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7

Youth, Elders, and Metaphors of Political Change in Late Colonial Buganda

CAROL SUMMERS

“THE YOUNG AFRICAN,” argued Robert Kakembo in a 1946 pamphlet calling for sweeping changes in Uganda, “will no longer tolerate the old out-of-date chiefs. They must give room to the young generation.”[1] In his progressive vision of Uganda’s politics, modern “youth,” qualified in new ways, were agitating against senior leadership and for new opportunities. Late colonialism, for Kakembo as for colonial officials, experts, and church leaders, was an era of youth, which Kakembo described with blunt and modern metaphors: “We are born in a queer age—an age of speed; it is a flying age. We are very impatient, because we want to grow overnight. We want to get the steering of our country from the old shaky faltering hands, and drive away at a break-neck speed. It is all right—it is a quality of all things young. We shall only learn by making mistakes. . . . That is the opinion of the African young men of today.”[2]

Reading Kakembo and a variety of other Ugandan, missionary or official observers of the simultaneously hopeful and perilous “break-neck speed” of the 1940s, youth seems a natural analytic category, a metaphor used by historical actors to interpret conflict as the growing pains of adolescence. Here, though, I seek to complicate simple ideas of youth. I briefly explore the idea of Buganda as a young or “adolescent” nation, an idea that was proffered in late colonial Buganda by missionary and official actors as well as by specific Ganda activists. I then reread Kakembo’s metaphors in a specifically Ugandan context by looking at patterns of Ganda politics and historical tales to show how Ganda social thinkers had at least two additional, alternative ways of thinking about the metaphor of youth—ways they continued to use during the turmoil of the 1940s and 1950s. The first of these provided an internal logic for the “Bataka Union,” as activists saw youth as politically significant through their integration into a community of clan members as inheritors and stewards, responsible for communal resources. Youth inherited not just individual fates, but the community itself from “old shaky faltering hands” that had once been strong but could no longer steer. Second, in uniting to demand the return of Mutesa II as kabaka during the crisis of the

1950s, Ganda loyalists drew on a model of youth, particularly the youth of the king and the elite, as a volatile, dangerous time of struggle that—far from being simple delinquency—allowed for both the emergence of brilliant individuals and a cyclical strengthening and remaking of the kingdom. Kakembo's invocation of "break-neck speed" and his statement that "We shall only learn by making mistakes" simultaneously acknowledged the dangers of this disruptive struggle and its creative necessity.

Together, the existence of these three models—the developmentalist one of adolescence and the alternative Ganda ideas of youth as heirs or challengers—complicates any vision of youth as a straightforward category. Instead, the category's heterogeneity suggests questions about how a variety of historical actors used the idea of youth for their own social ends. This study of assumptions encoded in the metaphor of youth thus encourages us to think about the history of youth as an intellectual and cultural history, rather than a description of what youth did. And this sort of history may offer new insights into changes and continuities in values and power in a specific historical context.

Liberal Colonialism and Buganda as an Adolescent Nation

During the 1930s and throughout the 1940s, British officials, missionaries, and even some Ganda activists, referred to Buganda as an "adolescent."[3] In doing so, they responded to the challenges of a difficult time: the men who had made the alliance between Britain and Buganda in 1900, as young men, were aging and sometimes dying, but not retiring gracefully.[4] The country's wealth and its leaders' investments in schools and governance meant that a rising generation of young men were ambitious and saw resources available for their visions of individual and group progress. Thus, as the Anglican bishop of Uganda complained, "[T]he Baganda are in a very difficult adolescent period . . . [e]merging from childhood where they were willing to be controlled but not yet having reached sensible thinking manhood."[5] The bishop's vision of history was perhaps too rosy in its evocation of a past paternal guidance, but he sought to explain a turbulent present. In a time of national adolescence, the slightest of causes could trigger disorder—the queen mother's marriage, for example, or upheaval at Budo school. The label "adolescent," applied to both "the Baganda" as people and "Buganda" as a nation, offered a relatively blame-free explanation for why a model colony where the Baganda once administered themselves prosperously, effectively, and at minimal if any cost to the British exchequer, had become unexpectedly turbulent: turmoil was a sort of growing pain.[6] And the metaphor of adolescence suggested hope that such turbulence was finite and would end with the adolescent achieving maturity and the ability to stand alone, independent and self-supporting. For the bishop and the British officials who deployed the term, these were important connotations. For the Ganda activists such as Robert Kakembo who also adopted it, ideas of an adolescent Buganda offered a way to legitimize rebellion and opposition to British guidance. An adolescent, after all, is more than a child. He or she knows more, understands more, and is on the verge of adulthood and maturity. Adolescents achieve maturity, moreover, not through the dutiful obedience and acceptance of subordination of a client, but by rebelling, pointing out injustice, seizing resources, and developing the experience to hold their new positions, sometimes by "making mistakes." Adolescence was a stage on the path to self-determination, self-sufficiency, and independence.

The power of adolescence as a progressive trope—a way of reconceptualizing the relation of colonizer and colonized from parent/child to master/apprentice or journeyman with an emphasis not on control and nurture, but on preparation for adult responsibilities and autonomy—comes through clearly in the time of colonial stress when, between the Great Depression and the aftermath of the Second World War, Britain's position in Uganda was vulnerable rather than powerful. The power of adolescence as a metaphor—its ability to provoke rethinking of racial and colonial institutions, relationships, rights, duties, and futures—alerts us to the significance of some of the metaphors that Baganda thought with as they debated the kingdom's power structure, moral values, and networks of patronage, clientage, and obligation.

Unlike the language of child and parent, phrases intuitively obvious and classically a part of politics and philosophy in discussions by such theorists as John Locke, the term adolescence came from the social science-based pastoral and caring professions of the early twentieth century, and it carried a gloss of modernity and precision. Early users included activists in religious education and the Sunday school movement in Britain and the United States, who faced the problems of instilling moral values and independent selves in modern urban youth.[7] Secular experts on educational sociology were also prominent, delineating "the adolescent" as a problem addressed in a substantial literature of research, textbooks, books, book reviews, and policy implications.[8] The idea of adolescence was a response to the increasing inadequacy of more conventional, romantic, and conservative ideals of patriarchal family life, maternal guidance, and child rearing. It acknowledged a need for policies to cope with physically mature, but unmarried, youth as individuals, rather than as sons and daughters, husbands and wives, or fathers and mothers. And it implied that though state and church policy was an important factor, the youth must also be involved in the learning and developing of new, modern, self-based maturity. Furthermore, from its origins in the Child Study movement of the 1890s onward, advocates such as G. Stanley Hall explicitly saw the maturation of an individual and the maturation of a society or nation as parallel processes that followed the same distinctive format.[9]

A specific, distinctive metaphor—"adolescence"—thus offers us an array of questions and possibilities to explore in seeking to understand not just specific policies of late colonialism, or the interests that actors pursued, but what was thinkable. Metaphors, especially metaphors that involve basic social categories, are very much worth taking seriously. Contextualized, they offer potential insight into past mentalities, ways that contemporaries understood basic social values, goals, and processes.

