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Social Policies and Center-Right Governments in Argentina and Chile

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Abstract: Latin America’s “left turn” expanded cash transfers and public services, contributing to lower poverty and inequality. Recently, right-leaning candidates and parties have begun to win back seats in the legislature, and in some cases have captured the executive branch. This shift has sparked debate about the future of Latin America’s welfare states. In this paper we analyze social policy reforms enacted by two recent right-leaning governments: Sebastián Piñera in Chile (2010-2014) and Mauricio Macri in Argentina (2015—). Contrary to neoliberal adjustment policies of the past, we find that neither Macri nor Piñera engaged in privatization or deep spending cuts. Instead, both administrations facilitated a process of policy drift in some sectors and marginal expansion in others. Policy legacies and the strength of the opposition help to explain these outcomes, suggesting that Latin America’s political context has been transformed by the consolidation of democracy and the experience of left-party rule.

Introduction

Latin America’s “left turn,” which began in 1998 with the election of Hugo Chávez, ushered in significant changes to the nature and scope of social welfare policy. Several of these governments expanded social assistance, insurance, and services, thus reducing poverty and inequality (Huber and Stephens 2012; Pribble 2013; Blofield 2011). Recently, however, the region has witnessed a new electoral trend, as right parties have begun to win back seats in the legislature, and in some cases, the executive branch. Right-wing Presidents were elected in Argentina, Chile, and Peru, and a center-right coalition
has reached majorities in Venezuela’s legislature. In 2016, Dilma Rousseff (Workers’ Party) in Brazil was impeached and replaced by a party further to the right and Evo Morales (Movement Towards Socialism) in Bolivia lost a referendum that so far precludes him from running for reelection.

This swing toward the right has sparked debate about the future of Latin American social policy (Cannon 2016; Casullo 2016). During the 1980s and 1990s, several countries in the region retrenched key welfare programs, privatizing pension systems and engaging in deep social spending cuts (Huber and Stephens 2000; Castiglioni 2005; Brooks 2009; Madrid 2003). In Chile this retrenchment was carried out by Gen. Augusto Pinochet’s right-wing dictatorship, while in Argentina it was Peronist President Carlos Menem that liberalized welfare programs. While the Peronist Party is a labor-mobilizing organization, its ideological orientation is flexible, encompassing groups from across the spectrum. During the Menem years, the Peronist party is considered by many to have shifted to the right (Huber and Stephens 2012, Pribble 2013).

The retrenchment witnessed in Latin America during the 1980s and ‘90s differed from the experience of advanced industrialized democracies, where such cut-backs were limited because the design of previous policies, or policy legacies, empowered social actors and generated broad support for existing programs, making cut-backs unpopular (Pierson 1994, 2001). Scholars argued that Latin American retrenchment was made possible by the debt crisis, the poor performance of social security institutions, the tenuous character of the region’s democracies, the fragmentation of civil society, and the weakness of left parties (Brooks 2009; Madrid 2003; Huber and Stephens 2000). The recent turn to the right, therefore, poses an interesting opportunity to explore whether the past 20 years of democratic consolidation and the rise of left-leaning parties has altered this political context, making overt retrenchment less feasible in Latin America.
In this paper we analyze two recent right-leaning governments: the administrations of Chilean President Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014) and the first year of Argentine President Mauricio Macri (2015—). We seek to understand whether and how the ideological shift has influenced social protection in these two countries. The findings reveal that the recent turn to the right in Latin America bares little resemblance to the experience of social policy reform in the 1980s and 1990s. Neither country has experienced outright social policy retrenchment. Instead, the kinds of policy reforms carried out by the right-leaning governments reflect a more complex process of policy drift and privatization creep in some sectors, and marginal expansions in other areas. In this way, Latin America’s swing right has produced a form of welfare politics that is more similar to the experience of advanced industrialized democracies than previous findings suggested. As in advanced welfare states, our analysis reveals that this combination of policy drift and expansion is explained by policy legacies and the strength of the opposition. Previous policies generate gaps that require reforms and generate popular support that makes retrenchment difficult. The electoral and mobilizational strength of the left in opposition also inhibits outright retrenchment. The inclusion of Brazil as a shadow case in the concluding section of the paper provides a note of caution. Recent social policy initiatives enacted by right-wing President Michel Temer suggest that in contexts of severe economic and political crisis, more overt forms of retrenchment could still be feasible in Latin America.² Previous research has supported the idea that economic crisis generates pressures for welfare state retrenchment in the region (Madrid 2003; Stallings 1992).

In the pages that follow we analyze social policy reforms undertaken by President Piñera and the initial social policy agenda of President Macri. Most social policy reforms take place at the beginning of new administrations, both because presidents enjoy enough
support to make it possible and because frontloading popular policy decisions can benefit their parties in midterm elections. Even in the case of Chile, Piñera’s primary initiatives were carried out during the first two years in office. We, therefore, contend that the analysis of Macri’s first year in office provides important insight into the administration’s goals and orientation. Drawing on newspaper articles, legislative debates, and secondary sources, we find that neither Macri nor Piñera engaged in outright retrenchment of existing social policies, yet there was retrenchment through policy drift, and in both cases the administrations made marginal expansions to pensions and conditional cash transfers (in Argentina) and maternity leave (in Chile), but did not expand public services.

**Existing Research and Theoretical Expectations**

Studies of the welfare state find that the politics of expansion and retrenchment are different. Theories that explain expansion of the welfare state focus on political-institutional and economic factors. Political-institutional arguments point to the impact of strong left parties and union mobilization (Huber and Stephens 2001; Dion 2010), political institutional design (Immergut 1992), policy legacies (Martínez-Franzoni and Sánchez-Anochea 2016), and regime type (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; McGuire 2010). Other scholars note that economic factors, namely growth levels (McGuire 2010) trade openness (Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 1985), and the socio-political effects of neoliberal reforms (Ewig and Kay 2011) also shape the expansion of social policy.

Studies of welfare state retrenchment find that scaling back social programs can take many forms, ranging from the most overt and outright (privatization, program elimination, and deep spending cuts), to more minor changes (tightening eligibility requirements and introducing conditionality), to passive measures such as policy drift (Pierson 2001; Hacker 2004). These minor and passive changes, as Mahoney and Thelen (2010) explain, can have important consequences. Policy drift is one example of
incremental change, in which rules are formally the same but their impact changes due to shifts in external conditions. It occurs when, for example, a state maintains status-quo spending levels, but the demand for benefits goes up; when a state increases the level of income transfers at a lower rate than inflation; or when the state underspends the budget on particular sectors. In such settings, the generosity of benefits or program coverage will be negatively affected, thus resulting in de-facto retrenchment (Hacker 2004).

