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The Grotian Quest Revisited

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In 1625, more than twenty years prior to the ending of the Thirty Years War with the Treaty of Westphalia, Hugo Grotius wrote *De Jure Belli-ac Pacis*, outlining his solutions for a troubled world. While the details and particularities of his ideas may not be compatible with today's unsettled and transitory world, what he strove and quested for is as applicable today as it was at the beginning of the modern state system. At the time of Grotius, feudalism was being replaced by statist concerns, centering around territory and a dual centralization of domestic authority and military power. The transitory period of the early seventeenth century awashed itself in bloody wars between the defenders of the old and the provocateurs of systematic change. The Grotian Quest sought to establish a foundation of order by recognizing the realities of the emergent new order with its state emphasis but also retain the traditional heritage of Christian spirituality, morality, and legality. The nuances of the original Grotian solution - as opposed to the generalities of his quest - may not be the foundation upon what the present turmoil needs to root itself upon. In fact, the common Christian conscience upon which Grotius depended does not even exist in today's contemporary world.¹ However, the Grotian Quest must be revived - some kind of systematic synthesis of the old framework of world order of intellectual thought combined with the changing realities of today's world must be developed. Intrigal to the development of a new framework for world order is the question of how the role of leaders and leadership styles in general will affect the successful completion of the quest. What types of leaders and what kind of leadership is needed to guide the world through the transition from old to new? To answer this question, the paper will analyze two prior periods of peace under the current Westphalian system and discuss the leadership exhibited during those times. Also, world order characteristics of those two periods which affected the leadership will be presented

¹Faulk, Richard. *The End of World Order: Essays on Normative International Relations*. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983). pgs. 25-27.

Then, the United States will be offered as the world's only realistic future leader, and the U.S.'s role in the world, and how the emerging trends and characteristics of the new world will affect this role, will be discussed. Finally, the type of leadership needed to complete the Grotian Quest, the Presidential Model, sums up the paper.

The United States role will be determined by its foreign policy. What should be the over-riding vision of this policy? The late Kenneth Boulding, operating under the assumption that anything that currently exists in the world is possible, proposed that policy should make a deliberate and determined effort at the highest levels of government to promote the concept of stable peace. Stable peace is a situation where two parties do not even consider war as a reasonable option in resolving disputes. Currently, relations between Canada and the United States or the relationships between the Scandinavian countries could be described as operating under a stable peace. This present-day reality can and should, according to Boulding, be expanded throughout the world.² It should be noted, however, that stable peace does not mean a lack of conflict, only that the settlement of any conflict through the process of war would be well across the taboo line of all parties involved.³ Boulding compares the world system to a piece of chalk, where a disruption would be signified by the breaking of the chalk piece. This disruption, war, occurs when either the strain of the system was too great for the chalk to handle, or the strength of the chalk itself was insufficient to prevent snapping under the pressure applied. Proper policy would simultaneously attempt to reduce strains placed on the system as well as attempting to enhance the strength of the system to handle any such strain.⁴ The United States must seek to obtain its Grotian Quest with the objective of stable peace throughout the world by developing a policy to help formulate and construct

²Boulding, Kenneth. *Stable Peace*. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978)
pgs. 93-94.

³ *ibid.* pg. 10.

⁴ *ibid.* pg. 48-49.

the structure of a new systematic framework while engaging in a balancing act that will increase strengths and decrease strains as needed. Proper leadership is the key.

Prior Periods of Peace

On the eve of a new era, an era in which the U.S. would seek stable peace, it is useful to look back in history to two periods of peace occurring under the auspices of the Westphalian state system. An examination of why the relations between the major powers of the time were relatively calm sheds light on possible strategies for the future. While neither time period might be described as periods of stable peace, the stability during these era was impressive.

The Hundred Years Peace, 1815-1914

Historian Karl Polyani wrote his work *The Great Transformation* during the Second World War, a series of "wars of an unprecedented type in which scores of states crashed, and the contours of new empires are emerging out of a sea of blood."⁵ It was a time where "demonic violence is merely swiftly imposed on a swift, silent current of change."⁶ The Second World War ended a long period of peace between the Great Powers of Europe - England, France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, and Russia. During the entire century period, these powers were engaged in war with one another for a scant eighteen months - as opposed to an average of sixty to seventy years for the preceding two centuries. One might be quick to say that perhaps during this time the strength of the Westphalian order merely did not have to endure any strains upon the system. In

⁵Polyani, Karl. *The Great Transformation*. (New York: Octagon Books, 1944). pg. 4.

⁶*ibid.*

actuality, the period had much potential for turmoil. "[R]evolutionary and anti-revolutionary interventions were the order of the day"⁷ during the first part of the period, ranging from Spain, Hungary, the Germanys, Belgium, Poland, Switzerland, Denmark, to Venice. The second portion of the period was marked by the disillusion of the Ottoman, Egyptian, and Sheriffian empires as well as the forced opening of the Chinese nation. Also during this time, the United States and Russia began to emerge as world powers. Throughout all this, armed conflict occurred, but only between the Great Powers and lesser countries - never actually between the Great Powers themselves.⁸

Polyani observed three major reasons for the upholding of peace between the Great Powers during this time: balance of power, the emergence of a "peace interest," and the power of a *haute finance*. The balance of power system developed with the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, some seventy-five years after the state-system came into being with the Treaty of Westphalia. Within this system, nation-states acted in a way in which no one actor could dominate the continent by combining the power of several weaker states to offset a stronger power. Thus, those states involved in the system were assured of survival through the medium of war. However, in past instances, such as the Greek and Italian city-states or the European Great Powers right after the signing of Westphalia, balance of power lead to the survival of the sovereignty of participating states through a series of war-like behavior. During the Hundred Years Peace, balance of power caused on avoidance of war. The added factor was the development of a peace interest. This new peace interest found proponents in those who were threatened by the prospect of war, namely those in patrimonial positions susceptible to the rise of patriotism caused by the French Revolution. First, the Holy Alliance became the defender of peace over liberty, followed by the emergence of the Concert of Europe in

⁷*ibid.* pg. 5.

