Empathy, group-level guilt and identification: measuring their relationship through past American-Cambodian relations

Laura Musser
University of Richmond

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses

Part of the Leadership Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Musser, Laura, "Empathy, group-level guilt and identification: measuring their relationship through past American-Cambodian relations" (2009). Honors Theses. 1275.
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses/1275

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Empathy, Group-level Guilt and Identification:
Measuring Their Relationship through Past American-Cambodian Relations

Laura Musser
University of Richmond

A Senior Honors Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements
for the Bachelor of Arts Degree in Leadership Studies with Honors,
University of Richmond, Richmond Virginia 2009

Advisory Committee
Donelson R. Forsyth, Ph.D, Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond
J. Thomas Wren, Ph.D, Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond
Sungmoon Kim, Ph.D, Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond
# Contents

Abstract......................................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................ iv

Ch. 1 – The Nature of Collective Guilt........................................................................................... 5

The Khmer Rouge – A Brief Overview...................................................................................... 6

Guilt..................................................................................................................................... 7

Guilt on the Group Level..................................................................................................... 12

Perceptions of the Ingroup and Outgroup........................................................................... 15

Guilt, Apology, and Remediation..................................................................................... 16

Conceptualization............................................................................................................ 19

Ch. 2 – Methods............................................................................................................................ 23

Ch. 3 – Results.............................................................................................................................. 29

Ch. 4 – Discussion....................................................................................................................... 33

Ch. 5 – References......................................................................................................................... 41

Appendices................................................................................................................................... 45

  Appendix A (Collective identity condition).............................................................................. 45

  Appendix B (Individual identity condition)............................................................................. 58

  Appendix C (Historical account: no action).......................................................................... 71

  Appendix D (Historical account: aid).................................................................................... 72

  Appendix E (Historical account: apology)............................................................................ 73

  Appendix F (National geography bee)................................................................................... 74
Abstract

A collective approach to emotions suggests that, in some cases, members of groups may experience collective guilt when they consider the negative actions performed by other members of their group, even when they were not personally involved themselves. Social identity theory suggests that such group-level reactions are more likely when individuals strongly identify with their group, and less likely when their sense of identity is not linked as strongly to their group membership.

This hypothesis was examined by directly manipulating the salience of individuals’ collective identities through priming through an identification manipulation. The identification manipulation primed participants to feel more a part of the collective or more an individual in regards to the ingroup. After being primed, participants were asked to read one of three historical accounts, which chronicled their ingroup’s negative past involvement with an outgroup. Participants’ empathy levels were also measured. After completing a questionnaire about their feelings of identification, participants were asked a behavior measure, which prompted them to decide whether or not they would like to donate to a cause related to their ingroup’s past actions.

A sex effect was identified through this study: men who were primed as individuals felt more a part of the collective than the men primed in the collective condition. Empathy was correlated with guilt levels: the more guilt felt by a participant, the more empathic they self-reported. Those participants who were primed to identify with the collective were the most likely to donate through the behavior measure.
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Dr. Donelson Forsyth for advising me through the duration of this project. Not only did he introduce me to the field of social psychology through his Group Dynamics course two years ago, but he also inspired me to question the role social psychology takes in our daily lives. Because of his inquisitive perspective towards social psychology, Dr. Forsyth piqued my interest in the social psychological aspect of guilt, and it because of him that I was able to complete this research. I greatly appreciate all of the time and expertise that he was able to offer me throughout the past year.

Special thanks to the other members of my committee, Dr. J. Thomas Wren and Professor Sungmoon Kim, for their continuous support and ideas throughout the completion of this project. Their insight and thoughtful comments helped me to better understand the dimensions of my project outside the realm of social psychology, bringing it into different contexts.

I would also like to thank Dr. Hoyt and Dr. Price for their assistance in helping me to configure the initial design of this project.

Thank you to the Jepson School of Leadership Studies for granting me the funds to conduct this experiment. Without the Jepson School's generosity this research would not have been possible.

I also would like to thank Dr. Kirk Jonas and the IRB for reviewing and approving this study.

Last but not least, I thank my friends and family for putting up with me while I tried to balance this project with everything else going on during my senior year at Richmond.
1

The Nature of Collective Guilt

When Pope John Paul II started apologizing, the world listened. After maintaining thousands of years of divine authority, the man with the sole ability to speak “God's words” assumed some of the responsibilities for the past action of his group, the Catholics. While in the Czech Republic he apologized to a group of Protestants by stating: “I, the Pope of the Church of Rome, in the name of all Catholics, ask for forgiveness for the wounds inflicted on non-Catholics in the course of the troubled history of these peoples” (Gibney, H-H., Coicaud & Steiner, 2008, p. 259). While Pope John Paul II did not cause the “wounds” referenced in this speech, he felt compelled to apologize for the past actions of his group. This apology, an attempt to make reparations for hundreds of years of tension, raises questions about the nature of guilt in a group context. Does guilt extend beyond the actions of the self to the actions of a one’s group? Is it possible for individuals to feel guilty about actions that their group has taken towards others when they did not complete these actions themselves? In this “Age of Apology” where leaders are facing up to the past, questions like this are pertinent and must be examined (Gibney, H-H., Coicaud & Steiner, 2008, p. 3). Thus, I will examine questions of such group-level guilt through this thesis.

This thesis will present the results of a study that I conducted regarding group-level guilt. Before presenting the findings of this study, however, I will provide an overview of the prior theories and research relevant to guilt, particularly on the group level. First we'll examine an instance where one group committed an atrocity towards another group in the 1970s.
The Khmer Rouge Regime: A Brief Review

In the 1970s many US citizens had Southeast Asia on their minds as the war in Vietnam dragged on. Americans were dying, and the response of the American public was to “bring the boys home.” The war unfolded on peoples’ television screens, and after watching casualties mount on both sides, many people decided that enough was enough: too many people had been killed, Americans and Vietnamese alike. These sentiments turned into actions as the Americans eventually withdrew troops from Vietnam, beginning the long process of healing and rebuilding, but at the expense of others. One question that history books often leave out regarding the Vietnam War is whether or not it affected other countries? Few people ask about those other nations, those swept into the Vietnam War based on their geographical proximity or their post-colonial ties. The War was not neatly contained between the Vietnamese and the Americans; it involved Khmers, Laotians and Thais as it spilt into Laos and Cambodia, Vietnam’s neighbors to the north and the west. Consequently, it becomes evident that other countries became involved with the War through its progression, not through their own inclinations.

Although Southeast Asia is a region filled with historical tensions and geographical disputes, the spillover of the Vietnam War did not only occur because of friction between Vietnam and its’ neighbors: it occurred because of US involvement. During the Vietnam War, the US dropped bombs in the northeastern part of Cambodia- a quarter of a million tons, in fact. One civilian recounts the traumatizing experience of the US bombings:

Every time after there had been bombing, the KR [Khmer Rouge] guerillas would take the people to see the craters, to see how big and deep the craters were, to see how the Earth had been gouged out and scorched... Terrified and half-crazy, the people were
ready to believe what they were told. That was what made it so easy for the Khmer Rouge to win the people over (Jones, 2006, p. 189).

It seems logical that being bombed into submission would create chaos and the need for strong leadership. Terror management theory (TMT) supports Jones’ assertion that the US holds some responsibility in laying the ground for genocide. According to TMT, formulated by Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon in 1986, when one makes death salient, followers will look to a charismatic leader to take over during a time of crisis (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). When the US dropped 250,000 pounds of bombs on Cambodia, the Khmer people found themselves looking to the charismatic leader that emerged during this time of crisis: none other than Saloth Sar, infamously known as Pol Pot.

Because Pol Pot, the charismatic Khmer Rouge leader, stepped up in a time of crisis and came into power without much question, there seems to be some responsibility associated between the American bombs and the Cambodian genocide. Although it might be a small effect known by an even smaller number of people, there still appears to be a connection in the way that US bombings killed innocent Cambodian people. These bombs helped to set the framework for genocide through Democratic Kampuchea, most commonly known as the Khmer Rouge regime. Starting in 1975, the Khmer Rouge under the direction of Brother Number One, Pol Pot, killed two million Cambodian people in an urbancide, almost all by hand.

