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Campaign Managers: Strategic Leaders or Organizational Administrators

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"Campaign Managers: Strategic Leaders or Organizational Administrators"
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This paper reports an analysis of the characteristics of political campaign managers within the framework of leadership theory. Furthermore, as an outcome of this research I will present a theoretical framework for the further study of campaign managers as leaders.

As a research subject, political campaigns have been a topic of great interest in recent years. Many scholars have addressed such issues as campaign fundraising, consultants, and the media and political campaigns. However, very little scholarly research has been conducted regarding campaign managers. In fact, a study conducted by Martin (1993, p. 10) chastises scholars for "... a regrettable shortage of material for those seeking information about present-day electioneering. . ." For the purposes of this research, I define a campaign manager as the chief administrative officer within a campaign, who directs and coordinates the internal decision making process of the campaign (Martin, 1993, p. 96).

Through this paper I will address not only the subject of campaign managers, but the relationship between managers and candidates, the relationship between managers and the rest of the campaign organization, and the role of campaign managers as leaders. Though many trade journals and news magazines, such as Time and Newsweek have reported what are essentially case studies of campaign managers in national presidential elections, there has been very little synthesis and generalization of this information to other national campaign organizations, or to campaign organizations at the state and local levels. Even scholarly studies that do minimally focus upon the campaign organization or the campaign manager stress that scholars "... ought to focus more upon the elites who run the campaigns" (Margolis, 1985, p. 124). In essence, I hope to provide a scholarly,
leadership-based focus on the campaign organization and a very important, but neglected actor within that organization, the campaign manager.

This paper also attempts to offset the tendency in scholarly studies to overemphasize the subject matter of why candidates win or lose and under-emphasize the study of the leadership qualities of campaign managers. For example, Corsino (1985, p. 252) completed a study on campaign organizations in which he defined campaign success in the manager’s view as “. . . accomplishing those activities which would lead to the accumulation of the majority of votes on election day.” Instead of a success-oriented approach, I seek to address what it means for a campaign to be an effective organization and the manager to be an effective leader. More specifically, I believe that it is certainly possible that a campaign manager may fail to lead his organization to win the election, but he can still foster an effective organization that is clearly structured, emphasizes cohesive teamwork, and maintains a strong and consistent vision.

A third motivating force behind this analysis is to integrate the study of leadership into the study of political campaigns and to elucidate the leadership roles and functions of campaign managers. Given the general paucity of literature that focuses on the position of the campaign manager, I do not intend to test a single leadership theory in this research. Rather, I seek to isolate specific and relevant concepts in the leadership literature and apply those concepts towards creating a theoretical framework for the further study of campaign managers as leaders. More specifically, I plan to isolate various themes of an effective campaign and characterize the leadership roles of the campaign manager with regard to those theme. Hopefully, this analysis will indicate whether the term “campaign
manager" is a result of cavalier semantics or a true reflection of the administrative as compared to leadership duties that a campaign manager should perform.

In summary, this paper joins the study of leadership with the study of political campaigns. It seeks to create a leadership-based framework for explaining the leadership behaviors performed by campaign managers in their efforts to facilitate an effective campaign. Therefore, I have chosen the following organizational structure for my analysis: A review of the literature, a discussion of research methodology, a description of the data that was collected, and the presentation of a theoretical framework which may be useful for guiding future research in this area.

**Literature Review: Campaign Manager**

My literature review progressed through two steps. First, I reviewed the literature on campaign managers and subsequently I reviewed the literature on leadership theory.

My review of the literature on campaign managers focused on campaign management and electioneering. Much of the literature that I found was published in newspapers and magazines, and not in scholarly journals and the like. All of the literature on leadership theory that I reviewed, however, is based on a survey of leadership-based textbooks and the scholarly information included in those textbooks. With regard to the literature on campaign managers, I isolated twelve themes that I hypothesized to be most salient to effective campaign management and highly correlated with contemporary leadership theory. With regard to the leadership literature, I isolated four concepts that I believed could best be applied to the themes that I deduced from the campaign management literature. My literature review also led me to isolate four categorical themes that best represent what it means to run an effective campaign, especially with regard to the role of
the campaign manager. I then used those themes as possible criteria through which to evaluate the campaign manager's role as a leader or manager within the campaign organization and to isolate various common characteristics that represent strong leadership and/or management on the part of a campaign manager.

Several issues related to my analysis warrant identification. First, as noted above, the categories/criteria that I developed to guide my analysis represent common themes that I deduced from the literature; within the literature I found few scholarly generalizations regarding the effectiveness of campaign organizations. Additionally, these categories do overlap one another, but for presentation purposes I treat them as relatively conceptually distinct. I was able to isolate additional categorical themes, which can be characterized as follows: Mutual respect and trust within the organization, facilitation of grassroots campaigning, the importance of details, the value of experience, emphasis on opposition research, level of energy, level of confidence, and ability to control campaign leaks. Though I sought information regarding these categories during my data collection, I focused on the four criteria within my literature review on campaign effectiveness. Combined, the twelve criteria are used to assess the role of the campaign manager as a leader, and explain the campaign manager's leadership behaviors. Therefore, the following categories are neither exhaustive, nor mutually exclusive, but they do provide a fairly representative view of the extent of the work in this area of study.

**Teamwork/Communication**

Throughout the literature on political campaigns, teamwork is a consistent characteristic labeled as important in defining what is an effective campaign organization. Furthermore, the campaign manager is often identified as a key player in influencing and
enhancing the atmosphere of teamwork in the campaign organization. For example, a post-election analysis in *U.S. News and World Report*, cited President Reagan’s first presidential campaign in 1980 as an example of how much influence the campaign manager has on teamwork and how important teamwork is as a standard for judging campaign effectiveness. During the early phase of Reagan’s campaign, there was a strong degree of infighting and jealousy among staff. However, after Reagan fired his campaign manager, John Sears, and hired William Casey to replace him, Casey facilitated an increased level of positive and open communication, leading to a much more cohesive organizational atmosphere (Sanhoff, 1980, p. 68).

Other literature on political campaigns illustrate that campaign leaders, including the campaign manager, who try to excessively control the campaign may inhibit progress towards productivity. One example that epitomizes inhibited campaign productivity resulting from excessive control on the part of the campaign manager concerns Scott Reed, Bob Dole’s 1996 Presidential campaign manager. One aide criticized Reed for having excessively controlled the information networks within the campaign and “... and he sought to do it with a personal management style in which he works with two or three trusted friends while keeping everything close to the chest” (Dettmer, 1996, p. 8). I hypothesize that the result of such a management style is an organization, as a whole, that is less informed. For example, the *National Journal*, cited Don Sipple and Mike Murphy, Dole’s media consultants, as criticizing campaign manager Scott Reed for cutting them out of strategy discussions and refusing to open up communication networks (Barnes, 1996, p. 1986). As a result, the campaign became bogged down in struggles over campaign strategy, and the advertising consultants resigned. Both elections reveal how
much of a benefit or detriment a campaign manager can be as a facilitator of strong, cohesive internal campaign communication.

Finally, the campaign manager’s relationship with the candidate can also have a strong influence on the atmosphere of cohesiveness within the organization, and hence the effectiveness of that organization. Returning to Bob Dole’s 1996 campaign, post-election analysis criticized him for being “. . . mysterious and uncommunicative, often biting and rarely encouraging. . . He liked to have competing power centers in the campaign and would play one against the other” (Newsweek, 1996, p. 106). This type of attitude may result in an unfriendly working environment, and therefore the campaign manager, as the chief administrative officer, may be the best person to stop the candidate from fostering and reinforcing such an environment. Actions such as these may distract staff from the task at hand, running the campaign. An article in a business magazine argues that an effective campaign manager can use his/her power and position within the organization to at least persuade, if not force the candidate to focus his/her attention, and consider how such behavior may have detrimental effects on the campaign (Knopper, 1996, p. 28).

In summary, literature on the issue of teamwork in campaign organizations seems limited and incomplete because it primarily focuses on Presidential campaigns. Furthermore, the literature does not isolate leadership techniques through which the campaign manager may be able to facilitate open communication, set a positive tone for the campaign environment, and facilitate cohesive intra-organizational relationships. Such issues require further study with particular emphasis on determining the leadership techniques through which a campaign manager can affect the clarity and openness of communication networks, improve the team’s communication, the cohesiveness of the
organization, and maintain a strong, cohesive co-leader relationship with the candidate.

Many of these behaviors may be integral in creating a framework for understanding why a campaign manager can also be a campaign leader, and how we know that he or she is such a leader.

*Organizational Hierarchy*

Campaign managers may play a role in creating or facilitating interoffice coordination and a clear organizational hierarchy that is understood by members of the organization. In fact, clear organizational structure strongly complements an open communication network and facilitates the efficient flow of information within the campaign. Corsino's (1985, p. 256-257) study of a mayoral campaign in Massachusetts revealed that when campaign managers fail to clarify the duties and responsibilities of campaign members, those followers may not understand whether or not there is a structural mechanism for the flow of information from the bottom to the top of the organization. The present study further explores this issue and attempts to determine if there is validity behind the belief that lack of clarity in the hierarchy of the campaign organization results in demoralized participants or staff members. Furthermore, the question remains as to whether a lack of empowerment and participation within the decision making process for the staff will result in decreased staff productivity.

Refocusing on the responsibilities of participants within campaigns, some literature on campaigns has addressed the link between the organizational structure of a campaign and the responsibilities of the actors within the campaign. Runkel's book, based on an analysis of the 1988 Presidential election, uses Michael Dukakis' campaign to hone in on understanding this link. Michael Dukakis' manager hired and dismissed so many media
advisers that “instead of a few simple themes there was a changing lineup of muddled ones. Instead of an organization chart that bespoke clear strategy, there were ill-defined responsibilities” (Runkel, 1989, p. 83). In contrast, George Bush’s candidacy in 1988 was characterized by efficiency and an organization with designated areas of responsibility (Wayne, 1992, p. 178). Evidently, when responsibilities are constantly changing, the result may lead to dual accomplishments of tasks, wasted time, and overall slow procedural processes within the campaign.

Clarity and designation of responsibilities are not the only important factors with regard to organizational hierarchy. Martin’s (1993, p. 89) study on campaign management compares campaign organizations to diffuse social systems “... that must be carefully structured and organized to encourage maximum participation, and to make the best use of the experience, skills, and talents of those volunteers and staff involved in the campaign.” She seems to hint that the chaotic nature of campaign organizations generally may be offset by organizational discipline.