This chapter is part of a larger project on radicalism in Buganda from 1939 to 1956, and I was originally entranced by colonial leaders' metaphor of adolescence. The significance of adolescence in Buganda as a way of explaining and neutralizing the political, social, and economic clashes of late colonialism suggests the power of metaphors in a context where they have not been much studied. The image of adolescence that the bishop and others invoked is a telling one, offering hints of a specific challenge to conventional images of a parental colonial authority and a childlike African population. Historians of colonialism have explored the paternal images of the antislavery movement and liberal imperialism and noted the pervasive conceptualization of Europeans as adults and Africans as children in multiple genres, all of which make clear the huge gulf and great deal of work and guidance between childhood and adulthood.[10] The image of adolescence reshapes conflict from childish ingratitude to a stage of maturation. Like the Maasai *murran* described by Richard Waller, youth was disruptive to specific colonial policies. But liberal colonial actors did not see this as a challenge to colonial hierarchies.[11]

Even as images of adolescent Ugandans and an adolescent Ganda nation both legitimated and defused tensions between Ugandan subjects and their colonial parents, they de-legitimated conflicts that broke this model, such as those among senior men who demanded rights and protections rooted in precedent. If social parenthood was to be progressive, it must be assigned to colonial authorities, educated men, and experts. The senior men who bemoaned lost land, honor, rights, and values became political fossils, irrelevant to the new Uganda, no matter how modern their methods or critiques of specific policies. Major historical figures such as Apolo Kaggwa and Semei Kakungulu struggled with British constraints in the 1920s. And a more ordinary elder who condemned life in the 1950s compared to the days of his youth was reinterpreted by a *ggombolola* chief as "when the old man was young people had few needs. When they did want anything extra, they just went to Bunyoro and robbed someone. Now they cannot do that."[12] The elder's complaints about the effect of markets, of immigrant labor, Indian middlemen, and problems with inequitable land ownership disappeared in the new analysis, and the elder appeared only as a reflexive reactionary disgruntled by law, order, and progress. Even Sir Apolo Kaggwa, radically innovative and political in his heyday, was dismissed by a protectorate government that characterized him as obsolete, sick, and backward.[13]

"Adolescence" as a concept had little to do with real young people on the verge of adulthood. It was part of a vision of how social change paralleled individual maturation. It legitimated one set of progressive hopes and struggles for a modern Uganda, and de-legitimated politics rooted in indigenous histories. It was not, however, the only metaphor for social change or values in circulation in Buganda, or even the only metaphor that invoked ideas of youth. As my project has moved from straightforward examination of official documents and mission materials to explorations of security files, anthropological fieldwork, and writings by Ugandan intellectuals and activists, I have remained convinced of the power of ideas of adolescence but come to acknowledge that the idea—though occasionally adopted by elite Ganda in communications with the church or the protectorate—was only one of several ways in which Ganda used very distinctive ideas of youth and generation to rethink politics, political values, and possibilities for change. The colonial metaphor of adolescence, and indeed the entire colonial framework of progress, blocked recognition of other ways Ugandans in this period understood power, politics, and change. As we explore the metaphors and *mentalité* of a historical context, it is important to look not merely at a dominant, colonial-sponsored vision but also at some of the dissident ways other actors thought with and used alternative visions and metaphors of youth—ideas that involved fundamentally different understandings of time, maturity, rights, and inheritance.

During the late colonial era, a time when youth was repeatedly invoked by a wide range of social and political actors, it had more than one potential meaning. Despite the resonance of the image of adolescence in the colonial literature, Ganda, trying to explain the challenges and changes of politics and society, deployed at least two alternative and fundamentally different ideas of youth that deviated from the liberal model of progress and maturation of the individual self. These two alternatives offered very different ways of thinking about politics and morality. Reconstructed from the translated and mediated phrases of Ganda activists, notes of anthropological fieldworkers, and other highly suggestive but far from definitive sources, these alternative metaphors offer glimpses of just how culturally specific and radical seemingly natural categories such as "youth" and "change" can be. For at least some Baganda, their ideas of youth fit not in developmental models of the maturing youth or progressive nation but in Ganda visions of time—a time of continuities marked by the stewardship and inheritance of grandfathers and grandsons within patrilineal clans (Bataka), and a time of disruption and individual ambition associated with the life cycle of kings.

The Bataka movement of the 1940s, explicitly invoking ideas of grandfathers and grandsons, used the distinctive idea of intergenerational alliance between elderly stewards and youthful heirs to oppose the greed of fathers. It offered a powerful critique aimed less at British overrule than at the "progressive" leaders of colonial Buganda. And, alternatively, Ganda understood what it meant to be a kingdom under a kabaka who would inherit while young, greedy, potentially violent, experimental, and almost certainly dangerous: with each king-centered cycle, they could expect the king's youth to open the kingdom to new influences and changes as it had in the time of long-ago kings, and more recently the reigns of Muteesa I, Mwanga, Daudi Chwa, and Muteesa II. Upheaval, conflict, innovation, and violent change constituted no linear development toward progressive kingship, or disintegration of local authenticity, but part of a classic pattern of cyclical kingship that drew on the life cycle of the king to reconstitute and renegotiate the kingdom's social contracts and associations on a regular basis. Muteesa II, like Daudi Chwa, Mwanga, and Muteesa I before him, inherited not smoothly and benignly, but with turmoil and civil unrest that eventually provoked a remaking of the kingdom. In looking beyond the real youth of colonial Uganda, or conventional ideas of youth as progressive or disruptive forces in the twilight of an era, we can see the creativity of alternative politics in the kingdom, alternative visions of time, generation, and change that survived the colonial encounter, and allowed people to continue to think creatively about what should be, rather than drawing entirely on Northern models of progress and ideas of linear change.

