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
This paper is part of the requirement for honors in rhetoric and communications studies. The signatures below, by the advisor, a departmental reader, and a third reader, demonstrate that Kristin Kushlan has met all the requirements needed to receive honors in Rhetoric and Communications Studies.



(Advisor)



(Departmental Reader)



(Second Reader)

CONSTRUCTING MUAMMAR AL-GADDAFI

KRISTIN KUSHLAN

MAY 2007

Introduction:

The European Self needs violence and needs to confront its Other to feel and maintain its power, to remake itself continually. The generalized state of war that continuously subtends colonial representations is not accidental or even unwanted- violence is the necessary foundation of colonialism itself... the Master can only achieve a hollow form of recognition; it is the Slave, through life-and-death struggle, who has the potential to move forward through full consciousness.ⁱ

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire

Present-day rhetoric of the United States government utilizes the age-old binary of good versus evil that creates divisions between the West and the Middle East and justifies violence against all civilians, soldiers and government officials from the opposing side by rhetorically constructing an enemy that is non-human, evil, and dangerous. This rhetorical tool of the binary becomes increasingly problematic when used to suppress rebellion and perpetuate dominant power structures, for it encourages further rebellion and conflict. What we are experiencing in U.S. political rhetoric today is that as the dominant power structure, the government fights to control resistance (appearing in the form of terrorism) against Western systems of oppression.

The use of the binary of good versus evil in U.S. political rhetoric, sometimes referred to as the Manichean dichotomy,ⁱⁱ is a rhetorical strategy used by the state as it attempts to reinforce dominant power structures. “The imperial machine... produces and reproduces [master narratives] (ideological master narratives in particular) in order to validate and celebrate its own power.”ⁱⁱⁱ Those in the U.S. Government understand that

language legitimizes and furthers power structures, but the use of binaries, specifically those which attempt to “erase and neutralize... differences and individualities”^{iv} with the creation of the enemy, will only be met with rebellion in this post-modern world that demands acceptance of difference.

Increased subordination inherently leads to an increase in uprising, but this is not a negative process, for “disobedience to authority is one of the most natural and healthy acts. To us it seems completely obvious that those who are exploited will resist and-- given the necessary conditions-- rebel.”^v Given this light, terrorism is a healthy act of rebellion against a prevailing system of oppression, for America colonized the space of the Middle East through globalization and capitalistic expansion, and so-called terrorists such as the Libyan leader, Muammar al-Gaddafi,^{vi} rebel against that oppression. For example, Osama bin Laden speaks of freeing his people from Western oppression: “We fight because we are free men who don't sleep under oppression. We want to restore freedom to our nation, just as you (America) lay waste to our nation. So shall we lay waste to yours.”^{vii} Sometimes, like in the case of September 11, the rebellion is successful, while other times, such as the case of Gaddafi, the oppressor forces concession. Thus, the War on Terror is a struggle by the U.S. to contain revolutions against its global power.^{viii}

Rhetoricians such as Robert Ivie and George Lakoff have examined the use of language of opposition to create and control various enemies during the War on Terror, but they have also ignored or overlooked numerous cases. This paper will examine one such case, that of Muammar al-Gaddafi, whose reciprocal violence eventually succumbed to the oppressor's global economic power. This case study will explore how the U.S.

government rhetorically constructed Gaddafi in order to control both his identity within American society (as either an enemy or an ally), as well as the counter-violence that Gaddafi supposedly enacted against Western systems of power. This essay aims to bring to light the circumstances of Gaddafi's situation that lies between the two poles of the imposed binary and to ultimately question the faulty rhetorical system with which the U.S. government justifies its violent foreign policies.

To achieve this, I will examine the rhetorical construction of Gaddafi by looking at first language of opposition found in archived newspaper articles and political rhetoric from the 1980s^{ix} to show how Gaddafi was portrayed as an enemy, followed by rhetoric from the past five years to show how Gaddafi has been framed as a reformed sinner and an ally. I will then explore the political reasons behind this change in rhetoric, exploring why the U.S. government chose to change the construction by which Gaddafi was defined. I will argue that the U.S. government, having trouble maintaining justifications for the War on Terror and the War in Iraq, aimed to validate these conflicts by placing Gaddafi within a binary. The last section of this essay will aim to expose the middle ground within the binary from both time periods to show that Gaddafi was not completely evil in the 1980s and that he is not a reformed ally today. The essay hopes to provide another example from the War on Terror of how the U.S. government utilized language to legitimize violence in the hopes of controlling rebellion against the Western systems of oppression and power, and to highlight the dangers of these rhetorical constructs.

Today the U.S. government relies on language of opposition to justify violent foreign policy. Because of this, we find ourselves faced with revolt against the system of oppression that we have produced, because language of opposition promotes cultural

hegemony and furthers oppressive power structures. In our postmodern world, oppressive power resides in discourse, for “discourses have become one of the primary means of imperialism. Whereas in the past, imperialism was about controlling the native by colonizing her/him territorially, now imperialism is more about subjugating the ‘native’ by colonizing him discursively.”^x U.S. “representations of subjects of developing countries and racially oppressed groups are as an ‘other’-racially inferior groups are hence open to subjugation by (white) Western discursive practices.”^{xi} While violent rebellion is the common reaction to such oppression, the more peaceful method is to reject the binaries presented to us by political rhetoricians, and search for the full meaning of an international conflict found within the middle ground removed by the binary.

To achieve this, we must pay attention to what is commonly known as the “excluded middle”^{xii} and “resist the notion of rhetoric as a unified, coherent, and univocal collection of texts stretching over time... [we] must instead locate the variety of rhetorics that exist at any particular moment and examine their interaction with each other and the conditions of their production.”^{xiii} This essay will aim to reveal the ‘variety of rhetorics’ present in the case of Gaddafi using a critical rhetorical approach in my research. I argue that Gaddafi did not undergo a ‘change of character’ as the political discourse claims, but that after years of diplomacy and secret meetings, Gaddafi made a decision that was beneficial to both his country and to U.S. interests.

In doing this, I argue that the Western world must rethink its use of binaries and language of opposition, for binaries promote the dehumanization and eradication of other cultures in an attempt to advance and protect current systems of power and domination

and stifle revolutionary violence. While it is impossible to eliminate the use of these binaries, it is crucial that, upon receiving these rhetorical constructions from politicians via the news media, Western audiences are aware of and critical in their analyses of such language. It is equally imperative that Western audiences become acutely aware of the dangers of language of opposition that leads to subjugation of the enemy Other. “The crisis of modernity has from the beginning had an intimate relation to racial subordination and colonization... the nation-state is a machine that produces Others, creates racial difference, and raises boundaries that delimit and support the modern subject of sovereignty.”^{xiv}

I must briefly stress that the complete elimination of language of opposition is impossible, for the processes of human meaning-making are based upon difference, and it is upon difference that binaries are structured. “Difference matters because it is essential to meaning; without it meaning could not exist... [and] the ‘Other’ is fundamental to the constitution of the self.”^{xv} The creation of a self (such as a national identity) is dependent upon the existence of an Other, thus the rhetorical construction of the Other and language of opposition are inherent to the human process of understanding. This may be benign when basing identity on peaceful cultural differences- such as: the French like stinky cheese while Americans prefer hamburgers- but these processes become dangerous when used to create an enemy in order to justify violence against, and subordination of, other human beings.

While the rhetorical creation of the Other may be an effective short-term solution in justifying violence in the attempt to retain control of the dominant systems of power, it will fail in producing such control, for the binary will be met with resistance and revolt.

This is a historical assumption, as the United States rests on a creation narrative of revolt against systems of oppression, and while the use of the rhetorical framing of an Other will always occur, the oppressors will eventually fail. The importance of this work is to highlight language of opposition that is used to justify violence and reify power structures, for it is this use of rhetoric that keeps us from moving forward peacefully toward an era in which difference is accepted.

Section 1: Muammar al-Gaddafi- Product of the Binary

The use of the good/evil binary in mediated political rhetoric^{xvi} has become a staple for the U.S. government in justifying the War on Terror, during which we have witnessed multiple examples of language of opposition and rhetorical creations of an evil Other/enemy. In the original conflict, President George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden rhetorically constructed each other as evil enemies. Bin Laden defined U.S. capitalism as evil, and Bush as the crusading leader of this power-hungry society. Bush's rhetorical path was somewhat less smooth. The conflict began with overall indictment of the Muslim culture as backwards, but as racial problems in America emerged from this rhetoric, he carefully and quickly re-defined the enemy as a radical group who do not represent all Muslims, and who are crazy and different from "good" Muslims. Bin Laden was portrayed as the crazy, extremist leader of this group, who were quickly defined as terrorists. The war moved rapidly from a war in Afghanistan to a global War on Terror and finally to the War in Iraq.

Over the past five years, Americans have witnessed the U.S. government justify violence through the rhetorical creation of an enemy, today labeled as the 'terrorist,' (including those labeled as a supporter terrorists, the definition of which ranges from

allowing labeled terrorists to stay in a country, to the possession of nuclear weapon technology). While rhetoricians have examined the implications of this language from a number of angles and instances, the essential binary remains constructed and often uncontested or overlooked within our culture's language.

One example of language of opposition that remains relatively unexamined is the rhetorical construction of the leader of Libya, Muammar al-Gaddafi— particularly the rhetorical relocation of Gaddafi from one side of the binary (evil) to the other (good) over the past ten years. Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, political discourse portrayed Gaddafi as an other/evil enemy and as a primary sponsor and supporter of international terrorism. During the period, Gaddafi incurred numerous economic sanctions and military attacks. In 1999, economic problems from imposed sanctions forced Gaddafi to attempt to re-enter the international fold, but the U. S. government would not remove sanctions without Gaddafi's promise to disband nuclear intelligence and repay the families of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.^{xvii} When Gaddafi finally gave into Western requests in 2003, sanctions were lifted and the political discourse surrounding Gaddafi changed, discursively leading to the removal of Libya from the State Sponsors of Terrorists list^{xviii} in May 2006.

This section of the essay will first examine political and journalistic rhetoric from the 1980s that discursively portrayed Gaddafi as an evil enemy, thus justifying violence against him and his people. I will then examine the same kind of rhetoric from the past five or so years that portrayed Gaddafi as a man who underwent a change of character to become the U.S government's number one ally in the Middle East.

The Construction of Gaddafi as an Evil Other

Throughout the 1970s, Western leaders associated Gaddafi and his regime with terrorist activities, and by the mid-1980s, Journalists mirrored the rhetoric of Western politicians that portrayed Gaddafi as the principal financier of international terrorism. The U.S. government tied Gaddafi's regime to acts of terrorism including the 1972 Munich Olympics killing of Israeli athletes, the 1973 assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Sudan, and the 1975 raid of a meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in Vienna, led by the international terrorist known as Carlos the Jackal. The U.S. government also accused Gaddafi of supporting the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Japanese Red Army, and others.^{xix} While the list of Gaddafi's supposed infractions goes on, I will narrow my examination to public discourse surrounding operation El Dorado Canyon to illuminate language used to justify state violence and further Western systems of power.