With regard to the lowest levels of the organizational hierarchy, some scholars have isolated the role of the campaign manager in creating and stimulating a large volunteer effort and strong fieldwork. This is especially emphasized within the literature on national Presidential campaigns, but it may also be important in lower level campaigns, as well. Volunteers and fieldwork are important for at least two reasons according to the literature on the subject. First, as suggested in Wayne’s (1992, p. 117) book on the 1992 Presidential election, the mobilization of voters often occurs as a result of phone banks, door-to-door campaigning, and local fundraising, and the center of focus of any campaign is mobilization of voters. Evidence for the importance of voter mobilization, shows that
get out the vote efforts have resulted in three to five percent differences in final election outcomes (Martin, 1993, p. 124). An adept campaign manager may realize this, and create a plan for an organization with extensive manpower and regionally distributed manpower to facilitate the success of voter mobilization efforts. The second reason for the importance of large volunteer efforts is that many experts within the campaign field believe that fieldwork determines whether one wins or loses. In order not to underestimate the importance of this factor in a campaign, it is important to note that within a campaign organization "... 75 to 80 percent of the full-time staff labors in the field" (Sanoff, 1980, p. 68). These statistics make it easy to understand why national level campaigns may be easily crippled by poor organization and mobilization of staff and volunteers.

Another area of organizational focus, are the lateral coalitions that campaigns build with their respective political parties. Some practitioners believe that campaign managers play an important strategic role in building such coalitions. For example, Susan Estrich, Michael Dukakis' campaign manager in 1988, argues that organization of state campaigns is a major duty of the campaign manager in order to build a unified national organization (Runkel, 1989, p. 93-94). This indicates that in national campaigns the effective campaign manager needs to have a plan for how the campaign organization will interact with other actors within the electoral arena, as well as a plan for the internal structural coordination of the campaign. Martin's (1993, p. 63) study of campaign management techniques suggests that the political party-campaign coalition is especially important if the campaign wants to attract highly partisan voters whom the party can easily mobilize and influence. Poor campaign-party relations can also harm campaigns because many campaigns rely
heavily on the local, state, or national political parties for fund-raising and grassroots activities (Wayne, 1992, p. 178).

In conclusion, the literature leaves certain questions to be answered, which are included as elements of the present study. First, do each of the above examples of organizational discipline extend in importance to state campaigns, and do campaign managers play the same role of creating a clear organizational structure and distinct staff responsibilities in state as in national campaigns? Additionally, what specific techniques and factors become important to a campaign manager in designing an organizational structure, delegating responsibilities, building a large volunteer effort, and creating strong political coalitions? More importantly, this research explores whether such techniques represent leadership processes/behaviors or merely reflect characteristics of an effective manager.

Strategic Vision

A third valuable characteristic for campaign organizations is a long-term strategic vision. Direction is important not only for planning purposes, but common direction among the staff also creates comfort for staff members and a feeling of cohesion among the staff through a substantive campaign (Martin, 1993, p. 31). As an example, when Bush’s campaign in 1992 was floundering, the campaign team pushed for bringing former campaign manager James Baker back into the organization because he was one of the few people who could help Bush create a vision for his next four years in office, and prevent him from focusing on his past four years in office (Duffy, 1992, p. 44). The Bush campaign exuded such a sense of desperation and need for Baker that it is very easy to
conclude that a manager with both a plan for winning and vision or picture for how the
candidate will govern may indeed be priceless to a campaign organization.

Early planning of fundraising and spending strategies appears to be associated with
effective Presidential campaigns. Wayne (1992, p. 116) argues in his book that within the
structure of presidential contests "having a solid financial base is a strategic imperative."
Campaigns, especially national campaigns, are so costly and contain such a heavy
emphasis on expensive advertising strategies, it may be imperative that managers have the
ability to create long term plans for financial mobilization. The campaign may also be
incomplete without a manager who can facilitate the presentation of the candidate in an
appealing manner to both partisan and independent voters. Furthermore, all of these
different strategies must be set up in phases and be presented as appeals based on timing.
Wayne's (1992, p. 199) book argues that these phases are imperative because there is a
tendency of campaigns to become more highly salient to voters as the election approaches,
and therefore "candidates naturally desire to build momentum as their campaigns
progress." Overall, this discussion emphasizes the possible importance of a strong
campaign manager in balancing the attention/awareness of the campaign organization
between the world external and internal to the campaign organization.

Along with the above emphasis on stages of campaign strategy, it is also important
for the candidate and campaign manager to agree on and consistently present an overall
theme for the campaign. The contrasting Presidential election campaigns of 1996 present
evidence of the value of consistency. Harold Ickes, Clinton's campaign manager, argued
that Clinton would be successful because he presented a distinct message to the American
people and continuously repeated it (Garland, 1995, p. 36). On the other hand,
Newsweek cited one Dole campaign analyst posing the question “What is Dole’s message? One day it’s the 15 percent tax cut, the next it’s Clinton’s character, then it’s back to ‘he’s a liberal’ or ‘who do you trust?’” (Alter, 1996, p. 30). The resulting unity and confidence within the Clinton campaign in contrast to the confusion of the Dole campaign reveal how important it is for a campaign manager to be aware of and focus on the need for thematic consistency within the campaign.

Existing discussions of strategy fail to raise several issues that I will address in my research, including an analysis of both higher order campaign strategies as well as operational strategies necessary to run the internal campaign organization. An example of such a higher order strategy would be the Dole campaign’s broad message, “he’s a liberal,” in attacking Bill Clinton. The specific execution of that message in advertising or other attack methods against Bill Clinton would represent an operational strategy. Through an analysis of these two strategic levels I will characterize, compare, and contrast the manager’s role as leader for both the higher order and operational strategies. In other words, does the effective campaign manager focus his leadership skills solely upon internal organizational strategy, or does she/he balance that behavior with an emphasis on creating an overarching message, such as “it’s the economy stupid”? Additionally, the present study attempts to identify possible mechanisms used by a campaign manager to influence strategy on both levels. Finally, since strategy is naturally associated with both the candidate and the manager positions, the manner in which these individuals resolve conflicts that may arise over disagreements in strategy requires attention.

Locus of Management
Managers must not only be wary of processes within the campaign, but they must also be wary of the candidate. Candidates can become excessively involved in either or both the administrative, managerial work of the campaign and the direction setting, leadership work of the campaign. For example, one major problem cited in the losing campaigns of both the 1988 and 1996 Presidential elections were candidates who controlled their organization themselves. Co-chair of the Dole campaign, Lyn Nofziger, criticized the Dole campaign because "there was no organization and nothing went right. But a lot of that was Dole's fault. He always interferes with his own campaigns" (Dettmer, 1996, p. 8). Therefore, such criticism may indicate that candidate interference confuses the locus of control within the campaign, and may also lead to hostility among campaign leaders. The campaign manager who can communicate well with the candidate and foresee such difficulties may be able to act as preventative medicine for problems in this area of campaign management. On the other hand, if the candidate seeks control of his/her own campaign and chooses a complementary campaign manager, hostility and conflict may not occur among campaign leaders. However, in the latter case the campaign may not be as effective because the candidate has assumed the overwhelming job of running his/her campaign, as well as the responsibilities of traveling, meeting voters, and media appearances.

Despite a need for a locus of organizational control focused on the campaign manager the candidate should not be totally lacking in input. National campaign consultant, Frank Luntz (1988, p. 57), conducted a survey of 68 campaign consultants and found that 46% believed the candidate should be somewhat involved in campaign strategy, compared to 15% who argued for little or no involvement. These findings based on the
views of campaign insiders lend credence to the idea that candidates should be involved in their campaigns, but that they should temper their involvement. In fact, in the 1988 Presidential election campaign Lee Atwater, Bush's campaign manager, argued that the difference between Bush losing and winning was because "he made some basic strategy calls in this race that we might have made differently" (Runkel, 1989, p. 91). Clearly, most experts in campaign management analysis would argue for a balance of control between the candidate and campaign manager as the optimal strategy for an effective political campaign.

Balance may also be an important focus in successful relationships between consultants and campaign managers. Martin's (1993, p. 101) study of campaign organizations defined the most effective role of campaign consultants as advisers providing specialized assistance in focused areas on behalf of the candidate. However, sometimes the role clarity of the two positions can become intermingled and internal strife based on control conflicts between these two parties can result. Luntz (1988, p. 64) argues that some consultants would even go as far as to purposely undermine the power of the manager, exploiting the sometimes harsh relationship between the candidate and manager. Such conflict among leaders within a campaign can be destructive and draining of productive energy. One of the goals of the present study is to characterize preventative measures that the manager may take in order to halt such conflict.

The discussion above leaves a major question unanswered in regard to who should have responsibility within a campaign to maintain a balance of control over strategy and management between the candidate and other campaign staff. I would hypothesize that the central role of the campaign manager as the chief administrative officer would lend
credence to the position of the manager as the best locus for this responsibility, since he or
she is responsible for the inner structural coordination of the campaign. Additionally, the
discussion above fails to isolate leadership techniques that a campaign manager may use to
maintain a balance of campaign control between the candidate and the manager or to
prevent campaign control conflicts. However, before addressing this issue, I must
examine whether the conflicts described above occur as often on the level of state
campaigns, the subject of my study. In particular I am interested in determining if the
ability to manage conflicts among campaign staff, including the candidate, is a highly
regarded leadership trait for campaign managers. In the end, this study hopes to reveal the
impact of locus of control conflicts on the ability of the campaign manager, or for that
matter, the candidate, to enact positive and effective leadership skills.

In conclusion, the four categories or themes of effective campaigns described
above provide good starting points for probing the character of campaign managers as
leaders. The literature pretty consistently shows that at least teamwork, structural
coordination, vision, and locus of control are important for effective campaign
organizations and tend to be responsibilities associated with the campaign manager.
However, even though the literature associates these characteristics with the campaign
manager, this does not mean that the campaign manager, at the state level, does or should
be involved in these functions and activities. Therefore, in this study I attempt to
determine the level of influence the campaign manager tends to display within state
campaigns, the leadership techniques managers in these types of campaigns use to perform
their duties, and the sort of leadership framework that best describes the role of the
campaign manager as a leader within the campaign organization.
Leadership Literature Review

The lack of any previous theoretical framework for understanding campaign managers and their roles in political campaigns led me to create a leadership theory-based framework for the study of campaign managers. In other words, the lack of scholarly information on campaign managers and leadership led me to create an exploratory framework so I could study campaign managers through the lens of leadership. Therefore, in this section I isolate various concepts from the realm of the leadership literature and indicate the relevancy and importance of these concepts to my project. Among other reasons, I chose the following leadership concepts because they best test what I believe to be imperative behaviors for a leader. In addition, the following theories are integral within the discipline of leadership to describe how leaders use power, communicate and exchange information with followers, and inspire followers. I also chose the following theories because many of the behaviors described within the theories, such as communicating and motivating, are associated frequently with campaign managers in the campaign literature. Since these behaviors are integral to effective leadership, I believe that viewing campaign manager behaviors in light of these leadership theories will effectively explore their role as leaders, managers, or both.

Social Exchange Theory

Within any campaign organization there are going to be relationships among the members of that organization, be they leader-follower relationships, co-follower relationships, or co-leader relationships. One leadership theory which applies the concept of transactions within relationships and the resulting influence and status gained from those transactions is Social Exchange Theory (Yukl, 1994, p. 210). The basis of Social
Exchange Theory is that leaders within an organization contribute to a group through their
"... control over scarce resources, access to vital information, or skill in dealing with
critical task problems" (Yukl, 1994, p. 210). The result of such a relationship is that when
a leader or follower positively uses the resources he or she controls for the betterment of
the group, he or she gains idiosyncratic credits or trust with the group, thereby increasing
that individual's level of influence.