⁸*ibid.* pgs. 5-6.

the second portion of the century. However, while the Holy Alliance had the support of both the aristocracy and Church, the Concert of Europe, at best, could be called a loose confederation, lacking feudal and clerical aspects. How did the Concert manage to keep the peace as well as the Alliance, without having the advantage of the church-state union? The answer lies in the final piece of the puzzle, the influence of *haute finance*. This factor was the main link between the political and economic organization of the period, supplying the instruments for the international peace. The international banking system, whose personal consisted of families like the Rothschilds, were independent of any one government and held loyalty only to a firm. While they had made their money through the financing of wars, and they did not object to minor, localized wars, a general war between the Great Powers would interfere with the monetary foundations of the international system. Upholding peace was not the primary goal of the *haute finance*, gain was, and peace made gain possible. The balance of power system, combined with the elites' peace interest, and driven by the *haute finance*, came together to support and uphold the Hundred Years Peace. The death knell of this period, however, came upon the joining together of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, and the ultimate counter-alliance of England, France, and Russia. The end of balance of power, combined with Germany's acceptance of the gold standard, thus starting the era of protectionism and colonial expansion, overcame the *haute finance's* ability to avert war. The War to End All Wars soon followed.⁹

American Leadership During the Hundred Year's Peace

During the Hundred Year's Peace, as indicative of most of the nineteenth century, the United State's involved itself little in world affairs. This isolationist foreign policy

⁹*ibid.* pgs. 6-19.

was rationalized as being consistent with national interest in that any global involvement would adversely affect democracy at home. The Presidential roots of isolationism stem from George Washington's Farewell Address, which advised and warned against the United State's involving itself with any permanent alliances with any portion of the world. This view saw the participation in balance of power politics with the non-democratic, despotic European governments as dangerous due to the potential for the United States to be drawn into a foreign conflict in which the U.S. had no real interests. Furthermore, this potential for increased involvement abroad would allow for the possible loss of democratic freedoms at home, implying involvement with corrupt governments would warp the nation's own democratic system.¹⁰ The epitome of the American mindset during this period came under President Monroe, when his Secretary of State, and future President John Quincy Adams delivered a speech in 1821 describing the role of the U.S. in world affairs:

"Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will [America's] heart, her benedictions, and her prayers be. But she does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator of her own. She will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and by the benignant sympathy of her example...[Otherwise] she might become the dictatress of the world. She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit."¹¹

This mentality, combined with the domestic implications and problems in America throughout the century (such as the Civil War and Reconstruction) limited the United States' leadership role in international affairs to as bare a minimum as possible. The President of the United States was merely that, avoiding international leaderships, except where it involved the direct defense of the U.S. against other's predatory actions.¹²

¹⁰Kegley, Chalres W. and Eugene Wittkopf. *American Foreign Policy*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991). pgs. 34-35.

¹¹*ibid.* pg. 34.

¹²*ibid.*

The Long Peace

The second period of relative peace between the Great Powers of the day under the Westphalian system occurred during the "Cold War" between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. John Lewis Gaddis has analyzed this period, calling it the "Long Peace," indicating the lack of armed conflict between Great Powers during the time. In the chapter "Great Illusions, the Long Peace, and the Future," in his work *The United States and the End of the Cold War*, Gaddis indicates five factors that contributed to the relative peace of the period. One factor, although certainly not the lone one or even the predominate one, was the presence of nuclear weapons. These weapons, far surpassing any destructive capacity of any weapon in human history, enabled politicians to know the outcome of a war using these weapons without actually engaging in one. Mutually assured destruction prevented either side during the Cold War from actually using these weapons, despite the occasion saber-rattling. Another factor, bipolarity, is closely linked with the presence of nuclear weapons, since it is difficult to separate the two factors as the two major nuclear powers comprised the bipolar nature of the world. However, one can say that nuclear weapons had nothing to do with the emergence of bipolarity, since a bipolar system would have World War II regardless of the development of the weapons of mass destruction. The length of time bipolarity survived is considerable, and may be attributed to the combined factor of nuclear weapons. The symbolism of nuclear weapons in providing "great power status" did provide for the appearance of bipolarity well into the 1980's, despite the lack of bipolarity in non-military spheres - for instance, the actual triangular, multipolar economic realm with the U.S., Japan, and Europe emerging as the dominate powers. So, the twin-factors of nuclear weapons and bipolarity combine to provide a strong reason why peace prevailed during the Cold War.

The third factor offered up by Gaddis is one of hegemonic stability, particularly in the economic realm. This factor is due to the a single hegemonic power, in this case the U.S., dedicated to upholding a system incorporating rules promoting a liberal economic order, meaning one based on minimizing barriers to trade and investment across international borders. A vital part of this theory is the hegemonic power achieving legitimacy in its reign, which is why the Soviet Union could not be considered the sole hegemonic power. Hegemonic stability can be linked with the two prior reasons in that the U.S. may not have risen to the leadership role without the immediate threat of the Soviet Union. For instance, the U.S. could have achieved this hegemonic stability between the world wars, but the lack of a clear and present enemy failed to motivate the U.S. to rise to this role. Linked to this hegemonic preponderance by the U.S. is the fourth reason for the Long Peace, the triumph of liberalism. The abrupt end of the Cold War in 1989 suggests that this triumph is sudden and complete and the importance of economic over military power, the advantages of lateral over hierarchical organization, and the declining utility of repression and terror cannot be over-stated. The world's democratic political order rest upon the foundation of three factors of its own: the obsolescence of great power war, the increased permeability of borders, and the failure of command economies. War is now considered an exceptional event by Great Powers, and war between Great Powers is almost not even a possibility. This is not to say that we have entered an era of stable peace, as the eight year Iran-Iraq war and the 1991 Gulf War proves. Borders are no longer a barrier to other cultures, technologies, ideologies, or trade. Satellites prevent the concealment of many events within a nation-states own borders, as well as the simple movement of troops. The failure of command economies have legitimized the fact that free and open economies are a better alternative, and there seems to be a link between collapsing command economies and the increase in

democracy.¹³ These three factors appear to support Francis Fukuyama's assertion that the fundamental change which occurred in 1989 was the "total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism."¹⁴

The final factor put forth by Gaddis in support of why there existed the Long Peace after World War II is his Long Cycle Theory. The cycle of history brings forth a Great Power, hegemonic war every one hundred to one-hundred and fifty years. The post-war period is characterized by the rise of a dominant leader, a phase followed by the eventual delegitimization of that leader, further followed by a decentralization of power through the system, bring the cycle full circle to war. The recent Long Peace, then, was just a nature phase in the cycle of history, and we are currently moving into the "delegitimization" of the post-war leader, the United States. The cycle theorists seem to agree that the cause of the cycle is a disparagement rate of economic and technological development, causing states growing in power to challenge the system. The great question, of course, is whether or not the cycle can be broken. Will nuclear weapons prevent another Great War? Has the triumph of liberalism and the current hegemonic stability slowed the economic divisions? And perhaps of most immediate importance, if economic growth has been accelerated, will this shorten the time hegemons stay in power, thus shortening the phases of the historical cycle?¹⁵

¹³Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
pg. 168-186.