In 1986, Western politicians blamed Gaddafi and his government for an attack on a discotheque in Berlin that killed two U.S. servicemen, after which the U.S. Navy invaded the Gulf of Sidra in the Mediterranean Sea. Libya claimed the gulf as territorial waters, and string of military conflicts ensued.^{xx} On April 14, in what was dubbed operation El Dorado Canyon, the U. S. government bombed the Libya's capitol, Tripoli, striking Gaddafi's home and killing a number of civilians including Gaddafi's young adopted daughter. The U.S. government had to justify these actions, so "the administration charged that its leader, Mohammar Qaddafi, was organizing terrorist strikes on Americans and U.S. interests abroad."^{xxi} The news media disseminated this political rhetoric to portray Operation El Dorado Canyon as the necessary eradication of an irrational evil enemy, allowing for the motivations behind violent acts to remain

unchallenged. “When it came to defining the problem, the media overwhelmingly favored the administration,”^{xxii} thus journalists allowed the government to disseminate language of opposition to the public without question. While the journalists failed to perform their duty as the watchdog of the government, the audience (Western civilians), also failed to question this language.

The discourse surrounding Gaddafi in the 1980s exemplifies the use of the rhetorical arsenal necessary to create an enemy using a good versus evil binary. There are a number of rhetorical tools commonly used in this process including: the creation of the self/audience^{xxiii}, the process of dehumanization, and the “three topoi”^{xxiv} as theorized by Robert Ivie. The placement of Gaddafi as the evil Other within the binary of good versus evil, simplified the justification of violence against him and his supporters. As Dr. Rosa Eberly explains, the designation of an Other as evil is dangerous because “while ‘evil’ might function for some audiences as an answer to forensic questions, it does little to provide guidance for deliberative questions... claims about evil shut down deliberation.”^{xxv}

The binary of good/evil becomes harmful when used to rhetorically create an enemy because when political rhetoric constitutes a person as the evil Other, the self (in this case the American/Western audience of this rhetoric) will aim for the complete eradication of the evil, even through violent means. This rhetoric also positions the audience as striving for goodness at the risk of becoming evil, thereby forcing the audience to fight evil while satisfyingly positioning them as good.

In 2000, journalist Ugboaja Ohaegbulam explained how this discourse functions, its implications, and how Gaddafi had been placed within a binary at the aim of creating an

enemy:

Over the past three decades, casting leaders of foreign countries as Hitler's and their countries as evil empires has become the staple of U.S. foreign policy. U.S. Administrations... have tended to use such characterizations as a shorthand justification for a number of invasions, bombing sorties, and military buildups. Conducting foreign policy in this fashion, however, can have serious drawbacks. Castigating foreign leaders and America's enemies as evil personifies raises the stakes of operations and leaves little room for a nuanced and often more practical approach to conflict resolution. Americans troubled relations with Libya have been a victim of this approach for about thirty years.^{xxvi}

A common rhetorical tool used to create an enemy is known as "imperial savagery."^{xxvii} In this method, the political rhetorician portrays a culture as backwards and in need of saving. John R. Butler defines this type of rhetoric as, "the development of a primitive society that does not appreciate its problems or the benevolent intentions of those who wish to help [and] the identification of a solution that constitutes bringing civilization to a troubled culture."^{xxviii} James Bovard, a writer for the *Future of Freedom Foundation*, discusses the Reagan Administration's use of this tactic when it proposes that the Libyan people are trapped by Gaddafi and need to be saved by America. At the same time, Bovard argues, the U.S. government warns the Libyan people that Gaddafi's evil acts implicate them as enemies to the Western world:

While the U.S. government insisted that the killing of civilians was an accident, a Voice of America broadcast that night warned the Libyan people, "The people of the U.S. bear Libya and its people no enmity or hatred. However... so long as

Libyans obey his orders, then they must accept the consequences. Colonel Qaddafi is your tragic burden.^{xxxix}

Another example of imperial savagery appeared in a speech Reagan gave the night before Operation El Dorado Canyon when he said “I’m sure that today most Libyans are ashamed and disgusted that this man has made their country a synonym for barbarism around the world. The Libyan people are a decent people caught in the grip of a tyrant.”^{xxx}

Dehumanization is another primary component of the process of enemy-making, for the construction of the enemy as evil and non-human justifies killing the enemy. Ivie refers to the result of this rhetoric as a ‘just’ or justified war. He explains that “warfare is characterized as a means of last resort, a necessary evil forced upon a reluctant nation by the aggressive acts of an enemy bent upon the alienation of humankind from their liberties.”^{xxxi} The self/good side, in fighting against an aggressor, is freed from responsibility for the conflict and has been forced to war as the victim of an attack by evil. This “victimage rhetoric”^{xxxii} allows for complete justification for war through the projection of the aggressor as a savage with irrational desires for domination. The use of this topoi was seen clearly when Reagan stated that “Colonel Qadhafi had engaged in acts of international terror, acts that put him outside the company of civilized men,” and said that the bombing at La Belle Discothèque was a “monstrous brutality” that was “but the latest act in Colonel Qadhafi’s reign of terror.”^{xxxiii} This language portrays Gaddafi as a non-human, for he is not like ‘civilized men,’ thus constructing him as an enemy who can be killed without remorse.

Ivie lays out the three topoi (means of justification) against the enemy, all of which

the U.S. government applied to Gaddafi both in relation to his own actions and through his associations with other 'enemies' such as terrorists, and to his possession of 'weapons of mass destruction.' The first of topos, 'force versus freedom,' posits that everyone has a right to freedom and that the good side can offer that freedom. In this construction, a political rhetorician constructs the good side as fighting in defense of freedom against an enemy who is forcefully threatening to remove said freedoms, thereby forcing the self to retaliate with even greater force, and so on. During Operation El Dorado Canyon, Reagan argues that the U.S. and its allies are fighting to defend the freedom that Gaddafi is forcefully trying to destroy, so the U.S. must in turn use force to protect that freedom:

Our friends and allies in Europe... understand better than most that there is no security, no safety, in the appeasement of evil. It must be the core of Western policy that there be no sanctuary for terror. And to sustain such a policy, free men and free nations must unite and work together.^{xxxiv}

By declaring that not just America, but all of its allies in Europe, are fighting for freedom, Reagan is creating an enemy who threatens an entire way of life. This enemy is dangerous not only to the U.S., but to all who are good who defend security and safety, therefore the eradication of this enemy is all the more justified.

The second topos is the construction of "irrational versus rational,"^{xxxv} in which the enemy and his ideas are irrational because he^{xxxvi} is crazy and non-human, while the self's ideas are rational, as he is sane and human. This method is employed in an article in which the bureau chief of The New York Times in Madrid, Edward Schumacher, portrayed Gaddafi as a crazy person. "Many have wondered: is Qaddafi mad? A megalomaniac? Otherwise respectable psychologists have tried to analyze him from

afar... While many of those around him are corrupt, Qaddafi by all accounts is not, making him the worst sort of dictator: a true-believing one.”^{xxxvii} By positioning him as crazy by all Western standards, and then labeling him as a dictator, who by definition is contrary to Democracy and therefore is an enemy, Schumacher reflects the perspective intended by the government that Gaddafi is indeed an irrational evil enemy. This topos suggests that it is the job of the self to contain and tame the other because they are too irrational to fix themselves, which we see when Schumacher said that psychologists (assumed to be sane/Western) have studied this Other—a ‘madman’ who truly believes that he is an honorable revolutionary.

The language in a 1986 *Newsweek* article also shows the use of the “irrational versus rational”^{xxxviii} topos when it quotes former Secretary of State George Shultz as encouraging a coup in Libya, and quotes an unnamed U.S. Official as saying that “the problem is Kaddafi, not Libya.”^{xxxix} The language in this article assumes that Gaddafi is a problem without question, saying Reagan’s advisors “believe it [eliminating Kaddafi] will stop Libya’s troublemaking.” The article concludes by stating that:

Trying to reason with him [Kaddafi] has failed... and organizing sanctions has proved either impossible or ineffective. With all other possibilities blocked, administration hands say, they decided months ago that military pressure was the only choice left. ‘The debate about options,’ says one senior official, ‘ended late last year.’^{xl}

This article argues that rational methods of peace-making such as ‘reason’ or ‘sanctions’ have failed because Gaddafi is an irrational being, leaving the government with no other choice but to use violence to topple this non-human threat.

The third topos defined by Ivie is “aggression versus defense,”^{xli} which assumes that the enemy was the voluntary and initial aggressor, and we (the self) are involuntary and defensive in our response. A *New York Times* article from 1986 begins with, “Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi is spreading death beyond Libya's borders again,”^{xlii} and refers to Gaddafi’s involvement in Chad as “naked aggression.”^{xliii} The journalist then portrayed the U.S. government as the needed defenders of good in the world, thus portraying it as a hero against the enemy: “The Reagan Administration's response is as welcome as it is swift. It is reassuring to see that, despite the Iran-contra affair, Washington can still respond to a crisis in a way that appears timely, measured and open.”^{xliv}

In a speech given the night before Operation El Dorado Canyon, Reagan uses this topos most often of the three. He stated that “self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty,”^{xlv} and that Americans wanted a peaceful solution, but that Gaddafi the aggressor did not allow it:

We Americans are slow to anger. We always seek peaceful avenues before resorting to the use of force -- and we did. We tried quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, economic sanctions, and demonstrations of military force. None succeeded. Despite our repeated warnings, Qadhafi continued his reckless policy of intimidation, his relentless pursuit of terror.^{xlvi}

This statement rhetorically constructs ‘we Americans’ as the good, humane, and rational side who tried to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner, but because of Gaddafi’s irrational and aggressive tactics, we were forced to use violence in order to conquer this extremely dangerous threat.

All three topoi of justification allow for the dehumanization of the enemy in such a way that absolves the self of any responsibility for the violence that comes with the conflict. Through this process, the call to war is portrayed as a last option; a final resort in saving the good in the world (the self) that is being threatened by evil. This rhetorical construction became the foundation of the American War on Terror, and it continues to be relevant to all who are portrayed as the evil Other by association with groups of peoples or activities already constituted in the American identity as evil.

In the 1980s, political rhetoricians constructed Gaddafi as the evil enemy using common rhetorical tools of enemy-making. I will now examine to current discourse that constructs Gaddafi as a person who, due to a change of character (as opposed to a change in policy), has moved to the 'good' side of the binary by attaining the identity of the self. When reading this next section, keep in mind the tools of dehumanization and the three topoi discussed in the previous section, for their use in the past construction of Gaddafi as an enemy is crucial to the relocation of Gaddafi from enemy to ally. This narrative of an other-turned-self highlights Gaddafi's human nature by showing how he has undergone a change of heart, thus providing proof that he has moved from the side of the inhumane/irrational/aggressive/evil other to the side of the humane/rational/passive/good self.

The Construction of Gaddafi as a Self

In 2003, the U.S. government announced to Western audiences that Gaddafi planned to end his nuclear weapons program. From 2003 to the removal of Libya from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list in May 2006, Western politicians began to change their rhetoric surrounding Gaddafi in the hopes that he would smoothly transition from

enemy to ally in the eyes of the Western audiences. Using the same processes that were used when creating Gaddafi as an enemy, politicians were able to construct Gaddafi as an Other who has, with the help of the civilized Western world, been reformed to become less like an enemy (irrational, inhumane, crazy) and more like the self (rational, human, sane). In addition to political rhetoric, I will examine newspaper articles in which journalists' construction of Gaddafi mirrors that of the politicians in showing the successful relocation of Gaddafi within the good/evil binary.