Along with describing Social Exchange Theory, the literature I looked at revealed
a number of research findings regarding Social Exchange Theory. First, Yukl's (1994, p.
210) research found that leaders are expected to be innovators in their work and that their
resulting success or failure with regard to innovation correlates strongly with a
complementary increase or decrease in the level of influence given to the leader by the
group. In other words, status seems to be ascribed to the leader by his or her followers
based on what the leader gives to the group, as a whole. Other research shows that Social
Exchange Theory can be used to describe why members join groups. For instance,
Newcomb (1960) conducted a study of college men living together in a dormitory in
which he found that people join groups because of the similarity in values between the
individual joining and the group itself; an exchange in values between the two entities
(Forsyth, 1990, p. 63). This finding may very well extend to campaign organizations
because it may explain why campaign staff and volunteers join and leave campaigns. I
hypothesize that campaign leaders, including the campaign manager, who do not identify
with and even criticize the staff and volunteer's political values can cause attrition of those
campaign participants.
A sub-area of Social Exchange Theory of possible importance to this study is Vertical Dyad Linkage Theory. This theory argues that leaders develop special in-group relationships with certain members of a group and that mutual influence between the two parties results (Yukl, 1994, p. 238). The rest of the members of a group have an out-group relationship with the leader, where the leader primarily uses downward coercion and distributes rewards to gain followers' compliance (Yukl, 1994, p. 238). With regard to my study, important research findings by Cashman, Dansereau, Graen, and Haga (1976) show that an individual's ability to have an in-group relationship with his/her followers relies on the ability of that leader to have positive in-group relationships with his/her leaders. In other words, leaders who tend to use coercion and rewards to gain their followers' compliance also tend to be coerced or rewarded by their own leaders. The question in relation to my study is whether a correlation exists between the nature of the relationships between the campaign manager and lower campaign staff, and the nature of the relationship between the campaign manager and the candidate.

In light of past research and the emphasis of the current study on an appointed leader (campaign manager), it is important to note differences between the social exchange processes of elected versus appointed leaders. Past research shows elected leaders tend to be more dependent on subordinate evaluation, have higher expectations from their followers, and are more vulnerable to rejection by followers than are appointed leaders (Yukl, 1994, p. 210-211). Despite such differences between appointed and elected leaders, there is reason to believe that social exchanges are very important between the campaign manager and other staff members. Extrapolating from the political campaign literature discussed above, social exchange is important in describing the role of the
campaign manager because of his/her control over information and communication networks, and his/her subsequent ability to empower and influence others within the organization through such control. Using the Dole campaign as an example, we find that Scott Reed, Dole's campaign manager, would not open up strategic discussions to other members of the campaign staff, thereby hoarding informational resources. As a result, followers, such as the media consultants, lost trust in Scott Reed and left the organization because Reed cut off the informational exchange (Barnes, 1996, p. 1968). Thus, in my study I attempt to describe exchange relationships between campaign managers and other staff, and to discover the potential impact of such exchange relationships on the overall effectiveness of the organization. Furthermore, I try to isolate how these exchanges impact the gain or loss of status and trust for the campaign manager and perceptions of his/her leadership role.

Bases of Power

Sources of power for campaign managers may also be helpful in describing the role of the campaign manager as a leader. One categorization of power specifically cited in the leadership literature is French and Raven's (Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy, 1995, p. 340-345) five power bases: Expert power or the power of having information, referent power or power gained from personal respect and admiration of a leader, legitimate power or power based on one's formal position, and reward and coercive power or the respective abilities of a leader to influence others positively or negatively based on his/her control of resources. Use of this theory is not duplicative of Social Exchange Theory because past research shows Social Exchange Theory to be most applicable and narrowly focused on expert power. Therefore, use of French and Raven's model of power in this study allows
for the categorization of the campaign manager's use of other power bases besides expert power. Additionally, consideration of power bases allows me to examine the effects of various forms of power on campaign managers, beyond their effect on levels of trust ascribed to leaders under Social Exchange Theory.

Closely related to power bases is the idea of influence tactics. The difference between the two concepts is that "... power is the capacity or potential to influence others, [while] influence tactics are the actual behaviors used by an agent to change the attitudes, opinions, or behaviors of a target person" (Wren, 1995, p. 348). In essence, influence tactics are the operational side of power bases. A leader who merely examines his/her power bases only comes to an understanding of the type of authority of his/her position, whereas a leader who examines his/her influence tactics better understands why certain tactics lead to certain outcomes (Wren, 1995, p. 350). The various influence techniques include among others the following: Rational persuasion, or the use of logical arguments, inspirational appeals, or proposals made to encourage enthusiasm, consultation, or when followers participate in planning an activity, and pressure tactics, or threats (Wren, 1995, p. 348-349). In summary, a study of power bases may lead to an understanding of how a leader's position influences the leadership behaviors used, while a study of influence techniques may allow one to better understand the impacts of such leadership behaviors.

As a group, the research on and application of power base theory reveals a bias within the theory. For example, Yukl's (1994, p. 208) study exploring French and Raven's power bases revealed that less socially desirable forms of power such as coercion may not be reported in relation to leader effectiveness in research because satisfied
subordinates tend to attribute the more socially desirable referent power to the leader than unsatisfied subordinates. In contrast, Warren (1968) "... found that expert, referent, and legitimate power were correlated positively with attitudinal commitment by subordinates, whereas reward and coercive power were correlated with behavioral compliance" (Yuki, 1994, p. 208-209). This contrast may indicate that generalizations about a leader's effectiveness and use of power bases may vary greatly depending on whether one defines effectiveness according to subordinate satisfaction, commitment, or compliance.

By itself, the concept of power bases would probably be too prescriptive for application to this study. While campaign managers may want to use some of the methods described in the conclusion of this paper for influencing their leaders, co-leaders, and followers, the primary purpose of this paper is to explore and describe the power bases used by campaign managers and the leadership influence tactics they use to assert these power bases. Additionally, some of French and Raven’s categories may not be applicable to campaign managers. For example, I would conjecture that the campaign manager is unable to use coercive power and punishment on volunteer members of an organization because of the nature of the leader-follower relations in that environment. Campaign organizations are unique because they are temporary and contain members whose motives may differ from those joining other organizations. Many organizations have members who work for them for pay or self-advancement, but volunteers in a political campaign may be working for that organization solely for altruistic reasons. I hope to generalize some leadership techniques used by campaign managers within organizations to assert power, the type of power they are most likely to assert, and the impact of the uniqueness of the organization on their potential power bases.
Visionary Leadership

The uniqueness of the political campaign organization and the position of campaign manager provide an excellent opportunity from which to apply the principles of visionary leadership. One view of visionary leadership comes from Marshall Sashkin (1995, p. 403) who identifies three parts of visionary leadership: Creating a future image for the organization, formulating an organizational philosophy that reflects that image and practicing that philosophy, and leaders' actions in personal relationships with other members of the organization to support that vision. In interpreting these three stages, I would conjecture that visionary leadership involves bringing a group from their current status closer to an ideal status, or bridging the gap between current reality and expectations. In fact, Breckhard and Pritchard (1995, p. 398) argue that during periods of change, the successful leader identifies and creates a plan for what the organization must do to meet the demands of change. For example, the leader determines if the organization needs to expand its employee base to meet increased consumer demand, and where and how to conduct such an expansion. Bennis (1995, p. 378) concurs with this argument and observes that successful leaders possess "the capacity to create and communicate a compelling vision of a desired state of affairs. . ." To generalize, these scholars seem to argue that it is important for a successful leader to communicate his/her vision to followers and gain followers' acceptance of that vision and the constant expansion of that vision. Hence, while goals specifically associated with the vision may be achieved, the vision becomes never-ending, and is constantly in a state of growth and change.

Past research also reveals various techniques leaders can use in practicing visionary leadership. In a study of twelve CEOs, Tichy and Devanna (1986, p. 362) found that
leaders with high self-esteem and a common purpose with their followers tended to be characterized as visionary leaders. Bennis and Nanus (1995, p. 364) support this conclusion in their study of corporate and public sector organizational leaders finding that many times the visions leaders espoused came from followers within the organization and as a result of open communication networks. Since managers may be thought of as chief administrative officers for campaigns, one of the goals of my research is to determine if some of the same leadership techniques used by CEOs and organizational leaders are also used by campaign leaders in developing and articulating their visions for campaign organizations.

Visionary leadership is important in this research because I believe that there may be two different visions within a political campaign. The campaign manager may have a vision for the organization, while the candidate may have a vision for the office and region in which he or she is running. Then again the campaign manager may not even have a leadership vision, and may therefore be characterized as more of a manager than a leader. Despite the fact that past visionary leadership research has focused on organizations that have long term visions, and the campaign organization has a short term focus, the theory still has strong implications for this study. I would hypothesize that a campaign organization needs a visionary leader or someone who can communicate and gain commitment from staff for a common overarching campaign direction. Without this I believe that the campaign becomes inefficient and ineffective as staff members begin to pursue different goals that at best do not complement each other and at worst are diametrically opposed to one another. Additionally, visionary leadership tends to emphasize concepts that are also important to an effective campaign organization. Similar
to the characteristics of an effective campaign organization, Sashkin (1995, p. 403) argues that leaders who effectively use visionary leadership need to facilitate communication and listening to others, consistency and trustworthiness, and self-respect and respect for others. Exploring these similarities, understanding the relationship between the respective visions of managers and candidates, and determining the impact of the short term nature of the campaign organization on visionary leadership are major focal points of the present study.

*Transforming Leadership*

The final leadership approach that is relevant to this paper is the idea of transforming leadership. James MacGregor Burns (1978, p. 19-20) defines transforming leadership as leaders and followers mutually facilitating each other to higher levels of moral motivation. By moral motivation Burns means mutual appeals by both actors towards values such as liberty, justice, and equality (Yukl, 1994, p. 351). Bass (1985, p. 351) built upon Burns' framework with his own theory of transformational leadership, in which the leader motivates followers by making them aware of the value of the task at hand, the importance of the organization's needs over the followers' self-interest, and the followers' higher-order needs. Implicitly, Bass' research focused more narrowly on the direction of influence from leader to follower, as opposed to Burns' research on the mutual influence between the two.

Despite differences between Bass and Burns regarding transformational leadership, both agree on the definition of another form of leadership, transactional leadership. Both agree that this kind of leadership represents a sort of social exchange relationship characterized by an exchange of rewards for compliance, or leaders and followers
exchanging valued resources, but having no long term mutual purpose that binds them (Yukl, 1994, p. 352,; Burns, 1978, p. 19-20). Of possibly greater importance to this study, a number of scholarly studies show that the most effective type of leadership behavior is that which is comprised of a balance of transformational and transactional behaviors (Yukl, 1994, p. 352, 354).

