social psychology definition incorporates a “long-term focus” that is implied in its positive psychology equivalent. Scholars hypothesize that grit is a crucial element in high achievement, and a

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\(^{29}\) Scholars generally agree that perseverance is both shaped by and shapes the environment people use it in. As such, its appearance in a subject is not fixed, and an individual’s predisposition to perseverance can vary; Kimberly K. Merriman, “Leadership and Perseverance,” in *Leadership Today*, ed. Joan Marques and Satinder Dhiman, Springer Texts in Business and Economics (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 335–50, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31036-7_19; Forsyth, “Behavioral Theories: What Leaders Do,” 3.

\(^{30}\) Merriman, “Leadership and Perseverance.”
distinguishing factor in star achievement outcomes.\textsuperscript{31} Perseverance in Major League Baseball managers can take the form of personal, team, or environmental struggles, such as poor health, a bad team, and the outbreak of war. Managers must then cope with the hand they are dealt to best maximize the teams’ chances of winning.

Many works have sought to evaluate managers’ success through a myriad of means, such as statistical and biographical. Furthermore, the literature is rife with applications of leadership theories. However, very little of this literature tackles the evolution of the baseball manager and studies that apply leadership theories to the baseball manager profession. Bill James’ \textit{The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers: From 1870 to Today} is the one most similar to this. However, it makes no explicit mention of leadership theory. Philip G. Roffman’s \textit{A Study in Leadership: An Analysis of the Leadership Styles of Baseball Managers and What Lessons Can Be Learned by Educational Leaders} is at the intersection of leadership theory and baseball managers but applies its findings to the education world instead of the baseball manager profession. Furthermore, Roffman’s study does not assess changes in leadership across time. As such, there is a void in the literature assessing baseball manages through the lens of leadership theory across the history of Major League Baseball.

The analysis moves chronologically through baseball’s century-long evolution, first focusing on the \textit{World Series Era (1903-1920)}. Connie Mack is the focus of this era. The creation of the American League, the first World Series, and the creation of the Federal League in 1913 all helped shape baseball in \textit{World Series Era}.\textsuperscript{32} Further, outside factors, such as the

\textsuperscript{31} Four actions are correlated with increased perseverance: “A challenging goal identifies the need to persevere. Appropriate use of rewards reinforces and enhances the perceived value of perseverance. A growth mindset enhances one’s belief that success can stem from perseverance. Smarter practice enhances results of perseverance for development and achievement”; Merriman.

\textsuperscript{32}“The History of Baseball.”.
Progressive movement and World War I influence the game of baseball as well. The study then moves to the *Landis Era (1920-1947)*. The *Landis Era* analyzes Joe McCarthy, Miller Huggins, and John McGraw. The governance of Commissioner Landis and his quest to clean up the game after the Black Sox scandal of 1919 defined the era.\(^{33}\) The economic boom and subsequent crash of the Roaring Twenties and Great Depression, along with the outbreak of WWII, also had dramatic effects on baseball. The economic fluctuations affected disposable income, reducing attendance.\(^{34}\) The outbreak of WWII altered rosters and positioned baseball as an essential part of the war effort.

Baseball changes dramatically after the Second World War. The debut of Jackie Robinson in 1947, the first instance of a televised World Series and Major League expansion into the West all shaped the *Integration Era (1947-1968)*.\(^{35}\) Additionally, the Civil Rights Movement also significantly influenced the era by bringing race relations to the forefront of baseball. Casey Stengel and Walter Alston are analyzed in this era. The analysis continues with the *Collective Bargaining Era (1968-1976)* when the first collective bargaining agreement in professional sports occurred in 1968, Curt Flood began his fight against the reserve clause, and the Designated Hitter was introduced in the American League.\(^{36}\) Furthermore, Richard Nixon tied baseball to both his war on drugs and the Vietnam War. Nixon’s actions made Major League Baseball a political actor and its players’ unwitting spokespeople.\(^{37}\) Sparky Anderson is the sole

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\(^{35}\)“The History of Baseball.”


managerial focus on the Collective Bargaining Era. Increased player movement, two separate major player strikes, and increased parity shaped the Free Agency Era (1976-1998).\(^{38}\)

None of the identified managers achieved the majority of their World Series titles during the time period of the Free Agency Era. The chapter focuses on how contextual factors made it, so no manager won more than two World Series titles across the twenty-two-year period. Finally, an explosion in player contract, team, and media rights deal values marked the $100 Million Contract Era (1998-Present). Further, it signified the seeming appearance of analytics in baseball and the development of social media platforms and the streaming environment. The final three managers, Joe Torre, Bruce Bochy, and Tony La Russa, are all analyzed in the $100 Million Contract Era chapter.

Ultimately, I derived the eras by using significant events or changes in Major League Baseball as guideposts. The analysis begins in 1903, marking the first instance of a World Series being held between an American and National League representative. I demarcated the beginning of an era with the occurrence of an event of a change in the status quo, such as when Kevin Brown signed the first $100 million contract in 1998.\(^{39}\) Those happenings lend their names to the eras. Each era, with the exception of the Free Agency Era, focuses on one or more of the top ten managers, as determined by total World Series wins, in Major League Baseball History. Each of the ten managers fit into eras in which they won the majority of their World Series titles. To assess the impact each manager’s leadership had on their respective club's success, traditional win-loss percentages and Pythagorean Win-Loss records are used. Each manager's career winning percentage, win percentage in his first three and last three years with

\(^{38}\) “The History of Baseball.”

each club managed, and that team’s winning percentage in the three years prior to and after the manager's tenure are analyzed. I chose three years as the appropriate data set because Baseball-Reference sets their rate stat qualifier minimum of 315 games managed.\(^{40}\) That figure is slightly below two full 162-game Major League Baseball seasons. However, to account for the differing number of games played per season across the data sample, I added a third season to the data set to eliminate the skewing effects of any partial season data. All winning percentages include only the regular season. Partial seasons were not used in the calculation of winning percentages except for each manager’s cumulative career and team tenure winning percentages.\(^{41}\)

In addition to various winning percentages, I used Pythagorean winning percentage to determine the effectiveness of the identified managers.\(^{42}\) Baseball-Reference.com’s formula for Pythagorean winning percentage is \((\text{runs scored}^{1.83})/[(\text{runs scored}^{1.83}) + (\text{runs allowed}^{1.83})]\). The formula was derived to determine how many games a team *should* have won when accounting for the difference in total runs scored and total runs allowed. Pythagorean winning percentage allows us to identify when a team has over or underachieved relative to its expected record from its run differential.\(^{43}\) The Pythagorean record provides a means to assess the relative success of each manager. The more wins above predicted, the better the manager did at influencing the team's success. The Pythagorean W-L totals calculated include all games for a

\(^{40}\)“Major League Managers.”

\(^{41}\) Partial seasons, defined in this study as any season in which the manager did not manage at least 90% of his team’s regular season games, were not used to determine winning percentages in the first three or last three years of a manager’s tenure unless the absence was not a result of being hired or fired in the middle of a season. Partial seasons were also not used to calculate a team’s winning percentage in the three seasons prior to or after a manager’s tenure. In the event that a manager was hired or fired part way through a season, the season immediately preceding or following was used as the start of the data set.

\(^{42}\) The formula for Pythagorean winning percentage was developed by statistician Bill James.

team during the season, including games missed by the manager. However, it does not include partial seasons as defined above.

Ultimately, this study seeks to show that charisma, perseverance, situational leadership, and both task and relational leadership were present among the best Major League Baseball managers and whether those concepts affect team performance. For example, did managers who joined consistent winners ride the coattails of their predecessors and a strong roster, or did they elevate their team? Further, if a manager experienced success at only one stop in his managing career, was that success a fluke?
Chapter 1: The World Series Era (1903-1920)

“There is one man who is baseball’s greatest manager, and no one else can be spoken of in the same breath. And his name is Connie Mack”\textsuperscript{44}

- Joe McCarthy

Part 1: Connie Mack

I identified each of the hypothesized universal leadership traits and styles in my analysis of Connie Mack. During his time as owner and manager of the Philadelphia Athletics, he displayed perseverance, charisma, an aptitude for situational leadership, and a balance of task and relational leadership. This section will provide evidence of the presence of these traits and styles and show their correlation with Mack’s successes and failures as a leader.

Connie Mack’s perseverance is evident in both his actions and how he was viewed by others. He managed an unprecedented 53 years in the major leagues and did not retire until the age of 87.\textsuperscript{45} Mack holds the major league records for managed, won, and lost games, highlighting the length of his career and continued push to lead. Furthermore, he was still personally scouting players in his 60s on the Athletics’ rare days off, as he did with future Hall of Famer Outfielder Al Simmons.\textsuperscript{46} Biographer Norman Macht brought to life some of the downsides of Mack’s fearsome perseverance when he said, "he was stubborn to the extreme….he was practically a one-man operation all his life. His mental health deteriorated in the ‘40s, and he

\textsuperscript{46}James, The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers, 95.
hurt the team by staying so long.”47 Mack’s role as owner, general manager, and manager of the A’s, long after other owners had stopped managing and hired separate general managers, brought with it unique struggles of governance that he pushed through, even if it was at the detriment of his team. His stubbornness highlighted his persistence in continuing his leading role with the A’s even after senility struck him.48 That perseverance was aided by the respect and adoration he commanded and earned as sportswriters protected him from criticism and his coaches became the de facto managers. Mack’s longevity and perseverance would not have been possible without his charisma.

Connie Mack’s most common descriptor was that of a gentleman and it lends insight into how his charisma manifested. It was the gentlemanliness that drew players, reporters, and fans alike toward the “Tall Tactician.” Never ostentatious, Mack embodied all the best aspects of being a gentleman. It is the gentlemanly qualities that are most easily recognizable in his charisma. Despite his overbearing stature and notoriously bushy eyebrows that portrayed a menacing appearance, Time magazine described Mack as "measured and self-aware—a logical, likable, natural leader, often called on to arbitrate conflicts among teammates."49 Each of the descriptors used by Time magazine point towards Mack as a charismatic leader. The most poignant word choice was “natural leader.” It perfectly encapsulates the mystique of charisma. Mack’s allure was hard to describe. He simply appeared to lead naturally. Being self-aware, measured, logical, likable, and someone whom others go to all point towards a leader that followers were intrinsically drawn towards.

48 Fitzpatrick.
Historian Bill James and reporter Red Smith’s descriptions of Mack also emphasized his charisma. For example, James stated that “Connie Mack was better at that game than anybody else in the world. People liked Mack, respected him, and trusted him, and there were times when Mack got players for that reason” when discussing Mack’s player recruitment skills.\(^{50}\) Mack convinced players to sign with the A’s because of his inherent magnetism. The players did not know Mack personally, likely only through stories and newspaper clippings, but he came off as a likable and respectable leader, which made them more inclined to join him. James also described Mack as “easygoing,” and the same as Time magazine, “a gentleman.”\(^{51}\) Mack’s consistently approachable attitude and gentlemanly persona, along with his standing as a preeminent manager of his time, speak to a mythic figure that inspired players to want to join the Athletics.

Red Smith’s description of Connie Mack in his eulogy in the *Philadelphia Inquirer* illuminates not only how others viewed Mack but also his awareness of it. Macht states that “many people loved Mack, some feared him, everybody respected him, as far as I know nobody ever disliked him.”\(^{52}\) Charisma can manifest in many different ways. Love, fear, and respect are each examples. Mack was able to draw upon all three to lead. Further, Mack was not fighting against the negative effects of potential followers disliking him. Instead, his natural persuasiveness could work unabated. Smith says that "nobody ever won warmer or wider esteem, and nobody ever relished it more."\(^{53}\) Mack’s charm not only drew people to him, but his enjoying of its status made it more likely for him to continue engendering it. The combination of being charismatic and enjoying its side effects created a positive feedback loop in which Mack

\(^{50}\) James, The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers, 96.
\(^{51}\) James, 96.
\(^{52}\) Norman L. Macht, Connie Mack and the Early Years of Baseball Norman L. Macht ; with a Foreword by Connie Mack III. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007).
\(^{53}\) Macht.
was never incentivized to stop being charismatic. This is never more evident than when the A's opened their season in Washington, D.C., during World War II. Washington Senators owner Clark Griffith beckoned for Mack to come over to the VIP box prior to first pitch, and when he left the dugout to a standing ovation of 25,000 baseball fans, he basked in the cheers. Reports described him as taking "off his hat and clasped his hands above his head, grinning broadly as he strode rapidly across the field. On his way back, he waved to the fans in the bleachers." Mack played into the spectacle and humored the fans by waving and recognizing their cheers. Doing so only enhanced his stature among them and ensured his influence in baseball continued.

Smith ends his description of the “Tall Tactician” by listing a string of personality traits that Mack embodied: “He was tough, human, clever, warmly wonderful, kind and stubborn and courtly and unreasonable, proud, humorous, demanding, unpredictable.” The kaleidoscope of descriptors points to a man whose appeal was hard to describe. The seemingly contradictory traits, warm and tough, courtly, and unreasonable, add to Mack’s apparent allure. People are often drawn towards what they do not fully understand, and Mack’s deep and varied personality made knowing 100% of him unlikely for a common fan or a player.

Mack's charisma is not only apparent in others' descriptions of him. His actions also highlight it. During the 1943 Major League Baseball season, the Federal government forced clubs to do spring training closer to home instead of their warm weather facilities in the south because of the scarce resources during wartime. The Athletics conducted their training at their farm team’s stadium in Wilmington, Delaware, and stayed at the Hotel du Pont, three miles from the park. While most players took the bus to train, Mack walked. On a particularly cold day, he

55 Macht, Connie Mack and the Early Years of Baseball Norman L. Macht ; with a Foreword by Connie Mack III.
left the hotel and walked briskly by a group of players waiting for the bus and said, "Come on, boys, the walk will be good for all of us." Cuban ballplayers Bobby Estalella then asked the player standing next to him, “How old he?” to which the teammate replied “eighty.” Estalella retorted, "He eighty…He live to be a hundred. We win the pennant, he live to two hundred.” Estalella began walking to the park that day after deciding that if his old manager could, then he would.56 Mack’s decision to walk the three miles every day, which flew in the face of his status, age, and the weather, created an aura of awe that inspired Estalella to follow suit. Estalella’s comments about Mack’s age show how the near-impossibility of the action played a part in persuading him to follow his manager’s lead. His remark on doubling Mack’s life expectancy with a pennant extols the manager’s love for the game. The situation created an idea of Mack as a larger-than-life figure, a concept that is strongly linked to charisma.

All successful baseball managers use situational leadership to varying degrees because each player has different skill sets. However, Connie Mack used situational leadership considerably because of his team-building philosophy. Mack preferred younger players he could shape and mold versus veterans and minor leaguers with more experience but potentially hardened skill sets.57 Mack’s status as the owner and de facto general manager, in addition to the manager, gave him the ability to make his preferences a reality. As such, Mack’s leadership evolved as his pupils grew. He did not need to continue to shape them after his tutelage had been ingrained, and they did not need as much guidance. Mack’s propensity to tear his team down to the studs and rebuild like in 1915, ostensibly because the team had met their expiration date, but more likely because of monetary constraints, forced him to move through the situational leadership stages continuously. As players like Eddie Collins matured and became stars, Mack

57 Wertheim, “The Pathetics.”
was forced to sell his players. Only later did his players learn that his resistance to giving raises was because he did not have the money to give and keep the team solvent.58

“The Tall Tactician” altered his behavior to get the best results out of his team. When he was a younger manager, he had the propensity to go into the clubhouse after a loss and explode. He realized it was unproductive and a weakness and began forcing himself to wear a suit to games because of his belief that only uniforms should be in the clubhouse. His self-restraint gave him a chance to cool off and lead better.59 Baseball managing is predicated on using situational leadership, but Connie Mack’s unique position as owner, general manager, and manager and his team-building philosophy made it so that situational leadership was especially crucial to the Athletics’ success or lack thereof.

The final universal trait I identified in Connie Mack was a balance of task and relational leadership. Mack’s task focus leadership mainly manifested in his running of the business side of the A’s. He once told a family member, ”the best thing for a team financially is to be in the running and finish second. If you win, the players all expect raises.”60 Mack understood that his financial position forced him to keep lower payrolls and sell expensive veterans instead of giving them raises. His primary goal was to keep the Athletics solvent, and he would do so even at the cost of his players, no matter how much it pained him. Despite this, his task-focused nature did not preclude him from making a poor financial decision to help someone else out. He once paid $5,000 for a useless prospect knowing it would be enough for the widowed owner to keep her club.61

58 Macht, Connie Mack and the Early Years of Baseball Norman L. Macht; with a Foreword by Connie Mack III.
59 Fitzpatrick, “A Lifelong Mission to Tell Connie Mack’s Story.”
60 Wertheim, “The Pathetics.”
61 Macht, Connie Mack and the Early Years of Baseball Norman L. Macht; with a Foreword by Connie Mack III.
Mack’s relational focus was made clear in his relationships with his players. Mack had a soft spot for ace pitcher Rube Waddell, despite him not fitting his stereotypical formally educated, intelligent, and socially gracious player type. Waddell was known to leave the dugout in the middle of games to chase a fire engine, join in on a parade, or pet puppies. When questioned on how many women he had married, Waddell was always uncertain. Nevertheless, Mack gave Waddell innumerable chances until the rest of the team grew frustrated and complained to him as a group. After the pitcher died in 1914 without a penny to his name, Mack paid for the funeral. Waddell was without a doubt an asset on the field, having held the single-season record of strikeouts with 349 until it was broken by Sandy Koufax six decades later, but Mack showed he cared about the person when he paid for his funeral. It also opens up the possibility that the many chances given to Waddell were a result of more than on-field performance. The exception making Mack employed was a sign of the relationship he had formed with Waddell. It was an example of the value that Mack put on bonding with players at a personal level.

Waddell’s situation was not unique. Journalists theorize that Mack signed Ty Cobb and Tris Speaker at the end of their careers to give them a chance at redemption after being accused by pitcher Dutch Leonard of having fixed games. Mack’s willingness to take a chance on two players with baggage shows the value he placed on people and wanted them to succeed. Cobb and Speaker were at the tail end of their storied careers and not at the height of their powers, but Mack still brought them into the fold because he cared about them as people.

Star players were not the only people to benefit from Mack’s kindness. Sam Crane was a twenty-year-old shortstop who played in only two games for the A’s in 1916. But, in the late

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62 Wertheim, “The Pathetics.”
63 Wertheim.
1920s, he shot and killed his girlfriend and her lover after finding them drinking in a bar. Mack would later write to the parole board on Crane’s behalf and, after his release, gave him a job at the Athletics home ballpark Shibe Park. Mack's relationship with his coaches also pointed towards a strong relational focus. After Mack's health deteriorated and senility took its toll, coaches told players to ignore his dugout signs and watch them so that Mack could continue managing the team he loved. One of those coaches was Al Simmons, whom historian Norman Macht says “loved him like a father.” Simmons, decades earlier, had been Mack's star outfielder and infielder. Jonny Dykes remembers a time when Mack brought Simmons and himself closer together at Mack's own expense: "One day Al Simmons and I were arguing on the bench in Chicago. It kept up until Mr. Mack couldn't stand it any longer. He jumped up off the bench and hit his head on the concrete roof. It must have hurt, but he didn't let on. All he said was, 'Dykes, keep your blankety-blank mouth shut.' "When the inning was over, Simmons and I ran out on the field together, and Al said to me, 'Boy, you really stirred him up.' Back on the bench Mr. Mack turned to one of the other players and said, 'Look at those two. They're out there telling each other how mad they had me.'" Mack redirected his players’ anger at each other to him so that they would stop fighting and have a common enemy to bond over. He was focused on improving team cohesion and creating a strong environment, key tenets of relational leadership.

In his New York Times obituary, the paper described Mack as a "new type of manager," one who "always insisted he could get better results with kindness." Furthermore, the Times

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64 Wertheim.
65 Fitzpatrick, “A Lifelong Mission to Tell Connie Mack’s Story.”
66 Macht, Connie Mack and the Early Years of Baseball Norman L. Macht ; with a Foreword by Connie Mack III.
said, "He never humiliated a player by public criticism. No one ever heard him scold a man in the most trying times of his many pennant fights."\textsuperscript{68} His behavior lent itself to building strong bonds with his players and fostering a good clubhouse environment. Furthermore, Mack’s belief in the power of kindness points towards his knowing embrace of relation-focused leadership.  

A story former A’s infielder Eddie Mayo told perfectly encapsulates Connie Mack’s focus on relationships: “I once asked (Mr. Mack) about what was the hardest thing in managing a ball club, expecting he would answer about strategy or player relations. ‘Telling a player you have to release him,’ said. Mr. Mack.”\textsuperscript{69} Mack’s answer highlights how he valued his relationships with players. He did not want to hurt them when telling them they were being released. Having to do so was harder than any amount of losing games, money, or otherwise. The Tall Tactician emphasized his players as people rather than just as tools for winning. He valued a strong clubhouse culture, treating his players with respect, helping others, and building relationships.  

Mack’s leadership traits correlated with success. Mack’s career-winning percentage was .484. However, that number is skewed by both financial constraints that knee-capped the Athletics from 1915-1924 and again from 1932 until the end of Mack’s tenure in 1950 and health constraints. After tearing down the A’s in 1932 at the age of 69, Mack’s mental health was not strong enough to rebuild the team once the club had acquired the requisite financial resources in later years. While his winning percentage does fall below .500, the circumstances surrounding large portions of his managerial tenure make it hard to draw conclusions about his overall success. What can be said, however, is that he experienced periods of immense success with three World Series titles in four years from 1910-1913 (and an AL pennant the year after) and back-to-back titles in 1929 and 1930 (with another AL pennant the year after). Mack’s record in

\textsuperscript{68} Hingston.  
\textsuperscript{69} Macht, “Connie Mack and Wartime Baseball — 1943 — Society for American Baseball Research.”
his first three years leading the A’s, which coincided with the American League’s first three years, was a .507 winning percentage and winning a pennant in 1902 before the World Series was being held. In his last three years managing, the A’s had a .470 winning percentage. But, as touched upon above, much of the coaching and managing was being done by other coaches on the staff at that point as senility had taken its toll on Mack. There is no data available for the three years prior to Mack managing the A’s because he was their first manager. In the three years that followed his tenure, the Athletics accumulated a .450 winning percentage which was in line with their sub-par performance in the later stages of Mack’s leadership. Mack also led the A’s to eleven more wins across his 50 seasons managing than their run differential would have predicted using the Pythagorean record. The degree of that accomplishment falls outside the scope of this study. However, Mack did lead his team to more winning than their on-field performance would have seemed to engender.70

The asterisks associated with Connie Mack’s winning percentage and, thus, Pythagorean records make it difficult to draw a correlation between the identified leadership traits, styles, and theories and success. However, the presence of multiple successful championship runs (1901-1905, 1909-1915, and 1927-1932) and five World Series titles provide enough evidence to point towards a correlation between Mack’s success and the identified leadership variables.71


Three major events in Major League Baseball occurred during the World Series Era. The first was the creation of the American League in 1901.72 Its creation was tied to the sport’s

70“Connie Mack Managerial Record.”
71“Connie Mack Managerial Record.”
72“The History of Baseball.”
exploding popularity and the appetite for a second major league alongside the National League.\textsuperscript{73} Further, the advent of the American League increased competition for players, which drove player salaries higher.\textsuperscript{74} Managers had more teams to contend with for players, and they had to be more persuasive to sign coveted players. Managers like Connie Mack enticed players to sign by building relationships and charisma were at a competitive advantage. Additionally, the new teams in the American League had to endure strong pushback from the National League clubs when trying to swipe players. As a result, many players reneged on agreed-upon deals, and managers often did not know their roster until the first day of spring training.\textsuperscript{75} Managers in both leagues had to deal with unexpected circumstances and be able to adapt on the fly and persevere through the changing landscape.

The second was the creation of the World Series in 1903.\textsuperscript{76} Winning the annual series between the winner of the National League and American League champions became the pinnacle achievement of the sport, the stick by which all teams would come to be measured. The World Series created a means to comparatively judge the best players, managers, and teams. It also signified the National and American leagues as the preeminent professional baseball leagues in the nation. Third, the formation of the Federal League in 1913 as a third major league disrupted the status quo that had emerged in the aftermath of the creation of the National Baseball Commission in 1903.\textsuperscript{77} The owners of the Federal League clubs were exceptionally wealthy and did not recognize the reserve clause that limited player movement. Hungry to make a name for themselves, the Federal League owners offered top stars, such as Ty Cobb and Walter

\textsuperscript{73} Steven A. Riess, Sport in Industrial America - 1850-1920, 2nd ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013).
\textsuperscript{74} Macht, Connie Mack and the Early Years of Baseball Norman L. Macht ; with a Foreword by Connie Mack III.
\textsuperscript{75} Macht.
\textsuperscript{76} “The History of Baseball.”
\textsuperscript{77} “The History of Baseball.”
Johnson, large contracts to poach them from their clubs. However, the approached stars almost all resigned with their current clubs at massive raises after using the Federal League offers as leverage. Twenty stars who were approached and stayed with their clubs averaged a 92% pay increase. Federal League rosters were primarily filled with minor-leaguers, journeymen, and players past their prime. After two years of fierce competition where the Federal League lost $2.5 million, $59 million adjusted for inflation, and the American and National Leagues dealt with escalating salaries and legal costs, the leagues negotiated a settlement. Ultimately, the proposed New York City clubs received $600,000 to dissolve, and the Federal League owners in Chicago and St. Louis were allowed to buy the Cubs and Browns, respectively. Baseball’s antitrust exemption would come out of a lawsuit by the Federal League’s Baltimore club in a 1922 ruling.78

These events affected, and were often a result of, the Progressive Era. The formation of the American League and later the Federal League were made possible by the increased urbanization, an influx of immigrants, and new work patterns that progressivism had wrought. In 1930, thirty percent of the nation’s population lived in cities, and from the turn of the century through 1915, more than fifteen million immigrants came to the United States. That number is roughly equivalent to the number of immigrants in the previous forty years combined.79 Professional baseball teams played in cities, and immigrants considered the sport one of the best ways to assimilate into American culture.80 The increase in urban population and new eager fans propelled baseball into a juggernaut. Furthermore, the progressive decrease in working hours

78 Riess, Sport in Industrial America - 1850-1920.
increased the amount of leisure time workers had and subsequently increased the amount of time for playing and watching baseball.

