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An Analysis of the Impact of Foreign Education on Leadership

Mary Robinson, Benazir Bhutto, and Shimon Peres

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I pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance during the completion of this work.
Introduction

The world today, going into the twenty-first century is much "smaller" than the world in 1900. Most scholars, business leaders, and politicians would agree that we are all part of an increasingly global community. The fax machine, telephone, and Internet allow for instantaneous communication with people around the world. In addition, most professionals are forced to come into contact with members of other cultures, whether it be for academic research or commerce (Kauffman 1). This study arises out of the question, what implications does globalization have for leaders, and how are leaders affected by extended experiences, such as study abroad, in which they are exposed to another culture?

Researchers such as Piaget believe that a change in one's environment allows people to perceive the world in a more complex manner. As individuals have new experiences which do not mesh with their traditional framework for understanding the world, they must modify their world view (Kauffman 124). Study abroad contributes to this change because students are exposed to a new situation, and students are forced create a new social network different from their established circles of family and friends. In addition, exposure to a new culture may lead students to new ways of interpreting their own culture since foreign travel provides individuals with a "unique opportunity to compare firsthand various forms of government, systems of education, values and lifestyles" (Kauffman 69). This may lead to a critical examination of one's own cultural assumptions, and could result in the incorporation of some of the host country's cultural practices into one's own belief system.

The goal of this research is to determine whether extended study abroad and exposure to a foreign culture has any impact on leadership. Specifically, the study is meant to investigate the possibility of "bridge leaders," or leaders capable of integrating two discrete cultures and value
systems into a new type of leadership. I hope to explore whether extended exposure (at least one year) to another culture and another socio-political context has an effect on a leader's political and moral choices. In her book on global organizations, Nancy Adler speaks of reaching "cultural synergy" in a multi-cultural situation. "Cultural synergy" would be an approach which reflects the best aspects of all participant cultures without severely violating the cultural norms of any one of these individual cultures (Adler 1997 108). From this concept comes the idea of a "bridge leader," who could create synergy by selecting aspects from both his native culture and the culture in which he studied in order to find a unique leadership style effective in the country's context. Or, one of these individuals could, perhaps, learn "bad values" from the country of study and become an ineffective or morally corrupt leader.

In conjunction with the possibility of such "bridge leaders," the question of whether or not foreign education provides the means for arriving at culturally creative solutions to problems needs to be addressed. Does exposure to another culture expand one's value options? Or is the effect of studying at a foreign educational institution minimal? Do leaders who have been abroad have greater insight in solving ethnic conflicts? Or does time in another country simply make an individual more nationalistic and devoted to his own cultural practices? Although this paper does not have the opportunity to explore all of these questions in depth, it does look at the careers of three international leaders who studied abroad in order to explore the possibility that their experiences overseas affected decisions they made and political stances they took once they attained leadership roles in their home countries.

The three political leaders examined in this paper each attended Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, although their time at Harvard ranges from four months to four years. Mary Robinson, who attended Harvard Law School, was president of the Republic of
Ireland; Benazir Bhutto, who graduated from Radcliffe College, was prime minister of Pakistan, and Shimon Peres, who attended the Advanced Management Program of Harvard Business School, was prime minister of Israel. While these cases barely scratch the surface of the questions, a comparison of the three lives may grant some insight, not only into the influences affecting the leadership of these individuals, but also into further questions regarding the impact of foreign education on leadership and the connection between leadership, culture, family background, and education.

**Literature Review**

In recent decades, education has increasingly been viewed as a tool for increasing awareness and understanding of the "other" as well as for international development. R. Freeman Butts states in 1963 that the "whole program of technical assistance itself is in essence a matter of deliberate education in social change and every such program of social change involves the ideas, beliefs, customs, and education of the people involved, both senders and receivers" (Butts 43). Despite this view, however, there are relatively few models in existence for cross-cultural leadership, and for the effect of education on both the quality and effectiveness of such leadership.

Geert Hofstede’s study on the international relevance of American management theories is one of most often-cited models for cross-cultural leadership, perhaps because it is one of the few existing studies of any significance. Hofstede examines four variables: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individuality vs. collectivism, and masculinity vs. femininity (Hofstede 46). He then plots where different countries fall for each of these characteristics. Hofstede’s study, while it provides a basic foundation for understanding essential differences between
various nations’ views on leadership, does not provide any real insight into the effect of cross-cultural education on leadership. Rather, Hofstede’s focus is on the effectiveness of American management and motivation theories in other countries, given these culturally different perceptions of effective leadership. His study does, however, give a framework for comparing and contrasting the stereotypical “cultural norms” for leadership within Ireland, Pakistan, and Israel, since each of these countries was included in Hofstede’s study (See Appendix 1).

A more recent model for the effect of cross-cultural education presented by Norman Kauffmann et al proposes a theoretical framework for studying the effect of study abroad on students. They view education as change, and as a growth process which leads to a “complex evolving process of balancing and rebalancing, of assimilating (interpreting new experiences in terms of current or previous structures of knowing) and accommodating (modifying existing ways of looking at the world to incorporate new knowledge or experience)” (Kauffmann 3). Kauffmann’s research model includes six variables—autonomy, belonging, values, cognition/vocation, and worldview— which mediate the interaction between an individual and the environment (Kauffman 127). (See Appendix 2)

The model represents a “pattern of development from adolescence to adulthood” (Kauffmann 127), paying attention to both the cognitive and noncognitive aspects of personality. According to the model, students move from Level I, in which they view the world in absolutist terms, relying on conventional values inherited from their families, to Level II, in which they begin to question their assumptions and look at the world in more relativistic manner. Level III, which most people do not reach until mid-life, represents a stage where “trust is centered in the meeting of self and other, and in recognizing the strength in each” (Kauffmann 129). According to the authors, studying abroad helps students gain a greater sense of autonomy and also
increases student’s tolerance and acceptance of other peoples’ cultures and belief systems. A foreign experience, therefore, helps students become more assured of their own beliefs in relation to those of others and improves an individual’s sense of autonomy. The level of development depends, however, on the student’s degree of autonomy before they study abroad as well as on the degree of intensity and interaction while overseas.

Kauffmann states that empirical research does not adequately measure the changes incurred by students during a study abroad experience. He argues that when students are immersed in a foreign culture they cannot separate the personal from the academic. He states that “involvement in the new culture draws the students in, and it leads them to a way of knowing that changes how they think and behave” (Kauffmann 143). This type of learning intertwines the personal and the academic, resulting in a transformation which remains “hidden to researchers using standardized instruments” (Kauffmann 143) to test the students’ development. According to Kauffmann, “study abroad represents a new way of knowing... the changes experienced by students who study abroad have eluded simple interpretation” (Kauffmann 144). The authors continue on to say that “study abroad challenges educators and researchers to discover new ways to explain and measure the process of change that is the essence of education” (Kauffmann 145). In other words, studying abroad profoundly affects individuals, albeit in different ways depending on the student’s level of maturity and the degree of immersion of their study abroad experience. Precisely because foreign education affects one’s personal and cognitive development, it is an extremely personal experience which affects each individual differently. As a result, one cannot say with great assurance what effect studying abroad would have on an individual’s leadership until one investigated that individual’s
developmental stage before their foreign experience, and then analyzed the intensity of their time in the host country.

Although F.G. Bailey does not comment directly on study abroad, he does write about leaders' ability to choose between a variety of value systems when deciding how best to lead. While study abroad is not the only way to gain exposure to other sets of cultural mores, it is one means of doing so. Bailey's thesis is that "leadership is the art of exploiting cultures" (Bailey 46). By this, the author means that leaders have the ability to choose values and cultural practices from among a variety of cultures, his or her options being limited only by the number of cultures to which he or she has been exposed. According to this perspective, culture is not king, for "leaders make use of existing values, either in a straightforward way or in more devious ways, to recruit and control followers" (Bailey 58). Bailey's model of cross-cultural leadership, therefore, is one in which leaders pick and choose the aspects of various value systems which they would like to adopt, and discard the rest. As a result, moral codes lose their original form, and instead become warped according to the goals and desires of the leaders.

Hofstede, Kauffmann, and Bailey present three completely different approaches to the effect that exposure to a foreign culture has on leadership. Hofstede's model outlines the possible modifications in behavior a leader might have to adopt when entering another country. It does not call for any change in the leader's value system, or a change in the leader's worldview, it merely calls for an understanding of the other country's cultural norms according to Hofstede's four variables, which may lead to a change in tactics on the part of the leaders. Kauffmann's model is much less objective and concrete. He describes the study abroad process as a learning experience in which an individual undergoes both personal and cognitive development, which are so intertwined that it is difficult to measure the change which has
occurred within the individual. Kauffmann states that the individual who has studied abroad begins to see and interact with the world in a different way. Bailey’s approach is different still, positing that leaders use their access to different cultural models for their own purposes of exploiting their followers. Unlike Kauffmann’s students, Bailey’s leaders do not necessarily use their exposure to foreign value systems as an opportunity for personal and cognitive development.

Methodology

This research seeks to find answers to the questions: Does education in another country have an impact on individual leadership? How does exposure to a foreign culture affect a leader’s decision-making and moral choices? Do leaders educated abroad assume some of the cultural practices of the country of education, or do they respond to situations and issues the same way as others of their country? Do leaders with exposure to multiple cultures have the ability to see multiple sides to issues when problem-solving? Because these questions are looking for possible causal relationships, deal with contemporary subjects, and because the leaders’ individual behavior is impossible to control for, the research lends itself best to the case study approach (Yin 16). In addition, since the subject of this paper revolves around personal development and possible value-shifts, quantitative analysis would be difficult to conduct.

According to Robert Yin, “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin 23). This project examines leaders holding a major political office within the last 10 years and studies whether their educational experience at Harvard seems to have any effect on
the decisions they make and on the morals they espouse. These individuals, therefore, are each studied within the context of their own country, where their education is merely one variable interacting with others such as world affairs, political system, family legacy, class system, social movements, and role restrictions. Further, it utilizes several different sources of evidence, including biographies, newspaper articles, journal articles, and archival documents.

Yin cautions that for multiple case studies, each case should be selected in such a way that it either predicts similarities to the other cases or is expected to provide contrary results for a predictable reason (Yin 53). I chose to study three individuals who have all studied at Harvard, rather than at another foreign institution, in order to control for the culture and school to which the leaders were exposed. Additionally, they are all leaders from countries which experience ongoing historic religious or ethnic conflicts. Traditional research methods were used to select and analyze the documents, which come from a wide range of sources, including speeches, school archives, popular magazines, and scholarly works. Each source was examined with the conscious realization that each document was written to a specific audience and for a specific purpose (Yin 87).

Once data was collected, each case was organized in sections including personal background, political career, and performance in their highest political office. Then, each case was studied and analyzed separate from the others in order to see if foreign education seemed to have an impact on that individual’s leadership in relation to the other variables affecting their life and their country. Specifically, the cases investigate how the leaders dealt with key issues which might give insight into the leader’s degree of openness to difference, skill at creative problem-solving, level of initiative, and depth of global understanding. Afterwards, the results of the cases were compared to see if there were any similarities, any trends for further study, or any
notable differences. In addition, the models presented by Hofstede, Kauffmann, and Bailey were used as possible frameworks for gaining insight into the cases. The purpose of the paper is, however exploratory, to investigate what, if any, impact foreign education has on leadership. Much more must be researched however, including leaders from different schools, different countries, and different contexts before one can make any definitive conclusions. If anything, the findings of this paper should be used to raise additional questions regarding the impact of study abroad on leadership and to lead to further investigation and definition of a "bridge leader." For this purpose, the data from the cases was also used to comment on the relevance of the three models presented in the literature and to raise questions for further research.

MARY ROBINSON

Introduction/Overview

Although Independent, Mary Robinson was nominated by the Irish Labour Party as a candidate for the 1990 presidential election. The Labour Party did not want Fianna Fail to have the presidency again, and Mary Robinson fit all the necessary criteria: she was young, fit, compassionate, and always sided with the underdog (O'Sullivan 176). A humanitarian idealist, the odds against Mary Robinson winning the presidency were 100:1 (Liswood 32). A key factor in her electoral victory was the hard work of her campaign, in which she traveled around the country, visiting community organizations and talking with the general public. The journey had a profound effect on her leadership, as well, since Robinson claimed that "not since her Harvard days had anything like it touched her life so completely" (O'Sullivan 182). Despite her efforts to reach out to the voting public and her twenty years of experience as a Senator, Mary Robinson won by a margin of merely 86,557 votes (McQuillan 7).
The position of Irish president is non-executive, and therefore has little real power outside of the ability to intervene if proposed legislation is unconstitutional (Time 62). In fact, she cannot give a speech or leave the country without permission from the prime minister (Liswood 33). Despite her limited formal power, Mary Robinson created a position for herself, with more than 800 engagements, 700 speeches, and 5 foreign visits within her first year. In addition, Robinson began the policy of visiting all the counties in Ireland each year in order to maintain a connection to the issues facing the Irish people. On these visits the president stressed the importance of local and regional communities, encouraged people to express their own creativity, identity and heritage, and advocated self-development through grassroots movements (McQuillan 19). She created an office that is highly visible, not only by opening the presidential mansion to any group (including marginalized groups like homosexuals and the unemployed) wanting to come (Time 62), but also by leaving a light on as a signal to Irish people abroad that they have a tie to their homeland (Liswood 31).