In brief, transforming leadership is important for this project because it draws attention to what binds members of the campaign organization together. It is equally important to take note of transformational leadership and transactional leadership because they may also be important in understanding the leadership versus management roles of campaign managers, and in determining what makes their leadership or management effective. In addition, by examining transforming leadership I hope to find what, if any role the manager plays in facilitating the growth of the moral values of volunteers. Furthermore, I am interested in determining if a manager can be a transforming leader within the organization or if that undermines the role that the candidate must play. Finally, if the manager is a transforming leader I would like to isolate the moral values, such as liberty within Burns’ framework, that bind the organization and members to the manager in this exchange relationship. However, if the manager is either solely a transactional leader or both a transactional leader and a transforming leader, I would also like to isolate the concrete resources that are being exchanged between the campaign manager and the followers. For example, I hope to determine whether or not the volunteers work for the manager in exchange for his or her expertise in getting the candidate elected.

In conclusion, although not exhaustive, the four approaches to understanding leadership discussed above appear to be those that are most applicable to the study of
campaign managers and leadership. In particular, I will use the leadership concepts to explain the campaign manager's role as a leader within the framework of the eight categories of campaign effectiveness isolated in the campaign literature. I believe that the same leader-follower behaviors described by the leadership literature can also be used to describe the campaign manager's behaviors in relating to the candidate and other staff members. Therefore, under the guidance of the leadership concepts above I will create a theoretical framework depicting the nature of the campaign manager as a leader, manager, or a combination of both.

Methodology

The purpose of my project is to create a possible theoretical framework for understanding campaign managers and leadership, and therefore the purpose is exploratory in nature. Exploratory research is valuable for a project such as mine because it "... assumes the value of context and setting, and searches for a deeper understanding of the participants' lived experiences of the phenomenon" (Marshall, 1995, p. 39). Along these lines, the data I have used in developing my framework was derived from the experiences of participants within campaign organizations and their perceptions of their campaign managers.

A subordinate purpose of my project is to explore previously identified themes that are common within effective and ineffective campaign organizations in a context, which has yet to be studied. As noted earlier, most studies of campaigns in the past have focused on Presidential campaigns, and neglected research on local or state campaigns, opening the question of whether generalizations from Presidential campaigns can be applied on a more localized level. Therefore, I conducted in-depth interviews with a sample of
participants involved in four gubernatorial campaigns within the state of Virginia. In order to prevent partisan bias and to obtain data that are more generalizable, I interviewed members of two Democratic campaigns, the Mary Sue Terry and Don Beyer campaigns, and members of two Republican campaigns, the George Allen and the James Gilmore campaigns.

Sample

Within the campaigns noted above I sampled a variety of high and low level campaign staff based upon the availability and accessibility of those individuals and their willingness and ability to give me information about their respective campaign managers. This sample was meant to be diverse and representative of a broad range of views within campaign organizations, thus providing a reliable base for generalizations. In order to maintain confidentiality, participants in the samples are not directly quoted, only listed in the bibliography section of this paper, and their responses have only been used to identify thematic similarities and dissimilarities in their responses.

Interviews

I used telephone and face-to-face interviews to collect data because they allowed me to gain in-depth insight into participants' perspectives on events within the respective campaign organizations. However, I must note that because my questions sought to obtain the perceptions of participants and because I have summarized the respondents answers according to my own perceptions, question and interviewer bias may be a source of error that limits the results of this study. Furthermore, these interviews focused upon an organization, the campaign, that can be secretive and personal at times, so some information may have been withheld from me (Marshall, 1995, p.380-81). My only
method for preventing the withholding of information was to guarantee respondents that their names would not be directly associated with any quoted material in my paper.

*Interview Schedule*

More specifically, I created a moderately structured interview schedule designed to explore the twelve issues outlined in the literature review section of my project under the umbrella of leadership (see Appendix I). These questions have been pre-tested with a sample of individuals to increase the clarity of the instrument, and have been "... examined for bias, sequence, clarity, and face validity" (Marshall, 1995, p. 96). The twelve concepts which I chose to focus upon included: teamwork/organizational communication, organizational structure, strategic vision, locus of management, mutual respect and trust, grassroots campaigning, the importance of details, the value of experience, level of energy, focus on opposition research, control for campaign leaks, and confidence level. Each of the primary interview questions was open-ended so that respondents would not be influenced by any interviewer expectations. Furthermore, each of the interview questions was designed to test a specific concept or two from the list above.

In order to better understand the structure of my interviews, I have outlined below the rationale underlying the interview questions. First, I divided my questions into four subject areas, the respondent, the campaign manager's responsibilities, the overall effectiveness of the organization, and the role of the campaign manager as a leader. The question area regarding the respondent focused upon his or her role within the formal structure, and perception of informational flow within the organization and that individual's feelings about positive and negative aspects of the campaign. My objective
was to elicit responses from the individual that characterized the dyadic relationship between the individual and the campaign manager. It was hoped that these questions would reveal information regarding the leader-follower exchanges between the individual and the campaign manager, and the “power bases” or “influence tactics” used by the campaign manager. Furthermore, the questions regarding the positive or negative characteristics of the campaign were intended to reveal respondent perceptions regarding the locus of responsibility for such characteristics within the organizational hierarchy.

The second area of questions focused directly upon the campaign manager as a leader. These questions allowed me to better characterize whether the campaign manager was perceived of as a leader and, if so, the type of leadership behaviors the campaign manager displayed. Other areas of inquiry, such as the details of scheduling and advance work in contrast to the broader strategic vision of the campaign, were designed to obtain information that would allow me to characterize the leadership or management status of the campaign manager.

The third area of questions focused on the broader context of the organization. These questions sought to obtain information regarding the level of effectiveness of the campaign as perceived by the respondents. Organizational culture, vision, and grassroots empowerment were the foci of these questions. Among other things, I hoped that responses to these questions would allow me to explain and outline the leadership techniques and role of the campaign manager as a leader in cultivating an effective organizational culture, vision, and grassroots effort for the campaign organization.

The final two questions were summary questions meant to garner a conclusion from the respondent regarding the leadership/management role of the campaign manager,
and why the respondent drew such a conclusion about that role. A comparison of the
consistency of these responses to the respondents' earlier statements enabled me to
determine whether the interpretations I made from those earlier statements accurately
reflected the beliefs of that respondent. Consequently, if the respondent’s earlier
statements diverged from his/her final conclusion, then my interpretations and
generalizations may have been inaccurate, or the respondent may have misunderstood my
questions or what occurred in his/her campaign.

A common theme throughout all of the interview questions was that each question
sought to elicit a response that revealed the respondents’ perceived locus of control with
regard to the concept being measured. It is hoped that each question provided an
opportunity for the respondent to identify the locus of leadership within the campaign
organization, possibly the campaign manager. Furthermore, the interview questions called
for extensive respondent descriptions of campaign characteristics allowing them to
possibly identify leadership behaviors used by senior campaign staff to influence such
characteristics. Though a better data collection instrument may have existed for this
study, I used this instrument because it distinctly isolated the concepts I desired to study,
and produced data from which I could draw generalizations.

My analysis of the responses to my research interviews is twofold in nature. Each
question was meant to elicit a response from the interviewee through which I hoped to
discern patterns of behavior within the organization, especially with reference to the
campaign manager. Therefore, I sought internal consistency among responses from a
single respondent to characterize the leadership behavior of the campaign manager, and
comparative consensus among respondents to increase the validity of these
characterizations. Disagreements on patterns of behavior or multiple patterns characterized across respondents may indicate the lack of validity behind that concept and its use in studying the leadership of campaign managers, or they may be accounted for by extraneous factors that I am attempting to isolate within this study. Conversely, agreements among respondents may indicate valid concepts that may be useful for the further study of campaign managers' leadership behaviors; however, care was taken not to over-generalize from my data, since socially desirable responses may have accounted for agreement among respondents.

The second part of the analysis focused on responses in terms of the general leadership concepts outlined in the literature review. For example, if many respondents emphasized the negativity of the campaign manager for not controlling the campaign, I examined the context of their responses. Consideration of such contexts helped reveal whether the campaign manager's actions or lack of action might best be understood through the lens of poor transformational leadership, an inability to capitalize on his or her power bases, or another leadership concept.

In conclusion, this project aimed to create a theoretical framework for understanding the leadership behavior of campaign managers. More specifically, I am attempted to isolate various behaviors that highlight effective leadership on the part of campaign managers, and subsequently to explain these behaviors within the penumbra of the concepts of power bases, transformational leadership, Social Exchange Theory, and visionary leadership.

Data Results
The following data for this research paper were acquired through a series of 26 interviews with members of the four Virginia gubernatorial campaigns outlined above (See Appendix III). In presenting results, the respondents will not be directly quoted and the campaigns will be identified by the numbers 1 through 4 to add an element of anonymity to the participants in this research. The data include interviews with both senior staff and lower level staff, as well as interviews with three out of the four campaign managers and three out of four of the candidates in the four election campaigns. The campaign manager, candidate, and other staff members not interviewed were either not accessible, refused to be interviewed, or no longer lived in this area. Presentation of the results is structured according to major subject areas included in my interview schedule.

Information Flow and Structure

The first subject area of questions focused on the respondent’s perceptions regarding the campaign organization. As part of this section respondents were asked to characterize the informational flow or communicational structure of the campaign organization. A common theme throughout each campaign organization was weekly or monthly staff meetings involving the senior staff. Though each campaign had different titles for the senior staff and included different numbers of people in their senior staff, a general common picture of the composition of the senior staff became apparent. In each of the four campaigns respondents emphasized that the candidate, campaign manager, fundraising director, and a press secretary or media consultant were the members of the senior staff. Campaigns two, three, and four also included strategic consultants, media consultants, and polling staff, in their senior staff structure.
It may be important to note one difference emphasized by members of campaign one. Campaign one was unique because this campaign organization also held staff meetings for each department within the campaign organization, giving an opportunity for input from lower level staff into the decision making process. For example, the department head in charge of field coordination, or volunteer mobilization, would have weekly conference calls with field representatives in various areas of the state.

A series of questions also focused on determining if the campaign manager was integral in facilitating communication and the information flow within the campaign organization. The results show that, indeed, the campaign manager was mentioned extensively as both a source of and recipient of information. However, the results also show that respondents in all four campaigns were just as likely to mention either the candidate or the various department heads as their primary sources of information or targets of the messages they sent. Many respondents in campaign one communicated directly with the candidate because the candidate was accessible and because they wanted to bypass the campaign manager. They disagreed with the campaign manager's management style and ideas, and also felt like they were 'left out of the loop' in the decision making process. Campaign three respondents pointed out the importance of the various department heads in the communication flow because they saw the campaign as very loosely organized. There was a lack of strict control from above over how information would travel throughout the organization. Many respondents understood that they had a job, understood the duties of that job, and did that job with little or no supervision. Therefore, it was up to each individual to seek out information that he or she
needed, and the department heads, the only clear hierarchical positions in the campaign, became targets for giving and receiving information.