Baseball’s increasing popularity was also tied to its harmony with the broad progressive ethos. Order, efficiency, tradition, and Americanization were all hallmarks of progressivism and were instilled at the core of baseball. City officials, the federal government, and immigrants themselves saw baseball as means to fostering hometown pride and accelerating acclimation. Furthermore, it was thought it instilled in youth a respect for authority that contemporary sports like hound-racing and boxing could not. On a macro level, baseball was thought to embody American democracy. Different classes and backgrounds all enjoyed rooting for their team and sat together at the ballpark. Additionally, the teams were predicated on merit, not social standing, providing a means of social mobility. In many ways, baseball was a guide to the principles the United States of America was founded on. In the minds of the nation’s leaders, baseball modeled the kind of behavior, the American democratic kind of behavior, that was the backbone of the country.

However, despite thoughts to the contrary, baseball did not emerge fully formed as a progressivist’s dream sport. Instead, it was a sport in transition, just as the country was in a transitional phase in the Progressive Era. Despite being based in cities, baseball was, at its origin, a rural sport, even if it owes much of its current existence to industry. As such, it combined both the urban dynamic and the history of America as an agrarian society. Some original players of Organized baseball did not always intend for it to be an everyman’s sport. It began its professional, organized life as a game for the upper crust, and the social elite intended to keep it

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82 Riess, Sport in Industrial America - 1850-1920.
that way. However, as it spread from New York to less industrialized cities like St. Louis, its popularity grew, and it became the preeminent form of organized American recreation. Daily newspapers that published box scores and an expansion of railroads and telegraphs helped its national rise. While initially intended to be a part of the social stratification that the Progressive Era was fighting against, baseball became a game that tore down class and status walls, embodying progressive ideals.

Experts viewed baseball as analogous to progressive business. A group mentality was necessary to win in the factory and on the field. Individuals had to sacrifice for the betterment of the whole. Furthermore, experts saw technical skills, strong character, and applied intelligence as essential to both business and baseball. Baseball was congruent with the work its fans were doing every day. Social scientists have hypothesized that it is that congruence that helped increase the popularity of the sport. Additionally, behaviorists have hypothesized that baseball and sports, in general, helped compensate for the lack of human relationships in the menial and boring factory jobs that dominated urban life in the Progressive Era. Baseball further mimicked the progressive movement in one of its greatest times of need. In a move akin to appointing an expert to assess and bring to light major issues, Major League Baseball owners appointed Judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis as the first Commissioner of Baseball to deal with the aftermath of the 1919 Black Sox scandal.

The various progressive ideals that gave rise to baseball’s increased popularity and that the sport mimicked created an environment where a balance of task and relational leadership,

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83 Panacy, “Major League Baseball Finds Its Roots in Progressive America.”
84 Panacy.
87 Panacy, “Major League Baseball Finds Its Roots in Progressive America.”
perseverance, and charisma would all be beneficial. Inspiring a team mentality is easier with a focus on relationships and the ability to draw followers close. Dealing with the increased competition required perseverance on the part of managers, as discussed above. The identified universal leadership styles and traits were positive assets during the *World Series Era* because of the progressive ideals that defined it.

Another large-scale phenomenon that had a major effect on baseball during the *World Series Era* was World War I. Approximately 38% of active major leaguers served during the war, and eight players died during the conflict in action or from illness.88 Luminaries such as Christy Mathewson and Ty Cobb served in the Chemical Warfare Service, and Mathewson's career never continued after the war due to injuries he suffered serving his country.89 Major League Baseball owners complied with the federal government’s request to reduce the 1918 season from 154 to 128 games. However, to protect their bottom lines and players, many argued that baseball should be considered an “essential industry” because of its necessity in upholding American democracy and morale. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker disagreed with that notion and refused to omit baseball players from the military draft.90 The first active Major Leaguer to be drafted into the military was Lawton Witt, the Philadelphia Athletics’ shortstop, on August 2, 1918. Later that year, the 1918 World Series became the first and still only Fall Classic to take place entirely in September in an effort to wrap the season up. It was during the first game of the series between the Boston Red Sox and Chicago Cubs that the Star Spangled Banner was first played at a World Series game. The ongoing struggle in Europe, increased patriotism felt at

90 “Hall of Famers Served in World War I Gas & Flame Division.”
home, and sorrowful sentiment across the nation created a storm of events wherein the Star Spangled Banner gained immense national prominence after its playing at the game. After that point, it was played on all opening days and World Series games, and its designation in 1931 as the national anthem likely would not have happened without its playing in 1918 in Game One of the World Series.91

The most notable of the universal identified traits that World War I created selective pressure for was perseverance. From a purely tactical standpoint, managers had to deal with losing players from the roster at near-random times. From an emotional standpoint, managers were tasked with leading their teams through scary times and setting an example of patriotism and strength for the rest of the nation to mimic. To that end, American League teams began practicing drills in 1915, and Mack declared that the Athletics’ Shibe Park would serve as both the home to the team and a drill ground.92

Baseball in the World Series Era was shaped by happenings both in and outside of baseball. New leagues in the form of the American and Federal Leagues increased competition and drove up player salaries. The creation of the World Series created an important benchmark by which teams could measure themselves. The Progressive Era helped lift baseball to new heights, and the game mimicked many of its teachings. Finally, World War I created unique challenges for teams to deal with while also supporting their nation. Charisma, perseverance, situational leadership, and a focus on both task and relational leadership were beneficial within this context, and Connie Mack displayed each.

Chapter 2: The Landis Era (1920-1947)

“I honestly feel that it would be best for the country to keep baseball going”

- President Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Part 1: Joe McCarthy, Miller Huggins, and John McGraw

I identified each of the hypothesized universal leadership traits and styles in my analysis of Joe McCarthy, Miller Huggins, and John McGraw. During their times as players, owners, and managers, they displayed charisma, a balance of task and relational leadership, an acknowledgment of Situational Leadership, and perseverance. This section will provide evidence of the presence of these traits and styles and show their correlation with McCarthy, Huggins, and McGraw’s successes and failures as leaders.

Huggins' charisma manifested in his dedication to baseball and how he parlayed his immense knowledge of the game into persuasive ability. New York American reporter Damon Runyon once noted, "Mr. Huggins has a way about him in the baseball arbor which inspires the feeling that he knows his business." Huggins had a mystique about him that instilled the thought in others that he was an expert in his field. That, in turn, only strengthened his charisma, reading something akin to a feedback loop. While Runyon does not explicitly note that he has devotion to Huggins, his use of the phrase “a way about him” implies that he observes others being drawn to the manager. Washington Post reporter J.V. Fitzgerald wrote in 1918 that Huggins was “the smallest of the big-league managers, but he carries a wise baseball head, and

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there are few who know more about the inside workings of the national game."95 Huggins
overcame his short stature, negatively correlated with perceived charisma, to put forth an image
as a shrewd and knowledgeable leader. His ability to create an air of extraordinary capability
helped his ability to rouse devotion in his most troublesome player, Babe Ruth. Ruth was
notorious for being difficult to manage and doing what he pleased. However, the Babe said that
Huggins “was the only man who knew how to keep me in line.”96 Huggins gained Ruth’s
compliance, if not his respect, highlighting his natural ability to draw even the most raucous of
players in.

Huggins also showed an ability to be highly expressive about his love of baseball. That is
something that likely would have endeared him to his players through a shared sense of
camaraderie that would tie into Huggins’ ultimate vision of winning. During an interview with
future Major League Baseball Commissioner Ford Frick, Huggins said, “Baseball is my life. I’d
be lost without it…Maybe, as you say, it will get me some, day-but as long as a I die in harness,
I’ll be happy.”97 Huggins showed dedication to baseball and, thus, his team and players. His
adamancy and the strength of the language he used are signs of charismatic leadership.
Furthermore, by saying “I’ll be happy” with reference to dying while managing, Huggins
showed a sense of enthusiasm that is often infectious when displayed by leaders. Ironically,
while managing the Yankees, Miller Huggins would go on to die on September 25th, 1929.

Huggins’ use of relationship-focused leadership is most apparent in how his players
viewed their relationship with their manager. Lou Gehrig said, “he was more like a father to me

95 By J.V. FITZGERALD, “HUGGINS FACES TOUGH TASK, BUT HE’LL STIR UP THINGS: CAN’T BE
EXPECTED TO WIN PENNANT WITH YANKEES THIS SEASON,,” The Washington Post (1877-1922),
February 21, 1918, 145625820, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post.
96 Steinberg, “Miller Huggins – Society for American Baseball Research.”
97 Steinberg.
than anything else.”\footnote{Steinberg.} Babe Ruth also shared that sentiment. After being suspended and fined by Huggins in 1925, he began viewing his manager in a new light.\footnote{“When the Babe Almost Hit Huggins,” The New York Times, March 31, 1977, sec. Archives, https://www.nytimes.com/1977/03/31/archives/when-the-babe-almost-hit-huggins.html.; Steinberg, “Miller Huggins – Society for American Baseball Research.”} The reverence with which two of the greatest stars in baseball history held Huggins was a testament to how he nurtured relationships with his players, a clear sign of a relational leadership focus. Gehrig was a significant beneficiary of Huggins’ propensity to foster relationships with his players. A few years after his debut as a 20-year-old in 1923, Gehrig gushed about his manager: He’s the most patient manager I ever knew…He is the best teacher I ever had the privilege of being with.”\footnote{Steinberg, “Miller Huggins – Society for American Baseball Research.”} Huggins’ treatment of the then-green Gehrig was a testament to his dedication to ensuring the growth of his players by creating a positive environment.

Before Ruth and Huggins grew closer, Huggins made sure to give Ruth the breathing room to fully express himself. Huggins described his treatment of Ruth when he said, “If the harness were strapped too tight on Ruth I believe it would cramp his style, his personality. He is simply Babe Ruth, an institution.”\footnote{Steinberg.} Huggins recognized that the best way to establish a relationship with Ruth that was beneficial to the Yankees was to be amicable to who Ruth was and not force him to conform to a common standard. The respect he paid Ruth when he called him an institution likely enhanced his relationship with the star pitcher turned outfielder. While he did not create an equitable environment, a tactic associated with relational leadership, it can be implied that he did so for the purpose of creating and maintaining relations within the larger Yankees team.
Upon Huggins’ death at the end of the 1929 season, Gehrig and Ruth’s emotional reactions were an attestation to the bonds that had been formed between manager and player. Reporters quoted Gehrig as saying, “I’ll guess I’ll miss him more than anyone. Next to my father and mother he was the best friend a boy could have…He taught me everything I know.” The relationship Gehrig had with Huggins transcended that of boss and employee. Gehrig held Huggins in the same regard as his parents, showing the manager's importance in his life. The typically jaunty Ruth cried at the news of the passing of Huggins and said, “You know what I thought of him, and you know what I owe him.” The emotion that Huggins’ death inflicted upon Ruth provided insight into the true nature of their relationship. Despite their, at one time acrimonious relationship, the pair had grown close. The definitive tone of Ruth’s statements makes it clear that his feelings for Huggins were indisputable. The Babe also lead the Yankees at Huggins’ funeral, another sign of their strong relationship.

In addition to his focus on relationships, Huggins also emphasized task completion. His resolute desire to win was evident when he talked to reporters after losing the 1921 World Series with the Yankees: “They won. We Lost. There you have it in four words, and that’s all there is to the story.” Huggins was matter of fact and had little patience to look beyond the black-and-white of winning and losing. His emphasis on outcomes showed a regard for task completion, in the baseball manager’s case, winning. Huggins was even more explicit on his focus as Yankees manager when he said, “It is our desire to have a pennant winner each year indefinitely. New York fans want championship ball, and the Yankees can be counted on to provide it. We are

102 Steinberg.
103 Steinberg.
105 Steinberg, “Miller Huggins – Society for American Baseball Research.”
prepared to outbid other clubs for young players of quality.”¹⁰⁶ Not only did Huggins emphasize the desired outcome of winning, his use of “indefinitely” provided assurance that it was not a fleeting mission but instead a task to be completed regularly. Furthermore, Huggins expressly delineated a means by which he intended to win when mentioning outbidding rivals. Huggins both encouraged and furthered the Yankees' quest to win.

Huggins was forced to adapt his leadership style upon switching from the St. Louis Cardinals to the New York Yankees in 1918. With the Cardinals, Huggins overachieved with a third-place finish in 1914.¹⁰⁷ He was consistently at the helm of teams less talented than rivals. Upon taking over the then-struggling Yankees, little changed. However, by 1920, the Yankees had acquired Babe Ruth, and with his arrival came heightened expectations. Huggins had to manage a team full of stars in the largest city in the world with the Yankees, a stark contrast from his time with the Cardinals. However, in 1926, experts expected indomitable Yankees to perform poorly after managing only sixty-nine wins the year prior. However, that team surpassed expectations to win the American League pennant.¹⁰⁸ The cause of the discrepancy between public opinion and the eventual results was a lack of understanding of Huggins’ ability to develop young talent. The 1926 Yankees started a twenty-three-year-old Lou Gehrig at first base, a rookie Tony Lazzeri, who had played a grand total of zero major league games up to that point, at second base, and at shortstop Mark Koenig who had only played 28 games at the big-league level. Huggins had to fall back on his managerial style from his Cardinal days when a limited budget forced him to win by developing, not buying players.¹⁰⁹ He did so to an aplomb.

¹⁰⁶ Steinberg.
¹⁰⁸ “Miller Huggins Managerial Record.”
¹⁰⁹ Steinberg, “Miller Huggins – Society for American Baseball Research.”
Huggins recognized the need to be adaptable in the face of a wide variety of players. It signified his awareness of situational leadership principles and their importance in managing a baseball team. In his second year as Yankees manager, Huggins described his theory of leading: “I studied the characters of my players. One system will not rule. It is impossible, because you will find temperamental players, you will find players who do not need any rules, and you will find players who insist they know more than the manager.”\(^\text{110}\) Huggins explicitly mentioned the need for multiple systems, or leadership styles, because players have differing needs. His professed leadership style aligns closely with that of situational leadership.

The final trait that I confirmed that Miller Huggins expressed is perseverance. Huggins overcame his stature to become a successful major leaguer and various ailments during his managerial career to ascend to an all-time great. Miller Huggins was one of the shortest players to ever play in the major leagues. John Sheridan wrote in the *Sporting News* that despite being listed at five feet, six inches, and one-hundred and forty pounds he was likely only five feet, one inch, and one hundred and twenty-five pounds. Huggins had to overcome the stigma of his height, with John McGraw passing up a chance to acquire the second basemen and being quoted as saying, “That shrimp...He’s too little to be of any use as a big leaguer.”\(^\text{111}\) Nevertheless, Huggins went on to a thirteen-year Major League Baseball career and received Most Valuable Player votes in two seasons.\(^\text{112}\) Part of his success can be attributed to the tenacity he showed when choosing to learn to hit left-handed to have the advantage of being a few steps closer to first base. In a 1913 *Washington Post* article, Huggins’ process to become a left-handed hitter

\(^{110}\) Steinberg.

\(^{111}\) Steinberg.

was described: “After he had become a major leaguer, he spent four winters in a Cincinnati gymnasium exercising the muscles on the left side of his body. Work on the pulleys to strengthen his forearm, toe weights on his left foot, and muscle building exercises for the calf and thigh muscles of the left leg occupied his attention. It was a monotonous grind at times, but Huggins persisted because he intended to become an effective batsman.”

Huggins made a concerted effort to improve his chances at success, and his desire to be a good major leaguer drove his grit.

By the time he became a manager, Huggins had overcome the stigma of his stature. However, he was beset by debilitating illnesses. During the 1920 season, Huggins suffered from a nervous breakdown. From 1920-1922 he lived through neuritis, rheumatism, digestive problems, insomnia, and blood poisoning. In 1924 Huggins told reporter Fred Lieb that he “would not go through those years (1920-1922) again for a million dollars…I was a sick man during a good part of the time, perhaps sicker than my friends knew, but I held on and stuck it out.”

Huggins pushed through numerous physical and mental ailments, often without others knowing, to achieve immense success in his managerial career.

Like Miller Huggins, Joe McCarthy displayed charisma, task and relational leadership, situational leadership, and perseverance during his managing and playing career. McCarthy showed charisma through his ability to endear himself to others through a sense of relatability. Six years after he retired, McCarthy listed his first World Series championship in 1932 with the Yankees as his greatest pleasure: “Perhaps you understand why…First it was my first World Series winner. Secondly, it was against the Cubs.”

Having been fired by the Chicago Cubs less
than a year after leading them to the National League Pennant, McCarthy’s notion of revenge, while innocent, connects with the human soul. Wanting a semblance of payback is only natural; thus, the added joy McCarthy gained from defeating the Cubs creates a portrait of a relatable man. Furthermore, the affable way he makes his statement has the quality of inviting warmth. He acknowledges the specialness of it being his first World Series victory but then slyly remarks about the Cubs. McCarthy showed an ability to connect with others through his ability to relate, and his delivery enhanced its endearing effect.

While he only had thirteen ejections in his twenty-four years managing in the Major Leagues, McCarthy’s expressiveness during these rare occurrences speaks to his charisma. During a Yankees game against the Oakland Athletics on June 2nd, 1934, McCarthy called Umpire Louis C. Kolls a “C _ _ _ S _ _ _ _ E” and a “Fathead,” among a number of other profanities. After his ejection, he remained on the bench and continued to direct his team. McCarthy again showed his ability to be evocative during a Boston Red Sox game on July 24th, 1948. After Umpire John W. Stephens ejected infielder Johnny Pesky, McCarthy left the dugout to clarify if Pesky had been ejected. Upon being told he was, McCarthy engaged in a profanity-laced tirade against Stephens. Among the things said by McCarthy were, “You son of a bitch,” “you bush league prick I’ll get your job, you son of a bitch,” and “bush league cocksucker lousy prick.” The entirety of his rant was audible to his players and the crowd. While not eloquent, McCarthy endeared himself to his players by standing up for them, and his use of profanity added a character of flamboyance characteristic of charismatic leaders. Furthermore, his disregard for authority, the umpires, showed a sensitivity to his players’ feelings, namely their

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116 Letter
117 Ibid.
118 Letter
dislike of them. The feeling of being aggrieved by the umpires made McCarthy’s rants more salient to the players. McCarthy being attuned to the needs of his players allowed him to strengthen his authority by taking advantage of charismatic actions.

McCarthy’s charisma is most prevalent in his mastery of baseball and immense knowledge base. Yankees star Joe DiMaggio is quoted as saying, “never a day went by that you didn’t learn something from McCarthy.”119 The ability to impart knowledge on his players lent McCarthy a certain level of prestige that added to his appeal. While many lay people believed that the sheer talent on McCarthy’s Yankees teams made winning a formality, those in baseball saw McCarthy’s important contributions. In a 1941 *Washington Post* article, McCarthy was praised for his ability “for keeping great teams great.”120 Furthermore, the article highlighted McCarthy’s ability to sustain success compared to luminaries such as Connie Mack and John McGraw. Writer Bob Considine summarized the unnatural quality of McCarthy’s leadership that enabled such success: “McCarthy’s teams, sparked by his quiet genius for getting the most out of men who normally should be surfeited with success, never flop.”121 McCarthy’s natural way of leading, his “quiet genius,” was able to inspire in his players hard work and a devotion to winning. His extraordinary ability inspired the Yankees despite their successes that should have had the effect of dampening the enthusiasm to work for more titles.

During his managerial career, McCarthy inspired a sense of awe that percolated through his players. Star Shortstop Phil Rizzuto once said that “He (McCarthy) was always a master of his ball teams. We were always in awe of him as a person and a manager…Joe McCarthy was a

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121 By Bob Considine.
master to all of us who played for him. He was simply the greatest."\textsuperscript{122} Rizzuto highlighted the immense knowledge that McCarthy had and his extraordinary capabilities that are associated with charismatic leadership. Further, the veneration Rizzuto had for McCarthy underscores the allegiance he instilled in his players. The use of the word “simply” leaves no room for debate on the finality of Rizzuto’s feelings. Additionally, his use of “all of us” points to McCarthy’s standing among all of his players, not just Rizzuto.

In addition to his charisma, McCarthy also showed usage of both task and relational leadership. McCarthy was often called a pushbutton manager, a back-handed compliment that alluded to the seeming ease of managing the Yankees because of their overwhelming talent. However, it can also be interpreted as him being focused on completing the task at hand, winning, by pushing any buttons necessary to do so. Historian Bill James calls McCarthy “a decision maker and disciplinarian.”\textsuperscript{123} Those tags come with the connotation of an individual whose focus was on outcomes and removing any obstacles to them. Another example of McCarthy’s task-focused leadership occurred when a player made a mistake. After a blunder, McCarthy would talk with the player in his office after the game. In these talks, he emphasized that making the same mistake twice was unacceptable. Doing so would increase the odds of that player’s tenure on his team ending.\textsuperscript{124} The mistakes hampered the team’s chances of winning and thus accomplishing the task before them.

McCarthy’s usage of relational leadership is evident through his interactions with the media and players. Despite never being a favorite of the New York City media, McCarthy indoctrinated himself into their good graces through his treatment of his players and them. One

\textsuperscript{122} Randy Schultz, “For The Record . . . Joe McCarthy Ranks Among Baseball’s Greatest Managers.,” \textit{Baseball Digest} 64, no. 6 (August 2005): 68–72.
\textsuperscript{123} James, \textit{The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers}.
\textsuperscript{124} Schultz, “For The Record . . . Joe McCarthy Ranks Among Baseball’s Greatest Managers.”
reporter opined in 1929 that McCarthy “has one quality which endears him to those who know what a manager has to face in the way of heckling. He stands by his players…Tell him his team is weak here, or weak there, and he will not fly off the handle. On the contrary, he will tell you where it is strong and going along to suit him.”\textsuperscript{125} McCarthy’s defense of his players against hecklers showed honorability to the press, creating a sense of respect. Furthermore, his civility in responding to reporters’ criticisms of his team fostered a positive relationship with the media. Finally, McCarthy’s ability to remain calm and repurpose an insult into a display of confidence charmed members of the press.

McCarthy’s interactions with his players also paint a picture of a manager who understood the importance of maintaining relationships. On June 14\textsuperscript{th}, 1933, Yankees first baseman Lou Gehrig was ejected from a game against the Red Sox. McCarthy immediately protested and was subsequently thrown out as well. McCarthy risked and incurred a fine to show Gehrig that he had his back.\textsuperscript{126} McCarthy chose Gehrig over avoiding personal harm.

Another example of McCarthy’s usage of relationship-focused leadership came with his star player on the Red Sox. In 1969, Boston Red Sox Left Fielder Ted Williams met with McCarthy as they reminisced about their time together. During their conversation, McCarthy questioned if Williams remembered the manager’s words to him after losing in a one-game playoff in 1948: “Do you remember what I said to you that day’ Joe inquired. ‘How could I ever forget those kind words…They were the kindest words ever spoken to me in baseball.’” McCarthy had said, “We did get along didn’t we? And we surprised a lot of people who said we couldn’t.”\textsuperscript{127} Across a career that spanned twenty-one years, Williams attributed the kindest

\textsuperscript{125} McMurray, “Joe McCarthy – Society for American Baseball Research.”
\textsuperscript{126} Letter
\textsuperscript{127} McMurray, “Joe McCarthy – Society for American Baseball Research.”
statement he had ever heard to McCarthy, showing the bond that the two had. This was despite widespread speculation that the two would butt heads before the season started. McCarthy’s efforts to never criticize a player in the press helped strengthen the relationship between player and manager.\textsuperscript{128} McCarthy tried to cultivate a relationship with Williams, showing his focus on relational leadership.

Like other successful managers, McCarthy had to adapt to changes on his roster and certain players. One example of his ability to adjust his leadership is how he treated Babe Ruth. To avoid confrontation with the mercurial star, McCarthy ignored his own policy of treating all players as equals. Ruth was allowed to act as he pleased, with the understanding that he would continue to perform up to expectations.\textsuperscript{129} McCarthy was not tied down by stubbornness or a misguided notion of equality. Instead, he adapted to the situation at hand and modified his leadership accordingly. McCarthy’s willingness to deviate from his preferred leadership style maximized Ruth’s effectiveness and thus improved the Yankees.

McCarthy was also adept at dealing with changing roster constitution. Despite handling less roster turnover than many managers because of his role as manager of the Yankees, a notoriously wealthy and successful franchise, McCarthy was still tasked with integrating new players and phasing out old ones. His success in nurturing stars such as Lou Gehrig, Phil Rizzuto, and Joe DiMaggio showed his ability to lead inexperienced but talented players. This was in contrast to the heavy veteran contingent that often dominated his teams. Furthermore, his removal of Ruth from the Yankees in 1935 because of his flailing performance not being commensurate with his baggage exhibited his ability to alter a past decision upon the realization of its detriment to the group.