Guilt

The work of the Khmer Rouge, so far removed both by the passage of time and the geographical distance of Cambodia to the United States, may not even cross the minds of
many Americans on a regular basis. Even if Americans do not spend much time contemplating Cambodia, its past, or the United States’ involvement with the Khmer Rouge, it is possible that it might have an effect on the American group. If the Cambodian story is made salient to Americans, how does guilt come into play? Do “self-identified” Americans feel group-based guilt from these actions done by the American government in the name of their country? Should they feel guilty? Does empathy have anything to do with the reactions of Americans to learning about the US’ past involvement in Cambodia? How do these emotions play out in a behavioral context? Before investigating the answers to these questions, there are certain principles that must be understood. One must know the way in which ingroup identification affects group-level, collective guilt and how it relates to empathy, principles that will be explored in order to fully understand their interaction within this study.

Psychology professor Jane P. Tangney of George Mason University has done extensive work on the notion of guilt. In her article published in 2007 entitled “Moral emotions and moral behavior,” Tangney examines guilt from a psychological standpoint. According to Tangney, guilt is what Jonathan Haidt has termed a moral emotion, an emotion that is “linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or the agent.” Guilt fulfills this definition of a moral emotion because it involves evaluating a specific behavior in a negative manner, although the evaluation lies upon the specific behavior, not the person who completed it. These feelings of guilt should not be confused with those of shame, which according to Tangney, emphasize the action of the individual (Tangney, 2007).
Tangney believes that guilt promotes constructive, proactive actions by attempting to nullify the consequences of the guilt-creating action through different paths of redemption, from changing one's behavior to repairing the consequences to extending a genuine apology. Each form of reparation strives to "right the wrong" one has done through some action induced by their proneness to guilt. Through her research, Tangney has found that guilt goes "hand-in-hand" with one's level of other-related empathy. Those who are more predisposed to guilt may also be more able to take others perspectives and harbor empathic concern on their behalf.

The ability to feel more or less guilty is tied to one's ability to relate to others through "perspective-taking" and "empathic concern." In this sense, Tangney uses Feshbach's definition of empathy from 1975: "a shared emotional response between an observer and a stimulus person." This sense of empathy mandates that one have the cognitive ability to recognize another person's experience by accurately taking their perspective; while living this vicarious experience, they are able to focus on the other person's needs. Concerns that stem from empathy are "possibly central to the human moral affective system" according to Tangney, which means that they play a fundamental role in peoples' emotional systems. There are several reasons that empathy plays a fundamental role in human functioning: it elicits concern for others, it helps prompt helping behavior towards others, and it assists in curbing aggression and other behaviors that can harm others. Because Tangney believes that guilt and other-oriented empathy go hand-in-hand with one another, guilt can induce one to feel empathy towards others. In this way, Tangney believes that guilt is "most effective in motivating people to choose the moral paths in life" (Tangney, 2007, p. 355).
Social psychologist Roy Baumeister links specific personality traits to guilt, one of which is empathy shown through interpersonal sensitivity. He feels that other traits, such as shyness, loneliness, a lack of social assertiveness, and relational competence can also be predictors of guilt. Baumeister's article, "Guilt: An Interpersonal Approach" published in 1994, focuses on the way that guilt functions within communal relationships. In this context, Baumeister identifies three functions of guilt: to redistribute emotional distress, to operate as a means of "interpersonal influence" that can help "powerless people" persuade others, and to enforce communal norms that establish mutual respect, treatment, or concern. According to his research, "seeing others suffer, a person will feel bad, and this bad feeling is the basis for guilt." Similar to the Tangney's idea that more empathic people are more likely to express their guilt than less empathic people, Baumeister asserts that guilt can promote pro-social effects, especially when paired with empathy. Because of this, Baumeister considers empathy to be a "pro-social" emotion; more empathic people are more likely to feel more guilt.

Because of the pro-social aspect of guilt, people will use an array of strategies to get rid of their guilt. Depending on their levels of guilt and empathy, they may or may not be inclined to issue an apology, make amends, or change their behavior so that it is more agreeable to the other party, or seek forgiveness:

Not only the causes but the consequences of guilt are interpersonal. Guilt motivates people to apologize, to attempt to make amends, to try to repair damage to relationships, to confess and seek forgiveness, and to change their behavior so as to be more pleasing and satisfactory to relationship partners (Baumeister, 1994, p. 260).
On account of their empathy and level of guilt, combined with strong interpersonal connections, one might be motivated to seek reparations. Baumeister is more specific, however, noting that compensation is more probable than an apology because apologies connote personal involvement in the guilt-creating situation, which may cause them to suffer when considering their responsibility. While guilt can prompt others to act in a way that will strengthen social relationships, there may be other factors that influence the type of pro-social behavior that results from these relationships as well.

One possible influence is the strength of the interpersonal connection. If there is no interpersonal connection, and “no communal relationship exists, guilt [then] motivates people to distance themselves from victims.” This assertion coincides with the research completed by Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, and Birch, completed in 1981, which found people are more likely to have an empathic response to others who are more similar than dissimilar to them. Thus, this relationship that Baumeister explores between empathy and guilt exists more strongly in the sphere of interpersonal relationships than between strangers.

As an emotion stemming from a situation, guilt does not have to involve only one person: guilt can occur in a collective at the group level. In 1971, Helen Block Lewis described guilt as a self-conscious emotion that focuses on consequences of the wrongdoing, done to the “victim.” From Lewis’ perspective, guilt’s outward effects provoke the guilty party to give the victim redress; shame, on the other hand, will most likely provoke avoidance.
Guilt on the Group Level

After examining how guilt affects the individual, the next question becomes how guilt functions on a group level. Social psychologists Rupert Brown and Sabina Cehajic at the University of Sussex used Lewis' definition to explore guilt at the collective level in their study "Dealing with the past and facing the future: Mediators of the effects of collective guilt and shame in Bosnia and Herzegovina." In this study they use Lewis' idea as a springboard for Bernard Weiner's idea about collective guilt. Weiner, a social psychologist at UCLA, determined that collective guilt arises when members of a group apprehend their control over or responsibility for misdeeds or their consequences committed by other ingroup members. Combining these two theories, Brown and Cehajic assert that empathy for the outgroup links guilt to reparation; theoretically, the ingroup should want to offer the "harmed" outgroup restitution for their actions (Brown, & Cehajic, 2008). This, however, is not always the case.

In "The Measurement of Collective Guilt: What It Is and What It Is Not," a chapter from the book Collective Guilt: International Perspectives, social psychologists Nyla Branscombe, Ben Slugoski, and Diane Kappen explore different ways that collective guilt manifests itself, some which parallel Brown and Cehajic, and others that differ from their ideas related to collective guilt. According to Branscombe and Doosje, the individual must feel a part of the group that has acted immorally. The notion of collective guilt comes from group members' distress when they accept the responsibility of their group's immoral actions that resulted in harm towards others. Because people view the morals of their group, the ingroup, as superior to others, collective guilt is more likely to be evoked, particularly when the ingroup commits harmful actions towards the outgroup. These
harmful actions, when they are deemed unjustified, can have "consequences for collective emotions" when committed by either the ingroup or the outgroup towards their respective "other." According to their research, events occurring as long ago as the "distant past" to those "more recent," seem to have similar consequences in evoking collective emotions (Branscombe, Sligoski, & Kappen, 2004, p. 31). There are three proximal determinants of the intensity of collective guilt that Branscombe has identified: the degree of the ingroup's responsibility in the harm to the outgroup, the perceived immorality or illegitimacy if the ingroup's actions, and the perceived benefits and costs of achieving a more honorable relationship with the outgroup. Collective guilt also surfaces when the ingroup shares a negative interpretation of their history.

Ingroups and individuals within them react differently to the different levels of collective guilt they experience in order to "legitimize" themselves by staying on the moral high ground. Members of the ingroup who no longer manage to view themselves on moral high ground take different paths to negate their responsibility to avoid feelings of guilt. Some may lessen their guilt through what Latané and Darley termed diffusion of responsibility; if there were many groups involved, it becomes easy to believe that one's ingroup is not the sole group responsible, decreasing one's feelings of guilt. Levels of collective guilt are also related to level of identification with the group; in some cases, one's identification may undermine their willingness to internalize negative information pertaining to their groups' past. At times those high identifiers who feel superior to the outgroup members whom they have harmed may experience low levels of guilt. High identifiers can also reach the point where they feel so threatened by their group's harmful
actions that they may feel guilty even if the incident occurred decades prior or if they are innocent themselves.

