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Disproving the Military as an Effective Paradigm of Leadership:

A Critical Analysis

by

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DISPROVING THE MILITARY AS AN EFFECTIVE PARADIGM OF LEADERSHIP: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

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BACKGROUND:

In the study of leadership, there are many existing paradigms which address the different contexts and abilities of leadership. The example of the military is often used as a leadership paradigm; however, while the organization and internal development included in the military can be respected as an effective machine, in reality, the military cannot be considered an effective leadership paradigm.

It can be difficult to define what leadership is. Hughes, Ginnett and Curphy define leadership as “the process of influencing an organized group toward accomplishing its goals...(with) one aspect of this definition particularly worth noting: Leadership is a social influence process shared among all members of a group. Leadership is not restricted to the influence exerted by someone in a particular position or role: followers are part of the leadership process too.” (Hughes et. al., 8). Thusly, leadership is not an inherent ability, which would focus the concept of leadership on the leader. Leadership, instead, is a process that incorporates the whole story, the many elements that contribute to leadership, including the leader(s), follower(s), and the situation in an interactional framework, (Hughes et. al. 92).

Even considering this definition, leadership still exists as a conglomerate of murky ideas that are relative. For this reason, we turn to leadership paradigm
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and theory to guide our understanding of the differences within the world of leadership. Theories are "statements of relation among concepts within a set of boundary assumptions and constraints," (Wren, 1995). Paradigms exist as "a network of theories, ideas, and methodologies that people have come to accept as given in a certain field or topic," (Ciulla, 1994). Observing these definitions, trends in leadership are collated into categories defined by their leadership theory and overriding paradigms.

What makes these theories/paradigms long-standing? Such dogma can be identified by certain testable qualities. Testability; scientific parsimony, or the idea of how much a theory explains; internal validity, the adequacy of the logical and empirical development; external validity, the generalizability of the concept; and applied, or heuristic value, the usability of a theoretical framework, are required, interrelated elements for accepted theory.

In understanding the concept of leadership itself, as well as leadership paradigms, one may question if a militaristic paradigm is truly considered as a theoretical definition of leadership. The paradigm of military leadership as it currently stands can be most succinctly stated in the motto of West Point Academy: "Duty, Honor, Country." These three qualities, in order of importance designate the characteristics inherent in a West Point graduate who is considered to possess leadership skills. This philosophy easily addresses theory qualifications. Likewise, it demands the incorporation of task (duty) development and vision, ("serving" country). The military exists as a theory, but in what discipline: leadership or otherwise?
In answering the question of the relation between this model and leadership philosophy one must look to where education is formulating present-day leadership. The Jepson School of Leadership Studies at the University of Richmond is becoming the contemporary authority on leadership in undergraduate education. The prerequisite for pursuing any type of studies within this doctrine is to complete the “Foundations of Leadership” course. The intention of this course is to give a broad, overarching view of leadership and the content of the school’s curriculum, however, early in this course, the focus on military philosophy is evident.

The “bible” of leadership students from 1993 to Spring of 1995 was the Jepson reader. In examining the table of contents, approximately one seventh of all the articles included in this book are referenced to military organizations. The book itself is divided into seven parts, examining the key building blocks of leadership: introduction, the concept of leadership, the elements of leadership, the process of leadership, the practice of leadership, the purpose of leadership, conclusion. Three of these categories include at least one military writing: the elements of leadership, the process of leadership, and the purpose of leadership. It is obvious that there is an emphasis on military input in the more substantial subtexts of leadership as identified. This becomes even more obvious when one realizes that one section, arguably the most important and influential, the process of leadership, dealing with leading and motivating groups and individuals, is comprised completely of military literature.
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Public opinion also has developed to include the military in the stereotype of leadership almost by default. In examining leadership literature, the military is an ever-present context both in providing the literature and in serving as a testing ground for leadership theory. “Institutional leadership theory” is often defined as leadership exhibited in a military setting by psychological journals (Kirkland, 320). This assumption not only pervades academia but also the public at large. An informal poll of thirty University of Richmond students not pursuing a degree in Leadership Studies found 60% identifying the military as an example of leadership and/or leaders.

