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Pro-integration policies and the occupational expectations of immigrant youth

Volha Chykina
University of Richmond, USA

Abstract
Europe is experiencing heightened public attention toward anti-immigration policy reforms and restrictions. Despite the potential importance of these policy changes, we do not know whether these policies influence how immigrant children perceive their futures in their host countries. Employing secondary data analysis of the Program for International Student Assessment and the Migrant Integration Policy Index data, I show that a decrease in policy support for immigrant integration is associated with a decrease in how good of a job immigrant children expect to have when they are adults. Since students’ occupational expectations influence their eventual status attainment, this article shows that a decrease in pro-integration policies has important implications for the integration of immigrants into their host countries and for their life trajectories.

Keywords
Education of immigrant children, Europe, immigrant children, immigration policy, occupational expectations

The reception today’s immigrants to Europe experience in their host countries is different from the one they experienced in the first decade of this century. Recent years have seen a surge in observed levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (Rustenbach, 2010), especially after the Syrian refugee crisis began (European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) Secretariat, 2016). In many European states, the growing popularity of radical right parties, many of which base their political platforms at least in part on promises to pass anti-immigrant policies, highlights this increase (Golder, 2016). When these parties achieve electoral gains, they try to legislate away from supporting immigrants within their borders (Golder, 2016; Rydgren, 2008).

Concurrently, demographers predict an increase in the number of immigrants settling in Europe by the end of the 21st century (Eurostat, 2020). In fact, population estimates show that in the 21st century, cumulative net migration will be the main contributor to population growth in the European Union, helping offset the population decline due to the contraction in birth rates (Eurostat, 2020).

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As such, ensuring that immigrants fulfill their career potential is crucial for these countries’ overall well-being. Immigrants with stable jobs and sufficient income are less likely to need public assistance and, therefore, pose less of a potential burden to the state. They are also more productive contributors to the economies of their host countries.

Given this, it is very important to understand how immigrant students are integrating into their host societies and what factors might aid their status attainment. High ambitions contribute to immigrants’ high educational attainment levels (Kao and Tienda, 1995). Researchers tend to study these ambitions by analyzing how much education immigrant children expect to achieve (Chykina, 2019; Feliciano and Lanuza, 2016; Kao and Tienda, 1995, 1998; Krahn and Taylor, 2005; Pasztor, 2009, 2016). Immigrants’ ambitions, however, go beyond educational expectations. Immigrant youth’s occupational expectations are an important yet often overlooked consideration (for exceptions, see Alarcon et al., 2014; Beicht and Walden, 2019; Feliciano and Rumbaut, 2005; Portes et al., 2010; Wicht, 2016). In addition, given the potential for rightward immigration policy shifts and the variation in immigration policy regimes from country to country, we must consider the range of effects that these policies might have on how immigrant children see their futures. While we know immigration policies affect how well students perform in school (Levels et al., 2008; Manatschal and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2013; Van de Werfhorst and Heath, 2019), researchers have not examined how immigrant students might change their occupational ambitions based on the immigration policy environment they experience. In this article, I explore these questions and show that immigrant children tend to have higher occupational expectations than their non-immigrant peers. Furthermore, I show that immigrants’ advantage in occupational expectations is not as large in countries with fewer pro-integration policies.

Theory

Occupational expectations of immigrant students

Student occupational expectations have interested researchers since the development of the Wisconsin model of status attainment. This model explains how social mobility occurs, linking it to a variety of individual characteristics, such as mental ability and educational attainment, socioeconomic background, and the influence significant others have on eventual status attainment (Sewell et al., 1969, 1970). The ambitions and plans adolescents have for their future also feature prominently in this model. The model distinguishes between educational plans and occupational plans and shows that these plans significantly contribute to one’s eventual occupational status (Sewell et al., 1969, 1970).

Research on immigrants’ future ambitions has focused almost exclusively on how much education immigrants expect to achieve. The majority of these studies examine the educational expectations of immigrant youth in the United States and find that immigrants have higher educational expectations than their non-immigrant peers (Feliciano and Lanuza, 2016; Goyette and Xie, 1999; Hao and Bonstead-Bruns, 1998; Portes and Rivas, 2011). By conducting a cross-national analysis of immigrant youth in Europe, Chykina (2019) shows that an immigrant advantage in educational expectations is also present across European countries. In addition, one-country studies of Canadian (Krahn and Taylor, 2005) and French (Brinbaum and Cebolla-Boado, 2007) youth show similar patterns of immigrant advantage. Yet, a few studies also show that the immigrant advantage is not universal and depends on the country and immigrant group analyzed (Lee and Zhou, 2015; Portes, 2016; Yiu, 2013).

Overall, scholars refer to the phenomenon of immigrants having a high level of ambition as “immigrant optimism” (Kao and Tienda, 1995; Portes and Rivas, 2011; Portes and Rumbaut,
Chykina 2001). This scholarship argues that immigrant parents have a high level of drive and motivation—after all, they were willing to undertake a move few would find easy—and project those values onto their children. Internalizing these values, immigrant children strive to achieve more education than non-immigrant children from similar socioeconomic backgrounds (Kao and Tienda, 1995; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001).

Only a handful of studies have attended to the occupational expectations of immigrant youth, however (Alarcon et al., 2014; Beicht and Walden, 2019; Feliciano and Rumbaut, 2005; Portes et al., 2010; Wicht, 2016). This is a serious oversight, especially in light of the fact that in the Wisconsin model of status attainment, occupational expectations exercise direct influence on eventual occupational attainment; the link between occupational attainment and educational expectations is indirect, as it works through educational attainment (Sewell et al., 1969, 1970). The small body of work that focuses on occupational expectations tends to compare the occupational expectations of first-generation immigrants to those of second-generation immigrants (Alarcon et al., 2014; Portes et al., 2010). While important, this research does not answer the question of whether the occupational expectations of all immigrant youth are higher than those of non-immigrant youth. Most applicable to the immigrant versus non-immigrant comparison is research by Beicht and Walden (2019) and Wicht (2016) that shows that immigrant students in Germany tend to have higher occupational expectations than their non-immigrant peers. These single-country findings may not necessarily generalize to other contexts, though. As such, a cross-national examination of immigrants’ occupational expectations is an important addition to the literature. Combining these findings with the research on the high levels of educational expectations that immigrants possess, I expect that, on average, immigrant students will have higher occupational expectations than their non-immigrant peers.

