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THE LEADER'S METHOD AND THE FOLLOWER'S OUTCOME:
PREDICTORS OF FUTURE INTERACTION

BY

GEOFFREY J. NIMMICH

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY
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IN PSYCHOLOGY

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RUNNING HEAD: INTERACTION PREDICTORS

THE LEADER'S METHOD AND THE FOLLOWER'S OUTCOME:

PREDICTORS OF FUTURE INTERACTION

BY

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DEDICATION

TO LINDA: Your constant assistance, concern, and understanding, through times of confusion, despair, and anxiety, were my strength in this endeavor and always.

TO DR. BLICK: Your willingness to extend a helping hand and your dedication to the student will always remain as a pleasant memory and a strong guide.

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Abstract

In attempting to explain the degree of cooperation in the leader-follower dyad, leadership style and situational outcome, in a mixed-motive game, were controlled. 120 business employees, both male and female, were paired with a leader who was projected as a Prisoner's Dilemma game expert. The subject, with the help of the leader who was either democratic or autocratic, then played a round of the game against a confederate subject. The win/lose outcome of the first game was controlled. The subject was then given the opportunity to play a second game against the leader, and the number of competitive choices made by the subject was recorded. After the second game, the subject completed an attribution questionnaire. The results indicated that neither leadership style nor first game outcome effected the amount of cooperation in the second game, however, women were significantly more cooperative than men. Analysis of the attribution scale showed that women rated the leader as more pleasant than did the men, and the experimental groups rated the leader as more pleasant than did the control subjects. The short interaction utilized in this study was viewed as a major factor which may have had a strong influence on the results.

The Leader's Method and the Follower's Outcome:
Predictors of Future Interaction

Social psychologists have assumed the task of explaining the initiation, development, and termination of social events as they exist over a large range of personal interactions. The dyadic relationship comprises only one small facet of social research and yet it is critical due to the foundation it provides for further group development. This research studied only one example of the dyad, that of the leader-follower relationship. This specific situation is of interest due to the leader's increasing difficulty in meeting production requirements, maintaining product quality, and building worker motivation. This research was an attempt to provide empirical support for utilizing a specific leadership style and the importance of considering other related facets of the follower's environment so that a more productive dyadic relationship may be developed.

In reviewing past research in the areas of leadership, power, and authority, two prominent leadership styles, autocratic and democratic, emerge as those most often studied. Lewin, Lippitt, and White (1939) provided valuable insight into several opposing styles with their classic study of leadership and group life. The experimenters in that research assigned various types of leaders to several groups of boy's clubs. The group which was given an autocratic leader reported a very controlled atmosphere,

discontent and irritability directed toward other group members and the leader, a great deal of nonconstructive criticism from the leader, and a lack of ability for the members to direct group activities. In the democratic leader's group, there was a relaxed atmosphere, opportunity for self-direction and social interaction, and an environment which allowed the leader to be viewed as a partner who deserved the member's cooperation.

Other research has looked directly at the authority or power relationship. Adams and Romney (1959) proposed a functional analysis of authority based on a Skinnerian, verbal behavior, reinforcement paradigm. They suggested that the authority relationship was asymmetrical in that the authority's initial response specifies its own reinforcement, whereas the follower's does not. Their central idea in authority relations was that of reciprocal control and reinforcement of two individuals. Basically, their paradigm stated that when a person performed a task directed by an authority, the authority was reinforced by its completion and the follower was reinforced by the authority's acknowledgement of his performance. However, should the follower not comply with the request, or the authority not acknowledge its completion, there is a break in the authority sequence and the authority loses power over the follower. Harvey and Smith (1977) wrote that power is never a one-way street, "if the existence of a social relationship depends on all parties believing they can receive outcomes better than they could get

outside the relationship, then all are dependent on the relationship in at least some measure" (p. 306).

