Abstract
Intentional definitions of argument, i.e. the conclusion being intended to follow from the premises, abound. Yet, there are numerous problem cases in which we appear to have arguments, but no intention. One way to try to avoid these problem cases is to appeal to acts, in which case one has to give up on the repeatability of arguments. One can keep repeatability and intentions if one resorts to act types, but then it appears that the problem cases re-emerge.
Document Type
Book Chapter
ISBN
9781848902848
Publication Date
2018
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2018 College Publications. This book chapter first appeared in Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Volume II.
Please note that downloads of the chapter are for private/personal use only.
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Recommended Citation
Goddu, G.C. "Against the Intentional Definition of Argument." In Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Volume II, edited by Steve Oswald and Didier Maillat, 339-348. Milton Keynes: College Publications, 2018.