Although ingroup members are more likely to feel collective guilt when they are presented with the opportunity to make amends through reparative actions, this desire to take action seems to be increasing in recent years. In his book *The Guilt of Nations*, Elazar Barkan observes that "...the desire to redress the past is a growing trend, which touches our life at multiple levels, and it is central to our moral self-understanding as individuals and members of groups and the world over" (Barkan, 2001, p. xi). Through his research, Barkan has come to believe that admitting guilt through either apologies or another form of restitution are a part of guilt, and while it is difficult to accept ones' soiled image on account of injustice, it is gaining popularity.

Apologies have the potential to evoke different ideas behind restitution. They may also "serve to communicate acknowledgement of the wrongdoing to the disadvantaged group of their suffering, as well as one's group's regret about its behavior" (Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2007, p. 166). According to "Consequences of National Ingroup Identification Responses to Immoral Historic Events" by Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead, offering an apology might intensify the negative affective reactions of those who are high identifiers with the ingroup, meaning they would feel stronger levels of collective guilt. On the inverse, an apology coming from a low identifier would be more effective because it would impart the message to the outgroup that they are able to accept negative actions that were committed by ingroup members. By issuing an apology, one can appease those who were injured, while also avoiding accusations or reprisals, instead helping to exact some type of forgiveness, freeing the ingroup from guilt. Apologies are "essential to the smooth
working of society" (Augoustinos & LeCouteur, 2004, p. 239). It is important to note that such apologies must come from an ingroup source in order for them to be considered genuine; if the apology does come from an ingroup member, it might elicit collective guilt, especially amongst high ingroup identifiers.

**Perceptions of the Ingroup and Outgroup**

To better understand the eminence of being an ingroup or outgroup member, theories surrounding these ingroup/outgroup identification concepts must be examined to better understand how they would function in a situation that induces collective guilt. Leon Festinger’s social comparison theory, cited in “Assimilation and contrast to group primes: the moderating role of ingroup identification” by psychologists Natalie Hall and Richard Crisp at the University of Reaching- Berkshire, United Kingdom, states that in order to find out more about ourselves, we must compare ourselves to others. Our self-perceptions depend upon the different types of comparisons that we make between ourselves and others.

Social psychologist Jackson revisits the impact of these impressions through his examination of Social Identity Theory developed by Tajfel and Turner in 1986 through his article “Intergroup Attitudes as a Function of Different Dimensions of Group Identification and Perceived Intergroup Conflict.” Tajfel and Turner identified group-level identification on three levels: cognitive, evaluative, and affective levels through knowledge, value, and emotion. High levels of social identity can lead to ingroup bias, depending upon several factors. One factor that can lead to ingroup bias and subsequent conflict is the degree that one identifies themselves within the group. Another factor is the degree that their social identity is made salient to them, and a third factor is their perceived structure. Finally,
Empathy, Group-level Guilt

Social identity can lead to ingroup bias by causing ingroup members to think about how their decisions affect both the ingroup and the outgroup. Tajfel's theory elucidated "that part of an individual's self-concept...derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group." As a result of these comparisons and this social knowledge, those who identify highly with others in certain groups will be more likely to stereotype themselves into them, according to psychologist Jolanda Jetten's research on social identity. When group members self-stereotype, they identify more strongly with the group than they do with their individual identity. Thus, they will more easily adopt the values, attitudes, and ideas of the group.

Guilt, Apology, and Remediation

Using this basis of group level guilt, questions surrounding its effect on the members of both the ingroup and the outgroup are left unanswered. Do members who feel they are part of the ingroup collective feel inherently guiltier than those who feel less part of the collective? Are those who identify more strongly with the ingroup less likely to apologize for the wrong actions on behalf of their ingroups' prior actions? Questions similar to these were posed in a study titled "Antecedents and Consequence of Group-Based Guilt: The Effects of Ingroup Identification" conducted at the University of Amsterdam, by social psychologists Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead. They sought to examine a trend that they found to be occurring in the twentieth century: apologies. The Pope apologized to the Jewish community; former President Clinton apologized to Nelson Mandela, and the list continues (Doosje et al., 2006, p. 325). More specifically, their study examined the feelings of group-based guilt affected by their ingroup identification with their nation's ancestors who colonized another country (Doosje et al.,
2006, p. 326). Their model utilized the Netherlands and the Dutch’s previous colonial involvement in Indonesia. Doosje’s team began their study by administering an ingroup identification scale that measured how much the participants identified with their ingroup: the Netherlands, in this case. Doosje et al. wanted to understand the relationship between ingroup identification and group-level guilt "in response to an unfavorable message stemming from the ingroup" (Doosje et al., 2006, p. 330). Their hypothesis was that low identifiers would believe that apologizing was the correct action in regards to the negative past, while high identifiers would find hearing about their ingroup’s actions to be troubling. Ultimately, they hypothesized that "when an ingroup expresses an apology to the victimized group for the ingroup’s behavior in the past, ingroup identification will be positively related to group based guilt" (Doosje et al., 2006, p. 332). Their predictions were supported: identification with the ingroup did positively relate to group-based guilt through an apology, while identification did negatively relate to guilt through the money condition (Doosje et al., 2006, p. 333).

The method Doosje et al. employed is as follows. First they surveyed their participants to gauge their level of identification with being Dutch. Doosje et al. made salient their ingroup identification, being Dutch, by asking participants to answer eight questions about their feelings of being Dutch; this served as a continuous independent variable. They then divided their participants into groups of three, each receiving one of three historical accounts of what occurred in Indonesia; Doosje et al. used these accounts to manipulate the perceived level of follow-up involvement by the Dutch. Each account detailed the same initial actions of the Dutch towards the Indonesians, but each portrayed a different follow-up behavior on behalf of the Dutch. One account, the control, did not
allude to any further follow-up behavior by the Dutch after colonization, the second account of follow-up behavior chronicled an apology by the Dutch to the Indonesians as a result of their behavior, and the third follow-up outlined that the Netherlands tried to offer money as reparations on multiple occasions to Indonesia (Doosje et al., 2006, p. 332).

After the students read these accounts they were asked to analyze the negative messages in their historical accounts on a scale from 1 to 7: 1 being extremely negative to 7 being extremely positive. The participants used the same scale to measure their guilt after reading the passages.

Doosje et al. concluded that participants’ level of ingroup identification served as an important predictor of group-level guilt when dealing with the ingroup’s past behavior in the form of reparations. Their hypotheses were affirmed: those with higher levels of ingroup identification felt more group-level guilt if they thought that the Dutch government had issued an apology, consequently admitting responsibility for what they had done to the Indonesians during colonization. They also affirmed that if participants did not feel a strong level of identification with the ingroup, they would be more likely to offer psychological reparations in the form of an apology or money because their feelings as part of the ingroup are low; they will not feel the guilt that comes from an apology because they do not feel a strong connection with the group that was responsible. While Doosje et al. did affirm their hypotheses, it is important to note that they only measured identification. Through my experiment I plan to manipulate feelings of ingroup identification to see if manipulating ingroup identification will have stronger results. I also plan to apply their work to the United States, so that I can easily manipulate ingroup identification to be
identification with belonging to the country where the experiment will be conducted, the United States.

**Conceptualization**

When do the members of a group experience guilt when their group mistreats, or is responsible for, harm done to another group? Prior research suggests that ingroup members, especially those with higher levels of empathy, will feel more guilt. Their level of guilt, however, will depend on the strength of their relationship to the harmed group, which in this case is not particularly strong since they will not know any of the wronged individuals on a personal level; the wronged party in this experiment is a collective. Because of this, participants may, in general, distance themselves from the situation and feel less guilt. Prior research also suggests that those who indentify more highly with the collective of the ingroup will have more guilt for the action taken by their group than those who indentify less with the collective and more as an individual in the outgroup.

My research extends prior work by actually manipulating feelings of collective and individual identity in relation to the group. While manipulating identity I also looked at empathy levels and whether or not ingroup members would act in a way that reflected their level of guilt.