Mary Robinson is a highly intelligent individual, and as such, she was determined to achieve something with her presidency (Howell 245). Although as president she is constitutionally forbidden to speak directly on political issues (Howell 244), Robinson outlined specific goals which would characterize her term as head of state. One of these objectives was the desire to represent those of Irish descent living outside of the Emerald Isle and has suggested the use of the Internet for Irish around the world to keep in touch with each other and their Irish heritage (Knight 1). Connected to this goal, the president hoped to deepen her own knowledge of the Irish language and cultures while also promoting local community development projects in the hopes that others would follow her example. On a larger scale, Robinson was concerned with extending friendships, with no strings attached, to both communities in Northern Ireland.
She also demonstrated concern for the international protection of human rights, making visits to famine-stricken Somalia and pleading on their behalf before the United Nations (Carroll 1).

**Personal Background**

Mary Robinson comes from a distinguished, conservative, prosperous, professional family. Growing up in Western Ireland, Mary Robinson (née Bourke), saw little of the poverty experienced by her neighbors (O’Sullivan 14). She attended Miss Claire Ruddy’s private preparatory school in Ballina, until age 10, when she left for boarding school in Dublin under the care of nuns of the Society of the Sacred Heart (O’Sullivan 19). In 1961 Mary Robinson attended a Paris finishing school where she gained fluency in French, as well as an appreciation for French culture, before enrolling at Trinity College, Dublin. Trinity College was conservative by European standards, and had not experienced the student revolts of American and other European universities. While in college, Robinson was described as a “bluestocking,” who was opposed to any organizations that sounded like they might be liberal or progressive (O’Sullivan 26).

It was not until she arrived at Harvard University Law School in 1967 on a scholarship that any sign is seen of the liberal advocate of international human rights, women’s equality, and social justice. Harvard was in the middle of a student revolution, with a student body intensely involved in public affairs. The university was facing up to the inequalities of sex and race at a Duffy when all of the United States was beginning to question its social values. Law students were especially concerned with their social responsibility in regard to community problems, and the moral basis of the laws they studied. They questioned authority, institutions, and competitive systems (Dean’s Statement 3).
For Robinson, Harvard was a "seismic learning experience," an environment of intense questioning that encouraged her to think for the first time. The teaching method at Harvard was different than that of Trinity College. At Harvard, professors emphasized discussion, and forced students to examine the unresolved ambiguities of the law (Duffy 64). The Law School Handbook for 1967-68 emphasized the school's case method approach and the professor's use of the Socratic method to draw answers out of the students (Handbook 15). Professors at Harvard Law School were not in the business of telling students what was and what was not correct. Rather, students were responsible for thinking, and professors asked questions intended to trouble students (Handbook 20). The purpose of class was not to make students memorize the law, but rather to "analyze a complex of facts that is a description of relationships of members within society" (Handbook 10).

Robinson often acknowledges a debt to Harvard, stating that the young people there were more prepared to accept responsibility and seek involvement after graduation. One of the central missions of the Law School, clearly stated in its handbook, was the lawyer's obligation for public service, whether in private practice or public service (Handbook 7). The handbook also mentions the lawyers "role as an advocate" (Handbook 77) and the role of "guardian of due process and the integrity of the government process" (Handbook 84). Several other key objectives outlined in the handbook included the importance of striving for equality before the law (Handbook 85), the need to represent causes that may be unpopular (Handbook 87), and the role of the lawyer in legal reform (Handbook 88). Most importantly, perhaps, Harvard Law School hoped to train the type of lawyer who would remain "free to make up his own mind how he will vote, what causes he will support, what economic and political philosophy he will espouse" (Handbook 89). After an intense year of study, Robinson began to apply what she had
seen at Harvard to the situation in Ireland. She returned home “transformed” by her experience in the United States, a “bluestocking” converted to liberalism who was determined to use the law to improve society (O’Sullivan 31).

**Legislative Background**

The political life of Mary Robinson began long before the 1990 presidential election, however. Her true legislative impact occurred during her 20 years in the Senate (Duffy 64), when she distinguished herself as an independent thinker and as a vocal advocate for the oppressed. When Mary Robinson (Mary Bourke at the time) was elected in 1969, she was one of five women in the Senate (O’Sullivan 41). People were attracted by her energy and vigor, and Robinson, elected on an independent platform, was consistently re-elected to the Trinity seat. From the outset, Robinson was critical of the Senate for failing to exert any real influence on the political life of Ireland, and she worked to change it by bringing issues of social welfare to the Senate floor.

Within six months of her first election, Robinson was unpopular with the Roman Catholic hierarchy, the middle-class, and the conservatives. She had a fundamental belief in the rights of the individual, which enabled her to see beyond the usual class distinctions (McQuillan 73). She was also able to see beyond religious lines as evidenced by her December 1970 marriage to Nicholas Robinson, a Protestant (O’Sullivan 49) and her argument for a secular, rather than a Catholic constitution in order to better reflect Ireland’s pluralism (O’Sullivan 73). Throughout her career she scrutinized legislation, spoke out on minority issues, advocate needed reforms, and drew attention to injustices (O’Sullivan 113). At times her advocacy for the disadvantaged resulted in her suspension from the Senate; once for protesting a case of gender
discrimination in the workplace and once when prisoners were placed in military custody (O'Sullivan 121).

In 1977 Mary Robinson joined the Labour Party out of a desire to change the structures of wealth and power and form a more socialist, democratic society founded on principles of equality (O'Sullivan 95). The independent-minded senator left the party in 1985, however, due to her disapproval of the Anglo-Irish agreement, which she perceived as an imposed framework since the Unionist parties were not involved in the negotiations (O’Sullivan 152).

One of Robinson’s passions was to be an advocate for women’s issues, although she claimed to be against the “extremist” American feminist movement which challenged the social order (O’Sullivan 42). Contraception was one of the main issues she worked to address. The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1935 prohibited the import of contraceptives for sale, although Doctors could prescribe “cycle regulators” for their patients, and thousands of women were taking the pill for “medical reasons” (O’Sullivan 53).

Despite national sentiment supporting legalized contraception, however, when Robinson presented the first Contraception Bill to the Dail (Spillane 3), she could not even get a first reading. In 1973 she created a modified version of the bill which moved contraception from being an issue of criminal law to one of welfare (O’Sullivan 61). This bill was read, and even made it to the second stage, but it, too was defeated. Mary Robinson refused to accept defeat, however. She reminded the House in 1977 that contraceptives remained banned, and in 1978 she introduced a Family Planning Bill which was later blocked (O’Sullivan 122). After deciding not to run for reelection in 1989, Mary Robinson joined the Law Library and became one of a handful of practicing female barristers in Ireland (O’Sullivan 170). She fought in Irish and European Courts for the reform of laws which restrict the availability of information regarding
abortion, that make homosexual acts guilty of life imprisonment, and that label children born out of wedlock “illegitimate” ("Presidential Lies" 59).

**Presidency**

Robinson, as president, engaged with communities all over Ireland, emphasizing overlapping concerns and aspirations that described the general human experience more than national, religious, or socioeconomic differences. Three areas in which Robinson demonstrated particularly influential leadership are women’s rights, the Northern Ireland issue, and international human rights.

**Women’s Rights**

Mary Robinson’s election was seen as a “seismic paradigm shift” in a country whose constitution defines women’s position in society in relation to the home (Spillane 2). Once elected president, Robinson continued her social advocacy and used her position as a platform for endorsing and validating women’s groups all over Ireland (McQuillan 41). Known for her often liberal views, Robinson “has gone out of her way to embrace traditional women’s groups as well as feminists, clearly conscious that she can play her role as a national symbol only if she avoids alienating more conservative members of society” (Phillips 46). She invited women, Protestant and Catholic, from Belfast to come tell their stories from Northern Ireland with women in the Republic of Ireland. She offered the women the resources of her office to help them establish a network of women’s groups and to put them in touch with groups throughout Europe (McCafferty 19).
When asked whether she saw herself as a role model for other women, Robinson answered that she was "very pleased that I seem to be giving a boost and a support to women in sort of every walk of life, and I mean not only what might be characterized as more traditional rural women, even older traditional rural women, but also young feminists, and women of all backgrounds" (Carroll 16). She was, indeed, successful at using her role as the first female president to advocate women's issues. In fact, she was successful that all four candidates running in the presidential elections in October, 1997 were women (Bogert 45).

Robinson credited Irish women for her electoral victory, and in her victory speech she thanked all the women "who instead of rocking the cradle rocked the system" with their vote (Spillane 12). While a legislator and practicing lawyer, Robinson developed the legal underpinnings for divorce and abortion-rights reform, although she personally does not believe in abortion. In 1996, during her presidency, Ireland held a referendum which legalized divorce. Although abortion has still not been legalized, reforms have allowed the display of information showing how to go to Britain for the procedure (Spillane 13).

Northern Ireland

Robinson's approach to the Northern Ireland situation is another critical example of her ability to bridge cultures and identities. More recently, Robinson became the first Irish president to make Northern Ireland a primary concern, and was the first welcome Protestants and Catholics from Belfast to the presidential mansion. In 1992 she met with women's groups in Belfast, and in 1993 the president caused a furor by shaking hands with Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein (McQuillan 51). At the time, Adam's was not only denied a U.S. visa, but was also
banned from British television (Spillane 15). The gesture’s intent, however, was not to stir controversy, but rather to ease “the isolation of Catholic-dominated West Belfast” (Knight 24).

Robinson’s “path to inclusionary politics has often been at some distance from the main road” (Spillane 14). Yet her handshake with Gerry Adams led to imitation, by then-Prime Minister Albert Reynolds and by Bill Clinton (Spillane 15). She has worked to create opportunities for dialogue among various community and women’s groups in Northern Ireland, and has invited mixed groups of Catholics, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Anglicans to Dublin in order to promote positive press regarding Northern Ireland. In addition, the president was the first to make an official visit to Northern Ireland, and has actually visited four times. Those visits have included laying flowers on the monument to 11 victims killed by an Irish Republican Army bomb blast in 1987, an open rebuke of the IRA, which many Irish politicians have hesitated to condemn (Phillips 47). On the home front, Robinson worked to prevent the Dublin government from institutionalizing its position in the North. By maintaining distance, Robinson feels the Republic of Ireland can better free the parties within Northern Ireland to arrive at a mutually acceptable form of government (O’Sullivan 155).

*International Human Rights*

Robinson’s presidency was marked by her attention to international human rights issues, particularly the famine in Somalia. She broke all precedent by being the first head of state to visit Somalia and refugee camps in Kenya in 1992 and then argued on the victim’s behalf in front of the United Nations General Assembly (Carroll 14). While in the country, Robinson hand-fed starving children, and she accused the United Nations and the European Community of “‘offending justice by acting slowly in aiding the devastated people of Somalia’” (Phillips 46).
Robinson’s plea in front of the United Nations sparked the organization “for the first time in its history to intervene in a member nations internal affairs for humanitarian reasons” (Spillane 15).

Robinson’s compassion for developing countries was not isolated to Somalia. In 1994 Robinson visited the enormous refugee settlements in Tanzania and Zaire resulting from the Rwandan civil war (Spillane 15). In her current position as United Nations high commissioner for human rights, Robinson has spoken with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Congolese President Laurent Kabila about their respective countries’ abuse of human rights (Bogert 45). When discussing her compassion for the African famine victims or her understanding of developing countries, Robinson shared that “[w]e have a folk memory of famine in Ireland. We were never a colonizing country. We were for a long period of our history a colony, and so we have that remembered history. We have a very strong folk memory of the potato famine in Ireland in the 1840s” (Carroll 14). In addition, she emphasized that “by my history, I’m from the south [the politically correct term for poor countries]. That does mean I have a broader perspective” (Bogert 45).

Analysis

As president, Mary Robinson “took a dull, ceremonial job and used it as a soapbox to advocate civil rights” (Bogert 45). Her leadership in the areas women’s issues, the situation in Northern Ireland, and international human rights demonstrate her ability to “defy convention, create precedents and think for herself” (Knight 24). The president was described as “liberal and feminist in Irish terms” (Knight 24), which implies that the president takes the context of the country and her followers into consideration when acting out her beliefs. In fact, Robinson has been hailed for engaging with many communities across Ireland, working to touch common
hopes and concerns in order to create a broader bond of humanity that transcends ideological and geographical boundaries (Spillane 15).

Robinson’s approach to international human rights demonstrates her desire to work in the global arena while maintaining an Irish identity. Robinson sought to bridge the difference between Ireland and developing countries in Africa by capitalizing on the history of the Irish potato famine, as well as Ireland’s own colonial history under Great Britain. Although Robinson recognized the difficulties of developing nations, and worked to draw attention to the plight of the suffering in China or the Congo.

Although merely a figurehead in the role of the president (Knight 24), Robinson “embodie[d] a new pride in being Irish—and [broke] the old nationalist mould in which Irish politics have long been set.” Rather than engaging in the political scandal which previously characterized Irish government, Robinson engaged in fighting for controversial social issues. Perhaps this is why she has been perceived as practicing a “special brand of moral leadership” (Phillips 47). Robinson has also been described as one “willing to defy expectations” and one who “turned an irrelevant, constitutional necessity into a vibrant and exciting institution that plays to the strengths of a modern Ireland (Ryan 22).

A quick look at the accomplishments of Mary Robinson explains from where the praise originates. Active both at home and in the international arena, Robinson’s popularity in Ireland stood at 93% in 1995. Not only did she make over 63 official and state visits during her tenure in office, but, closer to home, she also ventured to Belfast where she shook hands with Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams. In addition, Robinson highlighted human rights issues abroad, as in Somalia, and in Ireland, with groups including the homosexuals, unwed mothers, and the impoverished. Robinson also speaks in interviews of a “new global ethic” in which “divisions
on moral issues such as divorce mark differences as much as views on society or the economy....[and] which values community endeavor more than statist bureaucracy” (Ryan 21).