An important rhetorical tool in the creation of an enemy is the creation of the self, which appears when Gaddafi is framed to have “decided” to turn away from activities identified with the “other” such as terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, and join the identity of the “self.” John M. Murphy explains that political rhetoricians provided a construction “through which the audience was to interpret its identity. Simply put, we were good and they were evil.”¹ This process was applied to Gaddafi, for when associated with terrorism and WMD's , he was an enemy, a non-human and an Other. When language constitutes him as someone who was an enemy in the past, it implies that he is by default now a self. Gaddafi's movement from one side of the other is primarily constructed through language that shows him to be removing his identity from things that we regularly identify in tandem with enemies or otherness, including terrorism and nuclear proliferation. By removing these aspects from Gaddafi's identity, it is easy to construct him as an ally.

A BBC article from 2006 clearly shows how Gaddafi has become more like the self in noting his humanity (an important aspect of self-ness): “looking and sounding increasingly weary, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, 64, seems to have come to terms with

his own mortality.”^{xlvi} The article portrays him as one who was once an other: “he [Gaddafi] has ruled his country in the style of the most eccentric of absolute monarchs imaginable,” but then shows his change of character: “with the wisdom of years perhaps, the Libyan leader has tried hard to turn a new page and clean up the image of his country as a haven for revolutionaries.”^{xlviii} The article shows that Gaddafi has been rewarded for his choice to become more like the Western self:

the decision of the U.S. to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya marks the crowning success of his efforts to have his country accepted back into the international community. He would clearly like a skeptical world to see this as final proof that he and his country have cast aside their rebellious streak.”^{xlix}

In this article, Gaddafi is shown as a formerly crazy revolutionary who has come to his senses and accepted the correct way of life; the life of the Western self. Another BBC article in 2004 says that Gaddafi was once “one of the West's bogeymen,” who has “turned into, if not exactly a new friend, then someone the West is doing business with,”¹ providing discursive proof that Gaddafi is no longer the evil other of the 1970s and 80s.

A BBC article from September 2005 called Libya the “Washington fairytale,” in reference to Gaddafi’s decision to end Libya’s nuclear weapons program. The article states that “once seen in Washington as a typical ‘rogue state,’ Libya has now definitively come in from the cold.” The article calls Libya “a country once condemned for its involvement in international terrorism and for having clandestine weapons programmes,” again showing a previous (and now non-existent) identity associated with concepts that define Otherness. This language highlights the idea that Gaddafi was an enemy in the

past, implying that he is no longer such thus, according to the binary, he has become more like the self.

The article again emphasizes Gaddafi's past identity as an enemy, calling Gaddafi a "maverick veteran" and highlights his change of character, saying that Arabs were "as surprised as anyone when Libya admitted responsibility for the Lockerbie and French airliner bombings,"^{li} showing that his change of character was unexpected due to his past evilness, thus highlighting that he has truly changed. Journalist Anthony Layden said that Gaddafi chose "a radical change of direction,"^{lii} emphasizing Gaddafi's move from the side of the enemy/other to the side of the self, for an enemy can not be like the self unless his previous moral deficiencies (upon which or justification of violence against him rested) have been removed or remedied.

While many journalists reflected the language of the political rhetoricians, one *New York Times* writer makes note of, and denounces, the change in political rhetoric. He shows Gaddafi's past status as an enemy by referring to Gaddafi as, "a onetime bitter enemy [that] the U.S. government had tired for years to isolate, topple, or kill,"^{liii} thus noting Gaddafi's past location within the binary. The article quoted Noman Benotman,^{liv} as saying that "anyone who is an enemy of Kadafi is also an enemy of the United States," showing how Gaddafi has literally become part of the self as an ally to the U.S. government. The article then quoted Ashur Shamis,^{lv} as recognizing the change in Western rhetoric, saying that "Kadafi was considered to be a dictator and terrorist, and Libya was a rogue regime... suddenly, everything has changed. Kadafi used to be public enemy No. 1 and now you are arresting people based on his information..."^{lvi} While this article ultimately questions the change of rhetoric, it still uses language of opposition, and

clearly shows that Gaddafi has moved from one side of the binary (enemy) to the other (ally).

In addition, Gaddafi is shown to be so much of a self that he can serve as a model for helping other enemies to become good. “The US Assistant Secretary of State, David Welch... explicitly cited Libya as an important model as Washington pushes for change in the policy of other countries, notably Iran and North Korea.”^{lvii} This political rhetoric shows that Gaddafi and Libya have been reformed, or saved, by the Western self, and provides a model for the salvation of other so-called others. Libya provides the U.S. government with a clear example of the success of its policies, and can be used to help other international goals, such as controlling nuclear weapon knowledge in Iran. The argument that “the experience with Libya shows that seemingly intractable problems can be grappled with by diplomatic means,”^{lviii} allows the U.S. government to continue policies that ‘encourage’ other enemies to become “good” members of the global community. Today and in the future, the supposed success in Libya provides more fuel for the fodder of the U.S. government to continue implementing anti-nuclear policies abroad, thus violence to this end is again justified.

On May 15, 2006, President Bush announced the removal of Libya from America’s list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, officially declaring Gaddafi an ally to the Western cause, bringing new implications to the aforementioned rhetoric. Upon doing so, Bush discussed Gaddafi’s change of character, making clear the idea that Gaddafi was now to be identified as an ally:

Colonel Gaddafi... communicated to us his willingness to make a decisive change in the policy of his government. At the direction of Colonel Gaddafi himself,

Libyan officials have provided U.S. and British officers with documentation on that country's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programs and activities. With today's announcement by its leader, Libya has begun the process of rejoining the community of nations. As the Libyan government takes these essential steps and demonstrates its seriousness, its good faith will be returned. Libya can regain a secure and respected place among the nations, and over time, achieve far better relations with the United States. The Libyan people are heirs to an ancient and respected culture, and their country lies at the centre of a vital region. As Libya becomes a more peaceful nation, it can be a source of stability in Africa and the Middle East... as we have found with other nations, old hostilities do not need to go on forever.^{lix}

During this speech, Bush rhetorically constructed Gaddafi as a self, an ally, and a friend. He spoke of Gaddafi as if Gaddafi were a rational human being. He highlights this with the comment 'at the direction of Gaddafi himself,' implying that Gaddafi's move was unexpected due to his past construction as an enemy, and that he has changed from that construction. Bush uses language that adds humanity to Libya, emphasizing its cultural heritage as well as its potential for good in the unstable region. This discourse prepares the American audience for a change in rhetoric, for it begins to portray Gaddafi, Libya, and the people of Libya as associated with the self, the good, and the ally.

It has become clear, as will be explained in the next section, that Gaddafi's move to the self side of the binary was a prelude to his removal from the list. The narrative of an enemy turned ally over a six-year process should seem shaky (at the least) to the discerning audience. How could an irrational evil enemy suddenly become an ally to the

West in a short six years? Gaddafi has not turned from evil to good-- the public discourse around him changed in tandem with political motivations of the Western world. The next section of this essay will explore the political motivations that in part provide explanations for these changes.

Section 2: Political Motives Behind the Rhetorical Turn

In the previous section, I explored rhetoric from the late 1980s, and then from 2003 to 2006, to show the ‘before and after’ effect of language of opposition. What the audience perceives today is a man who used to be evil in nature (on one side of the binary) who changed in nature to become good, like the self (to the other side of the binary). This relocation appears seamless, as if Gaddafi woke up one morning and decided that he had been wrong, and needed to change his ways. But what happened from the late 1980s to 2003? This time period provides us with the excluded middle, the ignored ‘multiple rhetorics’ systematically removed by the binary of good versus evil.

The process of a change in international policy concerning Gaddafi actually began in 1999, when Libya pledged its commitment to fighting Al-Qaeda and offered to open up its weapons program to international inspection after secret meetings with the Clinton administration. Evidence that Gaddafi’s policy change began in 1999 was found in an official State Department document that stated: “We have seen definite changes in Libya’s behavior, specifically in declining support for terrorism and increasing support for peace processes in the Middle East and Africa.”¹⁸ Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Gaddafi was one of the first Muslim leaders to condemn the actions of the Al-Qaeda bombers, again attempting to enter the global community.

The change in political rhetoric did not occur until two full years later, when it was

beneficial to the U.S. government. Three political motives arose in 2003: the need for justification of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the need for justification of (and proof of the legitimacy of) the War on Terror, and oil prices. The reasons that Gaddafi's initial attempted change in policy, as well as the reasons behind the U.S. government's choice to wait until 2003 to allow these changes, will be discussed at greater length in this section of the essay.

The U.S. Government's decision to change the rhetoric surrounding Gaddafi and finally allowing him to disband his nuclear programs helped to justify the War in Iraq. In order to rationalize the violence of and motives for the widely criticized War in Iraq, the Bush Administration discursively portrayed Gaddafi as giving up weapons of mass destruction just after Saddam Hussein was attacked and overthrown, implying that the War in Iraq scared Gaddafi into concession. In the *Financial Times*, Martin Indyk brings much of this to view:

Embarrassed by the failure to find Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, President George W. Bush is trying to find another WMD-related justification for the pre-emptive war on Iraq. Bush administration spokesmen have been quick to portray Libya's December decision to abandon WMD programs as the direct result of the US invasion of Iraq.^{lxix}

At the State of the Union address in January 2004, President Bush spoke solely about the War in Iraq, and implied a direct connection between U.S.'s involvement in Iraq and Gaddafi's decision to give up his nuclear programs:

Because of American leadership and resolve, the world is changing for the better. Last month, the leader of Libya voluntarily pledged to disclose and dismantle all

of his regime's weapons of mass destruction programs, including a uranium enrichment project for nuclear weapons. Colonel Qaddafi correctly judged that his country would be better off and far more secure without weapons of mass destruction. Nine Months of intense negotiations... succeeded with Libya, while 12 years of diplomacy with Iraq did not. And one reason is clear: For diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word of America"^{lxii}

Indyk says that, "the implication is clear. Get rid of one dictator because of his supposed WMD programs and others will be so afraid that they will voluntarily abandon their weapons programs. Therefore, even if no WMD's were found in Iraq, we still made the world a safer place."^{lxiii} This can be seen when Bush states that Libya 'would be better off and more secure,' referring to the fact that Iraq was bombed and the leader overthrown because of a suspicion of similar weapons programs. In addition, Bush draws a parallel to Saddam Hussein by referring to Gaddafi's government as a 'regime.' Bush concludes by stating that America has made the world a better place, and has redeemed its dependability in the international community.

Vice President Dick Cheney more directly pointed to the connection between Gaddafi and the War in Iraq, stating that Gaddafi's decision was "one of the great by-products . . . of what we did in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just five days after we captured Saddam Hussein, Mu'ammarr Qaddafi came forward and announced that he was going to surrender all of his nuclear materials to the United States."^{lxiv} Here, Cheney directly justifies the widely questioned violence of Iraq and Afghanistan, calling Gaddafi's decision 'one of the great by-products' of the violence. The violence was justified when

it supposedly lead to an evil enemy deciding to come to the 'good' side and give up his evil ways to become like the self.