I predict that those primed to identify highly with the ingroup collective will feel more guilt if the US government has already extended an apology to the Cambodian people. These individuals will be most inclined to buy a bracelet by act out their guilt in a behavioral. If given the choice, these high identifiers will also prefer to send aid because they will feel less guilt by not apologizing and assuming some responsibility. Those who are primed to feel more individual from the ingroup will not show a preference to towards
apologizing or giving aid money since they will feel less guilt in general as low identifiers. Their willingness to apologize or to donate personally by buying the bracelet in the behavioral measure may be attributed to their level of empathy. I predict that empathy will mediate the relationship between guilt and identification.

To examine this possibility I conducted a study, in which I manipulated both the ingroup’s response to their previous actions towards the outgroup, as well as the extent to which individuals identified with the ingroup.

My study tested whether the strength of identification as an American affects the ways in which one view the actions of the United States towards Cambodia: do those made to feel more American feel more guilty about the US’ involvement with the genocide in Cambodia? While Doosje et al. used more than 400 students to complete their study, I surveyed 90 students within the University of Richmond community in Richmond, VA. I believed that the findings of this study would be similar to those of Doosje, particularly about US involvement and the peoples’ knowledge of the governments’ actions. If guilt were measured on a scale of 1 to 7: 1 being no guilt felt and 7 being extremely high levels of guilt, I hypothesized that those made to feel more American will feel more guilt on behalf of the United States’ action. I hypothesized that those who are made to feel less a part of the ingroup than “most Americans” will feel low levels of guilt, perhaps a 1 or 2, determining that appropriate action would be an apology. I predicted that those made to identify more strongly with the ingroup as Americans will score a 4 or 5 on guilt, while recommending monetary compensation in order to avoid the negative feeling of admitting that their ingroup did something negative in the past through an apology.
To further measure their level of guilt, each participant answered three statements on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 extremely negative, to 7, extremely positive: “I feel guilty about the negative things the United States has done to the Cambodians,” “I feel regret for the harmful past actions of the Americans toward the Cambodians,” and “I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by the Cambodians which were brought about by the Americans in the past.” In order to verify the ways in which they translated their feelings of guilt into action, participants indicated what the US should do for Cambodia: endorse the actions taken by the US in their story, offer an apology, offer aid, or take no further action. In addition to verifying their level of guilt through proposed action, they also had the opportunity to act on their own feelings of guilt. At the end of the experiment, participants could accept $10 as compensation for their time, or they were able to use the $10 donation to buy a bracelet made by Cambodian children, helping to subsidize their education in Cambodia’s public schools.

Based upon the prior research done within the realm of ingroup identity, group-level guilt, and empathy, I predicted the following hypotheses would be affirmed through this study. The first hypothesis was that participants, whose group-level identities were activated and they felt as though they are part of the ingroup, would experience higher levels of collective guilt than those who had their individual level identities activated. The second hypothesis predicts there to be a relationship between identity and historical account. Participants primed to feel more collective as a part of the ingroup will feel more guilt when they read about the apology their ingroup has made to the outgroup for their past actions. The third hypothesis that I believe would be affirmed was that participants with higher levels of empathy will feel more group-level guilt across both conditions, those
manipulated to be part of the collective and those primed to feel more individualistic from the ingroup.
Methods

Participants

The participants in this study were undergraduate students from the University of Richmond who volunteered to take part in this research after consent. Participants were recruited from various classes, but the study was open to all members of the University of Richmond community; they had to be at least 18 years of age to take part. A convenience sample was utilized. No one younger than 18 years was included in the study.

The study was conducted in Room 119 of Jepson Hall on the campus of the University of Richmond; it did not disrupt any classes. Participants were able to come before and after class during the hours posted outside of the door. Participants were compensated for their time, not to exceed one hour; they received $10 cash after their completion of the experiment.

Procedure

The experiment followed the procedures used by Doosje et al. (2006). After briefing and consenting, participants received a booklet of questionnaires that were compiled for the experiment, a survey study. Some questionnaires measured different variables within the study, while others served as fillers to reduce the level of demand. For example, the first questionnaire asked participants geographical questions said to be from the National Geography Bee. Participants were asked to identify different countries on the world map: Djibouti, Venezuela, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Lesotho, and Cambodia. The questionnaire is included in the appendix.
Participants wrote directly on their surveys. On their surveys, participants reported their level of empathy, their level of ingroup identification, and their level of group-level guilt. The survey began with an introduction letter from the research team that gave specific instructions about completing the surveys in order, followed by the IRB consent form.

**Measures and Manipulations**

Participants began to fill out their surveys by responding to the questions listed on the different questionnaires. Each questionnaire within the booklet relayed specific instructions about proper completion to ensure that participants responded to the questions in the appropriate order, from the first questionnaire in the booklet to the last. Independent measure: empathy. The second questionnaire in the booklet was a modified version of the 28-question Davis multidimensional approach that measures individuals’ levels of empathy. Questions measuring empathy through fantasy were replaced with questions about empathy for countries that have suffered different types of hardships such as war, famine, etc. Here are the items that were added in place of those that measure empathy through fantasy: “Sometimes I feel sorry for people who live in countries that have had civil wars, like people in the United States, the Sudan, Guatemala, and Cambodia,” “Sometimes I feel sorry for people living in countries with extreme poverty, like people in India, Malawi, and Sierra Leone,” “Sometimes I feel sorry for people who live in countries that have been struck by natural disasters, like people in China, Myanmar, and Thailand,” and “I sometimes feel sorry for starving children with swollen bellies that I see in pictures.” These questions, when combined, measure collective-level empathy, and will be referred to as the Musser Outgroup Scale of Empathy, or MOSE. The higher the individual’s
score on the MOSE, the more empathy they express for members of outgroups experiencing hardships. The questionnaire is included in the appendix.

**Independent variable manipulation: ingroup identification.** Participants completed a brief questionnaire that manipulated their level of identification with the ingroup. Half of the participants were primed for increased group identification, whereas the other participants were primed for increased individuality. Both questionnaires are included in the appendix. These manipulations were adapted from those presented in the 2008 meta-analysis by Oyserman and Lee, “Does Culture Influence What and How We Think? Effects of Priming Individualism and Collectivism,” regarding how to prime individualism and collectivism in different cultures.

To prime participants for increased ingroup identification, they were given the following instructions: “For the next two minutes, you will not need to write anything. Please think of what you have in common with your fellow Americans. How do your fellow Americans expect you to act?” Participants were asked to formulate a sentence and record it on their answer sheet using some of the following words: *we, us, ours, American, America, United States, join, similar, alike, share, cooperative, agreeable, help, group, respect, partnership, together, team, support, others, attached, alliance, closeness, cohesive, connection, interdependence, intimate, joint, merged, overlap, shared, union, friendships.*

A similar questionnaire was used to prime participants for decreased ingroup identification. They were given the following instructions: “For the next two minutes, you will not need to write anything. Please think of what you do differently from other Americans. How do you expect yourself to act differently from other Americans?” Participants were asked to formulate a sentence and record it on their answer sheet using
some of the following words: *I, me, mine, American, America, United States, distinct, different, competitive, own, free, unique, dissociate, unusual, autonomy, alone, apart, autonomous, detached, different, dissimilar, distinct, diverge, independence, individual, isolate, separate, solitude, split, unique, self-contained.*

**Historical account manipulation.** The fourth item in the survey was an “historical account” said to be written by David Chandler, a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer who specialized in the history and politics of Cambodia. Participants were assigned, at random, to one of the different account conditions. Each account detailed the same level of ingroup involvement in Cambodia before their civil war, but the actions of the ingroup after the civil war were different. One historical account demonstrated an apology by the ingroup for their involvement with the outgroup: this depicted that the US apologized to Cambodian citizens for previous actions. Another historical account demonstrated that no action has been taken by the ingroup on behalf of their harm to the outgroup; the US has done nothing in terms of reparations for the outgroup, the Cambodians. The third historical account specified that the ingroup sent money to the outgroup to make amends for US’ prior destructive behavior in Cambodia. Each of these historical accounts is listed in the appendix.