Conservative governments in advanced European welfare states have tended to use these more complex forms of retrenchment—such as policy drift—rather than outright roll-backs. This gradual form of retrenchment responds to the role of political institutional factors, policy legacies, and economic variables. Specifically, a large number of veto points helps protect against social policy cut-backs (Pierson 1994, 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Castiglioni 2005). Policy legacies can also limit retrenchment by making reforms unpopular (Pierson 1994, 2001; Huber and Stephens 2001; Brooks 2009). In Latin America, however, several studies show that outright retrenchment was feasible in the 1980s and 1990s, due to economic crises, capital account openness, and pressure from international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (Madrid 2003; Rudra 2008). Others note that reforms were facilitated by the weak state of democracy, civil society, and left parties (Huber and Stephens 2000).

Our paper builds upon and refines this existing literature by exploring whether outright retrenchment continues to be feasible in Latin America. We find that the region’s experience of democratic consolidation and left-party rule has generated a political context in which outright retrenchment is costly and unlikely. Instead, and similar to the case of advanced industrialized democracies, parties of the center-right in Latin America are more likely to retrench by means of policy drift and may even face incentives to marginally expand some programs. Similar pressures as those in advanced industrial
democracies explain this outcome: policy legacies and the strength of the opposition. Policy legacies, or the design of previous policy, influence current reforms in two ways. First, they help define what reforms are necessary. For example, a health policy that expands access to public services without building new infrastructure, may create overcrowding and wait-lists, putting pressure on the government to address the problems. The gaps and challenges created by existing policy design helps determine when and where governments concentrate their social policy efforts. A second way that policy legacies shape the direction and nature of reforms is by structuring the preferences of actors (Ewig and Kay 2011). Where existing policy offers broad coverage and high quality benefits, the programs will enjoy popular support, making retrenchment prohibitively costly.

The second variable in our framework is the strength of the opposition. We contend that opposition strength is made up of three factors: (1) electoral strength, (2) the share of seats in the legislature, and (3) mobilizing capacity. First, where center-left parties pose a viable threat in the Presidential election (i.e. where the election was won by a narrow margin), right-wing candidates are likely to adopt a centrist approach to social policy that maintains popular programs. These parties may even commit themselves to expanding social policy in settings of strong competition from the left. Such promises of expansion are most likely in the case of income transfer policies because parties can more easily claim credit and reap electoral gains. This is because voters easily understand where transfers are coming from and therefore can reward that party in elections (Niedzwiecki 2016). In addition, expanding transfers tends to be cheaper than making structural reforms to social services.

A second element of opposition strength relates to the share of legislative seats that the opposition holds. We argue that where the opposition maintains a majority in at least one chamber, policy reform is likely to be more progressive because of the ability of
left=center-left parties to shape reform during the legislative debate. In addition, Presidents that do not have majorities in the legislature tend to develop proposals that may not fully respond to their party’s preferences but have a chance of passing. The third element of opposition strength is mobilizing capacity. When opposition parties have ties to strong and mobilized civil society organizations, they will have a better chance of influencing the President’s agenda and the policy process through pressure in the street.

Policy legacies and opposition strength are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining policy reforms. They are contributing factors. In fact, a given outcome (maintenance, retrenchment, policy drift, or expansion) can be achieved through different causal paths that involve different dimensions of the two variables (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). For example, while the expansion of pensions in Argentina is partly explained by strong linkages between the opposition Peronist Party and unions, the expansion of maternity leave in Chile did not respond to mobilized civil society with linkages to the opposition, but mostly to a highly competitive Presidential election. In both cases, policy legacies were key for understanding the reform process.

Research Design: Social Policy Reform in Argentina and Chile

To assess the role of policy legacies and strength of the opposition, we employ a qualitative comparative research design that focuses on social policy priorities and reforms enacted by right-wing Presidents in Argentina and Chile. We select Argentina and Chile for a number of reasons. First, right-wing parties won the Presidency in Chile (2010-2014) and Argentina (2015—) thus allowing us to test the role of ideology on social policy. Piñera’s National Renovation (Renovación Nacional, RN) is center-right in its political orientation, favoring free market policies, but shying away from conservative orthodoxy when it comes to social issues. The RN is widely considered a pro-business, middle-class party that is more centrist than its coalition partner, the Independent
Democratic Union (UDI) (Alcántara Sáez 2003; Pribble 2013). Still, the party has a record of favoring market-based solutions for social welfare and opposing the expansion of the state in the provision of social services and income transfers. Macrí’s Propuesta Republicana (PRO) is also center-right due to the policy preferences of its cadres and their closeness with business. PRO combines both new politicians from NGOs (especially think tanks) and private businesses with traditional politicians partly from right-wing parties (Vommaro and Armesto 2015; Vommaro and Morresi 2014).

A second reason for the case selection is that both countries have experienced sustained democratic rule since their respective transitions (1983 in Argentina and 1990 in Chile), with multiple periods of left party rule during the early 2000s. Moreover, both countries are considered leaders in the domain of social welfare policy, but also underwent some of the most radical social policy retrenchment in the region during the 1980s and 1990s (Huber and Stephens 2012). In this way, Argentina and Chile provide an excellent context for assessing to what extent democratic consolidation and left party rule have transformed the politics of welfare retrenchment in Latin America.

Chile and Argentina’s left-leaning parties have a strong following and were narrowly defeated by Presidents Piñera and Macri. The election that brought Piñera to office in 2010 was tightly fought with the right-wing candidate beating former Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei by a margin of 51.6 to 48.4 percent in a run-off election (Servicio Electoral República de Chile 2016). The entrance of a protest candidate on the left, Marco Enríquez Ominami, in the first round turned up the pressure for both Frei and Piñera and during the campaign both candidates vowed to improve the quality of public education and health services, eliminate extreme poverty, boost employment, and extend maternity leave (Castiglioni 2010). In Argentina, Macri won the 2015 elections by only 3 percentage points (51.4 percent versus 48.5 percent) in a runoff against the
incumbent candidate representing *Frente para la Victoria*, a left faction of the Peronist party. As the race tightened and moved into the second round, Macri’s campaign promised to not reverse those policies that had benefitted a large segment of the population, such as conditional cash transfers and the nationalization of major companies. This moderation in the discourse made Macri an acceptable candidate for defenders of social rights (Freytes and Niedzwiecki 2016; Semán 2015).