\textsuperscript{128} McMurray.
\textsuperscript{129} Dubso, “Joe McCarthy, Yanks’.”
Joe McCarthy showed perseverance through his drive to play Major League baseball despite a catastrophic childhood injury and the sheer length of his career. As a boy, McCarthy suffered a broken kneecap and severe cartilage damage, which hampered his speed greatly.\textsuperscript{130} Despite his injury, he managed to play for fifteen seasons in the minor leagues. While never succeeding in making the Major Leagues, his persistence in continuing to play was evident. Even if he never ascended to the Major Leagues as a player, his twenty-four seasons as a manager at the highest level are a testament to his perseverance. McCarthy holds the record for most wins in Yankees history and the second most wins in Major League Baseball history. Those records would not be achievable without the resolve to continue to lead. Further, despite being fired or resigning twice, McCarthy returned to manage at a high level, winning seven World Series titles with the Yankees after being fired by the Cubs in 1930 and leading the Red Sox to a .606 winning percentage after resigning from the Yankees due to an alcohol abuse problem.\textsuperscript{131} While he would not win another World Series after leaving the Yankees, his determination to return despite his alcoholism issues showed immense grit.

John McGraw is the third manager among the top ten who won the majority of his World Series titles during the \textit{Landis Era}. Like Joe McCarthy and Miller Huggins, John McGraw also showed charisma, task and relational leadership, situational leadership, and perseverance. Nicknamed “Little Napoleon” for his fiery personality, New York Giants coach said that “McGraw eats gunpowder every morning for breakfast and washes it down with warm blood.”\textsuperscript{132} McGraw was notorious for a penchant for being ejected from ball games and castigating

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\item McMurray, “Joe McCarthy – Society for American Baseball Research.”
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umpires. Before being passed in 2007 by Braves manager Bobby Cox, McGraw held the record for most ejections with one hundred and eighteen.\(^\text{133}\) As previously discussed, standing up for one’s players, especially in a flamboyant manner, is evidence of charismatic leadership. The frequency at which McGraw was ejected emphasized charisma’s prominence in his leadership toolkit. McGraw also strived to install a common vision amongst himself and his players: “Personally I could never see this idea of taking defeat philosophically… I hate to lose, and I never feel myself beaten until the last man is out. I have tried to instill that same fighting spirit in all the teams I have managed.”\(^\text{134}\) McGraw’s emphasis on a core vision and his passion were both signs of his bent towards charismatic leadership. The use of “instill” signified a plan on McGraw’s part that indicates a purposeful effort to establish a vision for his teams.

McGraw used task-focused leadership more than relationship-focused leadership. But the latter was still a part of his leadership. The care that McGraw showed for his players emphasized that. One example is when he tried to save his pitcher Arthur Lawrence “Bugs” Raymond, from the throes of alcoholism. He eventually had to cut Raymond after he was sent to the bullpen to warm up, but when called upon was nowhere to be found. Later that day, he was found in a saloon, having traded in his practice ball for alcohol. Bugs was dead a year later.\(^\text{135}\) McGraw could have cut Raymond at the first sign of his alcoholism. Instead, he tried to help his player. His effort highlighted his relational leadership abilities. McGraw’s failure to save Raymond does not reflect poorly on his leadership ability.

\(^{133}\) Jensen.
McGraw’s relationship with a different pitcher was decidedly different. He and star pitcher Christy Mathewson overcame vastly different personalities to forge a close bond. Mathewson appreciated his manager’s loyalty and strategic skill. McGraw likewise was found of Mathewson’s intelligence on the mound and courage. McGraw ultimately saw Mathewson as “his boy, his kid brother.” While McGraw was better known for his task-focused behavior, his ability to connect with his players on a personal level and his decision to take a vested interest in their well-being speaks to his relational leadership.

To say McGraw was detail-oriented would be doing him a disservice. Casey Stengel recalled how McGraw would examine players’ meal tickets to see how they were eating. If he were not satisfied, he would talk with the player. If curfew were at 11:30 PM, a staff member would knock on the player’s doors at 11:30 PM sharp. McGraw ensured that his players would be in the best position to win ball games. His efforts extended onto the field as well as off of it. Hall of Fame infielder Frankie Frisch remembered how McGraw personally saw to his development: “He saw to it that I was given a chance to hit during batting practice. He used to play the infield himself and he personally took charge of polishing up my fielding. He would hit grounders for hours. He’d hit them straight at you and he’d hit them to either side…McGraw even hit to the infield in pre-game warm-up. If you didn’t make a play the way McGraw wanted it, he’d hit you another, five more, ten more, until the play was made the way he wanted it.” McGraw was obsessed with maximizing his team’s chances to win. Strengthening his team’s defense and ensuring a player could develop through batting practice were logical ways to improve the Giants' ability to complete the task of winning. McGraw’s dedication to his role of

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137 James, *The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers*.

138 James.
McGraw’s task-leadership-focused orientation is an extension of his longing to accomplish the charge of a baseball man, winning.

McGraw also showed a penchant for situational leadership. Historian Bill James said that John McGraw loved teaching young men how to play baseball. Because of that, like Connie Mack, he inevitably had to adapt his management as his pupils grew. McGraw had to treat rookies differently than in their prime stars, who had to be treated differently from aging veterans. The success that McGraw had over his illustrious career lends credence to the idea that he employed situational leadership because, without it, that success would have been unlikely. In addition to having had to alter his man-management, McGraw also adapted to changes in strategy that evolved during his thirty-six-year managerial career. An avid proponent of the stolen base and small ball, McGraw was loathed to embrace the long ball when it burst onto the scene as viable offense in the 1920s. However, as the home run took over baseball, McGraw adapted and began to emphasize the change he so loathed.

McGraw’s perseverance is most evident in the longevity of his career. Across his thirty-six years managing in the major leagues, he accumulated the second most wins in history with 2763 behind only Connie Mack. More telling is the passage of time between his first and second World Series titles. McGraw won his first title with the New York Giants in 1905 at the age of thirty-two, after refusing to play in the series the year prior because of his hatred for Ban Johnson despite being the National League pennant winner. It would be another sixteen years before he

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139 Dickson, “How to Build a Baseball Dynasty; John McGraw’s Dynasty Was Built on Speed, Agility and Intellect.”
140 James, The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers.
would win another World Series in 1921.\textsuperscript{142} While the Giants won four National League pennants in the intervening time, McGraw’s dedication stood out because of the sheer length of time it took to ascend to the top of the sport once again.

Joe McCarthy, Miller Huggins, and John McGraw’s displayed leadership characteristics were directly correlated to each manager’s success. Miller Huggins’ success differed vastly between his stints with the St. Louis Cardinals and New York Yankees. Huggins overall had a .555 career winning percentage, and he led his teams to fourteen more wins than predicted by Pythagorean record. However, his Cardinals winning percentage was only .455. His winning percentages in his first three and last three years with the St. Louis club did not differ significantly from the .455 mark. His first three and last three years resulted in a .447 and .467 winning percentage, respectively.\textsuperscript{143} Huggins’ performance with the Cardinals represented a small increase over the team’s performance immediately before and after his tenure. In the three years before Huggins took over, the Cardinals won at a .442 clip.\textsuperscript{144} In the three years after the Cardinals fired Huggins, their winning percentage was .429.\textsuperscript{145} While Huggins did improve the Cardinals, they never emerged out of mediocrity.

His career with the Yankees stands in contrast to his time with the Cardinals. He ran up a .597 winning percentage and won three World Series.\textsuperscript{146} Most importantly, he dramatically

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  \item \textsuperscript{143} “Miller Huggins Managerial Record.”
  \item \textsuperscript{146} “Miller Huggins Managerial Record.”
\end{itemize}
improved the Yankees’ fortunes the team hired him. The three years before Huggins arrived resulted in a .479 winning percentage. In his first three years, Huggins did better by eighty-six points (.565). His tenure appeared to gain steam with time as in the three years prior to his death, the Yankees had a .647 winning percentage and won the World Series in both 1927 and 1928. The three years after his death, the Yankees had a .623 winning percentage and won the World Series in 1932. For the most part, the Yankees maintained the level of their success in the aftermath of Huggins’ death.

When the totality of Huggins’ is looked at the identified leadership characteristics are correlated with his success. However, they are also correlated with mediocrity regarding his tenure with the Cardinals. While that may seem contradictory, it can be concluded that within Huggins’ individual seasons or team tenures, the identified traits, styles, and theories may not be correlated with success, but that across his entire career, they are correlated.

Joe McCarthy’s career-winning percentage was .615. Most impressively, he never led a team to a losing record across twenty-four seasons. With the Chicago Cubs, McCarthy won at a .579 clip. The Cubs winning percentage in the three years before McCarthy’s tenure was .497%. McCarthy was able to improve that to a .560 winning percentage in his first three years

148 “Miller Huggins Managerial Record.”
and won a National League pennant in year two. McCarthy led the Cubs to a .603 winning percentage in his last three years from 1928-1930.\(^{152}\) That rate eclipses the Chicago club’s performance in the subsequent three years by forty points (.563).\(^{153}\) However, the Cubs would advance to the World Series in 1932 without McCarthy, only to be defeated by his Yankees.\(^{154}\)

When looking at the Cubs' performance before and after McCarthy’s tenure, it is clear that he improved the team and maximized its talents. In the immediate future, after he left, the Cubs did not ascend beyond the heights he brought them to.

While at the helm of the New York Yankees, McCarthy accumulated a .627 winning percentage.\(^{155}\) McCarthy’s continued a dynasty begun by Miller Huggins and gave way to one led by Casey Stengel. In the three years prior to McCarthy taking over the Bronx Bombers, the Yankees had a .593 winning percentage and a World Series title in 1928.\(^{156}\) McCarthy elevated the Yankees even further by winning at a .639 clip and winning a World Series in his second year, 1932. While McCarthy won a World Series in 1943, the last three years of his tenure were mainly a disappointment. The Yankees had a .570 winning percentage, heavily buoyed by a .636 mark in the Series-winning year.\(^{157}\) After McCarthy left mid-way through the 1946 season, the Yankees had a .623 winning percentage from 1947-1949.\(^{158}\) Additionally, they won the World

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152 “Joe McCarthy Managerial Record.”
154 “1932 New York Yankees Statistics,”
154 “Joe McCarthy Managerial Record.”
157 “Joe McCarthy Managerial Record.”
Series in 1947 and 1949.\footnote{1947 New York Yankees Statistics | Baseball-Reference.Com.} McCarthy clearly took the Yankees to another level with seven World Series titles in his fifteen full seasons in charge, including four straight from 1936-1939.\footnote{1949 New York Yankees Statistics | Baseball-Reference.Com.} However, the team’s performance dipped at the end of his tenure. While it could be said that McCarthy was a product of his circumstances, he still managed to win more World Series titles than either Miller Huggins or Casey Stengel, two managers that were gifted similarly talented Yankees teams.\footnote{Joe McCarthy Managerial Record.} Before retiring, McCarthy also managed the Boston Red Sox.\footnote{Major League Managers.}

Across his three teams, McCarthy led his team to eight more wins than the Pythagorean record would have predicted. The impressiveness or lack thereof of that accomplishment cannot be accurately assessed in this study, but nevertheless, McCarthy’s teams did outperform their expected win total. Furthermore, McCarthy holds the Major League Baseball record for playoff winning percentage at .698.\footnote{Joe McCarthy Managerial Record.} That his playoff winning percentage dwarfed his career winning percentage is a testament to the dominance he led his teams to at the highest levels of competition. The presence of success prior to and after McCarthy took over the Yankees clouds my ability to draw a correlation between the ascertained leadership traits, styles, and theories and his success. But, his work with the Cubs, and to a lesser extent, the Red Sox, when combined with his seven World Series titles, postseason performance, and overall sterling Yankees tenure,
makes it likely that there is a correlation between the identified leadership variables and the success McCarthy enjoyed.

John McGraw managed a career win percentage of .591 with the New York Giants. Additionally, he led the Giants to twelve more wins than expected by Pythagorean record. The start of his tenure with the New York City club got off to a racing start with a .663 winning percentage in the first three years. Furthermore, the Giants won a National League pennant in 1904 (John McGraw refused to play in the World Series because of his disdain for Ban Johnson) and a World Series title in 1905. The success he enjoyed immediately particularly stands out because the Giants had only managed a .405 winning percentage the three years prior. McGraw led the Giants to only three sub-.500 full-season records in his thirty-three seasons in the Big Apple. The end of his managerial career did not live up to the heights of his time with the Giants, as the team managed only a .565 winning percentage, below his career average. In the first three years after his departure, the team won at a .600 clip, including winning the World Series in 1933. When combined with his turn-around of the Giants and the over-performance of his teams by Pythagorean record, McGraw's consistent winning points towards a correlation between the identified leadership variables and his success.

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164 “John McGraw Managerial Record.”
166 167
Part 2: Kenesaw Mountain Landis, The Roaring Twenties, The Great Depression, and WWII

The election of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis as baseball’s first Commissioner on January 12, 1921, fundamentally altered the game, and his influence on the game was felt until his death. Landis ascended to the Commissioner’s office with ultimate power. National League President John Heydler said, "we want a man as chairman who will rule with an iron hand. Baseball has lacked a hand like that for years. It needs it now rose than ever. Therefore, it is our object to appoint a big man to lead the new commission." At the time of Landis’ hire, baseball was ridden with scandals, such as the Black Sox scandal of 1919. Owners, terrified at the prospect of public abandonment and the revenues lost, were desperate for a savior. As expressed by Heydler, the owners were looking for an autocrat to straighten out baseball. The blank mandate given to Landis, when combined with his own demands for the position, made Landis an unquestioned authority. During negotiations with the owners, Landis demanded that “owners of ball clubs must yield all their rights – even the right to think.” Landis was negotiating from a position of strength, while the owners were not. He was a federal judge while baseball was at a crossroads. Ultimately, Landis agreed to a seven-year contract that paid him $50,000, more than even the best-paid players.

Landis was not liberal with the power he wielded. Despite the courts acquitting the eight White Sox players accused of throwing games in the 1919 World Series at trial, Landis banned all of them from baseball for life. Explaining his reasoning, Landis said, “regardless of the

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169 “Kenesaw Landis.”
171 Busby.
verdict of juries, no player that throws a ball game, no player that entertains proposals or promises to throw a game, no player that sits in a conference with a bunch of crooked players and gambles where the ways and means of throwing games are discussed, and does not promptly tell his club about it, will ever again play professional baseball.”¹⁷² Landis was judge, jury, and executioner. He was free to establish his own rules and reveled in it. There was no appeal process and no guidelines for suspension or fines beyond Landis’ discretion.¹⁷³ Managers were now faced with the prospect of losing players to suspension or ban. Further, managers now had to deal with the fallout of punishments that would likely have affected players’ moods and, thus, performances.

In his quest to clean up baseball, Landis made it his mission to rid the game of the shady elements. He eventually banned a total of eighteen players and the President of the Philadelphia Phillies for their connection to gambling and criminals.¹⁷⁴ Landis dealt with any connection to the underworld swiftly. When John McGraw and Giants owner Charles Stoneham bought Havana’s Oriental Park racetrack and the Cuban American Jockey Club in 1921, Landis demanded they divest. They acceded to the Commissioner’s command. Stoneham was also reprimanded by Landis when he watched a Giants game with New York kingpin Arnold Rothstein from his box at the Polo Grounds. Stoneham did not make the same mistake again.¹⁷⁵

Despite his moral crusade against gambling and other unsavory aspects, Landis was a major factor in the continued segregation of baseball until his death. While he rightly argued that no rule barred an owner from signing Black players, he did nothing to encourage the process. Instead, he relieved himself of any culpability by claiming that player acquisition was the

¹⁷² “Kenesaw Landis.”
¹⁷⁴ “Kenesaw Landis.”
business of owners, not the Commissioner. His statement on the lack of a rule against signing Black players highlights the stance he took: “Negroes are not barred from organized baseball by the commissioner…there is no rule in organized baseball prohibiting their participation and never has been to my knowledge.”\textsuperscript{176} He made a point to state that he did not prohibit the practice. Further, he overlooked the unspoken rules of the game, something he was likely aware of as the ultimate authority in the game when stating the absence of a rule in organized baseball. At the time, teams understood that Landis was against the practice of signing Black players, and as such, an unwritten rule was established. It was likely not a coincidence that Jackie Robinson broke the color barrier a year after Landis’ death when Branch Rickey signed him to a Montreal contract.\textsuperscript{177} While it can be pointed out that owners were not rushing to sign Black players, as a figure of power, Landis must bear fault for his role in continuing segregation.

Landis’ ascension altered the power structure in baseball. Managers’ powers were reduced, especially as the Commissioner represented another party that could punish players, a realm wherein the manager had reigned supreme. Managers were robbed of ultimate power in an area essential to relational and task-focused leadership. Furthermore, Landis created an informal barrier around the signing of Black players. From a sporting perspective, managers were denied a rich talent source. More importantly, managers and other leaders in the sport were restricted from taking a stand and integrating the sport. While Landis provided a sense of security to baseball, his legacy is not entirely positive.

The Roaring Twenties backdropped the beginning of Landis’ tenure. The 1920s were a prosperous decade in the United States up until the 1929 stock market crash. With prosperity came an increase in discretionary income for workers. More than ever before, consumers had

\textsuperscript{176} “Kenesaw Landis.”
\textsuperscript{177} Busby, “Kenesaw Mountain Landis – Society for American Baseball Research.”
choice in how they wanted to spend their discretionary income. Baseball had to contend with an influx of other entertainment options, a proposition that scared owners. Other professional sports, such as boxing and wrestling, along with amateur sports like college football and track and field, had the ability to eat into baseball ticket sales. However, motion pictures were the biggest threat to baseball’s near monopoly on entertainment, thanks to vast improvements in the first two decades of the 20th century. Films evolved to be longer, and as directors and actors became established, a sense of credibility and reliability was bestowed upon motion pictures.  

The threat of motion pictures was particularly salient for owners because, unlike today, where the primary source of team revenue is typically television contracts, owners were heavily reliant on ticket sales. Concessions also generated revenue, but to a lesser extent, and owners viewed them as a secondary revenue stream. Compounding teams’ reliability on gate receipts was the fact that owners could not count on revenue from selling radio broadcast rights. Because winning attracts fans to games, managers were likely under increased pressure to field a winning team to offset the new influx of entertainment options during the Roaring Twenties. Having the ability to persevere through the increased pressure would have been essential.

The 1920s also brought with it changing population demographics. Cities like Detroit, Chicago, and New York grew rapidly throughout the decade. The more residents, the easier it was for teams to generate large crowds and, thus, large revenues. Boston, Philadelphia, and St. Louis all grew at slower rates than the other cities. Each of Boston, Philadelphia, and St. Louis was home to two major league franchises in the 1920s, but by the 1950s, each city was left with

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179 Surdam and Haupert.
Larger cities had bigger revenue streams to access which would have given them a leg up in player acquisition. To improve attendance, historian Robert Burk hypothesized that owners artificially boosted offense, specifically by emphasizing home runs. It was a seemingly strong strategy, as regression analysis has subsequently proved that home runs positively affected attendance during the 1920s to the degree of eight hundred to nine hundred additional fans per new home run generated. The focus on home runs would have fundamentally altered how managers had to view the game. The first two decades of the century were coined the Dead Ball Era because of a lack of offense and pitching domination. Stolen bases and small ball were the norms. However, the 1920s brought with it an offensive explosion, with Babe Ruth as the poster boy for home run sluggers. Having the ability to adapt how they managed their team was crucial for managers during the 1920s. The Roaring Twenties were a period of prosperity for baseball and the nation. Despite competition from emerging entertainment options, baseball maintained its popularity and continued to generate strong revenues.

The stock market crash of 1929 ushered in an era of darkness for the world at large. Baseball was not immune to the effects of the Great Depression. However, it also forced baseball to evolve, and the game still maintains many of the innovations from the Great Depression today. The biggest effect on baseball from the Great Depression was decreased attendance. The discretionary income that had been so widespread during the Roaring Twenties had dried up. Baseball was a luxury, and the common American was struggling to get by, making the attendance of a game an afterthought. In 1931 and 1932, attendance dropped by seventy percent.

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180 Surdam and Haupert.
when compared to 1930.\textsuperscript{182} The drop in attendance had long-term ramifications as it would take sixteen years, and the end of WWII with the return of millions of soldiers, for Major League Baseball’s collective attendance to crest ten million again.\textsuperscript{183} Owners had exacerbated the effects of the depression through their carelessness and hubris. The stock market crash in 1929 was followed by record attendance in baseball during the 1930 season.\textsuperscript{184} Despite warning signs of reduced discretionary income, owners were narrow-sighted, focused only on the most recent season, and ignored their surroundings. Frank J. Navin, owner of the Detroit Tigers and acting American League President, said prior to the 1931 season, "Former business depressions have not hurt baseball… and I do not think the present depression will materially affect attendance this year."\textsuperscript{185} Baseball owners showed immense hubris when they believed baseball could rise above the Great Depression. The decrease in attendance was compounded by a refusal to reduce ticket prices because of a belief that since during the Roaring Twenties, they had not raised prices during the boom in attendance that they should not have to reduce them during the depression.\textsuperscript{186}

As a result of the decreased attendance, and thus revenues, most teams attempted to lower costs by firing coaches or eliminating them entirely and using player managers. As a collective, Major League Baseball reduced twenty-five-man rosters to twenty-three players.\textsuperscript{187} The change in the status quo forced managers to take on additional tasks and work with fewer available players, necessitating a change in leadership style. Furthermore, job security was lowered because of the threat of being replaced by a cheaper alternative.

\textsuperscript{182} Lauren M Vorel, “The Great Depression: Catalyst for Change in America’s Game,” April 2010.
\textsuperscript{184} Belson, “Apples for a Nickel, and Plenty of Empty Seats.”
\textsuperscript{185} Belson.
\textsuperscript{186} Lauren M Vorel, “The Great Depression: Catalyst for Change in America’s Game,” April 2010.
\textsuperscript{187} Belson, “Apples for a Nickel, and Plenty of Empty Seats.”
The Great Depression forced innovation on the part of owners to bolster revenues. The all-star game, nighttime baseball, consistent radio broadcasts, and the farm system all came out of the hardship of the Great Depression. The all-star game’s intentions were two-fold. It would provide another source of revenue. And it would increase baseball’s popularity and interest among fans by pitting the world’s best players against each other. To further incentivize fans to invest in the all-star game, fans had the ability to vote players into the game. The *Chicago Tribune* also ran a promotion wherein they would award five-hundred dollars in cash to the fans who could best predict the all-star game teams.\(^\text{188}\) The combination of financial incentives with the spectacle of seeing the best players face off made the all-star game a surefire success.

Another method of increasing fan interest was the introduction of night baseball. The blend of a new, fresh presentation and workers being more easily able to attend games after work was out-necessitated that night games were significantly more heavily attended than day games.\(^\text{189}\)

The final way in which owners attempted to increase baseball’s popularity during the Great Depression was through radio broadcasting. For many, listening on the radio was the only way they could enjoy the game because of the paucity of extra funds to attend a game. While some owners feared that broadcasting games would reduce attendance, it had the opposite effect. Baseball on radio succeeded in both spreading the game to new fans and ensuring that current fans were still engaged and willing to return to the parks when circumstances allowed it.\(^\text{190}\)

In addition to seeking to increase revenues, owners also tried to reduce costs. The Great Depression spawned the creation of the farm system. The minor league system allowed teams to apply a developmental framework instead of trading with other teams. The new model allowed

\(^{189}\) Vorel.
\(^{190}\) Vorel.
teams to avoid higher salaried players and the cash cost that typically accompanied acquiring a player from a rival. Managers were tasked with developing emerging talent and using younger, more inexperienced players. Additionally, players had more ability to grow because they could play competitive games outside of the major leagues. There was less pressure for major league managers to fully develop prospects, but instead, put the finishing touches on a strong product.

WWII and the Great Depression are inextricably linked. The latter acted as a spark for the violence that erupted in Europe and as a lifeline for the flagging American economy. Financial pressures paved the way for Nazi rule, and the United States escaped the throes of the depression thanks to the wartime economy. Baseball was not immune to the changes that WWII brought. More than five-hundred major league players, including luminaries like Joe DiMaggio, Bob Feller, and Ted Williams, served in WWII. Managers had to adapt to vastly changed rosters and an influx of players who typically would not be on a major league roster. Charisma would have been essential to uniting a team unaccustomed to playing together. In addition to losing many players, attendance decreases during the 1942 and 1943 seasons that reduced revenues hurt professional baseball. However, the reduction was only temporary. In 1944, attendance levels returned to pre-war levels, and in 1945 Major League Baseball set an attendance record. The wartime era of baseball was unpredictable, making adaptability on the part of team leaders essential.

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191 Vorel.
While baseball continued through the war, its continuity was not certain. In January of 1942, Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis wrote to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, better known as FDR, to ascertain if the sport should be shuttered during the war. Landis did not seek clarification on whether players would be exempt from the draft. Baseball players would serve their country if eligible and called upon. Instead, the Commissioner sought to know if baseball as an institution would continue during the time of world turmoil. In response to Landis, in what would later become known as “the green light letter,” FDR wrote, “I honestly feel that it would be best for the country to keep baseball going.” The President reasoned that because the populace would be working harder, with less time off, they deserved to have an entertainment outlet. FDR also sought to clarify further the effects of player losses on teams and the value of baseball. After re-articulating that “individual players who are active military or naval age should go, without question, into the services,” Roosevelt said that “even if the actual quality of the teams is lowered by the greatest use of older players, this will not dampen the popularity of the sport.” Baseball as an institution was larger than its individual players, and its importance to American identity could not be questioned. It would continue, regardless of the quality, during WWII because that is what the nation needed to help distract and motivate it from the hardships of war.