Respondents were also asked to determine if the information flow was generally accurate, timely, and adequate for them to do their jobs. Overwhelmingly, three out of four of the campaigns characterized their respective information flows as accurate. A common response was that staff members could always accurately back up internal polling results done by the respective campaigns with the media polls published in newspapers. Campaign four respondents, on the other hand, characterized their informational flow as only somewhat accurate and they were highly critical of the poll interpretations of the consultants. They found interpretations of polling results to give a false sense of security on certain issues, leading to inaction by the candidate or campaign on issues that turned out to be imperative for the campaign to address.

With regard to timeliness of messages, by a two-to-one margin most respondents believed the campaign organization to “always” be timely with information versus only “sometimes” timely with information. However, all of the respondents who criticized the timeliness of information in their respective organizations attributed the problem to the inherent nature of campaigns. For example, respondents would state that candidate A would attack candidate B on an issue on Monday morning, and by that afternoon candidate B would need to have his team prepare a defensive response and counterattack.

Every respondent from all of the campaigns stated that the information that the respondent received was always adequate for that person to do his or her job. Furthermore, some respondents commented that if they ever needed more information
they could always approach the candidate or another informational resource for such information.

When asked about the formal hierarchy of the respective campaigns, respondents from each campaign gave similar descriptions with only minor deviations. Respondents from campaigns one and three described a structure with the candidate at the top of the organizational chart followed by the campaign manager and consultants, who oversaw the department heads (See Appendix II). Campaigns two and four only differed in that they placed the campaign manager and consultants at the same level beneath the candidate with all of the department heads (See Appendix II). However, campaigns one and four did both tend to make use of a "kitchen cabinet" comprised of advisers, or close, personal friends of the candidate. These people were not hired by the organization and their role was to give outside advice on broad strategic decisions. According to respondents, the primary reason for the chosen structures was tradition. The senior staff who selected the structure tended to be experienced in political campaigns and had found based on past experience that these respective structures provided the best means of coordination and tended to be associated with winning campaigns.

Perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the structure varied somewhat across the campaign organizations, but there were some overall similarities. All of the campaigns emphasized the importance of autonomy and openness of communication within the formal hierarchy. Generally speaking, respondents considered autonomy to be the willingness of campaign leaders to allow staff members to be self-directed. Senior staff members delegated responsibility to and empowered lower staff members by allowing lower staff members to make decisions on their own, such as how each member would
play a role in implementing the campaign strategy. With regard to open communication, respondents indicated that senior staff members were always willing to take their advice on issues and listen to their concerns. One respondent in campaign three related a story of how that individual almost used an idea by the candidate's driver as an idea for a campaign commercial. Even in campaign one, where respondents felt "out of the loop," some emphasized how the candidate would call individuals directly for advice on certain campaign ideas or to solicit information.

Oddly enough, even among the losing campaigns, the most common answer to the question about structural weaknesses was that "there were none." However, each campaign did have its detractors, and among all of the campaigns the single greatest structural flaw was the lack of cohesiveness or teamwork within the organization. The same autonomy claimed as a strength above was also likely to be claimed as a weakness. It is important to note that each campaign had cohesiveness problems in different areas and for different reasons. Campaign three, the campaign described as loosely organized, tended to encourage workers to act independently of each other, and as a consequence at times they would pursue opposite directions, sometimes to the detriment of the campaign. In a similar, but more narrowly defined situation, campaign number four had difficulties with consultants and their ability to work with the rest of the campaign staff. Respondents from campaign four complained that consultants only paid attention to their poll numbers, focused too much on national trends in politics, and failed to fully understand the character of the Virginia voter.

*General Campaign Characteristics*
The next section of questions focused on isolating common strengths and weaknesses across the four campaigns. The overwhelming response was that the greatest strength of the campaigns was the people involved. The reasons for giving this answer differed widely across the campaigns, but some descriptions were more popular. Respondents thought very highly of the level of enthusiasm of the people involved in all of the campaigns. In campaign one, respondents stated the importance of a highly motivated group of staff members when the campaign hits a slump. This can help the group unite under pressure creating cohesiveness among staff members, another frequently noted positive characteristic of the campaigns. Similarly, campaigns one and three both created an atmosphere void of backbiting. Staff members united behind the candidate, believed in the principles of the candidate, and put aside their petty differences. In campaign one, one respondent explained how the belief in the candidate was so important to volunteers that this individual was able to mobilize volunteers and gain their commitment to the campaign, despite a lack of campaign literature, yard signs, and other rallying points for energy.

Responsibility for creating and maintaining energy, cohesion, and high performance standards among the staff and volunteers was attributed to the candidate in every campaign except campaign three, where respondents failed to identify a source of responsibility. Whether the candidate won or lost, the respective respondents would never fail to tell me a story about how fans, volunteers, and supporters would flock to their respective candidate whenever he or she came to town. Most respondents credited and attributed their candidates with charisma, a contagious vision, and an image of having strong and consistent political and moral principles.
Two positive characteristics were identified by many respondents: Grassroots support for the candidate and ample money to spend on the campaign. Grassroots support was considered important because it allowed respondents to "feel" the energy of the voting public for their candidate and increased their motivation and energy in return. Money increased the confidence of the respondents because the more money the campaign had the more it could spend on television ads, bumper stickers, and yard signs, thereby increasing the visibility of the campaign.

Negative characteristics emphasized by the respondents primarily focused on three areas including the media, field work, and monetary concerns. Campaigns two and four both had many problems with the media attacking their respective candidates. Respondents from both of these campaigns complained that the media in various parts of the state were highly critical of their respective campaigns and candidates, and that the media consultants and press secretary for the campaigns were unable to diffuse these attacks. Campaigns one, three, and four all had some difficulty with field work. Campaign one respondents argued that their campaign manager emphasized media coverage too much at the expense of the grassroots or field effort. Campaign three respondents complained that the candidate neglected parts of the state, alienating certain voting sectors, and lowering the morale of the grassroots effort. Finally, money was a difficulty in campaign one and two, but for different reasons. Almost everyone respondent explained that campaign two could not raise enough money to put the candidate up in hotels when that individual was on the road. This decreased staff morale and hence had a negative effect on the energy level of the staff. Campaign one, on the other hand, had enough money, but respondents tended to believe that the money was mismanaged. As
stated above, many believed the campaign did not spend enough money on field efforts and did not target important voting populations as much as was necessary.

Confidence Level

In general, the respondents of all of the campaigns except number four expressed confidence in the campaign and its potential for success throughout the campaign season. Furthermore, respondents in all four of the campaigns cited polls as a major reason for their confidence or lack thereof. Respondents said that polls showed how much the voting public either identified with a specific candidate or issue, raising campaign staff morale. Respondents also cited the candidate as a major reason for their level of confidence. Returning to an example above, respondents said they saw how crowds reacted to meeting their respective candidates, and how the crowds ‘loved’ or ‘adored’ their particular candidate. The voters’ overwhelming sense of identification with the candidate spread within the organization, so much so that respondents in campaign two even described the campaign atmosphere as a “family” environment with family members building the confidence of other family members.

Respondents stated that the level of cohesiveness did have an effect on the confidence level within the campaign. Respondents from every campaign except number two expressed the negative side of decreased cohesiveness among the staff. Respondents from campaign four cited that the consultants and those advocating the use of television, the media, and polls became pitted against those advocating the use of volunteers and field work as the direction for the campaign. Consequently, two different camps arose with different strategic directions for the campaign, and the ensuing confusion about direction was cited as lowering the morale of the campaign staff. In contrast, respondents from
campaign two described their organization as comprised of a tightly knit group of confident senior campaign officials, finance director, campaign manager, media person, and the candidate. These respondents stated that the senior team served as a role model for the rest of the organization. Hence, other staff members, seeking to identify with these leaders, would internalize and express the positive, consistent confidence of the senior staff.

Respondents from the four campaigns split in their judgement on the effect of money on the confidence level of staff members. Campaigns two and four believed that money had no effect on the confidence level. Many respondents from campaign two redirected my attention to their comments about the level of voter support as the major source of increased confidence within the campaign, because in the end they believed money did not buy votes. Campaigns one and three, on the other hand, believed that the more money spent, the more name and face recognition garnered for the candidate, and the better the chance of getting votes. Respondents from campaign three spoke of the sense of increased faith they felt when they would drive around certain areas of Virginia, and everywhere they looked they saw their candidate’s name or their candidate’s picture.

Campaign Manager’s Role

This set of questions revealed different pictures of the respective roles of the campaign manager within the four campaigns, but also some common similarities among them, as well. The only aspect common to all four campaigns, according to respondents, was that the respective campaign managers were all involved in the coordination or day-to-day work of the campaign in some capacity. For every campaign this meant making sure a press meeting did not occur at the same time as a fundraising event, or that two
different department heads were not duplicating each other’s work. For campaign three it meant making sure that if the press people were supposed to send out a press release in two days, that this in fact did occur. For campaign four it meant administrative tasks such as hiring competent people or making sure that regional offices throughout Virginia were staffed with volunteers.

Respondents in campaigns one, two, and three also indicated that the role of the campaign manager was to oversee how money was spent, and not necessarily to see how it was raised. The manager in campaign two was always concerned about whether too much money had been spent on literature endorsing the candidate, while the campaign manager in campaign three was always worried about where in Virginia the campaign’s money should be spent, Richmond versus Northern Virginia.

Respondents in campaigns two, three, and four also emphasized the role of the candidate in resolving conflicts within the organization. Respondents in campaign three described instances where a fight occurred among staff members over blaming someone for spending too much on literature or ads. Often the manager would step in and take responsibility for the action alleviating the stress of the situation.

Across the campaigns respondents had different images of the overall role of the campaign manager in their organization. Campaign one respondents classified their manager as the person who contacted consultants, aided in crafting messages to be communicated to the voters, and made strategic decisions, such as how ads would be created and how money would be spent. Campaign two and three respondents viewed their manager as involved in both the broader strategic vision for how the election could be won and in the daily activity of checking on people to make sure jobs were
accomplished and not duplicated by five different people. Campaign three respondents state that their manager would be just as likely to nail campaign signs to telephone poles, as to craft the negative ad against the opponent for the next commercial. Finally, respondents in campaign four portrayed their manager as the most administrative manager of all four. These respondents gave all of the credit for direction and strategy of the campaign to the consultants, and viewed the manager as merely implementing their decisions. In other words, the consultants would say we are going to go negative and create three negative television ads, and the manager would make sure that a time would be set up to shoot the ad, that the candidate got involved, and that the necessary staffed showed up to the ad shoot.

With regard to the relationship between the campaign manager and candidate, the results show that within campaigns two and three this relationship was one of mutual faith and trust in each other. Additionally, most of the respondents in these respective campaigns believed that because the candidate and campaign manager had worked together in the past, they were able to develop and maintain this sort of relationship. All of the candidates had run for office before this election with some of the current campaign managers working on those campaigns. Consequently, respondents stated that the relationships between at least some of the campaign managers and candidates resulted from the trust built up during those past elections. Furthermore, this trust served as a model of inspiration for similar relationships among the rest of the staff who sought to identify with the candidate and campaign manager.