The area of cooperation and competition is another major aspect of the leader-follower relationship. Kelly and Stahelski (1970a) conducted research which helped to explain this portion of the dyadic interaction. Their subjects were made to choose a cooperative or competitive strategy in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. The subjects were then paired with persons of opposite goal choices. During the game, they were interrupted to ask their judgements of each other's goals. The most common error in perception of goal, consisted of a judgement by the competitive person that his cooperative partner was competitive. This misjudgement was a result of a behavioral shift in the cooperative-competitive interaction, as the cooperative subject tended to behave more like the competitive one. This shift is seen as a temporary means of adapting to a competitive adversary, and not a permanent change in the selected goal. Additionally, the cooperative individual, but not the competitive one, is aware of the latter's dominant role in the relationship.

The purpose of this research was to study the leader's effect on the follower. While not as precise as the Adams and Romney (1959) paradigm nor as subjective as the Lewin et al. (1939) research, this work was an attempt to test if cooperation, directed toward the leader by the follower, was effected by the differences

in autocratic and democratic leadership. The research discussed made it logical to support an emergent hypothesis: a follower who has experienced democratic leadership, when placed in an equal relationship with that leader, will react in a more cooperative manner than a follower who experienced autocratic leadership.

Reciprocation, reinforcement, and equity have a direct influence on the reward structure in the leader-follower dyad. Reciprocation centers on the benefits gained or lost by both parties. The Adams and Romney (1959) paradigm mentioned above emphasized a reciprocal aspect involving the follower's completion of a requested action and the authority's acknowledgement of the same as being the key to a workable relationship. Equity research looks into the distribution of rewards and payoffs as a function of previous distributions and future interactions. Studies by Leventhal, Weiss, and Long (1969), Garrett and Libby (1973), and Shapiro (1975) showed that when a first payoff was divided, if one member was over or under rewarded intentionally, that individual would consider that outcome when he distributed a subsequent payoff. However, if the under or over reward was a result of chance, it did not figure into the computation of future payoffs. Reinforcement in the dyadic relationship is also of interest. Davidson and Steiner (1971) provided research results indicating that reinforcements are communicative acts that inform the recipient of the probable intentions, attitudes, and freedom of the

agent who administers them. Considering these factors in the dyad, it seemed logical to hypothesize that if a follower failed to achieve his desired goal as a result of the leader's direction, he would respond less cooperatively to the leader than would a follower who achieved his goal due to the leader's direction.

In support of the Lewin et al. (1939) findings, and the direction of research in the areas of reinforcement and equity, this study manipulated both the leader's methods and the follower's outcome. It was hypothesized that the interaction of leadership style and situation outcome variables would result in the greatest follower competition against the leader in that situation where the leader was autocratic and the follower failed to achieve his goal due to the leader's direction. And conversely, that the least evidence of follower competition would exist in that situation which involved a democratic leader whose follower achieved his goal due to the leader's direction.

The possibility of a sex difference, as a function of either leadership style or situational outcome, deserved consideration as a major factor. There have been many sex difference studies, but such research directly related to cooperation and competition is scarce, conflicting, and controversial. Pruitt (1967), utilizing college students, found a game by sex interaction in his study of Prisoner's Dilemma. The results showed that women were more cooperative than men in the first phases of several games. In

attempting to account for this outcome, the author suggested a possible basis to be the degree of generosity available and that women tended to be more generous. A pilot study using college students and conducted in preparation for this research (Nimmich, 1977), produced a significant post hoc sex difference due to greater cooperation by the women. Thus it would appear that the sex factor should be controlled in all future research in this area and it was a major variable in this study. It was hypothesized that women would display greater cooperation than men but that this factor would not be involved in any interactions.

An experiment such as this must consider the domain of attribution. Most activities which take place between the members of a dyad, are related to personal motives which one member attributes to the other. The follower may attribute the leader's style to his personality or to the work situation. The direction the attribution takes will effect the relationship as it develops and changes. Kelley and Stahelski (1970b), in their comparison of cooperative and noncooperative college students, reported that each player attributed the other's behavior to their own view of these personality dimensions. Harvey and Smith (1977) wrote that an individual was more likely to attribute intent where it was consistent than where it was inconsistent. Previously, numerous assumptions have been made about attributions of interpersonal influence without sufficient data. To combat this

problem and to provide possible explanation for the follower's reaction to the leader, this study utilized an experimenter-developed attribution scale using a semantic differential format. This questionnaire is described in the method section and provided information concerning the subject's intentions and the intentions he attributed to the leader and/or his opponents. The analysis of this scale provided a comparison of the experimental groups and another method of verifying the manipulation of leadership style and situational outcome.