Hypothesis 1. Immigrant students will have higher occupational expectations than non-immigrant students.

Occupational expectations of immigrant youth in the context of immigration policies

Researchers often use segmented assimilation theory to understand incorporation patterns among the children of immigrants (Bueker, 2020; Haller et al., 2011; Hirschman, 2001; Portes and Zhou, 1993; Zhou and Bankston, 2016; Zhou and Xiong, 2005). In opposition to classic assimilation theories that assume that immigrants assimilate into a monolithic mainstream (Alba and Nee, 1997; Gordon, 1964), segmented assimilation theory allows for the possibility of different assimilation outcomes for different immigrant groups and posits that some groups under certain conditions experience either downward assimilation to the underclass or upward assimilation to the middle and upper class (Portes and Zhou, 1993). Portes and Zhou (1993) refer to combinations of these conditions as modes of incorporation, or ways for immigrant groups to insert themselves at different levels of a host society. In other words, immigrants experience a variety of contexts that facilitate or hamper their incorporation into their host society. Recent studies offer various extensions and interpretations of the theory while generally keeping in mind its overarching principles (Stepick and Stepick, 2010; Zhou, 1997). While scholars originally developed segmented assimilation theory to explain the experiences of immigrants to the United States, Vermeulen (2010) argues convincingly that researchers can use this theory to explain immigrant experiences in Europe, as long as they ensure that their analyses carefully consider institutional differences between European states. This careful consideration of differences between European states is especially important...
for cross-national analyses, because it helps ensure researchers do not analytically equate immigration policy regimes to countries. For example, countries might have similar immigration policy regimes and yet have different labor market structures, financial resources to support newcomers, and other country-specific features.

As part of segmented assimilation theory, Portes and Zhou (1993) propose that immigrants experience certain modes of incorporation, the contexts that shape their integration into the host society and, thus, their eventual status attainment. These contexts include government policy, societal reception, and the type of ethnic community. Societal reception refers to attitudes natives might have to a particular group of immigrants: when natives are not biased (or less biased) against immigrants, it is easier for immigrants to become part of the middle and upper classes (Chykina, 2021). In this theoretical vein, Ubalde and Alarcon (2020) show that when members of a society exhibit more open attitudes toward immigration, the gaps in labor market outcomes between immigrants and non-immigrants decrease. Portes and Zhou (1993) also propose that a strong co-ethnic community helps immigrants overcome lower levels of social capital and thereby facilitates immigrant incorporation. Empirically, studies show that co-ethnic community shapes earnings attainment and employment that immigrants obtain in a variety of ways (Damm, 2009; Demireva and Zwysen, 2021; Levanon, 2014). For example, an economically strong co-ethnic community facilitates immigrant incorporation; however, socioeconomic standing of each immigrant within the community also shapes how much immigrants can benefit from the resources that the community has to offer (Demireva and Zwysen, 2021; Khachikian, 2020; Levanon, 2014).

Government policy is the most theoretically important concept to this article. Portes and Zhou (1993) subdivide government policy environments into receptive, indifferent, and hostile. The environment is receptive when governments adopt policies that support immigrant integration. These policies might tackle how easily newcomers can get a work permit, whether they can access the same benefits as non-immigrants, and other initiatives that can ease integration. A hostile government policy environment involves a government actively blocking immigrants from both entry and assimilation. Indifferent contexts are those in which the government neither opposes nor encourages immigration through policy. How these government policy regimes interact with immigrants’ occupational expectations is a focal question of this article. According to segmented assimilation theory and the status attainment model then, immigrants in countries with stronger integration policies should be more likely to exhibit higher levels of occupational expectations. Conversely, immigrants in countries with weaker integration policies should be more likely to exhibit lower levels of occupational ambition.

Empirically, a number of studies have examined the relationship between pro-integration policies and many aspects of immigrants’ integration into society, such as immigrant-native employment gaps (Guzi et al., 2014), immigrants’ intentions to vote (Voicu and Comsa, 2014), and their propensity to volunteer (Manatschal and Stadelmann-Steffen, 2014). When researchers examine labor market outcomes—an area of utmost importance to immigrant integration—they find that the effects of pro-integration policies are inconclusive. For example, Aleksynska and Tritah (2013) find a positive association between pro-integration policies and immigrants’ labor market outcomes. Other researchers, however, find no relationship between pro-integration policies and immigrants’ likelihood of being employed (Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli, 2015), as well as no relationship (Pichler, 2011) or a negative relationship (Corrigan, 2015) between these policies and occupational prestige. This heterogeneity in findings might result from the fact that different immigrant groups experience pro-integration policies and government receptivity regimes differently (Portes and Grosfoguel, 1994; Portes and Zhou, 1993). Some of these analyses tend to provide the outcomes for an average immigrant, brushing over various intra-group, within-country dynamics. Available data sets often do not allow for in-depth explorations, however, and this limits the
researchers to examining outcomes for an average immigrant, as opposed to immigrants of a particular ethnicity or nationality (Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli, 2015; Chykina, 2019).

While labor market outcomes are a key integration metric for adult immigrants, researchers and policymakers alike consider education of immigrants’ children as one of the most important ways to aid immigrants’ integration into host societies (Alba et al., 2011; Crul and Vermeulen, 2003). Specifically analyzing immigrant students, several studies have shown that immigration-related policies can influence immigrants’ educational outcomes. For example, Manatschal and Stadelmann-Steffen (2013) and Van de Werfhorst and Heath (2019) report that pro-integration immigration policies have a positive effect on the educational achievement of immigrant youth. At the same time, when examining immigration admission policies (as opposed to pro-integration policies that immigrants experience once in their destination country1), Levels et al. (2008) find a positive association between stricter immigration admission policies and achievement of immigrant students. The authors attribute these effects to the fact that these policies lead to a more positively selected stock of immigrants coming to their respective destination countries (Levels et al., 2008). Ham et al. (2017) find that pro-integration policies positively affect immigrants’ sense of belonging in school, another correlate of eventual educational attainment. But while these studies look at educational achievement of immigrant youth and their sense of belonging, none examine how these policies might affect their career ambitions.