FDR continued to support baseball during the war. Only a month before he died early in 1945, the President said, "I am all in favor of baseball so long as you don’t use perfectly healthy people that could be doing more useful work in the war. I consider baseball a very good thing for the population during the war." FDR reasserted his belief that baseball was a positive

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195 Bazer and Culbertson.
196 Bazer and Culbertson.
influence that should remain active during WWII, but not at the cost of the military. His consistency on baseball’s role during wartime was staunch as during the same press conference when asked about player losses making it hard for Major League Baseball to operate, he said, “It may not be quite as a good a team, but I would go out to see a baseball game played by a sandlot team – and so would most people.”

Baseball was given a mandate, with specific instructions, at the highest level to continue operations during WWII. It was up to managers to adjust and adapt their leadership to win with older players, less skilled players, and with fewer resources. FDR provided strong leadership to the sport by setting forth a consistent message and an example for all of baseball’s leaders to follow.

Context continued to shape baseball during the Landis Era. Kenesaw Mountain Landis ascended to become the sport’s first commissioner. He brought with him an iron fist of judgment that cracked down on criminal activity in the game. However, he was not without flaws, with substantial culpability in the continued segregation of Major League Baseball during this era.

The Roaring Twenties were a period of growth and financial strength for baseball. Unfortunately, the Great Depression, combined with owners' short-sightedness and hubris, damaged baseball’s revenues. Innovation in the form of the all-star game, night baseball, radio broadcasting, and the farm system revitalized the sport, stabilized it, and put it on the path to reach levels never seen at the end of WWII. The war brought with it a mandate to continue operations from the President. Teams had to make do with replacement players as rosters were gutted by players serving their country. Baseball emerged out of WWII at its strongest point, buoyed by record attendance levels and continued popularity. Charisma, perseverance,

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197 Bazer and Culbertson.
situational leadership, and a focus on both task and relational leadership were beneficial within this context, and Miller Huggins, Joe McCarthy, and John McGraw displayed each.
Chapter 3: The Integration Era (1947-1968)

“It would make everything I worked for meaningless if baseball is integrated but political parties were segregated”\(^\mathrm{198}\)

- Jackie Robinson

Part 1: Casey Stengel and Walter Alston

While Casey Stengel showed each of the hypothesized leadership traits, styles, and theories, Walter Alston represents the first manager who does not. Stengel exhibited charisma, perseverance, task and relational leadership, and situational leadership. Alston used the latter three, but the presence of charisma is tenuous at best. This section will provide evidence of the presence or lack thereof of these traits and styles in Stengel and Alston. Furthermore, it will show their correlation with the pairs’ leadership successes and failures.

Stengel’s penchant for opaque verbosity was the most visible indicator of his charisma. He was one of the most expressive and flamboyant managers of his time. Stengel was one of the most quotable figures in sports during his time as a Major League Baseball manager. When discussing his players’ sex lives, Stengel once said, “The trouble is not that players have sex the night before a game. It’s that they stay out all night looking for it.” While his players may not have always appreciated his candor, it was his honesty that was endearing to fans, the media, and his players.\(^\mathrm{199}\)


\(^{199}\) Leigh Montville, “The Lunatic in Cooperstown; Casey Stengel Was the Only Person in History to Wear the Uniforms of All Four New York Teams: The Dodgers, Giants, Yankees and Mets. Leigh Montville Reviews ‘Casey Stengel: Baseball’s Greatest Character’ by Marty Appel,” Wall Street Journal (Online), April 21, 2017, 1890247518, International Newsstream; ProQuest One Business,
most. He once told the press that “the secret of managing is to keep the five guys who hate you away from the guys who are undecided.”*200 Admitting that some players he managed did not like him exposed a vulnerability that made his joking manner more charming. Stengel also attacked people’s penchant for mortal humor when he said, “most people at my age are dead...you can look it up.”*201 Joking about his age and potentially impending death created a sense of relatability. It was that quality that formed a mystique around Stengel that is commensurate with charisma.

Stengel further endeared himself to others through his distinctive verbiage. Coined “Stengelese,” he had a penchant for painfully obvious axioms and head-scratching statements. For example, Stengel called a good fielder a “plumber,” rookies the “Youth of America,” and when he said, “hold the gun,” he wanted to change the pitcher.202 A favorite of Stengel’s was saying, "you got to get twenty-seven outs to win."203 Additionally, “Stengelese” was not unique to baseball. One of his more bizarre quotes was, “There comes a time in every man’s life, and I’ve had plenty of them.”204 Stengel, for all intents and purposes, was a goof. But it was because of his interesting word choice that he was so interesting and magnetic. While his players did not always love Stengel’s antics, they were at least persuasive enough for players to appreciate. An example of such was when Stengel and Mickey Mantle testified before a Senate subcommittee on baseball’ antitrust exemption on July 9th, 1958. After Stengel rambled in his classic “Stengelese” for forty-five minutes, bringing countless bouts of laughter into the Senate Caucus

200 Montville.
201 Montville.
204 “Stengel, Casey | Baseball Hall of Fame.”
Room, Mantle followed his manager by saying, “My views are just about the same as
Casey’s.”

Mantle clearly was amused by his manager’s escapades, a sign of Stengel’s ability
to draw in his players.

Stengel’s humor and unique vernacular were Stengel's most visible charismatic qualities.
However, but he also displayed the supreme knowledgeability that is correlated with appearing
charismatically. Cincinnati Reds and Detroit Tigers Manager Sparky Anderson said about
Stengel that he “knew his baseball. He only made it look like he was fooling around. He knew
every move that was ever invented and some that we haven’t even caught on to yet.”

Stengel’s players likely would have been able to see through his charades to understand their manager's
strong mind. Furthermore, when combined with his thirteen-plus year playing career that
included two World Series titles, his expertise becomes clear. The final aspect of charisma that
Stengel displayed was promoting a shared vision. While every team has the goal of winning the
World Series, he still made sure to emphasize that it was the Yankees’ primary goal: “If the
Yankees don’t win the pennant, the owners should discharge me.”

Stengel was referencing the expectations that were placed on him when he said that. But he also was highlighting what the
Yankees were striving for, which made it abundantly clear to the clubhouse. Casey Stengel’s
expertise and espoused vision, combined with a highly expressive and flamboyant personality,
made his charisma readily apparent.

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206 “Stengel, Casey | Baseball Hall of Fame.”


Casey Stengel also showed a propensity for both task and relational leadership. Stengel’s use of task-focused leadership was most evident through his use of platooning and insistence on a pre-spring training instructional school for prospects. Stengel was adamant about his desire for an instructional school for the Yankees’ young players to help instill fundamentals and how a Yankee played the game. Prospects such as Mickey Mantle, Bill Skowron, and Gil McDougald all benefitted from the extra practice. The school became a mainstay of Yankees camp during Stengel’s managerial tenure.209

In addition to his focus on improving his prospect’s skills, Stengel was also a proponent of platooning. He believed that having the versatility to shuffle catchers into the outfield and play one player across the infield and outfield gave him the added flexibility of having six “additional” players on the roster. Furthermore, Stengel took advantage of righty-lefty matchups to put his players in a better position to succeed. He platooned despite many of his players hating the practice. Stengel platooned because he felt it got the Yankees closer to winning ball games, even to the detriment of his relationships with players like outfielder Hank Bauer.210 Historian Bill James stated that it was not a lack of loyalty to his players that triggered platooning or dropping players from the roster but instead a sense of duty to put the team in the best possible situation to win because that is what they were trying to do.211

Stengel’s propensity to reorganize his roster frequently made his use of relational leadership less apparent. However, the loyalty that he did show to a couple of players and his deflection of credit for the Yankees’ success pointed to some level of a focus on relationships. Stengel tried to avoid falling into the trap of many successful managers, having a strong sense of

209 Bishop.
211 James, The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers, 297.
loyalty to the players that put them on top. He would help his players grow, scold them for mistakes, and work on their skills. But, if they did not produce the desired results, he would cut them loose. Two exceptions to the rule are Yogi Berra and Billy Martin.\footnote{James, 296.} Despite middling statistics, Martin was a Yankee from his rookie year in 1950 until he was traded in the 1957 season, with the exception of his military service during the 1954 season.\footnote{Martin accumulated on 3.0 career WAR and never had an OPS+ above 97 in his career.; “Billy Martin Stats, Height, Weight, Position, Rookie Status & More,” Baseball-Reference.com, accessed February 19, 2023, https://www.baseball-reference.com/players/m/martibi02.shtml.} Stengel argued, “That fresh punk, how I love him!” with reference to Martin.\footnote{Frank Deford, “Love, Hate and Billy Martin,” Sports Illustrated Vault | SI.com, accessed February 19, 2023, https://vault.si.com/vault/1975/06/02/love-hate-and-billy-martin.} And, after trading Martin to Kansas City, he told his beloved player, “You’re the smartest little player I ever had.”\footnote{Deford.} While Berra performed strongly and consistently on his way to a Hall of Fame career, ten World Series victories, eighteen all-star game appearances, and three Most Valuable Player awards, by the end of his career, he was not as productive. In 1962, Berra played in only eighty-six games and had his worst statistical season. He followed that season up by playing in only sixty-four games. After a one-year hiatus from baseball, Stengel brought Berra back into the major leagues when he signed him for the New York Mets. This was despite two years of poor production and one year out of the league. Berra would go on to play in only four games and produce negative WAR during his stint with the Mets.\footnote{“Yogi Berra Stats, Height, Weight, Position, Rookie Status & More,” Baseball-Reference.com, accessed February 19, 2023, https://www.baseball-reference.com/players/b/berrayo01.shtml.} Stengel showed a higher use of task leadership, but he still exhibited relational leadership, even if less frequently.

While Casey Stengel is best known for his historic tenure as the manager of the New York Yankees, his work with three other major league teams and five minor league teams points towards the use of situational leadership. When Stengel became the Brooklyn Dodgers manager...
in 1934, it came on the heels of seven years of minor league experience in Toledo and Worcester from 1925-1931. Stengel’s three Dodgers teams were largely devoid of talent, and the franchise as a whole had only made four playoff appearances in its nearly fifty-year existence before Stengel was hired. After being fired by the Dodgers, the Boston Braves née Bees hired Stengel, where he managed from 1938-1943. The Braves had not made the playoffs in twenty-three years since their 1914 triumph and had only won the National League once since the creation of the World Series between the American and National Leagues. The teams’ most notable player was a thirty-seven-year-old Al Simmons in 1939.

After five more years in the minor leagues, the New York Yankees hired Stengel. There, he inherited a star-studded team and worked for a franchise with the most resources in baseball. Stengel had widely different expectations thrust upon him and a different caliber of player available. As such, altering his leadership, even if only slightly, was necessary to accommodate his new surroundings. When he became the manager of the expansion New York Mets in 1962, Stengel was presented with another new set of challenges that would dictate a change in philosophy. While winning was still the goal; it was not expected. Instead, he had to shepherd the new club through its adolescence. Stengel’s time managing a variety of different teams, in both the minor and major leagues, points towards his having used situational leadership to adapt his leadership to the scenarios he found himself in.

219 “Casey Stengel Minor & Cuban Leagues Statistics.”
222 “Casey Stengel Minor & Cuban Leagues Statistics.”
The same variety in clubs managed that showed Stengel’s situational leadership also lends insight into his perseverance. The Dodgers and Braves fired him after largely unsuccessful tenures. Furthermore, even when the Braves hired him in 1938, it was under the pretense of being the team’s third choice after their General Manager Bob Quinn told reporters as much.223 Despite being fired twice, he still fought to have a major league job. He returned to the minor league level for five years, after having previously spent seven years in the lower levels of professional baseball, in his quest to return to The Show. While his Mets tenure was filled with the typical lumps of an expansion franchise, Stengel chose to take the job after the Yankees fired him despite winning 97 games and an American League Pennant in 1960. He could have retired at 69, having been let go by franchise he had led to nearly unparalleled success, but instead kept pursuing Major League Baseball bench jobs.224 Stengel wanted to leave baseball on his terms and he displayed perseverance by his drive to continue managing at the highest level.

Additionally, Stengel also fought through physical issues during his managerial career that highlighted his perseverance.225

Walter Alston is the first manager of this study that was not charismatic. While he stood at a physically imposing six feet and two inches tall and weighed one-hundred and ninety-five pounds, satisfying one common characteristic correlated with charisma, and he certainly had the knowledge to portray as an expert, one would be hard pressed to describe Alston as a charismatic

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223 Bishop, “Casey Stengel – Society for American Baseball Research.”
225 Stengel also fought through physical issues during his managerial career. During the 1960 season, he was hospitalized with a feared heart attack after chest pains but returned after two weeks. Earlier in his career, when with the Braves in 1943, Stengel was hit by a taxi which fractured his leg and caused a staph infection. He was hospitalized for six weeks and never fully recovered, always walking with a limp, but returned and managed the team’s final one-hundred and seven games. Stengel displayed charisma through his long career and overcoming illness.; Bishop, “Casey Stengel – Society for American Baseball Research.”
leader. In a *Washington Post* obituary, the paper described Alston as “rugged” and “quiet-spoken,” hardly words associated with charisma. Alston was not a charismatic leader, but he was still able to command his players' respect through quiet confidence. That confidence acted as a pseudo-substitute for the charisma that the other managers studied showed.

Following in line with his quiet persona, Alston’s use of relationship-focused leadership was low-key and hidden from the public view. Alston replaced Charlie Dressen as Brooklyn Dodgers manager, and their form of feedback to players vastly differed. Where Dressen would fiercely criticize players in front of fans, the press, and teammates alike, Alston would instead make those conversations private. Furthermore, in an effort to not play favorites and maintain a calm dressing room, Alston refrained from overly praising players. He viewed publicly criticizing and praising players as two sides of the same coin, with neither beneficial to maintaining solid relationships among the team. Alston also deflected credit for victories away from himself and refused to blame players for losses. Alston exhibited concern and awareness for team dynamics and attempted to mitigate problems by being level-headed and fair. When discussing how he managed, Alston said, "I just try to do things the way they should be done. I think it is more important to keep the players as content and relaxed as possible than to know when to bunt and steal a base or put on the hit and run." He showed an inclination for maintaining positive relationships in the team, and his last statement seemed to point towards having highlighted relationship over task-focused leadership.

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227 By Martin Weil Washington Post Staff Writer.
229 James, 408.
However, despite a potential affinity for relational leadership, Alston still used task-focused leadership. Task-leadership is defined as any action that promotes task completion. In this context, it would be any action that directly contributes to the on-field product. Task-focused leadership has a strong concern for positive group production and outcomes as the core goal.\textsuperscript{231} Alston employed a series of tactics, including sacrifice bunts, pinch hitters, and defensive substitutions, that would have negatively affected his players' batting statistics but contributed to winning. Additionally, Alston frequently used the intentional walk up until 1969. He also was an early proponent of heavier bullpen usage, which reduced the number of complete games, a prestige statistic, his pitchers pitched.\textsuperscript{232} Alston showed a willingness to sacrifice some of his players' statistics for the sake of the club.

Alston represents one of the most cogent examples of situational leadership among the managers this study looks at. He was tasked with overseeing a Dodgers team that moved across the country from Brooklyn to Los Angeles in 1958. Alston had to deal with players being in a new locale, a new stadium, new travel schedules, and other significant changes. The move to L.A. came on the heels of a trying 1958 season in which he dealt with an aging team. Alston had to adapt to the stars that had helped win the World Series in 1955 and a National League pennant in 1956 age out of stardom and integrate a new generation of stars that would lead the team to glory in 1959, 1963, and 1965.\textsuperscript{233} Furthermore, Martin Weil of the \textit{Washington Post} commented on Alston’s proclivity for situational leadership when he said Alston was “esteemed for his versatility, his ability to adapt his style and strategy to the gifts and abilities of his players.”\textsuperscript{234}

\textsuperscript{231} Forsyth, “Behavioral Theories: What Leaders Do.”
\textsuperscript{232} James, \textit{The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers}, 385–86.
\textsuperscript{234} By Martin Weil \textit{Washington Post} Staff Writer, “Baseball’s Walter Alston Dies at 72.”
Alston had to manage through a large amount of upheaval between a rebuilt roster and a cross-country move. He has rightly been lauded for his ability to adapt his leadership to best maximize the Dodgers’ performance.

Throughout Alston’s twenty-three years as Dodgers manager, all on one-year contracts, Alston faced numerous threats to his position and speculation on his job security. Even at the beginning of his tenure, the media was skeptical about his prospects. The day after the Dodgers hired him, a New York City paper’s front page displayed a picture of a sign saying, “Walt Who?” During the same coverage of his hiring, sports reporter John Lardner wrote that “If Alston doesn’t win the pennant and beat the Yankees in the World Series, there’s a clause in his contract which requires him to refund his entire salary and report immediately to the nearest Federal penitentiary.” Alston would be forced to persist through scrutiny from the beginning of his major league managerial career.

In 1958, Charlie Dressen was re-hired as a coach, which immediately prompted speculation that Alston was a lame duck, with Dressen ready to take his job back. Despite finishing in seventh place, Alston returned the next year. The Dodgers won the World Series in 1959. Another high-profile former Dodgers manager was added to the staff for the 1961 season after Dressen took the Milwaukee Braves job the year prior. The front office hired Leo Durocher as one of Alston’s coaches. Durocher and Alston hated each other and were complete opposites. Durocher, like Dressen before him, was seen as a manager-in-waiting. Dressen was added to the front office as a special assistant in 1962 and had a clear ambition to return to the manager’s chair. Durocher had remained with the team, and Alston was never allowed to choose his coaches. Surrounded by vipers in a pit, Alston and the Dodgers won the World Series in 1963.

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236 James, 409.
Alston persevered through threats to his job from his predecessors, a seeming lack of confidence from the front office, and no confidence in his abilities from the media in the first place to lead the Dodgers to three World Series in near successive fashion after a threat appeared.237

Casey Stengel displayed each of the hypothesized universal traits but it is difficult to draw a correlation, positively or negatively, with the outcome of his career. Walter Alston displayed all of them but charisma, and the three present were correlated with his success. Despite winning a joint-record seven World Series titles, Casey Stengel retired with only a .508 win percentage. Of the four teams he managed, only one, the Yankees, had a winning record with him at the helm. During his stint as the Brooklyn Dodgers manager from 1934-1936, the team had a .453 winning percentage.238 That represented a decrease from the .490 winning percentage in the three years prior to his arrival.239 Additionally, in the three years after he was fired, the Dodgers achieved a .473 winning percentage.240 The Dodgers were better both before and after Stengel was their manager, even if, overall, the results were mediocre.

His tenure with the Boston Braves née Bees was not much better than his time with the Dodgers. From 1938-1943 (only a partial season in 1943), the Braves had a .432 winning percentage under Stengel.241 Unlike with the Dodgers, that was an improvement on the three

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237 James, 410–11.
238 “Casey Stengel Managerial Record.”
241 “Casey Stengel Managerial Record.”
years prior, in which the Braves won at only a .410 clip.242 In his first three and last three years with the club, he achieved a .451 and .410 winning percentage, respectively.243 The Braves did improve, albeit marginally, to a .464 winning percentage in the three years after Stengel resigned.244

After toiling in the minor leagues, Stengel returned to the Show with the Yankees in 1949. Across his twelve seasons in the Big Apple, Stengel won seven World Series and ten American League pennants. He accumulated a .623 winning percentage.245 Stengel’s first three years represented a big jump in success, even by the lofty Yankee standard. While from 1946-1948, the Yankees had a .602 winning percentage and won the 1947 World Series, from 1949-1951, Stengel achieved a .634 winning percentage and a string of three straight World Series championships.246 The Yankees would extend that streak to a record five. Stengel’s last three years with the Yankees were, by comparison, disappointing; only a .580 winning percentage, one World Series in 1958, and an American League pennant in 1960.247 To add insult to injury, the Yankees would go onto a .637 winning percentage and back-to-back championships, along with an American League pennant in the three years after Stengel was forced to retire.248 In his twelve


243 “Casey Stengel Managerial Record.”


245 “Casey Stengel Managerial Record.”


247 “Casey Stengel Managerial Record.”

years as the Yankees manager, they never finished below .500 and had only one season with less than ninety-two wins. There were only two years where the Yankees were not American League or World Championships, and in one of them (1954), they won one hundred and three games. Stengel clearly experienced great success with the Yankees and arguably led them through their most prolific period of greatness.

In stark contrast to his time with the Yankees, Stengel’s leadership of New York’s other team, the Mets, was putrid. Stengel was put in a nearly impossible position leading the expansion franchise, but the team managed only a .302 winning percentage in his almost four years at the helm. That rate would qualify as the second-worst all-time winning percentage behind Doc Prothro’s .301. As an expansion squad, there are no data for the three years before Stengel’s arrival. Still, in the three years after Stengel retired again, the Mets dramatically improved to a .412 winning percentage and eventually a surprise World Series victory in 1969.

Stengel’s Pythagorean record also does not reflect particularly well on him. Of the ten managers included in the study, his teams’ performance of five more actual wins over expected is the worst mark. While still positive, in comparison to his peers, Stengel’s Pythagorean record is poor. It is hard to draw a positive correlation between Stengel’s observed leadership traits, styles, and theories because of his resume's overwhelming amount of poor results and his comparatively poor Pythagorean record. However, it is also hard to draw a negative correlation

249 “Casey Stengel Managerial Record.”  
250 “Casey Stengel Managerial Record.”  
251 With a minimum of 315 games managed. “Major League Managers.”  
because of the presence of his dominant Yankees run and the three other franchises he managed, the Mets, Braves, and Dodgers, all being in different states of disarray when he was in charge. Ultimately, I have determined that there is little to no correlation between what I observed about Stengel and winning.

While Stengel managed four different teams, Walter Alston only managed the Dodgers. He achieved a .558 winning percentage across his twenty-three years as manager. His first three years were stronger than his last three years. From 1954-1956 the Dodgers won at a .614 clip and finally broke through to win a World Series in 1955, along with a pennant in 1956. By comparison, from 1974-1976, the Dodgers had a .581 winning percentage and won the National League pennant in 1974. Alston took over a team that was already a high achiever but could not finish the job. In the three years before the Brooklyn Dodgers hired Alston, the team had a .642 winning percentage and had lost in the World Series in 1953 and 1952. Alston similarly left the Dodgers in a strong position when he retired, as they made the World Series in 1977 and 1978 on their way to a .560 winning percentage in the first three years without him.

Alston’s Pythagorean record stands out as particularly impressive, with twenty-six more wins than expected, the second-highest total in the study. As with the other managers, in a vacuum, it is hard to make a judgment on that statistic, but when compared to the other managers studied, and particularly Casey Stengel, it points towards a high correlation between the

253 “Walter Alston Managerial Record | Baseball-Reference.Com.”
observed traits, theories, and styles and Alston’s success. Each of perseverance, situational leadership, and task and relational-focused leadership is likely correlated to the winning that Alston experienced. Charisma, however, is not because it was not observed.

Part 2: Integration, Team Movement, the First Televised World Series, and The Civil Rights Movement

The Integration Era brought with it fundamental changes to baseball. In April of 1947, Jackie Robinson integrated Major League Baseball in the National League when he debuted for the Brooklyn Dodgers after having previously integrated the minor leagues the year before. Larry Doby would break the American League’s color barrier in July of that same year. The Dodgers did not integrate solely for racial justice but instead to both improve the roster and make the team money. Branch Rickey, the man responsible for signing Robinson, firmly believed that integration would be a financial boon in addition to any performance benefits.256 Robinson’s debut was preceded by a tryout with the Boston Red Sox in 1945. A progressive city council member, Isadore Muchnick, threatened to deny the Red Sox the ability to play on Sundays if black players were in consideration to be signed. As a result, three Negro League players, Robison, Marvin Williams, and Sam Jethroe, had a sham workout at Fenway Park in April. The Red Sox, along with the Pittsburgh Pirates and Chicago White Sox, two other teams who similarly orchestrated workouts on false pretenses, had no intention of signing any black players.

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players. The Red Sox would be the last team to integrate more than twelve years after Robinson’s debut when Pumpsie Green debuted for the team in July of 1959.

By 1958, black players made up 10% of all roster sports in the major leagues. That number would reach twenty percent in 1965. Managers had to be concerned with new potentially volatile relationships within locker rooms with the integration of baseball. An emphasis on relational leadership would have been essential to maintaining a positive clubhouse atmosphere. Furthermore, managers had to defend their players from verbal and physical abuse from other teams, fans, and the media. While some managers, like Walter Alston, who was a part of Rickey’s initial experiment in the minor leagues and managed Roy Campanella and Don Newcombe, had experience managing black players and thus a mixed-race locker room, many did not. Additionally, managers who had black players on their roster had to persevere through bigoted comments. For example, Walter Alston recalled that when he was managing in the New England League in 1946, an opposing manager asked if he was sleeping with Roy Campanella.

The integration of baseball also brought with it strategic considerations. After adjusting for confounding variables, pitchers hit black players forty-two percent more often per plate appearance than their white counterparts. Teams that employed more black players would have benefitted from more baserunners increasing the odds of winning. However, those same

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teams would have faced an increased risk of injuries because of the hit-by-pitch occurrences. Skill in task leadership would have allowed managers to best take advantage of or mitigate the effects of having black players in the lineup. The integration of baseball brought with it new challenges and opportunities for managers. However, what made integration so extraordinary was how it preceded desegregation across the nation.