Along the same vein, present day heroes that are held in the highest regard and who fill auditoriums to capacity with their lectures often openly display their allegiance, past or present, to the military. The most hotly desired candidate in the 1996 Presidential election in embodied in a former war hero, Colin Powell. The most celebrated individual recognized in the success of the recent Gulf War was General Norman Schwartzkopf. The only competitor for concentrated public adoration during this time was President George Bush, who, in the election just prior to the Gulf conflict, ran a Presidential campaign filled with propaganda and commercials focusing on his extremely long and successful military career.

These heroes are not only serving the adult population in this role. Military giants are being served to children and young adults as the subject of respect and adoration. The most highly publicized member of the Board of Trustees for the Jepson School is General Norman Schwartzkopf, a military guru; moreover, the Dean of the Jepson School is a highly decorated former military man and
Dean at West Point. When it comes to those who are viewed to be competent in getting the job done, and getting it done right, the public has come to rely on its men in uniform in all four branches of the military.

The perception of military dogma as part of leadership is obvious. The validity of such a relationship is questionable. Are military leaders able to transfer their leadership ability to other contexts? What role do followers play in the process of leadership? Considering the equation of military leadership, “honor, duty, country” the first two qualities are admittedly character traits, the third incorporates vision. Followers are neither included by involvement nor opinion. This questionable relationship between leadership and the military is what remains to be explored.

The purpose in undertaking this project is to clarify the various contexts of leadership theory. Too often, the military is the convenient example used by society as well as scholars to define leadership. The military’s dictatorial style discredits the true potential of leadership and its many facets. Not only to educate the public, but also to validate the mission of such institutions as the Jepson School of Leadership Studies, it is imperative to reeducate people on what really is true leadership.

Likewise, this study will greatly serve the needs of the leadership community. Many are calling for leadership, and many more still don’t know what that means. It is imperative that the necessity of leadership and its true value be recognized. Currently, the military continues to exist as the “cop-out” stereotype of leadership in practice. In order to challenge ourselves, the field of leadership
studies must leave this archetype behind and examine other options and contexts more closely. As leadership theory then continues to break new ground, it continues to gain respect and validity.

Not only will this project emphasize the importance of leadership and its theory and value, but it will also reiterate the necessary integrative nature of the multidisciplinary field that is leadership studies. Leadership is parented by the field of psychology and in order to comprehend where a doctrine is going, it is first essential to understand and respect where it has been. In utilizing various research means and resources for information, namely from the psychological field, leadership does not disregard the benefits of other studies which contribute to the holistic area that is leadership.

In exploring the validity of the present study’s hypothesis, a triangulate research method was utilized combining literary research, direct observation, and personal narratives from individuals directly involved in the military and those with no previous military experience who came in contact with military “leadership”. This method reduces the ability for contradiction in limited research and also allows for exhaustive exploration of all the possible resources, opinions and information.

In summary, this work intends to disprove leadership stereotypes while supporting the concept of evolving leadership and educating present day scholars as well as the general public. This is not only important to the leadership community for what it will bring about theoretically, but also because it applies the driving goals of the Jepson School including the principles of personal execution
of leadership, “helping others exercise leadership and holding other leaders accountable,” reestablishing paradigms of leadership and using effective modes of inquiry. All these variables combine into changing the status quo of an existing leadership paradigm, by establishing the essential elements of leadership paradigm and theory and applying these to existing models. The results show not only what benefits result from a leadership education in use, but also how this can benefit leadership education of the future for students of all ages.

METHODOLOGY

In compiling the data for this report, it was necessary to find as many different perspectives as possible. The first step was to identify the elements of leadership theory that relate to and result in paradigm development and definition. This was accomplished through the curriculum of “History and Theories of Leadership” as well as “Critical Thinking.” Critical elements were determined and a theoretical process for leadership was devised as a model to serve as a comparison for any leadership paradigm or theory.

Descriptive data was collected through observation of public opinion, and resource type and availability concerning the role that the military may play in leadership dogma. After this preliminary research, more extensive literary searches were executed to develop a standard military doctrine.