Taken together, these studies provide evidence that immigrants’ outcomes are malleable by immigration-related policies. In respect to occupational expectations, it is possible that when the integration regime is not as strong, immigrants do not see their future as bright. On a practical level, they can also see immigrant-related barriers to entry into certain positions. In light of the literature outlined above, I expect that the positive association between immigrant status and occupational expectations will be weaker in countries with a more limited number of pro-integration policies.

Hypothesis 2. The positive relationship between immigrant status and occupational expectations will be weaker in countries with fewer policies supporting immigrant integration.

Research design
In these analyses, I use multiple sources of data drawn from 18 European countries: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. I chose this set of European countries because the data for all necessary country-level covariates were publicly available for them.

Estimation strategy
I test my hypotheses using a series of random effects models that take into account the structure of my data. Because of the nested structure of my data (students within schools within countries), I include random intercepts at both the school and the country levels. This strategy allows me to account for unobserved heterogeneity across units (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). I follow Nezlek (2011, 2012) and Huang (2018) in their recommendation to use multilevel models even when the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) is low (in the case of my models, it is 3% at the country level and 10% at the school level).
Dependent variable

Data for my dependent variable—and all other individual- and school-level variables—come from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2015. PISA is a cross-national survey that assesses the reading, mathematics, and science literacy skills of 15-year-old students in 72 countries and economies. PISA employs a two-stage stratified sample. During the first stage, the survey samples schools systematically with probabilities proportional to a measure of size (PPS), where size means the number of PISA-eligible students enrolled. At the second stage, the survey samples PISA-eligible students within each focal school (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2017).

The dependent variable of interest is occupational expectations. I derive it from students’ responses to the question asking what occupation they expect to have at the age of 30. The survey maps student answers onto the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) scale (Ganzeboom, 2010b; Ganzeboom and Treiman, 2003). This scale reflects what socioeconomic standing the job can afford to its holder (Ganzeboom, 2010b), with higher ISEI scores representing higher expected occupational status.

Independent variables

I have three primary independent variables: First-generation immigrant, second-generation immigrant, and MIPEX. First-generation students were born outside the country of residence to parents born outside the country of residence. Following PISA’s definition of second-generation students (OECD, 2016), I code students as second generation if they were born inside the country of residence to two parents born outside the country of residence. The referent group in my analyses is non-immigrant students. In cases where the information on country of birth was not available for both parents, I use information on just one parent to determine student immigration status. For example, if a student was born inside the country of testing, with one parent born inside the country and no information available for the second parent, I code this student as non-immigrant; if, however, one parent of this student was born outside the country and no information was available for the second parent, I code this student as second generation. Following much immigration research (Burger, 2019; Ham et al., 2020; Levels and Dronkers, 2008; Levels et al., 2008; Ruhose and Schwerdt, 2016; Teltemann and Schunck, 20162), I apply this strategy to students in all countries, including students in Estonia and Slovenia, some of whom do not come from families with conventional history of immigration; rather, they are migrants due to recent geopolitical change in Europe. I discuss this coding choice and a robustness check to examine that this coding does not affect my results in the Robustness Checks section.

MIPEX (the Migrant Integration Policy Index) 2014 measures countries on a number of policy indicators across eight policy areas: labor market mobility, education, political participation, access to nationality, family reunion, health, permanent residence, and anti-discrimination3 (Solano and Huddleston, 2020). These policy indicators register the presence of specific policies that might aid immigrant integration. For example, within the education policy area, the index assesses each country on a variety of policy indicators, such as whether all immigrant children, including undocumented ones, can get access to pre-primary and compulsory education; whether educational authorities provide guidance on the educational system in migrant languages of origin; and whether school curricula can reflect local and national diversity. Whether immigrants have immediate access to employment and have equal working conditions and access to work-related benefits, such as maternity leave and unemployment benefits, are a few examples of the indicators in the labor market mobility policy area. The index then averages these policy indicators to create a score for
each policy area and, after that, averages these eight policy area scores one more time for each country to get the final (aggregate) country score. Higher values on MIPEX indicate a country’s higher number of policies to support immigrants’ integration and equal treatment. The Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and the Migration Policy Group (MPG) produce the index. I use both the overall MIPEX score and specific policy indicators separately in my analyses. I do the latter because certain policy areas might be more effective in boosting immigrants’ integration outcomes (Bilgili et al., 2015; Rimoldi and Blangiardo, 2019).

MIPEX scores have several limitations. First, some researchers express concern regarding the lack of a strong theoretical foundation that underpins the selection of indices for inclusion into MIPEX (Ruedin, 2015). Combining separate MIPEX indicators in dimensions that fit researcher interests might be a good strategy to increase the validity of the index (Ruedin, 2015). Another potential issue is that policy implementation occurs locally, and it is impossible to assure that immigrants in different parts of each country can equally benefit from each pro-integration policy, even if it is the law (Caselli, 2014). While MIPEX is not without limitations, researchers generally agree that it provides a good cross-national measure to capture how favorable the policy contexts are for immigrants within their host countries (Callens and Meuleman, 2017; Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010; Hadjar and Backes, 2013; Ham et al., 2017; Van de Werfhorst and Heath, 2019).

Control variables

To account for possible confounders, I include several additional measures in the model. Parental education, parental occupation, gender, and student achievement influence student occupational expectations; further, these factors might affect immigrant and non-immigrant students in different ways (Alarcon et al., 2014; Feliciano and Rumbaut, 2005; Mello, 2009). As such, I include these variables as controls. Parental education is the highest number of years of education that either parent achieved. Parental occupation is the highest occupational level, as measured on the ISEI scale (Ganzeboom, 2010b), achieved by either parent. Female is a variable that captures student gender, with female students coded as 1. Following Buchmann and Park (2009) and Park and Byun (2015), I code achievement as a mean of the five plausible values for reading, math, and science.