Method

Subjects

Subjects were 120 volunteer employees from banking, industry, government, and department stores in the metropolitan area of Richmond, VA. These employees covered a cross section of educational background and level of employment. Since a leader must work with all types, this subject pool seemed a good representation of the actual population of followers.

Apparatus

The experiment required a small room which contained a table divided in half by a partition which was approximately two feet high. At one end of the table were two chairs, at the other end one chair, and in the middle, at the partition, one chair for the experimenter. Two identical, plastic-protected sheets, each printed with five matrices, and necessary tally sheets to record the points awarded,

were required for the experiment.

The matrix used for this study (Figure 1) was a non-zero sum, Prisoner's Dilemma game as developed and researched by Rapoport and Chammah (1965). A major concern was the response set used by the leader during his game against the subject. Oskamp (1971) and Wrightsman and Brigham (1973) provided the pertinent research by reporting that a matching or tit-for-tat response set induced the greatest percentage of cooperative responses. Since the measure used in this study's analysis was the number of competitive responses, it statistically strengthened the results to use a cooperative inducing response set in order that the subject could logically pursue a cooperative strategy.

Insert Figure 1 about here

The semantic differential format for the attribution scale, given after completion of the second game, consisted of four questions:

1. In the first game I felt that the leader was:

Restrictive :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Open minded

Undemanding :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Demanding

Authoritarian :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Democratic

Hindering :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Helpful

2. In the first game my choices were:

Cooperative :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Uncooperative

Inefficient :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Efficient

Unsure :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Confident

Careful :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Careless

3. In the second game my choices were:

Cooperative :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Uncooperative

Inefficient :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Efficient

Unsure :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Confident

Careful :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Careless

4. As a person I see the leader as:

Friendly :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Unfriendly

Bad :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Good

Tense :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ :__ : Easygoing

In the control condition, the word "leader" in questions 1 and 4 was changed to "bystander" and "second opponent" respectively. Two additional yes/no questions checked for the confounding influences of prior information and whether the subjects were able to explain how the experiment operated.

Procedure

The subject arrived at the location for the experiment and signed a consent form. The leader (constant male confederate) and the experimenter were already present. As the subject signed the form, another subject (female confederate) entered the room. Next, a rigged card drawing took place which resulted in the subject being teamed with the leader for the first game.

At this time all participants were directed to their seats and the experimenter explained to the subject that the leader was well versed in the game procedure and would be quite helpful in obtaining the goal of maximum possible points. The game procedure was then explained to all participants through the use of a sample matrix. Additionally, during this explanation phase, the confederate subject asked two standard questions in order to increase her credibility as a real subject.

The actions of the leader in the democratic role consisted of: greeting the subject upon his arrival, offering to keep score, and providing advice while allowing the subject freedom in his choices. Conversely, the autocratic role consisted of: a serious and unfriendly demeanor, taking the tally sheet and thus not allowing the subject to keep score, and directing the subject's choices while not allowing any difference in opinion.

The first game consisted of working through the five matrices three times. The experimenter gave appropriate responses for the confederate subject to insure that the win/lose condition was established. These contrived responses were standardized as much as possible according to the subject's responses. The subject's responses were directed by the leader who followed a set, beginning with cooperation (first 5) and then randomly alternating from that point on. Upon completion of that game, the scores were tallied and a winner and loser announced.

After this announcement, the subject was informed that he would be given the opportunity to play the game on his own. The confederate subject was thanked for her participation and warned against discussing the experiment; the leader moved to the other end of the table and the second game began.

The second game utilized the same five matrices, three times, with the subject required to make his own 2-choice decisions. The response set given by the leader was cooperative on the first choice and from then on the leader simply reflected the latest response given by the subject - a tit-for-tat strategy. During this game, the number of competitive choices made by the subject was recorded by the experimenter.

At the completion of the second game the outcome was announced and the subject was asked to complete the attribution scale. The win/lose outcome of the second game was not controlled as it did not effect the experimental manipulation. The subject was then given a short statement to read which explained exactly what took place in the experiment. Any questions were also answered. The subject was thanked for his participation, requested not to discuss the experiment, and excused.