It is difficult to determine how much, if any, Mary Robinson’s year at Harvard Law School influenced her leadership, whether in the Irish legislature, court systems, or presidency. She did definitely exert her independence and her desire to be a free-thinker while in the legislature, maintaining Independent status for the majority of her career, and separating from the Labour Party when she disagreed with their stance on certain issues. This independence, questioning of policy, and hesitancy to accept any dictated platform could possibly stem from her experience at Harvard, since the classroom was characterized by the Socratic method and an atmosphere of debate and distrust of institutional dictates. Likewise, it could simply be a genetic trait, or a habit of self-preservation she developed from being the single girl in a household full of boys.

Robinson’s activism and concern for the oppressed could also very well stem from her year in the United States, since Harvard in 1968 was intensely involved in the civil rights movement, the feminist movement, and the anti-war protest. The student body was active in demonstrations, rallies, and in the formation of committees to promote community involvement and service to the city of Boston. The Law School sought to ingrain in their students a sense of moral responsibility and an obligation to serve society through their skills. Trinity College in Dublin did not have this same type of educational philosophy, so for the middle-class, sheltered Robinson, Harvard represented an entirely new perspective on the world.

Robinson’s leadership was characterized by a willingness to listen to and accept varying points of view on controversial issues. Despite her own personal opposition for abortion, for example, Robinson fought to loosen the restrictions on the availability of information regarding
the procedure. In addition, she worked to support a wide range of women’s groups, from traditional, stay-at-home mothers, to radical feminist liberation organizations in the hope that she would not alienate any women, but rather validate the diverse roles women played in Irish society. Robinson also sought out diverse views on the Northern Ireland issue, and invited individuals of all religions to Ireland to share their perspectives both with citizens of the Republic of Ireland, and to share their views with others from Northern Ireland in a non-confrontational surrounding.

While there is nothing concrete to point to in Mary Robinson’s leadership to say definitively whether or not she was a “bridge leader,” Robinson does demonstrate a leadership characterized by openness and acceptance to difference. Her willingness to hear differing perspectives does not imply that she does not have her own moral standards; rather, Robinson has high moral standards, especially in regards to human rights, but she is willing to listen to and process other people’s opinions on issues before she takes action. Likewise, she seeks to work with collaborative groups and to encourage community grass-roots organizations to give more people the opportunity to express their own views and opinions. Robinson is not an extreme relativist, nor is she by any means an absolutist when it comes to cultural or moral issues. Rather, Robinson seeks a balance between her own personal moral code, and the ethic of Ireland, the European Community, and the larger international community. In this regard, Robinson is a bridge leader.
BENAZIR BHUTTO

Personal Background

Benazir “Pinkie” Bhutto was born June 21, 1953 into a wealthy, upper-class family which had been politically active for generations. While her rosy skin gave her the name “Pinkie” (Chitkara 21), a long family history as large landholders (Bhutto 38), and a long history in politics, stood behind the name Bhutto. The Bhutto family is to Pakistan what the Kennedy family is to the United States, and the young Benazir was “raised in a Karachi mansion by a British nanny, dressed in clothes from Saks” (“Benazir; face-to-face” 59). From the time of her birth, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made a deliberate attempt to groom Benazir for political leadership, and sought to give her a sense of her nation’s history. As children, Benazir and her siblings were exposed to high-level diplomatic meetings, since Zulfikar often brought them to meet foreign delegations visiting Pakistan (Bhutto 49). At the same time, however, Z.A. Bhutto wanted his daughter to have a Western education (Shafqat 1996 657). Benazir and her brother went to Catholic boarding school at an early age, and at age 16 she was accepted to Radcliffe College (Bhutto 42).

Benazir Bhutto arrived at Harvard in 1969 as a “pampered daughter of privilege.” Up to that time she “had never cooked a meal, washed a blouse, walked more than a block without being picked up by a chauffeur, or lifted a ringing telephone” (“Benazir; face-to-face” 59). She was shocked by coed bathrooms, smoking, and the informal nature of students in the classroom. She was very active in a wide variety of activities, hung out with the football and soccer players, but lived in Eliot House, known for its aristocratic ambiance. According to the senior tutor at Eliot House, “Bhutto threw herself enthusiastically into this bubbling mixture of backgrounds and social change, cultivating a democratic style and never putting on airs” (Starr 418).
Bhutto exhibited an interest in the United States and its regional differences, and even traveled to Mississippi over one spring break. Although she fit in with her college classmates, friends say she “always had a special way of combining her heritage and the West” (Starr 456). One classmate recalled that Bhutto did “not have a lover—her friends [understood] that for an upper-class Muslim woman that is out of the question—but she hangs out with a boisterous crowd of baseball jocks and teases them in the dining hall about their love lives” (“Benazir; face-to-face” 60). Another remembered “Pinkie—playing squash in sweatpants so as to observe Islamic modesty” (Starr 418) or “blending Islamic attire with Western chic. Islam call[ed] for her to wear pants, for example, so she [wore] ultra-tapered slacks and an oversized sweater. Custom call[ed] for her to drape her head in a scarf, but it’s an Hermes” (Starr 456).

Despite her modest inroads into Western culture, “Pinkie” never forgot that she was the daughter of the prime minister or an Islamic woman. Those who knew her at the time say that she had an American “college kid side,” but once political debates began, her role switched immediately to Benazir Bhutto, the Pakistani of a certain class, history, and political environment (Starr 419). One classmate accompanied Bhutto to a dinner of the Boston-area Pakistani Students Association. She recalled, “The minute Pinkie stepped into her Pakistani dress she became reserved, almost regal. At the dinner, I noticed the deference with which she was treated by the hosts and the other Pakistani students. She accepted it easily. I knew right then that she wouldn’t be Pinkie forever” (Starr 456).

Perhaps part of the reason for Bhutto’s strong attachment to her Pakistani identity were the major events which occurred in Pakistan while she was away studying. In 1970, her sophomore year, elections were held for the first time in 13 years, and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under leadership of Z.A. Bhutto gained control in West Pakistan. East Pakistan,
however, desired independence from the West, and proceeded to revolt. In 1971, when the Pakistani army slaughtered thousands of Bangladeshis, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took over as president. Although Harvard condemned Pakistan’s actions, Benazir “defend[ed] her father ferociously,” and when professor Michael Walzer criticized Pakistan’s military policies in class, she stood up “and lectur[ed] the lecturer in a voice shaking with anger” (“Benazir; face-to-face” 60). Over the next few years Bhutto became “vehemently nationalistic,” and her senior thesis was entitled “Muslim Separation and the Origins of Pakistan” (“Benazir; face-to-face” 60).

When reflecting back on her Harvard experience, however, Bhutto said it helped shape her understanding of politics and governmental process. She marched with Harvard students in anti-Vietnam rallies both in Boston and in Washington, D.C. Although she was already against the participation of the United States in an Asian civil war, Bhutto claims she was more radicalized by the anti-war furor surrounding her (Bhutto 59). She learned her first lessons in democracy at Harvard, and it became difficult to reconcile the contradiction between the ideal presented before her in her education and the autocratic reality of Pakistan (Shafqat 1996 657). She herself writes that she learned the importance of legitimate government, adding that “by studying government at Harvard I began to understand more about Pakistan than I ever had by living there” (Bhutto 61).

Benazir applied this knowledge to the political situation which was unfolding at home in Pakistan. When Z.A. Bhutto met with Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi at the Simla summit in June, 1972, his daughter, a junior in college, accompanied him (Bhutto 69). In 1973, her senior year, Pakistan created its first democratic Constitution and her father was elected prime minister. In her book, Bhutto connects the Pakistani Constitution to her Harvard experience, saying “the first representative government of Pakistan finally had the legal framework to
govern, the sanctioned authority that Professor Womack had brought home to me so clearly in
his seminar” (Bhutto 76). The Watergate hearings were simultaneously occurring in the United
States, and Benazir recalls that Watergate taught her the importance of nationally accepted laws
which apply to all members of society, from peasant to president. She was amazed that “even a
powerful president like Richard Nixon, who had put an end to the Vietnam War and opened the
pathway to China, could not escape the law of his land. I had read Locke, Rousseau, and John
Stuart Mill on the nature of society and the state, the need to guarantee the rights of the people.
But theory was one thing. Seeing it unfold in practice was quite another” (Bhutto 76).

After her four years at Harvard, Benazir moved on to study at Oxford. There, she was
surrounded by people of her own elite social class, and submerged in a much more formal
educational system than that of Harvard (Starr 457). She joined the Oxford Debating Union, and
in 1976 became the first female president of this “old boy’s club” at a time when the male to
female membership ratio was 7:1 (Bhutto 85). Even though Bhutto claims that while she was at
Oxford Pakistan seemed very far away, she retained close connections to home, much as she did
while at Harvard, and she also claims that she never considered not returning to Pakistan, for in
Pakistan lies her heart, heritage, and culture (Bhutto 84).

Pakistani Context

In order to more fairly evaluate Benazir Bhutto’s leadership, one must consider the
political context of Pakistan, for its political culture is quite different from that of the United
States, Ireland, or Israel. Pakistan is a country trying to establish a stable political system in a
nation long dominated by bureaucratic military elites. These military officials control
institutional bases of power, monopolizing government resources, and therefore possess a great
deal of power, privilege, and status within the country (Shafqat 1997 4). The only other Pakistani class that can begin to rival the power and prestige of the military elite is that of the feudal landlords, the class to which the Bhuttos of Sindh belong. The landowners, however, are not a homogenous group, and do not share either a political ideology, ethnicity, or perspective of Pakistan. Instead, they are defined solely by their relationship to those who cultivate their lands, a relationship based on dominance and control (Shafqat 1997 5).

Pakistan has only been an independent country since 1947. It is, therefore, a relatively new country, with a long history of dominance by outside forces. The country has little experience with democracy, and therefore, the politicians are still learning the necessary skills of negotiation, bargaining, and consensus-building. The process of democratization has been hindered further by the manipulation of the military elite, who purposefully seek to undercut the political process, thereby consolidating their own power. In the 1990s, therefore, political leaders continue to seek dominance within their own party, working to expand their own power as elected officials rather than work with other political parties to establish democratic structures (Shafqat 1997 13).

General Zia remained in power from 1977 until 1988, the longest rule by any one individual in Pakistan's history. Although he tried to have elections a couple times in the first years of his reign, they were canceled both times when Zia saw an “acceptable government” of pro-Islam and pro-military candidates was not likely to be elected. Under Zia, Pakistan experienced a period of harsh military rule, with Islamic reforms, constitutional changes, and a restriction of democracy (Richter 433). In 1983, Zia announced a program to gradually restore democracy, and in 1985 he held the first national elections since the 1977 coup which ousted Z.A. Bhutto. Political parties remained banned, however, so the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)
and other anti-Zia groups boycotted. Despite the boycott, candidates associated with the PPP performed well in the election, resulting in PPP being the strongest party to emerge despite eight years of being banned (Bhutto 279). General Zia lifted martial law December 30, 1985, and soon after political parties were allowed (Richter 434).

The long rule of the military strongly impacted Pakistan's political system. When Benazir Bhutto and the PPP were elected into office in 1988, an entire generation of military officers had been indoctrinated against the PPP during their eleven years of service under Zia (Shafqat 1997 228). In order to build a ruling coalition, Bhutto had to make a series of agreements with the president, which included staying out of military affairs, and not interfering with the broad thrust of foreign policy, also the domain of the military (Richter 436). Bhutto also kept some of the military-minded leaders appointed by Zia, including the foreign minister, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), and the president (Shafqat 1997 227).

Despite these concessions, the coalition remained precarious, with the president wary of Bhutto's intentions, and the military bureaucracy resentful of their PPP bosses (Richter 435). The uneasy partnership increased the challenge of running a democratic country, and four major conflicts between Bhutto and the military bureaucracy contributed to the dismissal of her government in August 1990, on charges of corruption, inefficiency, and misconduct of power (Shafqat 1997 230-1). On October 19, 1993 Benazir Bhutto was elected to a second term as a prime minister, the first woman in the Muslim world to gain a second term in the position (Chitkara 73). In her second term, she avoided interference in military affairs, and protected the interests of the military by campaigning to get arms from foreign sources (Shafqat 1996 667). Perhaps partly because of her improved relationship with the military, Bhutto's second government lasted three years.
Political Background

Bhutto's transition into Pakistani society from her time at school was not smooth. She left Oxford on June 25, 1977, and on July 5 a military coup led by General Zia resulted in the army's control of Pakistan (Bhutto 101). The years that followed for Bhutto included house arrest, detention, imprisonment, and her father's 1979 execution. In 1981 the Movement to Restore Democracy began in the Bhutto house, as a protest against Zia's military rule and martial law. The military responded to the group by arresting members and putting Bhutto in solitary confinement for five months (Bhutto 182). When Bhutto was released from prison in 1983 she left for London, the center of political activity for PPP members in exile (Bhutto 259). While in exile, Bhutto actively worked to raise awareness of Pakistan's situation, by publishing an Urdu magazine for distribution to international organizations and embassies, and by traveling to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to ask for assistance (Bhutto 263). She did not return to her country until July, 1985, when her brother Shah Nawaz died of poisoning, and she flew the body back to Pakistan for burial (Bhutto 300). That December Zia lifted martial law, and in January, 1986, Benazir asked the PPP Central Executive Committee if they would approve her return to Pakistan (Bhutto 318).