Many European countries use “tracked” education: various tests and recommendations result in some students attending schools from which they can enter universities and others attending schools that prepare them either for more advanced vocational degrees or direct exit into the labor market (Bodovski et al., 2017; Buchmann and Park, 2009; Teltemann and Schunck, 2016). Because tracking affects immigrant and non-immigrant students’ ambitions differentially (Chykina, 2019), at the school level, I control for program designation. I use general programs, or those tracks that provide access to the next general program level (including university education), as the referent group, as I control for whether an immigrant student is placed in the program that designates them for next level of vocational studies or exit into the labor market.

At the country level, anti-immigrant sentiment (Pasztor, 2010), percent unemployed (Clark, 2011), and GDP (Salazar et al., 2020) might have a differential effect on future plans of immigrants. Higher GDP might also be a proxy for post-material societies or advanced industrial societies; these societies tend to have specific occupational opportunity structures capturing which is important, because they might be related to occupational expectations (Charles, 1992; Charles et al., 2014). Furthermore, Cummins and Rodriguez (2010) show that percent of immigrants in the country can be related to MIPEX. Thus, I control for these potential confounders.

In order to control for the general level of public anxiety toward immigrants, I use data from the 2014 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a series of nationally representative surveys that examine Europeans’ attitudes and beliefs toward a number of social issues. Survey
participants answered the following prompt: “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?” The respondents provided their opinions on a scale from 0 to 10, on which 0 means a worse place to live and 10 means a better place to live. I reverse-code this variable from a measure of pro-immigrant sentiment to a measure of anti-immigrant sentiment (if a respondent entered 1, I code them as 9 in my measure, if they entered 2, I code them as 8, etc.). To construct my anti-immigrant sentiment control variable, I aggregate these data by calculating the weighted mean for each country. Percent foreign-born is the 2014 OECD estimate for the percent of foreign-born population of a given country. Values for percent unemployed and GDP per capita in 2014 come from the World Bank’s Data Bank. I present descriptive statistics for all variables in Table 1.

### Results and robustness checks

I begin by providing two figures that show both the occupational expectations gaps between immigrants and non-immigrants and MIPEX scores for countries in my sample. More specifically, Figure 1(a) shows the occupational expectations gaps between first-generation and non-immigrant students, alongside each country’s MIPEX score, and Figure 1(b) shows the occupational expectations gaps between second-generation and non-immigrant students, alongside each country’s MIPEX score. In both figures, Hungary has the lowest MIPEX score (42) and Sweden has the highest MIPEX score (87). Both figures show that, when not adjusted for covariates, occupational expectations gaps across these countries tend to favor immigrants, with a few exceptions. Gaps that favor first-generation immigrants are largest in Sweden and the Netherlands, and those that favor second-generation immigrants are largest in Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Estonia, Slovenia, and Switzerland are exceptions to the occupational expectations trend that favors immigrants; in these countries, either gaps that favor non-immigrants or no positive gaps are present.

### Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupational expectations</td>
<td>57.435</td>
<td>17.717</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant background (Ref: Non-immigrant students)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-generation</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>500.774</td>
<td>86.832</td>
<td>151.469</td>
<td>795.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental education</td>
<td>13.941</td>
<td>2.855</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental occupation</td>
<td>52.581</td>
<td>21.636</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program designation (Ref: General programs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next level of vocational studies</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit into the labor market</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX</td>
<td>58.666</td>
<td>12.48</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant sentiment</td>
<td>5.023</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td>3.328</td>
<td>6.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent unemployed</td>
<td>8.583</td>
<td>4.542</td>
<td>3.484</td>
<td>24.441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent foreign-born</td>
<td>12.688</td>
<td>4.985</td>
<td>4.525</td>
<td>28.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, in 1000s</td>
<td>45.639</td>
<td>20.426</td>
<td>14.198</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for variables used in my analyses. MIPEX: Migrant Integration Policy Index.
Figure 1. MIPEX and occupational expectations gaps: (a) first-generation immigrant; (b) second-generation immigrant.

Note. Figure 1(a) displays the occupational expectations gaps between first-generation immigrant and non-immigrant students for each country in the sample by each country’s MIPEX score. A positive gap indicates that first-generation immigrants have higher occupational expectations than non-immigrants. The correlation between country-level occupational expectations gaps for first-generation immigrants and MIPEX equals 0.33 ($r=0.33$). Figure 1(b) displays the occupational expectations gaps between second-generation immigrant and non-immigrant students for each country in the sample by each country’s MIPEX score. A positive gap indicates that second-generation immigrants have higher occupational expectations than non-immigrants. The correlation between country-level occupational expectations gaps for second-generation immigrants and MIPEX equals 0.31 ($r=0.31$).
depending on whether I examine first- or second-generation youth. In all but these three countries, the gaps work to the benefit of immigrants, and the size of these gaps appears to widen as the number of pro-integration policies increases. In Figure 1(a), the correlation between country-level occupational expectations gaps for first-generation immigrants and MIPEX equals 0.33 ($r = 0.33$).

In Figure 1(b), more countries are in the northwest quadrant, where the gaps are high but MIPEX is low; despite this, the correlation between country-level occupational expectations gaps for second-generation immigrants and MIPEX equals 0.31 ($r = 0.31$). In other words, these figures suggest that a systematic association between MIPEX and immigrants’ occupational expectations might be present: as MIPEX scores increase, occupational expectations gaps appear to become somewhat more favorable to immigrants. Overall, Figure 1 provides compelling motivation for further examination of MIPEX and occupational gaps between immigrants and non-immigrants that accounts for additional individual and country characteristics in my sample.