**Guilt.** To measure group-level guilt through ingroup identification, participants responded to a five-item measure that asked: “I feel guilty about the negative things the United States has done to the Cambodians,” “I feel regret for the harmful past actions of the Americans towards the Cambodians,” “I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by the Cambodians which were brought about by the Americans in the past,” “I feel ashamed of my country’s previous actions in Cambodia,” and “I wish there was something that I could
do to help negate the actions of my country." Participants responded to these questions on a scale ranging from 1, extremely negative, to 7, extremely positive. Participants also indicated whether they felt the US has taken appropriate action towards reparations with Cambodia: should the US have acted in the way that they did, or should the US have offered an apology, offered aid, or taken no further action.

*Compensation.* As a behavioral check on their guilt, participants had the opportunity to accept $10 or to use their compensation as the $10 donation to buy a bracelet made by Cambodian children, helping to subsidize their education. After their choice to donate or not to donate was recorded, all participants were given their $10 as payment, and charitable donations were not accepted.

*Manipulation checks.* In order to check the manipulation, participants were asked to place an 'X' through the set of seven conjoining circles that best described their relationship with the American group (adapted from “From Personal Identity to Social Identity" in *Group Dynamics*). Participants were also asked to identify the actions of the United States in the historical account they read by checking off that the United States: apologized to the Cambodian government, gave aid money to the Cambodian government, or took no action towards the Cambodian government.

Participants' level of ingroup identification was identified through a five-item scale that asks questions such as "I identify with other Americans" and "I feel attached to American people." These measures adapted from those used by Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead in their experiment “Antecedents and Consequences of Group-Based Guilt: The Effects of Ingroup Identification,” published in 2006.
After answering the questions within the booklet, participants were asked to list their age, sex, and country of origin on their answer sheet for statistical purposes. It was important to know participants' country of origin, as it could affect ingroup identification levels if they are not originally from the United States.
Results

This study examined the influence of both identity and type of action taken by the leaders of the ingroup on guilt and willingness to make a monetary donation to the group that was harmed by the ingroup. This chapter presents the findings of the research, and begins by first checking to see if the variables I sought to manipulate were, in fact, successfully manipulated. Following this check on the manipulation I turn to examine people’s degree of guilt, to determine if those individuals whose collective identity, primed to identify more highly as Americans, felt more guilt than those whose individual identities were primed. Unless otherwise noted, data were examined using a 2 (prime: individual vs. collective) X 3 (historical account: apology, aid, control) X 2 (sex: males and female) analysis of variance (ANOVA).

Priming of Collective and Individual Identity

Individuals assigned to the collective identity condition were asked to write a sentence, using such group-level terms as we, us, and American. Those individuals assigned to the individual identity condition were asked to write a short sentence, using such individual terms as I, different, and individual.

Analysis of these sentences indicated that those participants in the individual identity condition did use the word I more frequently in their stories than those in the collective identity condition; F(1,83) = 52.29, p < .0001. The mean number of Is used by individuals in the collective condition was .32 whereas the mean number of Is used by those in the individual condition was 2.04.
We also checked the effectiveness of the manipulation near the end of the study, by asking participants to complete items used in previous research pertaining to their identity—recognizing that their responses may be affected by the contents of the historical accounts. Analysis of those five questions revealed a significant main effect of prime for three of the five items. However, the interaction of prime and sex was also significant for these same items; $F_s(1, 77) = 5.06, 4.97, \text{ and } 6.40, ps < .05$. All the items revealed the same pattern: men in the individual prime condition identified more with the collective than men in the collective condition. The prime did not influence the women’s identification with the collective. The means for one illustrative item, “American people are an important group to me,” are shown in Figure 1.

![Figure 1. The means for men and women in the collective and individual primed conditions for the item “American people are an important group to me.”](image)
Understanding of the U.S. Government’s Response

Participants assigned to the apology condition read that the U.S. government had offered the government of Cambodia a formal apology under the Bush administration when former President Clinton travelled to Cambodia and met with Prime Minister Hun Sen. Participants assigned to the aid condition read that the US government had offered the government of Cambodia $4.3 million in aid to reconstruct rural areas. Participants assigned to the control condition read that the U.S. government had taken no action.

To check if participants read the accounts with sufficient care, taking notice of and remember the information about the U.S. government’s response I asked them to respond to the following item: “In the historical account that you read, the United States took the following action towards the Cambodian government.” Participants were asked to then check the appropriate response from the following items: “Apologized to the Cambodian Government,” “Gave aid money to the Cambodian government,” or “Took no action towards the Cambodian government.” Analysis indicated that 87 of the 89 (97.6%) participants correctly reported the type of historical they read. One participant did not answer this item.

Collective Guilt and Empathy

Participants were asked a series of 4 questions pertaining to their feelings of guilt over the U.S. government’s treatment of Cambodia. These items were all highly correlated, and so I averaged them together to yield a single index of collective guilt. The index of internal consistency, Cronbach’s alpha, was .814, indicating the items were all similar. Unexpectedly, neither prime nor historical account predicted degree of guilt in the ANOVA. However, an ANCOVA using outgroup empathy as the covariate (as assessed using the
Musser Outgroup Scale of Empathy) predicted guilt; $F(1, 83) = 17.50, p < .001$. The more empathic the individuals, the more guilt they felt for the U.S. actions. Note that the Cronbach’s alpha for the Musser Outgroup Scale of Empathy was .805.

**Donation Behavior**

Analysis of individuals’ decision to donate to support humanitarian efforts in Cambodia revealed a significant interaction of prime and historical account; $F(2, 73) = 3.54, p < .05$. The results of this effect are shown in Figure 2. As predicted, individuals in the apology/collective prime condition were the most likely to make a donation to the Caring Chains.

![Figure 2. Donation behavior by condition and identity level.](image-url)
Discussion

Through this study I examined the influence of both identity and type of action taken by the leaders of the ingroup on guilt at the group level, along with willingness to make a monetary donation to the group that was harmed by the ingroup. I also examined the relationship between group-level guilt and empathy.

Feelings of collective guilt can be influenced by several things, including one’s level of identification with the ingroup, one’s capacity for empathic feelings towards others, and the way in which one constructs their social identity. The way in which one constructs their social identity influences their level of identification with the ingroup: those who define themselves with many ties to their ingroup will feel more collective guilt for previous negative actions their ingroup committed towards an outgroup than those who rely less strongly on their ingroup’s identity. Empathy influences guilt because they go “hand-in-hand.” Thus, those who have a higher empathic capacity will feel more guilt, particularly if they have a personal connection to the person or group that has been harmed. Issuing an apology relates to guilt: by issuing an apology, one assumes some of the responsibility for harm done. On the group level, if one issues an apology on behalf of the ingroup’s actions, ingroup members might feel guilty to varying degrees, depending upon their level of identification with the ingroup.

Before examining the findings of this experiment, it is important to consider the difference between apologies on the individual and the collective levels. When an individual apologizes, they are assuming some level of responsibility for their previous action, presumably in an effort to restore their positive relationship. Collective apologies,
given by an individual on behalf of a group, may have different effects than their counterparts between individuals. While collective apologies also seem to assume some level of responsibility for the group's behavior, they may serve a different purpose. Instead of seeking remediation to restore a positive relationship, collective apologies from an individual on behalf of a group may serve to restore functionality. Members of the collective may not know the wronged individual or group on a personal level; therefore, it is possible that an apology on behalf of a group might serve solely as a means to restore a functioning relationship between the wronged and the collective, lacking the same moral implications as an apology on the individual level.

Knowing these different theories affirmed through previous research, I made several hypotheses regarding the results of my research. The first hypothesis I made was that participants, whose group-level identities were activated and they felt as though they are part of the ingroup, would experience higher levels of collective guilt than those who had their individual level identities activated. The second hypothesis predicts there to be a relationship between identity and historical account. Participants primed to feel more collective as a part of the ingroup will feel more guilt when they read about the apology their ingroup has made to the outgroup for their past actions. The third hypothesis that I believe would be affirmed was that participants with higher levels of empathy will feel more group-level guilt across both conditions, those manipulated to be part of the collective and those primed to feel more individualistic from the ingroup.