Personal perceptions were collected in the form of personal journal entries from individuals involved in the ROTC program on the University of Richmond campus. Some are involved with the leadership program, others are not.
reflections were also collected from individuals who had experience with military leadership for the first time, with no previous experience with military paradigm. Individuals were also contacted for personal interviews to examine their personal views of military leadership and its contribution to leadership as a whole. All this data was combined with the resulting comparison between the standard devised for leadership theory and the military paradigm as it was identified.

One final comparison study that was considered was the descriptive data on leadership roles across contexts for individuals who were primarily (or initially) military leaders. This was determined by length of time served in the military or sequence of leadership positions held, (i.e. if military leadership was the first leadership experience for an individual). This practical application of military leadership was designed to investigate whether military leadership can be considered overall effective leadership across contexts.

Through the synthesis of all these different content analysis, the resulting conclusions were able to be drawn. There is a high degree of certainty in these findings due to the triangulate method of research that was used. This counterbalances for the different research methods and their respective faults and eliminates contradictions or omissions. Likewise, all information gathered was from 1988 on, with the majority of support occurring between 1990 and 1996.

ANALYSIS

Perceptions and analysis of educational methods and social attitudes have already described the existing assumption that the military is leadership. In examining the implications of military doctrine, it is obvious that such teachings
can stand on their own as theory. However, when placed within the discipline of leadership studies, military doctrine becomes directions for an effective organization, not a model of leadership paradigm.

The influence of military writings is not to be totally discounted, yet its meaning needs to be clarified. Presently, the danger exists that a direct connection forms between military philosophy and leadership ideas. The military exists as just one situation where leadership may or may not take place. Although the applied value is strong for the prescribed actions within a military piece, the heuristic value comes into question. As mentioned, the military model discounts the effects of situation on leadership. Prescribing to only one situation negates the effectiveness of military leadership in a situation but one of a military nature.

As explained by Gordon Taras, military philosophy focuses on the “military scenario” which is designated by a fixed objective with an attacker and a defender. The attacker wants to attain the said objective and the defender wants to defend against the objective. The outcome of such a situation is always of a distributive, or win-lose, nature with one side destroyed and the other side benefiting, yet severely damaged, (Taras, 1996).

Further literary research revealed interesting insights into the effects of military conditioning and leadership. Maintenance of values is a necessary element of leadership. Guimond found in his 1995 research that one of the major components of becoming part of the military machine is the intense socialization that one undergoes in terms of becoming a military officer, or one with leadership
potential or position. His research showed that the military socialization process could be considered an extremely intense socialization and that values were changed throughout this process and became more susceptible to change later. Older subjects were just as susceptible to change as younger subjects (Guimond, 260).

Likewise, the methodology behind this socialization was not altogether positive. Results of this study showed that the two stages of the socialization process were one, an encounter, or harsh initiation, characterized by negative attitude changes and two, a metamorphosis, consisting of a sharp values change congruent with the organization, (Guimond, 255).

This is obtuse to the ideals of transformational leadership or servant leadership which work to build up the follower in their process to gaining positions of leadership themselves. Furthermore, the value change that is required it towards values that are those already existing within the organization. This limiting of personal development gears individuals towards “groupthink,” a downfall of potential leadership. Groupthink refers to the deterioration of mental efficiency, individual testing and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures, (Janis, 328).

The definition of leadership holds only disdain for mere influence by one group over another without their input, or consideration for their concerns. Leadership is a process of influence involving all parties, not only one. The results are negative from a leadership standpoint, but the methodology is negative as well. Scientific parsimony includes conducting theoretical work in an
ethical manner. Subjecting individuals to “harsh” situations filled with “fear,” (Kirkland, 320), and “punishment and harassment,” Gibson & Haritos-Fatouros, 227) refuses to consider the impact on “subjects” or followers.