The discourse that Gaddafi was scared or coerced into giving up weapons of mass destruction ran thickly through U.S. political rhetoric, yet the end of Gaddafi's WMD programs were not a result of the War in Iraq. Libya had offered to give up the programs in secret negotiations with the Clinton Administration in May 1999. The original surrender was because of a "deepening economic crisis produced by disastrous economic policies and mismanagement of oil revenues."^{lxv} Because of UN and U.S. sanctions incurred with the designation as a 'State Sponsor of Terrorism,' it was impossible for Gaddafi to export oilfield technology or expand oil production, thus reconciliation with the U.S. government was an economic necessity as opposed to a change of character.

Gaddafi first began to mend his international relations with the Clinton administration by settling a dispute with Britain over the shooting of the policewoman in London, followed by a decision to relinquish two Libyans accused in the Lockerbie bombing for trial in a third country.

Gaddafi offered to join the Chemical Weapons Convention and open their facilities to inspection during these preliminary talks, and then again in a second meeting in October of 1999, at which time they also offered to join the Middle East multilateral arms control talks. "Why did we not pursue the Libyan WMD offer then? Because resolving the PanAm103 issues was our condition for any further engagement. Moreover, as Libya's chemical weapons program was not considered an imminent threat and its nuclear program barely existed, getting Libya out of terrorism and securing compensation had been top priorities."^{lxvi} From the years of 1999 to 2003, Gaddafi attempted to re-

enter the international fold because of economic troubles brought about by sanctions, yet there was no benefit to the U.S political agenda, so there was no perceived need to discuss Gaddafi or his changes in policy. “The task of US diplomacy was to maintain the sanctions until Mr. Gaddafi had fulfilled all other obligations under the UN resolutions: ending support for terrorism, admitting culpability and compensating victims’ families.”^{lxvii}

The Bush administration created a convenient narrative that constructed Gaddafi’s choice to disarm as a direct result of the War in Iraq, but this narrative excluded large portions of the story. In *Newsweek*, Michael Hirsh illuminated the difference between the story portrayed by Western mediated political rhetoric, showing the binary between good and evil (noted in italics) as provision of a convenient and character-based narrative: Here is the official story on Libya, which Washington removed from its list of terror-sponsoring states this week. As the Bush administration likes to tell it, Muammar Kaddafi was scared straight by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. On Dec. 19, 2003, just days after Saddam Hussein was hauled from his spider hole, Kaddafi... terrorist poster boy from the 1980s...*gave up his life’s work as an international terrorist, renouncing both his weapons of mass destruction and his terror tactics.* Shocked by the fall of his fellow dictator, Kaddafi *turned into* as much a quivering stoolie as any doomed character on ‘The Sopranos...’ Now the autocrat whom Ronald Reagan *once called a ‘mad dog’ has become*, in the words of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, ‘*an important model* as nations around the world press for changes in behavior by Iranian and North Korean regimes.’ And Kaddafi’s about face is considered by Bush hard-liners to be a sweet vindication

of its policy of *confronting bad guys* without quarter.”^{lxviii}

The language in this article shows how Gaddafi used to be portrayed as evil, crazy and irrational, and how his construction within the U.S. government has changed to portray him as an important ally in the region. The italicized comments show the use of the good versus evil binary in political and new media rhetoric, as well as highlights Gaddafi’s move from one side of that binary to the other.

The political discourse surrounding the move from Iraq to Gaddafi is misleading, as “the talks with Libya long predated the invasion of Iraq, and they began long before Tripoli gave up either its terrorist or WMD aspirations.”^{lxix} While Gaddafi did change his foreign policies in 2004, he had been attempting such a change since 1999. Furthermore, this change in policy was simply that: changes necessary to hasten the removal of economic sanctions. Gaddafi wanted to change his policy on WMD’s in 1999, but was unable to do so until it was in the best interests of the U.S. government. In 2004, the U.S. government was able to use this change in rhetoric to not only provide justification for the War in Iraq, but also for the War on Terror.

The first change in the U.S. government’s rhetorical construction was to cite the 2003 decision to remove WMD programs as Gaddafi’s reform as sparked by fear of retaliation similar to Operation Iraqi Freedom. During the time between the announcement to disband nuclear programs in 2004 to the removal of Libya from the terrorist sponsor list in 2006, the government took diplomatic steps to ensure a smooth and unchallenged transition from enemy to ally. On September 21, 2004, President Bush ended the national emergency between Libya and the United States and lifted most economic sanctions other than those attached to the designation of a State Sponsor of

Terror. In Executive Order 13357, the President lifted four sanctions that had been in place since the late 1980s.^{lxx}

The provisions of the State Sponsors of Terrorism list were originally outlined in the Act of 1979 (expired in 2001, but renewed in Executive Order 13222, President Bush), which is maintained by the Secretary of State, who can not do away with any designation unless the President submits a report to congress that states that there has either been I) “a fundamental change in leadership and policies of the government, the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and the government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future,” or II) “that the government concerned has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the government concerned has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.”^{lxxi} The Arms Export Control Act of 1994^{lxxii} outlined further restrictions, and sanctions that remained due to this designation as outlined by the State Department included a number of bans exports on goods or services that could support military or terrorist activity.^{lxxiii} May 15, 2006, The U.S. State Department announced that it would restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and would removal Libya from the list of nations that support terrorism.^{lxxiv} This action followed Presidential Determination No. 2006-14 in which President Bush declared that “Libya had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six months, and had provided assurance that it would not support acts of international terrorism in the future.”^{lxxv} The determination brought an end to all sanctions once placed upon the country, allowing for trade to resume between Libya and the Western world. In September 2006, President

Bush formally ended the trade embargo with Libya, and waived most defense restrictions, allowing U.S. companies to participate in the destruction of Libya's chemical weapons.^{lxxvi}

This removal gave much needed validity to the War on Terror by showing measurable success of the War on Terror by proposing that designating Gaddafi as an enemy in this war forced him to change his policies on terrorism and WMD's. In addition, his removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list verified the list as a valid diplomatic tool, thus proving a measurable success in the War on Terror.

The placement of Muammar al-Gaddafi within a good/evil binary was an attempt to physically locate the enemies and allies in the Middle East, for the 'terrorist enemy' is not confined to a single concrete locality. The creation of a tangible enemy required numerous rhetorical tools including the 'Axis of Evil,' the 'Deck of Cards of the Terrorist Enemy,' and the list of 'State Sponsors of Terrorism,' that rhetorically aided functioning of the self-Other dichotomy by providing means of identifying the Other. The existence of these rhetorical tools is further legitimized when the Other is either defeated or reformed. In the case of Libya, the removal from the State Sponsors of Terrorists shows the success of the list, for it shows that not only did a real threat exist (as shown via its defeat) but that it was the list (via sanctions) that helped that defeat become a reality. By showing that the list (as a primary tool in the War on Terror) was successful in stopping support to terrorists, the U.S. government was able to point to tangible evidence of measurable success in the War on Terror, thus justifying further violence and the use of the rhetorical tools listed above.

The change in rhetoric allowed the Bush Administration to justify its foreign policy initiatives, legitimating both violence in Iraq, and in the name of

the War on Terror. I do not mean here to argue the worth of the sanctions in international affairs, but to discuss the way that the language surrounding the use of these sanctions functions to reinforce dominant power structures. The final reason for the change in rhetoric is oil prices. Libya is an extremely oil-rich country, and by removing economic sanctions (via removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list) on the country, President Bush made a huge amount of oil available to U.S. markets, as international oil companies were able to return to Libya. According to a BBC article from May 2006, “over recent months there have been moves towards economic reform. U.S. oil companies have returned to acreage they left in 1986, and firms from around the world are competing fiercely for new oil and gas contracts.”^{lxxvii} An Al Jazeera article stated that oil and gas reserves are the most important natural resources in Libya and that a 2005 estimate put Libya's proven oil reserves at 39-40 billion barrels and its natural gas reserves at 52 trillion cubic feet. The article explained that after “Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi fulfilled all requirements for the lifting of UN, British and US sanctions, Western - including U.S. - companies saw a green light to do business in Libya again. Not surprisingly, the biggest U.S. companies re-entering Libya are from the energy sector.”^{lxxviii} The U.S. companies who re-entered Libya included Marathon Oil Corp, Conoco Phillips, ExxonMobil Corp, and Chevron Corp and Occidental Petroleum Corp.^{lxxix} Clearly, the removal of sanctions led to huge opportunity for U.S. business.

Many argue that the driving force behind Operation Iraqi Freedom was oil, and I believe that it was one of the motivations for removing sanctions on Libya. Research today widely posits that nonrenewable resources such as oil are directly responsible for violence and that countries with a natural abundance of a resource such as oil are at

increased risk of violence. “The abundance of mineral resources is consistently associated with higher levels of conflict and lower levels of human and institutional development.”^{lxxx} While much of rhetoric surrounding oil is concerned with problems of scarcity or abundance, other rhetoric is concerned with oil dependency, with marked difference between the terms of abundance and dependency. “This paper... stresses the vulnerability resulting from resource dependence, rather than conventional notions of scarcity or abundance.”^{lxxxi} While rhetoric of scarcity or abundance talks in terms of the amount of oil available, rhetoric of dependency is focused on the interpersonal implications of the global oil market. Whether speaking in terms of abundance or dependency, Libya’s large oil reserves directly increase the amount of violence, both domestically and internationally:

Beyond increasing the risk of armed conflict by financing and motivating conflicts, natural resources also increase the vulnerability of countries to armed conflict by weakening the ability of political institutions to peacefully resolve conflicts.

Contrary to the widely held belief that abundant resources aid economic growth and are thus positive for political stability, most empirical evidence suggests that countries economically dependent on the export of primary commodities are at a higher risk of political instability and armed conflict.”^{lxxxii}

Libya’s government is forced into the global market and into international violence over oil, for “resources are exported into the world economy from numerous peripheral places. They are worth controlling and fighting over precisely because they are valued in the global economy.”^{lxxxiii} Because these resources are so valuable to the global market, all major economic players will be involved in that resources production and exportation,

thus any country with naturally occurring resources such as Libya are subjected to international economics, politics, and most importantly, violence.

While the U.S. government rhetorically created a move from evil (WMD's and terror) to good (accepting Western standards), there has been very little discourse surrounding the issue of oil apart from various statements in the Western media proclaiming how much oil is available in Libya, and in what ways this will be good for the U.S. oil companies. Any rhetoric surrounding the oil issue includes terms such as 'increased diplomacy' and 'opportunity for business,' thus rhetorically constructing an economic benefit from Gaddafi's transformation to good and ignoring the possibility that oil dependency may have led to the removal of those sanctions in the first place.

