Abstract

This article discusses the main elements of the Chen Shui-bian administration's cross-Strait policy, analyzes the policy's key domestic and international determinants, and offers a preliminary assessment on the policy. Chen's crossStrait policy adheres to Taiwan's "economic security" approach to national security. Whereas the previous Lee administration sought to safeguard national security by reducing economic dependence on the mainland, Chen's policy strives to normalize cross-Strait economic relations as an important pillar to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Although Chen has accelerated his political maturation, his China policy continues to be constrained by various factors (most importantly, the PRC's insistence on a "one China" precondition for cross-Strait talks) and has succeeded more in reducing tensions and maintaining the status quo than in reaching a modus vivendi with the mainland. A benign stalemate without imminent military threat has ensued. Diplomatic setbacks, electoral considerations, and growing frustration with Beijing's spuming of his good will led Chen to move toward to a hardened position, such as his "Taiwan and China, each side is a country across the Taiwan Strait" formula in August 2002.

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

Fall 2002

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2002, St. John's University Institute for Asian Studies. This article first appeared in American Asian Review: 20:3 (2002), 91-124.

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