The strength of the opposition is also manifested in the legislative seat share of left parties and in their ties to mobilized civil society. In Chile, RN’s coalition faced strong opposition from the center-left Concertación, which controlled 47.5 percent of seats in the lower house and 50 percent in the Senate (Emol 2009). Though Chile’s center-left parties did not enjoy strong ties to the mobilized student movement, these parties were still able to influence legislation. In Argentina, Macri currently governs with a legislative minority. After the elections, PRO and its allies controlled only 35 percent of national deputies and 16 out of 72 national senators. *Frente para la Victoria* and its allies held almost a two-thirds majority in the Senate and were the main force in the Lower Chamber (Freytes and Niedzwiecki 2016). In addition, the Peronist Party (and *Frente para la Victoria*, in particular) has ties to strong unions and other organized groups in society. As a result, the party has both electoral and mobilizational strength.

Despite both countries enjoying overall strong legacies and left opposition, we observe variation within countries across policy sectors. The within country strategy allows us to probe our explanation for why right-leaning governments might pursue retrenchment by policy drift in some sectors and marginal expansions in others. In particular, the precise nature of policy legacies and the level of opposition vary across policy sectors. This variation helps explain differences in outcomes within countries.

Finally, the two countries provide an interesting contrast because in one (Chile),
the turn to the right occurred during the final years of the commodity boom, and therefore, the government faced a favorable economic climate and limited external pressure to scale back spending. In Argentina, Mauricio Macri’s victory came after the end of the commodity boom. The price of Argentina’s main export, soybeans, fell by 40 percent in 2014. Economic growth averaged a meager 1 percent and the fiscal deficit was increasing. By 2015, inflation was also on the rise (Murillo 2015). In this context, it becomes easier to shift the blame for adjustment policies and use social policies to appease opposition in Congress and in the streets. Blaming the previous administration for the economic problems, the government implemented a number of austerity policies, such as increasing the price of basic utilities and public transportation, and laying off thousands of state employees. The difference in economic context, however, does not explain the similar outcomes that we observe in the two countries.

Still, it is possible that the lack of outright retrenchment in Argentina and Chile partially results from the absence of severe economic crisis. Thus, to further probe the role of economic crisis, we include Brazil as a shadow case in the conclusion of the paper. Between the fourth trimester in 2015 and the same trimester in 2016, Brazilian GDP contracted by 2.5 percent. GDP growth dropped from a peak of 7.5 percent in 2010 to -3.6 percent in 2016 (IBGE 2016). The country, therefore, provides a better sense of whether economic crisis makes outright retrenchment more feasible.

In the next section of this paper we analyze the key social policy initiatives of President Piñera and President Macri. We identify four potential policy outcomes: expansion, maintenance of the status quo, retrenchment through policy drift, and outright retrenchment. We define outright retrenchment as reforms that involve the elimination of programs, spending cuts, or privatization. The unit of analysis in this study is a country’s policy sector. We select the main sectors in each country in which there have been
important reforms either in the previous or current administrations. Our findings suggest that Macri and Piñera have mostly maintained the status quo, while also retrenching through policy drift (and creeping privatization in healthcare). Moreover, in both countries the right-wing governments have expanded cash transfer programs (yet decreasing the real value of transfers in Argentina), but done virtually nothing to improve social services. Table 1 presents a summary of our findings.

Table 1: Social Policy Change During the Macri and Piñera Administrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Expansion</th>
<th>Status-Quo</th>
<th>Retrenchment through Policy Drift</th>
<th>Outright Retrenchment</th>
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<td><strong>Chile</strong></td>
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<td>(2010-14)</td>
<td>Maternity Leave</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Healthcare (public option weakened)</td>
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<td>Social Assistance</td>
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<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(2015—)</td>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>Healthcare (Sexual Program)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Assistance (real value of transfers)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(CCT eligibility)</td>
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Social Policy Reform in Chile during the Piñera Administration (2010-2014)

*Maternity Leave*

President Piñera’s social policy reforms varied across sectors, involving an expansion to maternity leave, status-quo maintenance of education and social assistance programs, and policy drift in healthcare. The maternity leave expansion occurred in 2011, when the center-right government approved law (20,545), which extends the maternity leave benefit from three to six months and increases access by facilitating the formalization of workers that were not contributing to the social security system. The law
also provides the possibility of mothers and fathers to share the final three months of the leave (Staab 2012). President Piñera’s commitment to maternity leave emerged during the 2009-2010 electoral campaign after his opponent voiced support for a proposal to extend the country’s leave to six months (Blofield 2016). Chile’s maternity leave was already quite generous by international standards, but its coverage was limited because many women work in the informal sector. Previous attempts to raise the issue had been ignored during the 1990s and early 2000s because of concern about the potential cost for employers (Staab 2012) and labor market discrimination against women (Blofield 2016).

Piñera’s original proposal sought to expand coverage, extend the length of leave, and allow fathers and mothers to split the additional 12 weeks. It also attempted to ease labor market regulations related to sick leaves and protection from dismissal. These elements were quickly criticized by unions and other civil society organizations, and were eventually eliminated from the law. During congressional debate, opposition politicians also managed to increase the ceiling for income replacement during maternity/family leave (Staab 2012). The end result is a maternity/family leave law that expands access while providing a generous benefit. Critics note that the law does very little to encourage men to take leave (and in fact only increased the leave available to men by one day), but that the reform constitutes progress for working women, especially those who do not have a labor contract (Blofield 2016).

Our theoretical framework helps explain the content and timing of Chile’s new maternity leave law. First, the importance of strong electoral competition and a tightly-fought presidential election pushed President Piñera to prioritize the issue (Blofield 2016). Moreover, the increase in the ceiling for the income replacement emerged as a result of congressional debate, following demands from left-leaning parties. Policy legacies help explain the reform’s approval as well. The fact existing maternity leave
policy did not impose a cost on employers was crucial in avoiding opposition from the right. Staab (2012) argues that Piñera was able to get his coalition behind the initiative, in part because the benefit is funded through general revenue, and therefore, employers did not incur an additional cost. The existing system of maternity leave had also generated negative consequences for private health insurance firms, thereby increasing the incentives for right parties to take interest in the reform. Under the previous system, mothers who returned to work after three months of leave often found themselves having to request sick leave when infants fell ill. Under Chilean law, sick leave is financed through health insurance. Blofield (2012) notes that as sick leave requests increased throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, private health insurance companies began to grow alarmed about growing costs and supported the extension of maternity leave. Since the RN and UDI parties enjoy a strong relationship with Chile’s private health insurance firms, this policy legacy facilitated the passage of the reform.