Upon return, Bhutto spent time traveling around the country, giving speeches, participating in demonstrations, and working to strengthen the PPP. In December, 1987 she married Arif Zardari, a businessman, in an arranged union, thereby satisfying those who disapproved of a single woman's involvement in politics. In May, 1988 Zia dismissed the Junejo government and set November 16 as the date for elections, guessing at the time when the pregnant Bhutto would be giving birth and therefore be at a disadvantage (Richter 434). Before
they occurred, however, Zia was killed in a plane crash. Benazir began campaigning, promising
to fight the culture of crime and corruption in government. She promised to provide a better life
for peasants and to end ethnic strife (Chitkara 14). Benazir was able to mobilize PPP
supporters, and her reputation as a confrontational resistance leader and crusader for democracy
helped the PPP win the elections, as did her family name. Going into her first term, however,
there were questions regarding her ability to make the transition to a parliamentary leader and
consensus builder (Shafqat 1997 226). Topics that help analyze Benazir Bhutto’s ability to
bridge her experiences at Harvard with her leadership in Pakistan include her stance on social
issues, the foreign policy with India, governmental corruption, and Pakistani ties to the United
States.

Prime Minister

Social and Economic Issues

Bhutto’s record in regard to women’s issues, social welfare, and ethnic relations not lived
up to expectations. To foreign officials, Bhutto portrayed herself as a “woman struggling against
the odds to steer her turbulent Islamic country on a moderate course of economic liberalization
and social justice….but economic and security problems—notably a long-running conflict with
the ethnic Mohajir National Movement in Karachi—dented her popularity at home” (Lyon 4).
When running for office, Bhutto’s platform included plans for “slum clearance, food for the
hungry and land and jobs for the peasants” (Doan 11). Bhutto also tapped into her gender,
claiming that support for her government was “an act of solidarity with international
womanhood,” and presented herself in a speech as “a representative of the young…As a
representative of women” (Beinart 12).
Despite Benazir’s campaign promises to remove the Shariah laws (Islamic religious law) as well as the Hudood ordinances, which requires four witnesses to prosecute a rape if a woman is to escape charges of fornication or adultery, both of which are punishable by stoning and flogging (Liswood 152), Pakistan’s Human Rights Commission “described her support for women’s rights as ‘lip service’” (Beinart 12). Although Bhutto did order the release of the women charged under the Hudood ordinances, she did not follow through with the implementation, and she did not act to repeal the Shariah from fear of the mullahs (powerful Islamic religious officials) (Rafi. 18). Although the PPP had enough votes to repeal the ordinance, Bhutto felt her “hands were tied” because of Islamic passions (MacFarquhar 1989 39). Bhutto did take some administrative measures to promote women’s rights, such as elevating the Women’s Division (which pursues socio-economic progress for women) to the ministerial level (Rafi 19) and appointing three women to prominent positions in government (Shafqat 1996 658). In addition, her cabinet during her first term included five women out of 43 members (Shafqat 1997 227), which is not too bad, considering that Bhutto was the first female prime minister of any modern Muslim nation (Richter 433). Overall, however, Bhutto disappointed Pakistan’s women activists, who were “looking to their first woman Prime Minister to erase centuries of discrimination” (MacFarquhar 1989 39).

Bhutto also disappointed the poor, who “form the PPP’s main constituency” (“Hard Part” 47). Despite a national per capita income which placed Pakistan on the border of becoming a middle-class nation, the literacy rate was merely 24%, life expectancy only 52 years, infant mortality was 10% of all births, and maternal mortality was 600 out of 100,000 births (MacFarquhar 1989 39). In many ways, however, Bhutto was set up to fail, for the poor’s perspective was “we’ve been denied everything for the past eleven years. Now it’s our turn to
get a share” ("Hard Part" 47). Despite these hopes, the treasury was practically empty under Bhutto’s leadership. She has been criticized for failing to move quickly enough on economic and social legislation (Richter 449), and the PPP focused more on the politics of patronage than economic policy (Shafqat 1997 234). Although Bhutto did take “all the cost-free measures at her command” in her first few days in office, freeing political prisoners, ending censorship of the press, and lifting a ban on student unions, “four months into its term, the PPP [had] not introduced a single piece of legislation” (MacFarquhar 1989 39).

Granted, the IMF had struck an unfavorable deal with Zia, which Bhutto was forced to continue which contributed to the financial woes of Pakistan. Military spending and debt-servicing together account for over 80% of the budget. In contrast to the 52.2 billion rupee military budget, education received only 1.97 billion rupees. Despite IMF insistence on a reduction in the budget deficit, the government made little effort to control government spending. Wealth was not spent productively, and “the government’s high rate of domestic borrowing starves industry of money for investment” ("Getting Away" 36). In addition, tax evasion was rampant, and only 1% of the country’s 130 million people actually paid income taxes (Shafqat 1997 248). Those taxes which were paid were raised largely through a new sales tax that “hit the ordinary people hardest” ("Tax and Bend" 34). The public felt the new tax increases were “levied unfairly, with the privileged and the well-connected exempted.” This complaint was well founded, since the elite landowner’s agricultural income was tax exempt, civil servants retained previous tax breaks, and members of parliament voted themselves pay raise as part of the new budget ("Tax and Bend" 34). All in all, the budget reinforced the sentiment of the young and poor who “feel alienated from a government that seems to be owned by the rich” ("Pakistan" 4).
One final group noticeably upset with Bhutto's failure to live up to campaign promises was the MQM (United Refugees Front) Party, to whom Bhutto promised repatriation of 250,000 Moslems stranded in Bangladesh. When the MQM, one of Bhutto's main coalition partners, decided to break away, ethnic violence resurfaced in Karachi, Pakistan's largest city, "where the MQM had been restraining its street fighters" (MacFarquhar 1989 38). The ethnic conflict in the Sindh province stemmed from tensions between the refugee Mohajirs mixed in with Punjabis and other groups from elsewhere in Pakistan. In February, 1990, an anti-government strike, "plus shoot-outs between Mohajirs and government supporters and several kidnappings, set off four days of protest and killing" ("Desert and Sea" 36). Bhutto used to "blame the chronic violence of her home province on the divide-and-rule tactics of the late president....but the advent of [her] much-acclaimed democratic rule has brought no lessening of Sindh's lawlessness and political feuding, rather the reverse" ("Sins of Sind" 42). Ironically, Bhutto alienated her most staunch advocates with her failure to live up to campaign promises. Rather than being the savior of the poor and oppressed, many of Bhutto's actions contributed to the worsening of their condition.

Relations with India

Bhutto worked in the first part of her term as Prime Minister to warm relations with neighboring India. For the first time since the 1972 agreement after the war in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan signed agreements. This time, Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi "agreed to promote cultural exchange, to avoid double taxation, and not to attack each other's nuclear installations," but did not resolve the conflict regarding Pakistan's support of Sikh terrorists in Punjab ("Warmer Enemies" 32). Later in the year Gandhi and Bhutto met to reach an agreement on "how to end the bitter little undeclared war between the two countries" in Kashmir ("Cold War
Bhutto’s hands were tied later, in 1990, when Muslim separatists in Kashmir “surged through the narrow alleys of the decrepit city [Srinagar], chanting ‘Indian dogs, go home!’” in response to the detention of 400 accused terrorists” (Beyer 44). The military wanted to support the Kashmir uprising, and challenge India’s role as “regional policeman” throughout southern Asia (Shafqat 1997 234). Bhutto infuriated Prime Minister V.P. Singh, when she abandoned her earlier position and “voiced support for the militant Kashmiris” (Beyer 44). Later, during her second time as Prime Minister, Bhutto thanked the Labour Party for endorsing a “statement to the effect that Kashmir is ‘disputed.’” Such as statement makes it evident that “a Labour government [would] not take a pro-Indian position over Kashmir” (Goodwin 7). Such a reversal of opinions in regard to India reflected Bhutto’s inability to stand by promises. In addition, it demonstrates her tendency to move with the tides of opinion, changing her views in order to benefit her personal political and economic position. Although she began her term as prime minister by stressing the need to interact with India as another democratic nation (Shafqat 1996 665), by the end she openly supported the Kashmiri separatists.

Ends” 31). The territory of Kashmir has been disputed by Pakistan and India since their 1947 independence. The prime ministers decided, however, that “India would move, stage by stage, towards a Siachen disengagement, while Pakistan gradually reduced its support of the Sikh separatists in Punjab” (“Cold War Ends” 31). Bhutto’s signature to the document, however, is not worth as much as one might think, since part of her deal with the army in order to gain power was that Pakistan’s Punjab policy would “remain under military control” (“Warmer Enemies” 32).

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Pakistan under Bhutto often failed the test of a true democracy, and was rife with political deals and elite privileges. According some diplomats, Bhutto "approached everything from a partisan view of the world....She became Prime Minster of the People's Party, not of Pakistan" and as such "put 10,387 people into government jobs without going through the proper procedures" (MacFarquhar 1990 41). Other criticism sheds light on why she was dismissed after 20 months as Prime Minister. Despite her foreign education, "Bhutto nevertheless seemed to govern Pakistan as she would have a feudal kingdom. Her government appeared to operate largely by petition; she bartered Cabinet seats for increased support in Parliament, an she was unwilling to allow the army, which she distrusted, to interfere in the violent politics of her power base in Sindh" (Chua-Eoan 33).

Bhutto's second attempt at Prime Minister was not much better than her first. Price hikes, inflation, and charges of corruption led to a crisis of legitimacy for her second government. The PPP, in its attempt to accumulate power, forgot the need to establish political support from a wide variety of socio-economic groups in order to retain a wide power base. Opposition leader Nawaz Sharif called Benazir's government anti-people and pro-landowners, and charged the government with mismanagement and corruption. Part of the mismanagement involved the arrest of Sharif's close relations. In addition, "other opposition leaders awaiting trial on various corruption charges [were] in jail, having been denied bail" ("Contempt of Court" 31). When the chairman of the Senate and speaker of the National Assembly demanded that parliament members awaiting trial be released when parliament was in session, Bhutto refused, claiming "parliament cannot interfere with the workings of the judiciary" ("Contempt of Court" 31). Paradoxically, however, "of the 20 new judges appointed to the Lahore High "Contempt of
Court”, 13 were former activists in the ruling Pakistan People’s Party...[and] three were supporters of the Muslim League faction which supports Miss Bhutto’s coalition government” (“Contempt of Court” 32).

Actions such as these were responsible for Pakistani’s view that “their politicians [were] corrupt and self-serving” (“Pakistan” 3). Some said that “Bhutto has become just another Third World pol, operating by the debased political code common to insecure democracies” (Griffin 52). Her version of democracy was a farce, for just “weeks after taking power she dismissed the regional assembly in the state of Baluchistan after it voted no confidence in her local cronies” (Beinart 12). When Bhutto’s second government was dismissed on November 5, 1996, a feeling of distrust and allegations of corruption remained over the heads of Benazir Bhutto and her husband, Asif Zardari (Shafqat 1997 250).

Asif Zardari did not conduct himself appropriately for his role as spouse of the prime minister. He became known as “Mr. Ten Percent” for his shady financial deals which often benefited both himself and his circle of friends (Shafqat 1997 233). He turned his position into a source of power, and went on a shopping spree in the 1990’s that included a $4 million London estate, and $660,000 worth of jewelry. In addition, Zardari and Bhutto constructed a $50 million mansion as the prime minister’s residence. Zardari used part of the $1.3 million park budget for the construction of the estate’s track, polo field, and stables. Overall, the Bhutto family and associates received over $1.5 billion in illicit profits from kickbacks which were the result of complex negotiations and special contracts designed by top Western executives (Burns A8).

Bhutto has stated that the documents are fabricated and that the corruption charges were brought up by prime minister Nawaz Sharif in order to damage her reputation (Burns A8). Yet, Benazir weakened the economy and had to negotiate foreign loans to pay off government debts
(Burns A1). She had fostered an image for herself as a leader who would work for the rights of the poor and as an opponent of leaders who used power for personal gain and "leave the cupboards bare" (Burns A8). But under her government, Pakistan remained a poor nation, with over 70% of the population illiterate, and millions living without shelter, schools, hospitals, or safe drinking water (Burns A1). Bhutto, who entered office with lofty speeches on re-establishing democracy, failed to follow the principles of democracy, and instead fell into the practices of "corruption, nepotism, an other abuses" (Lyon 2).

Ties to the United States

Bhutto's time at Harvard, and the connections she made while there, contributed to her government's close partnership with the United States. Beginning in 1984 after she was released from detention, Bhutto became a regular visitor in Washington, D.C.. While there, she would use Peter Galbraith's office as a base for her calls, and her Harvard friend helped her win friends in Congress (Galbraith 24). The friendships with Congressmen paid off. When Bhutto visited the United States in June 1989, she was the first official visitor to the Bush administration, and on the same visit, she delivered the Harvard commencement address. Her speech focused on measures for enhancing democracy and respect for human rights. She also spoke of the need to create an international organization of democratic nations "to uphold, protect, and promote the idea of choosing government" (Galbraith 25). According to Bhutto, her undergraduate experience contributed to her perception that "she understood American society, including its contradictions....She had, in fact, a kind of residual American self from her Harvard years with which she could relate to the United States" (Starr 419).
Peter Galbraith reiterated Bhutto’s understanding of the American mindset, crediting her Harvard experience for her skill at gaining American allies in Congress. The United States originally supported Zia’s regime, because he criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, whereas certain members of the PPP supported the Soviets in the search for an ally against Zia. Because the PPP was socialist in character, the United States was originally anti-Bhutto, viewing her as radical, controversial, and dangerous. Bhutto listened to her friend Peter’s advice, however, and refined her message so as to convince the senators that her leadership would not be harmful to U.S. interests. She promised the continue Zia’s anti-Soviet policy in Afghanistan, and emphasized her desire to overthrow a repressive dictatorship and restore democracy. Peter Galbraith is convinced that it was Bhutto’s knowledge of the American culture and her connections to friends in the United States which helped her win U.S. support. He added that the United States is partly responsible for her position as prime minister in 1989, for the PPP only received a plurality of votes, not a majority, and therefore the president refused to name Benazir Bhutto the prime minister. Since Bhutto had established relationships in Congress, the United States stepped in and declared that indeed, Bhutto had won, and there was no question that anyone else should receive the post (Phone Interview).