Once these individuals achieved leadership positions, the implications, from a leadership position are not much more positive. In examining military leaders in a study looking at group leadership, Coll showed that whether the decision of who would be “leader” was made by subordinates or superiors, leaders were chosen in the basis of dominance and conformity, (70). This does not bode well with leadership theory. Such characterizations of “leadership” by various rankings in the military is more specifically a judgment based on power and followership rather than leadership ability or prowess. The followers perceptions and impact are again neglected. Such a scenario includes only one of the three required leadership elements, leaders. Followers and situation are not included in the equation.

When such military leaders in general were judged again not only by their peers but also by civilians, it turned out that when subjects were asked to describe the military “leadership” the adjectives used were “confident...and conforming,” (Popper, Landau & Gluskinos, 6). Other leaders were characterized by their “vision, ethics, (and overall charisma),” (Popper et. al., 6). Again, this differentiation between how the military is perceived not only externally but also internally is a contradiction to the nature of leadership. Leadership is defined as a process. Processes necessitate the development of a task, strategizing and
Completing. Conforming includes only the completion of a task. “Leadership” that is not process based, is not actual leadership.

When military “leaders” were identified as successful, or quality in terms of their leadership ability, analysis revealed that individuals felt that personal attributes “significantly predicted leadership ratings,” (Atwater & Yammarino, 660). This is an obvious manifestation of the now extinct “trait theory.” Leadership scholars have moved away from such thinking because they have come to recognize the multitudes of other variables that affect a leadership situation and thusly the leader. To identify the military as significant in terms of leadership, where elements are so regulated that other variables are not considered even if they do occur, renounces prominent leadership thinking of the present day.

Inasmuch as leaders within the military were identified as individuals with the appropriate “personal attributes,” leadership is again discounted as any type of process if the military model is to be employed. Military theory also loses credibility not only with the definition of leadership as a gauge, but how it stands up as a theory of leadership. If leadership as defined by the military is to be accepted as inherent in an individual, the process of developing a leader as prescribed by the military becomes non-existent. In losing any effects of developmental processes, such a paradigm loses all internal validity due to its fallacious testability. One can not test a theory that relies on internal development to create a leader and/or leadership skills when the leader is designated by internal traits. The results do not correlate with the method.
What happens once one is enrolled in the military permanently, past the initial phases of conditioning and socialization? A study examining the psychological implications of the “leadership style” within the military showed that any type of supportive leadership is almost non-existent. Furthermore, the dominant features of the military culture are fear and obedience, (Kirkland, 327). The prescribed solutions to absolving the rampant fear discovered include leader dedication to success rather than intimidation. Another tactic recommended is to increase a leader’s psychological integrity by developing expertise and supportive leadership styles, (Kirkland, 328).

However, supportive leadership has never flourished in the military, and the lack of this leadership style, as well as the element of fear present provides another contradiction to the theory of leadership. Leadership emphasizes working towards the goals of the group. Silencing followers through fear steals their voice in group activities. Again, in the realm of leadership, internal validity of a military paradigm is lacking due to the contradiction of the results with the hypothesis of what would be focused on to create.

Military literature itself can also present ideas that are not in agreement with leadership philosophy. In an article submitted by West Point Associates, group processes were examined for pitfalls, benefits, and prescriptions for success. One of the major elements identified as an obstacle to effective group dynamics was “physical separation.” When groups are not geographically close to one another, many elements of interaction fail. Communication is hindered, development of an identity common to all is inhibited as well. Both of these group
qualities: communication and identity are essential to leadership in terms of getting a common goal and meeting the interests of all parties.

In looking at the structure of the military machine itself, all individuals are separated by rank, by platoon, by specialty. "Officers' Clubs" segregate the higher military officials from the lower ranking men and women. Barracks sequester groups of people during non-structured time. In not facilitating communication, the military fails to foster group interdependence and communication that allows for all involved parties to contribute. In restricting the influence that different parties can have upon one another, the process of leadership breaks down and superordinate, common goals are lost.

Literature has not been the only source for information demonstrating the incompatibility between leadership paradigm and the military model. Personal experiences within the last twelve months have demonstrated inadequacies in practice of military theory. In a recent University of Richmond ROTC training weekend, during the Fall of 1995, senior student ROTC leaders worked with ranking officers to develop junior ROTC members into promising cadets for the upcoming "Ranger Challenge," a testing process designed to assess the future ability of military candidates. The first few hours of the group's time together was spent, en route via buses to the assigned location.