**Education**

The area in which Piñera was the least active, despite growing student protest and demands, was education. Beginning in 2011, Chile witnessed a wave of intense student protests. University and secondary students took over schools, mobilized, and organized strikes. The student demands included calls for free, high quality, and universal public education, including university. The response of the Piñera administration was sluggish; it responded by increasing education spending and creating a quality monitoring agency. Spending on education increased from around 4 percent of GDP (in years 2008-2011) to 4.6 percent in 2012 (Cepalstat 2016), but no structural reforms were enacted to address the students’ demands. In this way, Piñera’s approach to education was status-quo with a slight increase in spending. The fact that such intense protests did not provoke a significant policy reform is largely explained by policy legacies, which have weakened
the public education system and made it difficult for demands for structural reform to gain traction. Additionally, the fact that the parties that made up Chile’s center-left Concertación coalition did not have strong ties to the student movement, meant that the opposition did not push Piñera to engage in a deeper reform. Moreover, the President’s coalition partner, the right-wing UDI party, has historically been especially supportive of Chile’s voucher (education) system and has a sustained record of resisting reforms that curb public subsidies to private providers (Pribble 2013). This made it difficult for the RN to respond to student demands without endangering the viability of their right-wing coalition. The result was status-quo maintenance of education policy.

Another area where the Piñera administration upheld status quo policy was in the domain of preschool education. There, too, policy legacies help explain the president’s decision to maintain the existing system. In 2009 Socialist President Michelle Bachelet passed a comprehensive early childhood health and education program: Chile Crece Contigo (Chile Grows With You). The program guarantees access to daycare for 0-2 year-olds and to preschool for 2-4 year olds for the bottom 60 percent of income earners. This commitment was made possible by an expansion in daycare facilities during Bachelet’s presidency. Ortiz Rojas (2009, 8–9) finds that public daycare centers increased from around 700 in 2006 to more than 4,000 in 2009. This quintupled the available spots for 0-2 year olds and doubled the spots for those between the ages of 2 and 4. Piñera continued to implement Chile Crece Contigo, though at a notably slower pace. The OECD (2016) reports that the daycare enrollment rate for 0-2 year-olds grew from 12.3 percent in 2009 to 17.6 percent in 2010, but then held steady at that number in President Piñera’s first full year in office. In the case of 3-5 year-olds, the impressive growth seen during the Bachelet administration (from 45.8 to 66.5 percent) slowed during Piñera’s first two years in office, growing by only 5 percentage points to 71.2 percent.
OECD 2016). All of this suggests that while the government did not roll-back advancements in public daycare and preschool, they did not prioritize expansion either.

In 2013 President Piñera oversaw the approval of a constitutional reform (law 20,710) that increased Chile’s mandatory years of schooling from 12 to 13, creating a public system of kindergarten (pre-elementary) that is required for entrance into elementary school. This guarantees that all children will attend at least one year of preschool and that education will be fully funded by the state for those who choose to use the public sector (Government of Chile 2013). Importantly, the law did not require additional financial investment because Chile Crece Contigo had already guaranteed access to preschool for virtually all children enrolled in public school. In essence, then, the reform formalized a right that already existed and is an example of policy maintenance. The initiative reveals how policy legacies create inertia, pushing a new government to uphold existing services and meet popular expectations.

**Social Assistance**

The Piñera administration also reformed Chile’s existing CCT, Chile Solidario, but the outcome reflected another case of status quo maintenance. Upon arriving in office, Piñera set the goal of eliminating extreme poverty by the end of his four years in office (Moreno 2011). As part of this promise, the government sought to reform the existing CCT program, replacing the program with a new benefit called “Ingreso Ético,” or Ethical Income in 2012 (law 20.595 and decree #29). Ethical Income has three pillars: so-called “dignity” income transfers, “responsibility” (or conditional) income transfers, and income transfers based on achievements. Thus, the program expanded the size of the benefit (through the addition of new transfers), but also altered the eligibility requirements. The primary change relates to the first pillar of transfers, which are granted without conditionality and includes a
family transfer and an additional sum per person in the household. The second pillar is paid per child, but receipt of the funds is conditional upon school attendance and healthcare check-ups. The final pillar includes a series of one-time payments that can be earned as a result of accomplishments, such as completing school, female employment, and finishing a drug rehab program (Cecchini, Robles, and Vargas 2012). While several studies note that the overall transfer is larger than that provided by Chile Solidario, the precise increase is difficult to assess since the third pillar of payments is not guaranteed. The Chile Solidario benefit was small, totaling roughly US$21 for the first six months, US$16 for months 7-12, and US$11 for months 13-18 (Pribble 2013, 76). One analysis of Ethical Income estimates that the “dignity” pillar constitutes a transfer of somewhere between US$9 and US$15 per month, while the conditional pillar provides approximately US$20 per child (if conditions were met) (Henoch and Troncoso 2012). The one-time “accomplishment” payments range from US$100 for top-ranking school performance to US$10 for a healthcare accomplishment.

In addition to a small expansion in benefit size, Ethical Income puts an added emphasis on the issue of employment. Recipient families receive visits from social workers and employment counseling/preparation. The labor counseling provides assistance in overcoming barriers to entering the labor market and basic skill-training. The counselor is responsible for linking participants with the local job placement office and helping participants enroll in training courses. Finally, female heads of household enrolled in Ethical Income are eligible for a labor market subsidy to incentivize employers to hire the woman (Cecchini, Robles, and Vargas 2012). This emphasis on employment reveals a key ideological pillar of Chile’s right-leaning parties, namely that work should constitute the first barrier against poverty.