In the year before Robinson debuted for the Dodgers, restrictive covenants were still in effect, black mayors were missing from big cities, a small number of blacks were enrolled at the nation’s most prestigious colleges, and only two members of Congress were black. The lynching of six African Americans took place. The military would not be desegregated until 1948, and it was not until the Eisenhower administration that schools would be desegregated. Integration in baseball was not limited to only on the field. The first Black baseball writer was admitted to the Baseball Writer’s Association of America in 1947 as well. The integration of baseball proceeded almost every notable event of the Civil Rights Movement. *Brown v. Board* (1954), the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Civil Rights Act of 1968 all came after the desegregation of America’s National Pastime.

The momentum of the Civil Rights Movement and the passage of important legislation owes some of its success to baseball. Interviewees stated that Robinson’s success in breaking the color line in baseball provided a sense of hope that nationwide integration was possible. Furthermore, Robinson’s athletic prowess helped spur support and fandom among the white fan

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262 Dreier, “The Real Story of Baseball’s Integration That You Won’t See in 42.”
265 “The Modern Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1964 - Civil Rights (U.S. National Park Service).”
base, bringing the nation closer to equality, even if only slightly.\footnote{Impact on the Civil Rights Movement, } Martin Luther King Jr. attributed his success to Negro League players when talking to Don Newcombe: “You’ll never know what you and Jackie and Roy (Campanella) did to make it possible to do my job.”\footnote{Dreier, “The Real Story of Baseball’s Integration That You Won’t See in 42.”} Additionally, King Jr. said of Robinson that he “made my success possible. Without him, I would never have been able to do what I did.”\footnote{The History of Baseball and Civil Rights in America | Baseball Hall of Fame.} Baseball provided a spark for the Civil Rights Movement. Robinson and other black players were a source of inspiration and, in many ways, were flag-bearers who provided the first step toward nationwide recognition of the struggle for equality.

The movement and expansion of Major League Baseball mirrored a changing United States demographic.\footnote{Later in the era, baseball experienced a flutter of movement among franchises and expansion. The most notable change of locale occurred when the Brooklyn Dodgers moved to Los Angeles, and the New York Giants moved to San Francisco in 1957. The Boston Braves had previously moved to Milwaukee in 1953. An expansion of the American League in 1961 would follow these moves. Major League Baseball added the Los Angeles Angels and created a replacement Washington Senators to replace the original, which moved to Minnesota in 1961. The New York Mets and Houston Colt .45s joined the National League a year later in 1962. The Philadelphia Athletics moved to Oakland at the end of the era in 1968. Managers had to contend with expansion drafts reducing the quality of players available and changing their roster construction. Furthermore, more major league manager jobs were available with the expansion. Teams that moved faced new challenges, as touched upon with Walter Alston.; Jenny Schuetz and Cecile Murray, “They Moved Home Plate! How Baseball’s Geography Has Evolved with the U.S.,” Brookings (blog), March 28, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/03/28/how-baseballs-geography-has-evolved-with-the-u-s/; “Expansion - BR Bullpen,” accessed February 18, 2023, https://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Expansion; “Oakland Athletics Team History & Encyclopedia | Baseball-Reference.Com,” accessed February 20, 2023, https://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/OAK/index.shtml.} In 1950 as the sixteen Major League Baseball franchises were only in twelve counties, all in the Northeast and Midwest, baseball was aligned with the nation’s population centers. However, as the American population spread to the Pacific Coast and down South, baseball moved with them, albeit at a slight delay. Teams were also intrigued by areas of the country that were in the top income quartile. Teams such as the Giants, Dodgers, and Athletics escaped multi-team cities to become the only player in town in their new Western digs.
Teams in new locales would have benefitted from increased revenue and a revitalized fanbase excited by their new team. Furthermore, new stadiums were often a part of the deal to relocate. These had both revenue and sporting effects. The expansion of baseball and the movement of existing franchises created new revenue streams and diluted the talent available to managers. Managers had to integrate new players and contend with new teams vying for the throne.

The beginning of the *Integration Era* aligns perfectly with the first instance of a televised World Series in 1947. Over four million people viewed the series on television, primarily at bars, storefronts, and restaurants, but also in homes. The World Series was broadcast to four markets, New York City, Philadelphia, Washington D.C., and Schenectady, New York. The effort took combining coaxial cable with microwave and other transmissions because of a lack of an established nationwide television infrastructure. The 1947 World Series was also one of the first instances of paid sponsor rights for sports television. President Harry Truman and his White House staff even watched some of the broadcasts. They remarked that the television’s ability to display baseball at such a high quality represented televisions arrival on the national scene.²⁷⁰

The rise of personal, in-home televisions was rapid. In 1946 only 6,000 television sets were in use. But, by 1951 that number had risen to 12 million and by 1955 half of all American homes housed a television.²⁷¹ In 1962 the percentage of American homes with a television crested 90 percent before stabilizing in the upper ninety percent range in the decades that followed.²⁷²

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mainstay of living rooms across America. Just as baseball had evolved from a sport dominated by the elites, television had expanded beyond the upper crust. The expansion of television sets’ accessibility aligned it with baseball’s history of being a popularist sport rooted in American ideals of equal opportunity and social mobility. The rise of television synergistically collided with baseball to elevate both industries to new heights.

Baseball and television created a mutually beneficial relationship. While broadcasting the World Series expanded the sports viewability, baseball also helped jumpstart the television industry. More television receivers were sold in anticipation of the World Series in the broadcast metropolitan areas than at any time since the beginning of radio. Furthermore, the chairman of RCA, which owned NBC, one of the three broadcast networks along with DuMont and CBS, believed that television relied on baseball: “[television] had to have baseball games and if [baseball owners] had demanded millions for the rights, we would had to give it to them.”273 Baseball provided a draw for the television networks, and teams garnered new revenues from broadcast rights and the increased visibility. The advent of televised baseball brought with it new challenges for managers. They had to contend with increased scrutiny on their decision-making and players. Furthermore, the increased spotlight would have created new clubhouse dynamics because the gap between star players and other players was bound to grow with the greater publicity. From 1947 onwards, baseball and television were linked. The sport provided a boost to the fledgling industry and played a part in it becoming the behemoth that it is today. Television gave baseball a spotlight that it would not give up for nearly two more decades.274

Baseball in the Integration Era both shaped and was shaped by its surrounding environment. The integration of the sport through Jackie Robinson’s debut helped provide

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273 University, “The First Televised World Series Spurred America’s TV Boom, 75 Years Ago.”
274 Rohrbach, “Basketball Overtakes Baseball as America’s Second-Favorite Sport with Soccer Gaining.”
momentum for the Civil Rights Movement. Martin Luther King Jr. attributed Negro League players with helping to pave the road to equality. Changing demographics in America stimulated many teams to move to new locales and sprouted new teams in now-open cities and fresh areas. Finally, 1947 brought the first instance of a televised World Series. Managers had to adapt to countless changes in strategy, player relationships, and new locations. Charisma, perseverance, situational leadership, and focus on task and relational leadership were beneficial in this context. Casey Stengel displayed all four, but his success is unlikely to be correlated with their appearance. Walter Alston displayed only the latter three, but we can speculate that the success he achieved with the Dodgers organization was correlated with his exhibition of those leadership traits, styles, and theories.
Chapter 4: The Collective Bargaining Era (1968-1976)

“I can’t believe they pay us to play baseball...Something we did for free as kids.”

- George Lee “Sparky Anderson”

Part 1: Sparky Anderson

I identified each of the hypothesized universal leadership traits and styles in my analysis of Sparky Anderson. During his time in Major League Baseball, he displayed perseverance, charisma, an aptitude for situational leadership, and a balance of task and relational leadership. This section will provide evidence of the presence of these traits and styles and show their correlation with Sparky’s successes and failures as a leader.

Sparky Anderson’s charisma was evident in how his luminaries and players talked about him and how he carried himself. Jim Leyland, who managed nearly 3500 games at the Major League level and won a World Series across stints with the Pittsburgh Pirates, Florida Marlins, Colorado Rockies, and Detroit Tigers, said that Sparky “was one of those managers who would make you think you could play, even if you couldn’t.” Leyland was alluding to an unspoken ability to inspire and motivate players beyond what they believed possible. That ability was akin to charisma. The capacity to inspire was not limited to his peers. His players were effusive about Sparky’s effect on his teams and the lengths they would go for him. Hall of Famer Tony Pérez

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said that his manager “made us go” with respect to the great “Big Red Machine” Cincinnati Reds of the 1970s. Arguably the greatest player to play under Sparky Anderson, Hall of Famer Pete Rose, was more vibrant on his feelings for the beloved leader of the Tigers and Reds when he said, “I’d walk through hell in a gasoline suit for Sparky.” Perez pointed to Anderson as the engine of the Reds, while Rose, speaking in hyperbole, was willing to go to the extreme for his manager. The ability to arouse dedication in his players, attracting them by being “Sparky,” speaks to the charisma latent in Anderson’s leadership. Another former player under Anderson for both the Tigers and Reds, Champ Summers, minced no words when he explicitly said that “Sparky’s got style and charisma…and knows how to manage and get the best out of his players.” Summers put words to and identified the elusive notion of charisma, making it clear that, at least in his eyes, Sparky Anderson was charismatic. Furthermore, Summers alluded to Sparky’s ability to draw out the potential of his players, likely through embracing the collective goal of winning the World Series and Anderson’s expertise. Both are hallmarks of a charismatic leader.

Anderson’s charisma is not only visible through the words of others. The quote at the beginning of the chapter has a warm, genuine quality that instinctively draws in a reader. He acknowledged the privilege he had for baseball to be his livelihood. The self-awareness displayed has an endearing quality that is enthralling. The genuineness that Anderson displayed was another manifestation of his charisma. Anderson also displayed an affinity for humor that contributed to his charismatic personality. At his Hall of Fame induction speech in 2000, he said,

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“There’s two kind of manager. One, it ain’t very smart. He gets bad players, loses games and gets fired. There was somebody like me that I was a genius. I got good players, stayed out of the way, let’em win a lot, and then just hung around for 26 years.” Sparky’s affable nature contributed to his charismatic air. His decision to deftly deflect his success away from himself on the day of one of the crowning achievements of his career while still highlighting his managerial prowess showed an aura of attraction commensurate with charisma.

Like the other managers in this study, Sparky Anderson used task- and relationship-focused leadership in his quest for World Series glory. Sparky prioritized fundamentals and self-discipline as a manager. He believed that nothing was more important as a baseball player than winning. He said, “I realized you can’t be in a game as a professional unless winning and losing are everything, your whole life.” While undoubtedly an exaggeration, the quote provides insight into Anderson’s priorities. Outcomes are the prime concern and having a philosophy that instilled that goal in his players points toward his task leadership. Sparky’s task-oriented leadership was also visible in less explicit ways. When his teams traveled, they were required to wear ties and coats, and he enforced with vigor a Reds team rule of no facial hair or long haircuts. Anderson emphasized looking and acting like a professional to be professional: “If you carry yourself proudly, you look like a pro.” Sparky felt that being professional would make the self-discipline he thought was necessary for his players' second nature. His attention to detail carried over from off the field into the dugout. When he began his tenure as Reds manager in 1970, he immediately began drilling fundamentals to make them routine. Tony La Russa was in

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282 Thomson.
awe of Anderson’s ability to keep his Big Red Machine Hall of Famers sharp in the routine and their egos in check, showing that no player was exempt from Sparky’s leadership philosophy. Hall of Fame Second Basemen Joe Morgan spoke perfectly about Sparky Anderson’s use of task-relational leadership when he said, “In his passion for winning, he will not ever put the feelings of any individual above the team.” Morgan stressed that leading his teams to glory took precedence for Anderson, a hallmark of task-focused leadership.

While Morgan’s comment makes Anderson’s task leadership particularly salient, he also was fiercely loyal to his players and valued manager-player relationships. He kept an open-door policy and welcomed them questioning him, even if the ultimate decision-making still was his. Sparky was also not afraid to be equals with his players. He did not view being removed from a pedestal as a detriment but as an aid to communication. Strong communication is an indication of any solid relationship. Anderson’s acknowledgment of its importance and his lack of ego accentuating its effectiveness, he displayed strong relational leadership. By all accounts, Anderson created a welcoming and inclusive environment in line with relationship-focused leadership principles.

Anderson’s use of relational leadership extended to how he mentored his peers. Tony La Russa described a man who took no shortcuts while helping others: “Of all the mentors I’ve had and I’ve had a lot of them- he was probably No. 1. It was just because of the accessibility he proved. No matter what, he didn’t ever say he didn’t have time for you…He did that for everybody who was interested and asked.” Anderson sacrificed to help others. He was not picky about who he helped. The only prerequisite was effort.

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283 Hummel, “Sparky Anderson Mentored Tony La Russa, Others in Baseball.”
285 Thomson.
286 Hummel, “Sparky Anderson Mentored Tony La Russa, Others in Baseball.”
The true nature of Anderson’s focus on relationships is evident when looking at his relationship with Bob Howsam. Howsam was responsible for both hiring Anderson in 1970 and committing the cardinal sin of firing him nine years later at the close of the 1978 season. Anderson would have had every reason to be scornful and petty, especially after leading the Reds to their most prosperous stretch in team history. However, Anderson not only attended Howsam’s funeral but gave his former boss a eulogy where he said: “The man changed my entire life, my home, everything. He was precious to me.” Instead of being spiteful, Anderson recognized the outsized role Howsam played in his life. The value he placed on his relationship with Howsam is evident through his word choice and syntax. When he cuts off his list of what Howsam changed in his life, Sparky was providing insight into the enormity of the impact. Furthermore, “precious” emphasized the depth of the pair’s relationship. It was not trivial. It was able to overcome Howsam firing Anderson from his dream job.

Anderson’s relational leadership was also evident in how he talked about his players. When a reporter once asked him to compare his star Catcher Johnny Bench to the Yankees backstop Thurman Munson, Anderson said, “Don’t ever embarrass nobody by comparing him to Johnny Bench.” Anderson’s effusive defense of his player showed his support and admiration for Bench. Likewise, Anderson held Pete Rose in such high esteem that he had no difficulty saying that “Pete Rose was baseball.” When read in conjunction with Rose’s earlier quote about Anderson, we can see a strong, two-way relationship built on mutual respect between player and manager. Anderson valued his relationships with his players, peers, and bosses. Jim Leyland perfectly summed up Anderson’s relational leadership when he said Anderson “was a people

person.” While Sparky Anderson was resolute in his use of task-oriented leadership, he did not neglect his relationships with others.

Anderson displayed situational leadership through his innovative pitching staff usage and personality moderation. While he received the nickname “Sparky” during his minor league playing days because of his eager playstyle, his temper nearly ruined his managerial career before it ever started. He was fired from his job as the Toronto Maple Leafs, a minor league baseball team, manager after only one season because of his inability to control his anger. Bill James described that his “intensity bordered on self-destructiveness” while Sparky managed in the minors. While he was still intense at the beginning of his Reds tenure, he was able to find a better balance and became more detached as his career continued. Anderson recognized his flaws and was willing to change and evolve his leadership. The situational leadership shown revolved less around changing followers' abilities and confidence and more around Anderson learning the best leadership style for him now that he was a manager and not a player.

Like any great manager, Anderson showed an ability to adapt to the strengths and weaknesses of his squad. To that end, he gained the nickname “Captain Hook” because of his penchant for pulling his starting pitchers earlier in the game than other managers and going to the bullpen. In an era where complete games were not yet a rarity, the Big Red Machine did not have an abundance of starting pitching star power. Instead, Anderson turned to a bullpen that led the majors in saves in 1970, ’72, ’74, ’75, and ’76. Captain Hook changed his strategy and went against the norm of baseball strategy at the time to maximize the effectiveness of his

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288 Hummel, “Sparky Anderson Mentored Tony La Russa, Others in Baseball.”
289 Hummel.
290 James, The Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers, 419.
pitching staff. That malleability, in part, led to the two World Series titles and an additional two National League pennants during his time with the Cincinnati Reds. Despite showing a penchant for situational leadership, Anderson did not always use its principles. By the late 1980s, a new generation of Major League Baseball managers who went to the bullpen faster and faster, a trend that has continued through the present, had passed by him. As the nickname “Captain Hook” became outdated, Sparky became one of the slowest hooks in the game.\(^{293}\)

Finally, Anderson’s perseverance is most readily apparent through the longevity of his career and the dedication and sacrifice he showed to become a Major League Baseball manager. Before he ever graced the dugouts of Major League stadiums and led two franchises to World Series glory, Anderson struggled to make a living as a minor-league manager. Across his five years managing in the lower rungs of professional baseball, Sparky worked secondary jobs such as stocking at Sears, selling used cars, and a factory job.\(^{294}\) Anderson was not willing to give up his dream of being a Major League manager and was willing to toil in menial labor jobs to make it a reality. His perseverance continued upon reaching the highest level of managing. Sparky managed for twenty-six straight seasons and over 4000 games. He showed immense persistence for managing so consistently. He retired with the fifth most games managed in Major League Baseball history and still ranks eighth as of the start of the 2023 Major League Baseball season.\(^{295}\)

The hypothesized universal leadership characteristics Anderson displayed were correlated with his success. Anderson achieved a .545 winning percentage and three World Series victories. However, the bulk of his success came during his nine-year tenure with the Cincinnati Reds.

\(^{294}\) Thomson, “Sparky Anderson – Society for American Baseball Research.”
\(^{295}\) “Major League Managers.”
From 1970-1978, he led the Reds to a .596 winning percentage with two World Series victories and an additional two National League pennants.296 The success he brought to the franchise was immediate. After winning at a .533 clip in the three years prior to his arrival, the Reds won 57.7% of their games in Anderson’s first three years.297 The Reds won National League pennants in the first and third years of Sparky’s tenure.298 The final three years of Sparky’s run as manager of the Big Red Machine were even more fruitful than the start had been. The Reds had a winning percentage of .581 from 1976-1978 and won the 1976 World Series.299 After Anderson was fired, the Reds still won at a slightly diminished .568 clip but made the playoffs only once in 1979.300

After being hired full-time by the Detroit Tigers in 1980, Anderson had the same positive effect on their record as he had previously had in Cincinnati.301 Along the way to a .516 winning percentage in seventeen seasons and a World Series title in 1984, Sparky led the Tigers to a .524

298 “Sparky Anderson Managerial Record.”
301 Sparky Anderson managed only 106 games for 1979 Detroit Tigers after being hired mid-season.
winning percentage from 1980-1982.\textsuperscript{302} That represented a forty-two-point increase from a .482 clip over the three years before he became the Tigers’ manager.\textsuperscript{303} Unfortunately, his last three years were not as successful as the beginning of his Tigers’ career. He managed the team to only a .470 winning percentage.\textsuperscript{304} However, how much blame he deserves for the lack of success is up for debate. The Tigers won at only a .405 clip in the three years after he left.\textsuperscript{305}

Sparky Anderson’s Pythagorean Record points towards a manager who positively influenced winning. He led his teams to nineteen more wins than expected. As with the other managers, in a vacuum, it is hard to make a judgment on that statistic. But when compared to the other managers studied, Anderson stands in the middle of the pack. Sparky only led his team to a losing record six times. Additionally, he led the Tigers to their most recent World Series victory. However, five of the instances of losing seasons occurred in his last seven seasons.\textsuperscript{306} Each observed trait, style, and theory likely correlates to Sparky Anderson's success. However, as pointed out earlier, Anderson failed to adapt as his career continued. Furthermore, as his fieriness mellowed, it is possible that his charisma waned. Perseverance, charisma, task and relational leadership, and situational leadership are all likely to be positively correlated to the success that

\begin{thebibliography}{1}
\bibitem{} “Sparky Anderson Managerial Record.”
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Sparky Anderson had. Still, his inability to maintain all of them may have led to a downturn in results. However, that falls outside the realm of this study.


The short, eight-year period that makes up *The Collective Bargaining Era* was rife with institutional changes and challenges, along with political ramifications that shaped the era and how managers led. Within Major League Baseball, the first collective bargaining agreement in professional sports was struck in 1968. Curt Flood unsuccessfully challenged the reserve clause across a series of court proceedings from 1969-1972. And the American League adopted the Designated Hitter in 1973. President Richard Nixon’s love of the game and his desire to use it for political messaging and the ongoing Vietnam War also shaped *The Collective Bargaining Era*.

Until the designated hitter (DH) became universal in 2022, it served as a wedge issue between National League traditionalists and the American League that had used it for the better part of five decades. In the late 1960s, as offense floundered in both leagues, various minor leagues began an experiment, under the supervision of Major League Baseball, with using a DH.

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307 “HISTORY | Mlbpa.”


310 “The designated hitter rule allows teams to use another player to bat in place of the pitcher. Because the pitcher is still part of the team's nine defensive players, the designated hitter -- or "DH" -- does not take the field on defense. The DH must be selected prior to the game, and that selected hitter must come to bat at least one time -- unless the opposing team changes pitchers prior to that point. A team that chooses not to select a DH prior to a game is barred from using a DH for the rest of that game. A player who enters the game in place of the DH -- either as a pinch-hitter or a pinch-runner -- becomes the DH in his team's lineup thereafter. If a player serving as the DH is later used on defense, he continues to bat in his same lineup spot. But for the rest of the game, his team cannot use a DH to bat in place of the pitcher. A team is also barred from using a DH for the rest of the game if the pitcher moves from the mound to another defensive position, a player pinch-hits for any other player and then becomes the pitcher, or the current pitcher pinch-hits or pinch-runs for the DH.” ;“Designated Hitter Rule | Glossary.”
At the end of the experiment, American League and National League officials disagreed on implementation. The former voted in favor of a universal DH, while the latter voted against it. A three-season compromise from 1973-1975 was reached, whereupon the American League would use a DH on a trial basis. While the intention had been to finalize the use, or lack thereof, of the DH in both leagues at the end of the three-year trial, the two leagues still differed in opinion at the end of three years. While the National League wanted to maintain tradition, the American League was drawn to the increased offensive production that stimulated higher attendance for the American League. From 1973-1975 no DH was used during the Fall Classic, but after its use was confirmed on a permanent basis in the American League, an even-odd system was implemented until 1985.\footnote{During the so called Even-Odd Era a DH was used during World Series taking place in an even-year and pitchers continued to hit for themselves in an odd-year.} After 1985, and after the start of inter-league play, the home team’s rules were used during the World Series and any other matchups between American and National League teams.

The DH brought new tactical wrinkles to game management for field managers. The DH allowed managers to keep players off their feet in their field while still benefitting from their bat. Furthermore, it allowed managers to play a player who may have been too injured to play defense but could still ably swing a bat. The DH also allowed for players to extend their careers. As a result, American League squads were likely older on average than their National League counterparts. Managers in both leagues had to deal with managing under different rules depending on the home stadium. National League managers were tasked with implementing a new player into the starting line-up, changing the batting order.

Additionally, National League teams did not build their rosters with the DH in mind. As such, their DH was often a bench player whose offensive prowess was far below their American
League counterparts. American League managers had to adapt to building a line-up where one of their best hitters was potentially missing. Managers often needed to choose between sacrificing defense or offense. Would the DH play in the field, removing a superior defender, or would he sit on the bench? Furthermore, American League pitchers did not have the same level of experience with bunting or advancing the runner as National League pitchers making the pitcher’s spot in the line-up even more of a black hole.

The DH also created different strategic considerations in the National and American League. Where National League managers had to consider pinch-hitters and managing around the pitcher’s spot in the line-up, American League managers were free to manage their pitching staffs unburdened by the shackles of pitchers batting. Additionally, National League managers had to ensure their pitchers could adequately bunt to advance runners. Pitchers also faced increased injury risk from batting in the form of being hit by pitches and running the bases. The DH introduced new tactical and player-management considerations in both leagues and altered how managers had to lead.

Away from the field, Curt Flood took it upon himself to fight to defeat the Reserve Clause. Upon being traded by the St. Louis Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies at the end of the 1969 season, Flood, feeling betrayed by the team he had been a star in Centerfield for twelve years, decided he wanted to sue Major League Baseball. After meeting with Marvin Miller, Flood wrote and released a letter to Commissioner Bowie Kuhn in December of 1969: “After twelve years in the Major Leagues, I do not feel that I am a piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes…I believe I have the right to consider offers from other clubs before making decisions. I, therefore, request that you make known to all Major League clubs
my feelings in this matter and advise them of my availability for the 1970 season.” Kuhn rejected Flood’s request, and public perception was decidedly against Flood. Much of the public could not fathom making $90,000 and being unhappy. Additionally when Flood said “a well-paid slave is, nonetheless, a slave” on a nationally televised interview, he was perceived by viewers less as a seeker of rights and more as a threat to America’s national pastime. Flood’s initial trial, *Flood v. Kuhn*, commenced on May 19th in the US District Court of New York and ended on August 12th with the court siding with Kuhn and Major League Baseball. In Flood’s appeal to the US Court of Appeals in April of 1971, the courts upheld the ruling. Flood exhausted all of his legal options when he appealed to the US Supreme Court. In a 5-3 ruling, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling. The courts cited earlier Supreme Court precedent that ruled that antitrust laws did not apply to baseball. It was the Court’s opinion that Congress, not the Judiciary, should remedy any issues surrounding Major League Baseball antitrust exemption. While the reserve clause was not defeated during Flood’s legal proceedings, he did succeed in raising awareness among the players and the public about the inequitable system.

Furthermore, Major League Baseball argued that the reserve clause should be dealt with in negotiation, which pressured owners to engage in a genuine negotiation process. Flood’s legacy continued to impact baseball long after his failed legal action and after his death in 1997. The reserve clause was eliminated in 1974, a precursor to true free agency, and in 1998 Congress removed baseball’s antitrust exemption concerning labor issues when they passed the Curt Flood Act. After Flood passed away, the 1997 American League and National League player

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312 Sloope, “Curt Flood – Society for American Baseball Research.”
313 Sloope.
representatives David Cone and Tom Glavine said, “Every major league baseball player owes Curt Flood a debt of gratitude that can never be repaid…With the odds overwhelmingly against him, he was willing to take a stand for what he knew was right.”