Respondents from campaigns one and four viewed their respective candidate-campaign manager relationships as being based on conflict over strategic direction.
Respondents cited that the two leaders would argue about whether to focus on television or newspaper advertisements or whether to focus campaign activities in Richmond or Northern Virginia. The reasons for these relationship problems varied. In one case the candidate was seen as stubborn and unwilling to listen to the campaign manager’s views; in other case the principles of how to win differed between the two leaders thereby resulting in constant and ongoing disputes.

Respondents in the four campaigns also commented on the level of the campaign manager’s involvement in details within the campaign, i.e. the logistics of traveling and the precise timing of scheduled events. Respondents in all of the campaigns split pretty evenly over whether or not they believed their campaign manager was a “micro-manager”. For instance, some respondents in campaign three felt that the campaign manager “looked over their backs” a little too often to see if they were doing their work. However, other respondents in campaign one explained that the manager did a good job in keeping track of how the money was spent, so as to prevent waste within the campaign.

Respondents were also asked to describe the level of involvement of their respective campaign managers in creating the strategic vision of the campaign. Responses indicated that the managers of campaigns one and three were both heavily involved in determining how the organization would win the race. However, respondents in campaigns two and four described the creation of the strategy as a much more team-based effort. A combination of the manager, department heads, consultants, and the candidate determined which voter groups to target and in planning for media advertising.

Though respondents did not describe any sort of internal vision that each campaign manager had for their campaign organizations, campaign managers did have some guiding
principles or objectives for the staff of the organizations. This guiding objective was a broad principle for how the managers thought the campaign organization should be run. Interestingly, all four campaign managers emphasized two simple objectives for their respective staffs to meet in order for the staff to run the internal organization effectively. The first principle was to never be wasteful, always be efficient, and the second, was to understand your responsibilities and job and do it. In other words, if one person was writing a speech for the candidate, then five other people need not be doing the same thing. If you are a part of the press department, your primary focus should be advertising and press releases, not speech writing.

Similar to the questions asked regarding the campaign manager, respondents were also asked about the role of the candidate as a micro-manager. The respondents in campaigns two and three described their candidates as either minimally or appropriately involved in details. For example, in campaign two the candidate would personally sign thank you cards to donors, in a good will effort, to show that the candidate cared about people. In campaign one and four, the candidates were also appropriately involved in such things as preparing for the individual's own debates, but they were also overly involved in other aspects. Campaign one respondents felt that the individual was overly involved in scheduling and believed that he or she always knew best which events to attend and which not to attend.

Respondents felt that the candidate was heavily involved in the strategy of all four of the campaigns. Respondents described campaign one as the brain child of the candidate, who had been planning this race for years. In campaigns one and two the
candidates created or founded the idea of creating their own field or volunteer organization.

Campaign Manager's Experience

Overall, past experience of the campaign manager tended to play a tremendous role in the effectiveness of the campaign organization. All four of the managers had worked on races in the past, and some had managed races before, giving them what respondents saw as valuable learning experiences. For example, respondents in campaign one stated that their manager had a strong will, was resilient, and would not back away from opponent’s attacks. In campaign two, respondents said that the manager could foresee mistakes before they occurred based on past experience, and that the manager also had a second-sense about Virginia politics, having worked in Virginia election campaigns before.

More specifically, the respondents in campaigns three and four felt that the manager’s past experience had no effect on the media coverage or the way the media was handled by the campaign. These respondents felt that the press people and the media consultants deserve much more credit for how the media was handled. In contrast, respondents in the other two campaigns felt that their managers knew the crafty nature of the media and could react well to that nature. For instance, in campaign two the manager was praised for the ability to prevent the candidate from attacking the media because they portrayed the candidate falsely or in a negative manner.

Three of the campaigns had respondents who split in their feelings about the role of the manager in fundraising. Only campaign four had respondents who felt that all of the credit for fundraising should go to the finance director. Similarly, many in the other
campaigns agreed that responsibility for fundraising went to the fundraising director (same position as the finance director), as well. However, many others also believed that if the campaign manager knew donors from past Virginia election campaigns, he or she facilitated fundraising by providing an "in" to tap those resources. Furthermore, the manager in campaign three was praised for national contacts that brought in a lot of money into the state campaign.

The same split in opinions that occurred with respect to opinions about fundraising in the campaigns also was evident with respect to views on the effects of the manager's experience on party support. Many people said the manager helped garner party support, while others said that the manager either had no effect or actually turned off party patrons. The manager in campaign two was often cited as a person whose past service to the party made that individual well known among local party leaders in various areas of the state, aiding the effort to increase the breadth of the campaign's support.

Culture of the Campaign Organization

Loyalty and dedication, followed closely by honesty, were the most popular responses as descriptors of the organizational culture of all four of the campaigns. Respondents from campaign three would often tell me about the long days and hours that they put into the campaign, but they said they never complained because they believed in the candidate. Many respondents from campaign one told me that the openness of the campaign and the effort by at least some senior staff members to listen to lower staff members helped to created a culture of honesty within the organization. Respondents from campaigns two and three also emphasized the degree of focus within the campaign organization. They told me that everyone in the organization worked consistently on
reinforcing the message that the candidate was trying to communicate to the voters. In other words, everyone tried to link everything in their work to the candidate's message.

Furthermore, almost every respondent cited the candidate as responsible for the level of honesty, loyalty, and focus within the organization. When the staff knew that the candidate was out traveling and not coming home for weeks at a time, they identified with the candidate. As a result of this "model" image of the candidate, respondents told me they felt as if they were working directly with the candidate and that the two of them were working together to win the election. This identification with the candidate led respondents to realize that everyone needed to make sacrifices for their organization to be a success.

Level of Grassroots Support

The level of grassroots support was considered high by every respondent in campaigns one, two, and three. Almost all of the respondents also cited the method for accruing such a high grassroots turnout as local networks. Respondents in these three campaigns cited how the senior staff divided the state into volunteer-based precincts and then recruited volunteers to man these field organizations. Respondents cited very strong rapport and communication networks with local politicians as the source for mobilizing the volunteers. Respondents in campaign two talked extensively of the backyard barbecues held in honor of the candidate, the large number of small donations garnered at such events, and the many field events or rallies held.

Responsibility for the success of the grassroots campaigns varied according to campaign. Campaign two emphasized the travel of the candidate and that individual's desire to meet and know people as the cause of the high grassroots support. Campaigns
one and three cited their respective field or organizational directors as responsible for building a network of local political leaders and encouraging them to drum up local volunteerism.

Campaign four was seen as poor in its grassroots effort because respondents believed that it ignored important racial groups in its get-out-the-vote effort. Furthermore, respondents held both the candidate and campaign manager responsible for the lack of grassroots effort. They believed that the decision not to mobilize certain ethnic groups came from the top of the campaign, and therefore they were responsible for the result.

*Messages of the Campaigns*

According to respondents, campaigns one, two, and three ran solely on messages that were very policy oriented or substantive in nature. For example, all four campaigns included education, its importance to Virginia, and what the candidate could do for education within their campaign messages. However, respondents from campaign four added that it also used a more nebulous and less concrete message, the idea that their candidate was the best leader for Virginia.

Most respondents in all four campaigns also placed responsibility for the message in the candidate's hands. They all stated that the message presented to the voters was based upon the principles of the candidate, and that any outside influence on the message was merely for the purpose of packaging an appealing message. For example, the candidate would create the idea of promoting education, but the campaign manager, media consultant, or general consultant would create the slogan used to convey that message to the voters.
There was similar consistency across campaigns with regard to negative advertising that appeared during campaigns. All of the respondents argued, as stated above, that the candidates themselves did not want to go negative. A common belief among the candidates, according to respondents, was that one should run on his or her own record and give people a reason to vote for him or her through that record. However, as most respondents argued, at the end of the election the campaign leaders felt that they were forced to go negative in order to defend their respective candidate against attacks from the opponent, and to counteract the opponent's lies. Respondents in campaigns one and two claimed that they went negative in order to defend against the character attacks on their candidate and to show that their candidate's record on certain substantive issues was better than the opponent's record. Campaign three was the only campaign with respondents who argued that they went negative for the purpose of not only comparing the records of the respective candidates, but also to set the record straight as to the opponent's lies on certain issues. In all of the campaigns, these messages appeared to be secondary to the candidate's principle message (e.g. education) were crafted by media consultants, and based on reactionary and retaliatory actions.

The respondents overwhelmingly agreed with the message of their respective campaigns. Many agreed because they believed in the principles or policy illustrated by the message, but some believed in the message merely because they believed in the candidate. In other words, some conservative respondents would agree with the respective conservative candidate because they believed in a smaller, less intrusive government, while others would agree merely because they identified with and were devoted to that candidate.
Campaign Manager as a Leader

The final two questions asked respondents to identify their respective campaign managers as leaders, managers, both, or neither, and why they believed this. The majority of respondents found their managers to exhibit leadership behaviors, followed by a mixture of both leader and managerial behaviors, followed by solely managerial behaviors. By a small majority respondents in campaign one found their manager to be a poor leader and a poor manager, respondents in campaign two found their manager to be a leader, respondents in campaign three found their manager to be a manager, and respondents in campaign four found their manager to be a combination of both manager and leader.

Those who responded that their manager exhibited managerial behaviors said they felt this way because their manager coordinated the entire campaign and also monitored people to make sure they were doing their jobs. Many respondents said the manager made sure the trains ran on time and that people in the press department were not doing the same job as people in the field department. In fact, respondents from campaign three explained that they believed their campaign manager was a poor manager precisely because that individual did not coordinate various departments and did not gain loyalty from lower staff members. Respondents told me that a lower staff member could tell the manager that he or she had lined up 2,000 volunteers for a rally the next week and the manager would never check to see if this figure was accurate.

Respondents who claimed that their manager exhibited some leadership behaviors cited ethics, respect of lower staff, and inspirational effects as evidence of the leadership of the manager. Respondents in campaign three stressed that their manager embodied the campaign’s culture of honesty and acted consistently in an honest manner, becoming a role
model for other staff members to be honest. Conversely, respondents in campaign three said that their manager was a poor leader because that individual did not provide inspiration for others. That individual cut both senior and lower staff members out of the decision making process, discouraging team decision making, and lowering the morale and energy of the staff. Finally, respondents in campaign two explained that their manager showed good leadership because the staff respected the individual for listening to their views on issues. Respondents told me that even the person who mailed out campaign literature could be heard and would have their ideas taken seriously.