Taken as a whole, then, the reforms enacted by President Piñera constitute policy
maintenance since the CCT value remains small and coverage limited. Additionally, the
duration of Ethical Income (like Chile Solidario that preceded it) is limited to two years.
The Piñera administration’s decision to create a new cash transfer program reflects
Chile’s tightly fought presidential election. In the wake of a narrow victory, the right
parties sought to build an electoral following, but the organizations were reticent to
expand public spending and the state’s role in service provision. The narrow scope of the
reform, limited the CCT’s cost, allowing the RN to appeal to lower-income voters, while
avoiding conflict with its core constituency.

**Healthcare**

President Piñera’s government did little to reform the underlying structures of
Chile’s healthcare system, though it increased public expenditure modestly. Healthcare
expenditure grew from roughly 3.3 to 3.8 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2014 (World
Bank 2016), but so too did public transfers to private providers, thereby promoting policy
drift. Piñera did not eliminate the country’s public healthcare system nor undo the
Concertación’s signature healthcare reform: Plan AUGE. Plan AUGE was passed by
Socialist President Ricardo Lagos in 2004. At the time of its approval, the program
guaranteed treatment for 56 illnesses, establishing timelines and treatment protocols that
both the public and private sectors were required to uphold. During the Bachelet
government the list of AUGE illnesses was expanded to 69 ailments. In 2013 Piñera
announced the inclusion of 11 new illnesses in Plan AUGE, bringing the total to 80
pathologies (Superintendencia de Salud 2013). The increase in spending enacted by the
Piñera administration sought to cover the inclusion of new illnesses in AUGE, but was
also used to eliminate wait lists for treatment. The elimination of these wait lists was
accomplished, in part, by increasing transfers to private sector providers.

During the 2009-2010 election campaign, both Frei and Piñera discussed the need
to improve the quality of public healthcare. In particular, the right-wing Coalition for Change stressed the problem of wait lists in the public sector and promised to eliminate the lists for AUGE illnesses by 2012 (Piñera 2010). In 2011 the president announced that the goal had been accomplished prior to the self-imposed deadline.

While the elimination of wait lists was celebrated by Piñera and his allies, critics noted that the project was accomplished by turning treatment over to the private sector, thus constituting a form of policy drift: creeping privatization. It is estimated that between 2010 and 2012 (Piñera’s first two years in office) public transfers to private hospitals and clinics grew by 21.7 percent (Goyenechea Hidalgo 2011, 4). Moreover, in 2013 the administration introduced a bill that sought to extend the “free choice option,” which allows those enrolled in the public sector to seek care in private clinics (subsidized by the state). The initiative would have further extended public transfers to the private sector and while the bill was not approved, the general trend toward increasing public transfers to private clinics is likely to weaken Fonasa over the long term. We contend that this privatization creep is a form of policy drift, as it leaves the public healthcare system vulnerable. This is because rather than investing in public infrastructure and capacity, the right-wing government transferred funds to the private sector, where prices are higher. Over time this may serve to strengthen private clinics and providers at the expense of public hospitals, leading to a de-facto privatization in healthcare.

Policy legacies played a strong role in this trend toward increased private sector involvement. Chile’s private clinics and health insurance firms (Isapres) are very strong due to the design of previous policies and the country’s right-wing parties are supportive of these actors (Pribble 2013). It is, therefore, of little surprise that Piñera turned to the private sector to boost performance. Additionally, weaknesses in the design of Plan AUGE, namely the fact that public sector under-funding was not resolved, helped to
prompt Piñera’s push to address the problem of wait lists. The tightly fought presidential election also shaped the policy outcome. Turning public healthcare responsibilities over to private actors allowed Piñera to make quick progress on the challenge of wait lists, which is important in a setting of a strong opposition. Indeed, investing in public infrastructure, while beneficial in the long term, would not have provided Piñera and the RN with the ability to claim credit for “resolving” the problem. Thus, the policy also reflects the way that a strong opposition party influences social policy decisions.

Social Policy Reforms during the first year of Macri’s administration (2015—)

Pensions

Social policy reforms enacted by the center-right government in Argentina also include a combination of expansion, status quo maintenance, and retrenchment through policy drift. The pension sector is an example of policy expansion. The previous Frente para la Victoria administration had extended the system of noncontributory pensions for the elderly by implementing a moratorium for workers who had reached the retirement age but had limited or no contribution records. A percentage of their income was discounted as a form of payment for the lack of contributions (Arza 2009; Niedzwiecki 2014; Brooks 2009). The moratorium was scheduled to expire in September 2016. This policy legacy forced Macri’s administration to make a decision: let the moratorium expire without replacing it (retrenchment), renew it without changes (status quo), or modify it.

Macri’s government proposed to let the moratorium expire and to implement, instead, a universal elderly pension (Pensión Universal a la Vejez) for all those older than 65 years old without sufficient contributions. This pension would not incur deductions because recipients would not have to repay missed contributions. The value of the benefit was set at 80 percent of the lowest contributory pension, thus maintaining some segmentation between the two systems. The original law also proposed a “historic
reparation” payment to those in the contributory system whose pensions had not been adjusted for inflation. The funding for the reforms would come from up to 7 percent of the Social Security Administration’s (Anses, Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social) “Guaranteed Fund,” the selling of these funds’ bonds currently invested in private companies, and from the declaration of undeclared assets (Ybarra, June 30, 2016; Stang, July 25, 2016; Presidencia de la Nación 07/27/2016; Senado y Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina 07/22/2016; Serra, June 08, 2016; Hadida, June 26, 2016).

Besides the expiration of the moratorium (i.e: policy legacies), the strength of the Peronist opposition in Congress shaped the outcome of the reform. The increase in federal transfers to provinces was the carrot that convinced many Frente para la Victoria legislators to support the bill.¹⁰ The reform was part of an omnibus bill that included 97 articles; it was approved in the Lower Chamber within a week and with an over 60 percent majority (Ybarra, June 23, 2016; La Nación, June 16, 2016). The Senate, with an overwhelming majority of the opposition, approved the bill (Law 27,260) in less than two weeks (La Nación, June 29, 2016). Cognizant of its minority in the legislature, the strategy of the government to include controversial articles (such as the plan to declare undeclared assets) and an increase in federal transfers to provinces was successful in guaranteeing passage of the bill in both chambers.

