Caesar in Spain: an economic policy?

Robert O. Turek

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CAESAR IN SPAIN: AN ECONOMIC POLICY?

BY

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Preface

During my early studies of Roman history I became intrigued with the question of whether the ancients attempted to control their economy or whether they merely reacted to the changes as they occurred. To me, ancient sources seem to focus primarily on political and military aspects of history.

In this work I will attempt to discover whether Julius Caesar showed a systematic plan of action in dealing with the economy of the Spanish provinces. E. Badian (Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, pp. 18-26) has well shown that the Republican government did not exhibit a systematic economic policy in dealing with its provinces. However, Caesar was a man who seemed to have a better grasp of the economic implications of his actions, but did he exhibit a particular plan of action in this realm?

I would like to thank the Department of Ancient Languages for its help and encouragement in this endeavor, in particular, my advisor, Dr. J.S. White whose advice has been invaluable and Dr. S.F. Johanson, who many times has patiently endured my arguments. I am also indebted to Dr. T.R. Selby for his support and concern and to the Graduate School which has made this year possible with its generous fellowship. Lastly, I would like to thank my wife for typing this paper and supporting me in the darkest hour of this endeavor.
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Roman interest in Spain dates back to at least before the Second Punic War. In 226 B.C. the Ebro treaty recognized Spain as the domain of Carthage; the rights of Saguntum which was allied to Rome had been guaranteed earlier. Following the settlement of the war Spain became Roman territory. For the next seventy years Spain was in fairly constant turmoil and revolt. While Roman rule has generally been characterized as "exploitation, not unmixed with extortion," and territorial expansion at the expense of the natives, there were high spots under the administration of more sensible men such as Cato and Gracchus. From 154 to 133 B.C. Spain was torn apart by two long wars for liberation; the Lusitanian War produced the hero of Spanish independence, Viriathus, and the Celtiberian War brought about a general acceptance of Roman authority.

Although there were some incidences following the destruction of Numantia, the provinces of Spain were relatively peaceful, for this period saw political turmoil in Rome and troubles in the East. Spain was not a center of interest again until the outbreak of the Sertorian War. Following the settlement of Pompeius, Spain remained relatively calm, until Caesar's expeditions in 61 and the outbreak of the Civil War in 49. Let us now take a look at
the situation in Spain during the period following the Senatorial Commission of 133 B.C.

Since 197 B.C. Spain had been divided into two provinces, Ulterior and Citerior (Livy, 32.28.11). The chief administrative official in each province was an ex-praetor or ex-consul with imperium proconsule. The staff of each governor consisted of one quaestor and three legati (one for an ex-praetor) and, of course, some lower echelon clerical workers. The term of duty was usually one year, though extensions were not unusual in times of trouble.

The duties of the provincial administration, either under or with the approval of the Senate and limited by the lex provinciae, are summarized by Van Nostrand:

1. Collection of tribute, taxes, etc.
2. Regulation of industry, commerce and trade
3. Definition and protection of boundaries
4. Introduction and supervision of Roman Law
5. Determination of political status of communities
6. Recommendation of individuals or groups for citizenship

The duties of the quaestors were generally financial since they were responsible for the stipendium.

Spain was not the coveted opportunity that the Eastern provinces were. There was less chance for personal profit and the absence of publicani provided less chance for rewards, financial or political.

It is not in the scope of this paper to delve into the complexities of Roman foreign policy, so let it suffice to say that in return for the organization and administration
Rome expected compensation, which she received in three forms: money, men and the fruits of mines and fields. The major part of this was the tributum, which was a stipendium certum, part of which was paid as vicensumas (grain tax) at the rate of one twentieth or half a tithe. The stipendium was paid generally in coin but sometimes in kind directly to the quaestor by the natives so no tax contracts were involved.

For the early period of Roman rule Livy provides an idea of the amounts of gold and silver which were extracted from Spain, though there is some dispute as to the exact nature of the Oscenses argenti. These metals probably were not a part of the stipendium but rather fell to Rome as the produce of state owned mines. The yield decreased from its early magnitude and in the time of Polybius was about 25,000 denarii annually (34.9) from the mines near Carthago Nova.

The term vectigalia was used to designate a variety of other taxes. Sources for these taxes are scanty, and much is assumed from the policies in other provinces. The portoria, customs duties, were two per cent and applied only to goods entering or leaving the province, thus intra-province trade was duty-free. Various other taxes covering inheritance, manumission and sales were imposed, and probably additional monies were collected from the leasing of whatever ager publicus the provinces contained, forests and a probable salt monopoly.

Plutarch (Pomp. 45) provides a definite account of
public finance for 63 B.C., before the inclusion of Pompeius' new provinces. The annual income of Rome was 50,000,000 denarii a year, and Spain's proposed portion about six million, later five to eight million, not including portoria and "other less important sources like the monopolies on public forests, and the fishing, river and salt taxes." Thus Spain, as a whole, stands as the second most important source of revenue to the Republic prior to the settlement of Pompeius' new provinces.

The primary administrative expense of the provinces of Spain was the army, usually one or two full legions in each province, from the fall of Numantia to the Civil Wars of Caesar. Caesar found two legions in Ulterior when he arrived as proconsul (Plut. Caes. 12). Surely during the Sertorian War the number had been greater. In 55 B.C. Pompeius was given both provinces of Spain with four legions which he probably increased to six regular legions and one in Italy; the budget was one thousand talents (six million denarii). T. Frank estimates a legion at about 800,000 to 1,000,000 denarii a year, from which we can see that the major expense was the armies. If administrative costs and expenses for public works, roads, harbors, etc. are included, it is probable that the budget generally broke even and at times, such as when additional troops were needed, was "in the red."

In dealing with the flow of wealth in or out of Spain, its balance of payments, other aspects are scantly recorded.
Money taken out by each administration varied greatly depending on the greed and ethics of the governor. Caesar enriched himself handsomely when he was proconsul, probably taking out enough to cover his supposed twenty-five million denarii debt (App. B.C. 2.26), but this was an unusual case and affected parts of the peninsula which were not under Roman control until that time. The sums extracted by other governors were not nearly as large during peaceful times, and that Spain was not considered as lucrative an assignment as the Eastern provinces has already been pointed out. The removal of money from the provinces as profits of tax farmers was small because the main bulk of the taxes, the stipendium, was not farmed out, and natives probably received the contracts for portoria and other minor taxes.

Commercial investments in the provinces were high. "It is likely that renewed placements of investments abroad used more Italian credit than the profits brought." During Cicero's consulship an embargo on gold and silver leaving Italy was imposed. Though this primarily was going to the Eastern provinces, it does show that there was some concern for Rome's balance of payments and it is not unreasonable to assume that some of these investments were headed for Spain. It seems to me that the balance of payments during this period was generally in favor of Spain. Yet Spain provided a source of funds for individuals such as Caesar and Pompeius and was known as a land of wealth. Let us now examine that wealth and its relation to the economic
situation before Caesar's quaestorship.

Spain was well known in ancient times as a source of mineral wealth. Pliny (N.H. 3.30) states "metallis plumbi, ferri, aeris, argentii, auri tota ferme Hispania." Even Catullus comments on its wealth in one of his poems (29.19), probably referring to the activities of Caesar as proconsul. Roman mining in Spain was extensive, but evidence dealing with Republican times is not as extensive as that for the Imperial period. Archaeological evidence is also meager in that few sites have been extensively examined, and certain problems present in the mines have tended to obscure workings of the Republican period. Many mines were continuously or intermittently worked which destroyed some evidence of earlier workings. Rio Tinto mines were worked by Carthaginians; the Romans then worked them for gold and silver (Strabo 3.2.8). Important finds of first century B.C. coins have been found in the mining town there, showing it was well worked in the late Republic. The mines reached their peak in the first and second centuries of our era, were reopened by Visigoths in the fourth and are even being worked today for copper. Ancient slag heaps were sometimes re-smelted for whatever ore was left when the mines were worked out, thus destroying evidence of earlier workings. Many less elaborately worked mines provide difficult dating due to the similarity in techniques and equipment of the period extending from early times to the Middle Ages.