¹⁴*ibid.* pg. 180.

¹⁵*ibid.* pgs.186-190.

American Leadership during the Long Peace

How did the Long Peace affect the nature of leadership during the period? The Second World War "revealed, encouraged, and catalyzed several trends which did much to shape the post-war role and policies of the United States."¹⁶ These trends, including "the collapse of the balance of power in Europe, the emergence of a bipolar international system in which two great powers shared a profound ideological antipathy towards one another, the development of nuclear weapons and the decolonisation process all had far-reaching implications for American policy and with it the role of the presidency."¹⁷ The leader of the United States became the leader of the free world against the Soviet Union, and, as such, caused the president to evolve and develop into three distinct roles. These roles - the president as "Cold Warrior," the president as Peacekeeper, and the president as the Chief Decision-maker - had consistent characteristics throughout all of the modern presidencies, from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Reagan. The correspondence between the modern presidencies and the Long Peace allows an analysis of leadership characteristics within the Long Peace period.

The role of "Cold Warrior" was one where the president defined the national interest and identified major challenges and threats to the security of the nation. However, this role also lent itself to each president defining the national interest as synonymous with the own individual's political interests. Situations which merely challenged the nation were suddenly perceived as a threat merely because they challenged and questioned the president's own strength, resolve, and determination. The president, having perverted national interests to coincide with his own personal issues, thus became the reflection of the nation's own *machismo*. The development of this *machismo* can be

¹⁶Williams, Phil. "The President and Foreign Relations." In *The Modern Presidency*.
alcolm Shaw, Ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1987). pg. 207.

¹⁷*ibid.*

traced to diverse foundations such as the American culture's emphasis on competitive individualism to the "Munich syndrome," where the American public and leadership were extremely sensitive to any perception of appeasement towards the Soviet Union. It was felt any sign of weakness or of giving in would only encourage aggressive. Furthermore, domestic pressures only strengthened the perceived need to project strength and toughness. Issues such as the "sellout" at Yalta and Potsdam or the question of "who lost China" only caused Presidents to enforce their *machismo*. Incidents of *machismo* are found throughout all the post-war Presidents. Truman engaged in the Korean War, Eisenhower's Secretary of State Dulles spoke of brinkmanship and massive retaliation, while Kennedy attempted to recover from the Bay of Pigs by being tough during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Johnson intervened in the Dominican Republic to prevent a second Cuba, and he also escalated the Vietnam War, leading to such *machoistic* policies as the Domino Theory. Nixon, while being a major player in the game of *detente*, still had to first show his political will and toughness by invading Cambodia and mining Haiphong harbor. Ford, through Henry Kissinger, sought to challenge Soviet intervention in Angola, solely to try to restore American credibility after Vietnam and to show the Soviets they could not easily meddle in the Third World. Carter was very much against American intervention abroad, making him have the potential to be strikingly different than the other modern presidents. In fact, with the exception of the Iranian hostage crisis, Carter did manage to avoid military entanglements abroad. However, despite Carter's desire to avoid a hard-lined stance in world affairs, domestic pressures forced him to lean in that direction even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. A hawkish Senate, combined with an American public who felt Carter was doing too little, too late with regards to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, doomed the President to a image of weakness. This image was due not only because the nation felt Carter's policies short-changed American power, but also because the public saw Carter's personality as being weak. While Carter's politics may have moved to a tougher stance in response to the

domestic pressures, his personality remained constant, lacking any of the *machoism* expected by a Cold War public. Americans felt Carter's failure to project a strong image lead to the humiliation of the Iran hostage situation, and the president's failed attempt at a *macho* rescue attempt was viewed as a near invitation for the Soviets' Afghanistan invasion. The election of Reagan, perhaps the last true "Cold Warrior," was a direct result of the "Iran syndrome" and Soviet aggression. Reagan was the public's reaffirmation of the *machoistic* quality it desired in the modern Presidency and a rejection of the Carter mentality and leadership. Grenada, Lebanon, and Libya were direct targets of Reagan's own *machismo*, as expressed through the role of "Cold Warrior."

The second leadership role of the President during the Long Peace was one of peacekeeper. Conflict resolution was a main consideration of all post-war Presidents, contrasting ironically with the "Cold Warrior" mentality of the day. Crisis-management during the Cold War always had a high degree of personal and sustained involvement of the President, especially when such conflicts potentially involved the Soviet Union. Truman's personal style of leadership set the precedent that the President was at the apex of the decision-making process during different crises, but the model was continued under subsequent Presidents. For instance, Eisenhower allowed Secretary of State Dulles great leeway in the day-to-day running of foreign policy, but was much more involved and assertive when situations involved China or the Soviets. Kennedy was explicit in his instructions to the Navy in the implementation of the blockade on Cuba, seeking to make sure the U.S. did not cross the line between coercive behavior and war-like tactics. This highly personal approach by the President to issues concerning the Soviets lead to an actual higher degree of sensitivity to the Soviet position on any matter. The President tended to view situation from a point of view which sought to understand how the scenario was affecting his Soviet counter-part. This empathy and attempted understanding lead the desire for greater communications between the superpowers in

order to avoid war through misunderstanding. The Washington-Moscow hotline was installed soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis for just this reason. As Presidents began to relate more directly with their Soviet equivalent, it was only natural that the peacekeeper role of the President would seek to establish direct contact between the two leaders. Summitry, while rarely providing break-throughs on serious issues, became a symbolic, psychological way to reassure Presidents, from Eisenhower in 1955 to Reagan and Gorbachev in 1985. Peacekeeping caused the emergence of direct dialogues between hostile powers, thus providing a significant step forward in improving relations.