The strength of the Peronist opposition also shaped the bill during the legislative debate. The most contentious aspect of the pension reform was the increase in women’s retirement age from 60 to 65 years old. With the moratorium, women could retire at 60 years old and men at 65 years old. Following pressure from the Peronist opposition and unions, the moratorium was extended for three years for women (until July 2019) and for one year for men (with the possibility of one more year). The new pension only applied for all those 65 years old and older. In addition, the opposition, in alliance with unions,
incorporated a permanent representative of the unions in the Council (*Consejo de Sustentabilidad Previsional*) charged with defining the characteristics of a new system. The Council is accountable to the two chambers (every six months) and has three years to prepare a unified pay-as-you-go universal system (Senado y Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina 07/22/2016, Art. 12). Finally, provincial governors that influence the votes of representatives in Congress, received an important concession: the national government would fund the debt of provincial pension funds (Origlia, July 31, 2016).11

After these modifications were introduced by the Peronist opposition in coalition with unions, the reform was approved.

The bill also increased the amount of some contributory pensions to avoid more pensioners’ law suits against the state. This last element of the reform only covered pensioners in the contributory system, excluding all those that receive non-contributory pensions. Since non-contributory pensioners tend to come from the lowest income brackets, the reform generates increased stratification between labor market insiders, who had enough contributions to retire and now receive an increase in their income, and those who do not have enough contributions to access the contributory system. Finally, the President decreed an adjustment in the formula to increase the amount of contributory pensions for those who retired after August 2016 (Ybarra, June 30, 2016; Stang, July 25, 2016b; Presidencia de la Nación 07/27/2016; Senado y Cámara de Diputados de la Nación Argentina 07/22/2016).

Macri’s pension reform does not retrench the system and could even be a move towards expansion, but only if the universal elderly pension has no expiration date. The temporal reach of the reform is unclear. This is because the legislation passed in congress created a universal regime with no termination date. However, the Presidential decree that implemented the law defined a three-year termination date (in July 2019)
The President hopes to enact a new overarching pension reform law before the three-year period expires. Such a measure would likely include an increase in the retirement age.

The expansion of Argentina’s pension system under Macri’s leadership resulted from a combination of policy legacies (i.e. the need to enact a reform due to the moratorium’s expiration) and a strong Peronist opposition –in alliance with unions— that shaped the proposal presented by the president and the final content of the bill. Macri included incentives to opposition legislators in the design of the bill, and the opposition extended the moratorium, the payment of provincial debt, and the incorporation of a union representative in the council in charge of designing a new system.

**Social Assistance**

Macri’s government expanded the eligibility criteria of the main CCT while letting its real value decrease. *Asignación Universal Por Hijo* (Universal Family Allowance) is a conditional cash transfer enacted by the *Frente para la Victoria* in 2009 of up to US$65 per child per month in 2016, up to a maximum of five children per family, and to pregnant women after the third month of pregnancy. It covers every unemployed or under-employed person earning less than the monthly minimum salary with children under the age of 18 or handicapped children. While the amount of transfer was increased by the discretion of the executive from 2009 to 2015 and in a context of increasing inflation, the previous government proposed and passed a bill to automatically index the amount of transfer twice every year (in March and September) according to an equation that includes salaries, social security revenues, and the number of beneficiaries (Lewkowicz, June 16, 2015; Clarín, July 16, 2015).

Following the requirement in the law, Macri’s government increased the CCT in March 2016 from AR$700 to AR$808 (Verón, February 12, 2016). However, this
increase took place in the context of increasing inflation and increases in the price of utilities that decreased the actual value of the transfer. The increase did not keep up with the rate of inflation, which was 35 percent in the City of Buenos Aires compared with the year before (INDEC 2016). The increase in the amount of transfer in a context of higher inflation is an example of policy drift.

Given the popularity of the CCT, Macri had promised not to eliminate it during his electoral campaign (Cappiello, July 21, 2015). Once in office, the administration even increased the policy’s coverage with a World Bank loan. The increase was initially a one-time expansion aimed at including children who had never accessed the CCT or who had lost the benefit due to not having national IDs and for not complying with education conditionalities. In addition, the expansion of coverage modified the eligibility criteria by extending contributory family allowances to the self-employed affiliated with the simplified tax system (monotributo) (Arza 2016). The expansion of eligibility for family allowances was a move towards expansion. In addition, the government returned 15 percent of the VAT of purchases with ATM cards (the same used to withdraw benefits) to the recipients of this CCT, among others (La Nación, July 19, 2016). Finally, the current administration announced a proposal to ease the eligibility criteria to temporary workers and to beneficiaries of provincial programs (Jueguen, February 18, 2016; Obarrio, April 16, 2016, April 17, 2016; Basavilbaso, April 26, 2016).

While the popularity of the policy (i.e.: legacies) in a context of competitive presidential elections (i.e: opposition electoral strength) explain the lack of outright retrenchment, the linkages of the opposition with strong mobilized sectors partly explains the nominal increase in the amount of transfer and the expansion of coverage. Many of the macroeconomic adjustment policies proposed by the executive, such as the decrease in the subsidy of basic utilities, particularly affected the most vulnerable sectors of the
population and therefore CCT recipients. These policies produced increasing mobilization in the streets. Previously fragmented peak union organizations reunified in opposition to Macri's austerity policies, the depreciation of wages in a context of increasing inflation, and layoffs. A major national newspaper that supports the new administration explained that public announcements to increase the amount of the transfer, increase its coverage, and the return of VAT to recipients responded to Macri’s goal of containing the increase in poverty (from 29 to 32.5 percent from December to April) and social unrest produced by his adjustment policies (Obarrio, April 10, 2016).

Since the government took power in December 10, 2015, there has been intense mobilization and protest against its policies. Figure 1 shows the total number of protests against the Macri government each month from December 10, 2015 to August 31, 2016. The data is taken from the report of public mobilizations in the main national newspaper, *La Nación*, which is generally supportive of the government.¹⁴

**Figure 1. Protests against the government per month (Dec. 10, 2015- Aug. 31, 2016)**

![Number of Protests in Argentina](image)

Source: Coding based on *La Nación* from December 10, 2015 to August 31, 2016.

Note: The high level of mobilization in February partly responds to the negotiation over
teachers’ salaries before the start of the academic year.

**Healthcare**

The analysis of the health system also includes a combination of two strategies: maintenance of the overall system’s status quo and defunding of a policy aimed at sexual education (i.e.: policy drift). Argentina’s health system includes three components – a publicly-financed sector (administered by provinces and some municipalities), social insurance funds (*obras sociales* mostly administered by unions), and a private sector. Macri’s administration sent a positive signal to unions in the context of increasing street protest (see Figure 1) by paying an outstanding debt of around USD 180 million to *obras sociales* administered by unions (Rosemberg, August 03, 2016).