The Romans did work the mineral deposits in Spain
extensively during the Republican times. Ownership of the mines is in dispute. Probably the Romans overtook ownership of silver and gold mines which the Carthaginians had worked. Livy's accounts of silver and gold reserves taken to Rome were probably from state owned mines. Strabo (3.2.10) definitely stated that during his time the mines were privately owned and T. Frank supposes they were sold during the Sullan period. Crassus owned mines in Spain during Caesar's time (Plut. Crass. 2), and mining companies (societas) are noted in the Republican lead mines. Later, Tiberius is credited with having begun the state takeover of privately owned mines (Tac. Ann. 6.19.1). On the running of the state owned mines leased to individual miners and the organization of the administration of the mines and mining communities, the Lex Metalli Vipascensis provides valuable information dealing with Imperial times. Some similar, though not as extensive regulations, were probably in effect for state owned mines during Republican times to insure work was maintained and controlled.

Roman mining differed economically from modern in certain aspects. Quick profits were important due to a lack of extensive credit, thus ore with a somewhat lower percentage was not smelted, though in a long-term operation it would have been profitable. While the market for metals was less sensitive on a short term due to the slowness of communication, new finds would drastically change the gold-silver-bronze ratio. Labor was basically manual though large
mines in Imperial times did show some surprising technical and engineering advances such as the Archimedes screw (cochlea) and water wheels for drainage, hoists for hauling and even the diverting of rivers for hydraulic mining. Labor was either low paid freemen or slave. Polybius (Strabo, 3.2.10) recorded the workings around Carthago Nova which employed 40,000 workmen and yielded 25,000 drachmae, a profit of seven per cent. If the 25,000 indicated net profit, however, the percentage would have been much higher.

Gold was commonly found present with silver (Pliny, N.H. 33.80) and was mined in Spain during the Republican times, but the major gold fields of the Northwest were not opened to Romans until after Augustus' Spanish Wars. Silver remained the most sought precious metal in Spain during the Republic. Caesar himself in his triumph symbolized the province as the land of silver (Vell. Pater., 2.56.2). Hannibal took three hundred pounds of silver a day from Spanish mines, probably those around Carthago Nova (Pliny, N.H. 33.97); while the Roman yield after occupation was somewhat less, Livy still reports amounts which annually account for about five per cent of the estimated state income from 218 to 168 B.C. The mines around Carthago Nova were slowly played out, a fact which West assumes led to the decline of that city as an administrative center. Augustus moved the capital of the Eastern province to Tarraco. Other silver mines in Citerior remained important though, with centers around Osca and modern Murcia. Around Castulo two
mining companies, *metallum Samariense* and *Antonianum*, were considered important in Republican times. The Sierra Morena range proved to be very profitable and was extensively worked in Imperial times. Strabo mentions the importance of Turdetania and regions around Ilipa and Sisapo (3.2.3, 3.2.8). Some areas in what later became Lusitania were probably opened as a result of Caesar's pacification of the Western coast.

Lead is commonly found in ores along with silver and was an important export of Spain in Republican times and continued to be so until high quality British lead dominated the market in the Early Empire (Pliny, *N.H.* 34.164). It is generally agreed that the lead mines were privately owned (Pliny, *N.H.* 34.165). At the modern Linares in the Sierra Morena range, where interruptions in operations which Davies relates to the activities of Sextus Pompeius in 44 B.C. are noted, galena, lead ore, as well as silver were mined. Other centers were around Ilurco, Castona, Castulo and Ovetum, and lead coffins have been found at Hispalis (Seville). A number of lead ingots have been found, many attributable to Spain with Republican inscriptions.

Other metals and minerals played a role in Spain's mining economy; tin or "white lead" mines in Ovieda and Cantabria reopened during the first century B.C. Spanish tin monopolized the market during the early Imperial times as it was of a better quality than the English variety. Copper was an important metal in the Rio Tinto district as it
is today. Hispanis and Corduba served as centers for this trade. Numerous coins were found in this area from first century B.C.; while the metal itself was so cheap there that it was used for objects made of terracotta in other places. Quicksilver was mined for making cinnabar (minium) and in purifying gold; antimony, used as a remedy, was possibly also mined at Lineares.

A good portion of the metals probably remained in the provinces, paid to the governors and then redistributed as payment for troops and other administrative costs. Some of the metals were issued by the municipalities as local coinage, both in silver and bronze during the second and first centuries B.C. The profits, though, did not aid the natives as much as the Italians and Romans in Spain. The owners of the lead mines known from the ingots mentioned above were all Italians. Some metal would have been removed from the provinces as profits by Romans who did business there, such as mine owners like Crassus, or as personal gains by governors and their staffs. This loss was probably balanced by investments and immigration from Italy.

Spain was also considered a land of great agricultural wealth in its early days (Polybius, 3.17.3; also, later, Justinus, 44.1), but such was not actually the case. In the early times of Roman rule, grain had to be sent to Spain. Agriculture was limited during Republican times to the South and East coast regions for the central highlands were not well suited for farming. West notes that presently
thirty-three per cent of the land is in grain, forty per cent in forests and pastures, four and one half per cent in vines and olives and feels these are approximate for the Empire. The percentages were probably not as large in Republican times, and olive growing especially had not become as popular as it did under the Empire (Pliny, N.H. 14.150, 15.8).

Grain production was estimated by Pliny as about equal to Gaul (N.H. 37.803), and Strabo points out that some towns had to buy grain (3.1.2). Baetica, the rich plain between Flumen Anas and Baetis, was important as an area of grain cultivation. The town of Eborce was also called Cerialis and the coins of Acinipo, Ilipense and Ulia show wheat as a symbol. Caesar mentions the grain of Citerior (B.C. 1.48-49, 2.18), but this was probably only for local use, and for any invading armies which happened to be involved in a Civil War around there. Barley was grown around Carthago Nova. By the time of the Empire, "Spain as a whole was self-supporting, but... the Baetis Valley alone had a surplus to be exported."

Olive cultivation requires time and capital to establish. While groves are mentioned twice in the Bellum Hispaniense (27.1,3) they were probably not grown extensively outside of the urbanized Baetis Valley until after Augustus brought peace to the province. West points to the need of urbanization and the growth of the concept of capitalistic farming on a more profitable scale spurring on the change from
grain to olive farming. He shows that the restriction placed on viniculture and olive growing in the Republican times seemed to have little effect, especially in olive production. There is doubt, though, whether this restriction was imposed on all the provinces or only on Gaul and whether it was intended to aid Italian farmers and wine merchants or those of Massilia. In any case, the cultivation of olives, a very profitable and important industry in Spain under the Empire, began in Republican times.

Wine was an important product of Spain during the late Republican and early Imperial times; Baetica exported large quantities before Augustus, and Pliny later records Spanish wine as the best of the inferior wines (N.H. 14.41, 30.71). Viniculture was also more profitable than grain.

Spain was noted during Caesar's time for other agricultural products which included spartum for rope, honey of Celtiberia and figs. Animals also provided a profitable business. Polybius mentioned oxen, cattle, swine and sheep (34.8.7-10), and Caesar mentions the purchase of Spanish horses for his Gallic campaigns (B.G. 7.55). The period following the fall of Numantia was a generally peaceful and stable time; agriculture showed "greater diversification and a more intensive cultivation" than was possible before, especially in the South and on the Eastern coast.

The fishing industry of Spain was well known for its
garum, the best coming from Carthago Nova (Pliny, N.H. 31.94). A more important and profitable industry was salt fish, tunny and mackerel especially. Coins of Gades, Ilipa, Emporiae and certain other towns regularly used the tunny fish as a symbol. Spanish oysters, while known, West feels were not exported.

Industry, trade and commerce were also growing during the late Republic. Sea trade was extensive. The port of Gades, especially active, was mentioned by Caesar (B.C. 2.18). Baetica, as already mentioned, was prosperous in agricultural produce and minerals, and the Punic traders had probably already laid the foundations for commerce there before the Romans arrived. On the East coast, Carthago Nova had a fine port, while Tarraco terminated a land trade route to Italy. The river system of Spain played an important part in the trade, both within Spain itself and between Spain and Italy, its chief export destination.

Trade appears to be in private hands until the time of the Severii, and control may have been in the hands of Italians or Romans. Spain was considered one tax unit so intra-provincial trade would produce a higher profit, while export-import business was subject to a two per cent (or two and one half per cent) tariff.