While the change in Gaddafi's international policies, due primarily to economic crisis placed on Libya by Western sanctions, began to take place as early as 1999, the change in language surrounding the leader began in December of 2003, only 10 months after the United States declared war on Iraq. As the War in Iraq escalated simultaneously with the War on Terror, the Bush Administration found their rhetoric and declarations constantly at odds with various critics, and their policies met disapproval from many sides. The choice of the Bush Administration to allow Gaddafi into the international arena after rhetorically creating the frame of a reformed sinner was a political move enacted in the hopes of justifying violence and encouraging the American public to support War efforts. While it is impossible to prove that three years of sanction removal and the eventual removal of Libya from the State Sponsors of Terrorist list was long-term plan for the justification of these two wars and their policies, the public discourse surrounding Gaddafi and Libya has performed that very function.

Today, the placement of Gaddafi in the good versus evil binary promotes the narrative that U.S. strength and diplomacy frightened Gaddafi into changing his policies and converted him the 'good' side of America's fight against weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The Western political arena benefited from changing the rhetorical framework of Gaddafi, for the change from other to self allowed for the justification of violence against the Iraqi and Afghani people, the legitimization of the War on Terror and the various associated lists, and increased business between Western oil companies and Libya due to removal of sanctions. The good/evil binary has been a useful tool for the U.S. government in achieving political goals, but it is dangerous and misleading as it leads to the justification of violence and oppression. Although language of opposition is a cornerstone of Western discourse, its use is infinitely problematic. The next section of this essay will argue that Gaddafi has been constructed through an ever-present yet faulty binary of good versus evil by illuminating actions of Gaddafi do not reflect the binary set forth in the texts previously examined.

Section 3: Reversing the Binary

In the case of Muammar-al Gaddafi, political rhetorical constructions present him as either an enemy or an ally in order to justify questionable political actions. One may ask "so what?" Every government changes their allies and foes for possibly not-so-sound political reasons, and here someone who as done not-so-nice things in the past can help attain certain political goals.

The answer to this is that while a narrative of an evil other turned good proved successful in attaining a goal, it has done so using the dangerous tool of oppositional language that provides justification for violence against other human beings based on that

person's rhetorically constructed 'evilness' and our perceived 'good.' In the case of Gaddafi, this language allowed for violence against human beings, as well as the proliferation of Western systems of power and subordination, both in the 1980s and today. In the 1980s, language of opposition allowed violence against a country whose leader (I will argue in this section) was in many ways a positive revolutionary against Western systems of oppression. Today, this language allows a man who has done extremely bad things to become our ally, and again proliferates Western systems of power and oppression and justifies violence against our enemy de jour.

In order to illuminate the problem with the binary, I wish to reverse its construction in order to make clear the 'excluded middle'^{lxxxiv} in which Gaddafi is not simply evil or simply good, but a human being whose actions may be constructed as both/and. To eliminate the notion of Gaddafi as good *or* bad, I will in part reverse the other-turned-self narrative to illuminate aspects of the Gaddafi government during the 1970s and 1980s that could be viewed as positive (contrary to his past construction as an enemy), as well as those which could be viewed as negative from the past six years (contrary to his current construction as a self). James Berlin warns of the first impulse when confronted with the 'good' versus 'evil' dichotomy "to portray the heroes as villains and the villains as heroes."^{lxxxv} I am falling prey to this impulse by reversing the dichotomy, but only with the knowledge that I will further analyze this binary after its reversal. I do not wish to portray Gaddafi as good in the past or bad today, but only to illuminate that he is not-- and was never-- one or the other, and to show that reality does not lie in a binary, but within a middle ground.

To begin this examination, I will examine at examples of Gaddafi's rhetoric and

actions that displace him from the construction of the evil enemy. This is essentially an account of Gaddafi's good deeds during the 70s and 80s, when Gaddafi was considered public enemy number one. I will then investigate examples of Gaddafi's rhetoric and actions during the past five years that displace him from the construction of the reformed enemy-turned-ally.

An Ally in the Past

In this section, I will look at Gaddafi's actions and rhetoric spanning over the time period in which he was rhetorically constructed as an evil enemy by Western politicians. To do this I will examine a number of Gaddafi's texts, speeches, and personal actions to displace him from the construction of an evil enemy. When Gaddafi came to power in 1969 at the age of twenty-seven, he wrote his political manifesto, *The Green Book*. In this work, he outlines his ideal governmental and societal system, as well as his personal beliefs in Arab and African unity. Because of the great wealth from oil revenues, "by the late 1970s virtually no Libyan wanted for housing, medical care or transportation, and 'the abolition of need' [called for in Qaddafi's Green Book] was proceeding apace."^{lxxxvi}

Gaddafi was "convinced . . . of the inherent iniquity of the international order [and believed that] as a vanguard revolutionary state, Libya should help liberate the rest of the Third World and reshape its political institutions."^{lxxxvii} He was a self-proclaimed world revolutionary whose activism spread across North Africa and the Arab nations.

^{lxxxviii}

According to a BBC article,

The main thrust [of the *Green Book*] was to remove all traces of imported ideologies like capitalism and communism, and all signs of foreign influence, before building a new society based on the basic principles of Islam and home-

grown socialism. As part of this process, corrupt officials were punished and politically unsound books burned.^{lxxxix}

The *Green Book* outlined Gaddafi's ideals of a Marxist community with special attention to equal pay and education: "Society should provide all types of education, giving people the chance to choose freely any subject they wish to learn... Insufficient schools restrict man's freedom of choice forcing him to learn the subjects available, while depriving him of natural right of choice because of the lack of availability of other subjects."^{xc} Gaddafi attempted to create a fair and equal society, using words such as fairness, equality, and removal of cruelty. He outlines a society in which people should help each other and nurture society as a whole.

Gaddafi is a popular African leader who has earned the praise of Nelson Mandela and others, and is always a prominent figure in various pan-African organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity (now replaced by the African Union). He is seen as a humanitarian because he gives large sums of money to sub-Saharan states, and allows Africans to immigrate to Libya for jobs, and he once said in an interview that Africa "is closer to me in every way than Iraq or Syria."^{xcii}

The vocal support of Mandela in 1997 was a particularly controversial topic. Mandela declared that it was "our duty to give support to the brother leader, especially in regards to the sanctions which [were] not hitting just him, they [were] hitting the ordinary masses of the people ... our African brothers and sisters."^{xciii} According to an article in the *Final Call Newspaper* in 1997, "the Clinton administration stepped up its public criticism of Mr. Mandela's trip, saying it undermines the international sanctions insisted upon by this country."^{xciii} While Western politicians perceived Gaddafi as an enemy, one

of the most respected peacekeepers in the world felt differently.

In the *Green Book* we find what may have been his greatest humanistic achievement-- his view on "The Blacks," to whom he dedicates an entire section of his work. The section begins with the following statement:

THE BLACKS WILL PREVAIL IN THE WORLD. The latest age of slavery is the white race's enslavement of the black race. The black man will not forget this until he has achieved rehabilitation. This tragic and historic event, the resulting bitter feeling, and the search for satisfaction derived from rehabilitating a whole race, constituting a psychological motivation in the movement of the black race to vengeance and domination, which cannot be disregarded. Added to that is the inevitability of the social historical cycles including the tallow race's domination of the world when it marched from Asia against the rest of the continents. Then came the role of the white race, when it carried out a wide-ranging colonialist movement covering all the continents of the world. Now comes the black race's turn to prevail.^{xziv}

Gaddafi is one of the few leaders who writes directly about the rise of the Black race, arguing that a "backward social situation... helps to bring about numerical superiority of the blacks because their low standard of living has protected them from getting to know the means and ways of birth control and family planning... leading to their unlimited growth."^{xcv} While his explanation the Black race seems racist by American standards, with statements such as, "the blacks... are sluggish in a climate which is always hot,"^{xcvi} Gaddafi is seen in Africa as an avid supporter of the Black race. In terms of race, Gaddafi provides an interesting foil to the Western notion of the

enemy. He is neither completely Black nor completely Arab in appearance, making it difficult to rhetorically pigeonhole his identity based on his physicality. Because of this, Western rhetoricians must focus on his 'garish' clothes and 'outlandish' personality when constructing him as an enemy. In addition, the fact that as a supporter of the Black race, and as someone who appears to be partially Black, makes it more difficult to completely construct him as an Other because in our time of political correctness, U.S. government officials can not speak about direct subordination of his ideals of Black domination. At the same time, it will be difficult to completely construct him as a self because the space of Western dominance is inherently White.

Gaddafi is also an important figure in the Arab world. In one of his more recent writings called the *White Book*,^{xcvii} Gaddafi envisioned and described step-by-step the solution to the Palestine-Israeli conflict which he called "Irastin," a bi-national single state for Palestinians and Jews. "Col. Gaddafi won some respect for having the courage to speak his mind without fear. He has generally struck a common chord, for example, in denouncing the deals that a number of Arab leaders have struck with Israel as a shameful sell-out."^{xcviii} This space of pan-Arabism is tricky when attempting to construct Gaddafi as either a self or an Other, for with the same actions on Gaddafi's part, he can be constructed as an enemy who is attempting to unite the Arab states against the West, or as an ally who is, like the West, striving for global peace.

Ultimately in his rhetoric and actions, Gaddafi's revolutionary ideas and socialist ideologies position him counter to many U.S. ideologies such as democracy and capitalism. As such, he embodies the Otherness with which Western politicians had constructed him in his call to revolt against all Western dominance, making it easy for

Western politicians to construct their view of him as an enemy/Other.

Guy Arnold writes of the revolutionary heroism of Gaddafi in *The Maverick State*, explaining that while most military takeovers that occurred in the Third World since the 1950s were about power and control, that “Gaddafi and the group of young officers who seized power in 1969 were real revolutionaries in their desire to alter the fundamental balance of their society.”^{xcix} Gaddafi’s three primary principles of revolution include political, economic and social freedom, national and pan-Arab unity, and Islamic socialism that eliminates class differences and promotes social justice.^c The principles on which Gaddafi bases his government are that of an ideal utopia of socialist society, a description which entirely contradicts the Western construction of an irrational and evil Other. Yet, his ideals run counter to Western ideals of capitalism and democracy, and he is an active revolutionary against the spread of these ideals, making him a threat to the dominant power structure that the West wishes to uphold.

While seemingly a positive influence in the Middle East and Africa, so why did the Reagan administration rhetorically construct Gaddafi as an evil Other? Noam Chomsky, an expert on the topic of Libya, concludes that the Gulf of Sidra (the conflict over territorial waters) was a trap, “presumably with the expectation that it might incite Qaddafi to acts of terror against Americans.”^{ci} This expectation was met with the bombing of La Belle discothèque in West Berlin, which was “immediately blamed on Libya.”^{cii} The response to this was the U.S. bombing of Tripoli in Operation El Dorado Canyon which Chomsky explains were, “carefully planned so that they would begin precisely at 7 p.m. Eastern Standard Time,” making this the “first bombing in history staged for prime time television.”^{ciii} In addition, an hour before the bombings

occurred, a report from Berlin came out announcing little to no evidence for Libyan involvement in the discothèque bombing. This went unreported in U.S. media, and two hours before the scheduled attack, Reagan stated that, “our evidence is direct, it is precise, and it is irrefutable.”^{civ}

The Libyan terrorist threat in the 1980s differed greatly from the Reagan administration’s construction. Chomsky quotes two commentators who reviewed the case of Libyan terror as stating that “the striking feature of Libyan atrocities is that they are the only ones whose numbers are sufficiently limited that the individual cases can be enumerated.”^{cv} Yet, the administration was able to create an enemy out of Gaddafi, for “Libya’s terrorism is a minor irritant, but Qaddafi has stood in the way of U.S. plans in North Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere... these are real crimes which must be punished.”^{cvi}

During the 1980s, Gaddafi was a revolutionary who posed a threat to U.S. ideologies and international political initiatives, thus incurring a rhetorical construction that portrayed him as an evil enemy. In many ways, Gaddafi represents Hardt and Negri’s description of the revolutionary, the voice of the subjugated minority hoping to rise above the oppressive forces of the United States.