Models in Table 2 estimate the associations between my predictors of interest and the occupational expectations of European students. In Model 1, I focus on the first-generation and second-generation coefficients, as they show whether immigrant students have an occupational expectations advantage over non-immigrant youth (the referent group). In Model 1, these coefficients are positive and statistically significant, which supports Hypothesis 1. Both first- and second-generation students, on average, have occupational expectations about seven points higher than those

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**Table 2.** The estimated relationship between first-generation immigrant status, second-generation immigrant status, MIPEX, and occupational expectations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupational expectations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant background (Ref.: Non-immigrant students)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-generation</td>
<td>7.039*** (0.25)</td>
<td>-0.770 (1.337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation</td>
<td>7.167*** (0.225)</td>
<td>2.198** (1.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>0.072*** (0.0007)</td>
<td>0.072*** (0.0007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.439*** (0.108)</td>
<td>2.438*** (0.108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental education</td>
<td>0.326*** (0.023)</td>
<td>0.323*** (0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental occupation</td>
<td>0.09*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.09*** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program designation (Ref: General programs)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Next level of vocational studies</td>
<td>-2.559*** (0.276)</td>
<td>-2.545*** (0.276)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exit into the labor market</td>
<td>-6.353*** (0.292)</td>
<td>-6.322*** (0.292)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPEX</td>
<td>0.044 (0.067)</td>
<td>0.033 (0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-Generation $\times$ MIPEX</td>
<td>0.132*** (0.022)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-Generation $\times$ MIPEX</td>
<td>0.087*** (0.019)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant sentiment</td>
<td>2.281 (1.562)</td>
<td>2.326 (1.553)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent unemployed</td>
<td>0.361*** (0.175)</td>
<td>0.366** (0.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent foreign-born</td>
<td>-0.098 (0.169)</td>
<td>-0.099 (0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, in 1000s</td>
<td>0.034 (0.056)</td>
<td>0.037 (0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.545 (11.53)</td>
<td>-6.286 (11.46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** Table 2 presents the results of random effects models. Random intercepts are used at the school and country levels. Number of students = 84,051; number of schools = 4,419; number of countries = 18. Between-school variance component for M1 = 16.578 (0.653) and for M2 = 16.6 (0.653); between-country variance component for M1 = 7.557 (2.566) and for M2 7.465 (2.535). MIPEX: Migrant Integration Policy Index. Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05.
of non-immigrant students, which is a substantively large increase. In Europe, the majority of immigrants are medium-skilled workers (OECD/European Union, 2015). To draw an example from medium-skilled jobs, an increase of seven points may represent a rise in occupational expectations from anticipating becoming a roofer (ISEI score of 36) to a building electrician (ISEI score of 43) (Ganzeboom, 2010a). The Wald test on the first-generation and second-generation coefficients from Model 1 is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 0.16, p = 0.686$), which means that the occupational expectations of first-generation immigrants are not different from the occupational expectations of second-generation immigrants. This is in line with Alarcon et al. (2014), who showed similar results in Spain: the occupational expectations of foreign-born immigrant students are not different from those of students who are born in Spain to immigrant parents.

While not the substantive focus of this study, some interpretation of the control variables in my model might help to contextualize my primary results. Females appear to have higher occupational expectations than males. This is in line with the literature that shows that female students have higher levels of educational expectations than male students (Chykina et al., 2016; McDaniel, 2010). This association underscores that female students in Europe appear to have higher levels of overall ambition than do male students. Following status attainment theory (Sewell et al., 1969, 1970), higher parental education and occupation positively influence students’ occupational expectations. These associations speak to the continued importance of familial background in one’s life course. Also in line with existing scholarship is the fact that those in lower tracks have lower occupational expectations (Sikora and Saha, 2007). This underscores the importance of educational systems to the formation of occupational expectations. Interestingly, a positive association exists between occupational expectations and percent unemployed at the country level. Future work that builds theory specifically about the relationship between unemployment and immigrants’ ambition could further examine this relationship.

Turning to Hypothesis 2, I test this theoretical expectation by examining coefficients on first-generation x MIPEX and second-generation x MIPEX in Model 2. These coefficients are positive and statistically significant, which indicates that as the number of pro-integration policies increases, so do the occupational expectations of immigrant youth. Respectively, in countries with fewer pro-integration policies, immigrants’ occupational expectations are lower. Figure 2 best showcases this relationship.

Figure 2(a) demonstrates how the positive association between first-generation immigrant status and occupational expectations changes under different MIPEX conditions; Figure 2(b) shows this relationship for second-generation immigrants. I show two separate figures, one for the marginal effect of first-generation immigrant status and one for the second-generation, because the plots for these marginal effects overlap heavily. X-axes display MIPEX scores for countries in my sample. Y-axes display the marginal effects of immigrant status, compared with non-immigrant students. At the highest MIPEX value of 87, first-generation immigrants experience an 11-point increase in occupational expectations and second-generation immigrants experience a 10-point increase. However, when MIPEX equals 42 (the lowest in my sample), the occupational expectations of first-generation immigrant students are only about five points higher than those of non-immigrant students; for second-generation students, the positive bump is about six points.

Figure 2 also shows that the occupational expectations of immigrant students remain higher than those of non-immigrant students at all MIPEX levels in my sample. With that said, the coefficient on first-generation in Model 2 is not statistically significant, which indicates that if a country were to have zero pro-integration policies, then the occupational expectations of immigrant youth would be non-distinct from those of their non-immigrant peers. Even in the absence of any pro-integration policies, however, second-generation students would still have occupational expectations two points higher than non-immigrant students.
Figure 2. Marginal effects of (a) first-generation and (b) second-generation immigrant status on occupational expectations.