Municipal development was also advancing during the late Republic. The South, the area to become the province of Baetica under Augustus, was becoming quite urbanized and
adopted many Roman customs. Strabo says that they even forgot their own language (3.2.15), an obvious exaggeration. The hill-towns and tribal units of the central highlands were declining. We shall look more closely at the aspects of municipal development and "Romanization" in the last chapter of this paper when we discuss Caesar's encouragement of municipal advancement. It will suffice to say that some progress had been made and that Spain was ready for the steps that Caesar was to take.

Polybius gives us a summary of the prices in Southern Spain for c. 150 B.C. (34.8.7-10). The prices and the cost of living which is inferred from them was considerably lower than that at Rome, while it is interesting to note, slightly higher than those in the Po Valley (Polybius, 2.15). This fact would give impetus to immigration of Italian poor who have already been mentioned in connection with mining and commerce. Rostovtzeff noted that the flow of emigration from Italy during the first century B.C. shifted from East to West due to the troubles in the East. There were enough citizens in Ulterior during the Civil Wars for Varro's call up of 18,000,000 HS, 20,000 pounds of silver, and 120,000 modii of grain (Caes., B.C. 2.18).

After the fall of Numantia in 133 B.C. there was a period of general economic growth in the settled regions of the Spanish provinces, interrupted first by the Sertorian War. Caesar's military expedition of 61 B.C. did not affect the civilized parts of the provinces greatly, but the
Civil Wars of Caesar and later Augustus brought on hardship. The growth after 133 was slow and uneven; Rome's policy did not seem to attempt to foster either economic or urban growth directly, and the Spains suffered at the hands of poor governors and a slowness of change. An example is the bankruptcy revision enacted by Caesar while proconsul (Plutarch, Caes, 12). In a period of economic growth, loans would foster expansion, but Spain's laws and the collection of a debt were very strict. Add to this debts incurred from the reparation of the Sertorian War along with the general conservative reluctance of the governors and a debt problem arises of the magnitude to make it worthy of mention in Plutarch's biography. Such unwillingness to deal promptly with the problems of the province in addition to an unsensitive administration hindered development which might have blossomed in the first century B.C. instead of the first century A.D. But such was not the case. When Caesar enters the picture, Spain was growing at an erratic rate economically.
Footnotes for Chapter I


5. Sporadic trouble and wars of expansion did occur; in c. 98 the Arevaci revolted and in 92 the Celtiberians again. These wars did not greatly affect the settled areas of the provinces not stir enthusiasm in Rome. For other minor wars see Fasti Triumphales. App., Iber. 99-100.

6. For early administration J.J. Van Nostrand, The Reorganization of Spain by Augustus (Berkeley: University of California, 1916), pp. 90-95, and G.H. Stevenson, Cambridge Ancient History, 1932, IX, 437-474. In 65 Gn. Calpurnius Piso was sent to Spain as quaestor propraetore. He seems to be the only quaestor sent as governor.

7. Van Nostrand, Reorganization of Spain, pp. 92-93.

8. Quaestors could serve as judicial officers, as Caesar himself did (Suet., Iul. 8).


11. Livy, 29.3.5, 43.2.12, 30.26.6. This seems to have been the rate set by the Carthaginians. Sources on all the taxes of Spain for the Republican period are at times scanty, some of them must be inferred from the policies in other provinces, Van Nostrand, Economic Survey, III, 126-135.

13. New portoria and vectigalia were established in 179 B.C. (Livy 40.51.8); generally, on such taxes, Van Nostrand, Economic Survey, III, 145-147.

14. Van Nostrand, Economic Survey, III, 146; 2½% is supposed from the inscribed potsherds of Monte Testaccio; T. Frank, "On export tax of Spanish harbors," AJP, LVII (1936), 87-90, and "Notes on Roman commerce," JRS, XXVII (1937), 72-79; most potsherds are from the Empire though.

15. Ager publicus would include leases of mines. T. Frank, "Dominium in solo provinciali' and 'Ager publicus," JRS, XVII (1927), 145, feels the only ager publicus in Spain during the Republic was near Carthago Nova and in the mining regions.


17. On armies, T. Frank, Economic Survey, I, 222-231, 333-336; Polybius (6.39) gives some idea of salary, which seems to have remained the same until Caesar's time (Suet., Iul. 26).

18. Plut. Caes. 28, Pomp. 55; surely a political move to counter Caesar's Gallic legions. E. Meyer sees in Pompeius' control of these legions in absentia through legati as a basis for supporting a precedent of the Principate, Caesar Monarchie und das Principat des Pompejus (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta'sche, 1963), pp. 176-77.


22. L.C. West, Imperial Roman Spain, the Objects of Trade (Oxford: Blackwell, 1929), pp. 40-56 gives a full list of passages in ancient authors dealing with mines and mineral wealth along with a good general summary on mining especially in Imperial times. O. Davies, Roman Mines in Europe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935) is very useful, see Chapter One for general aspects of mining and Chapter Four which deals with Spain in particular.

24. On legal aspects of sub-soil mineral rights, Davies, *op. cit.*, pp.2-5. In Republican times there seemed to be no distinction between ownership of soil and sub-soil.


31. In Polybius' day they were still profitable, see Strabo 3.2.10. Increase c.150 B.C., T. Frank, *Economic Survey*, I,

32. L.C. West, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7, 43-44.


37. O. Davies, *op. cit.*, p. 130.


40. O. Davies shows that some municipalities had control over certain mines, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

41. The mining communities themselves were not greatly benefitted by their wealth as they were closed to extensive intercourse with surrounding localities. 95% of coins found at Rio Tinto were badly worn—this, of course, was mostly during Imperial times, but probably also occurred
during Republican times. O. Davies, op. cit., p. 13.


44. Ibid., p. 18.


47. Cicero, De Republica 3.16 has been cited to show Roman policy of economic restriction for the betterment of their own industries or those of the Italians, as M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire, pp. 22, 548 n. 17, shows it applied to the other western provinces and may have been enacted in 125. T. Frank, Roman Imperialism (New York: Macmillian, 1929), pp. 280-281; Economic Survey, I, 172-174, holds that it was only intended to aid Massilia and dates it at c. 154; also, E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (Pretoria: Communications of the University of South Africa, 1967), pp. 20-21. I tend to agree with Frank and Badian since it seems odd that this would be the only example of such a policy of restriction in favor of Italian farmers, if it existed.

48. Strabo, 3.2.6; West, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

49. Pliny also mentions a talking crow (N.H. 10.124) - this was not of great economic import, but any crow who spoke Latin or Celtiberian is worthy of mention.


53. On river systems, Van Nostrand, Economic Survey, III, 189-192. The Ebro Valley showed most foreign influence, Greek and Roman. Baetis was the most important river in the West. Also, L.C. West, op. cit., pp. 4-9.


56. L.C. West, *op. cit.*, p. 9 and *supra*, p. 17 n. 14. Higher profits would result for no tariff would have to be paid, though it is possible that the tariff was passed on to the buyer.


In the ten years between 69 and 59 B.C., C. Julius Caesar, while holding all the offices to which a Roman nobilis was entitled (except censor and dictator), had his first extensive contact with provincial finances on an administrative level. This contact centered in Hispania Ulterior, the province of Further Spain. Here he served as quaestor, here he first won the title of imperator, here he was able to set his personal finances in order, and here he formulated some of the policies of finance which he later employed as dictator. In this chapter we shall look at some aspects of Caesar's early career, in particular his financial policies in Spain, and attempt a comparison with his later policies in the field of credit and debt.

Caesar held the office of quaestor in 69, and as such was appointed to the staff of the governor of Hispania Ulterior, the ex-praetor Antistius Vetus, whose son later served Caesar during the Civil Wars. According to Suetonius (Jul. 7.1) Caesar's assignment was judicial; "cum mandatu PR. iure dicundo," he conducted court on an assize circuit throughout the conventus. The language itself of the passage indicates a reliable authority in as much as Suetonius had access to official records. Though little other evidence exists concerning Caesar's quaestorship, with the exception
of certain biographical anecdotes which are disputed, it is probable that he was at least introduced to the administrative organization of provincial finances and of the economics of Spain in particular.