In *Bin Laden’s Last Stand*, David B. Edwards highlights the fact that a person perceived as an enemy by one audience may not be seen as an enemy to audiences who are not subjected to the oppositional language, saying that, “While the administration has been trying to isolate bin Laden rhetorically, we also hear reports that the al Qaeda leader is viewed very differently by many in the Middle East and South Asia. News reports make it clear that many see bin Laden as a hero on horseback, intent on righting the

wrongs committed against the Muslim people.”^{cvi} This is also true for Muammar al-Gaddafi, who some see as a committed revolutionary for the causes of the Middle East and Africa against the oppression of Western power structures.

An “Enemy” Today

According to his past actions and ideologies, Gaddafi can easily be constructed as a visionary revolutionary and a voice for regions of the world historically dominated by the West, or if nothing else, at least a man who was unduly constructed as an enemy during the 1980s. Just as some of Gaddafi’s actions and rhetoric in the 1980s directly contradict the Reagan Administration’s construction of his as an enemy, many of his actions in the past six years directly contradict the Bush Administration’s construction of him as a reformed sinner.

This section examines how well Gaddafi fits into this new construction of reformed sinner, the enemy-turned-ally. Michael Hirsh asks, “just what kind of ‘model’ is Libya really? It’s certainly not a model for Bush’s democracy campaign... although the administration is now touting the idea that diplomatic relations with Libya will give Washington more leverage in pressing for internal reform, this is blatant nonsense.”^{cvi}

A number of political groups in and outside of Libya agree with this conclusion, and voice their opinions on numerous websites that protest Gaddafi. These organizations include the National Conference of the Libyan Opposition,^{cix} the National Front for the Salvation of Libya,^{cx} the Committee for Libyan National Action in Europe, and the Libyan League for Human Rights.^{cx} There is also a website that actively pursues the overthrow of Gaddafi called StopGaddafi.org, which was set up in 2006 and lists 343 Libyans who the site claims are victims of murder and political assassination at the hands

of Gaddafi, as well as 59 foreign nationals who are listed as having met the same fate.^{cxii}

The U.S. government has also noted Gaddafi's recent bad behavior. On September 10, 2004, President Bush "determined in Presidential determination No 2004-44 that (1) Libya had violated terms of the Arms Export Control Act by receiving nuclear enrichment equipment, material or technology from Khan Laboratories in Pakistan, but that (2) implementation of the sanctions required under the Arms Export Control Act "would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests." In addition, Bush determined that new restrictions on Export-Import Bank support to U.S. exporters pursuing business in Libya were not in the national interest of the United States. According to this information, it would seem that sanctions should be re-imposed, but it was not in the best political interest of the U.S. Bush overlooked Libya's dealings with A.Q. Kahn so that Libya could move toward removal from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism allowing the application of the new construction of Gaddafi as good.

According to the U.S. Department of State's annual human rights report for 2005, "the government's performance remained poor, although it took some steps to improve its human rights record."^{cxiii}

Libya's human rights violations are listed by the report as: inability of citizens to change the government; torture; poor prison conditions; impunity; arbitrary arrest and incommunicado detention; lengthy political detention; denial of fair public trial; infringement of privacy rights; severe restriction of civil liberties□freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association; restriction of freedom of religion; corruption and lack of government transparency; societal discrimination against women, ethnic minorities, and foreign workers; trafficking in persons; and

restriction of labor rights.^{cxiv}

According to the report, the Libyan state controls the Judiciary, and there is no right to a fair public trial. In addition, the government prohibits independent human rights organizations from entering the country, ethnic and tribal minorities suffer discrimination, and domestic violence against women appears to be widespread.^{cxv} The report stated that torture is a problem within the government, and that:

The law prohibits such practices, but security personnel routinely tortured prisoners during interrogations or as punishment. Government agents reportedly detained and tortured foreign workers, particularly those from sub-Saharan Africa. Reports of torture were difficult to corroborate since many prisoners were held incommunicado. The reported methods of torture included chaining prisoners to a wall for hours, clubbing, applying electric shock, applying corkscrews to the back, pouring lemon juice in open wounds, breaking fingers and allowing the joints to heal without medical care, suffocating with plastic bags, deprivation of food and water, hanging by the wrists, suspension from a pole inserted between the knees and elbows, cigarette burns, threats of dog attacks, and beatings on the soles of the feet.^{cxvi}

Gaddafi's social system does not meet Western standards for human rights, and upon reading the above assessment, most those who consider themselves 'humane' by Western standards would have trouble identifying Gaddafi as a self. Freedom House,^{cxvii} which ranks civil liberties by nation, graded Libya at the lowest possible level of freedom. In 2006, it rated Libya a seven for both Civil Liberties and Political Rights, with one standing for the most free countries and seven standing for the least free.

Overall, Libya was given a rating of “Not Free” in 2006, with no indication of change for the better.^{cxviii}

The Western media recently covered the case of the six foreign health workers (five Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian doctor) who were accused of deliberately infecting 426 children with HIV-tainted blood in a Libyan hospital in 1999. On May 6, 2004, a Libyan court sentenced the workers to death, but international observers believe that the confessions of the health workers were forced either by torture or by some other method.^{cxix} The Country Report (another human rights organization) of 2005 stated that, “according to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the foreign medical personnel charged with deliberately infecting children in a hospital in Benghazi reported that they had been tortured through electric shock and beatings to extract their confessions.”^{cxx} These reported violations directly contradict the U.S. government’s construction of Gaddafi as a self who by definition is rational, kind, and humane, thus making it hard to conceive of him as a reformed enemy.

Upon the removal of Libya from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and the subsequent removal of various sanctions, the House of Representatives passed House Resolution 838^{cxxi} which urged the Secretary of State to require that the Libyan government settle all financial obligations pertaining to the Pan Am Flight 101 and show a clear move toward ending all terrorist activities. The resolution noted that in 2002 the Government of Libya offered \$2.7 billion to settle claims by the families of the 270 people killed aboard Pan Am Flight 103, representing \$10 million for each victim of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing. On August 15, 2003, Libya's embassy accepted “responsibility for the action of its officials”^{cxixii} in relation to the Lockerbie bombing. On

May 24, 2006, Congressman Mike Ferguson stated, “[To date,] the families of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103 have not yet received the final \$2 million payment promised by the Government of Libya.”^{cxxiii}

According to a *New York Times* article published on July 8, 2006, Gaddafi had yet to begin the promised payback, although the payments were supposed to have been made before Libya was officially removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list on June 30, 2006. The article stated that upon the promise of the payments in August 2003, the Libyan government opened up a Swiss bank account from which the first \$4 million out of a promised total of \$10 million per victim was released in September 2003 when the United Nations sanctions were lifted, and then another \$4 million in 2004 when the U.S. sanctions were lifted. With the removal of Libya from the list, Libya was expected to immediately pay the final \$2 million, but a Libyan lawyer representing his country was quoted in a press release saying that, “the settlement agreement expired, and the Escrow Account agreement also came to an end. Consequently, the remaining amount for which the corresponding condition had not been fulfilled was returned to its source.”^{cxxiv} The removal of Libya from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism was contingent upon his payment to the families, so his refusal to pay directly conflicts with the portrayal of Gaddafi as a reformed sinner.

One newspaper noted that his internal policies remain questionable, saying that “committees around the country nominally hold power, while real power still rests in the hands of the country's veteran leader... Col Gaddafi is intent, perhaps, to ensure that his idiosyncratic years as leader are left as a stamp on the country by the rise to power and possible succession of one of his sons.”^{cxxv} Gaddafi's governmental system is that of a de

facto ruler who has complete control of all aspects of the government. This type of government runs directly counter to American ideals of freedom and democracy, thus providing yet another foil to the construction of Gaddafi as a self.

The *New York Times* reported that there is no sign of a governmental change in Libya, and quoted Gaddafi as “urging his supporters... to ‘kill enemies’ if they asked for political change”^{cxvii} at a rally marking the 37th anniversary of his coup d’etat in August 2006. This action did not fall within the binary constructed by Western political rhetoric, for “Colonel Qaddafi said those who hoped for political change in Libya saw its people as ‘ignorant and immature.’”^{cxviii} The article quotes Gaddafi as saying:

Our revolution has won. The whole world accepts our revolutionary project as it benefits all peoples across the world. Our enemies have been crushed inside Libya, and you have to be ready to kill them if they emerge anew. Our political path is the correct one, as it grants freedom to the whole people, sovereignty, power and wealth to the whole people. (added by the journalist: referring to Libya’s Jamahiriya direct democracy system, which opposes Western liberal democracy and criminalizes the creation of opposition parties.) If the enemy shows up, you must finish it off because the enemy appears to exterminate you. We cannot tolerate that the enemy undermines the power and the people and the revolution.”^{cxviii}

A contradiction appeared again on November 19, 2006, when A CNN article reported that Gaddafi was supporting the leader of Sudan in refusing Western intervention to stop the mass genocide in Darfour. Gaddafi was reported to have “accused the West of trying to grab Sudan’s oil wealth with its plan to send U.N. troops to

Darfur and urged Khartoum to reject them.”^{cxxxix} In this instance, we are faced with a new ally acting as the conceived enemy would act:

Gadhafi is a longstanding opponent of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, which he has dismissed as a dispenser of victors' and colonizers' justice. Gadhafi accused the West of wanting to defeat his plan to construct a single African federal government in a so-called United States of Africa to maintain its economic dominance. ‘The West exploits tribalism, sectarianism and [skin] color to feed war, which leads to backwardness and Western intervention in a number of countries,” he said on Sunday. ‘All the conflicts in Africa are caused by colonialism, which does not want the rise of the United States of Africa and works for division and interference and for military coups.’”^{cxxx}

Another disturbing fact is that there is evidence that Gaddafi has recently made deals with A.Q. Khan, the infamous nuclear weapons dealer. This, compounded with reports of revolting human rights violations, the refusal to pay the families of the Lockerbie victims, and an apparent lack of change in the regime, all contradict the Western construction of Gaddafi as someone who has reformed to become “good.” For a man who Western political discourse has recently been constructed as a reformed evildoer who promised great hope for diplomacy in the Middle East, Gaddafi certainly does not always espouse such ideals.^{cxxxi} What the reader is left with is an unclear and muddled picture of Gaddafi, confusing the Western thinker who is used to narratives shaped by binaries.