The partnership between Bhutto’s Pakistan and the United States was mutually beneficial to both parties. For the United States, “the election of a democratic government in Islamabad [gave] Washington an incentive beyond simple anti-Sovietism for underwriting Pakistan” (MacFarquhar 1989). For Bhutto, her image abroad as a democratic leader working to restore human rights compensated for her poor performance and low domestic approval ratings. The relationship changed somewhat after 1990, for after the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States withdrew support for Pakistan’s nuclear program (“Pakistan” 2). A rising tide
Islamic fundamentalism, combined with the corruption in Bhutto’s government, described as a “commercial enterprise” (Griffin 52), led to a shift in Pakistani views towards America. In fact, Bhutto’s rating was “further hurt by her close links with the United States, which looms large in Pakistan’s pantheon as Great Savior, Great Satan, or both at once” (Griffin 52). The Prime Minister spent much of her time visiting overseas governments, visiting over 25 countries in 17 months, and did not return home when major crises, such as the murder of two Americans, occurred. Thus, although Bhutto was skilled at developing relationships with other countries, she did not use her ability to develop exchanges which would benefit the people of her country. Rather, many of her deals simply boosted her own image as a “democratic” leader or served to improve her own financial position while pandering to foreign interests (Griffin 52).

**Analysis**

It seems as though Benazir Bhutto’s foreign education did not greatly influence her leadership, but that is difficult to say because of the restrictive political context. Indeed, a classmate asserted that “Benazir Bhutto’s Harvard years should not be overinterpreted. Long before she showed up at Cambridge, she had been deeply formed by the dynamics of history, class, and political position” (Starr 457). For Benazir, the Bhutto name was central to her identity, weighing “far more heavily than the seven years she spent getting educated and acclimatized in Western ways at Harvard and Oxford (MacFarquhar 1990 41). Perhaps because she presumed privileges came automatically with her name, Bhutto was described by Harvard professor as “not a born compromiser, but intelligent enough to be a realist” (Palmer). This characteristic surfaced quickly in her leadership, or lack thereof. One friend explained that Bhutto “never made the transition from being leader of a crusade to being a governing Prime
Minister.” Instead, her government “became a one-woman show…. [which] put a premium on loyalty and reinforced a belief that democracy in Pakistan is synonymous with Bhutto-family rule” (MacFarquhar 1990 40).

Initially, Bhutto’s leadership was heralded by the international community. Bhutto proved skilled at “improvis[ing] new tunes—democracy, feminism, Islam—to dazzle divergent American audiences, con Congress and keep the money coming” (Beinart 12). Bhutto’s promises, however, never materialized into reality, and she did not demonstrate her commitment to progressive ideals once in the position of prime minister (Shafqat 1996 656).

Bhutto failed to live up to the expectations of feminists, who hoped a female Prime Minister would free them from some of the restrictions placed on them during the Zia regime. Although she promised to change the adultery laws and repeal the Hudood Ordinances, she never implemented policy changes, largely due to a fear of Islamic fundamentalists. Additionally, what inroads she did make, could be attributed to the legacy of her father, who had campaigned for women’s rights, and even inducted women into all branches of the elite civil service (Rafi. 18). Bhutto also failed to increase social spending on programs which would benefit the poor. Instead, her new budget hit the working class the hardest, while containing provisions which exempted the wealthy. Although Bhutto did not have much money to allocate, since a large portion of the budget had to go to debt-servicing, she was able to find money to increase the military budget.

Bhutto’s policy towards India shifted rather dramatically during her time in power. At first she did work for improved relations between the two nations, but due to the military’s control of foreign policy, her freedom of action was restricted. Bhutto stressed the idea that Pakistan and India were both democracies, and as such should cooperate. This line of reasoning
seems to fit with her Harvard experience, which continually emphasized the importance of
democracy, freedom of speech, and Constitutional rule. Bhutto’s outreach to Rajiv Gandhi,
prime minister of India could, however, have resulted from her father’s influence. After all,
Benazir accompanied her father to India in 1972 for the negotiation of the Simla Accords, with
Rajiv’s mother, Indira Gandhi, while on break from Harvard. In any case, it seems significant
that Bhutto was not consistent in her policy towards India. Although she originally sought to
reach a peaceful settlement in Kashmir, she later switched her views and encouraged the Labour
Party to call the region “disputed.” The Prime Minister had difficulty establishing a policy and
remaining constant to it.

Even Benazir’s claim that she learned the importance of legitimate government from her
classes at Harvard fail to ring true. For it is evident that she did not make an effort to
democratize the structure of PPP, and when in power she sought to consolidate personal power
rather than work to represent a wide variety of socio-economic classes (Shafqat 1996 657). The
corruption charges further illustrate her failure to incorporate the tenets of democracy into her
government. Bhutto was raised in an environment of wealth and advantage, and her short time
in the United States, especially at a privileged university like Harvard, was not enough to
overcome her sense of social superiority or her assumed position in the social hierarchy. Despite
her relative anonymity as a Harvard student, Benazir never forgot she was a Bhutto, and perhaps
felt that ruling Pakistan was part of her inheritance. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto purposefully kept
Benazir from spending too much time outside of Pakistan, and even when she was in school,
classmates commented that she never forgot her role as the prime minister’s daughter.

Benazir Bhutto, therefore seems to be a leader who’s family connections and political
history are so powerful that they provide one with an identity, the answers, and the model for
governance. Even though she did go to school overseas for seven years, Benazir remained in close contact with her family, and often joined her father when he was in the United States on political or diplomatic missions. In addition, since such dramatic events unfolded in Pakistan during her time as a student, Bhutto’s patriotism and loyalty to her country increased dramatically as a defense mechanism against the thousands of Harvard students and professors who condemned Pakistan’s actions. This socio-political context may have contributed as much as her elite family background to Bhutto’s close ties to her Pakistani identity. Indeed, the one example Peter Galbraith gave of how “Benazir synthesized in her leadership the two cultures,” was that she still practiced tribal customs—such as holding feudal court and ordering people around—while also speaking and understanding the language of the West (Phone Interview).

One major lesson Benazir Bhutto did take away from Harvard was the vocabulary of democracy. Bhutto learned the characteristics of a model democracy, and learned the values espoused in the U.S. Constitution. Although Bhutto never truly applied the principles of democratic rule in Pakistan, she did use democratic rhetoric in her campaign speeches, in her autobiography, and in her correspondence with foreign officials. In this way, Bhutto capitalized on dualistic American foreign policy which treated any “democratic” country as an ally, and any “socialist” country as an enemy. Her actions, thusly interpreted, serve as an example of what F.G. Bailey calls “leadership [as] the art of exploiting cultures” (Bailey 46). Bhutto drew on the democratic values of the United States, but used them in the Pakistani context by gaining international respect, ascending to power and then using her position to amass personal prestige, wealth, and authority.
SHIMON PERES

Personal Background

Shimon Peres was born in 1923 in a poor Polish town where Jewish identity was expressed in the form of Zionism rather than religion (Golan 8). At age 10 his family moved to Palestine, where the young Shimon became active in Hanoar Ha'oved, a youth movement which focused on training for kibbutz life. Although his heart was not in his studies, Peres wrote metaphysical poetry and read extensively on his own (Avrech 56). In Israel, his formal education ended after attending a commercial high school, for as a 15-year-old he took the oath to join the Haganah and fought with the underground army to expel the British from Palestine (Avrech 56). Shortly thereafter, his determination, hard work, ability to get things done, and sheer ambition took him to the top of the youth movement (Golan 10). He eventually became head of manpower in the headquarters of Haganah (Wakin 125), a position which Peres loved and which enabled him to develop the skill of handling challenges with minimal resources (Golan 18). David Ben Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, relied on Peres' administrative talents, and others who were envious of Peres' position of "favorite" accused him of being a "climber" (Wakin 126).

After the Israeli War for Independence Peres asked Ben Gurion if he could have permission to study, as he had never received a formal education. Although he could not speak much English and had never been to the United States, Ben Gurion granted him permission to study provided he did so in the United States while heading the Israeli purchasing mission. Peres left for the United States in 1949, and returned in 1951 once his mission was accomplished (Golan 19). While in New York Peres studied at the New School for Social Research (Wakin 125), which he called a "most remarkable institution... [with faculty including] such luminaries
as Justice Felix Frankfurter, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Max Lerner... From Reinhold Niebuhr I heard lectures on Jewish and Greek culture that left me spellbound” (Peres 1995 73).

After two years in New York, Peres traveled to Boston, where he completed the four-month Advanced Management Program (AMP) at the Harvard Business School. The AMP was an intensive course aimed at experienced executives (15-20 years of experience) who were targeted for future leadership positions within their respective companies. The purpose of the course, which was organized around case studies, was for the class to participate and learn through sharing their own experiences, ideas, and thoughts (AMP Circulation Flier 1). Although the participants were trained in specific administrative practices and procedures, the faculty had a practical approach and chosen cases which were realistic and drawn from a diverse field of industry (AMP Circulation Flier 3). The primary goals of the program were to “1) Develop competence in the management of business activity, 2) Develop the social skills needed to make business a good society, and 3) Encourage the willingness to participate constructively in the community and nation” (AMP Circulation Flier 4). Over the course of twelve weeks, the faculty covered the topics of business policy, administrative practices, business and the American society, cost and financial administration, marketing management, and problems in labor relations (AMP Circulation Flier 6).

Perhaps more important than the official subjects taught, was the contact with other students. The 1951 AMP session consisted of 171 students, of which 13 were United States servicemen, and 4 were government employees. Of those representing governments, all were foreign, and all represented new governmental agencies. As far as industrial membership, the oil industry topped the list with 37 representatives (List of AMP Statistics). Peres was a minority in the AMP Class of December 1951. Over two-thirds of the class had a college degree, many of
whom also had higher degrees. In addition, the average age of the group was 44, fifteen years older than Peres; only twelve individuals were under the age of 35 (List of AMP Statistics). The time at Harvard provided Peres with an opportunity to gain exposure to a wide variety of industries, to make invaluable contacts with businessmen and servicemen in the United States, as well as gave him a structural foundation for management. When asked about his experience at Harvard, Peres said it “definitely influenced his leadership” and adds that his time at Harvard was the “best four months of [his] life” (Forum, 1998). From his 1995 vantage point, Peres calls his stay in the United States “a period of constant and concentrated learning in myriad forms. It was a formative period both of my life and of my intellectual and political development” (Peres 1995 73).

Political Background

Shimon Peres has been an active member in Israeli politics throughout the entire history of the fifty-year old country. In 1952 at the age of 28, his “brilliant performance” managing weapons transfers from Czechoslovakia, Italy, Canada, and France led to David Ben-Gurion’s appointment of Peres as deputy director of the defense ministry (Heilbrunn 15). A year later, as director general at the Ministry of Defense, Peres “identified France as Israel’s most likely source of nuclear assistance, even though France itself was still undecided about its own nuclear future”(Cohen 16). The “political protégé” of prime minister David Ben Gurion, Peres was given the mandate to pursue his nuclear vision. The Dimona nuclear project in the Negev desert is perhaps the greatest accomplishment of this period of Peres’ career. He presided over the project for almost a decade, beginning “in 1956-57 [when], virtually alone, Peres exploited the unique political climate of the decentralized Fourth Republic in France, secretly arranging the
sale of a nuclear reactor and other sensitive components to Israel” (Cohen 16). In the 1960s, however, the United States became Israel’s leading military supplier. Starting with the breakthrough deal Peres negotiated on the Hawk missile system, The United States, which originally refused any arms deals with Israel, became the nation’s number one arms supplier (Wakin 127).

In 1965 Peres and Moshe Dayan joined David Ben-Gurion in the formation of the Rafi Party, but “once the 1967 war erupted, Peres arranged a truce inside Israel between the Mapai and the Rafi factions that resulted in the creation of the Labor Party” (Heilbrunn 16). The French military connection established through Peres proved critical in during the Six Day War (Salpeter 4), but he was sidelined by Golda Meir in the subsequent government, and did not regain a position of import until Rabin appointed him defense minister in 1974. Even then, however, Rabin commented, “I did not regard Peres as suitable since he had never fought in the IDF and his experience in purchasing arms did not make up for that experience...I accepted Peres... with a heavy heart” (Heilbrunn 16).

The next years were full of strife between Rabin and Peres as they battled for party leadership. During the Entebbe crisis of 1976, however, when Palestinian terrorists hijacked an Air France plane containing 100 Israeli passengers, the two men were able to work together (Wakin 129). The rescue plan was a success largely because Peres had “ruthlessly overhauled the army...restor[ing] its morale and equipment” in his role as defense minister (Heilbrunn 16). Despite his handling of the Entebbe crisis, Peres lost party leadership to Rabin by a margin of 41 votes in 1977 (Golan 167). When Rabin resigned as prime minister over a currency scandal, Peres served as interim prime minister until the next elections, when Likud Party, under Menachem Begin’s leadership came to power for the first time in 29 years (Golan 171).
By the mid 1980s, Israelis began to feel that Peres was a congenital loser, a politician rather than a leader (Golan 226). He was seen by many as an eloquent, smooth-talking politician who thrived on back room maneuvering (Wakin 128), and was described during intra-party battles as "an intriguer and backstabber" (Salpeter 4). Peres was further discredited by the late prime minister Rabin, who called Peres "an inveterate schemer" (Salpeter 4).