Although Caesar took an active interest in his duties and he himself supposedly said "...initio quaesturae suae eam provinciam ex omnibus provinciis peculiarem sibi constituisse et quae potuisset eo tempore beneficia largitum esse" (Bell. Hisp. 42), his interests lay elsewhere than in the provinces. At thirty years of age his election to the quaestorship provided him a seat in the Senate under the Sullan constitution, and it is reasonable to assume that his interest would have been the furthering of his own career. He left his post early and on the return journey the puzzling anecdote concerning his unsuccessful attempt to further incite the Transpadanes who were already "de petenda civitate agitantes" (Suet. Iul. 8).

Caesar's next service in Spain came in 61, when the province of Ulterior fell to him after his praetorship. He served there "pro consule" according to Suetonius. On his way out of town, Caesar was accosted by his creditors (Suet., Iul. 18; Plut., Caes. 11). It would be helpful at this point to look at Caesar's personal financial situation in order to gain some insight into the political and economic motivation which might have instigated the actions during his proconsulship in Spain, both military and economic.
A political career had become quite costly by the time of the late Republic and "the Roman Senator, particularly in the early part of his career, was frequently in debt well above his wealth and disposable assets." Aedileships became especially expensive, which led Cicero to comment on its necessity but to advise remaining within one's resources (Off. 2.57). The cost of elections was skyrocketing as was the use of bribery and secret agreements which can be seen in the frequent accusations of ambitus. The involved situation of the consular election of 54 B.C. is a good example, while for the cost of the votes, Caesar's own words to his mother concerning his pontifical election, "...dum se nisi pontificem non reversurum" (Suet., Iul. 13), provide some idea. Indeed, his opponent Catulus tried to remove Caesar from the running by offering to pay some of his debts (Plut., Caes. 7.2). The money lenders themselves were not unwilling to make a profit from elections as can be seen in the sudden rise of the interest rate from four to eight per cent in 54 (Cic., Att. 4.15.7; Quint. 2.14.4).

In as much as eligibility for office required at least Equestrian status along with a wealth in disposable resources of 400,000 HS, and by law (though probably not generally enforced until after 49 B.C.) the hoarding of coin was restricted, much of a man's wealth would necessarily be tied up in land with which he would be unwilling to part as it was an indication of his financial position. The sale of a large portion of a Senator's property could reflect on
his credit standing, his fides. This hold on land prompted Caesar to remark: "...integras vero tenere possessiones, qui se debere fateantur, cuius animi aut cuius impudentiae est?" (B.C. 3.20). As a result a politician would often borrow when in need of cash rather than liquidate his own resources.

"To remain a senator not only in legal terminology your existimatio, but also your fides must remain intact." Failure to meet financial obligations was a cruel fortune under Roman law. The treatment of debtors was harsh. Proscriptio and venditio bonorum could result, and a man might even be banned from public places (infamia) or removed from the Senate by the censors. This would quite literally ruin a politician's career for life. However, the process of temporary bondage (addictio) to the creditor was probably not enforced in the late Republic.

Unless one had a considerable family fortune at his disposal the obvious and only solution was to borrow. But this road ran in two directions. The loan was in actuality an investment in the future of the rising politician often with no tangible security or collateral. A good deal of the money was spent on intangibles such as games or ambitus. For a creditor whose only interest was the recovery of his capital, the calling up of such a debt would not readily be an advantage. The money had been spent. Caesar recognized the duality of the creditor-debtor relationship when he borrowed from his officers to pay his soldiers
Frederiksen believes this was the reason for Caesar's loan from Cicero in 47 or 46.

The complexities of personal finances can be seen in Cicero's loan mentioned above. After repeated attempts to collect, Caesar's secretary Faberius offered to pay off the debt with the notes of others, a process called delegatio debitoris (Cic., Att. 12.3.2).

"The greater the wealth that could be concentrated in the hands of individuals, the more the struggle for political power was transformed into a problem of finance." It was of great importance for the rising politician to be an expert at manipulating funds, usually someone else's, and Caesar was an expert. Though his family was not one of the wealthiest, Caesar managed to raise the funds for an extravagant early career. Plutarch reports that he was already thirteen hundred talents in debt before he held any public office (Caes., 5.4) and surely his quaestorship would not have provided all the sums he would need. As curator of the Appian Way in 67 B.C., he spent personal funds for some of the work. As aedile, he furnished public works and exhibitions and a gladiatorial show in honor of his father which threatened to be so extravagant that the Senate limited the number of pairs of combatants. His election as pontifex maximus and praetor must have been very costly, but it was not political costs alone that increased Caesar's debts. He was well known for his extravagance, such as the villa on Lake Nemi, which when

(Caes., B.C., 1.39).
found distasteful he had torn down and rebuilt, or Servillia's pearl. It is not surprising that his debts amounted to twenty-five million denarii as Appian states (B.C. 2.26).

Caesar was a good manipulator, even if one believes only a part of his financial involvements while he was consul and later Gallic proconsul, absent from Rome. He made a good profit from the Egyptian affair, dividing six thousand talents from Ptolemy Auletes (the Flute-player) with Pompeius, a scheme that Crassus had attempted a few years earlier but failed (Suet. Iul. 54). His intrigues in the scandalous election of 54 B.C. and his "buying" of many Senators with Gallic money were well known, and mention has already been made of his use of the creditor-debtor relationship. From his management of his personal funds we can see that Caesar had a good grasp of the intricacies of financial manipulation along with the problems of debt and that at the time of his leaving for Spain he was very much in debt and on bad terms with his creditors (Suet.,Iul. 18; Plut.,Caes. 11).

Who these creditors were we are not told, but whoever they were, their action at this precise time seems strange. We may well understand their seeing the period between Caesar's immunity as praetor and his actual accession to the proconsulship as their only chance for legal steps to recover their money, but their action came just before Caesar had an opportunity to improve his personal fortune (or rather the lack thereof) for the first time. It is very
unlikely that, had Caesar been unable to persuade Crassus or some other wealthy individual to cover his debts until he returned from Spain, these creditors would have been able to recover their investments. The money had already been spent mostly on intangibles - games, elections and public works.

Two explanations may be proposed for this inopportune recall of loans. It might well have been politically instigated by Caesar's enemies to delay his departure from Rome. That Caesar was in a hurry to depart for Spain is related by Suetonius (Iul. 18) and Michael Grant rightly suggests that he felt uncomfortable with the victorious Pompeius returning in part due to his supposed intrigue with Pompeius' wife, Mucia. Caesar's enemies realized that a delay in his departure would afford them a delightful opportunity to create animosity between Pompeius and Caesar.

While this supposition on political grounds may be likely we are given no support for it from our sources. It is more likely that this was merely a manifestation of the need for money among the money lenders. With the advent of Pompeius, new opportunities for investment in the new Asian provinces would open. During Cicero's consulship it was necessary to restrict the outflow of gold and silver from Italy. Allen has proposed that this money was to be used in provincial investments. If Caesar's creditors were money lenders of the Ordo Equestris, which seems likely, they would have been in need of ready cash for investment in
Asia. They might well have assumed that wealthy Crassus, to whom Caesar had been allied in the past and who wished to oppose the returning Pompeius, would be willing to cover some of his debts now, which he did with eight hundred and thirty talents (Plut., Caes. 11). They would be willing to forgo the additional year's interest in favor of the possibly larger gains to be made, so Caesar merely exchanged one group of creditors for another, Crassus, who might be expected to support his ally more willingly.