Flood’s impact went beyond his individual quest to gain freedom from an oppressive system. He was the forefather of a system that has given players unprecedented power to control their destinies. Cone and Glavine recognized that and rightfully acknowledged Flood’s efforts.

While there was little immediate direct impact on managers from Flood’s court case, they had to be careful not to jeopardize their relationships with players. Managers were in a difficult position wherein their bosses, the owners, were on the opposite side of the players they were around daily leading. They had to appease both parties to keep their jobs and to ensure a successful season. Managers had to persevere through a myriad of changes to the social ecosystem in baseball as players fought for their rights and gained more power. It is likely that a charismatic leader would be better able to toe the narrow line between supporting players and backing the company message. The impact of Curt Flood’s sacrifice would be felt more prominently during the Free Agency Era, but the seeds of change started during the Collective Bargaining Era.

Under the leadership of Marvin Miller, players negotiated the first-ever collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in professional sports. The creation of the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) in 1966 coincided with the players' decision to elicit outside support in the form of Miller. Where owners had once been negotiating with a disorganized mesh of individual players, Miller shaped them, with his background as an economist for the

United Steelworkers of America, into a financially sound labor union. Among a host of other quality-of-life improvements for players, the first CBA raised the minimum salary by more than 50% to $10,000 after it had been stuck at its previous level for more than two decades. After the first CBA expired in April of 1970, Miller once again negotiated on behalf of the players and secured another three-year CBA in June of 1970 that increased minimum salary to $12,000, $12,500, and $13,500 across the three years. Notably, the second CBA explicitly allowed agents to represent players. The passage of the new CBA charged an independent arbitrator with hearing all grievances outside of matters of the integrity of the game. No longer could the commissioner arbitrarily hand down punishment as judge, jury, and executioner.

Labor peace would not last beyond the second CBA. The first players' strike began on April 1st, 1972, and it was only with the coercion of President Nixon that the two sides were able to reach an agreement, with the aid of the director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, to play the season under a settlement instead of a new CBA. The third CBA was enacted in February of 1973 and once again covered three seasons (1973-1975). In addition to new increases to the minimum salary and other changes, it included key provisions that have continued through the present. The new CBA instituted the 10-5 rule and prohibited teams from optioning players with at least five years of service to the minors without consent.319 The final CBA of the era was agreed upon in July of 1976 and covered that current season and the three subsequent ones (1976-1979). This CBA brought with it the beginnings of free agency.320

The advent of the Collective Bargaining Agreement changed how managers interacted with their players and how much power they and the team wielded over the players. Managers

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319 The 10-5 rule provided players with ten years of Major League Baseball service time and five years with their current team the ability to veto trades. Ron Santo became the first player to do so when he vetoed his trade from the Cubs to the Angels on December 5th, 1973.

320 “Chronological History of the Major League Baseball Players Association - The 1960’s.”
faced the difficult decision of whether to toe the company line and stand against labor or back their players and the relationships they had built with them and speak out in favor of their players. Many managers tried to stay out of the negotiations as much as possible, but some, like Sparky Anderson, were outspoken in their support of the players. Higher minimum salaries also served to level the playing field financially among players and managers, potentially removing an obstacle to building meaningful relationships between managers and players. Additionally, players gained more power to dictate their futures through trade protections and the ability to refuse demotions to the minors in certain circumstances. Finally, managers and front offices had to adapt to the reduced flexibility they had in filling out rosters for 162 games. The Collective Bargaining Agreements continued a process of power shifting away from managers and the front office to the players. As such, they represented an impetus for managers to change how they had to lead. The CBA changed relational dynamics and added new wrinkles in team management and roster building.

President Richard Nixon’s connection to baseball was not limited to his role in quelling a labor crisis. Throughout his time as President of the United States of America, he also positioned baseball as a supporter of his drug fight and Vietnam War policy. Nixon believed that Major League Baseball had a major role to play in preventing the “grave social disease” of drug use from taking control of America’s youth. Nixon and Major League Baseball commissioner

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321 Nixon was an unequivocal fan of the game and was almost an integral member of its leadership. During his years in the political wilderness after losing his bid for the California governorship, Nixon was offered the role of Major League Baseball commissioner in 1965, which he declined. Despite pursuing politics further instead of becoming the commissioner of baseball, his love for the game did not wane. During the fallout from the Watergate scandal in the summer of 1972, Nixon undertook a passion project. What started as a list of his all-time greatest baseball players morphed into a four-team and eighty-player project. The teams, and their explanations, were published by the Associated Press and printed in publications across the nation.; Richard Nixon Foundation, “Love of the Game: RN and Baseball,” April 23, 2014, https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2014/04/love-game-rn-baseball/.; Frederic J. Frommer, “As Watergate Simmered, Nixon Buckled down on a Sportswriting Project,” Washington Post, July 2, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2022/07/01/richard-nixon-baseball-all-time-teams/.
Bowie Kuhn enjoyed a strong relationship. In May of 1971, Nixon wrote to Kuhn personally to thank and congratulate him on Major League Baseball backing his policies. After Major League Baseball commissioned and circulated an anti-drug pamphlet, Nixon once again wrote to Kuhn to express his thanks. Major League Baseball would go on to produce a shot film in the early parts of 1972 with its players' warning of the dangers of drugs. Managers were forced to support the collective messaging as employees of Major League Baseball. They risked being terminated and black-balled if they failed to toe the company line. Additionally, they had to advise their players on coming to terms with being used as propaganda for a political regime they may not have supported.

Vietnam continued to be a divisive issue during Nixon’s presidency, as it had been under his predecessors, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Nixon hoped to use the nationalistic sentiment in baseball that had been a part of America’s Arsenal of Democracy during WWII to garner support for the Vietnam War. After being unable to attend Opening Day in 1971 to throw out the first pitch, as had been commonplace, Nixon instead had a former Vietnam prisoner of war (POW) do so. The President had told Washington Senator owner Robert E. Short that allowing the POW to throw out the first pitch was “a matter of priority interest” and would “bring maximum publicity to our efforts on behalf of these brave men and their families.”

After securing reelection in 1972, Nixon once again tried to repeat his public relations boon. But, under the advice of Commissioner Kuhn, an officer instead threw out the first pitch at the

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season’s first nationally televised game to maximize the coverage.\textsuperscript{325} Nixon sought to use baseball as a form of propaganda to stoke nationalistic pride and counteract the anti-Vietnam sentiment that had seeped into the nation across the previous decade.

Baseball’s connection to the Vietnam War did not begin with Richard Nixon’s ascendancy to the Presidency. Major League Baseball officially endorsed the war and organized tours by players, executives, and managers to Vietnam and war hospitals before the Nixon Presidency. Trips to Vietnam began in 1966 when Joe Torre and Hank Aaron led a delegation. Stars such as Ernie Banks, Pete Rose, Tony Conigliaro, and Joe DiMaggio flew across the Pacific at the end of the 1967 season. Journeys to Vietnam continued in 1968 and 1969, and the league expanded them for 1970 and 1971. In a publicity stunt, Commissioner William Eckert and Boston Red Sox star Carl Yastrzemski visited President Johnson in the White House in 1968.\textsuperscript{326}

Similar to Nixon’s drug policy propaganda, managers had to adapt to leading players who may not have agreed with the Vietnam War and feared reprisal if they spoke out. New York Met Ron Swoboda was one of the more outspoken players against the war. He accused Nixon of prolonging and escalating the war. However, he also praised the valor of the soldiers he had met in Vietnam. Mets star pitcher Tom Seaver was also opposed to the war.\textsuperscript{327} He did, however, enlist in the Marines in 1962.\textsuperscript{328} After the Mets surprisingly upset the Baltimore Orioles in the

\textsuperscript{325} Winterhalt.
\textsuperscript{327} Ron Briley.
1969 World Series, he was famously quoted as saying, “If the Mets can win the World Series, then we can get out of Vietnam.”

Unlike in WWII, managers did not have to deal with the effects of large swathes of their players serving in the military. Controversially, a disproportional number of professional athletes landed commissions in the National Guard and Reserves. Each was draft-exempt. Uproar at the seemingly biased treatment led Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to declare on February 1st, 1967, that the National Guard and Reserves were on a “first-come, first-served basis.”

Baseball in *The Collective Bargaining Era* underwent structural changes and played a role in world politics. The advent of the DH changed roster construction and strategy for managers in both leagues. The creation of the MLBPA and Marvin Miller negotiating the first CBA in professional sports fundamentally altered the power structure in baseball. It served as the spark for future labor disputes and work stoppages. Curt Flood began the fight against the reserve clause. It represented the first step on the way to free agency. Finally, baseball was implicated in Presidential propaganda surrounding Vietnam and Nixon’s drug fight. Managers had to adapt to both new technical and player relations challenges. Charisma, perseverance, situational leadership, and focus on task and relational leadership were beneficial in this context. Sparky Anderson displayed all four, and his success was likely correlated with his predilection for them.

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329 Ron Briley, “Baseball and Dissent.”
330 Ron Briley.

“In order to protect the integrity of the Championship Season, the Division Series, the League Championship Series and the World Series, the 28 clubs have concluded with enormous regret that the remainder of the 1994 season, the Division Series, the League Championship and the World Series must be cancelled.”

- Major League Baseball Owners

No top-ten manager won the majority of their World Series titles during The Free Agency Era. As such, this chapter will discuss changes within baseball that may have contributed to that phenomenon. The era had increased player movement and roster turnover, aided by free agency, increased parity, and a series of player strikes that wiped out games from the schedule.

Contrary to logical thought, free agency did not heavily affect player turnover in its first decade of existence. The Player Turnover Rate remained at approximately 30-35% from the 1950s through the middle of the 1980s. However, the late 1980s saw the beginning of a statistical trend wherein as of 2008, the Player Turnover Rate has not fallen below 35% since the mid-1980s. The distribution, separated by WAR, of players that changed teams from one year to the next remained relatively constant after the start of free agency. Approximately 40% of sub-one WAR, 20% of one to three WAR, and 10% of three to five WAR players changed teams yearly. The stars, those players who accumulated five or more WAR in a year, historically changed teams around 5% of the time. That value increased, nearing ten percent in the years after

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332 Player Turnover Rate is the % of Players Changing Teams in a year
free agency began, but dropped back to historical levels before rising, along with the other categories, in the late 1980s as the total percentage of players that changed teams each year increased.  

The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) of 1976 heavily restricted the reserve clause. Instead of being contracted to one team on a series of perpetual contracts, players could enter free agency after six years of Major League Baseball service time. Many owners' arguments against free agency were rooted in the fear that the best players would be drawn toward the biggest teams, such as the New York Yankees. Enticed by large salaries and promotional opportunities, these players would leave small-market teams, destroying competitive balance. However, economic theory held that under the invariance proposition, talent distribution in baseball would remain the same under free agency as it had under the reserve clause, thus maintaining parity. They were wrong. Parity increased.

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335 Vrooman.
In *The Free Agency Era*, the New York Yankees won four World Series, and the Minnesota Twins, Los Angeles Dodgers, and Cincinnati Reds each won two World Series titles.\(^{336}\) In contrast, from 1921, when the Yankees won their first American League Pennant, to the start of the era in 1976, New York won twenty World Series and thirty American League pennants. They represented the American League in over half of the World Series held during that time frame. Included in their dominance was a five-year World Series winning streak from 1949-1953 and a four-year streak from 1936-1939. One-sided dominance was not exclusive to the American League. The St. Louis Cardinals won three World Series in five years and a fourth pennant from 1942-1946. While the Yankees still won the most World Series in the era, their total percentage of Series victory dropped from over 1/3 to under 20%. Additionally, they only represented the American League slightly over ¼ of the time. *The Free Agency Era* had fifteen different franchises win the World Series, which at the time represented more than half of Major League Baseball franchises.\(^{337}\) Never in baseball history had the glory of a World Series victory been felt by so many teams.

Parity in the era was not only limited to World Series victories. As of 2019, of the twenty teams who maintained a winning percentage greater than .550 for six or more consecutive seasons, only three occurred during the free-agency era: New York Yankees from 1976-1981, Baltimore Orioles from 1977-1983, and Atlanta Braves from 1991-2000. As of the end of the 2018 season, no team had more than three consecutive seasons with a winning percentage greater

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than .600 since 1976. Before 1976, five different teams achieved the feat, an average of one approximately every fifteen years.\(^{338}\)

There was also more parity among the worst teams in Major League Baseball during the era. Of the twenty-one non-expansion teams to endure winning percentages of less than .450 for at least six consecutive seasons, only two occurred during *The Free Agency Era*: 1977-1983 New York Mets and 1985-1990 Atlanta Braves. Each team won a World Series within five seasons of the end of their streaks. The Mets won in 1986, and the Braves won in 1995. The true cause of the increased parity is unknown. However, the replacement of the reserve system with the CBA and a geographical expansion from the early 1960s to the late 1970s that created a truly national audience has been hypothesized to have been contributing factors.\(^{339}\) The increased player turnover and change from the reserve system to the CBA, creating more parity, likely played a role in not having a top-ten manager win the majority of their World Series titles in the era.

In addition to the increased parity, four-player strikes, including the two largest by games lost, took place in *The Free Agency Era*. The 1980 strike resulted in zero regular season games being lost. However, Major League Baseball canceled 92 exhibition games. The 1980 strike revolved around the issue of free agency, which was only four years old at the time.\(^{340}\) It was widely seen as a prelude to the much more consequential strike in 1981. The 1981 strike was the first considerable strike in baseball history. Across almost two months from June 12th-July 31st, Major League Baseball canceled 712 games. Major League Baseball split the season into two

\(^{338}\) The teams to achieve this feat were the 1904-1910 Chicago Cubs, 1928-1932 Philadelphia Athletics, 1941-1946 St. Louis Cardinals, 1947-1957 New York Yankees, and 1971-1976 Cincinnati Reds.


halves, with the winner of each division in each half of the season advancing to the playoffs. The strike primarily revolved around free-agent compensation for teams who lost a player. Owners had wanted a combination of draft picks and players from the signing team’s roster, but the Players Association feared it would hamper free agency too much.\textsuperscript{341} Marvin Miller said, “The scheme was designed to end free agency and would certainly have succeeded if it had gone into effect.”\textsuperscript{342} Ultimately the two sides agreed to draft picks from the other team and the selection of unprotected professional players from a league-wide draft pool.

Similarly to the 1980 strike, the 1985 strike did not result in any lost games. However, unlike previously when players had gone on strike, they lost ground in negotiations. The new CBA increased arbitration eligibility back to three years from the two years that the sides had negotiated as a part of the 1980 strike, and the pension formula was renegotiated in a manner detrimental to the players.\textsuperscript{343} The league would enjoy nine years of labor peace before the worst strike in Major League history occurred. The 1994 season had begun without the agreement of a new CBA, but the owners’ continued insistence on a salary cap engendered the players to strike on August 12\textsuperscript{th}. The commissioner canceled the remainder of the regular season and the World Series a month into the strike.\textsuperscript{344} Across the 232-day strike that caused the cancellation of 938 regular season games and the playoffs, owners unilaterally implemented a salary cap, the union unilaterally declared all unsigned players, including those tendered contracts, in the 1995 off-season where free-agents, the lead negotiator for the owners resigned, the owners threatened and attempted to use replacement players, and a federal mediator failed, unlike under Nixon in the

\textsuperscript{342} Dierkes, “Why MLB Players Went On Strike In The Past And What It Tells Us About The Current Lockout.”
\textsuperscript{343} Dierkes.
\textsuperscript{344} Perry, “MLB Lockout.”
1970s, to bring the sides together on a deal. It took the issuing of an injunction by a federal court barring the use of replacement players to force owners to acquiesce, ending the strike.\(^{345}\)

Beyond the loss of the 1994 World Series removing the chance for a manager to win the World Series, the strikes may have contributed to not having a top-ten manager win the majority of their World Series titles in the era. The curtailed spring training of 1980 would have reduced practice time and chemistry building for all teams. However, younger teams would have been more heavily affected, potentially pushing back their contention window or preventing it from ever opening. The midseason strike of 1981 would have disrupted teams’ momentum that they may never have gotten back. Furthermore, the changed playoff format caused at least one team to miss the playoffs that would have made it in a normal season.\(^{346}\) While it is beyond the purview of this study to predict what may have happened in Major League Baseball had the reserve clause remained in force and the strikes not happened, those events are likely at least partially responsible for no top-ten manager winning the majority of their World Series titles during The Free Agency Era.

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\(^{345}\) Perry; Dierkes, “Why MLB Players Went On Strike In The Past And What It Tells Us About The Current Lockout.”

\(^{346}\) See footnote 300
Chapter 6: The $100 Million Contract Era (1998-Present)

“You can’t manage by memo. You can’t stand up there and just send out edicts. I think you just gotta really personalize your relationships.”

- Tony La Russa

Part 1: Joe Torre, Tony La Russa, and Bruce Bochy

I identified each of the hypothesized universal leadership traits and styles in my analysis of Joe Torre, Tony La Russa, and Bruce Bochy. During their time as managers, they displayed charisma, a balance of task and relational leadership, an acknowledgment of Situational Leadership, and perseverance. This section will provide evidence of the presence of these traits and styles and show their correlation with Torre, La Russa, and Bochy’s successes and failures as leaders.

Across more than a decade as New York Yankees manager, Joe Torre managed the impossible. He became bigger than New York City and the Yankees. Torre’s charisma was a large part of what enabled him to usurp those hallowed figures. Torre’s elevation was highlighted in how Yankees fans viewed their skipper. In a manner akin to religious fervor, Yankee fans revered Torre so highly that they canonized him as “Saint Joe.” In April of 2001, coming off the heels of four World Series titles in five seasons, Jack Curry of The New York Times published an article wherein he tried to summarize the feelings of Yankees fans. To that end, he wrote, “Joe Torre does not just walk. He walks on water. Joe Torre does not just speak. He speaks in parables. Joe Torre does not just make decisions. He makes the proper decisions…Torre has been so successful as manager of the Yankees for the past five years
that….they want to canonize him. St. Joseph, the new patron saint in pinstripes.”

Torre’s appeal transcended the limits of baseball and leaped into the realm of religious idolatry. The widespread and intense devotion Torre inspired made apparent the charisma he wielded. His ability to move beyond traditional forms of praise into the realm of religious figures highlighted the mystique that surrounded him. Religious figures, such as Mother Teresa and the Pope, are often seen as some of the most charismatic leaders because of the inherent power they seemingly have received from God. Yankee fans’ elevation of Torre to a level more closely related to individuals like Mother Theresa and the Pope, rather than to his fellow managers, signaled the perception of extraordinary capabilities that is closely associated with the appearance of charisma.

Similar to how Torre was elevated to the domain of religion, the public came to see him as an entity larger than the Yankees. The New York Yankees are the biggest brand in baseball and arguably the biggest brand in worldwide sports. They are typically bigger than any one player or owner, as Babe Ruth and George Steinbrenner can attest to. However, that did not stop Joe Torre from being the first thing people thought of when they heard the name of New York’s premier baseball franchise. Yankees Right Fielder Paul O’Neill said, “when people think about the Yankees, they think about Joe Torre.” O’Neill was verbalizing the feelings of the public. His comments further emphasize Torre as a larger-than-life figure. One who oozed enough charisma to become an icon that could stand alone among the Yankees’ vast list of all-time greats. As Steve Martinez wrote when Sporting News awarded Torre their Sports Man of the Year Award, Torre “led the Yankees to an improbable world championship and, in the process, turned a hard

boiled city on its head and into a legion of Torre Adorers.” The improbable nature of the Yankees’ first championship under Torre in 1996 created a sense of mysticism that fueled devotion for the manager. Torre’s ability to make the improbable probable signaled to the fans his extraordinary leadership which contributed to the charisma that was a staple of his leadership style.

While Torre’s leadership style heavily relied on relational leadership, he still used task-focused leadership. One prominent example was apparent during the 2001 American League Divisional Series against the Oakland Athletics. In line with task-focused leadership virtues, Torre emphasized preparedness in every situation among his players. To that end, he made sure his star shortstop Derek Jeter had practiced and knew where to position himself to back up a cut-off throw from the outfield during that season’s Spring Training. Regardless of the improbable chance of that occurring, Torre understood that it might be the difference between winning and losing. That attention to detail saved the Yankees when they were down two games to zero in the best-of-five series. Jeter was perfectly positioned to corral an off-line throw from right field and flip it to Catcher Jorge Posada to nail Athletics designated hitter Jeremy Giambi at the plate. The heady play preserved a one-run lead in a game that would end 1-0 in favor of the Yankees. It propelled them to their fourth straight World Series. While it would take more than half a year to bear fruit, Torre’s emphasis on practice and preparedness ultimately contributed to accomplishing the Yankees’ goal. Torre task leadership proved pivotal in the biggest of spots.

Torre’s task and relational leadership were often intertwined. Loyalty to his players was a consistent theme in Torre’s leadership, and it is a hallmark of relational leadership. When

349 Cohen.
Speaking on his loyalty to his players, he said, “Even though I have loyalty to people, you have to be loyal to twenty-five players as opposed to one.” Torre placed the goal of winning over any single relationship with a player. The whole was more important than the individual. Each is associated with task-focused leadership. Additionally, treating all individuals of a group as equals is a hallmark of relational leadership. Torre’s players understood that he was loyal to them but that the team came first. His view on loyalty represented a synthesis between task and relational leadership. The loyalty Torre showed allowed him to make typically contentious decisions, such as benching veterans for a strategic advantage without disrupting the clubhouse. Relief pitcher Mike Stanton said, “We’re loyal to Joe because Joe is loyal to us.” The relationships Torre had built with players enabled his task leadership. Torre applied elements of task-focused leadership to the relational leadership that is more associated with his leadership style to create a synergistic formula that both furthered the goal of winning and instilled a sense of trust and calmness in the clubhouse.

While Torre employed task leadership, the crux of Torre’s leadership was his relationships. Torre had an uncanny ability to connect with his players. Pitcher David Cone said, “There’s something about Joe, about the way he relates to his players, the way he conducts himself on and off the field.” The strides Torre made to relate to his players were not accidental. They were a part of his larger philosophy. Torre said, “I try to understand what motivates other people…I’m more into ‘Why did they say it? As opposed to what they said.” He wanted to know his players beyond a surface-level relationship. The focus he put on the

350 Cohen.
353 Useem, “A Manager For All Seasons Joe Torre Gets the Most out of His Workers, Makes His Boss Happy, and Delivers Wins. He May Be the Model for Today’s Corporate Managers. And He’s Not Afraid to Cry.”
“why” instead of the “what” highlighted an emphasis on more than results. Torre truly cared about his players. For example, when third basemen Scott Brosius’ father died on a 1999 road trip, he went to Torre to tell him he had to go home in a day or two to attend to his family and apologized for not giving more notice. Torre hugged him immediately and told him to “hit the road.”354 Brosius believed that Torre understood where baseball should fit into people’s lives, and he showed compassion and understanding when dealing with Brosius’ tragedy. Brosius the person was more important Brosius the player. Torre was not concerned with the last-minute notice, nor the effect it would have on the team’s line-up. Instead, Torre’s main concern was the emotional impact Brosius.

Torre’s relational leadership also manifested in how he dealt with downturns in performance. With the Atlanta Braves in 1982, Glenn Hubbard said that Torre refrained from yelling at the team amid a devastating late-season slump: “Even during our losing streak, he could have come out and blasted us, but he didn’t.”355 Torre focused on creating a confident environment and believed improving his players’ mindsets would be more beneficial than lambasting them. Torre’s emphasis on relational leadership was clear to Yankees broadcaster Tim McCarver summed up Torre’s leadership approach when he said, “Joe manages more in the clubhouse than he does on the field.”356 Torre focused on relational leadership more than task leadership, which was evident in how he managed. The brilliance of Torre’s leadership was not in how he handled a pitching staff or arranged his lineup. It was how he managed a clubhouse full of stars and created a team out of individual players. Torre was supportive of his players and

354 Useem.
356 Useem, “A Manager For All Seasons Joe Torre Gets the Most out of His Workers, Makes His Boss Happy, and Delivers Wins. He May Be the Model for Today’s Corporate Managers. And He’s Not Afraid to Cry.”
they rewarded him with their strong on-field performance. He was an unequivocal players manager.

Strong emotional intelligence lends itself well to relational leadership. It provides a skill-set, managing and understanding your own emotions and recognition and influence of the emotions of your surroundings, that is tailored towards building strong relationships. Torre in all likelihood benefitted from strong emotional intelligence. Psychologist Daniel Goleman said Torre was a “textbook case of an emotionally intelligent leader.” His emotional intelligence would have allowed him to diagnose and comfort players in slumps. Additionally, Torre could disarm conflict in the clubhouse before it began. Torre’s emotional intelligence worked with his focus on relational leadership to create an environment that produced multiple Yankee championships.

Torre also used situational leadership. The 1996 Yankees epitomized Torre’s adaptability. Unlike Yankee teams of yore, who were powered by sluggers like Babe Ruth, Joe DiMaggio, Lou Gehrig, and Reggie Jackson, Torre’s first team did not have a single player hit 30 or more home runs. Instead, a balanced approach that scraped runs across home plate one at a time with stolen bases and timely hitting launched the Yankees to victory. A franchise known for stars had no players finish in the top ten in Most Valuable Player voting. A rookie shortstop by the name of Derek Jeter led the team in games played. The balanced approach carried over to the pitching staff. Ace Andy Pettite was the only pitcher to throw for more than 200 innings, and Torre heavily used his bullpen. Torre understood the strengths and weaknesses of his squad.