An official document from the U.S. State Department written on November 30, 1999, quotes Ambassador Ronald Neumann as listing a litany of changes Gaddafi had

made, all of which point to changes for good, but Neumann warns at this time to:

Exercise caution and to emphasize the need for changes in Libyan behavior before it is reintegrated into the world community. We have argued that Libya's past history of support for terrorism and intervention outside its borders cannot simply be forgotten, and that trust needs to be based on a consistent pattern of altered behavior and concrete actions."^{cxxxii}

Neumann states that he has "drawn for you a mixed picture, in which Libya has begun to take important positive steps to renounce terror and support peace, but continues to sound the bell of long-term opposition to the U.S."^{cxxxiii}

And so we are left with a confusing mixed picture, yet as confusing as it may be, it is the most accurate construction of Gaddafi. During the 1980s, Gaddafi was constructed as an irrational, evil enemy, and today he is constructed as a reformed sinner who, from a change of character, has become a rational, humane ally. Yet both constructions eliminate or ignore important facts, highlighting only what is useful to the current construction. This ignored middle ground appears to us a confusing mess of facts and opinions, but without it we are left with war rhetoric that leads to the subjugation of difference and violent revolt against the system of oppression that we have produced. The examination of the 'multiple rhetorics' that lie between the two poles of a binary leads to greater understanding of human conflict, a greater acceptance of difference, and reduces the risk of justifying violence. This is particularly true for the construction of Gaddafi through the binary of good versus evil, for this construction has fostered unquestioned justification of violence enacted by the U. S. on the grounds of fighting terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

Conclusion:

St. Augustine tells the story of a pirate captured by Alexander the Great, who asked him “how he dares molest the sea.” “How dare you molest the whole world?” The pirate replied: “Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great navy, are called an emperor.”^{cxxxiv}

- Noam Chomsky; Pirates and Emperors

For the past several decades, the U.S. has transitioned from a nation-state created through revolution, to one of several global superpowers, arriving today as the most powerful force in global politics and conflict. As the proverbial emperor, the U. S. government is able to accuse the pirates of crime that it itself is guilty of committing, and justifies this using the classic binary of good versus evil. This binary is an inherently exclusive system, breaking groups of people into two polar opposites and ignoring the “excluded middle”^{cxxxv} that paints the complexities and varieties of human interaction. Language of opposition promotes cultural hegemony and furthers oppressive power structures, and is dangerous both in its use to justify violence and in its tendency to promote subjugating systems of power, yet it remains a common rhetorical tool in Western language, perhaps for these very reasons. The use of such oppositional language has become increasingly perilous as it justifies violence in a time where nuclear weapons threaten the existence of humankind.

As the world’s single, unchecked superpower, the U. S. government attempts to reify the present system of power in which it rules supreme, with a large part of this process found in the rhetorical construction used to create enemies, who, framed as evil Others, threaten the emperor’s powerful hold. This rhetorical system allows the

American audience to readily accept disgusting acts of violence against perceived others without reflection or thought.

Unfortunately, the binary is inevitable, for it is through difference that we make meaning of our lives, and our situatedness in relation to other people,^{cxxxvi} but binaries are dangerous because they over-simplify that difference. Thus, understanding of the enemy as human is replaced with a singular identification of the enemy as evil. These supposed evil enemies are rhetorically created with the binary of good versus evil that eliminates any middle ground, yet it is within the middle ground, as explored in this paper with the case of Gaddafi, that we find that the binary is essentially flawed.

This theme has been addressed in academic writing concerned with the War on Terror and the War in Iraq, and has been explored to understand how enemies such as Bin Laden or Saddam Hussein are rhetorically created, but the case of Gaddafi was ultimately ignored by both academicians and the news media. This paper is limited to the case study, but it raises the question as to why, in the summer of 2006, the world barely batted an eye when a man who was once constructed to be public enemy number one was declared to have reformed his ways, and his country no longer considered a sponsor of terrorism. While the U.S. government's rhetorical strategy is understandable, why did the U.S. press comply in disseminating this rhetoric? Was it apathy, or did the press already have enough bad guys to fill the news reel? What about the American public? Are we so impressionable that we will consume any rhetorical frame fed to us by the media? Or were we so relieved to hear that at least one enemy is gone that we dared not question lest it be false? Was the lack of notice due to good public relations, or does the American public not care to question? These are all crucial questions that I urge the

reader to think about further.

While the reason behind the lack of notice can not be answered, this essay was intended to add one more case to the pile of examples of the U.S. government justifying violence through purely rhetorical means. In the case of Libya, government officials were able to first create an enemy (and thus was justified in violence against him), and a mere twenty years later, able to construct the same man as an ally using the same rhetorical construct. While this kind of rhetoric is clearly useful politically, it is dangerous because in justifying violence, it allows the audience to cease questioning the action. It makes war easy to accept, including civilian and soldier casualties on both sides of the conflict. Yet upon closer inspection of the middle ground destroyed by the binary, we find these binaries to be flawed, and our justifications weak. We find that the conflicts are not black and white, and our enemies to be merely humans whose opinions differ from our own. We find not a madman, but a politician, a man who has done good deeds along with the bad, a man who has not at all reformed his ways. We find in the case of Muammar al-Gaddafi, along with others who have been placed in the U.S. binary of the enemy, that the evil enemy of Gaddafi was a construct presented to us by the government via the news media aimed at attaining specific political goals.

The U.S. government uses language of opposition in order to maintain global power, when it should accept and aim to understand counter violence and attempt to reduce its own systems of domination. We see this played out in the case of Gaddafi, as the United States uses the rhetorical tool of the binary to repress counter-violence in order to maintain dominance in the world order.

As lines between nation-states are de-constructed through revolt, differences

between people will become space for free and constant debate that will keep any one group from rising to leadership. What is imagined in the postmodern imagination is a broad and free-flowing world of international citizenship, marked by a distinct decrease in the power of the nation-state and an underlying acceptance of difference.^{cxxxvii} Thus, we must look for a new narrative for understanding human conflict that embraces difference, for the suppression of difference will eventually lead to revolt on a grand scale. While the use of binaries will continue to exist and function in human discourse, it is the duty of the receivers of this rhetoric to increase their awareness of these constructs and question rhetorical foundation upon which they are based. It is my sincere hope that the American people will constantly question the binaries that discursively subordinate others and perpetuate systems of oppression and violence, and will eventually discover productive discursive practices that embrace differences, lead to nonviolent conflict resolution and aid in the movement toward a peaceful postmodern global community.

Notes

Introduction:

ⁱ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (London: Harvard University Press, 2000) 36.

ⁱⁱ Manichæism is a religion founded by the Persian Mani in the latter half of the third century. It was founded upon a theory of two eternal principles, good and evil, leading to its classification as a form of religious Dualism. Its existence has been traced to Africa, Spain, France, North Italy, the Balkans, Northern India, Western China, and Tibet, but remained most fully in its places of origin-- Mesopotamia, Babylonia, and Turkestan. The date of its extinction is uncertain, but its roots of the binary of "good and

evil,” remain as strong influences on Western/Christian thought and ideology. For more information, visit the online Catholic encyclopedia at <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09591a.htm>.

ⁱⁱⁱ Hardt and Negri 34.

^{iv} Shome.

^v Hardt and Negri 210.

^{vi} The actual spelling of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s name is widely debated. [Geocities.com](http://www.geocities.com) lists 32 different ways of spelling, and says to prefer the spelling "Mu`ammar al-Qadhafi" as the best transliteration from the Arabic of the Libyan Leader's first and last names. I chose the version that is used by the British Broadcasting Corporation and Time Magazine. When pronounced phonetically, the primary difference resides in the choice between *Kadaffi*, *Quadaffi* or *Gadaffi*.

^{vii} Osama bin Laden, “Full Transcript of Osama bin Laden’s Speech,” [Al Jazeera](http://www.aljazeera.com) 1 Nov. 2004, 15 Sept. 2006 <<http://www.aljazeera.com>>.

^{viii} Hardt and Negri.

^{ix} I intend here to make clear my own voice in the choice of materials from which I choose throughout this paper. Hayden White explains the dilemma of the historian, saying that “it is difficult to get an objective history of a scholarly discipline, because if the historian is himself a practitioner of it, he is likely to be a devotee of one or another of its sects and hence biased.” (Hayden White, [Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism](#). (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).) I wish to make clear my own choices as I write this history of Gaddafi. When looking for this rhetoric, I will look at mediated political rhetoric. Clearly, the possible examinable rhetoric is too broad to fully examine, so I will select newspaper articles and political rhetoric to which I have complete archival access from the Internet. I am not using printed news articles, nor television news, unless copies were available online. My selections include all mainstream American publications, as well as the BBC and Al Jazeera^{ix} (an attempt to access a middle-eastern perspective. Al Jazeera was chosen because it is what I would consider the news publication in that region of the world that is most free from government coercion, regulation, or bias.). When examining political rhetoric in these sections, my selections will be limited to rhetoric from the presidents of each war; President Ronald Reagan and President George W. Bush, and major international political players in each conflict.

^x Raka Shome, “Postcolonial Interventions in the Rhetorical Canon: An ‘Other’ View,” ed. J. Lucaites, [Contemporary Rhetorical Theory](#) (New York: The Guilford Press, 1999) 591-608.

^{xii} The theory of the “excluded middle,” known in logic as the law of the excluded middle, was originally posited by Aristotle in his work *Metaphysics*. In logic, this is stated as the formula $P \vee \neg P$, or “P or not P.” Aristotle theorizes that “...it will not be possible to be and not to be the same thing,” written in logic as $\neg(P \wedge \neg P)$, and that “since it is impossible that contradictories should be at the same time true of the same thing, obviously contraries also cannot belong at the same time to the same thing.” This theory claims simply that it is impossible to be both true and false and at the same time equally impossible to be neither true nor false, thus there are two sides to a binary, with the supposed middle ground of both/and disregarded. Aristotle, “*Metaphysics*,” Trans. W.D. Ross, The Internet Classics Archive 1994, 19 Apr. 2007 <<http://classics.mit.edu>>

^{xiv} Hardt and Negri.

^{xv} Stuart Hall, “The Spectacle of the Other,” Ed. Stuart Hall, Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices (London: Sage, 1997) 223-290.

^{xvi} I define mediated political rhetoric as: language spoken or written language by politicians, government officials, or journalists that has been disseminated to the (American/Western) masses through mediated systems of the “free press” (a.k.a. Western press) via modern communication tools of television, newspapers, or internet news sites.

^{xvii} See Appendix One for full details of these events.

^{xviii} The State Department defines the list:
“Countries that appear on this list provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture WMD and other destabilizing technologies that can get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.”

Section One:

^{xix} Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, “Who ‘Won’ Libya?” International Security 30, 3 (2005): 46-86.

^{xx} See Appendix One for full details of these events.

^{xxi} Robert Entman, “Projections of Power: framing news, Public Opinion and U.S Foreign Policy,” The University of Chicago Press (2004).

^{xxii} Entman.

^{xxiv} Robert Ivie, "The rhetoric of Bush's 'War' on evil," KB Journal 1.1 (2004, Fall).

^{xxv} Rosa A. Eberly, "Deliver Ourselves from Evil," Michigan State University Press, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 6.3 (2003): 551-553.

^{xxvi} Festus U. Ohaegbulam, "U.S. Measures against Libya since the Explosion of Pan Am Flight 103," Mediterranean Quarterly 11.1 (2000): 111-135.