In the public system, the previous Frente para la Victoria administration had strengthened primary healthcare through the distribution of free medicine (*Plan Remediar*) and through the reimbursement to public clinics and hospitals for services provided to uninsured people (*Plan Nacer/Sumar*). The previous administration also enacted a program on sexual and reproductive health (*Programa Nacional de Educación Sexual*). Macri’s government continued the distribution of medicine, yet changed the name of the program from *Plan Remediar* to *Cobertura Universal de Medicamentos* (Universal Coverage of Medicine). The new government also continued with Plan Nacer’s aim of developing clinical histories of users of the public system. The novelty was the proposal to potentially increase public funding for the provision of healthcare to obra social contributors (formal workers) who use the public system. The obra social does not currently reimburse that spending. In addition, the government expressed Macri’s intention to extend the coverage of basic illnesses included in the contributory health insurance system to those using the public system (Czubaj, August 04, 2016).

Finally, the Program on Sexual and Reproductive Health has been slowly
neglected. It has been in place since 2008, and it obliges the Ministry of Education to
develop educational programs for all schools at every level. The program aims to prevent
unintended pregnancies, HIV-Aids, and other sexually transmitted diseases, as well as to
improve the sexual and reproductive health of teenagers. Almost 90,000 school teachers
in 17 provinces had been trained for this policy since 2012. While the new administration
has not formally repealed the policy, it has delayed the transfer of funds and has not
opened up the training for teachers (Carbajal, July 07, 2016). Underspending what was
allotted in the budget is one way to produce policy drift and retrenchment by default.

Until October 2016, Macri’s administration had not made any structural reforms
to the health system. This is largely due to policy legacies, namely that previous policy
design created powerful stakeholders (such as unions) and programs that enjoy
widespread popular support. The underspending in the Sexual and Reproductive Program
is an example of policy drift that could be motivated by ideological considerations.

**Cross-Country Comparison and Conclusions**

Right-wing Presidents in Argentina and Chile did not outright retrench social
policies that had been expanded during the previous left-wing governments, but instead
engaged in a more complex form of retrenchment: policy drift. The administrations also
maintained the status quo in some public services, while slightly expanding select income
transfer policies. We contend that this expansion of income transfers is likely aimed at
boosting the right-wing parties’ popularity and makes good sense because such policies
require a minimal investment and are ideal for claiming credit (Niedzwiecki 2016).
Piñera continued President Bachelet’s early childhood education program, formalized the
existing system of public kindergarten, and maintained the solidarity pension. Macri’s
administration continued the main public health programs and followed the law in
automatically adjusting the CCT’s value. However, the increase in the amount of transfer
was not sufficient to keep up with inflation, creating policy drift and a de-facto reduction in benefit generosity. The healthcare sector in both countries also shows under-the-radar shifts in policy implementation and spending that threaten aspects of public health delivery. In Argentina, the government began to discontinue a program on sexual and reproductive health, while in Chile the elimination of waitlists was achieved by outsourcing treatment to the private sector. The increased levels of public transfers to the private sector in Chile may, with the passage of time, contribute to privatization creep.

Finally, these governments marginally expanded parts of the social state. The most notable expansion in Chile was the extension of maternity leave. Piñera’s government also increased the years of mandatory schooling, included new illnesses to AUGE, and created a new CCT that built upon the previous one. Macri’s main social policy achievement in his first months in office was the extension of non-contributory pensions and the increase in the value of pensions. His government also expanded the coverage of family allowances.

Our explanation sheds light on the variation in social policy reforms undertaken by Presidents Macri and Piñera, from maintenance, to policy drift, and expansion. The evidence confirms that policy legacies in both countries defined what kinds of reforms were necessary and feasible. The pension moratorium in Argentina was set to expire in 2016, and therefore the new government had to decide whether to continue with the existing system (with broad coverage but for a limited cohort) or to reform the benefit. Macri’s administration chose the latter. In Chile, existing gaps in the healthcare system prompted Piñera to address the problem of wait-lists. In education, the design of Chile Crece Contigo encouraged the administration to require an extra year of schooling. Policy legacies also shaped what kinds of reforms were feasible. Because Chile’s maternity leave is funded by general revenues and not through employer contributions, Piñera was
able to expand the benefit without encountering private sector resistance. In fact, the reform likely benefitted private health insurance companies by decreasing the amount of sick days requested by new mothers.

The strength of the opposition also shaped the outcome of the reforms. This was first manifested in the competitiveness of the Presidential election. Previous left administrations were popular, partly because their social policy reforms had generated broad electoral support. The popularity of the center-left alternative during Chile’s 2009 presidential campaign encouraged Piñera to commit to defending public programs and helps explain why the administration pursued the expansion of maternity leave. Similarly in Argentina, Macri also won the runoff by a mere 3 percentage points. This high level of competitiveness produced a moderation in his discourse and his explicit support of policies that had benefitted a large proportion of the population, such as the CCT.

Opposition in congress in both countries also contributed to the expansion of executive proposals. In Chile, the opposition increased ceilings for income replacement during family leave and eliminated labor code modifications. In Argentina, the opposition majority in Congress gained a number of concessions in the pension reform, including the extension of the moratorium, the payment of provincial debt, and the incorporation of a union representative in the council in charge of designing a new system.

Finally, the opposition avoided retrenchment through linkages with strong and mobilized civil society organizations. In the case of Argentina, mobilized unions with linkages to the opposition gained an extension of the pension moratorium, the payment of an outstanding debt to health insurance administered by unions, and an expansion of the coverage of the CCT. These social policy concessions, therefore, represented a broader tool to maintain social peace during a period of economic stabilization. Organized interests in Chile were also strong and the student movement demanded a broad
education reform; however, Piñera’s administration did not make concessions. Why could Piñera ignore students’ mobilization while Macri had to negotiate with unions and other mobilized groups? The effect of popular mobilization in both countries had different effects due to their strength and linkages to opposition parties. Unions and other mobilized sectors have been historically stronger in Argentina in influencing policymaking (Murillo 2001; Etchemendy 2004; Garay 2017). Since Macri took office in December 2015, there has been an average of almost 14 protests per month, or a protest almost every other day, against the national government (Figure 1). Organized civil society in Argentina has historical linkages with the Peronist opposition. The Chilean student movement did not enjoy similar linkages with parties in the opposition Concertación coalition, but instead sought representation through the Communist Party.