Grandfathers, Grandsons, and the Bataka

During the 1940s, radical Ganda activists in the Bataka movement developed a modern mass politics, drawing on ideas of the corporate rights and responsibilities of Buganda's clans, but developing them into a new politics and a new model of Ganda citizenship.[14] They published newspapers, had mass meetings of thousands, developed a "Buganda National Anthem," reconstructed personal associations with a greeting and chant of "BU" (Bataka Union), and communicated their new consciousness within the group in youth organizations, choirs, covert networks, and fundraising appeals, and to the world at large through sponsoring Ssemakula Mulumba as a lobbyist in London, writing regular petitions and briefings for Protectorate and Colonial Office officials, and attempting to reach beyond the British Empire with overtures not simply to the kings of Ankole and Toro but to the Khedive of Egypt, the foreign minister of the Soviet Union, and the trusteeship council of the United Nations. Both the scale and tactical modernity of the movement was impressive, and, somewhat shaken, British intelligence officers and officials became the Bataka Union's most enthusiastic duplicators and translators, collecting and analyzing telegrams, petitions, speeches, spy reports on meetings, and Luganda language newspaper reports. The movement reached a public high point in the 1949 unrest, which provoked its banning, mass arrests and trials for its leaders and associates, more intelligence efforts to sort out what the people sought, and changes in the Bataka Union's rhetoric that led British analysts in the 1950s to see the group not as a form of early, progressive, Ugandan nationalism, but as a reactionary and incoherent collection of the disgruntled and wronged.[15]

The enthusiasm of the Protectorate's intelligence efforts, though, combined with the systematic anthropological work of colonial anthropologists, provides an opportunity to look more carefully at the actual message the Bataka of the 1940s generated—who they were and what they sought. In their own speeches, telegrams, petitions, and publicity materials, Bataka activists identified themselves repeatedly as grandfathers and grandsons. This was no accident: it was a set of claims about youth and generation that had a particular moral force within Ganda politics. Grandfathers, both real and imaginary, laid claims not simply to age and respect, but to economic wisdom and stewardship. Within the context of Buganda in the 1940s, the men who called themselves grandfathers and chided the young about politics, land sales, and betrayal, stood for a vision of Uganda's economic and social life as something that must be nurtured and sustained, not invested in, developed, or consumed. In the famous (banned) 1944 pamphlet *Buganda Nyaffe,* one self-identified grandfather chided the country's fathers and asserted, "[I]t is your responsibility to preserve this land which should not be fragmented until you depart from it and bequeath it to your grandchildren. . . . Money is easily expended and exhausted whereas our native land remains permanently."[16] *Buganda Nyaffe* went on to caution Baganda about the dangers of betrayal. The real risks, the pamphlet asserted, were not from the British, but from Baganda who cooperated with them, working as their "dogs" and pets in controlling the people and seizing their resources. The Bataka party managed to assert legitimacy and citizenship in both "traditional" and democratic ways by emphasizing that as a member of a clan, each Muganda had both rights and obligations, rights as inheritors of their grandfathers' land and resources and obligations to pass those resources on to the future. These rights and obligations came from the Bataka—the clans and people—rather than being given (and potentially curbed) by the king and bureaucracy. They were not a vision of "human rights" in the Northern sense, but certainly a version of human dignity in a culturally specific metaphor.

Bataka leaders called for a politics of grandfathers and grandsons that resonated with older Ganda visions of family, moral responsibility, and good behavior and went beyond any simple colonial dichotomy of "tradition" and "modernity." Living grandparents, such as Jemusi Miti, whose house was an important gathering point, provided legitimacy to activists, as they remembered a time before clan resources had been seized by those in the Buganda government who did deals with the Protectorate. Ancestors and figurative grandparents were ways of emphasizing how the resources of the country belonged to all, as everyone had grandparents, was a member of a clan, and should expect to receive something as an inheritance that they would, in their own turn, pass onward.[17] Grandparents were thus the people's guarantors.

Like the metaphor of grandfathers, the trope of grandsons, also at the core of the Bataka movement, carried substantive emotional weight. Grandsons were the inheritors of the clan and the hope for the future. But they could be good heirs for the family, as opposed to advocates for themselves, only if they were properly raised, fostered in the homes of their grandparents, shown affection but also discipline and the need for service, and taught manners that marked them as members of patrilineal clans (Bataka), rather than simply as ambitious individuals. Grandsons were important because they were vulnerable and malleable and thus able to function as resources and representatives of their clans.

A politics of grandfathers and grandsons was thus very different from one of fathers and sons. Fathers were distant and could be harsh disciplinarians. And they were often seen as struggling for their own positions—marrying, acquiring offices, developing estates. Sons, in surveys during the 1950s, regularly expressed nervousness and fear of their fathers. Traditionally, fathers had good reason to fear their sons as well, as sons pressured fathers for tuition, resources, and help that took away from a mature man's efforts to establish himself and enjoy his status and success. A politics of fathers and sons was thus a politics of competition, consumption, and demands, as both father and son sought resources, used those resources to build their own status, and made demands on the other for help, labor, and respect. It was also a politics of individuals. Grandfathers and grandsons, as political figures if not always in reality, represented benign cross-generational inheritance, cooperation, and nurture. They emphasized the power of the clan and society—Bataka—rather than the achievements of specific individuals. And they stood for a sort of power and politics that preserved human and material resources rather than consuming them in a struggle for individual prosperity, achievement, or change.

In the context of the British protectorate of Uganda, the politics of grandfathers and grandsons was indeed radical, as it condemned the greed of elite Baganda who cooperated with the British and governed Uganda, called for protection of the people's inheritance, and evoked a vision of the future rooted in Buganda's history (reinterpreted as democratic) and not British paternalistic ideas of progress. They repudiated two concepts essential to Protectorate rule: first, that Baganda were simply subjects of the kabaka and chiefs rather than citizens and members of a Ganda community; and second, that Baganda should be guided toward modernity and progress along British models. If we take the metaphor of grandfathers and grandsons seriously, we as historians thus gain a glimpse of a Ganda historical consciousness and politics that challenges standard assumptions about nationalism, socialism, citizenship, politics, and legitimacy. It offers a vision of democratic participation rooted not in opposition to colonialism and Northern power, but in an indigenous oppositional tradition of community, stewardship, inheritance, and respect.

Young Kings

Thinking about the British metaphor of adolescence illuminates colonial visions of Ugandan independence and exploring the Bataka's metaphor of a politics of grandfathers and grandsons offers insights into a local vision of rights, obligations, and citizenship. If we wish to understand Ganda ideas of innovation, restructuring ,and national power, though, it is appropriate to look at another major metaphor of generation in Buganda, that of the kabaka/king, in the context of the normative life cycle of a monarch. By looking at how sometimes-violent intense competition, struggle, and ruthless ambition were part of the socialization of individuals into both achievement and service to the king and state, we see how Ganda rejected the Northern model of vulnerable or delinquent youth in favor of a less developmental model of competitive achievement where children and youth's actions and responsibilities paralleled those of adults. Results, rather than chronological age, were all-important as observers assessed specific patterns of violence, aggression, and self-promotion. The violent struggle of the young, and especially of young kings, was a routine stage of the succession, worked out temporarily in the process of a king's maturation with the expectation that upheaval and renegotiation can be expected to recur as his kingship passes to a successor. This violence, though, was understood not simply as stage to endure but also as a time of opportunity and creativity for ambitious men.[18]

