Abstract
This comment will deal with the concept of freedom of the press within the context of recent Supreme Court rulings which have directly or indirectly involved definitions of the role of the organized press in the governmental framework established by the Constitution. Specifically, the focus will be in the areas of the law dealing with defamation, testimonial privilege and the fair trial-free press controversy. The purpose will be to discern whether the Supreme Court is developing a concept of freedom of the press which is distinguishable from the general guarantee of freedom of speech and which derives its rationale from the recognition of the special institutional function of the press in a democratic society. The conclusion will summarize the results of this analysis, point out tendencies to limit the recognition of institutional press rights and discuss a theory upon which to base the recognition of a differentiated guarantee of freedom of the press.
Recommended Citation
Andrew A. Jaxa-Debicki,
Problems in Defining the Institutional Status of the Press,
11
U. Rich. L. Rev.
177
(1976).
Available at:
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol11/iss1/11