The third and final role played by the President during the Long Peace was that of Chief Decision-Maker. Legislation following the Second World War, including the Executive Reorganization Act of 1939 and the National Security Act of 1947, led to an increased White House staff and the development of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council (NSC), and a unified Department of Defense. These provisions were created in order to better inform the President on foreign affairs, but they also were seen as a way in which to limit the Presidential power by institutionalizing his relationship with the Executive branch. Conversely, however, these evolutions actually strengthened the power of Presidents in the realm of foreign policy due to the high degree of flexibility given to the President in determining the use of institutions like the National Security Council. Beginning with Truman, the NSC's advisory role was emphasized, and Eisenhower relied more on Dulles than the Council. Kennedy actually used the NSC to provide him access to new ideas within the Executive branch, although the President worked outside the NSC. Johnson avoided the formal role of the NSC, that of advising, by listening to a small group of advisors outside the Council. However, Johnson allowed the Council to be transformed in that its head, the National Security Advisor (NSA), began shielding the President of criticism of the Vietnam War emerging out of the Executive Branch. The NSA instead began to assure the President of the rightness of escalation, thus moving the position away from a neutral manager of opinions to an

activist advocate of the President's position. Under Nixon, Kissinger's stint as NSA furthered this trend, culminating in Kissinger's formal appointment as Secretary of State. Under the next two Presidents, Carter and Reagan, a reversion to the neutral manager by the NSA seems to have taken place. Carter was very aware of the criticism of the Nixon method, while Reagan may have enjoyed this return to neutrality simply due to the fact that the NSA position was held by three different individuals in quick succession. The significance of the way in which the modern presidents have used the NSC is the evolution of the President as Chief Decision-Maker. These differences between presidents in their use of the NSC only underscores how much the individual preferences and styles of each president affected the process, and sometimes, the outcome of foreign policy. While the NSC was originally intended to diffuse the decision-making process, the presence of a highly trusted individual in the Executive Branch, from Secretary of State Acheson under Truman to Dulles under Eisenhower to Kissinger under Nixon, tended to centralize the process into one figure, with the President being the ultimate decision-maker after that one person. Allowing this to occur was a dangerous game for the President. While Dulles may have superbly handled foreign affairs without quelling the advisory nature of the NSC towards the president, a strong figure like NSA Walter Rostow limited the flow of information to Johnson and, thus, hindering the leadership of the President. When there was no prominent figure, the President tended to work outside the NSC, using the Council only as a sounding board, while the decisions on foreign policy was ultimately made solely by the President. This approach seemingly made the NSC more neutral politically, allowing the President to be informed of a wide-range of options in foreign policy. The level of use of the NSC by the President seems to reinforce the particularities of each individual President. For example, Eisenhower did not wish to pursue a active foreign policy, and his consensus-building approach within the NSC only caused his foreign policy to be even more time-consuming and, thus,

inactive in nature. Johnson's reliance of a small group of individuals who tended to mirror his views, rather than using the entire NSC, only escalated his policy rigidity.

The three roles of the President - "Cold Warrior," Peacekeeper, and Chief Decision-Maker - combined to make the leadership exhibited during the Long Peace highly centered on the President of the United States. A strong President, meaning one who is at the apex of the decision-making process and who displays *machoistic* tendencies to keep the peace, has come to be seen as key to the future survival of the United States.¹⁸ The question now is whether or not, during this transition phase of the world framework, this type of leadership is still needed or desirable.

Why the United States?

If the world is poised at a time in history where the system which has guided the international order is transiting into an as yet unformulated framework, why must it be the United States that takes on the role of helping to define the new order? And if it is the United States' responsibility, how should the nation go about leading the world on the Grotian Quest? Is it an option for U.S. foreign policy to avoid addressing world issues and to simply concentrate on domestic problems? Or maybe, even if the United States wanted to be the leader on the world stage, perhaps it lacks the power or the legitimacy to do so. Despite all these assertions, the United States is the only nation-state in the world capable of leading the community of nations forward to a framework different than the Westphalian system as expressed by the Cold War. Furthermore, it is America's best self-interest to be the leader, rather than begging off and allowing some other actor to lead.

¹⁸*ibid.* pg. 36.

As stated by the U.S. Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, "It is now a cliché that America is the world's only superpower."¹⁹ But what exactly does this mean? The United States is the only contender for world leadership still strong in all areas of power. Tangible sources of power include basic resources, military capacity, economic resources, and scientific and technological development. These are the traditional, quantitative measures of how powerful a nation is in terms of natural resources. Intangible sources of power includes national cohesion, universalistic culture, and influence within international institutions. These power bases are less traditional and more qualitative, measuring perceptions towards the nation in question.

Power Resources of the Major Contenders, 1990

Source of Power	U.S.	Soviet Union	Europe	Japan	China
<i>Tangible</i>					
Basic resources	strong	strong	strong	<i>medium</i>	strong
Military	strong	strong	<i>medium</i>	<i>weak</i>	<i>medium</i>
Economic	strong	<i>medium</i>	strong	strong	<i>medium</i>
Science/technology	strong	<i>medium</i>	strong	strong	<i>weak</i>
<i>Intangible</i>					
National cohesion	strong	<i>medium</i>	<i>weak</i>	strong	strong
Universalistic culture	strong	<i>medium</i>	strong	<i>medium</i>	<i>medium</i>
International institutions	strong	<i>medium</i>	strong	<i>medium</i>	<i>medium</i>

* Sources of weakness italicized²⁰

As seen in Joseph Nye, Jr.'s table, the other four major world powers - the Soviet Union (now Russia), the states of Europe, Japan, and China - all have at least one major deficiency in the traditional areas of power. For example, the United States is stronger than China in the area of "universalistic culture," meaning the American culture prevails

¹⁹Dole, Bob. "Shaping America's Global Future." *Foreign Policy*. Spring 1995. Number 98. pg. 29.

²⁰Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. (New York: Basic Books, 1990). pg. 174.

and influences more individuals and countries throughout the world than does Chinese culture.²¹ The power relation between the two countries in this area forces China to attempt to "inoculate China's intellectuals and urban youth against the subversive cultural influence of the United States."²² The Tianamen Square massacre of student protesters, who were almost universally supported by the populace of urban Beijing,²³ only pushed China into a resistance of "Western cultural 'pressure'".²⁴ The reverse, however, is not true - the prospect of the Chinese culture overtaking America does not seem to be either a national security threat or an eminent possibility. The strength of the United States' universalistic culture affects China, but the relative weakness of Chinese culture does not challenge the U.S. However, the American leadership must always take into effect how the U.S.'s universalistic culture is affected the leadership of others. For instance, China's Deng Xiaoping's open door policy and wishes for faster economic reform are beneficial to the United States. Yet, the very same culture that provides the U.S. with power, also provides Deng's opposition a rallying cry against the "spiritual pollution" and "bourgeois liberalization" caused by the West.²⁵ In order for the Chinese leadership to survive, they must down-play the Western links associated with reform. If the very leadership the U.S. pursues emphasizes these associations, Chinese domestic pressures and foreign policy will once again link together as they did with the Tianeman

²¹*ibid.* pg. 173.