In the control (no leader) condition, the leader and confederate subject arrived after the subject. A similar rigged drawing took place with the subject being selected to play two games: first against the confederate subject and then against the usual leader.

During the game explanation, the leader looked on with the subject and then left the room until the first game was concluded. This was done so the leader would simply appear as another subject who had no special information about the game or idea of the strategy the subject used in the first game. The contrived responses for the first game and the response sequence for the second game were maintained.

The treatment condition for each subject was randomly assigned prior to the beginning of the experiment.

Results

The structure for this experiment was a 3 X 2 X 2 design. The factors consisted of type of leader, first game outcome, and sex. The unit of measure for data analysis was the total number of competitive choices made by each subject during the second game. All tests for significance were conducted at the $p < .05$ level, and the F_{\max} test confirmed the homogeneity of the group variances. Table 1 is a summary of the analysis of variance. There were no significant interactions and only one main variable was significant, that of sex. In figure 2 are the mean number of competitive responses selected by each sex.

Insert Figure 2 and Table 1 about here

The analysis of variance for the attribution scale was performed

as a repeated measures design at the $p < .05$ level, and the F_{\max} test verified the homogeneity of the variances. The first question (D1) was descriptively reduced to an autocratic (+1) - democratic (+7) scale. The cooperative - uncooperative choice of questions two and three were separately scaled from +7 to +1 respectively (D2 and D4). The remaining three choices from each of questions two and three were reduced to a planned (+7) - unplanned (+1) scale (D3 and D5). And, the last question was converted to a rating of the leader as pleasant (+7) - unpleasant (+1). This analysis resulted in significance for three, two factor interactions. Table 2 is a summary of the analysis of the attribution scale ratings. The significant interactions of Leadership Style X Question Rating, Situational Outcome X Question Rating, and Sex X Question Rating required that the design be split to test for simple effects. These tests pointed to significant results which showed that a) the experimental groups rated the leader as significantly more pleasant than did the control group, b) the win/lose effect of the first game was directly attributed to planned or unplanned strategy respectively, c) the women rated the leader as significantly more pleasant than did the men. Figures 3, 4, and 5 reflect the mean attribution ratings as a function of the questions.

Insert Figures 3, 4, 5, and Table 2 about here

Since the first question of the attribution scale was descriptively reduced in the above analysis and because it contained the critical aspect of the democratic - autocratic dimension, a separate, post hoc analysis was performed on the four items in that question. This analysis of variance was conducted at the $p < .05$ level and the F_{\max} test verified the homogeneity of the variances. This analysis (Table 3) resulted in two significant first-order interactions: Leadership Style X Situational Outcome and Leadership Style X Item Rating. A simple effects analysis pointed to the facts that: a) subjects who had an autocratic leader and lost the first game, rated the leader significantly lower, across all items, than did the other experimental or control group, b) the group with the autocratic leader rated the leader as less open minded than did the other two groups, and c) the autocratic leader group rated the leader as more demanding than did the other two groups.

Insert Figures 6 and 7, and Table 3 about here

Discussion

The autocratic leadership style and the inability to achieve goals did not produce the significantly higher competition as predicted. Additionally, the analysis of the attribution scale did not produce a significantly different rating of the leader on the

autocratic-democratic dimension. This suggests that a) the leader did not establish his role well enough, b) that the situation was not long enough to develop the establishment of the role, c) the follower was intimidated by the leader and thus suppressed his competitive desires, or d) the experimental design simply did not work as projected. A strong trend on the attribution rating, to rate the autocratic and democratic leader as such, did exist. This trend was further supported by a significant difference in attraction towards the leader by those who interacted with him. The experimental groups rated him as significantly more pleasant than did the controls, and those who had a democratic leader showed a strong, though not significant, trend to rate him as more pleasant than did those who had the leader in the autocratic role. In addition, the post hoc analysis reflected a significantly lower rating of the autocratic leader; he was described as being less open minded and more demanding, however, no significant difference was found on the autocratic-democratic dimension. These trends would tend to support the first two explanations above. In such a short interaction, the leader may not have had the opportunity to establish a strong autocratic role, especially if the subject blindly followed the leader's advice due to uncertainty, thereby never having to be directed or ordered by the leader to perform a specific action. Although Prisoner's Dilemma is an established form of obtaining competitive and cooperative behavior, this non-student subject pool may not have

been sufficiently familiar with its procedure to view it as such and thus did not see the game as a route for competitive behavior against an autocratic leader. However, since it is a proven format, future research should provide for a longer interaction between leader and follower as they play through the matrices. This increased length may provide time for the role-relevant expectancies to be established.