The results of this study show that those manipulated to identify with the ingroup collective do not have higher levels of guilt than those made to identify more as individuals, detached from the ingroup. This finding does not affirm my hypothesis. Oddly, the prime
for males, and only for males, was reversed: men in the individual prime condition identified more with the collective than men in the collective condition. The prime did not, however, influence the women's identification with the collective. The behavioral measure of guilt did work; individuals in the collective prime condition who read about their ingroup apologizing were the most likely to make a monetary donation. My hypothesis regarding guilt and empathy was affirmed: those who measured higher on the Musser Outgroup Scale of Empathy self-reported higher levels of guilt, which was expected based upon previous research. My findings support Baumeister and other social psychologists who have found close links between guilt and levels of empathy: individuals with a higher propensity for empathy feel guiltier than those individuals with lower levels of empathy. Empathic individuals' level of guilt was not affected by their level of identification with the ingroup, countering Tajfel and Turner's theory of Social Identity. Because those in the collective group who identified more highly with the ingroup were more likely to donate, my results do suppose Doosje's theory that apologies make people feel more guilt.

Although the identification prime did work, as demonstrated by the more frequent usage of the pronoun I by participants in the individual prime than those in the collective, the results regarding identification seem inconsistent with previous research. The manipulation that primed participants into the collective or individual identity conditions had no effect on women's self-reported feelings of guilt: they did not feel more or less guilty dependent upon their identity. The men were influenced by their ingroup prime: those in the individual prime condition felt guiltier than those in the collective prime. Because this effect was unique to the men, it's possible that the words used to prime individuals triggered a collective social identity unique to American men. It is also plausible that men
usually identify themselves more strongly with the American identity, and their stronger self-stereotyping facilitated this reaction with the manipulation.

Another probable cause for this effect may be attributed to the American sense of identity. The roots of American identity lie in the ideal of independence: the American colonists sought independence from England first through the Declaration of Independence, then as they fought for it during the Revolutionary War. Ultimately the colonists achieved their independence, birthing the American nation, the American identity, and its' heritage: the triumph of the individual. Today this heritage lives on through the Bill of Rights and the “American dream.” Embedded in the US Constitution, the Bill of Rights guarantee a set of certain, inalienable rights to each American individual, while the American dream continues to entice immigrants to the United States. Leaving their homelands behind, immigrants reinforce the idea of the rugged American through their pursuit of a free America, where if one chooses they can “pull themselves up by their own bootstraps.” Considering the strong connection between the “individual” and the American collective identity, it seems logical that those primed to feel more individual actually felt more a part of the American collective. Because this effect only influenced men, however, this effect must be considered within the context of gender roles and the American identity.

It is also possible that asking participants to fill out the empathy measure or the geographical questionnaire before the manipulation might have influenced their thought process. During the debrief that followed the experiment, some participants verbally commented that the questionnaire made them feel “stupid” or “inept” because they did not know many of the countries they were asked to identify. These feelings may have
compounded the way that the participants self-reported their level of guilt. Asking the participants to fill out the empathy measure prior to the manipulation may also have compounded the results in some unknown way: it is possible that participants were primed to feel more empathic, which was not part of my original hypothesis.

The strongest findings come from the behavioral measure when participants were able to make a personal monetary donation to the harmed outgroup. As predicted, the participants primed in the collective, apology condition were the most likely to donate. Those in the collective aid condition, on the inverse, were the least likely to donate. This could be attributed to the fact that they felt less of a need to donate because their collective group had already offered aid. It is also interesting to note that those primed as individuals were more likely to donate if they had read that their ingroup, the United States, had also given aid. Perhaps this result can be attributed to the American identity; even though they were primed as an individual, the words used to prime them might have evoked stronger feelings towards the collective American identity, which they used as a model for their donation behavior.

Possible reasons for the discrepancy between my hypotheses and the actual results could be attributed to the example I chose to use for this experiment. It is possible that because most American college students are unfamiliar with Cambodia, they do not have much empathy for its history or its people. If I had chosen a different outgroup that American college students are more familiar with, such as Iraqis harmed by Americans in the Iraqi War or African-Americans denied of rights until the Civil Rights movement, the results may have been stronger.
In relationship to Doosje et al.’s study “Antecedents and Consequences of Group-Based Guilt: The Effects of Ingroup Identification” which I used as a model for this study, my results tend to affirm Doosje et al.’s findings.

Doosje et al. found that group-based guilt and identification had a positive relationship when they were told that their ingroup had apologized for its past negative behavior towards the outgroup. I found another similarity to Doosje et al.’s study: level of identification with and reparation behavior of the ingroup did influence levels of group-based guilt on a significant level. More specifically, those primed as individuals still had relatively high levels of group-level guilt when they read that their group had made reparations by donating aid: participants primed as individuals were more likely to donate if the US had given aid instead of offering an apology. This finding parallels Doosje et al.’s study, and may be a result from the same argument made by Tajfel and Turner: “offering an apology is costly for the ingroup's image, and is therefore more likely to be favored by people who have not invested a great deal in their group membership” (as cited in Doosje, et al., 2006, p. 335).

The behavioral measure of my experiment also affirmed other findings of Doosje et al.’s study. By examining the donation behavior of participants primed to feel part of the collective, it becomes clear that they were more likely to feel guilty when their ingroup had acknowledged their past negative actions by offering an apology. Similar to Doosje et al., I also found that participants primed to feel part of the collective were less likely to donate if their ingroup had compensated the outgroup with aid money than those who were primed to feel like individuals. This signifies these participants, primed in the collective, do not assume responsibility for what their ingroup did to the outgroup. Doosje et al. attribute
this to the idea that the ingroup views the donation of aid money as a purely financial transaction, not an act that assumes responsibility. This point is further illustrated by the fact that collectively primed participants are only as willing as those primed in the individual condition to give some sort of compensation when the ingroup has offered an apology; this finding also parallels Doosje et al.

My study had another finding similar to Doosje et al., but it was illustrated in a different way. Participants in the collective prime when their ingroup had taken no action were less likely than those in the individual prime to donate. The fact that they were less likely to donate than those in the individual prime could be attributed to the fact that they felt more guilt and did not want to assume responsibility for their ingroup’s actions by donating any money.

Because some of my hypotheses were not affirmed and the results seemed to be flipped around, I would like to explore how priming for empathy can affect one’s level of guilt in future research. The three-part interaction between empathy, identity, and guilt is something that I would like to research in more depth, in order to examine how they all simultaneously interact with one another given certain levels of guilt, empathy, and identification. I would also like to do more research regarding the sex difference between men and women’s interactions with collective and individual American identities.

Conclusion

Through this study I manipulated identity to prime participants to feel more a part of the collective or more as an individual in relationship to their ingroup, Americans. In order to gauge different levels of guilt, I placed participants in groups where they read different historical accounts, outlining the negative behavior of their ingroup towards an
outgroup, the Cambodian people. Empathy was measured, and participants were given the option to not only self-report their levels of guilt but to act it out in a behavioral measure.

While all of my hypotheses were not affirmed, this experiment affirms several relationships between identification, guilt, and empathy. Empathy, linked with feelings of guilt on the individual, is also linked to feelings of guilt at the group level. This research has also helped to affirm that self-report and behavioral measures do not always have the same results: people may not be able to accurately assess their own feelings. Finally, this experiment affirmed the idea that apologizing, and thus taking some responsibility for prior ingroup actions, does invoke guilt on a group level for individuals who identify with their group.
References


Empathy, Group-Level Guilt


Appendix A

General Knowledge Survey
Spring 2009
Dear Participant,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in our survey research project. Please complete each of the following surveys and questionnaires to the best of your ability. Once you have finished one survey, please continue on to the next survey until you reach the demographics questionnaire; this will signify the end of the surveys.

If you have any questions, please feel free to ask your proctor.

Sincerely,
The Research Team
RESEARCH SUBJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM

TITLE: General Knowledge Survey

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this research study is to learn more about how people, in general, react to information about historical events.

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AND YOUR INVOLVEMENT
If you decide to be in this research study, you will be asked to read information an historical event that led to loss of life and then complete a brief survey that asks questions about your reaction to the description.

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR
The principal investigators for this study are Laura Musser, a senior at the University of Richmond, and Don Forsyth, professor of Leadership Studies.

RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
This project will take about 30-40 minutes of your time to complete. This survey asks only general questions about your personal reactions, so we don’t expect that it will cause you any distress. But, if at any time you feel you feel upset or uncomfortable, then you should stop answering the survey. You are free to discontinue participation at any time.

BENEFITS
You may not get any direct benefit from this study, but the information we learn from our research may help us understand how people respond to historical events. Also, it may be that you receive credit for taking part in this study, from your employer or teacher, or even receive a small monetary payment for taking part.