²²Levine, Steven I. "Sino_american Realties: Testing the Limits." In *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*. Samuel S. Kim, Ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). pg. 82.

²³Seymour, James D. "Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations." In *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*. Samuel S. Kim, Ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). pg. 219.

²⁴Robinson, Thomas W. "Interdependence in China's Foreign Relations." In *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*. Samuel S. Kim, Ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). pg. 190.

²⁵Whiting, Allen S. "The Future of Chinese Policy." In *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*. Samuel S. Kim, Ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). pg. 259.

Square massacre. In China, part of the domestic agenda of Deng include the securing of an appropriate successor who will continue with his economic reforms. To do this, a nationalistic stance is necessary in order to fight against Deng's domestic, conservative opposition. Blatant provocation by the American leadership, such as the sale of F-16's to Taiwan,²⁶ can always be stopped, but the universalistic culture projected by the U.S. is not so easy to control.

Another example is the power relationship between Japan and the United States. While there is the perception that Japan has over-taken the U.S. in the power sphere of economics, or, at the very least, has drawn even with America, it must be remember that this Japanese economic challenge has been supported by the United States' security guarantees to Japan. The U.S.'s strong military allows the United States to offer such security umbrellas to allies, and Japan is well-aware that while it may compete with the U.S. on economic terms, the U.S. holds the trump card of military protection. The leadership question, of course, is how much can the U.S. threaten to remove this protection without serious consequences? Japan has the capacity to go nuclear, but does not because of its own domestic taboo against it. Yet, if the U.S. suddenly pulls Japan's military security guarantee, it is conceivable Japan's taboo against nuclear weapons would disintegrate in the face of national security fears. The affect of a nuclear Japan upon North Korea and China would be tremendous. Fortunately, current thought in Japan seems to point away from a nuclear force, with the one caveat that the nation may pursue nuclear weapons if the United States ever abandoned them.²⁷ This leaves the U.S. with the leadership challenge of having the power leverage against Japan through the providing of that nation's security, yet not begin able to ever seriously consider fully following through on any threat to remove this security guarantee.

²⁶*ibid.* pg. 269.

²⁷Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.* (New York: Basic Books, 1990). pgs. 158-162.

It is important to note, however, that the United States does not have a preponderance of power in any one of the spheres of power listed in Nye's table. American power comes from the breadth of American influence across the spheres, not from its depth in any one area. The United States is not a hegemonic power, meaning it can not dominate and control each section of power. Furthermore, the very nature of power itself is changing, making the completion of the Grotian Quest even more difficult. This change makes it difficult for leaders who are confined to thinking of power in traditional ways. How leaders achieve goals must be re-evaluated. In the current transition period, power has become less fungible, less coercive, and less tangible in nature. Power being less fungible means a nation-state is less able to transfer its power in one area to affect desired outcomes in another sphere. For instance, no longer is it the case where a power can use its military might to conquer new territory for economic gain. In reverse, a state like Japan is restrained from converting its economic power into military strength. Despite this reduced fungibility of power, it is incorrect to say that military power has lost all of its transferability. The United States remains the ultimate protector of Europe and Japan, and this does become a power resource. While the U.S. voluntarily gave up some of its economic advantages by redistributing resources among its allies during the Cold War, the decrease in the potential Russian threat only enhances U.S. economic power. Yet, since the threat to Europe or Japan is not entirely gone, the U.S. retains some advantage by being these regions' protector. Reduced fungibility helps the United States since only the U.S. is powerful across spheres, and the remaining fungibility of military resources continues to assist in America's influence, as it did during the Cold War. Furthermore, with the increased economic interdependence between nation-states, the coercive nature of power has lessened in that the costs associated with the use of force has sky-rocketed. The benefits of economic relations move in both directions between states, and the threat of force by one nation must always undergo a cost-assessment as to the trade-offs between the use of force and the loss of

economic relations. Non-coercive power is a cooptive type of power, including such factors as ideology, culture, the principle authority over multinational corporations, and language. Cooptive power is the ability of a nation to structure the situation in such a way that other states develop preferences and define their own interests in the same way as the cooptive power. Finally, power is less tangible, meaning forces such as culture have become more influential on the world stage. No longer can power be discussed solely in terms of size of armies and amounts of resources. Factors listed in Nye's table (national cohesion, universalistic culture, and participation in international organizations) are increasingly important as they allow a nation to base their power more of information than resources. Acting on new information or the development of new technology depends upon intangible factors.

These three factors concerning the changing nature of power will have a profound affect on who leads the world into the new order. After evaluating their power resources, leaders will now have to ask the question "Power for what?" Furthermore, how a leader uses the power of the nation is more complex, meaning the use of power in one area will most certainly affect relations in another. Military power against a state will affect the economic power relations with that state and others , as Iraq saw when it invaded Kuwait. Because of the changing nature of power in the world, it is unlikely that any country will become a dominant hegemonic power. However, only the United States is strong in all the different areas of power, and, while it may be challenged and even bettered in any one power area, the U.S.'s breadth of power allows it to be an active force in all areas.²⁸ The term "superpower" no longer connotes absolute power, it merely indicates power strength in many areas. In this respect, Bob Dole is correct, the U.S. alone deserves the title. And from this title rightly springs William Safire's assertion that "Global heavy thinkers are not arguing about withdrawing from our duty to keep the world in order.

²⁸*ibid.* pgs.188-198.

The real battle is about the way we go about doing it."²⁹ The leadership needed for this battle will depend upon the emerging characteristics of the new world, combined with a discussion of the possible roles for the United States.