Note. Figure 2(a) displays the association between first-generation immigrant status and occupational expectations across different MIPEX values. The shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Figure 2(b) displays the association between second-generation immigrant status and occupational expectations across different MIPEX values. The shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
Importantly, the results above are contingent upon how I code second-generation immigrants. As a reminder, I code a student as a second-generation immigrant if both their parents were born outside the country (or one parent was born outside the country in cases of a single-parent household). If I instead code students as second-generation when one of their parents is born outside the country and the other one is native-born, these students still have higher occupational expectations than native-born students, but my interaction term becomes statistically insignificant ($B = -0.019; SE = 0.012, p = 0.109$). This finding, however, is not necessarily against my theory. I would expect students for whom one parent is a native to have less need of pro-integration policies, because they tend to be more integrated into their host country (Smith et al., 2019). In fact, many of these students—unlike those born in a country to two parents born outside that country—are citizens of the countries within which they reside and they report less perceived discrimination (Andre and Dronkers, 2017). By definition, these pro-integration policies are not supposed to help them to the same extent as these policies help non-citizens; thus, it is perhaps not surprising that when I include these students in the second-generation group, they eliminate the effect of pro-integration policies for this group. This is also in line with prior literature that found that immigrant effects become diluted when researchers define immigrants as having one foreign-born and one native-born parent, as opposed to two foreign-born parents (Jensen, 2001; Ramakrishnan, 2004). This contingency is very important to keep in mind when drawing conclusions about the results of this article. Also importantly, when I drop the students who have one native-born and one foreign-born parent from the analyses, the results of my original models remain unchanged: both first- and second-generation students have higher occupational expectations and both interaction terms are positive and statistically significant, with similar magnitudes of the effects.

Also, additional heterogeneity in the associations between pro-integration policies and occupational expectations may exist; the effect of pro-integration policies may vary, for instance, with immigrants’ race or religion. Unfortunately, I cannot examine this possible variation because PISA did not collect these data as part of its surveys. Using country of origin as a proxy for race or religion would also be problematic, because every surveyed country lists its own set of options for immigrants’ country of origin (such as country A, country B, other). This makes it difficult to consistently infer race or religion from immigrants’ country of origin, because race and religion span both listed countries and possibly the “other country” category. Future work should develop theories regarding these potential relationships and empirically test them. In addition, while this article focuses on how policies might affect immigrants’ future plans, future work should examine the link between anti-immigrant sentiment and immigrant outcomes, perhaps using psychological theories that link biases in the population to performance of immigrant students (Berjot et al., 2011; Chateignier et al., 2009).

The results above provide strong support for my theory. They also raise the question of whether a specific policy area of MIPEX might drive the empirical relationships shown above. If so, then certain MIPEX policy areas might be more likely to increase the positive occupational expectations gap that immigrants experience. Below, I reanalyze the data using specific disaggregated policy area scores as an independent variable. Supplemental Table A1 in the Appendix presents disaggregated MIPEX scores for each policy area. It shows substantial within-country differences in scores across policy areas; within countries, certain components might be rated low, while others might be rated high, as opposed to component scores clustering around the mean, that is, the overall MIPEX score. For example, Ireland has an overall MIPEX score of 59; yet it scores low (22) in terms of labor market mobility policies and high (86) on anti-discrimination policies.

Table 3 presents the results from eight separate models. For these analyses, I modify Model 2 by replacing my MIPEX variable with one of eight different disaggregated MIPEX scores, one for each policy area that MIPEX assesses. I present only the coefficients for interaction terms here, but
the analyses include the same set of constitutive terms and control variables as the analyses presented in Table 2.

Table 3 shows positive and statistically significant associations between first-generation immigrants and pro-integration scores in all but one policy area. This means that in countries where these policy areas are more pro-integration, first-generation immigrants experience an additional bump in occupational expectations. The only exception is a family reunion score, the interaction with which is not statistically significant for first-generation immigrants.

For second-generation immigrants, the interaction terms are positive and statistically significant for five of the eight policy areas: labor market, education, political participation, access to nationality, and health. As scores in these policy areas increase, so do occupational expectations gaps that favor second-generation immigrants. The interaction terms for anti-discrimination and permanent residence are not significant. This is perhaps logical, because achieving permanent residence might be an issue of less concern for second-generation immigrants than it is for first-generation immigrants. The anti-discrimination policy component—which deals with discrimination based on race/
ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship—might be less relevant for second-generation immigrants, because they tend to be more similar to the native population than first-generation immigrants, at least on certain characteristics, and thus less likely to experience discrimination.

Interestingly, the interaction term for family reunification and second-generation immigrants is negative, which means that as the number of policies that make family reunification easier becomes higher across countries, the occupational expectations gaps that favor immigrants become smaller. Perhaps this occurs because this dimension generally might not be as applicable to many immigrants in my sample as, on average, immigrants either immigrate to Europe with their families or have their spouses join them soon after they immigrate. In 2013–2017 in European OECD countries, only 7 percent of immigrant populations aged 15–64 were waiting for their spouses to join them in their host countries (OECD, 2019). It is also noteworthy that prior work has found a similar counter-intuitive effect of family reunion policies. For example, Guzi et al. (2014) find that while policies that favor family reunion decrease immigrant-native gaps in temporary employment, they appear to increase the overall immigrant-native unemployment gap.

Overall, these additional analyses indicate no one policy dimension specifically affects immigrants’ occupational expectations, and, thus, is a mechanism behind the discussed relationship of interest. It appears that it is the overall policy climate that matters, as the associations between scores for various policy areas and occupational expectations gaps are generally similar, especially for first-generation immigrants.

**Robustness checks**

I conduct a number of robustness checks. First, given the low ICC, I reanalyze my data using standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions; my results do not change when I use this model specification. Because I have only 18 countries in my analyses, I conduct additional robustness checks to test whether one or several countries might drive my results. More specifically, to examine the possibility that influence outliers drive my results, I calculate DFBETAS and Cook’s distance measures (Cook’s Ds), two commonly used standardized measures of influential data for point estimates (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2012). Following standard practice, I do this for all group-level (i.e. country-level) variables in my models (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2012). The DFBETAS plots do not reveal clear outliers, so I turn to examining Cook’s Ds across my two models. For Cook’s Ds, I find no evidence of outliers when examining them for all group-level variables. Turning instead to looking at just Cook’s D for MIPEX, I find that Denmark, Finland, and Portugal might be influential outliers. To assess their influence on my results, I drop these three countries and reestimate my models. My results are robust to this model specification. I also conduct a robustness check in which I iteratively drop each country, one by one, from my analyses, and find that my results are robust to these alternative model specifications as well. As it is also possible that some unobserved characteristic at the supra-national level might be affecting my results, I conduct an additional check where I include a fixed effect for the country region (Northern, Western, Central, or Southwestern Europe). My results are robust to adding this fixed effect.