Prime Minister and Other Leadership Roles

The 1984 elections ended in a stalemate. The Labor Party won 44 seats, and the Likud won 41. Since neither party had a clear majority, Peres had to work with Yitzhak Shamir to form a government, a difficult business due to the political and ideological differences between the parties. As Peres announced to the Knesset, "This government was born on divided ground, constructed on unknown precedents, and completed with the delicate work of straightening things out" (Golan 234). This "national unity government," cobbled together by the two leaders, called for a rotating premiership, with Peres serving as prime minister first (Heilbrunn 16).

Going into an extremely tense situation in a country divided over the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and suffering from soaring inflation, Peres had four primary goals. First, he "promised an early troop withdrawal [from Lebanon]. He also pledged to restore Israel's ailing economy to health and to bring down its staggering triple-digit inflation rate. He committed himself to warming up what he called the "cold peace" with Egypt...and he would seek ways of ending the nearly 40-year-old conflict between Israelis and Arabs" (Smith 86 48).
Economy

Peres was first elected to the office of prime minister in 1984 at time when Israel had the world’s largest per capita external debt (Keren 77). The most stunning success of his term, therefore, was his ability to turn around the economy (Wakin 131). The prime minister’s first words in office were, “Let’s start—get me the Minister of Finance” (Avrech 56). With the backing of the National Unity government, Peres “unveiled a new reform program that had a lot in common with Reagonomics... The government plan[ed] to reduce spending and cut taxes” (Richman 98). In addition, Peres devalued the shekel, and planned to “cut a billion dollars out of the national budget” (Avrech 56).

The connection to Reagonomics was no coincidence. Three weeks into his tenure as Prime Minister, Peres traveled to the United States to meet with the U.S. President. After meeting, the two leaders “announced the formation of a special committee made up of government and business leaders from their countries to find ways of directing future U.S. aid toward bringing about a long-range Israeli economic recovery” (Smith 1984 62). Other economic initiatives undertaken by Peres included the reduction of imports, and the “seemingly impossible feat of persuading the dominant Histadrut union federation to renounce the cherished system of index-linked pay increases (Smith 1986 49). Although his economic plan was tough, and many Israelis protested when it was announced (Golan 249), Peres was able to reduce Israel’s triple digit inflation to 15-18% (Salpeter 5). Despite the fact that his economist friends told him it “would be political suicide to try to clean up the mess” (Richman 98) of the 800% inflation (Smith 1986 48), Peres’ approval rating “soared from below 45% to 73%, largely because of the drop in inflation” (Richman 98).
Peres's "infatuation" with science and technology began in childhood, as did his love of poetry (Heilbrunn 14). As an adult, Peres is "clearly at home in the world of high culture" (Peretz 51). Introduced to a group full of intellectuals in 1985 as "the most literate head of government in the world today," the prime minister has even translated French and English poems into Hebrew (Peretz 51). Peres has, however found the "versatility to sustain a bookish life of the mind while simultaneously handling practical matters of state" (Avrech 55). During a trip to New York the prime minister met with experts in the field of technology in order to pursue the acquisition of such industries in Israel, and also met with writers including Arthur Miller (Avrech 55).

Perhaps because of his intellectual reputation, while in power Peres was supported by professionals and University professors, who sought the transformation of Israel into a society based on information and education (Keren 22) rather than one which focused on meeting the immediate needs of the masses (Keren 18). Peres came into leadership when the knowledge elite felt that the Likud Party was nationalist, traditionalist, anti-Arab, and anti-intellectual (Keren 3). He worked to increase industrial development, and took a personal role in negotiating deals between the government and industry for controlling prices and wages, often without the support of the finance minister (Keren 87). In contrast to Rabin, Peres did not make decisions without "extensive consultation" (Salpeter 6). He hired a staff of "academics in their 20s and 30s" (Avrech 56), who worked around the clock to help jump-start the economy and technological industry. Later in his career, when serving under Rabin, Peres used intellectuals to address another societal crisis, that of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 1992, Peres "authorized
two university professors to sound out the PLO" (Heilbrunn 16) in regard to the possibility of
peace negotiations.

**Peace Process**

One of the issues that distinguishes Shimon Peres as an Israeli leader is his tireless efforts
in pursuit of a peaceful settlement to the Middle East conflicts. His role in the Arab-Israeli
peace process began before his role as prime minister, and extended long after his tenure was
over. During the 1984 national unity government Peres tried to set up formal negotiations with
Jordan and Palestine, but the coalition banned negotiations with the PLO. He also wanted to
require a two-thirds Cabinet approval for the construction of any new Jewish settlements in the
occupied West Bank, but right-wing members of the Likud party refused ("Truly Revolutionary
Idea" 24). Instead of giving up all hopes for peace, however, Peres met with Jordan’s King
Hussein and discussed a settlement, even though both knew that the unity government would
object to any compromises (Keren 52). The prime minister was more successful in Egypt, where
he was able to reach an agreement to submit the Taba dispute, concerning 750 yards along the
Red Sea, to international arbitration. With this decision, Israel and Egypt restored full
diplomatic relations with each other for the first time since the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon
(Smith 1986 48). Not everyone supported Peres’s efforts for peace, however, especially within
the Israeli government. Israeli Minister for Trade and Industry, Ariel Sharon, “publicly accused
Prime Minister Shimon Peres of ‘unparalleled cynicism’ in his handling of secret Middle East
peace negotiations” (Smolowe 74).

Over the years Peres has “impressed even the most skeptical observers with his eagerness
to take the necessary risks for peace” (Peretz 51), but he has also been severely criticized. Peres
met with Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in Vienna in 1978 despite objections by Foreign
Minister Dayan, and Prime Minister Begin. The Vienna document written by Sadat and Peres
laid the groundwork for the 1979 Camp David Accords between Begin and Sadat (Golan 186).
This was quite a change in attitude from the Peres of 1967. In 1995 Peres said “[my]
contribution during that dramatic period [Six Day War] was something that I still cannot write
about openly for reasons of state security. After [Moshe] Dayan was appointed defense minister
I submitted to him a certain proposal which... would have deterred the Arabs and prevented the
war” (Cohen 17). The “hawk” of the 1970s, who suggested the use of a nuclear demonstration
to prevent war, had transformed by the 1980s into a leader who felt the only resolution to the
Middle Eastern conflict was through political means and worth the exchange of “territory for
peace” (Golan 301).

The Oslo Peace Accords are, however, Peres’s most noteworthy achievement for peace.
In the 1992 elections, Labor won with a commitment to pursue peace, and as foreign minister,
Peres declared that “first and foremost, we must all acknowledge the futility of war. The Arabs
cannot defeat Israel on the battlefield; Israel cannot dictate the conditions for peace to the
Arabs” (Wakin 132). Secret negotiations, which had begun between Palestinian and Israeli
scholars, turned into official talks when Peres received a letter from the PLO opening the doors
to an official meeting for peace between Palestinian and Israeli leaders (Wakin 133). Peres and
Arafat agreed to halt what Peres called “two parallel governmental systems with contradictory
sets of values. By its very nature, the military government is oppressive—to the people it rules
and to the people of the state” (Wall 212). Peres called the status quo “senseless,” and added
that “a nation that forces itself on another nation, even for reasons of self-defense, loses the will
to abstain from oppression because of the dynamics of conquest—a part of the same ‘invisible
profitable solutions to problems such as electricity, economics, and water, the Palestinians and Israelis can create a stable environment for peaceful human interactions (Forum speech).

Analysis

In both his speech to the Richmond Forum and a speech in Jerusalem's Hebrew University, Peres outlined three lessons in leadership he was taught by Ben-Gurion. The first states that a leader knows exactly what his goals are and does not let himself sway from them. The second states that a head of state, not the public, should lead. The final lessons states that a leader must not be afraid to take risks (Salpeter 6). Upon examination, Peres's leadership fulfills all three of this characteristics. During his time as prime minister in the national unity government, Peres set forth to overcome the soaring inflation rate, and his dramatic measures stabilized the Israeli economy. In that situation, as well as in his secret negotiations which initiated the 1992 Oslo Peace Accords, Peres took leadership into his own hands, despite the possibility of a drop in public opinion or the wrath of the Likud Party. Peres also took risks by reaching out to the Palestinians and other Arab nations, extending a hand of peace which many Israelis were not yet willing to proffer.

These leadership qualities were not always inherent in Shimon Peres, however. As Peres says, "Israel has come a long way from a young country that needed Dimona to deter war, to a strong country on the brink of peace" (Cohen 17). The same could be said of Peres, who began his career as a "militant Zionist" intent on "bombing Egypt, raiding the Western desert, [and] fighting frantically over the Canal" (Perlmutter 54). Today a leading advocate for peace, Peres believes it is the role of a leader to encourage people to create a coalition in order to cooperate against new societal dangers rather than compete against old ideological enemies (Forum
The mature statesman said that he was sincere when he said the Israelis "had no wish to rule over the Palestinian people" (Peres 1995 302). Further, Peres dreams of a Middle East "in which every believer will be free to pray in his own language, Arabic or Hebrew or Latin or whatever language he chooses, and in which his prayers will reach their destination without censorship, without interference, and without offending anyone" (Peres 1995 310). Statements such as these mark a dramatic shift in position from the Peres of the 1960s defense ministry, and a marked move towards seeing the Arab point of view and comparing it to the Israeli position under Great Britain.

Peres's participation in the formation of the national unity government also demonstrates his remarkable ability to work across cultures and ideological rifts. Only one other unity government, formed in 1967 on the eve of the Six-Day War, had ever been agreed upon before ("Truly Revolutionary Idea" 24). The reason for their rarity in the extreme difficulty of negotiating policy when leaders of opposing parties are forced to find common ground. Peres was praised for his "deft handling of the nation's problems" and his ability "despite strong pressure from within his party......[to resist] the temptation to force showdowns with his coalition partners, which might have broken the accord and led to early elections" (Smith 1986 48). Looking back on the experience, Peres said "decision making is desperately hard in a cabinet evenly balanced between ministers from opposing parties......[nevertheless] to my pleasant surprise, the government of national unity was able to reach and implement important decisions, at least during the first half of its term" (Peres 1995 209). Peres's own leadership and assertive role during the economic crisis was largely responsible for the success of the first two years of the national unity government.
Peres’s leadership is also noteworthy for his ability to synthesize the economy, education, and peace together into a concrete, inter-related process. According to Peres, “fate has brought us from a world of territorial conflict to one of economic challenge and of new opportunities created by human intellectual advances” (Heilbrunn 14). Heilbrunn criticizes Peres’s optimistic vision, however, arguing that because of Israel’s huge technical advantage over its Arab neighbors, a common market will never occur in the Middle East. Further, the author disputes Peres’ assumption that poverty is the root of fundamentalism, asserting that Islamic fundamentalism is “rooted largely in anti-Western currents” (Heilbrunn 18). He goes on to state that “while Peres sees technological advances as synonymous with higher standards of living, sometimes these advances just create bigger rifts between the haves and have-nots” (Peres 1995 19). These statements detract from the otherwise glowing praise of Shimon Peres, the Israeli statesman who has perhaps done the most work to promote peace and justice in the Middle East.

Several key questions remain to be asked in regard to Shimon Peres’s leadership. Although his experiences in the peace process and in the national unity government demonstrate his ability to work with those of differing political, ideological, and religious views, that does not necessarily qualify him as a “bridge leader.” Granted, Peres is one of relatively few Israelis who has put himself on the line to try to understand the perspective of the Palestinian people, but he also is scorned by a large number of Israeli nationalists, and lost (by a narrow margin) the 1996 elections to Benjamin Netanyahu. The most critical unanswered question, however, is what is responsible for the dramatic shift in Peres’s position from that of an “old hawk” (Perlmutter 136) to a leading proponent of peace? Although it would be convenient to state that Peres’ exposure to U.S. pluralist democracy during his stay in New York and Boston was the key, the shift in Peres’s stance did not occur until 20 years after his educational experience. While his book does
praise the U.S. Constitution for its attempt “to strike a fine balance between the rights of the individual and his duty to society, between religious tolerance and ethnic identity” and commends the fact that the U.S. has never “attempted to retain either [foreign] territories or resources, or to rule over another nation” (Peres 1995 74); one can hardly believe that those factors alone led to his dramatic shift from militant hawk to conciliatory dove.

The two years Peres spent in the United States probably did have some impact on his leadership, but most likely in regard to his ability to forge close relations between Israel and the United States. In addition, Peres’ affinity for the intellectual and technological community was probably augmented by his exposure to a wide range of leading industrialists during the four-month Advanced Management Program at Harvard. As he himself suggested in the Richmond Forum, however, the mellowing of old age, and the exhaustion from long years of party conflict are more plausible explanations his shift towards regional cooperation.

CONCLUSIONS

The three cases studied in this paper lead individually to three very different interpretations regarding the effects of cross-cultural education. Collectively, however, they do seem to point to the potential impact of a cross-cultural experience. Mary Robinson’s example seems to demonstrate that cross-cultural education can have an extremely powerful influence on someone, especially when lessons in the classroom are enhanced and further given credence by the host country’s social and political events. The young Mary Robinson was encouraged to think about, discuss, and interpret the ambiguities in the law, in a context where students protesting the Vietnam War and campaigning for the equality of women and blacks were forcing American society to examine its own beliefs and practices.
Benazir Bhutto’s case, in contrast, demonstrates the strong effect one’s family ties and social background can have on one’s leadership and one’s career path. Although Benazir is the individual who studied the longest overseas, spending four years at Radcliffe and another four at Oxford, in many ways her leadership exhibits the fewest foreign effects. Instead, her Western views and her focus (at least in political rhetoric) on democracy and women’s rights seem to be largely the legacy of her father, prime minister in the 1970s, who appointed women to high positions, negotiated agreements with India, and contributed to the Constitution of 1973. While the ideology her father hoped to imbue in her may have been solidified by her experiences abroad, Benazir remained closely in touch with her family and events in Pakistan the entire time she was at school. In many ways, although Benazir adopted some of the outward symbols of the American college student, she never forgot her heritage, and never fully assimilated into the student culture at Harvard, flying off to Simla to participate in the 1972 agreement, and sitting in on UN General Assembly meetings.