It should be noted, however, that across respondents characterizations of what is leadership and what is management overlapped. For example, some respondents saw conflict resolution as both a leadership and a managerial behavior. Campaign four respondents saw conflict resolution as being managerial in nature because their manager constantly put out “brush fires”, or petty fights among campaign staff. However, campaign one respondents viewed the same issue as leadership because their manager was able to inspire others to cohere on issues by acting as role model and searching for common ground when he or she was involved in a contentious situation. Similarly, one respondent might claim that a campaign manager with a focus on winning or on a consistent campaign message was showing good leadership by communicating a guiding vision and inspiring staff members to follow that vision. Another respondent would call such focus management because the manager constantly monitored them, giving staff members notice if they appeared to be heading off message in their work. Neither of the above characterizations was made by a majority of the respondents, so they should not skew interpretation of the data.
In conclusion, three points seem evident from the results reported above. First, some of the ideas that the respondents saw as positive or negative structural or general characteristics of the campaigns tended to coincide greatly with the characteristics of effectiveness cited in the literature review. Both the results and the literature review emphasize the importance of an open communication structure, empowered lower staff members, and a cohesive team among staff members. A second feature of potential importance is the emphasis or lack thereof of the campaign manager as a focal point in the campaign structure. Respondents mentioned the manager as an important part of the hierarchical and communicational structure of the campaign, but they only mentioned the manager within the context of a team of other people important in these activities. Furthermore, they consistently emphasized the candidate as being responsible for the positive concepts of energy, organizational culture, and message within the campaign, while the campaign manager was seen as responsible for money management, use or control over the media, and relations between the campaign and the field organization. Finally, it may be important to note that when asked to describe the role of the campaign manager the most popular roles cited by respondents were the traditionally administrative tasks of running the day-to-day operation of the campaign and managing the spending of money, with conflict resolution being the only consistent traditional leadership behavior mentioned.

Discussion

The following three-part discussion interprets the results based on the extent to which the campaign manager in political campaigns is best characterized as a leader, manager, or both within those organizations. I will interpret the results based on
predictions made within the first section of this paper, outline the limitations of my study and provide future directions for further study, and suggest a possible framework for understanding the role of the campaign manager as a leader.

The political campaign literature strongly suggests the importance of clear and open communication networks as a necessary condition for productive political campaigns. My research findings not only support this argument, but also add to the substance of why communication is important to a political campaign. The results section illustrated that weekly staff meetings were held in each of the four campaigns, indicating that consistency and frequency in intra-campaign communication is highly valued by members of a political campaign. Respondents spoke of a feeling of cohesiveness or inclusiveness that resulted from such frequent meetings and the ability of lower staff to provide input into the decision making of the campaign. In fact, in campaign one, the campaign in which respondents felt left out of the campaign manager’s decision making, the department heads created their own weekly departmental meetings. Though there is no apparent causal link between the campaign manager’s excessive control of decision making and the departmental meetings, it is clear that staff members value communication, and more importantly, value an upward, as well as downward communication flow.

The political literature also suggests that the campaign manager is integral to creating an atmosphere characterized by closed decision making among elite campaign leaders, or one characterized by open decision making among all campaign staff members. Past national campaigns, such as Bob Dole’s 1996 campaign for President, illustrate that campaign managers who have excessively guarded the decision making process have created attrition among staff members. Although my results show that the manager is
important in the communication network, they fail to show that he or she holds the sole responsibility for the opened versus closed nature of the decision making process. In fact, the formal structures described by respondents often showed that the manager was placed on the same hierarchical level as department heads or consultants, and appeared to serve as an intermediary between the candidate and the lower staff (See Appendix II).

Placing the campaign manager at the same organizational level as other department heads is important because it may provide indications for describing the role of the campaign manager as a leader. Though the campaign manager may still be considered a leader, he or she may be best characterized as a subordinate leader under the candidate or a co-leader among the department heads and consultants. For example, respondents within all four campaigns described the campaign manager as part of a team including consultants and department heads in developing the campaign strategy. This team-based leadership does not preclude the manager from being a visionary leader, or one who communicates a plan for how the organization will reach a desired state, victory. However, scholars may be narrowing their focus too much if they neglect to look at the importance of the press secretary, consultant, candidate, and other senior staff members with regard to the same function.

As illustrated in the discussion above, some national campaigns have had troublesome side effects based on excessive managerial control over information. In this study, campaign one illustrates additional effects of excessive managerial control based on lower staff complaints of feeling left out of the campaign manager's decision making. Therefore, many of these lower staff members bypassed the manager in communications and went directly to the candidate.
With regard to the study of leadership, Social Exchange Theory seems to best explain the effects of staff members bypassing the campaign manager in decision making. In campaign one, respondent answers showed that the manager refused to exchange information, a valuable resource, with the lower staff. As a result, the staff became frustrated with their inability to provide input into the decision making process and refused to share their information with the campaign manager. The staff refused to give their trust, another valuable resource, to the campaign manager. This resulted in both parties ceasing to engage in exchanges of these resources. The staff, seeking another exchange relationship, substituted the candidate-staff exchange relationship for the manager-staff relationship. In essence, the staff entered an in-group relationship with the candidate, while the campaign manager lost influence within the organization as his/her relationship with the staff became an out-group relationship.

According to the political campaign literature, another area of importance for an effective campaign is the organizational hierarchy of a campaign. The literature hypothesizes that it is important for campaign managers to create a working environment where staff members clearly understand that they have specific and designated duties and responsibilities within the campaign. The literature goes on to say that without this clarity and designation of responsibilities staff become confused on how to carry out the campaign's strategy for winning. My results, however, show that this lack of clarity can actually be a double-edged sword. Respondents in all of the campaigns identified the autonomy and self-directed nature of the campaign as both a major strength and weakness of the campaign. As the results show, some of the autonomy and lack of boundaries for staff responsibilities led to such positive effects as obtaining ideas for political commercials
from the candidate's driver. However, at other times this same autonomy encouraged staff members to pursue independent and contradictory directions.

Although the conclusion that autonomy is both a strength and a weakness seems contradictory, this finding is important because it illustrates the need for balance within a campaign. Empowerment and the campaign leaders' use of the ideas of lower staff members are positive aspects of autonomy, while duplication, waste, and contradictory staff objectives are negative aspects. Perhaps what an effective campaign may need is a campaign manager who can use a mix of transactional and transformational behaviors to balance the level of control and autonomy within the campaign. It may be important that the campaign manager transform, inspire, and raise staff members to the level of influential leaders by using their ideas in strategic decisions, such as in generating ideas for campaign commercials. At the same time, as respondents in campaign one pointed out, the campaign manager may also need to exhibit the transactional behavior of punishing staff with less authority or restricted authority when they are wasteful or inefficiently spend money. The effective campaign manager may be the one who can both inspire campaign staff and check up on campaign staff to gain assurance of their completion of duties.

The political literature also strongly emphasizes the need for someone, namely the campaign manager, within the campaign hierarchy to organize and mobilize a large volunteer or field effort. Past literature on national campaigns shows that such a strong field base can make the difference between a winning and losing campaign. My results support the importance of a large field organization because respondents in campaigns one, three, and four argued that the lack of emphasis on field work was a major weakness in their respective campaigns, while respondents in campaign two argued that their
campaign's strong emphasis on grassroots was greatly beneficial to the campaign organization. Respondents said that they felt more energized and confident about their candidate because of the large, adoring crowds that came to meet him or her at rallies.

My results also support the importance of the campaign manager in facilitating a large grassroots effort. Respondents in campaign four blamed both the candidate and campaign manager for not showing concern for important ethnic constituencies around the state, resulting in what they believe to be lower ethnic turnout at election time. The importance of this finding may be twofold. First, campaign managers who face such criticism may need to use visionary leadership to create and communicate a plan for mobilizing a large grassroots effort. Secondly, candidates need to make better use of their referent power and ability to gain the respect and identification of the average voter with themselves or their campaigns. In order to be effective at grassroots mobilization, both parties need to work together to create a vision for how the campaign is going to help the average constituent and use clear and convincing communication skills to persuade those constituents to identify with and "buy into" the vision.

Campaign coalitions with leaders of the state political party represent another area hypothesized as important for an effective campaign. The literature placed responsibility with the campaign manager for the strength of such coalitions. Though my results show campaign ties with the state party to be important to a campaign organization, they also emphasize that such ties should be with the local party chairs within the state because those are the people responsible for mobilizing volunteers. In campaign one, respondents argued that the manager had poor rapport with local party chairs, and as a result the grassroots effort never experienced complete cohesion and full mobilization towards
victory. Some respondents indicated that when local party leaders do not identify with the campaign manager because they view that individual as an outsider to the state, the campaign’s ability to create coalitions dissipates. In other words, managers who are viewed as outsiders by local party chairs are unable to use their referent power and influence tactics such as bargaining or persuasion to form party-campaign coalitions.

The third major grouping of predictions based on the campaign literature fall under the heading of strategic vision. The literature proposes that it is critical for campaigns to create fundraising and spending strategies early on in the campaign so as to have sufficient funds to cover the high costs of political advertising. The results of this study clearly show that money was at the forefront of the minds of many respondents during the campaign. Generally respondents stated that one of the greatest strengths of their respective organizations was the ample campaign funds, which increased their confidence in the advertising ability of the campaign. At the same time, respondents in campaigns one and two both roundly criticized money management as one of the major weaknesses of their campaigns. In these campaigns, mishandled spending was believed to have alienated important voter groups, and decreased staff morale because the candidate did not even have enough money to stay in a hotel when on-the-road.

The campaign literature suggests that the campaign manager should play an important role in the creation of a strategy for fundraising and the spending of campaign funds. According to the results, respondents in campaigns one, two, and three did suggest that one of the campaign manager’s major roles was to be a money manager. However, unlike the suggestions in the campaign literature, respondents believed the campaign manager’s role in relation to monetary matters should be strictly limited to the spending
side of the campaign. This is important because it focuses the role of the campaign manager on administrative and managerial tasks. The managers in these campaigns clearly used their legitimate authority to dispense funds to lower level staff. Respondents described the managers as knowing and deciding where every major campaign expenditure went. In sum, these monetary exchanges between the campaign manager and the staff were transactional exchanges because the manager gave the staff members money in exchange for their compliance on how the money would be spent.

With respect to strategy, the political literature also strongly hypothesizes that the campaign manager plays a role, along with the candidate, in creating a consistent message and strategy for the campaign. Campaigns without such consistency on both issues are portrayed as being 'lost in the woods' and composed of confused staff members. Although my respondents unanimously placed sole responsibility for the campaign message with the candidate, they did observe that it was important for the campaign manager and candidate to be in agreement with regard to strategy. Respondents in campaigns one and four illustrated what happens when such conflict does occur. The campaign manager and candidate disagreed often on campaign strategy and as a result these leaders would procrastinate on decisions, or even worse, the campaign manager and candidate would pursue divergent strategic directions. The staff never knew whether to follow the lead of the campaign manager or the lead of the candidate with regard to strategy, and as a result became confused.

In brief the results suggest that both campaign managers and candidates need to realize when conflicts over strategy arise and take action to better utilize their respective power bases to resolve these conflicts. Focusing on the campaign manager, he/she would
want to use expert power and referent power in order to encourage the candidate to agree with him/her. If the campaign manager has the trust and respect of the candidate, he or she can emphasize this trust or his or her extensive knowledge on the subject in order to coax the candidate into agreement.

The literature on strategy and political campaigns neglected to address this study's query of whether or not it is necessary for a campaign manager to balance his or her strategic focus. By this I mean does the campaign manager need a balance between a higher order strategy for winning the election and an operational strategy for motivating the staff so that they can make winning happen? As illustrated above, the results show that the campaign managers in all four campaigns became heavily involved in the strategy for winning the election; however, none of the campaign managers created an internal, operational vision for how staff members would achieve this broader vision. Instead, respondents discussed two internal principles that all staff were to follow: Be efficient and understand your job and do it. Though these rules seem overly simplistic, respondents felt like these rules provided enough direction for them to do their jobs.