Caesar's haste to leave for his province has already been mentioned, and indeed, he did leave before the allotment of and budget for the province had been formally ratified by the Senate (Suet., Iul. 18). Suetonius gives two reasons - to avoid lawsuits, possibly more actions by creditors, or "...quo maturius sociis inplorantibus subveniret"; calling to mind his later haste to reach Genava in 58 B.C. (Caes., B.G. 1.7). As soon as Caesar arrived in Spain he raised an additional ten cohorts to augment the forces already there (Plut., Caes. 12) and Caesar might well have used the "socii inplorantes" and his necessity for early departure to request additional funds in the budget to support this new legion. However, these cohorts could surely have been paid from the booty, and Caesar would have had some idea of the extent of the profits to be gained and expenses and necessities before beginning his campaign. We are not given any information that the allotment for Spain was increased at this time.
Caesar's term as proconsul in Ulterior was characterized by two aspects. The first was his military exploitation for personal financial rewards and augmentation of his political career by conquest. The other was his administrative reforms of the Spanish economic situation. According to T. Frank, "Julius Caesar provided the ugliest example in Roman history of provincial looting for personal gain." We might partially excuse Caesar's ruthless conquests on the basis of bringing peace to a region which was being ravaged by the most savage and incorrigible brigands, but such does not seem to be the case. Dio (37.52.1-2) explicitly states that the situation was not as grave as Caesar's actions were brutal and excessive. Suetonius (Iul. 54) tells us that he plundered a certain Lusitanian town after it had surrendered. While the brigandage along the northern borders of Hispania Ulterior had been a constant and expensive burden, there is no evidence, neither primary nor secondary other than Suetonius' brief statement (Iul. 18), that would indicate it was any worse at this particular time, nor that it threatened the province to such an extent that Caesar had to rush to his command and raise an additional ten cohorts, bringing the strength of the contingent to about three legions.

As explanation, not excuse, we may look to the system itself, which produced governors who acted as Caesar did. The career of a Roman politician was expensive and often as not he was considerably indebted by the time of a provincial appointment. Since government service paid no
salary, a magistrate looked to his provincial term to provide some capital to help cover the expenses incurred in gaining the office. In this light, the Senate would sometimes vote a surplus in the last provincial appointment for a magistrate, as was probably the case in the unusually high four and one half million denarii Macedonian budget for L. Piso in 58. Caesar was personally indebted and the province provided a long-awaited means of alleviating some of that burden while also increasing his political reputation by the title of imperator. Our sources are in agreement that his military operations made him wealthy and provided some booty to the treasury (App., B.C. 2.8).

When Caesar had concluded his conquests, having enriched himself that he might return to Rome "...cuius nunc venti valde sunt secundi" (Cic., Att. 2.1.6) and been proclaimed imperator, he turned to affairs of administration as proconsul and patron of the province. We see here a policy similar to the one he followed later in Gaul, fighting during the season and civil administration during the off season.

Appian (B.C. 2.8) specifically states that Caesar neglected public and judicial administration. This statement follows in context his account of Caesar's conquests and precedes Caesar's return to Rome to stand for consul, so it cannot be taken in the supposition that Caesar at first neglected administrative duties in favor of conquest and must stand as an overall statement concerning Appian's view of the proconsulship. Contemporary sources tell us
that Caesar was active as a benefactor in civil and judicial administration. Cicero mentions this in his speech Pro Balbo 43; Caesar himself in the De Bello Civili 2.18,20; and mention is also made in the De Bello Hispaniensi 42. Plutarch (Caes. 12) is a specific source for a debt settlement in Spain. It appears that Appian either overlooked Caesar's civil measures through lack of proper preparation and proper source material, or that he is attempting to shade Caesar's character as a civil administrator in favor of his military prowess. For such a purpose, a simple omission would not have been sufficient.

Our sources mention two main actions by Caesar concerning the economic status of the province:

1. Caesar sought to lessen the burden of taxation imposed since the Sertorian War: "insequente praetura ampliato honore vectigalia quae Metellus inposuisset a senatu petisse et ea pecunia provinciam liberasse..." (Bell. Hisp. 42).

2. Caesar eased the settlement of debts: "... καὶ μάλιστα τὰς τῶν χρεωφειλετῶν καὶ δανειστῶν ἱώμενος διαφοράς. ἔτι τὰ τῶν προσιόντων τοῖς ὀφείλοντι καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἐνελαυτὸν δυνὸ μὲν μέρη τὸν δανειστὴν ἀναφείσθαι, τῷ δὲ λοιπῷ χρῆσθαι τὸν δεσπότην, ἢ ἐχρὶ ἄν οὕτως ἐκλυθῇ τὸ δάνελον." (Plut., Caes. 12)
During the campaign against Sertorius, Q. Caeclius Metellus Pius served as governor of Ulterior. Following the murder of Sertorius in 72 and the final operations of the war in 71 a settlement was made by Pompeius. In Citerior Pompeius seems to have acted justly and gained many clientes. As a result, Citerior is an especially active Pompeian stronghold during the Civil Wars for Pompeius and later for his sons, a fact of which Caesar took note later (B.C. 2.18). Grants of citizenship, affirmed by Lex Gellia Cornelia, even extended into Ulterior. Metellus must have imposed certain taxes to cover some of the cost of the war, either during or in the final settlement, and these taxes were still in effect when Caesar arrived as the statement in the De Bello Hispaniensi indicates.

The term vectigalia generally is used to include taxes other than tributum, which for Spain had been a half a tithe since Carthaginian times (Livy 43.2.12) and had been increased in the past to pay war costs, as in 203 B.C. "Stipendium eius anni duplex et frumentum sex mensum imperatum..." (Livy 29.3.5). Vectigalia included the various other taxes, such as revenues from the mines and public land, customs duties (two or two and one-half per cent), inheritance taxes (five per cent), manumission of slaves (five per cent), sale of slaves (four per cent). The reason that Metellus increased vectigalia as opposed to tributum is not given, nor which particular vectigalia were increased. That the author (Bell. Hisp. 42) was unaware of the distinction between the two
terms, and thus used vectigalia in a general sense is unlikely, especially as the words are said to have come directly from Caesar's mouth.

Ulterior was a prosperous and well urbanized section of Spain, particularly around the old Punic centers in the South. The cities of the South such as Gades, Hispalis and Corduba had grown prosperous. Mines of the Rio Tinto and Sierra Morena were prospering. In agriculture olives were beginning to be profitable, large quantities of wine were being exported (Strabo 3.2.6) and much grain was being raised. Shipping and commerce were profitable, especially around Gades. An increase in vectigalia would be effective in this prosperous section for deriving money from cities, mines and produce which would not be covered by tributum. By way of precedent, Lucullus, attempting to ease the burden of debt which Sulla left Asia had shifted from land taxes to those which could be collected in cities of little land. This supposes an ingenuity which Metellus did not seem to have possessed, but there is little other information with which to work.

It has been generally assumed that the debts referred to by Plutarch (Caes. 12) were also a result of the settlement of the Sertorian War, and it is likely that some of the debts were outstanding from the imposition of new or the increase of already existing vectigalia by Metellus and mentioned above. Sutherland accounts for the debts, and rightly I believe, on the basis of economic
advancement and increase in exports. The previous fifty years of the Republic had seen economic advances, especially in southern Spain, and such advances were likely to bring on loans for expansion.

The debt measure instituted by Caesar was not a cancellation, as Plutarch clearly states, but rather provided for the settlement of the debts, still to be paid in full, and eased the burden of the debtor. As to the interest on the debt, usually about twelve per cent, nothing is said. The creditors were most probably natives, either Spaniards or Italian businessmen in Spain, for loans from Rome had been restricted both by the Lex Gabinia de Usura, which in effect prohibited loans to provincials from Rome, and by the later restrictions, passed during Cicero's consulship, which forbade the export of gold or silver. In the same light, the word δεσπότης indicates that the debtors were probably individual land owners rather than cities. The effect Caesar's action had was to establish a less severe method of repayment of debts by natives while keeping the debtor a productive member of his community.

This debt settlement has been compared to that which Lucullus attempted in Asia. In this settlement, though, the cities themselves were indebted and the creditors were, in some cases, publicani. Caesar's settlement granted a more favorable percentage (two-thirds) to the creditors than did Lucullus' one-fourth. The gratitude of the Ordo Equestris surely should not be overlooked as a
political motive.

Both of the measures which Caesar undertook in Spain should have had the effect of easing circulation and credit within the province. The money from the *vectigalia* remaining in the province would offset booty taken by Caesar (mostly from the less civilized North) and spur local investment, while a more reasonable solution to the debt question would make credit easier. While the creditor did receive less per year, the solvency of the debtor would ensure eventual payment in full without the necessity of foreclosure and auction of property. The continued ownership of the land by the debtor hindered the growth of *latifundia*, and created a better state of well being for the peasant population.