While the group was traveling, the military officer assigned to one of the buses began a intensive exam of the accompanying juniors' knowledge concerning military trivia, as well as perception of direction and map reading ability relative to where the bus was in relationship to its destination. As senior
ROTC members observed this impromptu examination, they were surprised as to the content of the exam. Questions addressed things that they themselves did not know, nor had they found a demand for in their “Ranger Challenge” experience.

Not only were senior ROTC members concerned about the appropriateness of the material, they were also concerned about the delivery and approach that the officer was taking with the younger cadets. Cadets were beleaguered until they provided some type of answer to the question, and when the answer was incorrect, they were severely remonstrated for their inadequacy and lack of promise. The planned exercise for the trip had not yet officially begun, yet in the officer’s eyes, training was in session.

After arriving at the destination point, a bus load of harried, frustrated, intimidated cadets left the bus described above. Two concerned senior cadets who were present felt the need to privately express their opinion of how the officer had handled the younger cadets. The two individuals, one a Jepson School student, the other, an individual with no academic leadership study, expressed their reservations about testing participants in areas they knew nothing about prior to the initiation of the exercise. The two cadets also voiced reservation about the harsh manner that had been used to present the information. They felt that this method of interaction with subordinates or otherwise, was inappropriate in any scenario.

In response to the cadet concerns, they received an equally brazen response. The officer was a captain and he said that his behavior that he had
exhibited was his style based on military experience. He then turned his attention
to the cadets and justified his behavior further by pointing out the difference in rank between the captain and two non-commissioned cadets. Because the students did not even come close to sharing the rank this man held, he dismissed them and their opinions. Because of his position, the captain felt these two students had no knowledge base to rightfully address such an issue, nor did they have any right to address him in a confrontational manner at all.

This isolated example, although drawn from a small sample, exhibits the divergence between leadership and military philosophy. The “leader” in this scenario was the captain and he felt that his experience had justified him to be whatever type of leader he chose. His style was ignorant of the impact of followers and/or situation. The captain was not dealing with a platoon on enlisted men who had failed in a specific responsibility, yet he felt justified in acting accordingly. Likewise, he neglected the situation, the formal training had not yet started, the travel time was set aside as a last bit of relaxation and preparation before the intense weekend session.

Furthermore, in ignoring two important components of leadership, followers and situation, the leader failed to incorporate the needs/goals of the followers and did not accomplish his goal. The captain wanted to make sure that the accompanying cadets would learn the techniques he quizzed them on. This objective was not created with any input from other members of the group. This objective did not include any influence from the followers. In berating them, in a state of unpreparedness, the cadets left frightened and no more educated than
when they had stepped onto that bus. The cadets had no input on a situation and were unsuccessful in performing such a task. There was no leadership.

The captain in the previous example also refutes the military model as a paradigm of leadership due to the lack of heuristic value. In exhibiting such behavior, the captain provided a model of “leadership” that was unable to apply to any variety of situations. A low-pressure, casual, interactive environment such as the bus trip did not equate to a successful outcome when matched with the captain’s style. The inability for the prescribed dogma to adapt to other real-life situations negates the validity of militaristic tactics as effective leadership theories.

Another example of non-transferability within the military model can be found in a recent study abroad trip sponsored by the Jepson School of Leadership Studies. The trip was led by an individual who was the product of a military education. He identified all of his leadership training as coming from the military institutions and practices that he had participated in. The group in attendance was a small, diverse group of students. The group developed similarly to the normal progression of group development as described by Yukl which involves phases of “storming,” “norming,” and “performing.” However, as the trip progressed, a sudden, harsh conflict divided the group.

The conflict began to disrupt group performance and inhibited the learning potential of the experience. Students attempted to deal with elements of the conflict but their efforts were unsuccessful. Intragroup conflict increased steadily, create a very negative situation. When the dilemma had become too large fro
students to accept or deal with any more, the group leader was contacted. The students knew that the present group situation was abnormal and were looking for the consultation of authority or the participation of authority to help rectify the situation.