Emerging Trends for World Order: A Transitory Period

Before one can begin to examine the United States' possible role in the new order of the world, an examination of what this new order may look like would be useful. In late 1993, with issues like Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia in the news, President Bill Clinton defended his administration's handling of foreign policy by stating: "We do the best we can without some quick and easy theories like containment."³⁰ His statement implies the present day world is much more complicated than in years past, and, in this transitory "deregulation era" where there are numerous new actors with new capabilities operating under precious few new rules, his implication is fairly accurate.³¹ The coming order will be difficult to pin down under one conceptual buzz-word. A single all encompassing paradigm dominating all areas of foreign policy thought and action will not emerge to intellectually cover the new world order.³² Its characteristics will be a cross of many differing traits of past eras. The successful completion by the U.S. of the new Grotian Quest of melding the past with the present to obtain a workable future depends on the United States willingness to work within many different spheres of characteristics.

²⁹Safire, William. "The Question is *How* U.S. Influences World, Not *If*." *Richmond Times-Dispatch*. March 7, 1995. pg. A-17.

³⁰"No time for innocents abroad." (Editorial). *America*. Novemebr 6, 1993. pg. 3.

³¹Haas, Richard N. "Paradigm Lost." *Forein Affairs*. January/February 1995. Volume 4, Number 1. pg. 43.

³²Hunter, Robert E. "Starting at Zero: U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1990's." *The Washington Quarterly*. Winter 1992. pg. 30.

Looking back upon the previous examination of the two prior era of relative peace under the Westphalian system, we see some similarities between the reasons behind the long periods of peace. We also see, however, diametrically opposite reasons for peace. While both periods were supported by economic peace interests (Polyani's *haute finance* and Gaddis' economic hegemon), the Hundred Year's Peace politically depended on the multi-polar balance of power, while the Long Peace depended on bipolarity. Furthermore, both periods had a "peace interest", but of differing natures. The Hundred Year's Peace interest derived from the fear of those in power of being overthrown by wars of patriotism. The Long Peace's "peace interest" was twofold. First, the nuclear weapons made the utility of peace greater than the utility of war between the two great nuclear powers, the U.S. and Russia. Combined with the nuclear threat, the triumph of liberalism, as opposed to the suppression of liberty in the Hundred Year's Peace, stressed the importance of peace. It is important to sort through these reasons in order to determine whether or not the similarities between the two periods will again exist in the new world order. Furthermore, when there are opposing system factors between the two periods, it would be useful in determining period aspect will most help the new world obtain stability.

The *haute finance* of the Hundred Year's Peace and the economic hegemony of the Long Peace will continue into any future world model, and their importance will guide the United States through the transition period to this new order. As President Clinton has stated: "The currency of national strength in this new era will be denominated not only in ships and tanks and planes, but in diplomas and patents and paychecks."³³ The economic sphere will be the area in which the United States will shore up past successes in other spheres. For example, in the military circle, the U.S.

³³Clarke, Jonathan. "The Conceptual Poverty of U.S. Foreign Policy." *The Atlantic Monthly*. September 1993. pg. 62.

out-lasted the Soviet Union and won the Cold War. However, a return to authoritarianism becomes more and more likely as people are unable to put food on the table in Eastern Europe and Russia. Furthermore, issues such as Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation can all be linked with economics. Fundamentalists are traditionally found among the poor, who reach out to the extreme in an attempt to better their lives. In Peru, terrorist groups indigenous to the nation spring forth out of a populace's dissatisfaction with their political process, which in turn is saddled by economic problems. Nuclear weapons were flaunted by the Ukraine in protests over the lack of aid and attention by the G-7 countries. And finally, Indian Hindus scapegoat their Muslim neighbors in part due to that nation's chronic underperformance in the economic sphere. All these problems are made exceedingly more difficult when the economic aspect of their causes are ignored.³⁴ The power of *haute finance* and the influence of the economic hegemon, the United States, can come together to help contain and resolve these problems during this transitory period of world order.

One of the most predominate questions concerning the future is whether the world order system will return to a classical multipolar situation now that the bipolar Cold War has ended. It is easy to fall into the false dilemma that the world must necessarily conform into either a bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar world. The world will not predominately be any of the three; it will have characteristics of all. Some contend the Soviet Union will be unable to continue on the road of democracy and will eventually return to the evil empire of the past, thus providing a continuance of the bipolar world. This is not a realistic possibility because, even if there was a radical return to the past within the Russian leadership, the Russians would still be extraordinarily far behind in the information revolution and the development of an information-based economy. A Soviet-resurgence would be based upon the same principles which caused the nation to

³⁴*ibid.* pg. 66.

fall behind in the first place, and the failure to address these concerns would cause any potential conservative threat to be short lived at best. The problems of Russia were caused by systematic and fundamental problems in the Soviet political economy. A return to such a mentality could not then solve the problems it caused and would collapse again under its own philosophical shortcomings.

Since the Soviet Union is not returning to the world stage, it is tempting then to merely agree with the assessment that the 1990's will bring a return to multipolarity, with the United States, Russia, China, India, Europe, and Japan becoming the balancing powers of the period. Unfortunately, this assertion ignores the fact that the classical balance of power situation, as found in Europe during the Hundred Year's Peace, resulted from the balancing of coercive power, while the present period, with its rise of different powers, is due to a dispersal of the same coercive power. There is a confusion between calling the emerging situation multipolar by arguing the diffusion of power is the cause and the reality of what the term multipolar means. Multipolarity implies a scenario where there exists a number of actors of relatively equal power who are able and willing to shift alliances frequently to maintain the equilibrium. As indicated by Nye's table above, the power relations between power contenders are not necessarily equal in the classic military sense. Furthermore, the ability and willingness to shift alliances with the current nuclear considerations is doubtful. Japan abandoning its American alliance and forging ahead with its own nuclear development would not be worth the scare to China for any of the three actors involved. In a strictly military sense, the world will remain basically bipolar, with the predominance of nuclear power remaining with the United States and Russia. Multipolarity is more possible in the economic sphere, but the U.S. still remains strong compared to other contenders.³⁵

³⁵Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. (New York: Basic Books, 1990). pgs. 233-236.