In Caesar's economic measures in Spain during his praetorship some writers have found a precedent for his later measures in handling the financial crisis created by the Civil War. The general's armed invasion of Italy brought on an immediate financial crisis, but the war itself was not as much an economic struggle as a political power struggle. The initial impact, as in any time of crisis, was a general feeling of financial insecurity, heightened in the minds of the propertied class by the fears of complete remission of debts, *novae tabulae*, and agrarian reform through land confiscation. Coin would be the safest form for one's wealth at such a time; as a result debts would be called up. To add to the strain on the currency in
circulation, the armies had to be paid to insure their loyalty. Caesar himself borrows from his officers to pay his troops (B.C. 1.39) and mints large quantities of new coin, reinstating the sestertius and quinarius and creating a new issue of aurei. The need for money was great enough to risk the sanctity of the tribune by taking money from the Temple of Saturn, money reserved for protection against a Gallic invasion. Pompeians also were in need of coin for troops. Varro calls up 18,000,000 HS and 20,000 pounds of silver from citizens in Hispania Ulterior. The voracity of the creditors and generals for coin created a shortage where one had not existed before the crisis. Cicero called it caritas nummorum (Att. 9.94). In turn, money became harder to borrow and property values dropped.

Caesar shows some degree of insight in control of currency and credit in his attempt to handle this situation. The times were turbulent and his own position was not stable, even after Munda; he spent only a little more than a year in Rome between his invasion and his assassination. In such an atmosphere financial stability was naturally lacking. Whether his measures would have cured the ills, or what other measures he would have introduced, we shall never know.

Caesar's measures were aimed at freeing the flow of wealth and re-establishing credit by stabilizing property values and providing for the proper repayment of debts. Our sources differ in some aspects of the actual details, and the
dating of various measures is in dispute, but let us follow some of the main points.

The first step had already been taken when Caesar arrived - the lowering of the legal interest rate by the tribunes (Dio, 41.37). Caesar provided for the transfer of _postmilia_ (ποστμηλία) as payment of debts and established a board of estimators to fix the value (aestimatio) of property at either the time of the loan (Dio, 42.51) or "ante civile bellum" (Suet. Iul. 42). Trebonius, as _praetor urbanus_, was in charge of these aestimationes when the renewed call for _novae tabulae_ arose from Caelius, a former Catilinarian. The interest on these loans was dealt with probably in 47; either being deducted from the capital or cancelled since the war began (Dio, 42.51). Either case resulted in a net loss of about twenty-five per cent to creditors, but this was a loss only of interest, not capital.

Other measures were to spur the circulation of currency by limiting hoarding. For this Caesar reinstituted an old law which forbade the hoarding of more than 15,000 denarii. How effective this measure was we are not told. Later, in 47 according to Dio (42.51), he released everyone from rent, up to 500 denarii, for one year - a measure which would aid the lower classes, the _insula_ dweller in Rome and the tenant farmer in Italy. Caesar also reinstituted the _portoria_ on foreign goods (Suet, Iul. 43) and reduced the number on the corn dole. The new coin issues,
already mentioned, though probably issued for military pay and equipment, would have found their way into circulation.

Frederiksen presents a good case from Tacitus (Ann. 6.16-17) for including in these measures a lex Iulia de bonis cedendis, which provided a more lenient settlement of bankruptcy. Under such a measure the debtor would admit insolvency before the praetor and retain some portion of his estate while the remainder would be given over to the creditor(s) through a cessio bonorum.

Such were Caesar’s measures during his dictatorship. That they probably had not affected a miraculous cure can be seen in Cicero (Marc. 23, Fam. 11.28.2). The confiscation of Pompeians’ property as the Civil War dragged on kept property values low. The political situation during the last six years of Caesar’s life was never stable enough to be conducive to a stable economy.

Both the measures in Spain during Caesar’s proconsulship and those enacted during his dictatorship in Rome dealt to a large extent with the problems of debt and the debtor-creditor relationship. In both situations Caesar followed the middle road between complete remission of debt and complete enforcement of already existing laws. The similarity in easing the burden on the debtor is especially strong if we accept Frederiksen’s lex Iulia.

The situations which produced the problems, on the other hand, were quite different in scope and instigation. The measures in Spain were to counter problems which had
existed for a number of years and to free money for economic growth in a single province. Rome, on the other hand, was the financial center of the Mediterranean world by this time. Such measures, brought on by the political situation and its related currency and credit crisis, would have an effect elsewhere in the Roman World.
Footnotes for Chapter II

N.B.: For complete acknowledgement of works previously cited, please see the footnotes for Chapter I.


3. Plut., Caes. 5.6; Suet. Iul. 7; Dio 37.52.2.

4. Gelzer, Caesar, p. 32; for Caesar's age and dates of office, I follow E. Badian, "Caesar's cursus and the intervals between offices," JRS, IL (1959), 81-89. The incident with the Transpadanes seems to me to lack motivation or sufficient prospect of gain for Caesar to attempt to incite them to open rebellion. He had no imperium to put down such a revolt. It is not in the scope of this paper to go into this more deeply.


7. Catiline could pay his debts, by sale of his property, but preferred revolution, Sall., Cat. 35.3; on his followers, Cic., Cat. 2.18; a loan to Cicero, when he probably could have used his own capital, Cic., Fam. 5.6.2.

8. Frederiksen, op. cit. 131; Cicero mentions debt judgement, pro Quinctio (5.19.60); "The method is clumsy, for it often means imposing much greater hardship on the debtor than is necessary to secure the creditor his rights," H.F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (Cambridge: University Press, 1967), p. 225; and a good summary of procedure in a debt judgement, 190-191, 223-226.


11. For Caesar's extravagance, Suet., Iul., 46, 47, 50; Plut., Caes., 4-8. Appian (B.C. 2.26) uses only μυρίαδες --- denarii or sestertii? --- sc. δραχμών ("μυρία", Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, 1963), a drachma was exchanged as equal to a denarius. If we take the amount as denarii, Crassus' security would be about 20% (Plut., Caes., 11); if HS, Crassus' would be 80%. I would accept denarii on the basis of the customary use of μυρίαδες as of drachmae and the fact that Crassus would be more likely to have put up 100% if he was going to go as high as 80%. In either case, it was only a rumor as Gelzer (Caesar, p. 61) points out. 25,000,000 denarii also seems an exaggeration on the basis that it is one-half of T. Frank's estimated budget.


17. Appian, Iber., 102 apparently makes two mistakes: he leads us to believe that Caesar completed the conquest of all the remaining parts of the peninsula and he cites the status of Augustus' Spanish provinces incorrectly.

18. Balbus of Gades received his citizenship from Pompeius.

19. Caesar may have intended to slight Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, consul 52 and father-in-law of Pompeius, though he was a Cornelii by birth.


23. C.H.V. Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 115-120.

25. M. Gelzer, Roman Nobility, p. 23, points out that such a law "was easy to circumvent... by special decrees," but it was probable that the bulk of the loans were not on such a scale to make it worthwhile. E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, pp. 75-76, points out that such a law made it possible to exact greater than legal interest rates from the Scaptius affair. Cic., in Vat. 12; pro. Flacc, 67.

26. ἐσκότης - literally "master of the house," usually used of an individual not a group, city or as a collective noun. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon, 1966.


28. T. Frank, Economic Survey, I, 342-343, feels that many of the loans were from rich natives, but some equites were involved as the opposition to Lucullus' settlement showed.

29. L.C. West, Imperial Roman Spain, p. 12.


32. Ibid., I, 348.

33. Appian, B.C. 2.41; also Plut., Caes. 35; Dio 41.17.1-2; Caes. B.C. 1.14, 1.33.

34. Caes., B.C. 2.18 - this sum is approximately equal to the supposed tribute taxes of all Spain; T. Frank, Economic Survey, I, 324.

35. Decline of property values, Cic., Att. 9.9.4; Caesar, B.C. 3.1 "Fides... angustior neque creditae pecuniae solverentus..."

36. Plut., Caes. 37; Appian, B.C. 2.198; Suet., Iul. 42; Dio 41.36-37, 42.51; Cic., Fam. 9.16.7; Caes., B.C. 3.1,20.

37. Perhaps those who were serving in the capacity of aediles (Dio 41.36).

38. Dio 42.22-25; Cicero joked of these in Fam. 9.16.7.

40. The problem of reconciling these two seemingly diverse measures lies in the conditional "si quid... fuisset;" whether interest was paid or not, the loss would still be that of the interest for two years, or 25%. Cic., *Fam.* 8.17.2. Caesar retains some favor with the moneyed class.