The Shimon Peres case is different from both women. Like Robinson, Peres does demonstrate some changes in his leadership style and in terms of his focus from issues of war to issues of peace. Unlike Robinson, however, who returned to Ireland and immediately began her work to improve the life of those at a disadvantage, Peres’ values and worldview did not change significantly until the late 1970s, almost 30 years after his experience in the United States. When the change did occur, however, it was significant and substantial. Before that point, however, Peres exhibited other qualities of a “bridge leader,” which could be a direct result from his two years of education in the United States. Throughout his political career, Peres was noted for his persistence, his skill for arriving at creative solutions, and his ability to work with people he personally did not like. For instance, Peres and Rabin, long-time competitors for leadership
of the Labor party, were able to act as a team throughout several of Rabin's ministries, and, more importantly, were jointly awarded a Nobel Peace Prize. Peres was also able to successful turn the economy around in a difficult situation, when he was heading a unity government with a ruling coalition that opposed many of the policies he felt strongly about.

These three leaders had diverse leadership experiences, but an examination of their work for peace, their handling of ethnic differences, and the degree to which they exhibited autonomy in their actions, leads to an understanding of the leaders' relative ability to bridge cultures.

**Peace Issues**

To a certain extent, all three leaders worked to create peace, and two, Robinson and Peres, made the additional connection between peace and economic circumstances. Mary Robinson maintained an open policy towards the Northern Ireland issue, stating that she would listen to anyone who had a legitimate political concern or platform to present. She invited representatives from a wide variety of groups to Ireland in order to promote dialogue. In addition, although she created an international controversy when she shook hands with Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams, Robinson continued her policy of extending the same treatment to all sides of the Northern question. This approach by Robinson demonstrates an open, accepting view of others, as well as an understanding that for every conflict there are numerous points of view, all of which deserve a hearing in a receptive audience.

Robinson also openly voiced compassion for the starving masses in Somalia, and pled for assistance on their behalf in front of the United Nations General Assembly. She opened the presidential mansion to individuals of all socio-economic classes, and included in her welcome marginalized groups such as homosexuals. Currently, the former president continues her service
to those less fortunate by chairing the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. For the former president, economics and peace were linked to the extent that harsh physical circumstances could lead to increased frustration and willingness to fight for food, land, shelter, and respect. This connection, and Robinson’s ability to recognize the interaction between poverty and violence, also demonstrates her skill at seeing the “big picture.”

Benazir Bhutto also spoke a great deal about peace and issues of the developing world, but her actions did not always follow her words. Although at first she worked to change Pakistan’s relationship with India, her hands were tied by the power of the military and the public’s perception that India remained a security threat. Her commitment to peace was later discredited when she reversed her perspective on relations with India by declaring the Kashmir region “disputed.” Bhutto did not follow through on her commitment to socio-economic justice, either, for her campaign promise to increase social programs did not ever materialize into policies or programs, and the PPP had to discard its socialist platform in order to comply with the IMF regulations. Between debt-servicing, defense spending, and alleged government corruption, little money was left for social welfare, which caused resentment among the masses, division within the ruling coalition, and a rise in Islamic fundamentalism. Overall, Bhutto did not seem effective in the peace-making process, and her inability to carry through on her promises reflects not only a completely relative value system, but an insecurity about the validity of her own beliefs and opinions.

Although it came late in his political career, Shimon Peres made great strides towards peace in the Middle East. He worked throughout his political career on various settlements with King Hussein of Jordan, and during his terms as prime minister he was successful at improving Israel’s relations with neighboring Arab countries. The highlight of his peacemaking career,
however, was his active role in negotiating the Oslo Agreement in 1994 with PLO chairman Yasser Arafat. In order to achieve such treaty, Peres had to see beyond his own opinion of the Middle East conflict, and try to understand and appreciate the concerns from the Palestinian perspective. Also, since at the time it was illegal to negotiate with the PLO, Peres was forced to use creative problem-solving techniques in order to do what he felt in his heart was right.

Peres, to a greater extent than Robinson, links economic policy with the pursuit of peace. His view of a “New Middle East” emphasizes the privatization of peace and the need to initiate cooperative economic development with Arabs and Israelis. He believes that peace cannot occur without an increased standard of living for the Arabs living in and around Israel. Although his concern for peace and economic development remains regional, not global, Peres demonstrates his desire to improve the lives of others, which is evidence of an expanded worldview.

*Ability to Create Unity out of Difference*

The three leaders varied in their success at creating a sense of unity (perhaps analogous to Adler’s cultural synergy), when faced with diversity. From these initial cases, it seems as though Robinson and Peres were better able to create a new identity out of diverse viewpoints, or at least to create a vision for one. Bhutto, however, did not seem as capable either at articulating a common vision for her followers, or at establishing a Pakistani identity.

Mary Robinson created a presidency full of symbols in order to tap into a feeling of Irish identity, such as keeping a light on as a welcoming guidepost to all those of Irish descent who live overseas. In addition, she reached out to the various constituencies in Northern Ireland without making political connections to any single group. During her campaign, Robinson traveled all over the country, visiting every town and village, in order to hear the views of those
she would represent. In addition, Robinson made the presidential mansion open to any group that wished to visit. Through her leadership, she appealed to a sense of Irish pride, and by supporting and encouraging grassroots initiatives, Robinson tried to make everyone feel important and critical to the success of Ireland.

Bhutto campaigned to re-establish a modern democracy in a country divided by class, religious, and ethnic differences, but it is difficult to determine whether she could not achieve those aims due to the political context, or whether she never truly intended to do so. Bhutto failed to create a unique Pakistani identity in a country where the citizens remained focused on whether they were Mohajir or Sindhi by birth, and in which disagreements with India over the status of Kashmir continued. While she was in office, the conflict in Sindh actually worsened, partly due to the weakness of Bhutto's government. Granted, Pakistan is an incredibly diverse country with a long history of ethnic conflicts, but Bhutto's leadership did not demonstrate any initiative at finding, or skill at developing, common ground among its numerous ethnic groups or social classes.

Peres, like Bhutto, faced the challenge of leading a country with considerable ethnic differences. Israel was created by a wide variety of Jews from all over the world and with all different ancestry, ranging from Africa to Asia to Eastern Europe. Israel, like Pakistan, had only been independent since the late 1940s, and was concerned both with building a solid international reputation and creating a national identity. Also like Pakistan, Israel had ethnic conflict not only within its own citizenry, but also with the Palestinians living within and around Israel proper. Peres, however, despite difficulties with other Israeli parties in power, was more successful than Bhutto in devising a plan for the creation of an Israel shared by Palestinians and
Israelis, and in envisioning a “new Middle East” in which economic regional cooperation serves as a tool to overcome ethnic differences and create a sense of unity.

Increased Individual Autonomy as Leaders

Kauffmann’s model for the effects of study abroad stresses not only the development of autonomy, but also the ability to choose a set of values after exposure to a wide variety of belief systems. According to Kauffmann, the highest level of autonomy involves an “integrated ethnorelativism” (see Appendix 2), which allows one to make ethical choices in a relativistic world without insulting other cultural practices by presenting one’s own views as superior. The three leaders in this study varied in the degree to which they seemed to act independently and against either the status quo or the dominant political stance.

Mary Robinson remained an independent candidate for the majority of her political career, and repeatedly took a vocal stance on controversial issues such as family planning and homosexuality. When Robinson did join a political party, she did so out of a commitment to the mission of the of the party. Once her beliefs did not coincide with the actions of the Labour Party, however, Robinson separated from the group. Robinson also demonstrated her ability to make ethical choices in a global environment in her role as the UN high commissioner for human rights, where she has confronted international leaders about their country’s abuses. Perhaps because of her commitment to the ideals of human justice, Robinson does not hesitate to condemn China’s human rights record as abusive, instead of accepting the potential argument that China has a different cultural value system.

Benazir Bhutto, however, does not seem to exhibit the same independence as Mary Robinson. For Benazir, much of her identity is connected to the name “Bhutto.” It appears that
it is from this name, this political, economic, and cultural heritage that she derives her identity, rather than any individual beliefs or values. In some ways, Bhutto would seem to be at Kauffmann’s lowest level of value development, inherited. Bhutto’s campaign largely revolved around restoring the democracy established under her father, and during her time in office she did not seem to distinguish herself as an individual committed to a certain platform. While part of this might be blamed on the military’s power and the agreements Bhutto made in order to gain power, not all of it should be so easily brushed aside. In regard to Kashmir, for example, Bhutto initially sought better relations with India, but then backed down. She did not espouse a coherent women’s rights platform, either, promising an increase in freedom, but later backing away from any substantial legislative action. Bhutto was afraid of the response of the military in the first instance, and of the mullahs in the second. The subordination of her promises in the face of others’ disagreement does not seem to indicate a strong sense of autonomy or a well-developed set of owned values. The few areas where Bhutto did demonstrate independence seemed to relate to governmental corruption and the abuse of power, when Bhutto did not seem to feel the law of democracy and equality applied to her as well.

Shimon Peres became more of an independent actor as time went by. In his early days, Peres acted under the guidance of his mentor, David Ben-Gurion, and was often criticized by others for this close affiliation. As he matured and gained confidence in his abilities as a politician, however, Peres stepped out on his own, sometimes defying orders in order to pursue issues which he felt were important. Peres’ meeting with Anwar Sadat in Vienna, for example, was not authorized by foreign minister Moshe Dayan, but he continued with the summit nevertheless. Likewise, Peres negotiated secretly with the PLO before official negotiations between the groups were allowed by the Israeli government.
Despite these examples of independence, however, Peres often relied extensively on others for consultation on issues and for assistance in decision-making. He was associated with the knowledge elite, and worked extensively with scientists, university professors, and other professionals (Keren 8). This connection to the intellectual community could reflect on Peres' ability to recognize the value in others' contributions, as well as his own ability to admit when he does not know the answer. By asking for input, Peres expands his options and increases the number of problem-solving approaches at his disposal.

Peres' experience in the United States could also be the impetus for the success of his economic partnership with the United States. When the Israeli economy was struggling, Peres asked Reagan for assistance, and together the two countries devised a recovery plan. The time Peres spent at Harvard could have potentially impacted this type of cooperation. For example, connections Peres made through business leaders in the AMP session might have paved the way for Peres' conversations with Reagan. Likewise, Peres might have learned how best to approach Americans, not only through his class discussions, but also through the four month experience of living and learning with a diverse group of American professionals.

Peres seems to be independent in some areas and consultative in others. These two characteristics are not mutually exclusive, and may in fact reflect a high degree of autonomy and an integrated ethnorelativism. Peres was able to take a stance on issues, such as peace, about which he is passionate, while also recognizing the benefits to seeking others' opinions. This statement is qualified, however, for although Peres demonstrated an ability to gain insight from those with different intellectual skills, that does not necessarily translate into a commitment to a set of values when exposed to a wide variety of beliefs. It seems evident, however, that Peres became more self-assured, for early in his political career Peres was only in leadership because
of a special relationship with another leader, such as Rabin or Ben-Gurion, but in the past decade Peres has stood on his own (Salpeter 5).

The Models in Relation to the Leaders

The three cases suggest some possible links between foreign education and leadership, but it is not yet clear the extent to which the two are linked, or the implications and possible repercussions of that connection. It seems as though connections between the country of education and the home country improve as a result of foreign education, for both Bhutto and Peres sought out and improved relations between their countries and the United States, and Robinson became active in the international arena. Additionally, of the three models presented in the leadership, it seems as though Kauffmann and Bailey are more applicable to this type of inquiry than is Hofstede, for the latter is more concerned with description of cultural differences, whereas the former consider the implications of exposure to other value systems. Kauffmann’s model is useful as a tool for conceptualizing the potential changes which could occur within a student studying abroad, but it does not provide any concrete methods for analyzing to what extent a student progressed. Likewise, Bailey illustrates the potential dangers which could arise from exposure to multiple cultures, for it gives a leader increased options not only for effective leadership, but also for corrupt and self-servicing rule.

Hofstede is especially difficult to use in this type of study for it is impossible to determine how an individual leader ranks within a cultural descriptor that refers to a society comprised of millions of people. Further complications arise from the lack of any tools for measuring, for example, how “weak” or “strong” a leader’s uncertainty avoidance before he went to Harvard as compared to once he was in power. Generally, it appears that Mary
Robinson *might* have become more individualistic as a result of her time in the United States, Benazir Bhutto *might* have decreased her sense of power distance, at least in campaign rhetoric, but remained loyal to her collective identity as a Bhutto, and Shimon Peres *might* have become more willing to take risks in the economic and peace arenas, but Hofstede does not elaborate on how one can interpret or measure individual change in any of those arenas.

Of the three leaders, it initially appears that Mary Robinson fits the Kauffmann model most closely, by demonstrating a re-orientation towards social issues upon her return from Harvard. She worked for peace, justice, and spoke out passionately about controversial issues, while also seeking to promote a sense of unity and Irish identity to which all with Irish blood could relate. Benazir Bhutto seems to provide an example of what Bailey describes. Bhutto used the language of democracy which she learned at Harvard (and from her father) to gain support and gain power. Once she was appointed prime minister, however, she reverted to the political corruption for which Pakistani politics was known. She appointed her own supporters to high offices, and her husband spent great quantities of the national budget for personal gain. Because she had multiple value systems at her disposal, Bhutto used her ability to speak about human rights issues and democracy in order to gain foreign support, while simultaneously promising the army noninterference in military matters.