Upon approaching the leader, students expressed their growing concern over the situation and asked for advice or intervention to ease the strife that currently existed. After talking with the leader, his response was simply that group dynamics can always be understood in stages of group development. The group present would understand this more and more. There was no reason for any manipulation of a situation that was proceeding according to some theoretical plan.

The students were greatly flustered. The conflict they perceived was directly affecting their performance and emotional well-being. The lack of cooperation shown by the leader affected the students' motivation for change. Again, a "leader" showed a lack of incorporating the element of situation into his practice of leadership. By prescribing to an absolute theory for every possible scenario of group development, the leader neglected the elements of persuasion presented by his followers as well as the impact of environmental influences. The military model of group development lost its heuristic value by forgetting to incorporate all elements of a situation necessitating leadership. Moreover, the applied value of the concept of group development was discredited due to the rigidity of belief in the theory that disallowed variation based on a situation.
CONCLUSIONS

So what does all of this information tell us about the military paradigm and its role within the world of leadership theory? The military paradigm as it exists is based on the motto “Duty, Honor, Country”. Such a theoretical approach to the context of military situations is not incorrect. As a theory in its own right, military philosophy withstands the test of theoretical validity. The methods and procedures that are defined and described as military dogma do exist as acceptable theory within the military context.

Work constructed to describe behavior is easily testable. The designed experiments and studies are scientifically parsimonious. West Point Associates publish work concerning group and individual development that address concerns of human development within the military setting. Internal validity is high. Military writings follow logic and scientific accountability, from hypothesis to conclusion. External validity is also present. Within military contexts the lessons found in military propaganda can apply to basic training, or combat situations, reaching out of their prescribed setting to effectively address other scenarios. Finally, the heuristic value also shows in the promising directions that such theoretical work takes military science.

The quality of this theory does in fact prominently show through in everyday life. Military organizations are often considered some of the most reputable. Military theory that guides military functioning has proven to stand the test of time and quality is ever present. The military exists as a well functioning machine.
The military, by its guiding principle address the character of individuals that it produces, (duty, honor) and the concept of vision or mission (country). The elements for effective task completion are obvious. Individuals who “graduate” with a military education through formal education or experiential training (i.e. boot camp) have the skills to benefit the system which they are a part of. These individuals get the job done, knowing what is expected of them in the situation at hand.

Why then are these individuals not considered leaders? If they are not, then the theory to which they prescribe loses credibility as leadership paradigm. We return to our definition of leadership. Leadership means a process that involves devising a task based on the input of all parties and completing that task to the satisfaction of the participants. Throughout this process, three essential elements are always considered: leaders, followers, and situation.

Military teachings definitely do follow process. They dictate steps to achieve most everything, on a individual level. These tasks, however, come from a hierarchical structure wherein decisions are made by the elite and carried out for no other reason than obedience, “skills and procedures are distributed top to bottom,” (Taras, 1996). The process does not occur at the same level of task completion. There is no goal satisfaction for the participants if they were not involved in the goal definition process from the beginning.

Furthermore, lower ranks are not only excluded from the decision making process, they are excluded from the military doctrine in terms of involving followers. For leadership to be truly enacted, followers perceptions, goals, ideas,
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and feelings are incorporated into the mixture to develop effective leadership. In the three guiding principles of the military paradigm, the focus is on the individual and his behavior. This determines “leadership”. However, the followers are never identified as an influential element in strategizing. In military personnel issues, people are the capital that are exchanged as means to an end, rather than a variable upon which success depends, (Cassel, 193). Neglecting the influence of followers on leadership behavior incapacitates the effectiveness and possibility of leadership.

Another of the three leadership elements that is curtailed by the military paradigm is situation. This is another source of influence that is discounted in military thinking. A common roadblock in intergroup dealings is known as the “military pitfall,” (Taras, 1996). When a group merely tries to attack and seize the competition, this is execution of the military pitfall. The problem is that the group utilizing such a premise does not consider resources unique to the situation that could be used to increase their own position, or a mutual agreement.