In order to ensure that multicollinearity does not drive my results, I examine the pair-wise correlations between my country-level predictors. I report these correlations in Supplemental Table A2 in the Appendix. None of the bivariate correlations are higher than 0.7. I also conduct Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests on these variables, and none of these variables have a VIF higher than 4: VIF is 1.57 on MIPEX, 2.3 on anti-immigrant sentiment, 1.53 on percent unemployed, 1.79 on percent foreign-born, and 3.56 on GDP per capita.

Another potential issue might be immigrant selectivity—the fact that certain countries might receive a more educated stock of immigrants who will be able to access better jobs in their host
countries (Feliciano, 2005, 2020; Ichou, 2014; Lee and Zhou, 2015; Van de Werfhorst and Heath, 2019). Immigrants who are more educated and have better career options might choose to immigrate to countries with more pro-integration policies. In order to ensure that this eventuality does not drive my results, I conduct several robustness checks. First, I aggregate parental years of education and occupational scores by country and immigrant status and then examine whether there is a positive correlation between education and occupational scores of immigrant parents and MIPEX scores. If selectivity drives the results of my analyses, we would expect a strong positive correlation between MIPEX and years of education and occupational scores of immigrant parents, indicating that immigrants with higher levels of education and occupational scores are choosing countries with more pro-integration policies. The correlation between MIPEX and years of education of parents of first-generation immigrants is −0.11 and of second-generation immigrants 0.03. The correlation between MIPEX and occupational scores of parents of first-generation immigrants is 0.08 and of second-generation immigrants 0.22.9 These correlations are weak, indicating that selectivity patterns are unlikely to drive my results. I also provide means for aggregated years of education and parental occupational scores by country and immigrant status in the Appendix. Supplemental Figure A1 presents means for parental years of education, and Supplemental Figure A2 presents means for occupational scores. In addition, I conduct another robustness check where I control for the percentage of tertiary-degree-holding immigrants within a country. I obtain these data for 2014 from Eurostat. The results I report in the main text are robust to this alternative model specification.

In addition, certain immigrant student groups in my sample can differ from other immigrant students in the way their families experienced migration. These two groups are students of post-Soviet descent in Estonia and students of Serb descent in Slovenia. Due to recent geopolitical changes in Europe, even though their families have not necessarily had a conventional migration experience, I code them as immigrants. For example, I code an Estonian-born student whose parents were born in a former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) country other than Estonia as a second-generation immigrant, even though their parents were not immigrants in a conventional sense, because they did not move across international borders to live in Estonia. In doing so, I follow other immigration research (Burger, 2019; Ham et al., 2020; Levels and Dronkers, 2008; Levels et al., 2008; Ruhose and Schwerdt, 2016; Teltemann and Schunck, 2016). Importantly, students of post-Soviet descent in Estonia and students of Serb descent in Slovenia also experience othering and discrimination (Prelc, 2009; Vetik and Helemae, 2011). They are also likely to benefit from pro-integration policies in ways similar to those of other immigrants. Yet, they represent a distinctive type of immigrant that differs from an immigrant student as traditionally conceived (Gorodzeisky and Leykin, 2020). In order to ensure these students are not driving my results, I conduct an additional robustness check. Each country that participates in PISA can choose its own set of responses regarding students’ and their parents’ place of birth. Respondents in Slovenia can choose Slovenia, Hungary, Italy, or another country. Respondents in Estonia can choose Estonia, another former USSR republic, or another country. As such, I can exclude students and parents who report a former USSR background in Estonia, students who choose “other country” for themselves or their parents in Slovenia, and students who do not report their or their parents’ country background; then I can reanalyze my data. When I do this, the results remain unchanged, indicating that these groups of students are not driving my results.

In addition, the migration processes discussed above will also affect official statistics for the estimated percentage of foreign-born residents within these two countries, as these specific migrant groups will count as foreign-born (Gorodzeisky and Leykin, 2021). In order to ensure this does not confound my results, I reestimate my models without including percent foreign-born as a control variable. My results are robust to this alternative model specification. For more information...
regarding the issues with national identification of the immigrant groups discussed above, including how these identifications can reinforce existing ethnic divides, please refer to Gorodzeisky and Leykin (2020) and Gromme and Scheel (2020).

Discussion

This article examines the occupational expectations of immigrant youth in 18 European countries. While prior single-country research that focuses on immigrant students in Germany (Beicht and Walden, 2019; Wicht, 2016) and racial and ethnic minority youth in the United States (Mello, 2009) shows that immigrant and minority students tend to have high levels of occupational ambitions, this article presents the first cross-national evidence of heightened occupational ambitions among immigrant youth, thus extending the generalizability of these one-country studies.

Prior work on educational expectations theorizes that immigrant optimism explains the high educational expectations of immigrants. My data do not allow me to formally test this potential mechanism in relation to occupational expectations. In addition, this article does not test whether immigrants are reporting high levels of occupational ambition because they are rational actors who are calculating their chances of achieving certain careers or if they are trying to signal a virtuous identity (Frye, 2012). With that said, whether immigrants act as rational actors who compare benefits of different outcomes when they state their occupational expectations or if they are trying to signal a virtuous identity, stated intent to achieve high-level occupations can shape actions and decisions that lead to realizing these ambitions (Breen, 1999; Frye, 2012; Morgan, 2005). Future work should examine these mechanisms that might shed light on why immigrants have higher occupational expectations than their non-immigrant peers.