"Traditional" normative ideas of child rearing among elite Ganda families beyond the Balangira (princes) differed radically from the psychology- and social science–influenced ideas dominant in the North and used by British officials when they invoked ideas of paternalistic colonialism or late colonial adolescence. Instead, Ganda norms taught even very young children about the absolutely central importance of relationships, manners, and hierarchies, and did so not by emphasizing nurture and affection, but by making negative sanctions—both from adults and other children—crystal clear. Successful Baganda men reminisced in their life histories about the elaborate hierarchies children built and enforced. Joswa Kivu, an important 1940s radical, described how in his youth he had lived in the household of his aunt, where about thirty boys of ages of six to seventeen organized intricate structures while herding. "We elected our 'chief' by show of hands or shouting," he remembered, "and other chiefs were appointed under him. . . . 'Commoners' built grass huts for our chiefs, but every boy had the right to build himself one also. I was seven years of age at the time, but I was chosen as the Sabawali of the fourth chief in order of rank. All complaints had to pass through me before they were heard by our leader. Although I used to hear cases, I had no power to give judgment. After I had listened to the case I had to refer the matter to the chiefs above me who were allowed to pass sentence."[19] Nor was this simple playing. Children as officials judged cases, took responsibility for the loss of goats, allocated work, and even organized "fighting games," not casually, but with kings, generals, and officers. Kivu's memoir emphasized, above all else, that children made their own social worlds, worlds with real consequences. Kivu's elaborate memories fit well with descriptions of growing up in ambitious chiefly households from other members of Buganda's elite. W. P. Tamukedde, for example, was proud of being named for his grandfather, an important military leader, benefited from his father's status as a *ggombolola* and eventually *ssaza* chief, and early on expressed an interest in following in such illustrious footsteps, so that his father bought two hundred acres of land for Tamukedde when the boy was only eight years old, automatically making him a *mutongole* chief—a real one—at a markedly young age. Tamukedde emphasized that, though his father appointed a steward, "as I grew up I took keen interest in the affairs of the village and in the chiefship as a whole." The young Tamukedde was further trained for office and status by being sent to live in the household of Prince Suna, where he was disciplined in proper behavior.[20] Both Kivu and Tamukedde also attended school, but their real training was as children fostered to an important household and holding practice (and real) offices.[21]

Audrey Richards's team of anthropologists at Makerere pushed these sorts of anecdotal notes further with a survey of children and those who worked with them at some of Buganda's most elite schools. Their results delineated an approach to raising responsible children that was markedly rigorous and unromantic but widely understood as essential within Buganda's elite society. A sampling of 177 boys indicated that 54 percent of Baganda boys had been sent away from home (for fostering) before their twelfth birthdays, leaving at varying ages grouped around seven or eight, and spending an average of more than three years away from home. Richards interpreted this to mean that they had been sent away as part of early training and character formation before their years of schooling (which often took place in boarding schools). And of those who offered an opinion, 88 percent of the boys sent said that their fostering was a good thing. They had learned and experienced more of the world, becoming members of their families (probably patrilineage/*mutaka*), and not simply possessions of a mother and father, or beloved babies.[22] Richards's respondents in the 1950s saw fostering and moral training as something of an old tradition that was fading. And they regretted its loss. One survey respondent from the elite Catholic school St. Mary's Kisubi complained that "[today's youth] are being spoilt by being let so loose—being treated in a European way. They even freely use their father's chairs."[23] Harsh discipline was particularly important in the raising of elite boys. One rebellious girl at Gayaza school complained bitterly about her family's treatment of her, but voiced the conventional sentiment about boys: "Boys were accepted [*sic*] to learn hard works. To stand at attention when talking with a person old than himself and better still to kneel."[24]

Growing up, elite Baganda children experienced more than simply herding goats or serving their aunts, though. They also went to school. Schools, though, continued very culturally specific patterns of youth organizing and responsibility that occasionally resembled British models (e.g., prefects, debate teams, scouting, sports) but above all reinforced basic Ganda lessons about hierarchy, group membership, and competitions. Hierarchies within a given school might differ from those outside its bounds—Tamukedde, for example, gleefully remembered how Prince Muteesa, soon to be crowned as Muteesa II, had swept his cubicle for him at King's College, Budo[25]—but they were carefully delineated by youth who understood ranking and hierarchy as real and worthwhile, whatever their attitude toward the British colonizers. A 1941 Budo school club that called itself "Nazi" (it was recognized as legitimate by school sponsors as it asserted that "Nazi" meant coconut in Kiswahili, and that its members were interested in boxing and social activities, not politics) nevertheless apparently felt the need to organize around officers (unfortunately titled "Hitler," "Himmler" and "Goering") and seek official school recognition.[26] And school clubs of a more respectable variety offered clear and smooth connections with the adult world of work and officialdom, connections emphasized by both the Old Budonians and the Old Boys of Saint Mary's Kisubi, clubs of elite school alumni with powerful social and financial connections.[27]

Autobiographies of the elite, and materials from surveys intended to ferret out information about Ganda ideas of leadership training, provide a vision of what it meant for a child to mature in Buganda which differed starkly from the vision implied in the literature on adolescence, of a youth seeking to find himself at a time between childhood and adulthood, with uncertain status and fragile economic resources. Elite Ganda youth, at least in "traditional" terms, had no business being adolescents or even children. Instead, they were on a clear route to the connections, roles, and responsibilities that enmeshed them in clan, social group, patrons, and competitors, within which they would define themselves for their entire adult lives. They were junior adults, not different in kind from their seniors, simply not as far along the path.[28]

Without the Northern view of children as helpless, needing protection, nurture, and guidance to mature as moral and social individuals, Ganda norms for elite youth seem to have expected levels of violence, sexuality, volatility, and ambition that sometimes shocked and dismayed Christian missionaries. Ganda seniors, despite the occasional grumbling about what youth were up to, seem to have understood violence, sexual activity, and ambition as ordinary and expected among elite youth. Such practices and attitudes did not block a future of achievement and power and might indeed foreshadow success. The structure of kingship, with a regular pattern of succession by a young king who rocked the kingdom and only with maturity settled down, seems to have adapted to and perhaps taken advantage of this vision of elite youth volatility as normative rather than a violation. Pulling together comments on this from surveys, one of the East African Institute of Social Research (EISR) researchers noted that they had effectively been told repeatedly that "[w]e sink all differences and support the king because, though he may be a nasty young man, he represents Buganda. . . . [we] condoned, and even admired, the Kabaka's cruelty, not just because anything he did was legitimate, but rather because the absolute, common end was the expansion of Buganda and a fierce Kabaka served and embodied that end."[29]