The situational outcome did not effect competition in a significant manner. The attribution ratings did reflect significance on the aspect of strategy in the first game. Those who lost that game claimed they used poor or unplanned efforts whereas those who won said they utilized a planned method of play. Additionally, the post hoc analysis reflected a lower rating, across all four items of question one, of the autocratic leader by those subjects who lost the first game, however, this possible credit or blame was not strong enough to influence the second game outcome. It again appears that length of the interaction may have been a determining factor. With a longer leader-follower relationship, more intent may have been given to the leader which might have produced the hypothesized competition as a function of goal denial. Since equity and reciprocations are functions of intention, it would appear that the subjects saw their outcome as strictly chance rather than the inability of the leader.

The obtained significance of the sex factor adds to the ever growing dimension of sex differences. Women were not as competitive

as the men. Additionally, the women rated the leader, irrespective of role, as significantly more pleasant than did the males. This reaction could be a function of the female being more accustomed to an autocratic male or boss, or due to the males' being affected, by several conflicting factors, when having to rate another male (the leader was always a male). This dimension should be more specific in future research to pinpoint why this factor was significant.

The outcome of this study would suggest that leadership style and situational outcome do not effect competition. However, the existence of certain significant factors and other strong trends points to the possible inconclusiveness of this data. A ten minute interaction was apparently insufficient to establish the leader's role and this factor alone may provide strong influences in future research that could produce an outcome more in line with those hypothesized.

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Table 1
 Analysis of Variance:
 Competitive Responses

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Type Leader (A)	2	6.85	0.46
Game Outcome (B)	1	20.84	1.41
Sex (C)	1	108.31	7.32*
A X B	2	5.66	0.38
A X C	2	0.68	0.05
B X C	1	8.51	0.58
A X B X C	2	24.92	1.68
Error	108	14.79	

* $p < .05$

Table 2
 Analysis of Variance:
 Attribution Ratings

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Between			
Type Leader (A)	2	0.85	-
Game Outcome (B)	1	1.65	-
Sex (C)	1	9.50	-
A X B	2	13.94	2.79
A X C	2	0.52	0.10
B X C	1	0.22	0.04
A X B X C	2	8.19	1.64
Error _b	108	5.00	
Within			
Attribution Scale (D)	5	27.61	-
A X D	10	5.11	2.35*
B X D	5	5.10	2.34*
C X D	5	6.25	2.87*
A X B X D	10	3.75	1.72
B X C X D	5	2.26	1.04
A X C X D	10	3.34	1.53
A X B X C X D	10	1.22	0.56
Error _w	540	2.18	

*p < .05

Table 3
 Analysis of Variance:
 Question No. 1 Ratings

Source	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>
Between			
Type Leader (A)	2	20.78	-
Game Outcome (B)	1	5.00	-
Sex (C)	1	8.80	1.45
A X B	2	23.28	3.84*
A X C	2	2.46	0.41
B X C	1	0.17	0.03
A X B X C	2	18.22	3.01
Error _b	108	6.06	
Within			
Question Rating (D)	3	7.41	-
A X D	6	6.57	3.13*
B X D	3	0.35	0.17
C X D	3	1.00	0.48
A X B X D	6	1.62	0.77
B X C X D	3	0.24	0.11
A X C X D	6	0.70	0.33
A X B X C X D	6	2.35	1.12
Error _w	324	2.096	

* $p < .05$

Figure Caption

Figure 1. An example of the Prisoner's Dilemma, non-zero sum matrix used in this experiment.