The American Role

One of the few points of commonalities among the current debates on foreign policy is that the United States must involve itself in world affairs. However, disagreement is rampant on how we go about immersing ourselves on the world stage. The differing schools - the unilateralists and the multilateralists - diametrically oppose one another. The unilateralists assert we should choose our battles and assert our leadership by inspiring, pressuring, and expecting our allies to follow our lead. The multilateralists believe in concerted action with international organizations like the United Nations or NATO.³⁶ In the United States government, unilateralists find a home with the Republican Party, while the administration and the Democratic Party are multilateralists. These viewpoints can clearly be seen in statements given by both sides in two extraordinary articles published in the current edition of *Foreign Policy*. Speaking for the Republican Party, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole discusses the post-World War II scene, where the United States "rose to the challenge of winning the peace through American leadership. New multilateral institutions were established...but they were insufficient. What made the difference was American will and power..."³⁷ Dole goes on to state it was "American leadership and commitment - supported by our allies throughout the world - that led to the overwhelming victories in the Cold War."³⁸ His opinions of international organizations do not improve throughout his article, stating that such organizations "will, at best, practice policymaking at the lowest common denominator - finding a course that is the least objectionable to the most members."³⁹

³⁶Safire, William. "The Question is *How* U.S. Influences World, Not *If*." *Richmond Times-Dispatch*. March 7, 1995. pg. A-17.

³⁷Dole, Bob. "Shaping America's Global Future." *Foreign Policy*. Spring 1995. Number 98. pg. 29.

³⁸*ibid.* pg. 30.

³⁹*ibid.* pg. 36.

This type of policy, in Dole's view, cannot and will not defend America's interests. The opposing article was written by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and represented the administration's and the multilateralist view of the world. Christopher states that "American leadership...requires that we galvanize the support of allies, friends, and international institutions,"⁴⁰ and the unilateralist view is naive because it "limits our flexibility, weakens our influence, and harms our interests."⁴¹ In this transitory world, Christopher contends the United States cannot "build a more secure and prosperous world by ourselves."⁴²

Stemming out of this debate between the two schools comes a vast array of suggestions for both the defining of American interests and iterating the United States' role in the world. These suggestions come from either extreme of the unilateral-multilateral debate, as well as from the middle. On the unilateralists side, roles tend to fall into the concept of minimalism, which avoids embracing any foreign policy goals. This view sees the United States in decline because of the costs of decades of involvement in the international realm. They demand a shift of resources to the domestic realm.⁴³ Minimalists would force a return to the leadership exhibited by the United States in the Hundred Year's Peace - the Monrovia "lead by example" style. On the other extreme, far reaches of the multilateralist school seek to define American interests as challenged by the over-riding threat of chaos in the world. Chaos theories define disorder as caused by environmental damage, overpopulation, poverty, refugee flows, ethnic conflict, and failed states.⁴⁴ Defining a the broadly-defined term of chaos as a

⁴⁰Christopher, Warren. "America's Leadership, America's Opportunity." *Foreign Policy*. Spring 1995. Number 98. pg. 9.

⁴¹*ibid.*

⁴²*ibid.*

⁴³Haas, Richard N. "Paradigm Lost." *Foreign Affairs*. January/February 1995. Volume 4, Number 1. pg. 49.

⁴⁴Rosner, Jeremy D. "Is Chaos America's Real Enemy?" *The Washington Post*. August 14, 1994. pg. C-1.

threat to the United States would force American leadership back into a neo-Cold War mentality, where tough images, peacekeeping (or creating order out of chaos), and decision-making would return to play a pivotal role. Neither extreme completes the Grotian Quest, as both merely apply old ways of thought to new-world problems, rather than seeking to synthesis the two.

Perhaps the best role that has emerged from somewhere in the middle of the two schools of thought is Alberto R. Coll's "Grand Facilitator" role for the United States. Coll acknowledges the world of the 1990's "will not be safer in all respects or require less attention than that of the Cold War years."⁴⁵ He notes the many new "opportunities for multilateral cooperation,"⁴⁶ but indicates that economic competition between the U.S. and its allies will create "political dangers,"⁴⁷ promoting industrial powers to cut side deals which will be difficult for the U.S. to manage through international institutions.⁴⁸ Coll further splits the two schools of thought in terms of the United States military role, which would be one of a global power balancer. As the balancer of power, the U.S. would seek to maintain regional balances of power, either through the assistance of friendly allies in the particular area, or unilaterally if no ally is available.⁴⁹ Unfortunately, this concept is what prevents the Grand Facilitator Model from being useful in this transitory stage because, again, this type of military intervention relies heavily on Cold War thinking, thus limiting American leadership to a by-gone mode of thought. Also, with the recent Congressional elections, it is extraordinarily doubtful that there would exist domestic support for this level of interaction.

⁴⁵Coll, Alberto C. "America as the Grand Facilitator." *Foreign Policy*. Summer 1992. Number 83. pg. 47.

⁴⁶*ibid.*

⁴⁷*ibid.* pg. 50.

⁴⁸*ibid.*

⁴⁹*ibid.* pg. 51.

The Map for the Grotian Quest: The Presidential Model for American Leadership

What is need in today's transitory world is a model for leadership that allows for the complexities of a changing world. Many of the roles and models proposed in the current foreign affairs literature are too limiting in that they address only one sphere of influence in which the United States must engaged. For instance, the Grand Facilitator Theory is based upon the military concept ⁱⁿ that the U.S. act as a balancer of power, despite the fact that in toady's world, as previously discussed, such power is limited in its ability to affect other spheres, like economics. A model needs to present a wide range of options for action without reference to a single power sphere. Furthermore, such a model must avoid support for any one of the past leadership styles. Minimalists foster isolationism, while chaos theories propogate Cold War tendencies of *machoism* and conflict. The new model's prime purpose is to guide us through this transitory time period, rather than jump ahead in an attempt to define America's role in whatever emerges from this period of change. The Presidential Model serves to guide President until a new world framework emerges. In other words, the following model is a tool to be used upon the quest, not the shining light that signifies the completion of the journey. In the words of Thomas Kuhn: "To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted."⁵⁰ The Presidential Model does not seek to address specific cases in order to offer solutions, rather it attempts to offer a framework of options that any case put before the President can evaluated under. Robert Haas states it best: "Case-by-caseism, even if done competently, is simply inadequate."⁵¹

⁵⁰Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). pgs. 17-18.

⁵¹Haas, Richard N. "Paradigm Lost." *Forein Affairs*. January/February 1995. Volume 4, Number 1. pg. 44.