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358 Useem, “A Manager For All Seasons Joe Torre Gets the Most out of His Workers, Makes His Boss Happy, and Delivers Wins. He May Be the Model for Today’s Corporate Managers. And He’s Not Afraid to Cry.”
359 Cohen, “Joe Torre – Society for American Baseball Research.”
and maximized their potential. He knew the situation his roster put him in, and instead of trying to fit the team to his plan, he let the team dictate how he managed. Torre did not let preconceived notions of what a Yankees team get in the way of leading. He created a winning formula that played to the Yankees’ current strengths, not their past ones. Later Yankee teams would be defined by the “Core Four” of Derek Jeter, Andy Petitte, Jorge Posada, and Mariano Rivera. The change to a team once again dominated by stars showed that Torre continued to use situational leadership. Torre changed his leadership depending on how the front office built his roster which propelled the Yankees to four World Series titles on his watch.

Despite being a nine-time All-Star and holder of an MVP, Gold Glove, and Batting Title in addition to the accolades of his managerial career, Torre had to display immense perseverance to achieve his ultimate successes. Before Joe Torre became a four-time World Series champion, he held the dubious record of most major-league games, at 4,272, as a player and manager before his first World Series appearance. He played in parts of eighteen seasons and managed for fifteen more with three teams before he led the Yankees to the 1996 World Series. Despite toiling through an unprecedented lack of team success, Torre persisted. He was rewarded for his perseverance and emerged as one of the most successful managers in Major League Baseball history.

Like Joe Torre, Tony La Russa also displayed charisma, task and relational leadership, situational leadership, and perseverance. When the Chicago White Sox made La Russa the youngest manager in the majors at 35 when they hired him in 1979, owner Bill Veeck was drawn

361 Cohen, “Joe Torre – Society for American Baseball Research.”
to two things: “His intelligence was the thing that first attracted me. And his dedication. I think we’re going to find that he one of the really outstanding managers before he’s through.”

Veeck’s prediction would prove remarkably prescient. The owner was enticed by La Russa's apparent expertise and the vision he espoused, two trademark characteristics of charisma. Being hired to lead a major league squad at 35 was a remarkable achievement that likely would not have been possible without La Russa’s charisma persuading Veeck. La Russa maintained his charisma across his career. More than thirty years after he was first hired by the White Sox, St. Louis Cardinals outfielder Lance Berkman said, "This team (2011 Cardinals) reflects la Russa more than you see other teams reflect their manager. He’s an ultra-competitive manager, and his teams have that competitive personality. It’s a direct connection.”

The Cardinals were drawn to La Russa because of the values he embraced and the vision he tried to implement. His competitiveness showed sensitivity to his surroundings. In a room full of competitors, La Russa was the biggest one. The vision La Russa espoused, the sensitivity he showed to his surroundings, and his vibrant personality were all indicative of his charisma. The influence La Russa had in shaping his teams to reflect him, and the impression he made on others speaks to the charisma latent in his leadership.

The competitiveness that was a hallmark of Lar Russa’s charisma also contributed to his task-focused leadership. He was notoriously detail-oriented and always looking for an advantage on the field. Pitcher Dennis Eckersley said, “I never played for anybody who was as wired from

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pitch to pitch.” He was not afraid to experiment to gain the upper hand. He developed the notion of the one-inning closer that dominated the sport for decades. Jim Leyland, who at one point was La Russa’s third base coach with the White Sox and a prime rival as manager of the Detroit Tigers, said that La Russa was “the most creative manager I’ve ever managed against. He’ll do things other managers won’t. If his club isn’t hitting, he’s not afraid to try stuff to manufacture runs.” La Russa would do anything to get an edge in baseball. His dedication to winning was second to none. La Russa’s near-singular focus on winning highlighted his goal-oriented nature. His task-focused leadership can be best represented by a quote he told Coach and Athletic Director: “Tony the manager would have really liked and respected Tony the player. Except he would have never played him because he was trying to win.” Winning took precedence over everything, even if it would have cost his younger self playing time. La Russa was willing to put aside relationships to win. It showed the emphasis he put on production.

Somewhat contradictorily, the focus on winning also seeped into La Russa’s relational-focused leadership. He was a self-described players’ manager but, in his words, “only for the players who care about the team and how well we do.” La Russa’s relationships with players were predicated on the collective goal of winning. He genuinely cared about his players and wanted them to share his love and dedication to winning baseball games. In a way, La Russa’s relational leadership was contingent on a shared understanding of the importance of task focus with his players. An example of La Russa’s relational leadership was the concerted effort he made with his coaching staff to create an environment that would fuel camaraderie and

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366 Baldassaro.
367 “Tony La Russa.”
368 “Tony La Russa.”
excellence. In his memoir *One Last Strike*, La Russa wrote, “For years, what we’d always done as a coaching staff was to personalize our relationships with the players. Our goal was to create an environment where the ballplayer looked forward to coming to work and knew that a bunch of people were trying to put him and his teammates in the best position to win.”

The philosophy he implemented fell neatly in line with the principles of relational leadership. La Russa provided encouragement and individualized attention to players, and created a support structure to uplift the roster. While outside perception saw La Russa as a cold-hearted tactician whose relationship with players was lacking, he cared about his players and their relationships. He saw himself as a players’ manager first and foremost.

The situational leadership La Russa employed was evident in how across his career, La Russa’s teams epitomized adapting to their strengths. At the core of winning baseball games is outscoring your opponents. At the time of his first retirement at the end of the 2011 season, La Russa’s teams had outscored their opponents by a combined 1,523 runs. While that is impressive, it was the various ways his teams scored those runs that highlight La Russa’s situational leadership. Despite getting on base more than 2,000 times more than their opponents, they only had approximately 1,100 more plate appearances. La Russa’s teams had 1,523 more hits, 686 more walks, and were even hit nineteen more times than opponents. Of course, increased offensive production would lead to more wins. But that offense came in many forms. They hit 480 more home runs and stole 854 more bases. There were 79 fewer double plays and 141 more sacrifices. La Russa’s teams won in a myriad of different ways, and the results highlight that La Russa did not have any singular formula for his success. The varied approach to

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369 Baldassaro, “Tony La Russa – Society for American Baseball Research.”

offense points towards La Russa altering what offensive approach he emphasized depending on roster construction. La Russa was not beholden to a singular way of managing. He adapted to the resources he was given.

Another example of La Russa’s situational leadership comes in the form of the contrast between his 2006 and 2011 Cardinals World Series winning squads. While certain aspects remained constant across the two teams, namely the presence of Albert Pujols, who led the team in WAR both years, Chris Carpenter and Yadier Molina, more was different than the same. John Mozeliak was now General Manager in the stead of Walt Jocketty. Only one starting pitcher, Carpenter, remained a staple in the rotation five years later, and no key relievers carried over. Only two position players, Pujols and Molina, remained as starters from the 2006 to 2011 teams. Even those two players had transitioned from young phenoms to grizzled veterans in the subsequent five seasons.\(^{371}\) While the name on the front of the jerseys remained the same, the two teams were fundamentally different. La Russa could not repeat his leadership template in 2011. The make-up of the franchise was different. What remained from 2006 were in different stages of their careers. La Russa would have had to change his leadership to lead the 2011 Cardinals to a World Series victory. The common denominator between the two squads was the presence of Tony La Russa. He adapted to the changed makeup of his squad and maximized their talent.

Finally, La Russa also displayed perseverance. During the 2011 season, La Russa suffered through a painful bout of shingles. His illness forced him to leave the team for a week in May to receive specialized medical attention. Additionally, he managed the entire season while

taking heavy doses of medication and coping with pain and discomfort. Nevertheless, La Russa put forth a managing masterclass as he led the team to a World Series victory over the Texas Rangers before retiring. Cardinals General Manager John Mozeliak highlighted his manager’s perseverance after the season when he said, “Tony always prides himself with being prepared and even though he was not feeling 100 percent, he never waved in his work ethic. He never used it as an excuse and most of all he never wanted to leave the team.” Mozeliak explicitly mentioned La Russa’s work ethic and lack of excuse-making. The manager persisted through a debilitating illness but did not let it negatively impact the Cardinals.

Bruce Bochy is the final manager of this study. Like many of the others, he also displayed charisma, task and relational-focused leadership, situational leadership, and perseverance. Bochy’s charisma is evident in how he portrayed himself and how he was perceived. When asked why he chose to come out of retirement to manage the Texas Rangers in 2023, he cited his youngest grandchild: “I got a grandson, he’s fired up. Braxton, he’s four and a half now and playing tee ball and coach pitch. I found this out when I was coaching tee ball: Managing the big leagues is easier. I blame this on Braxton, I said you drove me to this.” The humor, detail, and honesty combined to create a warm atmosphere that draws people to Bochy. His comparison between tee ball and the major leagues humanized Bochy and the relatability it engendered was a sign of his charisma. Managing at the major leagues is harder than tee ball and any viewer of the press conference knew that. But, by relating to the scores of viewers who were involved in youth sports, Bochy was able to build a connection with them. Additionally, the importance of family is view shared by many. As such, when Bochy emphasized it, it created a

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372 Miklasz, “Cardinals’ Mental Toughness Reflects Their Longtime Manager Tony La Russa.”
common interest that would have appealed Bochy to the viewers. The story he told showed sensitivity to his surroundings as a manager returning from retirement who needed to reestablish a connection with fans. His almost nonchalant storytelling showed an understanding of the skepticism his return had garnered and went a long way in tamping it down.

Bochy’s charisma was also seen in how he treated others. San Francisco Giants broadcaster John Miller recalls seeing Bochy shortly after the team had received their 2014 World Series rings. He had asked Miller why he wasn’t wearing his, to which the broadcaster said he was not involved with winning the Series. Bochy responded, “Well, I didn’t win any of the games, either. What I do works because the players make it work. It’s not me who won the World Series.” Bochy's humbleness engendered him to people and created a sense of magnetism. Bochy inspired devotion by not hogging the spotlight and glory but instead passing it onto the players. But, he managed to still maintain the respect of others by recognizing that he did have a role to play. While not the most charismatic of the managers in this study, Bochy’s low-key magnetism showed that he still possessed an element of charisma.

The same humbleness that contributed to Bochy’s charisma was also a hallmark of his relationship-focused leadership. After the 2010 and 2014 World Series, Bochy attributed the Giants’ success to the players. When asked if he was a genius for leading the 2010 Giants to a title, Bochy said, “It’s not me, believe me. It’s these guys (the players).” Similarly, during the 2014 locker room celebration, Bochy told reporters, “This group of warriors, they continue to amaze me. To see guys getting their first taste of this, that makes it even more special…I’m just

amazed at what they did." Bochy displayed the same level of happiness for his players, if not more, as he did for himself when the Giants won the World Series. The affinity Bochy had for his players is evident in how he described them and the feelings they created in him. They amazed him. They were warriors. Bochy could have espoused boilerplate praise, but instead, the praise he heaped upon his players showed a genuine connection. Additionally, he focused the attention on his players and continually praised them. He deflected credit away from himself and shone the spotlight on who he thought was more deserving, the players. Bochy’s actions would have shown his players that he cared about them and that their efforts had value. Bochy’s relationship-focused leadership manifested in the humbleness he led with.

His concern for his players did not wane throughout his career. When he announced his upcoming retirement in 2019’s spring training, Bochy’s only request of the Giants was to be able to tell his players first before the announcement hit the news. Bochy did not want to blindside his players, which showed the value he put on their relationship. Further, it showed the consideration he treated the clubhouse with. He wanted the team to hear it from him, not find out on Twitter or ESPN. The care Bochy took emphasized the bonds he had built with his players. Madison Bumgarner, Bochy’s most relied-upon pitcher in crunch time, has gone on record saying, “I love him to death.” The ability to bring about the emotion of love pointed to an extremely deep connection between manager and player, one that transcended what was typical. Bochy valued his relationships with players and they reciprocated his focus relational leadership.

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376 Brown Jr.
378 Ibid.
Bochy’s emphasis on relationships was also evident in how others viewed him around the league. For example, when the Texas Rangers brought Bruce Bochy out of retirement to manage the team for the 2023 season, General Manager Chris Young cited Bochy’s “remarkable ability to connect and communicate with players, coaches, and staff” as a primary reason for his hiring.\(^{379}\) Even years after his retirement, Bochy was lauded for his relational focus. The Texas Rangers’ decision to hire Bochy because of those attributes spoke to the importance Major League Baseball placed on relationships in team building.

Within the same press conference with Bumgarner that he had uttered, “I love him to death,” the star pitcher lent insight into how task-focused leadership also played a role in Bochy’s leadership style. When asked what he admired most about his manager, Bumgarner said, “We’ll go competitor. He’s an ultra competitor. I know he’s never taken an inning off, a game off or a pitch off. He’s there to win it, every time.”\(^{380}\) Similarly to Tony La Russa, Bochy’s competitiveness was a peek into the intense desire to win that fueled him. He showed immense dedication because he thought it would increase his teams’ chances of winning. His competitiveness likely fueled his team’s desire to accomplish their goals. That is a hallmark of task-focused leadership. While task-focused leadership was likely a smaller part of Bochy’s repertoire than most of the other managers in this study, he still used it effectively.

Bochy’s use of situational leadership was never as abundantly clear as with his management of Bumgarner’s usage during the 2014 World Series. Bochy started Bumgarner in Games One and Five, where he pitched seven innings of one-run ball and a nine-inning shutout.


\(^{380}\) Andrew Baggarly, “Bruce Bochy, the Manager Who Has Never Been Fired, Wins His 1,000th Game with the Giants,” The Athletic, June 5, 2019, https://theathletic.com/1011730/2019/06/05/bruce-bochy-the-manager-who-has-never-been-fired-wins-his-1000th-game-with-the-giants/.
respectively. With the series having gone to seven games, Bochy went back to Bumgarner to pitch the last five innings of Game Seven.\textsuperscript{381} Bochy went against convention because he thought it put the team in the best position to win. He realized Bumgarner's dominance against the Kansas City Royals and adjusted his strategy to maximize the effectiveness of the tools at his disposal. Additionally, Bochy understood that playoff baseball differed from the regular season. Each pitch took on additional importance and the need to ration availability for the coming months was not present. Bochy adapted his pitching staff management to accommodate the change in structure, from regular season to playoffs, to great effect. He showed a strong understanding of the context and the ability of his players when using situational leadership to lead the Giants to a World Series victory.

Finally, Bochy’s perseverance can be seen through his battle with illness. Bochy underwent three different heart procedures in three years, from 2015-2017, to deal with atrial fibrillation, with him being quoted as saying, “I didn’t know if my heart was going to stop or just blow up.”\textsuperscript{382} The combined toll of an angioplasty in 2015, an irregular heartbeat in 2016, and two heart ablations in 2017 with the stress-ridden job of a Major League Baseball manager forced his retirement at the end of 2019. However, even his health problems could not tamp down his desire to manage as he returned to the dugout at the beginning of the 2023 season with the Texas Rangers. Bochy preserved through a myriad of heart issues to continue to manage for five more seasons with the Giants and later return to the major league bench with the Rangers.

Joe Torre, Tony La Russa, and Bruce Bochy each displayed all four hypothesized universal leadership characteristics. Their presence was correlated with the success each manager had. Across his managerial career with five different teams, Joe Torre won at a .538 clip and triumphed in four World Series along with two additional American League Pennants. However, the bulk of his success came with the New York Yankees from 1996-2007. Torre began his managerial career with the New York Mets from 1977-1981. Across the better parts of five seasons, he led the Mets to only a .405 winning percentage. In his first three years, the Mets won at only a .403 clip which represented a significant drop-off from the .492 winning percentage of the three years prior to his arrival. His last three years as the Mets manager were even worse than the first three, as the team only had a .400 winning percentage. After the Mets fired him, they improved to a .459 winning percentage in the subsequent three years. While the Mets were mediocre in the immediate time before and after Torre’s leadership, under him, the team was decidedly worse.

After the Mets fired Torre, the Atlanta Braves hired him before the 1982 season. The Braves had a .529 winning percentage in his three seasons in Atlanta. That represented a
sizable increase over the .461 winning percentage in the three years before Torre’s arrival.\textsuperscript{388} His success looks more impressive when it is considered that the Braves slumped to a .428 winning percentage in the three years after the team fired Torre.\textsuperscript{389} Torre objectively improved the fortunes of the Atlanta ball club. But he was not able to lead them to the playoffs, and their record declined in each of his three seasons.

After spending five seasons in the broadcast booth doing games for the Los Angeles Angels, St. Louis Cardinals hired Torre to manage in 1990.\textsuperscript{390} He managed four full seasons from 1991-1994 after he was the third manager hired during the 1990 season and fired after 47 games in the 1995 season. Across those seasons, the Cardinals won at a .498 clip.\textsuperscript{391} In the three seasons before the team hired Torre, the team had a winning percentage of .528 and had won the 1987 National League Pennant.\textsuperscript{392} The team also improved to a .502 in the three years after Torre was fired, including a postseason trip in the first full season after he was gone, something he had failed to do.\textsuperscript{393} Torre’s St. Louis stint was the embodiment of mediocrity. The team was not terrible, but he failed to improve them, and they hovered around .500.

\textsuperscript{390} “Joe Torre Managerial Record”; Cohen, “Joe Torre – Society for American Baseball Research.”
After being let go by the St. Louis Cardinals, the New York Yankees surprisingly hired Torre before the 1996 season. New York reporters subsequently labeled him “Clueless Joe.”

His time in New York would result in a career renaissance. The Yankees won at a .605 clip during his twelve years there (1996-2007), in addition to four World Series titles and six American League pennants. Torre improved the Yankees from a .566 winning percentage in the three years before his arrival to a .621 winning percentage in his first three years that, included a World Series championship in years one and three on the way to three straight in 1998, 1999, and 2000. Torre was not able to sustain the same type of success in his last three years as Yankees manager. The team won 58.8% of its games and did not win a pennant or World Series. While the team’s record barely improved in the three years after he left, they won at a .591 clip, the Yankees did win the 2009 World Series. However, they also failed to make the playoffs in 2008, which had never happened under Torre’s watch. Torre’s time as Yankees manager represented the pinnacle of his career. He improved the team and led it to large amounts of success, but he could not maintain the exceptionally high standards he had set by

394 Cohen, “Joe Torre – Society for American Baseball Research.”
395 “Joe Torre Managerial Record.”
being so successful in his first five seasons, even though his teams only once won less than 92 games. Even in that 2000 season, the Yankees won the World Series.\textsuperscript{400}

Torre ended his managerial career with a three-year stint as manager of the Los Angeles Dodgers from 2008-2010. The team won 53.3\% of his games in charge, which coincidentally was the same percentage in the three years after he retired.\textsuperscript{401} Torre improved the team’s performance from a .496 winning percentage in the three years prior to his arrival.\textsuperscript{402} The Dodgers made playoffs in each of Torre’s first two seasons but never made a World Series.\textsuperscript{403}

Torre's Pythagorean Record impresses despite his underwhelming record with any team not named the New York Yankees. He led his teams to 34 more wins than expected.\textsuperscript{404} That total is by far the highest among the managers included in this study. The objective impressiveness of that statistic is outside the purview of this study, but compared to the other managers included, it is highly impressive. While most of his statistical success came with the New York Yankees, Torre did a strong job maximizing their talent. The team never missed the playoffs under him and consistently won more than 90 games. The combination of Torre’s Pythagorean Record and his strong counting statistics indicates a strong correlation between the observed leadership traits, styles, and theories and Torre’s success as a manager.
Across 36 seasons as a big league manager, Tony La Russa won 53.6% of his games. La Russa started his career with a little more than eight seasons (1979-1986) as manager of the Chicago White Sox. While in the Southside of Chicago, he won at a .513 clip. Before the team hired him, the White Sox had a .465 winning percentage in the three years prior. La Russa improved that to .493 in his first three years. His last three years in his first stint in the Windy City resulted in a .531 winning percentage which was significantly better than the .448 mark that the White Sox mustered in the three years after the team fired La Russa. La Russa was overall successful as White Sox manager but could not consistently make the playoffs and thrashed between winning and losing records except for one two-year period (1982-1983).

The Oakland Athletics almost immediately hired La Russa, where he quickly had success and had a .542 winning percentage across his tenure. The A’s had managed only a .469 winning percentage in the three years before La Russa came on board, but in the first three full years (1977-1979) after his hire, Oakland won 58.4% of their games, an American League pennant in year two, and a World Series title in year three. The good times did not last; the

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409 “Tony La Russa Managerial Record.”
team slumped to a .443 winning percentage in his last three years.\textsuperscript{411} However, even after La Russa left, the team struggled. The A’s had a .447 winning percentage in the three years after La Russa left the team.\textsuperscript{412} His tenure as Oakland Athletics manager was a resounding success, with three American League pennants and a World Series title. While he could not sustain the success through his entire tenure, the team’s performance after he left displaces some of the blame away from La Russa.

La Russa once again landed on his feet when he took over the St. Louis Cardinals before the 1996 season, replacing Joe Torre. Across sixteen seasons (1996-2011), he led the team to three National League pennants, two World Series championships, and a .544 winning percentage.\textsuperscript{413} His tenure started out mediocrely, with only a .502 winning percentage in his first three years.\textsuperscript{414} But that still represented an uptick from the .482 winning percentage of the previous three years.\textsuperscript{415} His last three years ended his tenure magnificently. The team won at a

\textsuperscript{413}“Tony La Russa Managerial Record.”
.549 clip and won the 2011 World Series, sending La Russa off into a sunset retirement.\textsuperscript{416} The team continued to win after he retired to the tune of a .566 winning percentage in the subsequent three years, including a trip to the World Series in 2013.\textsuperscript{417} However, they have not won a World Series since La Russa left. Regardless of any other results, La Russa’s work with the Cardinals was a success. He won two World Series and mentored countless stars like Albert Pujols and Yadier Molina. La Russa returned from retirement to the Chicago White Sox in 2021.\textsuperscript{418} However, his tenure was too short to consider for this study as it lasted less than two full seasons because of health and performance issues.

La Russa sported a Pythagorean Record that saw his team win 22 more games than expected, which falls in the middle of the pack for managers included in the study.\textsuperscript{419} He is one of only two managers to win a World Series in both the American and National League, along with Sparky Anderson. La Russa’s success is likely correlated with the appearance of the aforementioned traits, theories, and styles of leadership.

Across stints with the San Diego Padres and San Francisco Giants Bruce Bochy won at a clip of .497. While with the San Diego Padres from 1995-2006, he had a winning percentage of .494 and one National League pennant.\textsuperscript{420} He improved the Padres' winning percentage in his first three years by 75 points to .506 in his first three years compared to a .431 clip in the three

\textsuperscript{418}“Tony La Russa Managerial Record.”
\textsuperscript{419}“Tony La Russa Managerial Record.”
years before his arrival in San Diego. His last three years resulted in a .529 winning percentage. The Padres dropped off to a .466 winning percentage in the three years after Bochy left. Overall Bochy’s tenure with the Padres was average. However, his performance was quite spectacular considering the franchise's pedigree, with no World Series wins and only two National League pennants. Bochy’s tenure resulted in more than a quarter of the franchise’s seasons with a winning percentage over .500. While he ultimately had a losing record in San Diego, his tenure could still be considered a success.

Regardless of the losing record Bochy had as San Francisco Giants manager, his tenure will go down as one of the most successful pairings in Major League Baseball history. While he had a .4995 winning percentage in his thirteen seasons, the team won three World Series in a five-year stretch of even-year magic from 2010-2014. In his first three years with the team, the Giants had a .475 winning percentage as a prelude to winning the World Series in year four.
The team had a .499 winning percentage in the three years before Bochy's hiring. The end of his tenure in San Francisco saw the team go through a rebuild and struggle to a .440 winning percentage. The team improved to a .565 winning percentage in the three years after Bochy retired. Bochy is responsible for over a third of the franchise’s World Series championships, including all of its titles since moving West. His losing record is skewed by the deliberate rebuilding phase that the team entered as its championship core aged out at the end of his tenure.

Bochy’s Pythagorean Record, 24 more wins than expected, is the third highest level in the study. When combined with the unprecedented success he led two franchises to, it is indisputable that Bochy experienced immense success. Despite a losing record with both the Padres and Giants, I believe that the appearance of charisma, perseverance, task and relational leadership, and situational leadership were correlated with success. Bochy has a chance to improve his overall record as he takes over the Texas Rangers at the start of the 2023 season.
Part 2: Increased Financial Stakes, New Media Scrutiny, and a Renewed Focus on Analytics

Baseball in *The $100 Million Contract Era* brought increased financial stakes, intensified media scrutiny, and a renewed focus on analytics. Team values exploded, and TV deals reached astronomical levels. The monetary values of player contracts have never been as high. Social media, specifically Twitter, has reduced the barrier between those whose livelihood is baseball and the public. Furthermore, fans had more access to the game with the increased prevalence of streaming. The Information Age also gave rise to an explosion in computer-processing power that decreased costs and increased opportunities for analytics in baseball.