^{xxvii} Butler, John R, "Somalia and the Imperial Savage: Continuities in the Rhetoric of War," Western Journal of Communication 66, 1 (Winter 2002).

^{xxviii} Butler.

^{xxix} James Bovard, "Terrorism Debacles in the Reagan Administration," The Future of Freedom Foundation 09 June 2004, 05 Apr. 2007 <<http://www.fff.org>>.

^{xxx} Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya," 14 Apr. 1986, 17 Apr. 2007 <<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu>>.

^{xxxi} Ivie.

^{xxxii} Ivie.

^{xxxiii} Reagan.

^{xxxiv} Reagan.

^{xxxv} Ivie.

^{xxxvi} I do not believe it is necessary to designate he/she in the aim of political correctness because I think that it detracts from the content and message of my writing.

^{xxxvii} Edward Schumacher, "The United States and Libya," Council on Foreign Affairs (1986).

^{xxxviii} Ivie.

^{xxxix} Mark Whitaker and John Walcott, "Getting Rid of Kaddafi," Newsweek Apr. 1986.

^{xl} Whitaker and Walcott.

^{xli} Ivie.

xlii “Containing Qaddafi,” New York Times 23 December 1986, 25 Sept. 2006 <<http://www.nyt.com>>.

xliii “Containing Qaddafi.”

xliv “Containing Qaddafi.”

xliv Reagan.

xlvi Reagan.

xlvii Gerald Butt, “Colonel Gaddafi’s Libya,” British Broadcasting Corporation 15 May 2006, 25 Sept. 2006 <<http://www.bbc.com>>.

xlviii Butt.

xlix Butt.

¹ Paul Reynolds, “The Colonel Gets his Reward,” British Broadcasting Corporation 24 Mar. 2004, 25 Sept. 2006 <<http://www.bbc.com>>.

li Butt.

lii Mike Thomson, “The Libyan Prime Minister,” Today Programme, British Broadcasting Corporation 14 Feb. 2004, 25 Sept. 2006 <<http://www.bbc.com>>..

liii Ken Silverstein, “How Kadafi went from Foe to Ally,” Los Angeles Times Sept. 2005.

liv A former member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group- Silverstein.

lv “A prominent London-based Libyan exile and longtime proponent of democratic reform.” Silverstein.

lvi Silverstein.

Part Two:

lvii Jonathan Marcus, “Washington’s Libyan Fairy Tale,” British Broadcasting Corporation 15 May 2006, 25 Sept. 2006 <<http://www.bbc.com>>.

lviii Butt.

lix George W. Bush, “Full Transcript: Bush Statement,” British Broadcasting Corporation 20 Dec. 2003, 19 Apr. 2007 <www.bbc.com>.

^{lx} U.S. Department of State, U.S Official Notes ‘Definite Changes in Libya’s Behavior 11 Nov. 1999, 15 Oct. 2006 <<http://telaviv.usembassy.gov>>.

^{lxi} Martin Indyk, “The War in Iraq did not Force Gaddafi’s Hand,” Financial Times 9 March 2004.

^{lxii} George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” The White House 20 Jan. 2004, 13 Oct. 2006 <<http://www.whitehouse.gov>>.

^{lxiii} Indyk.

^{lxiv} “The Cheney-Edwards Vice Presidential Debate,” Commission on Presidential Debates 5 Oct. 2006, 17 Apr. 2007 <<http://www.debates.org>>.

^{lxv} Indyk.

^{lxvi} Indyk.

^{lxvii} Indyk.

^{lxviii} Michel Hirsh, “The Real Libya Model,” Information Clearing House 2006.

^{lxix} Hirsh.

^{lxx} The four sanctions included Executive Order 12538 (November 15, 1985) which prohibited the importation of petroleum products from Libya; Executive Order 12543 (January 7, 1986) which declared that a national emergency existed, and prohibited imports, exports, transactions related to transportation, the provision of transportation, purchase of Libyan products via a third country, performance of contracts, or extension of credit or loans; Executive Order 12544 (January 8, 1986) which blocked all property, assets, and interests held by Libya in the jurisdiction of the United States; and Executive Order 12801 (Apr. 15, 1992) which prohibited the landing or taking off in U.S. airspace of aircraft coming or going to Libya. Executive Order 13357, September 20, 2004 (69 F.R. 56665): Dianne E. Rennack, “Libya: Legislative Basis for U.S. economic Sanctions Today,” Congressional Research Service: RL32604 2006.

^{lxxi} Pursuant to Section 6(j) (50 U.S.C app 2405(j)): Rennack.

^{lxxii} Further restrictions allowed congress to block a rescission of the sanction if it chooses to keep sanctions in place, and authorized the president to waive the prohibitions with respect to a certain transaction as long as it is determined by the President to be essential to national security, and the president submits a report to congress at least 15 days before the transaction occurs: Rennack.

^{lxxiii} Designating countries that repeatedly provide support for acts of international terrorism (that is, placing a country on the terrorism list) imposes four main sets of U.S. Government sanctions: A ban on arms-related exports and sales; Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism; Prohibitions on economic assistance; Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions, and lifting diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuits in U.S. courts; Denying companies and individuals tax credits for income earned in terrorist-listed countries; Denial of duty-free treatment of goods exported to the United States; Authority to prohibit any U.S. citizen from engaging in a financial transaction with a terrorist-list government without a Treasury Department license; and Prohibition of Defense Department contracts above \$100,000 with companies controlled by terrorist-list states: Rennack.

^{lxxiv} "U.S. to renew full ties with Libya," British Broadcasting Corporation 15 May 2006, 25 Sept. 2006 <<http://www.bbc.com>>.

^{lxxv} Christopher Blanchard, "Libya: Background and U.S. Relations," CRS Report: RL33142 2006.

^{lxxvi} "Timeline: US-Libya relations," Al Jazeera 15 May 2006, 25 Sept. 2006 <<http://www.aljazeera.net>>.

^{lxxvii} Marcus.

^{lxxviii} Brooke Anderson, "Is Libya Ready for US Business?" Al Jazeera July 2006, 17 Oct. 2006 <<http://aljazeera.net>>.

^{lxxix} Anderson.

^{lxxx} Indra de Soysa "Ecoviolence: Shrinking Pie or Honey Pot?" Global Environmental Politics 2,4 (2002): 1-36.

^{lxxxi} Phillippe de Billon, "The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts," Political Geography 20 (2001): 561-584.

^{lxxxii} Billon.

^{lxxxiii} Simon Dalby, "Ecological Politics, Violence, and the Theme of Empire," Global Environmental Politics 4.2 (2004): 1-11.

^{lxxxiv} Aristotle.

^{lxxxv} Berlin, James A. "Revisionary Histories of Rhetoric: Politics, Power and Plurality." Ed. Victor Vitanza, Writing Histories of Rhetoric 1994: 112-127.

^{lxxxvi} Lisa Anderson, "Qadhafi's Legacy: An Evaluation of a Political Experiment," Ed. Dirk Vandewalle, Qaddafi's Libya (New York: St. Martin's, 1995) 225.

^{lxxxvii} Ray Takeyh, "The Rogue Who Came In from the Cold," Foreign Affairs 80, 3 (May/ June 2001): 63.

^{lxxxviii} Jentleson and Whytock, 57.

^{lxxxix} Butt.

^{xc} Gaddafi.

^{xc}i Butt.

^{xcii} Askia Muhammad, "Mandela's Libya Visit raises questions about U.S. Policy," Final Call Newspaper 1997.

^{xciii} Muhammad.

^{xciv} Muammar al-Gaddafi, "The Green Book" (1975).

^{xcv} Gaddafi.

^{xcvi} Gaddafi.

^{xcvii} "AlGathafi Speaks," The White Book n.d, 17 Sept. 2006
<<http://www.algathafi.org>>.

^{xcviii} Butt.

^{xcix} Guy Arnold, The Maverick State: Gaddafi and the New World Order (London: Cassell, 1997).

^c Arnold.

^{ci} Noam Chomsky, Pirates and Emperors, Old and New (Cambridge: South End Press, 2002).

^{cii} Chomsky.

^{ciii} Chomsky.

^{civ} Reagan.

^{cv} Chomsky.

^{cvi} Chomsky.

^{cvii} David B. Edwards, "Bin Laden's Last Stand," The Catholic University of America Press 2002.

^{cviii} Hirsh.

^{cix} The National Conference of the Libyan Opposition, 2006, 15 Sept. 2006 <<http://libya-nclo.org>>.

^{cx} The National Front for the Salvation of Libya, 2006, 15 Oct. 2006 <<http://www.nfsl-libya.com>>.

^{cxii} Stop Gaddafi, 2006, 15 Sept. 2006 <<http://www.stopgaddafi.org>>.

^{cxiii} Stop Gaddafi.

^{cxiv} U. S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2005, 15 Sept. 2006 <<http://www.statedepartment.gov>>.

^{cxv} U. S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

^{cxvi} U. S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

^{cxvii} U. S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

^{cxviii} "Freedom House, a non-profit, nonpartisan organization, is a clear voice for democracy and freedom around the world. Through a vast array of international programs and publications, Freedom House is working to advance the remarkable worldwide expansion of political and economic freedom." Freedom House, Freedom House 19 Apr. 2007 <<http://www.freedomhouse.org>>.

^{cxix} "Freedom in the World 2006; Libya," Freedom House 16 Dec. 2005, 15 Sept. 2006 <<http://www.freedomhouse.org>>.

^{cxx} U. S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

^{cxxi} U. S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

^{cxxi} U.S H. Res. 838: “Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of State should not accept the credentials of any representative of the Government of Libya until the Government of Libya has fully met its financial commitments to the families of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103 and that the President should urge the Government of Libya to make a good faith effort to resolve other outstanding cases of United States victims of terrorism sponsored or supported by Libya.” Michael Ferguson. (2006, May 24). “House Resolution 838,” The Library of Congress 24 May 2006, 13 Oct. 2006 <<http://thomas.loc.gov>>.

^{cxxii} Ferguson.

^{cxxiii} Ferguson.

^{cxxiv} Matthew Wald, “Sanctions Lifted, Libya Withholds Final Lockerbie Payment,” New York Times 8 July 2006, 13 Oct. 2006 <<http://www.nyt.com>>..

^{cxxv} Butt.

^{cxxvi} “Gadhafi: U.N. Darfour force is ruse to grab Sudan’s oil,” Cable News Network Nov. 2006, 21 Jan. 2006 <<http://www.cnn.com>>.

^{cxxvii} “Gadhafi: U.N. Darfour force is ruse to grab Sudan’s oil.”

^{cxxviii} “Gadhafi: U.N. Darfour force is ruse to grab Sudan’s oil.”

^{cxxix} “Gadhafi: U.N. Darfour force is ruse to grab Sudan’s oil.”

^{cxxx} “Gadhafi: U.N. Darfour force is ruse to grab Sudan’s oil.”

^{cxxxi} I realize here it seems a mistake to call Gaddafi a Western political figure, but keep in mind that the Western tradition of speaking permeates the language of those outside of countries with Western ideologies.

^{cxxxii} U.S. Department of State.

^{cxxxiii} U.S. Department of State.

Conclusion:

^{cxxxiv} Chomsky.

^{cxxxv} Aristotle.

^{cxxxvi} Hall.

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