Regarding the intersection of occupational expectations and pro-integration policies, this article also shows the association between a higher number of pro-integration policies and immigrants’ higher level of occupational ambition. This indicates that, at least in this domain, pro-integration policies work as intended. Yet, these results do not guarantee that a more pro-integration policy regime will necessarily result in better labor outcomes for immigrants. For example, prior cross-national work that focuses on immigrant-native labor gaps finds that in some countries these gaps persist despite more pro-integration policies (Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli, 2015; Corrigan, 2015; Guzi et al., 2014; Pichler, 2011). Future research should study the nexus between immigrant ambition and labor outcomes, and specifically how pro-integration policies play into this process. This work will provide critical insights into how the model of status attainment works specifically for immigrants (Haller and Portes, 2019; Ishida, 2018) and whether pro-integration policies can help overcome the fact that immigrants often lack country-specific knowledge about school systems, university entrance exams, and job market processes (Alba et al., 2011; Barban and White, 2011; Goldenberg et al., 2001; Hill and Torres, 2010; Rosenbaum and Rochford, 2008). Another fruitful avenue for research should explore whether anticipated anti-immigrant discrimination (Dancygier and Laitin, 2014) might thwart the link between high ambition levels, educational choices that immigrants make after secondary school, and eventually, job market outcomes.

Importantly, the positive association between pro-integration policies and the occupational expectations of second-generation students is contingent on how I define second-generation immigrants. The fact that pro-integration policies provide second-generation students with a boost only when I define these students as having two foreign-born parents, as opposed to one foreign-born and one native parent, underscores the highly intersectional nature of the immigrant experience. It also likely indicates that pro-integration policies, at least in the domain of occupational expectations, work as designed: we should expect these policies to benefit less-integrated students of immigrant origin more. In addition, these results emphasize the necessity for more research that
compares students who grow up in families where two parents are immigrants with those where only one parent is an immigrant (Ramakrishnan, 2004).

Finally, educators, researchers, and policymakers should consider carefully the fact that not all immigrants will achieve their ambitious goals. In an age when career outcomes are closely linked to one’s sense of identity, not realizing high occupational expectations may lead to deleterious outcomes, such as a diminished sense of self-worth and higher levels of depression (Cherlin, 2019; Lamont, 2019; Sendroiu et al., 2021). This presents a challenge as to how educators should balance the positive effects of higher occupational expectations, such as choosing higher tracks and more advanced coursework in high school (Buchmann and Park, 2009; Feliciano and Rumbaut, 2005; Pasztor, 2010) and increased resistance to temptations that can lead students’ high school careers astray (Frye, 2012), against the potential psychological costs of not achieving these ambitions.

Importantly, occupational expectations also do not necessarily equate to economic expectations. While many studies show that socioeconomic background is a major predictor of occupational expectations, economic expectations (as defined by whether respondents have economic worries about their future, as well as whether they expect to have a job that pays well and they most want by the time they are 30) appear to be shaped more by a sense of community belonging and less by individual socioeconomic factors (Bandelj and Lanuza, 2018). Given the rich literature on the role that a sense of belonging plays in immigrant integration (Mallet-García and García-Bedolla, 2021; Osman et al., 2020; Rajman and Geffen, 2018), exploring the intersections between occupational expectations, economic expectations, a sense of community, and pro-integration policies might be a fruitful addition to the literature on what factors drive how immigrants imagine their futures (Lamont, 2019).

Conclusion

This article presents the first cross-national evidence that immigrants’ occupational expectations are higher than those of non-immigrant students. Taken together with prior work on high educational expectations of immigrant students (Chykina, 2019; Feliciano and Lanuza, 2016; Kao and Tienda, 1995; Krahn and Taylor, 2005), this article extends the literature on high levels of ambition on behalf of immigrant youth. Furthermore, this article finds a positive association between the occupational expectations gap that favors immigrants and a greater level of pro-integration immigration policies within a country. However, for second-generation immigrants, these results manifest only when both parents are born outside the country. Given the positive associations between occupational expectations of immigrant students and a number of school-related positive outcomes (Buchmann and Park, 2009; Feliciano and Rumbaut, 2005; Pasztor, 2010), this article suggests that the policy environment immigrants experience within their host country matters to immigrants’ successful integration (Portes and Zhou, 1993).

An influx of immigrants coinciding with elevated public hostility toward national outsiders is not historically unusual. A few examples of this context in Europe are the public attention garnered by the anti-immigrant stances of Sweden’s Swedish Democrats and the United Kingdom’s UKIP. The immigration issue dominated the discussion around Brexit. Far-right candidate Marine Le Pen—who famously promised to “make France more French”—gained significant support in recent elections. These parties and politicians want legislative change and increasingly draconian law enforcement to limit the number of immigrants coming to their countries and curb state benefits for those immigrants who already reside within their countries (Golder, 2016; Rydgren, 2008). Should these parties prevail, their countries are likely to roll back pro-integration policies. This article shows how this retrenchment could be detrimental to immigrant children’s education
trajectories, given the association between weaker integration policies and decreased occupational ambitions. Opponents will argue that additional services provided to immigrants are a burden on their country’s welfare system, yet European countries are experiencing historically low birth rates that amplify the importance of immigrants for long-term economic stability, making an investment in immigrant children an investment in these nations’ future workforces (Cafaro and Derer, 2019; Craveiro et al., 2019).

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**Notes**

1. Bjerre et al. (2015) provide an overview of why researchers should treat policies that regulate immigrants’ admission as distinct from pro-integration policies that immigrants experience once they are in their destination country.
2. All studies cited here include Estonia, Slovenia, or another European country with a history of migration flows similar to these two countries in their sample.
3. In 2020, MIPEX underwent an update. Current scores include 58 indicators, as opposed to 167 indicators in earlier iterations. This adjustment affected all scores, including 2014 scores. I use this updated version of MIPEX in my analyses.
4. Researchers often use GDP and the Human Development Index (HDI) interchangeably to capture a nation’s development level (Charles et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2017). In addition to economic indicators, HDI also includes educational attainment, thus potentially capturing high-attainment environments. The results I present in this article do not change when I use HDI instead of GDP in my analyses.
5. It is important to note that these figures do not provide evidence as to whether presented gaps are statistically significantly different from each other.
6. PISA does not have a citizenship variable to formally control for respondents’ citizenship status.
7. Model results and figures that I discuss as robustness checks are available upon request.
8. Estonia was the only country in my sample in Eastern Europe, and because I have a country-level predictor of interest, I had to omit Estonia from this robustness check.
9. I use the information for the parent who has the higher level of education and the higher occupational score when information for both parents was available.

**Supplemental material**
Supplemental material for this article is available online.

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