Abstract
In these chapters we have seen that neuropsychological discourse has been advanced by the use of metaphors from telecommunications, control systems engineering, computer science, holography, and other developments in parallel distributed processing (Pribram, Chapter 2); that theoretical discussions of the emotions have revolved around metaphors of inner feelings, physiological responses, vestiges of animal nature, diseases of the mind, driving forces, and social roles (Averill, Chapter 3); that treatments of motivation have portrayed the human person as a pawn, an agent, a natural entity, an organism, or a machine (McReynolds, Chapter 4); that a vast array of cognitive metaphors have been insinuated into a variety of domains in psychology and related sciences, ranging from the metaphors of "vigilance" and "defense" in the field of perception through the "access skeletons" and "flavors" of artificial intelligence (Hoffman, Cochran, & Nead, Chapter 5); that separate traditions proposing "reproductive" versus "productive" theories of cognition have evolved from diverse views of consciousness as either a passive mirror of reality or an active molder of experience (Bruner & Feldman, Chapter 6); that there is a rich history of behaviorist metaphors, extending from Descartes's reflected spirits and Pavlov's psychic reflexes through Tolman's mazes, Hull's machines, and Skinner's selection by consequences (Smith, Chapter 7); that whereas traditional discussions of social groups have typically utilized organismic, animalistic, and physicalistic metaphors, recent social scientific discourse has tended to view social life from the metaphoric perspectives of the animal laboratory, mechanistic regulation, meaningful relations, and systems theory (Gergen, Chapter 8); that there is a long history of categorizing and reifying unwanted conduct through the use of "mental illness," "hysteria," "schizophrenia," "hallucination," and other such loosely warranted metaphors (Sarbin, Chapter 9); and that an analysis of the historical roots of modern associationism, besides revealing the importance of cultural context in the articulation of basic psychological metaphors, suggests that a fuller understanding of the role of metaphor will involve a broader consideration of metaphor's place within psychological discourse as a whole (Danziger, Chapter 10).
Document Type
Book Chapter
Publication Date
1990
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 1990 Cambridge University Press. This chapter first appeared in Metaphors in the History of Psychology.
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Recommended Citation
Leary, David E. "Metaphor, Theory, and Practice in the History of Psychology." Metaphors in the History of Psychology. Ed. David E. Leary. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990. 357-367. Print.