41. Dio 41.37; who also mentions that Caesar refused a request to reward slaves for informing on their masters.

42. 48 B.C., M.W. Frederiksen, *op. cit.*, p. 134, to coincide with the settlement according to Suetonius (*Iul.* 42) whose technical language is rightly held more original.


46. Dio 42.51; on speculators in property, Dio 42.50.

47. The movement for novae tabulae was strong in Rome as can be seen in the actions of Caelius and Dolabella; for such a movement forming a third party, see W. Allen, "In defense of Catiline," *CJ*, XXXIV (1938), pp. 70-85.
Chapter III

The Spanish provinces were not directly affected by Caesar personally during the period from 61 until the Civil Wars. They did play a part during the fifties as a basis on which opposition to Caesar might build a balance of power. During his consulship Caesar did affect extensive legal revision of provincial administration which in part required governors to settle their financial accounts in the province before leaving. The *lex Iulia repetundarum* did not seem to affect any miraculous change in attitude toward the provinces though it made the administration more expedient and provided grounds for actions against governors by provincials.

In 55 B.C. Pompeius was given the governorship of both the Spanish provinces (Cic., *Att.* 4.9.1), but he remained in Rome, presumably under the legal pretext of the *curatio annonae* which he had held since 57. In 52 he had his command extended for an additional five years (Plut., *Pomp.* 55.12, *Caes.* 28.8; Dio 40.44.2). The number of legions approximately doubled and a budget of six million denarii was provided. The opposition to Caesar surely saw this as a balance to Caesar's armies, especially after the death of Crassus and Pompeius seemed to be drawing more toward the senatorial point of view (Caes., *B.C.* 1.84).
While Pompeius remained in Rome, Spain was administered by legati; by 49 the two provinces had been divided into three administrative units: Citerior, Ulterior (to the Anas) and the remaining part of Ulterior including Lusitania (Caes., B.C. 1.38), with a total of seven legions in all Spain. This tripartite division of the Spanish peninsula by Pompeius can easily be seen as a precedent for Augustus' later division of Spain into three provinces. The southern part of Ulterior, particularly the Baetis Valley region, had grown very prosperous, while the central and western sections, where mineral and agricultural potential had not yet been fully utilized, had remained less urbanized since Caesar's proconsulship. In addition, the northern border was not completely peaceful until Augustus' conquests as can be seen in the military nature of the colonies Caesar founded there.

When Caesar crossed the Rubicon, Spain was in Pompeian hands under the legati, L. Afranius, M. Petreius, and the prolific author, M. Terrentius Varro. Spain was mustered to war (Caes., B.C. 1.38-39, 2.18). Pompeius had been a benefactor to the Spanish people from the time of the Sertorian War and his clientelae were numerous there (Caes., B.C. 1.61, 2.18). Caesar also had some political friendships in the peninsula, particularly in Ulterior. Some towns remained loyal to him, but the armies and the wealth of the province were under control of his opposition.

"Economic motives are usually traced with ease in the case of civil wars, but not in this one." The struggle
was a political and military one, centered around personal ambition and carried on through professional armies. Constitutional questions and political theory became material of propaganda; sides were taken on the basis of vested interest and personal alliances. Italy itself was not enthusiastic and neither side was able to call up large enlistments of troops for their cause. Much of the action was in the provinces, and there the burden of the armies was felt most heavily.

Caesar quickly took Italy, Pompeius having fled from Brundisium. Caesar could not follow - no ships (Caes., B.C. 1.29); he decided to turn his attention to Spain. The reason for this tactical movement was many-sided. The lack of ships, the danger of leaving Italy with an unfriendly army in Spain, the Pompeian control of grain supply, all seem to have played some part in his decision. The mines in Spain might also have been a concern. Caesar was in need of money for his troops (Caes., B.C. 1.39) and Italy itself was in financial crisis due to the shortage of coin. Control of Spain's metal wealth would not be essential in a short term war, but if the war were protracted, the necessity of coin to insure the loyalty of troops and stabilize the "home-front" might well be as important as the grain supply. Though no mention of the importance of Spain as a source of financial wealth is made, we do find that Caesar does not abstain from taking money after his initial victory there (Dio 42.24) and later in 46 B.C. he symbolized Spain as
the land of silver (Vell. Pater. 2.56.2). This was surely not the most important reason for Caesar's Spanish campaigns, but it might well have played a part in his decision.

Spain suffered during the Civil Wars with almost constant troubles. The initial actions did not bring widespread hardship but the support of the huge armies and their later settlement in the province was not beneficial. Caesar's designee for governor was very poorly chosen. Q. Cassius Longinus began a systematic plundering of the provinces in general with himself as benefactor which led to unrest and rebellion. Pompeian forces again gained some control over Spain which was not relaxed even after Munda, for Sextus Pompeius carried on his war after Caesar's death.

Such an unstable political situation was not conducive to a stable economy for the province either as a self-entity or as a part of the Roman world. Military operations affected the agricultural production. Grain was needed to feed the armies, taken from lands that probably did not produce a great surplus (Caes., B.C. 1.48,49), while the unstable political situation would discourage long-term investments such as olive growing. Mining and industry were affected, as we have already noted in the case of the mines at Linares. Commerce was also hampered, on land by the armies and at sea since ships were commandeered for movement of troops (Caes., B.C. 2.18,19). Some individuals surely prospered by supplying the armies, but the general unstable political situation and the uncertain
future would make long-term planning difficult. Poor administration made the situation even less favorable.

Though this situation was less than beneficial, it was unavoidable in the power struggle which existed at that time. The political and personal conflict affected the provinces as well as the city itself, but Caesar had some concept of the need for stability and organization in Spain for the time when his civil conflicts were ended. This fact is evident in his steps toward municipal reorganization. "It was in the extension of the colonial system that his finest achievement lay."

Certain sections of Spain had been urbanized during the first century B.C. Economic opportunities, money and manpower immigrating from Italy spurred the growth of municipal centers. The growth of the mining industry and the diversification in agriculture have been noted in the first chapter of this paper. This growth was especially evident in the South (Strabo 3.2.15) and the east coast where centralization in towns which had a Punic or Greek heritage arose from the need of commerce and wealth. In the central highlands and the western coast changes were also occurring. "The old tribal units were breaking down, and many village communities exercised the sovereign rights of a Greek polis." The old native gentes, surrounding a fortified castellum, were developing into towns, some into the status of oppida stipendiaria. Only eight towns reached the status of municipium before Caesar's time in Citerior.
In both provinces the adaptation of Roman municipal systems was lacking. Formal Roman colonization was meager in Spain before Caesar. The first was Tarraco, noted by Pliny as *Scipionum opus* (N.H. 3.21) and later Graccuris and Valentia.

Following Caesar's victory at Ilerda and his overthrow of the Pompeian commanders in both provinces, he looked to the disbanding of the Pompeian armies and the insuring of a friendly province at his back when he proceeded east again. Then, following the operations of 46 B.C., he again made grants of favor to his allies (Dio 43.39.5). Some towns were granted colonial status directly, such as Ucubi in Ulterior (*Bell. Hisp.* 27) while others such as Hispalis, presumably pro-Pompeian, were resettled by Caesar's troops (*Bell. Hisp.* 35). The charter of one of these resettled colonies, *Colonia Genetiva Iulia*, at Urso (modern Osuna) has been preserved.

In the regard to the extent of colonization and municipal grants, Caesar tended to favor Ulterior more than Citerior. Henderson numbers the Latin charters granted by Caesar in Ulterior as thirty-four and colonies as six, while in Citerior only three and three respectively. Citerior had been more closely linked with Pompeius in the past (Caes., B.C. 1.61, 2.18) by his *magnis beneficiis*, and Ulterior with Caesar (*Bell. Hisp.* 42; Caes. B.C. 2.21). Grants as a reward and encouragement for loyalty would naturally make this disproportionate balance. Sutherland proposes that Caesar was
attempting to unite the urbanized Baetis Valley with less settled north and west coast regions. With military colonies in the North and civil colonies in the pacified regions, Ulterior would be easier to administer as a unit.