Situational variables are disregarded because the military has become an organization dedicated to one type of functioning, defense and aggression. One always does what one has been told to do, regardless of any differences that one may encounter. This may result in disastrous consequences. Such an example can be found in the examination of the My Lai Massacre.

An error of great proportions morally and operationally was committed when followers, as directed by their leaders, simply followed procedure, assuming that it would apply to any encountered situation. The brigade had been ordered
to maintain contact with the enemy until it (the enemy) was eliminated “once and for all,” (USMA, 285).

Neglecting to consider unique specifics of various situations results in failure if not disaster. The military, to present, has limited its variation of situation, but the resulting process of operation is not leadership. Such operations are merely the execution of procedure as done time and time again.

A final misinterpretation of the three leadership elements falls under the consideration of the leader herself. We have shown that military strategy tends to be leader-heavy, without consideration to the other elements of leadership. But the emphasis placed on the leader is not wholly virtuous. The military model focuses on leader character, identifying duty and honor as innate personality traits of a leader.

When a “leader” graduates with designation as a military leader, the process (s)he has gone through is not known as a “development” of leadership, but rather is exemplified through accomplishment of displaying such characteristics, (Taras, 1996). The leader has internalized such traits as are necessary and these traits are, in turn, what is recognized by followers to designate the individual as a leader. There is no emphasis on sharing of information, or development of further leaders. The focus is the honing of ever present skills into easily recognizable traits by subordinates.

The element of “leader” is not only disproportionate to the influences of followers and situation, but is also defined as ever-present, individual skills. Such
a concept negates any process in the leader herself, concerning her development or ability. Leadership is there as it ever will be.

As discussed previously, a participant in military leadership also becomes easily manipulatible concerning his/ her values. The changing of values rapidly does not promote a strong, task-dedicated individual who can orchestrate an effective leadership scenario. Values influence input concerning situations. If a leader’s values are susceptible to change, the leader’s impact on the situation become irrelevant.

The military model does not fall into the definition of leadership, and subsequently does not sustain itself as a theory or paradigm of leadership. When placed in the context of leadership, the theories that guide military operation fail to exhibit internal validity, external validity, and applied value.

When studied under the umbrella of leadership, theory that focuses on just one element of the leadership equation as the precursor for all success and procedure falls short of testing the hypothesized entity of leadership. Likewise, the converse is negated. When the conclusions aren’t logical and valid, the appropriateness of the lessons learned lose strength in the leadership world. Such studies and thought processes that do not support the discipline itself do not lend themselves to their situations of further study and they lose the aspect of applied value that is so important to valid theory.

The military does exist as effective within its context, but its application and theory can not be considered a valid field within the study of leadership. The military is an organization, functioning to achieve a specific task. It provides
theories and ideas that are situation-specific and do not lend themselves to other realms of behavior, particularly leadership.

In looking at leadership, although it remains ambiguous, we must have definite guidelines to relate experience to within the leadership community. Leadership is a process, it involves three elements, but not in one specific scenario time and time again. Leadership relies on paradigm to suggest shifts in holistic ways of addressing leadership situations that are numerous and diverse. Such paradigms can not concentrate wholly on one type of context as the military seeks to do.

Leadership serves as a basis for behavior of leadership in all types of contexts. This is why there is such a call to leadership around the world. All types of existing entities are recognizing the need for the core element of leadership. When an individual has a basis of leadership, they can then apply specific skills to that foundation. A person who understands and studies leadership and then becomes focused in on a profession or field will ultimately rely on the concepts of leadership expressed in paradigm and theory to dictate his/her behavior. This is the mark of a true leader.

The military, in suggesting that they are a paradigm, or model, of leadership, ask us to assume that in learning a trade, military or otherwise, an individual can also learn the set of skills related to leadership which are not restricted to one trade. Consider the metaphor of a lawyer and the essential ethical element of leadership. A lawyer who first learns leadership theory and practice will ultimately rely on such paradigms as the foundation of his work. He
will not question ethics within the confines of the law only, he will question the entire issue of ethics and how it relates to the practice of his law policy.