Drawing their examples from precolonial history, stories of Buganda's past have observed repeatedly that not only was the succession period after the death of one king and before the installation of the new one dangerous as a time of no law,[30] but the period of the young king was also potentially rocky, likely to be full of military action, sexual alliances, and innovations in the kingdom's structures and relationships. In the process, a successful young king, like Muteesa I in the nineteenth century, could expand his kingdom geographically and demographically in conquering new lands, capturing clients, cattle, and women.[31] He could kill his brothers as potential rivals, and demand women from the clans of Buganda and from among the captives of his wars. And he could renegotiate basic structural elements of the kingdom—not simply things such as who held what office, but the balance of power between clan heads and appointed chiefs, structures of taxation, land allocation, education systems, and trading initiatives. Muteesa I, who reigned from the mid-1850s until his death in 1884, was perhaps the best exemplar of the idea of kings as dangerously innovative and able to use the innovation and volatility of youth in their early years but shifting to other means as they aged. Muteesa's youth was popularly remembered as so violent and disruptive that he had to apologize to his people, change his name, and begin to marry his sisters off to his clients as an unprecedented form of compensation.[32] Those years, though, allowed him to deal successfully with Swahili traders and European missionaries, importing new weaponry to simultaneously modernize the kingdom's armaments and make them pay by allocating guns to elephant-hunting adventurers such as Semei Kakungulu.[33]

While Northern anthropologists and historians have emphasized the bureaucratic structure of the Ganda kingdom, Ganda historians both academic and popular have emphasized the ways in which succession and inheritance of young kings remade the kingdom with each generation, avoiding any calcification. In Kiwanuka's history, wars of expansion (mostly against Bunyoro) and succession (between brothers) shaped a pattern of kabakaship that demanded any kabaka be a warrior, not simply a statesman. Successful warfare, further, allowed a new king to reward his followers with the new lands and loot of conquest, putting together a corps of chiefs and officials to counterbalance the grandfathers and Bataka elders who held older areas of the country and subscribed to older norms.[34] Expanding kingdoms, too, offered new opportunities that leaders took advantage of. Kiwanuka noted the implications of early conquests by Ssakabaka Mawanda and Junju, which seized control over rich iron deposits and skilled ironworkers. Buganda's fighters also conquered lands with cattle, which could be easily distributed among the winners. And beyond the tusks of elephants in conquered areas, the king acquired the power to grant permission to hunt them, for which applicants paid. Even new manufacturing skills arrived in Buganda as a result of these conquests—not just better ironware, but better barkcloth, new grains to supplement *matooke,* and so on.[35]

And all this warfare and its spin-off innovations both economic and social—even in the nineteenth century, as sources improve—was associated in the minds of Ganda observers with youth. An anonymous Ganda author wrote a particularly articulate discussion of this, citing his father, and concluding that Buganda needed war when:

> 1. "the country was in poverty or needed more cattle";
>
> 2. "the country had lots of young men who might cause trouble, the way to get rid of them was to declare war; some would be killed and others would return back rich in cattle and women which they have plundered from other tribes";
>
> 3. "if there was a rival chief with Katikiro [prime minister] whom he wished to get rid of he may cunningly suggest to Kabaka to declare war and give command to that rival young man; if he returned he would become a good man as he would be rich enough; if he died that would be the easiest way of getting rid of him";
>
> 4. "if there was a new chief who was not rich enough the Katikiro might suggest to the Kabaka or even the Kabaka might appoint him as a General to raid a tribe and if he was successful he came back rich with cattle and women.
>
> "I may add here that at present [1950s] Uganda is in time where many young men are badly in need of getting rich quickly this would have been appropriate time—in older days to make a war to any tribe in order to get rid of the most ambitious young men or to make them rich if they were successful in the war."[36]

Of the stated reasons for war, all but one (chiefs who were not rich enough) were explicitly or implicitly associated with youth and succession. And Ganda elders who remembered their years in the civil war under Mwanga's explicitly violent and disruptive rule were remarkably mild in their assessments of those years and of Mwanga's prospects as a king. Reverend Bartolomeyo Zimbe, for example, despite being a Christian who described with pride both how he had participated in the end of the slave trade and given up a chiefship in favor of the ministry, offered a description of the young Kabaka Mwanga that differed starkly from critical historians' observations: Mwanga, he argued, had been a very good friend to the kingdom's young men. In Zimbe's history, Mwanga was a violent but promising young ruler who struck out against the Christians because they threatened to remove the young men whom he saw as key to his establishment of control. Zimbe acknowledged that Mwanga was violent—beating Apolo Kaggwa, sending the youth that was "second in command of the palace" off to be castrated when he failed in his obedience, and ordering a killing of the young boys who "learned religion" as they were causing trouble and in effect rebelling against the kabaka.[37] But Zimbe also remembered that Mwanga sent out young raiders who despoiled even grandparents, and after successful raids established *bitongole* chiefships of young men, clients of Mwanga, rather than his father, mother, brothers, or sisters. "We the young men indeed had freedom during this reign," Zimbe recalled. Even when Mwanga needed a general, he was sensible enough to consult his soldiers rather than precedent. Despite all the destruction and warfare Mwanga's violence unleashed, Zimbe emphasized that "[t]he fact that Kabaka Mwanga was brought back to his throne three times is a very sure sign of the love for him."[38] And (somewhat to the anthropologist's dismay) Mwanga, and the love people had for him, came up repeatedly in interviews about the deportation of Muteesa II in the 1950s. Muteesa II was widely viewed as "just like Mwanga" in a variety of ways—unable to love, violent, hanging around with the young, and unable to get on with elders, but also a man with "shining eyes" so that one could not look away.[39]

Violence, sexual adventurism and abuses, and genuine failures of judgment were part of what one expected in a young king, and like it or not, they were not understood by most Ganda observers as a reason to depose the king or change the system. Ganda observers, both in the time of Mwanga and of Muteesa II, rejected the sorts of prudery and disciplined standards put forward by Northern missionaries and government agents. Instead, they saw young kings, in all their violence and misrule, as the remaking of the kingdom. And a kingdom without this time of violence, exuberance, and experimentation was a fearsome prospect—it would be controlled by old men and dwindle in old men's schemes and conservatism. The chaotic violence of the transition meant both generational turnover, and individual opportunity. Mwanga's civil wars provided the context for Semei Kakungulu, Apolo Kaggwa, and others, to emerge as powerful, innovative leaders. In the turmoil around young Muteesa II's exile, activists from across the political spectrum, from Amos Sempa to E. M. K. Mulira, Apolo Kirondo, and others struggled to emerge as the new spokespeople and leaders of Buganda. The turmoil of a young king's reign—which encouraged selfishness and ambition, separated individuals and families, and foregrounded martyrs and diplomats—was important to the kingdom in ways that were distinct from the visions of stewardship and continuity put forward by Bataka and activists who emphasized grandsons as the inheritors of their grandfathers' resources and the hopes of their families.

In turmoil and danger, actual or political warfare, young men in a time of new kings vied for offices and scrambled for economic resources. In pursuing individual goals, they often trampled on the larger collectives of elders, clans, and families. In Mwanga's time, Semei Kakungulu, Apolo Kaggwa, and others remade Buganda. In Mutesa II's time, Kivu, E. M. K. Mulira, Ssemakula Mulumba, Apolo Kironde, Ernesiti Kalibala, and many others sought to do likewise not as delinquent adolescents (a category that made no sense in the context of Ganda tolerance for hierarchy, violence, sexuality, and ambition among the young) but as individuals whose visions were not simply ones of collective national benefits, clan solidarities, and tradition, but of achievement, respect, position, and leadership—making names for themselves in ways that would position them as the great men of their generation.