In light of the low value respondents placed on the need for an operational strategy, there may be an explanation for why a balance between the emphasis on higher order and operational strategy was not necessary in the four cases studied in this paper. The four campaigns in this study were all characterized by strong self-directed and autonomous staff. Hence, the staff became empowered leaders themselves, and perhaps they had their own operational strategy for winning. This self-leadership may have negated the need for a campaign manager with a leadership-based, operational strategy for winning. Future research should explore this possibility.
The final major hypothesis extrapolated from the political literature proposed that the campaign manager has a responsibility to make sure that the candidate does not excessively control the strategic direction of the campaign or become a micro-manager. The candidate needs to temper his or her level of involvement because over-involvement in the strategy or details can detract from the amount of attention the candidate can give to meeting the voters and sending a message to them. My results support part of this hypothesis, with respondents agreeing that both the campaign manager and candidate needed to temper their involvement in details. For example, respondents argued that the candidate should have input into the details of debate preparation, but should not be so involved as to personally plan every event that he or she will attend. Likewise, the campaign manager should periodically check up on the completion of assigned tasks, but should not constantly look over staff members’ backs as occurred in campaign three. My results diverge from the literature with regard to strategy, showing that respondents believed that the campaign manager and candidate should both be heavily involved in creating the strategic direction of the campaign. They seemed to agree with Lee Atwater, Bush’s campaign manager, that both organizational members can make strategic calls that can mean the difference between winning or losing the campaign.

The findings in this area of campaign management have two implications for the study of leadership. First, they show that both the campaign manager and candidate need to be empowering and transforming leaders with regard to their involvement in both the strategy and details of the campaign. They need to entrust, empower, and delegate a substantial portion of responsibility for strategy and details to lower staff members, aiding those staff members in becoming self-directed leaders. Secondly, these two leaders within
the campaign need to recognize that through such empowerment, they will be engaging in
a very important social exchange relationship. By giving up the resource of control or
responsibility over certain aspects of the campaign to lower staff members those staff
members become more likely to grant a higher levels of trust to and identification with the
campaign leaders, raising the level of influence and status of those leaders within the
organization.

The first section of this paper isolated eight categorical themes, in addition to the
four already discussed, which I hypothesized to be of importance to an effective campaign.
Of those eight themes, mutual trust and respect among campaign staff, strong grassroots
efforts, the importance of details, and the confidence level of the campaign staff have all
been implicitly discussed above. With regard to the other four themes, my results
supported in some cases and negated in other cases the relative importance of these
notions. My results supported the literature finding that an emphasis on opposition
research, and the ability to control campaign leaks are of minor importance to a campaign
manager and an effective campaign. Respondents in all four campaigns never mentioned
difficulty with campaign leaks nor saw the prevention of such campaign leaks as a major
strength of the campaign or the campaign manager. Additionally, respondents de-
emphasized the importance of negative advertising and opposition research. Respondents
only suggested that these actions were used at the end of the campaign, and only then to
save a losing campaign or to distance their campaign from the opposing campaign.

The value of the experience of the campaign leaders and the energy level of the
campaign were areas that this study might have given greater emphasis. Respondents in
all four campaigns strongly indicated that the past experience of the campaign manager
was invaluable because he or she was able to use that experience to foresee pitfalls that the respective campaigns might face. Furthermore, these individuals appeared more resilient and able to 'roll with the punches' enhancing the stability of the campaign organization.

With regard to energy level, respondents in many of the campaigns named this characteristic as a major strength of their respective campaigns. Energy level was seen by respondents as responsible for a high level of cohesiveness among campaign staff and valuable for aiding the organization during slumps throughout the election. Generally, future studies should place greater emphasis on probing respondents about the importance of campaign leaders' past experience and the overall energy level of the campaign organization.

**Limitations and Future Directions**

A few other limits of this current study and directions for future studies make themselves abundantly clear at this stage of my analysis. First, this study merely asked for descriptions about the formal structure of the respective campaign organizations without probing into the effects of such chosen structures. A study that probes deeper into those effects may glean valuable information about the effect of the formal position of the campaign manager on his or her ability to be an effective leader.

Another finding of this study was that half of the campaign organizations studied used a team leadership structure composed of various department heads, the campaign manager, consultants, and the candidate. Within this structure, this study failed to probe deeper into what respondents in all four campaigns cited as the most popular strength for all four campaigns, the competence of the people involved in the campaign. Future studies on leadership within political campaigns may want to be careful not to focus too narrowly
on one individual within the leadership structure of campaign organizations. Such a narrow focus may neglect to reveal other important and influential actors within the organization, fail to recognize major sources of inspiration within the organization, and fail to describe important leadership relationships among campaign leaders and the effects of such relationships on the campaign organization.

My results on organizational culture also reveal potentially important areas for further analysis. Respondents in all four of the campaigns characterized the culture of their campaign organizations as composed of honesty, dedication, and loyalty. Though respondents indicated that the candidate, as a role model, was responsible for this culture, future studies may want to explore the reliability of this conclusion across various campaign organizations. These studies may find that other campaign organizations see the campaign manager as the source of such culture, especially if he/she communicates an organizational culture through an internal vision for the staff. Additionally, future studies would want to seek how the individual or individuals responsible for the organizational culture communicate this culture and why respondents in some cases internalize it and in other cases fail to do so.

Leadership theory may also have more to add to future studies of campaign leadership. A consistent theme mentioned in respondents’ answers was an emphasis on the role of the campaign manager in preventing conflict, or “back biting,” within the organization, the negative impact of conflict on the organization, and control conflicts between the campaign consultants and campaign managers. Leadership theory and findings from leadership studies on intra-group conflict, influence tactics that promote
conflict, or the role of misperceptions in conflict situations may provide valuable information for campaign managers wishing to prevent or mediate campaign conflicts.

Along similar lines, findings of studies concerned with leadership substitutes and leadership neutralizers may offer important insights into the further study of the campaign manager as a leader. As mentioned earlier, respondents in certain campaigns would talk about bypassing the campaign manager in decision making processes, the self-directed nature of the campaign staff, and the role of the candidate or consultants in undermining the influence of the campaign manager. Perhaps such situations can be better understood when analyzed within the framework of leadership neutralizers and substitutes. For example, the self-directed nature of the campaign staff, their cohesiveness, and their competence may provide substitutes for a campaign manager’s operational strategy. Such characteristics may allow staff members to motivate and provide direction for themselves and each other, with no need for centralized leadership.

A final limitation of this study is its emphasis on only four gubernatorial campaigns, with only a sampling of representatives of those campaigns. Future studies certainly need to extend this study to state legislative races and Congressional races to determine the generalizability of the results of this research. Additionally, the validity of the findings of this study would also be increased if gubernatorial campaigns in other states were studied and if data were collected from a larger sample of campaigns and respondents.

Conclusion

The results of this study draw no definitive conclusion as to the desirability of the campaign manager as solely a manager, or solely a leader. Respondents for each of the
respective campaigns suggest slightly different conclusions about the nature of the campaign manager as a leader, manager, both, or neither. Some respondents saw their respective managers as merely money managers or administrative coordinators of the campaign departments, while others saw them as leaders who resolved conflict, provided a strategy, communicated a vision, and created empowered lower staff. In light of the diverse and varied conclusions drawn by the respondents, the only conclusion I feel confident in drawing is that an effective campaign manager needs to have the ability to be both a leader and a manager. Only further studies can enhance the validity of this conjecture, but my conclusion is that the effective campaign manager is both the individual who ‘makes the trains run on time’ and the individual with a vision for the future and the ability to communicate that vision to others.
Appendix I

I. Describe your role/responsibilities within the campaign organization.
   A. How did you remain informed about what was going on in the organization?
      1. From whom did you usually receive information?
      2. To whom did you give the information you received?
      3. How accurate was the information you received?
      4. How timely was the information you received?
      5. How adequate was the information you received?
      6. Describe the formal channels of communication for the campaign?
      7. What were the reasons for choosing these channels?
      8. What were the strengths of this structure?
      9. What, if any, were the weaknesses of this structure?
   B. What were some positive characteristics of the campaign?
      1. What was your role in the creation and facilitation of such characteristics?
      2. How did these characteristics come about?
      3. Why did you feel positive?
      4. What were some of the negative characteristics of the campaign?
      5. What was your role in the creation and facilitation of such characteristics?
      6. How did these characteristics come about?
      7. Why did you feel negative?
   C. How confident were you that the campaign organization was going to be successful?
      1. Why did you feel confident?
      2. How did this confidence begin?
      3. How did this confidence grow?
      4. How did cohesion among the staff affect the confidence level?
      5. How did monetary donations affect the confidence level?

II. Describe the role of the campaign manager in the campaign.
   A. How would you characterize the relationship between the campaign manager and the candidate?
      1. What explains the reasons for the nature of this relationship?
      2. How did this relationship affect you?
      3. Describe the campaign manager’s level of involvement in details, ie scheduling.
      4. Describe the campaign manager’s level of involvement in the strategic vision of the campaign.
      5. Did the campaign manager have vision for the staff and internal organization of the campaign?
      6. Describe the candidate’s level of involvement in details, ie scheduling.
      7. Describe the candidate’s level of involvement in the strategic vision of the campaign.
B. What role, if any, did the campaign manager's previous campaign experience have on the effectiveness of the organization?
   1. How did this affect you?
   2. How did this affect the media publicity of the campaign?
   3. How did this affect the ability of the campaign to raise funds?
   4. How did this affect the ability of the campaign to garner party support?

III. Describe the culture of the campaign organization.
   A. What assumptions were important in the decision making of the campaign?
      1. What beliefs were important in the decision making of the campaign?
      2. What values were important in the decision making of the campaign?
      3. Who, if anyone, was responsible for creating and facilitating this culture?
      4. How was this culture created?
   
   B. Characterize the level of grassroots support.
      1. How did the campaign gain support from volunteers?
      2. How did the campaign gain support from the party rank and file?
      3. Who coordinated this effort?
   
   C. Describe the message the campaign tried to communicate to voters.
      1. To what extent did it involve negative campaigning?
      2. Why?
      3. To what extent did the message involve positive images?
      4. Why?
      5. How was this message created?
      6. To what extent did you believe in the message?
      7. Why?

IV. From your perspective would you describe the campaign manager in your campaign as a leader, manager, combination, or neither?
   A. Why do you believe this?
Appendix II

Campaign One

Campaign Two
Campaign Three

Campaign Four
Appendix III

Interviews


Bowman, B. Deputy Director of the Joint Campaign, Mary Sue Terry’s Gubernatorial Campaign. March 18, 1998.


Britton, K. Executive Secretary, Mary Sue Terry’s Gubernatorial Campaign March 25, 1998.


Jolly, A. Assistant to the Financial Director, Don Beyer’s Gubernatorial Campaign. March 26, 1998.


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