Overall, Argentina and Chile’s “right turns” have not produced outright retrenchment of education, health, or income transfer policies, but rather a combination of maintenance of the status quo, policy drift, and marginal expansion. This suggests that the countries’ 25-plus years of democratic consolidation and the experience of sustained left-party rule have altered the politics of social policy formation and change. Unlike the 1980s and 1990s, when privatization and spending cuts were carried out in both countries, today’s right-leaning parties appear to be more moderate due to constraints imposed by the strength of the (left) opposition and by policy legacies that have generated widespread popular support for the social programs. In this way, the politics of welfare reform in contemporary Argentina and Chile are more similar to the experiences of advanced industrialized democracies than previous findings would have suggested.

The article does, however, suffer from limitations that constrain our ability to generalize this conclusion. First, the Macri administration has not completed its term in office. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether or not the right will continue to behave as
it did during its first year. Second, both Argentina and Chile are stable democracies with a free press and a robust civil society. They are also middle-income states with established social welfare systems. These characteristics are not present in all Latin American countries, which may limit the applicability of the findings in other parts of the region. Finally, the absence of a severe crisis in both countries might be relevant. In a setting of a deep economic and/or political crisis, it is possible that right-wing governments will enjoy more leeway to retrench social programs. Brazil represents this scenario.

The economic and political crisis that ended in the impeachment and removal from office of Workers’ Party (PT) President Dilma Rousseff in August, 2016 has weakened the role of the left and allowed the current center-right President Michel Temer to retrench social policies. From a high of 7.5 percent GDP growth in 2010, Brazil suffered a contraction of -3.6 percent in 2016 (IBGE 2016). In April 2016, 63 percent of Brazilians evaluated President Rousseff’s government as “bad” or “terrible” (ruim or pessimo) and 61 percent supported impeachment (Datafolha 2016). In the 2016 local elections, the PT received less than 5 percent of the votes (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral 2017), marking a steep decline in support for the left. In this context, the new government was able to cut public spending through a constitutional amendment that imposes a 20-year cap on all federal spending, reducing public funding of health, education, and social security (Barbara 2017). For 2017, the cuts amount to 37.5 billion reais (around USD 12 million) (Portal Brasil 2017). The Temer government also halted CCT payments to 1.1 million Bolsa Família recipients, alleging that their income was above the eligibility criteria (Moraes Moura 2017). Moreover, the administration proposed a bill that flexibilizes labor contracts, particularly benefitting employers (Martello and Amaral 2016). However, not all reforms involved outright retrenchment; the government
maintained some programs and expanded others from the previous left wing administration. It kept a housing policy (Minha Casa Minha Vida), increased the value of the national CCT by 12.5 percent, and even expanded parental leave to adopting parents and reduced working hours for workers with impaired dependents (Bernardes 2016; Portal Brasil 2016). The case of Brazil shows that in contexts of severe economic crisis, with a weakened (left) opposition, outright retrenchment is more feasible.

Future research should incorporate other cases to probe the conditions under which outright retrenchment of social policies is feasible in contemporary Latin America. This paper has shown that in Argentina and Chile, where policy legacies and the opposition are strong, outright retrenchment has not occurred, suggesting that the gains made in Latin America during the early 2000s are likely to be maintained despite electoral turnover. This is significant as it suggests that Latin America’s “left turn” had a lasting effect on social policy, citizen expectations, and attitudes about the state’s role in protecting social rights.

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Notes

1 We are grateful to Camila Arza, Merike Blofield, María Esperanza Casullo, Mala Htun, Evelyne Huber, Juliana Martínez-Franzoni, Jami Nelson-Nuñez, Ernesto Semán, and Gabriel Vommaro for providing helpful feedback on early drafts of this paper. The article
also benefitted from the careful and constructive comments offered by three anonymous reviewers and the editors of *LAPS*.

2 We do not include Brazil as one of our cases since the new government of Michel Temer is too recent at the moment of this writing and there is insufficient data. Given its relevance for the research agenda on the “right turn,” we do include a discussion of the case in the conclusion, showing that a context of deep crisis facilitates outright retrenchment.


4 Almost 20 percent of PRO’s cadres belong to right wing parties and 17 percent come from private businesses. The think thank *Fundación Pensar* with a pro-market ideology, provides PRO with cadres and policy ideas (Vommaro and Armesto 2015, 112, 120). Vommaro and Morresi (2014, 390) find that PRO leaders are socially conservative: 58 percent oppose abortion, 77 percent favor regulation of immigration, almost 60 percent want to limit the influence of unions, and 92 percent support restrictions on social protest.

5 The student movement enjoys strong ties to the Communist Party, which at the time did not participate in the center-left coalition.

6 Argentina was not in a context of serious economic crisis as had been the case in 1989 or 2001. We thank Esperanza Casullo for this distinction.

7 The law provides for a 100 percent salary replacement up to a certain cap. Piñera’s proposal included a low cap, but the opposition pushed to expand it (Blofield 2016, 24).
Families that were already enrolled in Chile Solidario could switch systems or maintain
in Chile Solidario, but new recipients were directed to Ethical Income.

The Chilean state can subcontract services from private clinics and hospitals. Plan
AUGE requires that treatment be provided within a defined time period. If the state
cannot meet the deadlines, users can request treatment in private clinics and hospitals.

The increase in federal transfers corresponds to an outstanding national debt towards
the provinces of 15 percent of coparticipación funds destined to fund Anses.

The transfer of pension funds from the provinces to the federal government started
after the 1993 partial privatization. Eleven provinces accepted the transfer and the
remaining thirteen kept their pension funds (Bullrich, June 30, 2016).

ANSES. “Asignación Universal por Hijo”
rate US$1=$15 Argentine pesos, as of July 26, 2016.

Nationally representative inflation figures are based on April 2016 and show an
increase in inflation (measured through the Consumer Price Index) from April to August
2016 of 9.8 percent (INDEC 2016).

The measure is conservative: a protest event is counted as “one” even if it occurs
simultaneously in different parts of the same province and lasts for more than one day. If
there are protests in different provinces in a single day, they are counted independently.
Provincial protests against local administrations are excluded.