Thinking with Youth

Youth and generational change are categories that historians and anthropologists often consider obvious and natural. We think we know youth when we see it. And we assume that the problem of generational change is fairly universal in a species that is born, socialized to maturity, and socializes the next generation to inherit. This set of assumptions about the "naturalness" of a category is very similar to the assumptions historians once made about sex and gender: it exists and is basic. Even within Northern models of the life cycle, though, ideas of youth, parental power, and change may be reshaped by the rise of new social science ideas of institutions and of the value placed on self-formation and individuality as opposed to family roles. Liberal imperialists thus found in modern visions of adolescence an ideal progressive metaphor for the tumult of Ugandans' politics as Baganda rejected ideas of colonial paternal guidance. The metaphor of adolescence allowed them to fight—if they even perceived—the creativity and diversity of Ganda activists' initiatives as the Bataka invoked indigenous models of community and inheritance, rights and responsibilities in a vision of popular ownership of a democratic nation with long historical roots. And it privileged order—a progressive order at that—over the intense ferment, uncertainty, danger, and opportunity that Baganda had historically associated with young kings and dynastic transition.

When I first started looking at Ugandan history, back in the 1980s, I was struck by the way colonial officials, missionaries, and Baganda discussed gender and sexuality. Missionaries in particular were intent on seeing women and sex as either being good—promoting effective motherhood and nurturance within basically monogamous relations—or bad and shameful. Baganda, though, and the colonial officials they influenced, proved remarkably resistant to the Northern-style moralizing of basic gender and sex categories. My early work on syphilis suggested some of the reasons why such an obvious, natural set of categories about women and sex failed to translate directly into Ugandan policy.[40] And my more recent look at Eastern Ugandan women suggested that colonial and mission categories of women could be rewritten in a context where local realities challenged Northern images of women's essential characteristics.[41] Here, I suggest that another equally simple, obvious, and natural category—youth and generation—suffers from similar problems. An analysis in which youth or adolescents are understood as inherently timeless even while times change risks missing the creative contestation over the category itself.[42] Instead therefore of marking out good youth (progressive, nation-building, education-oriented, innocent/uncorrupt, and productive) versus delinquent youth (violent, selfish, destructive, far too numerous, and poor), it is more interesting to ask how else we can think about youth and generation, drawing on local, indigenous models, and paying close attention to the politics and values delineated with our models of what youth is, should be, and can achieve.

Above all, though, in looking at youth through the eyes of liberal imperialists, Ganda activists, and historians of Ganda kingship, I see metaphors and ideas of youth that differ so radically that they fundamentally undermine any effort to see youth as a natural category with logical and straightforward consequences. Even efforts to produce a slightly more complicated model—looking at youth as alternatively progressive and hopeful to those seeking a just and democratic future, or as disruptive, violent, and demanding, undermining order and producing chaos—fail to fit the historical perspectives described above. Instead, perspectives on youth from Buganda included the colonialists' progressive ideas of adolescence that emphasized the individuality of Ganda actors in a time when Ganda politics was emphasizing integration and cooperation against the British. One of the most democratic and reformist threads of Ganda politics emerged through an explicit linking of grandsons and youth to elders and the community of Bataka, rather than to progressive and individualistic colonial politics. And the historical narratives offered by Baganda from a variety of generations rejected childhood and youth as a protected category of vulnerability in favor of seeing it as potentially, in a context of kingship, a sort of violence that shaped individuals' competition and ambition into forces that ultimately strengthened the king and Buganda's resources as a state, in opposition to the moral and communal connectedness of the clans and family.

Few actual youth show up in this essay. Here, I have written about metaphors, ideas, ideals, and concepts of social order. Partly, this is for a practical reason: when I have written specifically about individuals portrayed as youth, I have often been unable to determine how old they actually were. But even in autobiographical narratives of individuals such as W. P. Tamukedde or Joswa Kivu, where individuals born to Christian families did know their ages, and offered memoirs of maturation that make it possible to work out the individual's age at a given time, chronological age often failed to fit social age in terms of employment, responsibilities, status in family and inheritance, and so on. Thus Joswa Kivu was born in 1895, inherited his father's lands and became a chief at age ten, organized a successful strike as a schoolboy, worked as a county chief's clerk when he was fifteen, and subsequently enrolled at King's College Budo, where he was considered rather young. After a varied career, he "decided to become more active in politics" in his thirties, while working as a driver in Kampala, and was a major force in the 1945 general strike (especially in his telling of events). Though arithmetic suggests he was fifty by the time of the strike, he was nevertheless a leader of young men and something of a youth himself compared to senior men such as his uncle, Jemusi Miti.[43] There seems to have been no dramatic transition between childhood and adulthood, as adult responsibilities and resources arrived early, his involvement in politics and labor began before his teens, and his status as a client of senior men persisted into his fifties. W. P. Tamukedde, born a generation later in 1919, described a similar trajectory of important responsibilities begun early and a status as a client that persisted even into his years as a chief and authority.

Real youths, as individuals, were important to history. But they were important as Muteesa I, Mwanga, Apolo Kaggwa, Muteesa II, Joswa Kivu, W. P. Tamukedde, E. M. K. Mulira, and so on. The category of youth connected to these men's lives and historical significance only occasionally and tactically, and often for those who were not especially young, be they colonial missionaries, educators, officials, or Ganda activists.

The concept of late colonial Buganda as an adolescent nation is a vivid one for historians today, just as it was for progressive Ganda activists and colonial planners in the 1940s and 1950s. But it is not a simple, natural, or hegemonic metaphor able to illuminate all aspects of the political turmoil of late colonial Buganda. Baganda—and Ugandans—have deployed multiple ideas of youth and generation as they have both proclaimed and challenged their country's policies and political leadership. Youth, adolescence, and generation, like gender, must be understood by historians as political labels with varied associations used by constituencies who may contend violently as they use these concepts to mark out "natural" qualities and moral expectations.

Notes

1. R. Kakembo, *An African Soldier Speaks* (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1946), 44.

2. Ibid.

3. For examples, Bishop of Uganda to the Archbishop, 30 October 1943, and Cyril Uganda, "The Budo Disturbance" [undated], CMS Archives, Birmingham University (hereafter CMS), G3 A7 d1, G3 A7/e 1; Denis Herbert [headmaster, Budo school] to Hooper (CMS), 15 May 1943, CMS G3 A7/e 1; Ssemakula Mulumba to Bishop Stuart, 26 July 1948, Fisher Papers, 49:380–88, Archbishop of Canterbury's archives, Lambeth Palace.