The model casts the United States in the role of President of the World. This is an intellectual shift from envisioning America as the "leader of the free world," defending all from an evil empire. Also, it moves away from the concept that the U.S. merely leads by example, yet it avoids the Monrovia concern that the U.S. might become "dictatress of the world." The analogy to the President of the United States is useful in the conception of how the model will explain behavior options for the United States. For instance, there is a direct analogy between the President of the United States' veto power over legislation, and the U.S.'s formal veto in the United Nations. Furthermore, the informal power of the President to influence Congress through the media and be reflected in the United States' power to affect other countries through their populace by way of influencing them with American culture. The United State's mix of power, as expressed through Nye's table, coincide nicely with the decision-making options presented in the model. The model emphasizes two important characteristics: adaptiveness and participation, based upon Ron Heifetz's Theory of Adaptive Leadership and the Vroom-Yetton Normative Model, respectively. A synthesis of both concepts is the goal of the Presidential Model.

Ron Heifetz sees leadership as an adaptive work which seeks "to diminish the gap between values people stand for and the reality they face."⁵² As a part of this theory, leaders attempt to clarify what matters most - what are the trade-offs involved in any given situation. A leader's role is to force the followers to face tough challenges, to make these trade-offs, to clarify what is really wanted. Important in this process is the inclusion of various competing values and perspectives in order to allow for a good amount of reality testing of possible solutions to the difficult challenges facing the leader and followers. Reality testing forces a solution to be non-imperialistic. Finally, the

⁵²Heifetz, Ron. *Leadership Without Easy Answers*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). pg. 22.

response of the leader must be adaptive in nature, meaning the solution faces the problem, but has also been tested by competing solutions.⁵³

Complimenting nicely this sense of adaptiveness is the Vroom-Yetton Model's identification of five different decision-procedures for a leader. These different levels of follower involvement allow an adaptive response to almost any situation faced by the United States, and it also reveals the false dilemma imposed upon foreign policy by the unilateral-multilateral debate. Differing situations demand different levels of involvement. The levels of involvement proposed by Vroom and Yetton are as follows:

Autocratic I: The problem is solved by the leader alone, based upon information known at the time.

Autocratic II: The leader obtains the necessary information from the followers, then decides upon a solution.

Consultation I: The problem is shared with followers individually and suggestions and opinions are obtained by the leader. However, the leader still determines the final solution, which may or may not reflect the followers' input.

Consultation II: The problem is shared with the followers as a group and ideas are gathered by the leader. However, the solution is still determined by the leader, which may or may not reflect the group's input.

Group II: The problem is shared by the leader to the entire group and a solution is gained by consensus.⁵⁴

These levels of participation by the followers give a definitive framework from which the leader, meaning the President of the United States, can consult. These levels allow the United States to explicitly recognize the mixed motive nature of its foreign policy. The American principles of democracy, openness, and free market capitalism have never lent themselves to be an imperial power. However, like any other country, the United States must define and protect its interests. By comparing its leadership role to that of a president, this model helps to alleviate this conflict. Presidents, too, have personal,

⁵³*ibid.* pgs. 22-30.

⁵⁴Yukl, Gary A. *Leadership in Organizations*. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989). pgs. 113-114.

political concerns, but, at the same, time, they must lead their followers to common goals. Unilateralists err by forcing the U.S. into pursuing its own goals too rigorously, trampling on the needs of our allied followers. However, multilateralists subvert the U.S.'s interests too much to the world community. By using the Presidential Model, the leaders of the United States, depending on the contingency, can choose to lead in a unilateral style by implementing an Autocratic decision-making process, or they can determine America's interest's to not be strong enough to disallow maximum participation at the Group decision-making level.

The Presidential Model recognizes two realities presented previously: the changing characteristics of the world and the changing leadership needed to face them. The search through stable peace by combining the old ways of thinking with new realities can be accomplished through the implementation of the Presidential Model. It allows for the continuance of the role of the President of the United States as ultimate decision-maker, and encourages the use of the National Security Board as a sounding board by stressing the importance of reality testing. The model alleviates^{the} ~~the~~ cumbersome role of peacekeeper, allowing the United States to instead act more in concert with other nation-states in resolving conflicts around the world. This helps most in cases such as Bosnia, where direct American interests are difficult to find. While the role of Cold Warrior may have died a natural death with the end of the Cold War, the presidential tendency to display *machismo* has not. The Presidential Model helps curb this tendency merely by offering other, adaptive options. Yet, an elimination of this style would be undesirable, and remains will the Autocratic level of decision making. For example, in the recent Oklahoma City bombing, when it was rumored that perhaps it was an international incident, the President was quite to display his *machismo* by stating the terrorist would be found, wherever they tried to hide in the world.

The model is also responsive to the changing characteristics of the world during this transitory stage. By avoiding any situational references, the model does not tie down

the United States into thinking militarily when faced with an economic situation. Also, all the influences upon the world, from the peace interest of nuclear weapons to the intricacies of *haute finance*, are reflected in this model. Nuclear contingencies can be faced with a low level of participation, perhaps at the consultation stages, since the United States is still mainly dealing with a relatively small number of nations with this issue. However, free-trade issues within the economic sphere would most likely require the group level of decision-making, as expressed in the conferences held on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Furthermore, this model explicitly recognizes the United States as the leader of the world, yet it does not present America as a hegemon, dictator, or enforcer. Other nation-states already recognize this *de facto* situation, with a high ranking Japanese official stating "there will be no free world and no free trading system if the United States does not preserve them for us...The best Japan can aspire to is 'vice-president'".⁵⁵ The concept of the United States as president of the world merely connotes America as the best candidate for the job, as expressed by power level resources across the breadth of spheres.

Hugo Grotius provided the world with his framework for world order over three-hundred and fifty years ago. This framework evolved into the current Westphalian state system. Presently, however, we are not fortunate enough to know what framework of world order will eventually evolve out of the tremendous changes taking place today. Furthermore, it is not known whether or not this as yet defined framework will promote stable peace. The answer to the Grotian question presently must remain unanswered, for it is impossible to accurately portray with any confidence what the world order will be. However, this does not mean the Grotian Quest cannot be furthered by leaders who are

⁵⁵Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. (New York: Basic Books, 1990). pg. 161.

adaptive in nature. Working through the Presidential Model presented here will move the United States along the Grotian Path. Eventually, a new world order will emerge, and the Presidential Model may then have to be replaced with a model more suited for whatever has emerged. Until that time, the Presidential Model, combining the useful old leadership styles with the emerging world trends, can guide the United States, and its President, towards the end of the Grotian Quest and towards stable peace.