Peres does not seem to fit any one category precisely, for he seems to have undergone a major transformation, but it happened late in life. This could just be the result of the aging and mellowing process as he suggested in his speech to the Richmond Forum. In addition, Kauffmann did mention that most people do not make the transition to the third level of his model until mid-life. Greater exploration of the models’ relevance and accuracy in analyzing “bridge leaders” must be undertaken, however, before anything conclusive could be said about
their validity, as well as before one could determine how exactly each of these three leaders would be categorized according to the three models.

**My Personal Opinion of the Leaders**

Models aside, I personally believe that Mary Robinson seems to be a "bridge leader" for she consistently worked for issues of social justice, and stood up for those whose opinions no one listened to. This demonstrates a willingness to accept other cultural practices even though one may not condone them. Robinson, for example, campaigned for the availability of information about abortions even though she herself is Catholic and against the practice. Robinson also actively encouraged dialogue among groups in Northern Ireland, inviting women of different religions to the Republic of Ireland. As president, Robinson worked to create a sense of Irish identity, and herself took lessons in Irish culture even while becoming an active part of the European Community. For Mary Robinson, being Irish and being part of the United Nations were both critical aspects of her identity. She can work for Irish cultural unity, or at least an appreciation of the diversity in Ireland, while also working for international understanding and partnership. Because of this, Mary Robinson, to me, seems to be a "bridge leader," capable of bridging Ireland's culture and values with those of the global community.

I do not, however, feel Benazir Bhutto was a "bridge leader." My impression of Bhutto is that her view of leadership, her value system, and her cultural practices were formed by her family and her social standing. Bhutto was raised in a high socio-economic class, and led a wealthy, privileged life. She never truly became an American college student, although her social habits may have changed somewhat while at Harvard. If anything, Bhutto became more fiercely nationalistic while at Harvard because she was alone in defending her country and her
father at a time when the university community was critical of Pakistan's actions. In addition, Bhutto's time at Harvard is minimal in comparison to her time at Oxford, in detention, and in exile, all of which occurred after her 1973 graduation. Her undergraduate career, therefore, should not be the primary consideration when evaluating the impact of major life experiences on her performance as prime minister. In addition, Bhutto was not an effective leader, nor was she as popular at home as she was abroad. Although she was popular and successful when campaigning, she was unproductive and unpopular in power. There is little in Bhutto's leadership which seems to reflect anything she learned in the United States, except the ability to present herself favorably to the Western countries. The only examples of her combining the two cultures is her use of "feudal politics" when assigning judicial posts to PPP members, and her ability to conduct tribal court while speaking and understanding the language of the West. While this might count as being a "bridge leader" if one subscribes to Bailey's view that leadership is the exploitation of values, Benazir Bhutto's failure to really accomplish anything productive during her time in power demonstrated to me a lack of leadership ability, and therefore disqualifies her from consideration.

I cannot decide whether or not I believe Peres is a "bridge leader." In regard to his ability to develop a partnership with intellectuals, with the United States, and with the Palestinians, Peres seems to be open to multiple points of view, and interested in cross-cultural dialogue. The first two characteristics could be related to his time at Harvard, for there he was encouraged to develop his critical thinking and analytical skills in relation to business problems. Harvard also provided Peres with numerous contacts in the United States which might have been useful later in his political career. His work for peace, however, does not necessarily stem from his experience at Harvard, since the AMP session gave him connections to the United States
armed forces and businessmen, groups which are usually conservative, rather than exposure to the liberal, questioning atmosphere which Robinson encountered. In addition, it was not until late in his career that Peres became more open to the Arab perspective. For example, the 1978 document negotiated by Sadat and Peres in Vienna contained harsher terms for the Egyptians than did the Camp David Accord negotiated later by Sadat and Rabin.

Peres' earlier work towards peace merely focused on stability and an end to conflict, and it was not until recently that his focus seemed to be on the creation of actual peace and partnership between Arabs and Israelis. In addition, since his transition from a "hawk" did not occur until the 1980s, 30 years after his participation in the AMP session at Harvard, it is extremely difficult to determine the reason for Peres' shift. My hesitation in stating an opinion regarding Peres' qualification as a "bridge leader" hangs on the uncertainty of whether his foreign experience had any relation to his commitment to peace, for I have not seen any convincing evidence to relate the two. The only connection between Peres' vision of a New Middle East and his experience in the United States, is that during his Forum Speech he extolled both the democracy and the economic system of the United States. While further investigation and research might lead to more conclusive evidence either way, in my opinion the jury is still out on whether or not Peres is a "bridge leader."

Questions for Further Study

Comparing and contrasting the impact of foreign education on the three cases leads to many questions which need to be explored in greater depth. One of these questions concerns the leader's length of stay in the host country, and whether a culture's influence on leadership is in some way proportional to the duration of exposure to that culture. It is interesting that the one
leader who spent the greatest amount of time overseas, Benazir Bhutto, demonstrates the greatest amount of conflict and controversy in her leadership. She was dismissed twice after relatively short periods of leadership. Her reputation has been tarnished by a series of weighty corruption allegations, and her term in office failed to accomplish many of the goals which she had listed during her campaign.

Another factor that deserves further study is the impact of family legacy and socioeconomic class on leadership style. Benazir Bhutto was the only leader among the three born into a politically active and politically powerful family. Her wealthy landlord ancestors had been in Sindh for centuries and had likewise been intimately involved in the affairs of the region for years. Robinson, although from a wealthy family and described as a “bluestocking,” did not have the same political heritage as Benazir, and had to campaign vigorously to win a seat in the Dail and later to be elected president. Peres was the son of poor Polish settlers of Palestine who worked in kibbutzim and eventually became active in the Israeli defense ministry. Perhaps the different ways in which the three were raised affected their leadership as much if not more so than their classes at Harvard. After all, one’s first framework for interpreting the world comes from the lessons of childhood, and from the way in which parents, or parental figures, explain the mysteries of life.

The socio-political contexts of both the country of education and the home country at the time of foreign study also seem to play a role in the extent to which study abroad affects one’s leadership and one’s perspective on the world. The Vietnam protests, the Women’s Liberation movement, and the Civil Rights movement were all in various stages of development during the time Robinson and Bhutto were at Harvard. This created an environment of protest, radicalism, activism, and intense questioning which had varying effects on the two women. Part of the
reason for the disparate reactions was the different situation simultaneously occurring in their home countries. While Ireland remained stable during the year Robinson was at Law School, Pakistan experienced major trauma during Bhutto’s years at Radcliffe. Not only did East Pakistan (Bangladesh) separate from West Pakistan, but India became involved in the conflict. The result was humiliation and confusion in Bhutto’s homeland, a circumstance which disturbed her greatly. It may be possible that because much of Bhutto’s attention was focused on events occurring at home during her stay at Harvard, she was more defensive of her country and it’s perspective on issues and therefore was less open to dramatic change. In addition, the women Bhutto lived with in Eliot House “were by and large a conservative group…[who] were living after, but not in, the revolution” (Starr 419). Since she was not surrounded by radical feminists, Bhutto’s stance on women’s issues was not likely to change as dramatically as it might have otherwise.

In addition to these potential influences, there remain many others, such as time in exile or in prison which might affect one’s ability to lead a diverse group of people or the ability to see multiple options when problem-solving or discussing an issue. Further research needs to be done on the extent to which each of these variables affects leadership, as well as the extent to which the classes one takes while abroad affect one’s perception of the host culture. Personal discussion with the individual leaders would help one determine the actual impact of a foreign experience on one’s leadership, for the researcher could ask questions directly, rather than construct implied answers from inherently biased secondary sources.

One final series of remaining questions involves the conceptualization of a “bridge leader” and an understanding of national or ethnic culture. What exactly constitutes a good mixture between traditional national or ethnic identity and a global identity? How does one
determine which elements from each culture are best suited for the leadership context? In addition, what type of leadership is most effective in today’s increasingly global society where the opposing tensions of Jihad and McWorld come into play daily? Is the world becoming oriented towards the Western model of free market democracy? Are Western values best suited for solving modern day problems and cultural disputes, or is society calling for a return to traditional constructions of identity? In addition, is it possible for an outside researcher to evaluate, or even notice, a leadership style that uniquely combines two cultural views or value systems into a distinctive new approach if one is not familiar with the norms and assumptions of the two “parent” cultures? What are the best methods for determining effectiveness and the ability to bridge two cultures?

In conjunction with these questions, further investigation also needs to be done regarding the best means for learning about another culture and for assimilating foreign values into one’s own belief system. For example, classes and organizations in which a student participates will affect the way in which they learn about and perceive the foreign culture. Since professors have their biases, and since different organizations have different ideologies and structural hierarchies, two students from the same country who attended the Harvard could take different classes and join different organizations and leave the country with different interpretations of what constitutes American culture. How reliable, then, are our own perceptions of foreign cultures, and to what degree is our understanding of other beliefs limited by our personal worldviews and value systems?

Although this initial study is by no means conclusive, it does seem to indicate some possible trends in leaders who studied overseas and were thereby exposed to a foreign culture. It suggests that as a result of an international experience, leaders can undergo a transformation in
which their worldview, values, and career objectives change significantly. This transformation, depending on the individual, can occur almost instantaneously, or it can happen gradually over a series of years. All individuals who study abroad do not necessarily undergo this change, however. If individuals maintain especially close ties with their family and home country while they are abroad, they probably will not have as life-changing an experience in terms of worldview, values, and career orientation as one who separates himself from his circle of close family and friends. The cases also seem to indicate that issues occurring both at home and in the host country affect the degree to which an individual feels liberated to experiment with identity and with ideology. If for some reason one's country is under attack by the host country, an individual may adhere more strongly than usual to the typical values and perspectives of his country out of a feeling of self-defense and patriotism. Likewise, if the host country is undergoing a rigorous self-examination and critique of societal values, an exchange student is more likely to participate in the examination of his or her own society's values in addition to those of the host culture.

Further research and investigation of more leaders must be done in order to make any conclusive statements, but these three leaders all have something unique about their leadership, whether it is their dramatic change from war hawk to peace activist, or that they were the first woman to lead a Muslim country. Although it is impossible to determine whether this uniqueness was due to their family, their own political context, some set of personal characteristics, or education, by accumulating more data, one can begin to rule out options and see the common threads.
Appendix 1: Hofstede’s Dimensions for the United States, Ireland, Pakistan, and Israel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Power distance</th>
<th>Uncertainty Avoidance</th>
<th>Individualism</th>
<th>Masculinity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>small-medium</td>
<td>moderately weak</td>
<td>very individual</td>
<td>masculine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>weak</td>
<td>moderately indiv</td>
<td>masculine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>medium-high</td>
<td>moderately strong</td>
<td>very collective</td>
<td>exact middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>very small</td>
<td>strong</td>
<td>middle</td>
<td>low feminine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Power Distance*- indicates the extent to which a society accepts the fact that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally.

*Uncertainty Avoidance*- indicates the extent to which a society feels threatened by uncertain and ambiguous situation and tries to avoid these situations by providing greater career stability, establishing more formal rules, not tolerating deviant ideas and behaviors, and believing in absolute truths and the attainment of expertise.

*Individualism-Collectivism*- individualism implies a loosely knit social framework in which people are supposed to take care of themselves and of their families only, while collectivism is characterized by a tight social framework in which people distinguish between in-groups and out-groups.

*Masculinity*- measurements in terms of this dimension express the extent to which the dominant values in society are “masculine”—that is, assertiveness, the acquisition of money and things, and not caring for others, the quality of life, or people.
Appendix 2: Kauffmann Model for Transformation Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>autonomy</th>
<th>belonging</th>
<th>values</th>
<th>cognition/vocation</th>
<th>worldview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1: Other-Dependent</td>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>Dualistic</td>
<td>Encapsulated Ethnocentrism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2: Inner-Dependent</td>
<td>Self-Selected</td>
<td>Searching</td>
<td>Relativistic</td>
<td>Empathetic Ethnorelativism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3: Inter-Dependent</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td>Owned</td>
<td>Commitment in Relativism</td>
<td>Integrated Ethnorelativism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**autonomy**-refers to the way one person relates to another
**other-dependency**- sense of the world resides in an assumed authority outside the self
**inner-dependency**-begin to value authority of self as well as other sources of authority
**inter-dependency**-trust centered in the meeting of self and other and in recognizing the strength in each (Kauffmann 128-9)

**belonging**-deals with network of relationships
**conventional**-conforms to class norms and interests of group born into
**self-selected group**-expansion of previously held boundaries of family, includes “those of like mind”
**open**-an alliance with those that are truly other than oneself—those that see the world differently

**values**
**inherited**-political, religious preferences reflect those of parents or other authority figure
**searching**- any belief, no matter how sacred, up for evaluation
**owned**-committed to values uniquely their own

**cognition**-refers to intellectual development
**dualistic**-clear delineations between right and wrong based on authority of external group or person
**relativism**-recognize that knowledge is contextual and relative, different perspectives are pieces that fit into a whole
**commitment in relativism**-make a self-conscious choice for one’s way of knowing, affirm responsibilities within pluralistic world

**worldview**-major unifying perception of “what is and how it is” (Kauffmann140)
**encapsulated**-local seen as universal, relative as absolute, complex as simple
**ethnorelativism**-difference no longer seen as threatening, empathy for other beliefs
**integrated ethnorelativism**-allows ethical choice and action in the profoundly relativistic world
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