4. Efforts by specific British officials, such as acting Provincial Commissioner J. R. P. Postlethwaite, to encourage retirements could provoke articulate rejections at the highest levels. See, for example, Kabaka Daudi Chwa to Mr E. B. Jarvis, 9 January 1926, A/G Box 259, London, School of Oriental and African Studies, Council of British Missionary Societies Archives (hereafter CBMS), which complained that Postlethwaite was "too anxious to get rid of my old and trusted Chiefs and Advisors . . . and he even exhibits open dislike towards them. His present policy appears to be the wholesale dismissal of my old chiefs and the appointment in their place of his young native favourites, he advocates this principle so openly that naturally all the young educated natives flock round him, while my old and important chiefs naturally avoid him. In order to further his policy he has shewn marked favour towards all and sundry young educated as well as uneducated natives; and in certain instances he has even gone as far as to invite them to tea and to discuss with them all the confidential and important matters affecting the Native Government of Buganda and then promise to secure them appointments or promotions to some of the most important posts in the Native Government. . . . I have every reason to believe that there is no question or subject of a confidential nature affecting the Native Government, which he discusses with me or my Ministers, which he does not disclose to his young native friends, with the natural result that all the important questions affecting the policy of the Native Government are talked about in the streets even before we have had time to discuss or deal with them in the Lukiiko. From the foregoing, it is quite easy to understand that this policy is the direct cause of the endless trouble and difficulties which confront me and my Ministers in the matter of appointment or promotion of my chiefs."

5. Bishop of Uganda to the Archbishop, 30 October 1943, CMS G3 A7 d1.

6. In Buganda, after all, the British protectorate was established in the Uganda Agreement of 1900, a treaty effectively negotiated by a faction of the Ganda elite to end the civil war. And in the early years of British Uganda, Ganda administrators, generals, clergy, teachers, and even traders had been prominent in administering not simply Buganda, but the protectorate as a whole, especially in the north, in Bunyoro, and the east. The most successful examples of this were Jemusi Miti in Bunyoro, and Semei Kakungulu in the east. See J. Miti, "History of Buganda," English version, Files 1–3, Makerere University Library AR MI 8/3; M. Twaddle, *Kakungulu and the Creation of Uganda* (London: James Currey, 1993).

7. For U.S. examples, see N. Richardson, ed., *The Religious Education of Adolescents* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1918); J. L. Alexander, *The Sunday School and the Teens: The Report of the Commission on Adolescence (authorized by the San-Francisco Convention of the International Sunday School Association)* (New York: Association Press, 1913), and J. L. Alexander, *The Teens and the Rural Sunday School, Being the Second Volume of the Report of the Commission on Adolescence* (New York: Association Press, 1914). British sources include Edward Arthur Burroughs (Bishop of Ripon), "Education and Religion," a course of lectures given in the Bristol Cathedral, 1924; E. F. Braley, *Sir Hobbard de Hoy: The Religious Education of the Adolescent* (London: Macmillan, 1920).

8. A cursory search on WorldCat or JSTOR identifies enough of this literature to make it clear that any professional educational policymaker in the English-speaking world of the 1930s or after would be exposed to the central concept of adolescent, and the notion of managing it as a dangerous period of human development. See, for example, "Report of the Consultative Committee on the Education of the Adolescent" (London, 1926) and the articles and book reviews of publications such as *The American Journal of Sociology, Child Development, Social Forces,* and the *Journal of Educational*

Sociology. Sociologists' materials went to a wider interested audience in textbooks and journals such as *Scientific Monthly* and *School Review.*

9. David Leary, personal communication, June 2006.

10. An obvious example is Rudyard Kipling's "White Man's Burden"; and I discuss mission paternalism in colonial Zimbabwe in C. Summers, *From Civilization to Segregation: Social Ideals and Social Control in Southern Rhodesia* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994), esp. 262–63.

11. See preceding chapter, Richard Waller, "Bad Boys in the Bush? Disciplining Murran in Colonial Maasailand."

12. A. I. Richards, interviewing the "old man" in the presence of the chief, 3 February 1951, Mutuba III, AIR Fieldnotes from Busiro land survey, London School of Economics, Audrey Richards Papers (hereafter LSE, Richards Papers), 6/18.

13. See the correspondence in Public Record Office, London (PRO), CO 531/141.

14. On the moral significance of grandfathers and grandsons in the politics of the 1940s, see C. Summers, "Grandfathers, Grandsons, Morality, and Radical Politics in Late Colonial Buganda," *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 38, no. 3 (2005): 427–47. This discussion draws on my analysis in that piece.

15. D. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda* (1961; London: Oxford University Press, 1997), 124. The published literature on the Bataka movement is thin and rests principally on D. A. Low's work and his anonymous journalism for *The Times* (of London). Low had the advantage of proximity to events. See D. A. Low, *Buganda in Modern History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), and D. A. Low and C. Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule, 1900–1953* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960). Scholars such as T. V. Sathyamurthy, *The Political Development of Uganda: 1900–1986* (Aldershot, UK: Gower, 1986), 300–346, and S. R. Karugire, *A Political History of Uganda* (Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), 123–70, offer little hint of additional sources. Working with other sources now declassified, my articles on the Bataka include "Grandfathers, Grandsons," cited above; "Radical Rudeness: Ugandan Social Critiques in the 1940s," *Journal of Social History* 39, no. 3 (2006): 741–70; and "Young Africa and Radical Visions: Revisiting the Bataka in Buganda, 1944–54" (2004 draft paper, presented in various seminars). G. Thompson's *Governing Uganda: British Colonial Rule and Its Legacy* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2003) covers the same time period, but with a very different focus.

16. D. S. K. Musoke, "Buganda Nyaffe, 1944," in *Mind of Buganda,* ed. D. A. Low (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 119.

17. For an indication of just how powerful this expectation was, see the negotiations over the Uganda Agreement of 1900. Even in the act of making the Agreement (which was subsequently seen as a betrayal by many Baganda) the kingdom's leaders explicitly noted the need to preserve land and resources for the youth who married and, by implication, their children (The Regents of Buganda to F. J. Jackson, 16 January 1900, in Low, *Mind of Buganda,* 35).

18. See Richard Reid, "Arms and Adolescence: Youth, Warfare, and Statehood in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Africa," in this volume for a discussion of the vigor and violence associated with Kabaka Mutesa I's youth and more broadly with other successions to youthful kingship.

19. J. Kivu, "Autobiography," LSE, Richards Papers, 6/16.

20. W. P. Tamukedde, "My Life as a Chief and a District Commissioner," in *Uganda's First Republic,* ed. A. F. Robertson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 53–75.

21. Ibid.

22. These statistics are not rigorous. Variability from school to school was huge (at Aggrey Memorial; for example, boys were generally sent away at three to five years of age, for around three years). Their value is that they hint at assumptions and understandings about childhood and training that differ markedly from bourgeois Northern norms, more closely resembling British aristocratic or elite ideas ("Discipline and Attitudes to Authority in Buganda Schools" 4 February 1956, LSE, Richards Papers, 6/26).