Conversely, a lawyer who studies ethics within the realm of law only will be restricted to consider ethics as something which pertains to which side of the fence he may be on and how to represent a client effectively. Ethics within a specific trade are exhibited in specific rules: do not breech client confidentiality etc. The practitioner is limited to that which he is told is an issue of ethics in his trade. The holistic, leadership perspective and its resulting benefits are lost.

Such is the case with the military. The military cannot regulate leadership to a specific context and equate its theory to the entire realm of leadership. The military school of thought is not applicable to the entire world that is leadership, thusly, it cannot be considered a paradigm of leadership. The military exists as a separate entity, a well functioning machine, that can exhibit and practice leadership in certain situations. However, heuristically, the military does not define a paradigm of leadership.

What does this mean to the leadership community? It is already evident that the concept of the military and its functioning is related to the world of leadership in the public, student, and academic realm. Part of examining theory and paradigm shift is proving such thoughts wrong. This supports the intention of leadership and its practice. But now that the conclusion has been reached, where do we go from here?

In the short term, differentiation between the disciplines of leadership and military practice needs to be developed. This can be initiated through the fast
growing field of leadership study that is unrelated to military practice. Institutions such as the Jepson School establish distance between the two entities. Linguistics need to be consciously manipulated to identify what is leadership, what is the practice of leadership, and what is the application of leadership. A paradigm would establish the former, a context, such as the military, the latter.

In the long term, military propaganda may come to delineate itself as application of a select few theories from the broad field of leadership. If this can be accomplished, not only will the military lose its moniker of “leadership in action” but also, the military can begin to apply some beneficial theories to improve leader-follower cooperation. The organization can include Situational variables into its mission and goals.

Another long term benefit relates to the field of leadership studies itself. Leadership and its pursuit will be recognized for its own merit, not merely as a spin-off of psychological and military dogma. Operating without the shadow of contextual influences such as the military will also facilitate the expansion of leadership to encompass broader ideas, and more diverse context applications.

REFLECTION AND FUTURE DIRECTION

This study is obviously, not by any means, complete. Leadership is a developing field. The military has served as a parent for the credibility of such research. Now, as any young child grows up, it tries to establish its own identity and separate from overriding influences that take away from its validity.

For every example of a military practice that exhibits a practice of leadership, there have been examples of military practice that fail to include the
elements of leadership. As both fields, military and leadership progress into defining themselves independent of each other, a new relationship may eventually be established. In time, military dogma may become a paradigm of leadership, acting as an overarching school of thought within the field. Logistically, this has yet to happen, although it has been assumed for quite some time.

The concern becomes that although such a future relationship can not be discounted, separate identities must be explored. If separation is impossible, then this thesis bears reexamination. Currently, the two realms must try and separate. Leadership institutions must try and relinquish their dependency on military example and literature. Military institutions must refine their vocabulary to differentiate between ambiguous leadership and specific elements and applications therein.

In order for each field to truly become that which it is, this distance must be enforced. To date, very few leaders have transversed completely successfully into the realm of the military. Very few military officials have converted to effective leaders in other contexts. The reality proves what a mistake the everyday association is between the two.

For leadership to truly benefit its students and practitioners, it must be allowed to develop independent of any contextual stereotypes. The military has served as the parenting discipline of leadership for too long. The image of a leader should not equate to the image of a five-star general. They may share
commonalties, and someday the terms may be interchangeable, but until then, the lack investigation can not explain the referencing.

In conclusion, the military is not to be discredited. It performs its task expertly, with little failure and negativity. However, the military is not to be considered as a paradigm of leadership, or as “leadership personified.” The definition of leadership and included theory and paradigm have been applied to the school of thought belonging to the military and there was no match. Although the military exists as a beneficial organization, it does not encompass the concept of leadership dogma. Leadership is a process that incorporates leaders, followers, and situation to achieve a communal goal. To completely understand its magic, we must let go of the inhibiting stereotypes such as the military. Use such examples for what they are, a context, a laboratory for leadership elements and practice, but do not equate the broad minded idea of leadership and theory to the context of a military organization.
REFERENCES