R = Reward points	$S < P < R < T$
S = Sucker points	$2R > S + T$
T = Temptation points	$S + T = 0$
P = Punishment points	

A_2 B_2 A_1 1 , 1
(R) , (R)-2 , 2
(S) , (T) B_1 2 , -2
(T) , (S)-1 , -1
(P) , (P)

Figure Caption

Figure 2. Mean number of competitive choices made by each sex during second game. ($p < .05$)

MEAN NUMBER OF COMPETITIVE CHOICES IN SECOND GAME





Figure Caption

Figure 3. Mean rating for each question as a function of leadership style. D_6 was significant ($p < .05$).

- D_1 : Leader was autocratic (+1) - democratic (+7)
- D_2 : First game was uncooperative (+1) - cooperative (+7)
- D_3 : First game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)
- D_4 : Second game was uncooperative (+1) - cooperative (+7)
- D_5 : Second game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)
- D_6 : Leader was unpleasant (+1) - pleasant (+7)

MEAN RATING FOR QUESTION




ATTRIBUTION QUESTION

Figure Caption

Figure 4. Mean rating for each question as a function of winning or losing the first game. D_3 was significant ($p < .05$).

- D_1 : Leader was autocratic (+1) - democratic (+7)
- D_2 : First game was uncooperative (+1) - cooperative (+7)
- D_3 : First game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)
- D_4 : Second game was uncooperative (+1) - cooperative (+7)
- D_5 : Second game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)
- D_6 : Leader was unpleasant (+1) - pleasant (+7)

MEAN RATING FOR QUESTION



* = WIN FIRST GAME

+ = LOSE FIRST GAME

ATRIBUTION QUESTION

Figure Caption

Figure 5. Mean rating for each question as a function of sex. D_6 was significant ($p < .05$).

D_1 : Leader was autocratic (+1) - democratic (+7)

D_2 : First game was uncooperative (+1) - cooperative (+7)

D_3 : First game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)

D_4 : Second game was uncooperative (+1) - cooperative (+7)

D_5 : Second game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7)

D_6 : Leader was unpleasant (+1) - pleasant (+7)

MEAN RATING FOR QUESTION




Figure Caption

Figure 6. Mean overall rating by the first game losers as a function of leadership style. (Significant at $p < .05$)

OVERALL RATING BY FIRST GAME LOSERS




Figure Caption

Figure 7. Mean rating for each portion of question one as a function of leadership style. D_1 and D_2 were significant ($p < .05$).


D_1 : Restrictive (+1) - Open minded (+7)

D_2 : Demanding (+1) - Undemanding (+7)

D_3 : Authoritarian (+1) - Democratic (+7)

D_4 : Hindering (+1) - Helpful (+7)

MEAN RATING FOR QUESTION



Appendix A

The following consent statement was signed by each subject prior to the beginning of the experiment:

My signature on this document testifies to the fact that I am participating in this experiment by choice. I understand that no information as to my participation or performance will be released, that no physical or psychological damage will result due to my participation, and that I may stop the experiment at any time should I feel it necessary.

Appendix B

The following statement was given to each subject at the conclusion of experiment:

This experiment was designed to see how you would react toward the leader who was either democratic or autocratic when he assisted you in the first game. The first game was controlled so you either won or lost. We then allowed you to play a second game against the leader to see if you would be cooperative or competitive based on his leadership style and whether you won or lost the first game.

Those of you who had no leader (an individual to work with) during the first game were the control group which is critical for the experimental comparison.

Again, I would like to thank you for your participation and for the great assistance you have given me.

VITA

I was born in Jamaica, New York on 7 May 1948. Having moved south, at the age of three, to the little town of Summerville, just outside of Charleston, South Carolina, I claimed the south as my home. In 1970, I graduated with a B. A. in History from The Citadel; as a Distinguished Military Graduate, I was immediately commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Regular Army and entered on active duty. As a Field Artillery Captain, I have served at Ft. Sill, OK, Ft. Benning, GA, Ft. Bragg, NC, and in the Republic of Korea. My next assignment will be at Rutgers University as an assistant professor of military science. My wife is the former Linda J. Elliott of Andrews, SC, and we have two daughters, Michele Anne and Lisa Marie.