23. Survey response, St. Mary's School Kisubi. Respondents ranged from nineteen to twenty-three years in age. Of the thirteen respondents, twelve agreed with the notion of disciplining children sharply because punishments "made better characters" (LSE, Richards Papers, 6/27).

24. Florence Namulier, Gayaza, survey response [1956], LSE, Richards Papers, 6/28. Other girls also discoursed on the importance and enforcement of kneeling.

25. Tamukedde, "My Life as a Chief and a District Commissioner," 55.

26. See, for discussion, C. Summers, "'Subterranean Evil' and 'Tumultuous Riot,' in Buganda: Authority and Alienation at King's College, Budo, 1942," *Journal of African History* 47, no. 1 (2006): 93–113, esp. 107.

27. I discuss this more in C. Summers, "Catholic Action and Ugandan Radicalism: Political Activism in Uganda 1930–1950," *Journal of Religion in Africa* 39, no. 1 (2009): 1–31.

28. They fit better, in other words, with the image of young children as simply small adults that P. Aries, controversially, applied to the "pre-modern" world in *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (New York: Vintage, 1962). This characterization potentially applies to girls as well as boys, though evidence for girls is scantier, and sexuality and potential fertility were probably more central to girls' efforts to establish status in new marriages and elite polygynous households. See, for hints of this, Nakanyike Musisi, "Women, 'Elite Polygamy' and Buganda State Formation," *Signs* 16, no. 4 (1991): 757–86.

29. Comments (L. A. Fallers?) on "The Political Values of the Ganda," LSE, Richards Papers, 5/15 (undated, c. 1953). The commentator emphasized that fighting against a kabaka—such as Mwanga during the civil war—did not seem to have been considered illegitimate. People did not see a kabaka as inherently special. They demanded results. And if they did not receive them, in loot, for example, they sought a new king.

30. Such statements were probably reflections of fears and ideology, not reality, but they were voiced and recorded by anthropologists even before the kabaka crisis gave them a new relevance. See, for example, L. Mair, *An African People in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1934, 1965), 178. See also Richard Reid, "Arms and Adolescence: Male Youth, Warfare, and Statehood in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Africa," chapter 1 in this volume.

31. H. Hanson, *Landed Obligation: The Practice of Power in Buganda* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003), esp. 78–104, describes the expanding kingdom, and the ways conquest and loot transformed relations within the elite hierarchy of king and chiefs, and the wider web of the elite's connection with ordinary people. The centrality of young kings to this expansion can be seen in M. S. M. Kiwanuka, *A History of Buganda: From the Foundation of the Kingdom to 1900* (New York: African Publishing House, 1972), which emphasized the succession conflicts as important in restructuring the kingdom in the nineteenth century.

32. See, for example, A. Kalule Sempa, "A Short History of Buganda at the Advent of Whitemen," 23 July 1954, Sir (William) Keith Hancock Papers, 29/1/6, Institute of Commonwealth Studies (hereafter Hancock Papers, ICS), London, Sempa argued that when Mutesa I became king he was cruel and self-important, but "for a new King cruelty might have been the only recourse by which he could break in reactionary tendencies on the part of some of his subjects, for later on, after he had gained control . . . , he changed his name to "Mutesa" meaning Peace-maker." See also Rev. Bartolomayo Musoke Zimbe, "Buganda ne Kabaka: Ebyafayo Eby'obwa Kabak bwe Buganda" (Mengo: Gambuze Printing and Publishing, 1939), translated by Simon Musoke, 40: Zimbe gives a list of the relevant marriages and summarized: "That was the way in which Kabaka came to terms with his people by giving away princesses to them."

33. See Twaddle, *Kakungulu and the Creation of Uganda.*

34. See, e.g., Kiwanuka, *History of Buganda,* 98–100, 108, et passim. A. I. Robertson emphasized, "It has been said so many times in the vernacular literature that a king made war to stop his chiefs fighting," but Robertson contested this interpretation, emphasizing instead the role of the king's wars in building state power—both military and economic (A. I. Robertson, Notes on Wrigley, "Changing Economic Structure" [195?], LSE, Richards Papers).

35. Kiwanuka, *History of Buganda,* 149–50.

36. [Author confidential: possibly W. P. Tamukedde], "Leadership Study: The Powers of the Katikiro in Buganda in the Past," Hancock Papers, ICS 29/1/6/4. The author was explaining what he had been told by his father.

37. According to Zimbe, Kaggwa survived because he was too useful to kill. And Mwanga ordered the death of the person who botched the castration of his former servants, two of whom died. Bishop Hannington, in this version, was killed for violating the king's orders. And Mwanga's actions were all in a context in which he had been warned by the Arabs that Europeans "begin by saying they are teaching, and end by ruling." Mwanga's violence, for Zimbe, was a desperate effort to preserve his people. Converts were dangerous. Hearing of yet another elite young man's absence from court for prayer, Mwanga reportedly complained: "With whom shall I rule if the Katikiro's son Muwafu whom I expected to put in his father's place has taken the religion?" (Zimbe, "Buganda ne Kabaka," 141–43).

38. Many historians would provide a different explanation, probably emphasizing a combination of realpolitik, a shortage of heirs, and factions within the oligarchy. What's striking here is not the accuracy of Zimbe's judgment, but the fact that despite his careful description of Mwanga's violence, abuse of friend and enemy, and provocation of violent civil war, the young kabaka was nevertheless beloved and should not be condemned.

39. For examples, Joshua Kamulegeya (The Mugema), 28 June 1954, LSE, Richards Papers, 7/5; and talk with Kyingi 10 November 1954, LSE, Richards Papers, 7/6.

40. C. Summers, "Intimate Colonialism: The Imperial Production of Reproduction in Uganda 1907–1925," *Signs* 16, no. 4 (1991): 787–807.

41. C. Summers, "Whips and Women: Forcing Change in Eastern Uganda during the 1920s," paper presented at the Global Partners Symposium, University of Nairobi, July 2000, available at http://www.global-partners.org/africa/2000/papers/csummers/. The paper explores how local colonial officials and Mill Hill missionaries articulately and persistently advocated violence against women as a progressive development strategy, rejecting imperial ideals of a "civilized" restraint on the corporal punishment of women.

42. Consider, for example, Dave Eaton's thoughtful discussion in "Youth, Cattle Raiding, and Generational Conflict along the Kenya-Uganda Border" (chapter 2, this volume) of youthful cattle raiding, which reclaims the history of youthful contention with elders over bridewealth accumulation and opportunities. But Eaton concludes that "[t]he relationship between the elders and the young warriors in the North Rift has not been transformed recently" without exploring how people understood these categories and who they included.

43. Kivu, "Autobiography"; Tamukedde, "My Life as a Chief and a District Commissioner."