Predicted future revenues impact present spending. Major League Baseball has seen an increase in both its national TV deal values and local media rights fees. While local media rights deals are not publicly available for all 30 teams, and those deals that are accessible are typically vague, analysts believe that those deals increased along similar lines to the national deals. Major League Baseball’s current agreements with FOX, Turner, and ESPN, which all run from 2022-2028, all represented stark increases in value compared to the deals that ran from 2014-2021, which themselves were massive increases over the preceding rights. FOX’s deal increased 39% from $525 million to $728.57 million per year. Turner paid 65% more for its games package at $535 million per year. ESPN paid less total per year at $550 million compared to $700 million in the last deal. However, the agreement reduced the number of games they will broadcast, and as such, the rate they are paying per game has increased. The ever-increasing media money

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caused teams to increase their player payrolls accordingly. As a result, the total league payroll and the individual highest payroll have trended higher since the turn of the century. For example, in 2000, the total payroll was $1,686,271,795, and the New York Yankees had the highest payroll at just north of $92 million. By contrast, in 2022, the total payroll was $4,200,988,230, and the Los Angeles Dodgers had the highest payroll at over $285 million.\textsuperscript{434} Higher payrolls have often brought with them higher expectations for winning. Managers are expected to maximize the talent they are given, no matter what it takes. Furthermore, a higher payroll was typically indicative of the presence of star players. Managers must balance the egos of the locker room to achieve the team’s common goal. Charisma would be beneficial to help unite the various egos in the locker room and provide a collective identity. Furthermore, relational-focused leadership would help reduce players' stress trying to live up to their contracts. Finally, task-focused leadership would help ensure that the monetary output was maximized in wins.

The higher payrolls that teams ran during \textit{The $100 Million Contract Era} as a result of an influx of new revenues coincided with an explosion in player contract values and the average salary in Major League Baseball. Each of the ten largest contracts by total value signed by players has occurred during the era. Only two, both by Alex Rodriguez, were signed before 2019.\textsuperscript{435} Since Kevin Brown signed Major League Baseball’s first $100 million contract in 1998 with the Dodgers, 127 other contracts have reached the hallowed threshold.\textsuperscript{436} The era has also seen an increase in the league’s minimum wage from $170,000 in 1998 to $700,000 as of

The minimum wage as of 2022 is more than double the 1998 level adjusted for inflation. As total contract values and minimum salaries have increased, the average salary in Major League Baseball has followed suit. The average salary of $4,414,184 in 2022 is more than double the $1,998,034 average salary in 2000. While the inflation-adjusted difference of $1,018,503 is a smaller percent difference than the minimum salary, the average salary has still outpaced inflation. An emphasis on relational leadership would help managers deal with clubhouses that could have yearly salary differences of more than $40,000,000 and foster an inclusive environment. Additionally, task leadership would have ensured that players remained focused despite securing generational wealth.

The increased media money mentioned above was a driving factor in the explosion in team values seen in this era. At the turn of the century, the average Major League Baseball team sold for under $200 million. Furthermore, most teams were operating at a loss, causing limited interest in teams when they came up for sale. The turning point for Major League Baseball franchise valuation was the selling of the Los Angeles Dodgers to a consortium for $2.15 billion in 2012 after a sixteen-party bidding auction. Deals in the 2000s had multiples in revenues paid between 2x and 2.5x. However, more recent deals have encroached upon and surpassed 4x. The aforementioned increases in media rights fees primarily drive the escalating multiples. Forbes estimated that as of 2022, the average value of a Major League Baseball franchise is over two

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439 “Minimum Salary - BR Bullpen.”
440 “$170,000 in 1998 → 2022 | Inflation Calculator.”
billion dollars, led by a New York Yankees valuation of six billion dollars. Analysts theorize that the potential for increased local revenues from media rights fees and new revenue streams, such as jersey patches, have driven the significant increases in team value.

A Major League Baseball team's valuation is not independent of the rest of the league. Major League Baseball’s ownership in MLB Advanced Media, BAMTECH, and MLB Network and its investment portfolio contributed over $400 million in value per franchise. Additionally, the rise in team values has seen diminishing returns in growth the more valuable the franchise. For example, the New York Yankees ranked third-to-last in growth rate over the 2009-2019 period, while the Pittsburgh Pirates had the fifth highest growth rate over the same period (274%) but are only the league’s 20th most valuable franchise. Across the twenty-two years Forbes had released rankings through 2019, the average Major League Baseball team’s value increased 11% year-over-year. The higher values of teams have made sports ownership a higher-stakes venture. Teams are principally an investment. Said investment benefits from a strong on-field performance, as indicated by the San Francisco Giants having the largest increase in value from 2009-2019, a period in which they led Major League Baseball in World Series won at three. As such, managers, as one of the primary factors affecting on-field performance, as proven by Christopher R. Berry and Anthony R. Fowler's study on leadership and luck, have even more incentive to perform and be loved by fans and players alike. A focus on task

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444 Ibid.
leadership may increase the odds of positive on-field performance, and a charismatic personality could incentivize owners to be more patient in waiting for results.

Team exposure to larger audiences also increased during the 2000s. Social media drew back the curtains on players’ and managers’ personal lives and game-day thoughts. Twitter, founded in 2006, specifically, has become ingrained into the baseball ecosystem. It provided immediate and constant updates on everything to do with a team. Managers no longer only had to be concerned with the public image during press conferences; instead, every minute of the day functioned as an interview. An inspiring speech or denigration of a player is no longer confined to the people in the room. Managing the image put out was now part of the manager’s job description. Dealing with unsolicited criticism from the masses was not optional but integral to leading a team successfully. An emphasis on relational leadership would be essential to managing press and fan relations. A charismatic personality would also help engender managers with the fans and media, helping to build strong camaraderie that could build a buffer against any potential media snafus.

Major League Baseball also branched out to streaming, which has increased the watchability. When Major League Baseball live-streamed a game between the New York Yankees and Texas Rangers in 2002, it represented the first-ever major professional sports league streaming event. Despite the poor quality of the stream, Major League Baseball knew that streaming would be instrumental to the future of sports broadcasting. Their view has been backed up by a 2021 streaming industry revenue of 988 million US dollars and predicted

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revenues of 4290 million US dollars in 2028 at a compounded annual growth rate of 23.5%.\textsuperscript{446} They became the first league to stream with Apple and on gaming consoles. Major League Baseball’s innovation led them to create what is now known as BAMTECH. BAMTECH is at the forefront of streaming technology and underpins Disney’s Disney+ and ESPN+ streaming services. Because Major League Baseball was so far ahead of its competitors in the streaming industry, it allowed them to launch its streaming service MLB.TV first, and it is, to this date, the most successful sports league streaming service.\textsuperscript{447} The proliferation of Major League Baseball games on streaming services expanded teams’ media footprints. Like social media, streaming brought a heightened focus on managers’ personalities and leadership styles because of the increase in air time. As such, in this era, it was more important for a manager to be endearing and put forth a strong message than in the past.

While analytics had been a part of baseball since its early days, with roots in the “scientific baseball” movement of the 1890s, it gained renewed prominence and importance during the Electronic Entertainment Era. Analytics, at its core, is computational. And the need for computerization had increased as the complexity of the data increased. The Internet Age had brought the ability for teams to economically perform analytics in an attempt to get a leg up on the competition. A PlayStation 4 had more processing power than supercomputers from the late 1990s. A Samsung Galaxy S6 had four times the processing power of the TMC CM-2 supercomputer that was the backbone of many NIKE missile sites across the country.\textsuperscript{448}

Samsung’s latest flagship phone, the S22, had more than eleven times the processing power of the S6, which Samsung released in 2015. Because processing power was cheap compared to the recent past, the costs associated with operating an analytics division were substantially lower than prior to the Internet Age. While the ability to perform advanced analytics for baseball was present at the turn of the century, the motivation to do so was not. That changed with the 2002 Oakland Athletics. A team built with the help of advanced statistics, they overcame doomsday projections after losing their three most prominent stars to tie for the Major League Baseball lead in wins at 103. Once the door opened, it became difficult to close. The role of analytics in baseball has expanded over the last two decades, moving beyond player evaluation to pitching change decisions, defensive shifts, and more. Because of the change in how analytics teams have used analytics, managers’ interactions with it have increased. Knowledge and openness to embracing analytics were essential to the modern-day manager in the Electronic Entertainment Era.

Baseball in *The $100 Contract Era* increased its digital presence, became a larger financial player, and returned to its analytics roots. The increase in television rights media deals fueled increases in team values, payrolls, and player salaries. The advent of social media also increased the sport’s visibility and contributed to an instantaneous news culture. Finally, Major League Baseball branch out to streaming grew baseball’s virtual footprint. Managers had to adapt to new player and media relations challenges. Charisma, perseverance, situational leadership, and focus on task and relational leadership were beneficial in this context. Joe Torre, Tony La Russa, and Bruce Bochy displayed all four, and their success was likely correlated with their appearance.
Conclusion

“The players make the manager, it’s never the other way.”

- George Lee “Sparky Anderson”

Across the six eras analyzed, nine of the managers, all except for Walter Alston, displayed at least a modicum amounts of charisma, task and relational leadership, perseverance, and situational leadership. Alston displayed only the latter three. Relational leadership was the most prevalent and easiest to identify among the chosen managers. While charisma only appeared in nine of the managers in the study, when present, it was typically easy to notice and very impactful. In each era in which a manager in this study won the majority of their World Series titles, the context within and outside of baseball influenced managers.

As Major League Baseball moves forward, I believe that being charismatic and emphasizing relational leadership will be essential for managers. The game will only continue to expand its worldwide footprint, increasing visibility and viewership. As such, because of the need to build team brands, cope with increasing interaction with the media and fans, and the continued push towards on-demand news will make charisma a prerequisite to being a major league manager. Additionally, the continued digitalization of decision-making will heighten the need for relational leadership to act as a stand-out tool for managers. Strategic savvy’s value will continue to be diminished as front offices and computerization make more decisions. The differentiating factor in hiring will thus fall towards the soft skills that make up relationship-focused leadership.
I believe that some of the most impactful factors within baseball that will affect managerial leadership in the future are the continued trend of reducing pitcher workloads, robot umpires, and expansion. Furthermore, the rise of artificial intelligence, the continued globalization of the economy, and the possibility of a recession are all contextual factors that could have a major impact on baseball in the next couple of decades.

Only one active manager, Terry Francona, has two World Series titles. However, Francona has consistently battled major health issues and is the manager of a small-market team in the Cleveland Guardians.\(^{449}\) As such, it is unlikely that he will win a third title and ascend to become a top-ten manager. Six active managers, Brian Snitker, Dave Roberts, Dave Martinez, A.J. Hinch, Alex Cora, and Dusty Baker, have one World Series title.\(^{450}\) Of the sextet, I believe that Dave Roberts or Alex Cora has the best chance of reaching at least three career World Series victories. Each currently manages in a major market, Los Angeles and Boston, with ownership groups that have consistently run high payrolls. Additionally, Roberts is only fifty years old, and Cora is forty-seven.\(^{451}\) Roberts also has the fourth-highest winning percentage of all-time and the highest of all managers with at least 1000 games managed.\(^{452}\) Brian Snitker is sixty-seven years, and Dusty Baker is seventy-three years old as of the start of the 2023 season.\(^{453}\) As such, I deem it unlikely that they will manage long enough to win two more World Series. While A.J. Hinch is only forty-eight, he has yet to prove any success outside of the Houston Astros.\(^{454}\)

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\(^{449}\)“Major League Managers.”

\(^{450}\)“Major League Managers.”


\(^{452}\)“Major League Managers.”


currently has more seasons under .500 than over and has only one season with more than 90 wins.\textsuperscript{455} Combined with his tenuous job status as manager of the Washington Nationals, I find him an unlikely candidate to win two more World Series. Ultimately, I believe that the odds of any manager reaching three World Series victories in the near future are slim. The structural changes to baseball since 1903, such as the increased number of teams and the increase in manager turnover, have created an environment that is not conducive to the long stretches of dominance that each manager in this study had. Managers like Terry Francona have become outliers instead of the standard. Unless baseball undergoes significant change that reduces parity or increases managerial tenure, I fear that managerial greats as we have known them will become relics of the past.

This study has shown that baseball has been an integral piece of American history since at least the beginning of the \textit{World Series Era}. Baseball’s rise and its principles mimicked the ideals of the Progressive Era. Players and managers served their nation in World War I. The sport thrived and crashed along with the rest of the nation during the Roaring Twenties and Great Depression. President FDR made baseball a staple of his arsenal of democracy, and countless players, like Ted Williams, fought against tyranny in the European and Pacific theaters. President Nixon used baseball to push his agenda on drugs and Vietnam. Baseball has played a role in almost every major American historical event since its creation. Those events had a profound impact on baseball. They forced the sport to change and evolve. The fundamentals of the Progressive Era inspired the first usage of analytics in baseball in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The Great Depression inspired the invention of baseball mainstays like the All-Star Game, night baseball, and farm systems. Changing population demographics after World War II spurred a

migration of Major League Baseball teams westward. The dawn of the Information Age reinvigorated analytics’ role in baseball and changed the scouting process. It is inarguable that baseball has been shaped by world events, changing the sport across decades into its current form. However, baseball has also played a role in shaping the world it thrives in.

Years before public schools across the nation were desegregated by *Brown v. Board of Education (1954)*, Jackie Robinson integrated Major League Baseball when he debuted in 1947. Baseball was at the forefront of integration and helped the Civil Rights Movement achieve its goals through the publicity stars like Jackie Robinson and Roy Campanella garnered. The demand to watch baseball jumpstarted the television industry. The first televised World Series in 1947 caused a surge in television sales that never abated. Baseball also helped shape the labor industry for all professional sports with the passage of the first Collective Bargaining Agreement in 1968. Decades later, baseball was again at the forefront of change when it streamed the first professional sports game in 2002. Through its technology company BAMTECH, Major League Baseball was a leader in streaming technology, influencing entertainment beyond the sports realm. While baseball adapted to changing historical context, it also played a role in shaping it. Baseball implemented lasting changes in technology, labor, and civil rights that propelled the world forward.

Since the beginning of the *World Series Era* in 1903, baseball has experienced a lot. Major League Baseball has expanded from sixteen teams in 1903 to thirty in 2023. There have been ten Major League Baseball Commissioners.456 Regular season games have been played in Mexico, Puerto Rico, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Australia.457 Nine strikes or

lockouts have occurred.\textsuperscript{458} Twenty-four teams have won a World Series title.\textsuperscript{459} Throughout all of that and more, managers, leadership, and context have mattered. Context has guided baseball to its current state, and the sport has also contributed to an ever-changing society. Leadership has guided teams to the promised land or doomed them to oblivion. Players have thrived under the tutelage of the right manager or flamed out under the wrong one. Teams have changed names, cities, and leagues but continued to thrive because of strong leadership. While the manager’s role has shifted over time, he has been a constant in the clubhouse, guiding teams year after year. Baseball would not be what it is today without the leadership of Connie Mack, Joe McCarthy, Miller Huggins, John McGraw, Casey Stengel, Walter Alston, Sparky Anderson, Joe Torre, Tony La Russa, and Bruce Bochy. Baseball’s managers should be celebrated for their role in shaping America’s National Pastime. I look forward to seeing how the coming years change baseball and baseball changes the world.

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Appendix

Manager Biographies

Connie Mack

Name: Cornelius “Connie” Alexander Mack

Nickname(s): “The Tall Tactician” and “The Grand Old Man of Baseball”

DOB: December 22, 1862

DOD: February 8, 1956

Teams Managed (Years): Pittsburgh Pirates (1894-1896 as a Player/Manager) and Philadelphia Athletics (1901-1950)

Record (W-L): 3731-3948 [Each is a Major League Baseball record]

Hall of Fame: Inducted as a part of the second class in 1937

World Series Victories: 1910, 1911, 1913, 1929, 1930

League Pennants: 1902, 1905, 1910, 1911, 1913, 1914, 1929, 1930, 1931

Notable Team(s): 1931 Philadelphia Athletics - .704 winning percentage is tied for the 8th highest in the Modern Era (since 1900)

Notable Players Managed: Jimmie Foxx, Eddie Collins, Mickey Cochrane, Rube Waddell, Lefty Grove, Al Simmons, Ty Cobb, Eddie Plank

Major League Playing Career (Years): Washington Senators (1886-1889), Buffalo Bisons (1890)*, Pittsburgh Pirates (1891-1896)

Position (WAR): Catcher (6.9)

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**Notable Quote:** "Humanity is the keystone that holds nations and men together. “When that collapses, the whole structure crumbles. This is as true of baseball teams as any other pursuit in life.” – Connie Mack

*The Buffalo Bisons were a team in the 1890 Players League. It is considered a “major” league for statistical purposes.

**Joe McCarthy**

**Name:** Joseph “Joe Vincent McCarthy

**Nickname(s):** “Marse Joe”

**DOB:** April 21, 1887

**DOD:** January 13, 1978

**Teams Managed (Years):** Chicago Cubs (1926-1930), New York Yankees (1931-1946), Boston Red Sox (1948-1950)

**Record (W-L):** 2125-1333 [Most wins in Yankees history with 1460-867 record]

**Hall of Fame:** Inducted in 1957 by the Veteran’s Committee

**World Series Victories:** 1932, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1941, 1943

**League Pennants:** 1929, 1932, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1941, 1942, 1943

**Notable Team(s):** 1932 New York Yankees – 4th most wins in team history, 1939 New York Yankees – 5th most wins in team history

**Notable Players Managed:** Hack Wilson, Roger Hornsby, Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, Lefty Gomez, Bill Dickey, Joe DiMaggio, Phil Rizzuto, Ted Williams, Bobb Doerr, Johnny Pesky

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Major League Playing Career (Years): N/A; Played fifteen seasons in the minor leagues

Position (WAR): N/A

Notable Quote: “Ten Commandments for Success in Baseball by Joe McCarthy (1949)

1. Nobody ever became a ballplayer by walking after a ball.
2. You will never become a .300 hitter unless you take the bat off your shoulder.
3. An outfielder who throws in the back of a runner is locking the barn after the horse is stolen.
4. Keep your head up and you may not have to keep it down.
5. When you start to slide, slide. He who changes his mind may have to change a good leg for a bad one.
6. Do not alibi on bad hops. Anybody can field good ones.
7. Always run them out. You never can tell.
8. Do not quit.
9. Do not fight too much with the umpires. You cannot expect them to be as perfect as you are.
10. A pitcher who hasn’t control hasn’t anything.”

Miller Huggins

Name: Miller James Huggins

Nickname(s): “Hug” and “Mighty Mite”

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Shapiro 154

DOB: March 27, 1878

DOD: September 25, 1929

Teams Managed (Years): St. Louis Cardinals (1913-1917: 1913-1916 as a Player/Manager)
New York Yankees (1918-1929)

Record (W-L): 1413-1134

Hall of Fame: Inducted in 1964 by Veteran’s Committee

World Series Victories: 1923, 1927, 1928

League Pennants: 1921, 1922, 1923, 1926, 1927, 1928

Notable Team(s): 1920 New York Yankees – Babe Ruth’s first year in New York, 1927 New
York Yankees – highest winning percentage in team history and fifth highest all-time: .714

Notable Players Managed: Roger Hornsby, Home Run Baker, Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, Tony
Lazzeri, Earle Combs

Player Career (Years): Cincinnati Reds (1904-1909), St. Louis Cardinals (1910-1916)

Position (WAR): Second Base (35.4)

Notable Quote: “He was the only man who knew how to keep me in line” -Babe Ruth

John McGraw

Name: John Joseph McGraw

Nickname(s): “Mugsy” and “Little Napoleon”

DOB: April 7, 1873

DOD: February 25, 1934

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Teams Managed (Years): Baltimore Orioles - NL (1899 as Player/Manager), Baltimore Orioles - AL (1901-1902 as Player/Manager), New York Giants (1902-1932: 1902-1906 as Player/Manager)

Record (W-L): 2763-1948 [Second most Wins in Major League Baseball history]

Hall of Fame: Inducted as a part of the second class in 1937

World Series Victories: 1905, 1921, 1922

League Pennants: 1904, 1905, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1917, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924

Notable Team(s): 1921-1924 New York Giants – First manager to win four consecutive pennants in either league

Notable Players Managed: Joe McGinnity, Christy Mathewson, Rube Marquard, Frankie Frisch, Dave Bancroft, Casey Stengel, Hack Wilson, Roger Hornsby, Mel Ott, Bill Terry

Player Career (Years): Baltimore Orioles – NL (1892-1899), St. Louis Cardinals (1900), Baltimore Orioles – AL (1901-1902), New York Giants (1902-1907)

Position (WAR): Third Base, Second Base, and Outfield (45.7)

Notable Quote: “Personally I could never see this idea of taking defeat philosophically,” McGraw said. “I hate to lose, and I never feel myself beaten until the last man is out. I have tried to instill that same fighting spirit in all the teams I have managed.” – John McGraw

Casey Stengel

Name: Charles “Casey” Dillon Stengel

Nickname(s): “The Old Perfessor”

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DOB: July 30, 1890

DOD: September 29, 1975


Record (W-L): 1905-1842

Hall of Fame: Inducted in 1966 by Veteran’s Committee


Notable Players Managed: Hack Wilson, Al Simmons, Joe DiMaggio, Phil Rizzuto, Yogi Berra, Whitey Ford, Billy Martin, Mickey Mantle, Gil Hodges, Duke Snider

Player Career (Years): Brooklyn Dodgers (1912-1917), Pittsburgh Pirates (1918-1919), Philadelphia Phillies (1920-1921), New York Giants (1921-1923), Boston Braves (1924-1925)

Position (WAR): Right Field (20.2)

Notable Quote: “Most ball games are lost, not won” – Casey Stengel

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**Walter Alston**

**Name:** Walter Emmons Alston

**Nickname(s):** “Smokey”

**DOB:** December 1, 1911

**DOD:** October 1, 1984

**Teams Managed (Years):** Los Angeles née Brooklyn Dodgers (1954-1976)

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**Record (W-L):** 2040-1613

**Hall of Fame:** Inducted in 1983 by Veteran’s Committee

**World Series Victories:** 1955, 1959, 1963, 1965


**Notable Teams:** 1955 Brooklyn Dodgers – first World Series victory in franchise history and only World Series title in Brooklyn, 1959 Los Angeles Dodgers – first World Series in Los Angeles

**Notable Players Managed:** Duke Snider, Pee Wee Reese, Gil Hodges, Jackie Robinson, Roy Campanella, Don Drysdale, Sandy Koufax, Don Sutton, Bill Buckner, Tommy John

**Player Career (Years):** St. Louis Cardinals (1936: One game)

**Position (WAR):** N/A

**Notable Quote:** “Look at misfortune the same way you look at success – Don’t Panic! Do your best and forget the consequences.” – Walter Alston

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**Sparky Anderson**

**Name:** George “Sparky” Lee Anderson

**Nickname(s):** “Sparky” and “Captain Hook”

**DOB:** February 22, 1934

**DOD:** November 4, 2010


**Record (W-L):** 2194-1834

**Hall of Fame:** Inducted in 2000 by Veteran’s Committee

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Reds, 1984 Detroit Tigers – last Tigers World Series victory

Notable Players Managed: Johnny Bench, Tony Perez, Pete Rose, Joe Morgan, Tom Seaver, Jack Morris, Lou Whitaker, Alan Trammell, Tony Clark

Player Career (Years): Philadelphia Phillies (1959)

Position (WAR): Second Base (-1.2)

Notable Quote: “Don’t call us (ballplayers) heroes. Fireman are heroes” – Sparky Anderson

Joe Torre

Name: Joseph “Joe” Paul Torre

Nickname(s): N/A

DOB: July 18, 1940

DOD: N/A


Record (W-L): 2326-1997

Hall of Fame: Inducted in 2014 by Expansion Era Committee


Notable Teams: 1998 New York Yankees – Third most wins of all time with 114-48 record and the team with the most regular season victories to win the World Series\textsuperscript{472}

Notable Players Managed: Tom Seaver, Phil Niekro, Ozzie Smith, Andy Pettitte, Mariano Rivera, Wade Boggs, Derek Jeter, Roger Clemens, Mike Mussina, Hideki Matsui, Alex Rodriguez, Randy Johnson, Clayton Kersaw


Position (WAR): Catcher, First Base, and Third Base (57.5) – MVP, 9x All-Star, Gold Glove, and Batting Title

Notable Quote: “When we lost, I couldn’t sleep at night. When we win, I can’t sleep at night. But when you win, you wake up feeling better.” – Joe Torre\textsuperscript{473}

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Bruce Bochy

Name: Bruce Douglas Bochy

Nickname(s): “Boch”

DOB: April 16, 1955

DOD: N/A


Record (W-L): 2003-2029

Hall of Fame: N/A

\textsuperscript{472} Park, Simon, and Thornburg, “Which Teams Won the Most Games in a Season?”


Notable Players Managed: Tony Gwynn, Trevor Hoffman, Fernando Valenzuela, Rickey Henderson, Barry Bonds, Buster Posey, Madison Bumgarner, Carlos Beltran


Position (WAR): Catcher (2.3)

Notable Quote: "I wouldn’t be here if I didn’t want to bring a championship to Texas. I’m all in.” – Bruce Bochy

Tony La Russa

Name: Anthony “Tony” LaRussa

Nickname(s): N/A

DOB: October 4, 1944

DOD: N/A


Record (W-L): 2884-2499

Hall of Fame: Inducted in 2014 by Expansion Era Committee


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**Notable Teams:** 2004 St. Louis Cardinals – 105 wins which tied for the second most in franchise history and the most since the end of WWII

**Notable Players Managed:** Carlton Fisk, Harold Baines, Tom Seaver, Mark McGwire, Dennis Eckersley, Reggie Jackson, Rickey Henderson, Ozzie Smith, Jim Edmonds, Albert Pujols, Scott Rolen, Larry Walker

**Player Career (Years):** Kansas City Athletics (1963), Oakland Athletics (1968-1971), Atlanta Braves (1971), Chicago Cubs (1973) – 132 total career games

**Position (WAR):** Second Base and Shortstop (-0.6)

**Notable Quote:** "It’s a six-month season. I believe in the bubblegum card. Guys that have hit, are gonna hit” – Tony La Russa

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References


Shapiro 171


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