"The true importance of Caesar is that he first exported Latium and the colonial system in bulk to transmarine provinces..." From Dio (43.39.5) we find three types of grants:

1. χώρια καὶ ἀπέλευξις - land confiscated from Pompeians, as the colony at Hispalis, along with tax exemption.

2. πολιτεία - to individual and possibly also municipia such as Emporiae.

3. ἀποίκαις τῶν Ῥωμαίων νομίζοντο - This statement in conjunction with the number of Latina oppida found in Pliny (N.H. 3.7, 4.117) and the statements of Strabo on Baetica and Gallia Narbonensis (3.2.15, 4.1.12) leads to the conclusion that Caesar extended the ius Latii in Spain. "The extension of Roman citizenship within the provinces is limited to areas where there is a solid foundation of Italian immigration, and that communities where the native element preponderated were favoured with a grant of Latin rights rather than the citizenship."

The granting of Latin rights to already urbanized settlements and the increase in the number of municipalities would augment the uniformity of administration, making the
province as a whole easier to administer from Rome, while granting more local autonomy to the municipalities. Tax exempt status would free funds to be used in local growth, and the increase in local autonomy would free the municipal population from arbitrary or unresponsive policies at Rome. The widespread grants of the franchise would lessen the importance of its holder going to Rome, thus allowing the province to retain its most able politicians.

The founding of new colonies, while immediately necessary as a reward to loyal troops, provided the province with new markets for goods, protection along the borders, and pacification and civilization in more unsettled areas. Their municipal governments, working under the duoviri system, would have provided an ideal for other communities to work toward. The charter of Urso provides some idea of the character of the administration in the municipal government probably along lines very similar to those of Italy.

Were Caesar's actions taken in merely a "desire to obtain men, money and good-will in return for favors granted, or by a genuine interest in the welfare..." of the province? Both motives would seem to be at work. The necessities of the political situation dictated some of Caesar's actions. Troops and loyalty had to be rewarded; goodwill had to be insured. But the extent and organization of his grants indicated more. Sites for colonies showed that the interest in commerce or industry may have been noted. Tarraco, containing
a colony founded by Caesar, was a main commercial center on the land route to Italy and later became the capital of C iterior; Hispalis was situated on the farthest point of the Baetis River accessible to large ships. The actions Caesar took were beneficial to all concerned.

Whether Caesar's policy in the extension of Latin rights and the founding of colonies greatly improved the general economic growth of Spain is unclear. We cannot even be sure that Caesar's plans were complete when he died. Augustus' extensive reorganization of Spain overlay much of the work of Caesar, and source material for the intervening period is limited, but the fact that it was done indicates that Caesar's work was not extensive enough.
Footnotes for Chapter III

1. Gelzer, Caesar, pp. 93-95; Cic., Fam. 8.8.3, Pis. 50; Dio 38.7.5; and probably referred to in Caesar's speech in Bell. Hisp. 42.


3. One of these legions was borrowed by Caesar, Caes., B.G. 6.1, 32-33; on Plut. Caes. 25, 1-2 (two legions) see Gelzer, Caesar, p. 144 n. 3.


5. Praesidia, such as Pax Julia, Olisipo, Ebora, maybe Caesarobriga; see C.H.V. Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 121-125.

6. Corduba for example, Caes., B.C. 2.19, 21.


9. M. Gelzer sums them up briefly, Caesar, p. 204.

10. Caesar was quick to look after the food producing provinces of Sardinia, Sicily and Africa by sending out his legati, Caesar, B.C. 1.30.

11. De Bello Alexandrino 48-64; on his financial exploitation see 49, 56.

12. C.H.V. Sutherland, op. cit., p. 121. Since it is not within the scope of this paper to give an extensive discussion of the municipal development of Spain, the following works form the basis for some of the conclusions reached in this section: C.H.V. Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 112-129; Van Nostrand, The Reorganization of Spain by Augustus, pp. 98-120 and Economic Survey III, 143-144; T. Frank, Economic Survey I, 315-322 give a general summary of municipal development and Caesar's role in it. A.N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 142-148, 170-180 deals with the extension

Works with Pliny (N.H. 3.6-30; 4.110-118) to give some idea of the extent of Caesar's grants; G.F. Hill, Notes on the Ancient Coinage of Hispania Citerior (New York: The American Numismatic Society, 1931) provides information on the status of individual towns. T. Frank, "'Dominium in solo provinciali' and 'Ager publicus,'" JRS, XVII, (1927), 141-161 discusses Caesar's view of state ownership of provincial land. Van Nostrand, Reorganization of Spain shows the sites of municipalities at the time of Augustus in Map II.


15. Caesar, B.C. 1.86-87, 2.18-21; Livy, Ep. 110; Bell. Hisp. 27,35.


18. C.H.V. Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 121-126.


20. The first widespread enfranchisement of Spaniards occurred in 89 when a group of auxiliaries was rewarded for bravery before Ausculum.

21. Thirty-eight; Agrippa's survey is generally taken as source for Pliny.


23. A.N. Sherwin-White, op. cit., p. 170; Henderson shows that the new citizens were enrolled in tribus Galeria; op. cit., p. 10 n. 57.


25. G.F. Hill, op. cit., section on Tarraco; T. Frank, Economic History, pp. 348-349 also mentions the commercial importance of Caesar's colonies at Corinth and Carthage.
Conclusion

The question we set out to investigate was whether Caesar exhibited an organized policy toward the economy of the Spanish provinces. Two distinct aspects have been considered: that of Spain itself and its economic growth and that of Caesar personally and his policies.

During the first century B.C. the Spanish peninsula was exhibiting signs of the economic growth which reached its height during the first two centuries of Imperial times. Mining, industry and commerce were flourishing. Agriculture was becoming more diverse and profitable. Italian immigration, both of money and manpower, was providing an impetus to spur the growth which had been slowed in part due to the inconsistent and, at times, exploitative administration which the Republican Roman governors provided.

As an aspiring young politician and general, Caesar found in Spain an opportunity to enhance his personal position. He, as proconsul following his praetorship, strengthened his dignitas and recouped his personal finances there. We have seen that he was adept at personal financial maneuvers, that he was greatly in debt, and that he did indeed exploit the situation in Spain to his own financial gain. Badian calls him "the greatest brigand of them all," and it would seem rightly so.
On the other hand, Caesar was no Verres. He did exhibit a degree of concern for the provincials during his proconsulship and an understanding of both the economic situation and the consequences which his own authority could bring to bear. His debt settlement, though not innovative, was sound and beneficial to the province as a whole. The recension of the vectigalia freed money in the province. Caesar was a politician and we must not overlook the fact that these actions, while helpful to the province, were also extremely helpful to him personally. He became a patron of towns and individuals which surely aided him in his later career. What was good for Caesar turned out to be good for the province also.

Did Caesar use his governorship to formulate principles of or a system for later economic measures? This seems unlikely. Surely his governorship in Spain proved educational in respect to handling a debt problem, but so far as we have investigated, the situation in Spain and that in Rome during his dictatorships were different. In both instances Caesar reacted to the situation and his measures were dictated by the situation. The only parallel between the two would be in an easing of the process of a creditor taking property of the debtor, if we accept Frederiksen's lex Iulia de bonis cedendis.

When Caesar returned to Spain it was as one of the contestants in a political power struggle that was to change the Roman world. It was not likely that he was
unmindful of his position or of the future. The steps that he took in extending municipal government seem to be a definite attempt to provide some uniformity of administration. Such a more expedient administration would surely have made the economic life more healthy. However, this does not seem to be Caesar's main consideration. While it is true that colonies were placed at times in consideration of their commercial potential, the main concern was the rewarding of loyal veterans. His municipal grants were merely a raising of the status of towns or areas which were already urbanized and ready for such action. I suppose that the question of Caesar's economic policy towards Spain might best be summed up in the words of T. Frank, "Julius Caesar's program was apparently not thought out in economic terms, and yet Caesar more than any other Roman statesman seems to have considered the economic aspects of his political measures."
Footnotes for Conclusion

1. E. Badian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic, p. 78.

2. There is no inference from our sources that it applied only to the Roman citizen in Spain.

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