COSTS
There are no costs for participating in this study other than the time you will spend in the session and filling out questionnaires.

ALTERNATIVES
This is not a treatment study, so there is no need to seek alternative treatments. Your alternative to taking part in this study is to complete other studies or not participate in research at all.

CONFIDENTIALITY
We will not tell anyone the answers you give us. Your responses will not be associated with you by name, at any time, and the data you provide will be kept secure. What we find from this study may be presented at meetings or published in papers, but your name will not ever be used in these presentations or papers.
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
You do not have to participate in this study. If you choose to participate, you may stop at any time without any penalty. You may also choose not to answer particular questions that are asked in the study.

QUESTIONS
In the future, you may have questions about your participation in this study. If you have any questions, contact:

Don Forsyth, Professor
Jepson School of Leadership Studies
Room 233
Jepson, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA 23173
804-289-8461
dforsyth@richmond.edu

If you have any questions concerning your rights as a research subject, you may contact Dr. R. Kirk Jonas, the Chair of the University of Richmond’s Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Research Participants, at 804-484-1565 or at rjonas@richmond.edu.

CONSENT
The study has been described to me and I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation in the project at any time without penalty. I also understand that, if I experience discomfort or distress during the course of the study because of any sensitive issues that are raised, I am encouraged to call the University’s counseling center, CAPS, at 289-8119.

I have read and understand the above information and I consent to participate in this study by signing below.

________________________________________
Signature and Date

________________________________________
Witness (experimenter)
:: NATIONAL GEOGRAPHY BEE questionnaire (see Appendix F) ::
Respond to each of the following items by writing the appropriate number, as noted below:

0 1 2 3 4

does not describe me well describes me very well

___ 1. I sometimes feel sorry for people who live in countries that have had civil wars, like people in the United States, the Sudan, Guatemala, and Cambodia.

___ 2. I sometimes feel sorry for people living in countries with extreme poverty, like people in India, Malawi, and Sierra Leone.

___ 3. I sometimes feel sorry for people who live in countries that have been struck by natural disasters, like people in China, Myanmar, and Thailand.

___ 4. I sometimes feel sorry for starving children with swollen bellies that I see in pictures.

___ 5. I do not feel inclined to donate to charities that help improve the lives of other people around the world such as UNICEF.


___ 7. I have considered going on a service trip for spring break.

___ 8. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

___ 9. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.

___ 10. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.

___ 11. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.

___ 12. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.

___ 13. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.

___ 14. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.

___ 15. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.

___ 16. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.

___ 17. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.

___ 18. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.

___ 19. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.

___ 20. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.

___ 21. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
22. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.

23. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.

24. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.

25. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.

26. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.

27. When I see someone hurt, I tend to remain calm.

28. I tend to lose control during emergencies.
For the next two minutes, you will not need to write anything.

Please think of what you have in common with others. How do those with whom you can easily relate expect you to act?

Please formulate a sentence and record it below using some of the following words:

we, us, ours, join, similar, alike, share, American, cooperative, agreeable, help, group, respect, partnership, together, team, support, United States, others, attached, alliance, closeness, cohesive, connection, interdependence, intimate, joint, merged, overlap, shared, union, America, friendships


:: HISTORICAL ACCOUNT (see Appendices C, D, and E) ::
Respond to each of the following items by writing the appropriate number, as noted below:

1  2  3  4  5  6  7

extremely negative    extremely positive

1. I feel guilty about the negative things the United States has done to the Cambodians.
2. I feel regret for the harmful past actions of the Americans towards the Cambodians.
3. I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by the Cambodians, which were brought about by the Americans in the past.
4. I feel ashamed of my country’s previous actions in Cambodia.
5. I wish there was something that I could do to help negate the actions of my country.

What action do you think the United States should have taken towards Cambodia to make reparations?

Please select only one option.

I feel the US should have:

1. The US should have offered an official apology to the Cambodian people.
2. The US should have offered monetary aid to the Cambodian people.
3. The US should have taken no action.

Please place an “X” through the set of circles that best indicates the extent to which the American group (G) overlaps with the self (S).
Respond to each of the following items by writing the appropriate number, as noted below:

1. Being American just feels natural to me.
2. I feel attached to American people.
3. I identify with other American people.
4. I see myself as American.
5. American people are an important group to me.

Please select only one option.

In the historical account that you read, the United States took the following action towards the Cambodian government:

- Apologized to the Cambodian government
- Gave aid money to the Cambodian government
- Took no action towards the Cambodian government
Thank you for your participation.

Before you receive the $10 cash as promised, I wanted to share a project with you that I began last summer as part of my Jepson internship while I worked in Cambodia for a non-profit organization called Caring for Cambodia. Caring for Cambodia's mission is to subsidize public schools in the Siem Reap area, close to the Angkor Wat temples, because they do not have adequate supplies for the 3500 students that they serve. In addition to team-teaching an ESL class with Kim Choeun, an English teacher, I developed a program called Caring Chains, which raises abroad awareness and funding for CFC's different initiatives in Cambodia.

Below is the "Caring Card" that explains the significance of each Caring Chain. I have also attached a copy of the feature article on Caring Chains, included in the October 2, 2008 edition of The Collegian.

Would you be interested in donating your $10 to purchase a Caring Chain, which is also $10?  

**Please circle one response.**

Yes, please.  

No, thank you.
Demographic Information
For research purposes only.

Please circle your sex:  Man    Woman

What is your age in years? __________________________

In what city were you born? __________________________
Appendix B

General Knowledge Survey
Spring 2009
Dear Participant,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in our survey research project. Please complete each of the following surveys and questionnaires to the best of your ability. Once you have finished one survey, please continue on to the next survey until you reach the demographics questionnaire; this will signify the end of the surveys.

If you have any questions, please feel free to ask your proctor.

Sincerely,
The Research Team
RESEARCH SUBJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM

TITLE: General Knowledge Survey

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this research study is to learn more about how people, in general, react to information about historical events.

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AND YOUR INVOLVEMENT
If you decide to be in this research study, you will be asked to read information an historical event that led to loss of life and then complete a brief survey that asks questions about your reaction to the description.

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR
The principal investigators for this study are Laura Musser, a senior at the University of Richmond, and Don Forsyth, professor of Leadership Studies.

RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
This project will take about 30-40 minutes of your time to complete. This survey asks only general questions about your personal reactions, so we don’t expect that it will cause you any distress. But, if at any time you feel you feel upset or uncomfortable, then you should stop answering the survey. You are free to discontinue participation at any time.

BENEFITS
You may not get any direct benefit from this study, but the information we learn from our research may help us understand how people respond to historical events. Also, it may be that you receive credit for taking part in this study, from your employer or teacher, or even receive a small monetary payment for taking part.

COSTS
There are no costs for participating in this study other than the time you will spend in the session and filling out questionnaires.

ALTERNATIVES
This is not a treatment study, so there is no need to seek alternative treatments. Your alternative to taking part in this study is to complete other studies or not participate in research at all.

CONFIDENTIALITY
We will not tell anyone the answers you give us. Your responses will not be associated with you by name, at any time, and the data you provide will be kept secure. What we find from this study may be presented at meetings or published in papers, but your name will not ever be used in these presentations or papers.
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL

You do not have to participate in this study. If you choose to participate, you may stop at any time without any penalty. You may also choose not to answer particular questions that are asked in the study.

QUESTIONS

In the future, you may have questions about your participation in this study. If you have any questions, contact:

Don Forsyth, Professor
Jepson School of Leadership Studies
Room 233
Jepson, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA 23173
804-289-8461
dforsyth@richmond.edu

If you have any questions concerning your rights as a research subject, you may contact Dr. R. Kirk Jonas, the Chair of the University of Richmond’s Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Research Participants, at 804-484-1565 or at rjonas@richmond.edu.

CONSENT

The study has been described to me and I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation in the project at any time without penalty. I also understand that, if I experience discomfort or distress during the course of the study because of any sensitive issues that are raised, I am encouraged to call the University’s counseling center, CAPS, at 289-8119.

I have read and understand the above information and I consent to participate in this study by signing below.

____________________________________________________________________________________
Signature and Date

____________________________________________________________________________________
Witness (experimenter)
:: NATIONAL GEOGRAPHY BEE questionnaire (see Appendix F) ::
Respond to each of the following items by writing the appropriate number, as noted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>does not describe me well</td>
<td>describes me very well</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

____ 1. I sometimes feel sorry for people who live in countries that have had civil wars, like people in the United States, the Sudan, Guatemala, and Cambodia.

____ 2. I sometimes feel sorry for people living in countries with extreme poverty, like people in India, Malawi, and Sierra Leone.

____ 3. I sometimes feel sorry for people who live in countries that have been struck by natural disasters, like people in China, Myanmar, and Thailand.

____ 4. I sometimes feel sorry for starving children with swollen bellies that I see in pictures.

____ 5. I do not feel inclined to donate to charities that help improve the lives of other people around the world such as UNICEF.


____ 7. I have considered going on a service trip for spring break.

____ 8. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

____ 9. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.

____ 10. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.

____ 11. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.

____ 12. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.

____ 13. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.

____ 14. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.

____ 15. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.

____ 16. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.

____ 17. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.

____ 18. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.

____ 19. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.

____ 20. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.

____ 21. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
22. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.

23. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.

24. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.

25. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.

26. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.

27. When I see someone hurt, I tend to remain calm.

28. I tend to lose control during emergencies.
For the next two minutes, you will not need to write anything.

Please think of what you do differently from others. How do you expect yourself to act differently from others?

Please formulate a sentence and record it below using some of the following words:

I, me, mine, distinct, different, competitive, own, free, unique, dissociate, unusual, autonomy, alone, apart, autonomous, detached, different, dissimilar, distinct, diverge, independence, individual, isolate, separate, solitude, split, unique, self-contained
:: HISTORICAL ACCOUNT (see Appendices C, D, and E) ::
Respond to each of the following items by writing the appropriate number, as noted below:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

- extremely negative
- extremely positive

1. I feel guilty about the negative things the United States has done to the Cambodians.

2. I feel regret for the harmful past actions of the Americans towards the Cambodians.

3. I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by the Cambodians, which were brought about by the Americans in the past.

4. I feel ashamed of my country's previous actions in Cambodia.

5. I wish there was something that I could do to help negate the actions of my country.

What action do you think the United States should have taken towards Cambodia to make reparations?

Please select only one option.

I feel the US should have:

- The US should have offered an official apology to the Cambodian people.

- The US should have offered monetary aid to the Cambodian people.

- The US should have taken no action.

Please place an "X" through the set of circles that best indicates the extent to which the American group (G) overlaps with the self (S).
Respond to each of the following items by writing the appropriate number, as noted below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>not at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>very much</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_____ 1. Being American just feels natural to me.
_____ 2. I feel attached to American people.
_____ 3. I identify with other American people.
_____ 4. I see myself as American.
_____ 5. American people are an important group to me.

Please select only one option.

In the historical account that you read, the United States took the following action towards the Cambodian government:

_____ Apologized to the Cambodian government
_____ Gave aid money to the Cambodian government
_____ Took no action towards the Cambodian government
Thank you for your participation.

Before you receive the $10 cash as promised, I wanted to share a project with you that I began last summer as part of my Jepson internship while I worked in Cambodia for a non-profit organization called Caring for Cambodia. Caring for Cambodia’s mission is to subsidize public schools in the Siem Reap area, close to the Angkor Wat temples, because they do not have adequate supplies for the 3500 students that they serve. In addition to team-teaching an ESL class with Kim Choeun, an English teacher, I developed a program called Caring Chains, which raises abroad awareness and funding for CFC’s different initiatives in Cambodia.

Below is the “Caring Card” that explains the significance of each Caring Chain. I have also attached a copy of the feature article on Caring Chains, included in the October 2, 2008 edition of The Collegian.

Would you be interested in donating your $10 to purchase a Caring Chain, which is also $10?

Please circle one response.

Yes, please.  
No, thank you.
Demographic Information
For research purposes only.

Please circle your sex: Man Woman

What is your age in years? _______________________

In what city were you born? ________________________
Appendix C

The United States bombed Vietnam’s border with Cambodia because of the increasing number of Vietnamese soldiers stationed there during the Vietnam War. Between 1969 and 1973, the US dropped more than a half-ton of munitions over Cambodia, killing tens or hundreds of thousands of Cambodian civilians. Over this four-year span, the United States detonated over one and a half times as many explosives used during World War II against Japan. A Cambodian citizen recounts his experience:

“Every time after there had been bombing, the KR guerillas would take the people to see the craters, to see how big and deep the craters were, to see how the Earth had been gouged out and scorched... Terrified and half-crazy, the people were ready to believe what they were told. That was what made it so easy for the Khmer Rouge to win the people over.”

Once they had assumed power, the Khmer Rouge killed close to two million people, a quarter of Cambodia’s population through execution, starvation, forced labor, and starvation while attempting to creating a purely agrarian society. Since the end of the Vietnam War and the fall of the Khmer Rouge that followed the United States’ involvement in Cambodia, the US government has taken no action. They have chosen not to recognize

Cambodian citizens are still living in poverty after years under the Khmer Rouge. The US has taken no action.

Since the end of the Vietnam War and the fall of the Khmer Rouge that followed the United States’ involvement in Cambodia, the US government has taken no action. They have chosen not to recognize

―David Chandler is a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer who has specialized in the history and politics of Cambodia. After receiving degrees from Harvard University, Yale University, and the University of Michigan, he served in Phnom Penh from 1960-1962.
The United States bombed Vietnam’s border with Cambodia because of the increasing number of Vietnamese soldiers stationed there during the Vietnam War. Between 1969 and 1973, the US dropped more than a half-ton of munitions over Cambodia, killing tens or hundreds of thousands of Cambodian civilians. Over this four-year span, the United States detonated over one and a half times as many explosives used during World War II against Japan. A Cambodian citizen recounts his experience:

“Every time after there had been bombing, the KR guerillas would take the people to see the craters, to see how big and deep the craters were, to see how the Earth had been gouged out and scorched... Terrified and half-crazy, the people were ready to believe what they were told. That was what made it so easy for the Khmer Rouge to win the people over.”

Once they had assumed power, the Khmer Rouge killed close to two million people, a quarter of Cambodia’s population through execution, starvation, forced labor, and starvation while attempting to creating a purely agrarian society. Since the end of the Vietnam War and the fall of the Khmer Rouge that followed the United States’ involvement in Cambodia, the US government has offered the government of Cambodia $4.3 million in aid to reconstruct these rural areas. The Cambodian government has decided to use a large portion of this aid money to rebuild infrastructure around the country, including schools, medical clinics, and administrative buildings.²

² David Chandler is a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer who has specialized in the history and politics of Cambodia. After receiving degrees from Harvard University, Yale University, and the University of Michigan, he served in Phnom Penh from 1960-1962.
Appendix E

The United States bombed Vietnam's border with Cambodia because of the increasing number of Vietnamese soldiers stationed there during the Vietnam War. Between 1969 and 1973, the US dropped more than a half-ton of munitions over Cambodia, killing tens or hundreds of thousands of Cambodian civilians. Over this four-year span, the United States detonated over one and a half times as many explosives used during World War II against Japan. A Cambodian citizen recounts his experience:

"Every time after there had been bombing, the KR guerillas would take the people to see the craters, to see how big and deep the craters were, to see how the Earth had been gouged out and scorched... Terrified and half-crazy, the people were ready to believe what they were told. That was what made it so easy for the Khmer Rouge to win the people over."

Once they had assumed power, the Khmer Rouge killed close to two million people, a quarter of Cambodia's population through execution, starvation, forced labor, and starvation while attempting to creating a purely agrarian society.

Former President Clinton apologizes to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen.

Since the end of the Vietnam War and the fall of the Khmer Rouge that followed the United States'

involvement in Cambodia, the US government has offered the government of Cambodia a formal apology under the Bush administration. In December 2006, former President Clinton travelled to Cambodia to give his condolences to the Cambodian people after meeting with the Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen.³

³ David Chandler is a former U.S. Foreign Service Officer who has specialized in the history and politics of Cambodia. After receiving degrees from Harvard University, Yale University, and the University of Michigan, he served in Phnom Penh from 1960-1962.
Appendix F

Please label the following areas on this map of the world: Algeria, Cambodia, Djibouti, Lesotho, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela.